

Government Communication on Social Media: Research Foci, Domains, and Future Directions

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Abstract

The aim of this review essay is to draw attention to the diversity of work done in the field of government social media communication research. It is a rapidly developing area of study that has been approached from multiple disciplinary perspectives and a variety of research traditions. We suggest that studies of government social media communication may be broadly classified based on two characteristics: (a) whether their focus is mainly on the senders, messages, media, audiences, or effects of communication; and (b) the domains of government policy and public administration that they address. We review existing literature along this classification and conclude by suggesting fruitful directions for future research.

Keywords

government communication; government information; policy communication; political communication; public sector communication; social media

1. Introduction

Government communication is the communication of political executives and administrative officeholders. It may be conceived as a subfield of political communication (Canel & Sanders, 2012) and distinct from other subfields, such as party communication (focused on the messaging of political candidates, and electoral campaigning), parliamentary communication (focused on legislative matters and oversight of government), political journalism (focused on how political issues are represented and discussed in news media), and political activism (focused on how social movements and critical citizens try to bring about changes in government). Government communication may also be seen as a subfield of public sector communication

(Lovari & Valentini, 2020; Macnamara, 2025), which is a broader notion that also encompasses non-governmental entities such as NGOs, state monopolies, and businesses that provide public services.

Government communication essentially differs from other subfields of political and public sector communication because government officeholders and institutions wield coercive power: they can enforce laws and apply physical force, and the instructions they give can be backed by a threat or sanction (Edelman, 1971; Graber, 2003). Government communication may be used to seek compliance with a policy or demand and to legitimize and/or extend the power of an agency or individual (Hansson, 2017). Government communication can provide a public benefit such as data and information upon which citizens and businesses make decisions (e.g., financial, environmental, health-related). Moreover, in democracies, government communication can serve a transparency function and provide legitimacy via open government and truthful communication about their internal affairs such as their plans, budgets, and efficiency measures (Graber, 2003). Government communication practices are shaped and constrained by existing laws, the culture and ethics of public administration (Yudof, 1983), and the self-preservation tendencies of individuals and organizations (Hansson, 2018; Hood, 2011). As government communication is funded by taxes and performs several crucial functions in societies, it tends to be subjected to a high level of public scrutiny and research. Government communication in modern democracies is often expected to be impartial and autonomous of party politics (DePaula & Hansson, 2025; Russmann et al., 2020).

Governments disseminate and gather information and interact with citizens via various media, including print and broadcast outlets, telephone, and the internet. Since the 2000s, due to the global rise of social media usage, governments have also integrated these platforms into their communication activities. The term “social media” may have been first coined in 1994 (Aichner et al., 2021), but it is now associated with the various web technologies of user-generated content, including social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), microblogging platforms (e.g., X, previously Twitter), media sharing sites (e.g., YouTube, Pinterest), messaging applications (e.g., WhatsApp, Snapchat), and discussion/community forums (e.g., Reddit).

Government communication practices, including on social media, can be studied from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Previous reviews of social media in government (e.g., Medaglia & Zheng, 2017; Sandoval-Almazan et al., 2021) have been largely restricted to the literature on information systems, public administration, and e-government, thereby overlooking contributions from other relevant fields, such as linguistics (e.g., DePaula & Hansson, 2025; Hansson & Page, 2023; Love et al., 2023), political communication (e.g., Zhou et al., 2023), political science and international relations (e.g., Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2023), military studies (e.g., Nissen, 2015), and disaster research (e.g., Wukich, 2016).

In this essay, we provide a narrative review of the diverse scholarly literature on government communication on social media with the goal of devising a heuristic map of the field and progressing it forward. We dissect the existing academic work in terms of research focus, namely: the senders, messages, media, audiences, and effects studied. We then outline some of the domains of government communication that have received more academic attention so far. We conclude by suggesting future directions for research.

2. Foci of Government Social Media Communication Research

Communication processes can be analytically divided into elements such as senders/sources, messages, channels, recipients, and effects (Lasswell, 1948). We suggest that studies into government social media communication may be categorized based on which of these dimensions of the communication process they mainly focus on. Since the focus of the study determines the methodological choices, we also note the distinct methods employed under each category.

2.1. Senders

Sender-focused studies of government social media communication are interested in the actors (officeholders, agencies) and processes (tasks, routines, regulations) within government organizations.

Power is spread vertically between different levels of government, and accordingly, studies may focus on actors operating at either local, regional/state, national/federal, or international level. There are also two essentially different types of senders: (a) personal social media accounts of specific individuals—usually top officeholders such as presidents, prime ministers, governors, and mayors; and (b) impersonal/institutional accounts of government departments and agencies.

While research has addressed communication by government agencies at local (e.g., Bonsón et al., 2015), state (e.g., Thackeray et al., 2013), federal, and international levels (e.g., Guidry et al., 2023), differences across levels have rarely been compared (see, e.g., Zhou et al., 2023). There is also little research on the coordination of government social media communication between officials and agencies. However, a recent study of United States cities using X showed “centralized coordination nodes” from the mayor’s office mobilizing responses to the Covid-19 emergency across local agencies (Zeemering, 2021), pointing to the importance of coordination.

Social media platforms have been integrated into the communication practices of supra-national government officials as well, such as the spokespersons for the European Commission (Krzyżanowski, 2018; Özdemir et al., 2025) and the United Nations (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2023). These studies suggest that official communication on social media is increasingly individualized and personalized: Spokespersons post to personal profiles, use informal language, express emotions, and engage in positive self-presentation. The strong individualization may contribute to the downplaying of democratic concerns and undermine the institutions’ claims to “rational-legal” (depersonalized) authority.

Methodologically, sender-focused studies may involve ethnographic observation (e.g., Levenshus, 2016) as well as interviews, questionnaires, and document analysis (e.g., Criado & Villodre, 2022; Gregory, 2019; Torpan et al., 2023; Zeemering, 2021). Some studies have used regression analysis to measure the extent to which the type of institutional account had on message sharing (Bonsón et al., 2015; Sutton et al., 2020), as well as semantic network analysis to measure the degree to which different senders included political terms in their messages (Zhou et al., 2023). Social network analysis has also been used to assess the influence of political and government actors in the sharing of health information (Hagen et al., 2018).

2.2. Messages

Message-focused studies are interested in understanding the content of government communication, including the information that is propagated and the forms in which information and opinions are expressed. The two broad methodological approaches to government message analysis are content analysis (e.g., DePaula et al., 2018) and discourse analysis (e.g., Hansson & Page, 2023).

Studies of government social media messages usually employ content analysis to understand the nature and purpose of the messages. These studies either focus on a specific domain or context (e.g., emergency communication, police agencies, public health) or are more generalized. Messages are often categorized as serving either the purpose of information provision, promotion, input-seeking, or request for collaboration/participation (DePaula et al., 2018; Gruzdt et al., 2018; Mergel, 2013; Wukich, 2022). In crisis and health contexts, additional message elements are examined, for example the presence of “fear-appeal” (Yao et al., 2024) and “efficacy” related content (Guidry et al., 2023). In some studies, content analyses have focused on “themes” or “topics” of messages (Ho et al., 2024; Lwin et al., 2018) or examined message elements to assess political influences on the content (DePaula, 2023; DePaula & Hansson, 2025).

Scholars of political language and argumentation are interested in a more detailed exploration of text, talk, and images that reflect social and cultural norms and point to specific goals of the messages. For instance, discourse analysts have looked at how government actors try to legitimize their policies (Hansson & Page, 2022, 2023), how populist political leaders commit argumentative fallacies in their social media posts (Macagno, 2022), and how they may appeal to conservative audiences by evoking “a homeland threatened by the dangerous other” (Kreis, 2017, p. 607).

Discourse analysis has also been applied to describe language aggression in official social media messages. For example, President Donald Trump’s posts on X have been analyzed in terms of how he uses evaluative language to attack the character of his political opponents (A. S. Ross & Caldwell, 2020), how he promotes himself and provokes conflict (Wignell et al., 2021), and how he accuses journalists of spreading false information while spreading falsehoods himself (A. S. Ross & Rivers, 2018). Additionally, offensive uses of language and images targeted at foreign adversaries have been traced in the official diplomatic tweets of Russia and Iran (e.g., Altahmazi, 2022; Hansson, 2024). Self-presentation and “image-repair” strategies have also been examined across distinct types of government agencies (DePaula et al., 2018; Masngut & Mohamad, 2021).

2.3. Media

Media-focused studies are interested in the development and adoption of digital platforms, their affordances, the broader information and communication technology architecture, as well as the technological and legal implications of particular social media platforms for governments and the public.

The adoption of social media by government has been studied since 2010, first within the public relations and digital government literature (e.g., Avery et al., 2010; Bertot et al., 2010). Scholars imagined how new media could be used for anti-corruption practices, transparency, accountability, and efficiency, as the fast, open, and distributed nature of social media could enable individuals and institutions to analyze data and point to

issues in government processes (Bertot et al., 2010; Chun & Luna Reyes, 2012). These early studies traced the growing adoption of social media in the United States and Europe by federal, state, and local agencies (Bonsón et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2013; Mergel, 2013; Thackeray et al., 2013). The adoption process has been shaped by multiple factors such as agency innovativeness, having an internal information technology manager (Oliveira & Welch, 2013), as well as the level of e-participation and income level of the population (Guillamón et al., 2016).

Recent studies show how social media has been institutionalized in government agencies in many countries and at various levels of government (Criado & Villodre, 2022; Figenschou, 2020; Mergel, 2016; Raković & Dakić, 2024). Research suggests that Facebook and X are the major applications used in the United States and Europe (Gonçalves et al., 2015; Guillamón et al., 2016; Wukich, 2022) and in several other countries such as Mexico (Sandoval-Almazan et al., 2018), Brazil (Rodrigues et al., 2020), Israel (Yavetz & Aharony, 2023), and Malaysia (Masngut & Mohamad, 2021). The adoption of YouTube (Bonsón & Bednárová, 2018), Instagram (Malik et al., 2021), and TikTok (Babic & Simpson, 2024; Desoutter, 2025) by government agencies has also been examined. In China, much of the research is focused on government use of Weibo and WeChat (Q. Chen et al., 2020; Hou et al., 2022; Liao et al., 2020).

Each social media platform has distinct affordances, that is, possibilities for action, and distinct ways they are adopted. For example, YouTube affords the possibility to share long-form videos, whereas Instagram only enables the sharing of short videos and pictures. Both Facebook and X enable the posting of text, video, or images, and enable users to reply to the content. However, X has been found to be used more for public information (Lin & Qiu, 2013), whereas Facebook is used for “shared identities” (Spiliotopoulos & Oakley, 2020) and “social interaction” (Voorveld et al., 2018) and is associated with higher levels of privacy concern and bonding social capital (Shane-Simpson et al., 2018). A study comparing Covid-19 pandemic communication of public health agencies found more of a “data and policy orientation” for X messages, whereas Facebook showed more of a “local and personal orientation”—although the content was similar across platforms based on several dimensions (DePaula et al., 2022).

2.4. Audiences

Audience-focused studies look at audience characteristics and behavior to understand how social media users respond to and engage with government messages. Methods for exploring this include audience surveys (e.g., Wang et al., 2025), discourse analysis of audience responses (e.g., Page & Hansson, 2024), and the analysis of social media engagement metrics such as “likes” and “shares” (e.g., Haro-de-Rosario et al., 2018).

As social media adoption grows among the population, government accounts amass thousands to millions of followers. However, there are few studies examining the characteristics of audiences of government social media. From the research that has addressed this, some have found most users of local government accounts on X to be “light users” (Shwartz-Asher et al., 2016) and to be more female than male (Gonçalves et al., 2015). Examination of media organizations as specific types of followers has shown that in Western Europe official government accounts have a larger share of media followers compared to the accounts of heads of state (Reveilhac & Trembovelskyi, 2025).

Much of the research on government communication on social media is focused on how citizens, individuals, and/or site users respond to government content on these platforms (Gruzd et al., 2018; Malik et al., 2021; Yao et al., 2024). There are three major potential ways for users to do this: (a) share or retransmit the government post to their networks; (b) react to the content with a pre-defined emotional category, usually a like or thumbs up button, but also other emotions like sad, surprise, and anger (e.g., B. Ross et al., 2018); and (c) respond to the content in terms of comments (e.g., Hand & Ching, 2020).

Studies comparing responses to personal and institutional social media accounts in the context of health crises have shown that personal accounts of officeholders (e.g., mayor, governor) may be associated with higher message sharing than institutional accounts (Sutton et al., 2020), but both political and institutional actors may be perceived by users as influential and trustworthy in retransmitting health information (Hagen et al., 2018).

Social media users may respond to governmental posts by blaming officeholders for their incompetence, dishonesty, corruption, or indecisiveness (Hansson et al., 2022). Disaffected citizens may express blame in their comments/replies even in response to seemingly positive governmental messages, such as officeholders thanking someone (Page & Hansson, 2024). While multimedia features in messages (e.g., the use of photos, videos) were generally predictive of higher content engagement in the early days of social media, it has often been associated with less engagement in the context of more recent studies of government messages (DePaula et al., 2022; Huang et al., 2022).

2.5. Effects

Effects-focused studies are interested in the organizational and societal outcomes of government social media activity, such as how citizens' use of government social media may affect public trust in government, or how social media may improve the internal workings of the agencies.

There is evidence that when people use government social media, they may perceive the government as more trustworthy (Mansoor, 2021; Porumbescu, 2016; Song & Lee, 2016; Yuan et al., 2023). During emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the engagement with government social media accounts may increase (Lovari, 2020) as it could fill a void for the need for health and safety information and support measures of self-efficacy and response-efficacy (Tang et al., 2021). The public can help retransmit (share) government social media messages across social media networks, which can be helpful in emergency situations (Hagen et al., 2018). However, government social media messages during a crisis may also induce fear in the public (Lerouge et al., 2023).

The emergence of social media was first welcomed by scholars as potential anti-corruption tools and means to improve democracy and citizen engagement with government (Bertot et al., 2010; Mergel, 2013). While government social media accounts have been used by agency staff to answer user comments and questions, there are several limitations regarding the extent to which social media use can improve government accountability and civic engagement, including the profit motive of social media companies (Feeney & Porumbescu, 2021) and the difficulty of engaging in conversations with thousands and millions of followers (Lindsey et al., 2018). Ultimately, social media has been mainly adopted for information dissemination purposes rather than for citizen engagement (Lee & VanDyke, 2015; Medaglia & Zheng, 2017). Social media

use may also have little effect on internal organizational processes, such as organizational culture and communication (Roengtam et al., 2017).

Methods for studying the effects of government social media use include surveys and regression modeling (e.g., Song & Lee, 2016; Tang et al., 2021; Yuan et al., 2023) as well as interviews with government social media staff (Levenshus, 2016).

3. Domains of Government Social Media Communication

Governments formulate and implement policies in various domains, such as the economy, education, health, and so on. We suggest that studies into government social media communication may be categorized based on which policy domains they address. In this section, we outline some policy domains that have received more attention in existing academic literature.

3.1. Health and Safety

Preventing harm and keeping people safe and healthy is one of the core tasks of government. Researchers of risk, health, and crisis communication and crisis informatics (Guidry et al., 2023; Hagen et al., 2018; Reuter et al., 2018; Reuter & Kaufhold, 2018) have documented the adoption of social media in emergency and disaster risk management for various purposes, generally showing how authorities use social media to (a) warn the public about hazards, such as floods and wildfires, (b) provide guidelines on how to avoid accidents and behave during emergencies, and (c) support coordination between agencies (e.g., Houston et al., 2015; Vos et al., 2018; Wukich, 2016). Institutional social media practices that may help reduce disaster vulnerability include the sharing of educational materials concerning hazards, the monitoring of citizens' concerns during crisis events, the identification of missing persons, and the recruitment and organizing of volunteers who could help people during crises (Torpan et al., 2024).

During disasters and health crises, such as a pandemic, people may be exposed to false and harmful information on social media that may lead them to make poor decisions that put their lives at risk (Hansson et al., 2020, 2021). Therefore, governments may develop communication practices that help to reduce the spread and harmful effects of misinformation to keep people safe (Lovari, 2020; Torpan et al., 2021).

3.2. Law Enforcement

Social media has been adopted in criminology and policing (Ralph et al., 2024). Police communication on social media may serve a variety of purposes, including informing the public about problems (e.g., major road accidents), issuing warnings of immediate threats (e.g., a terrorist alert), advising people (e.g., regarding crime prevention and data security), appealing for help (e.g., in seeking a criminal suspect or missing person), recruiting new police officers, and publicizing police initiatives and successes (Babic & Simpson, 2024; Fielding, 2023; Jungblut et al., 2024; B. Ross et al., 2018). Police may also use digital platforms to carry out targeted influence campaigns for crime prevention (Horgan et al., 2025) and conduct online surveillance to gather information about crimes, suspects, and victims (Walsh & O'Connor, 2019). Police agencies may use social media communication to enforce border security (Walsh, 2020), including using online campaigns as instruments to control immigration (Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2020).

It has been observed that social media use may “de-bureaucratize” police communication, as police organizations may communicate both through organizational and personal identities and adopt a more informal approach to public messaging (Meijer & Torenvlied, 2016; Rasmussen, 2021). While social media communication could, in principle, facilitate citizen participation in public policing and increase public trust and confidence in the police (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015; Ralph, 2022), police departments may actually struggle to engage in interaction with citizens online (Bullock, 2018; Crump, 2011) and need to overcome various structural and cultural barriers to improve their practices (Dekker et al., 2020; Ralph & Robinson, 2023).

3.3. Foreign Policy

A growing body of literature explores how governments try to engage and persuade foreign audiences via social media. Researchers have traced the “digitalization of public diplomacy,” that is, the process of ministries of foreign affairs and diplomats learning to deploy social media tools to narrate their nation’s foreign policy, launch digital media campaigns to “sell” particular international deals to foreign citizens, manage national and personal brands online, and open virtual embassies to overcome the limitations of traditional diplomacy (Bjola & Manor, 2024; Manor, 2019). Importantly, governments may also use social media to build domestic support for their foreign policy (Bjola & Manor, 2018).

Ministries of foreign affairs have become central actors that craft and disseminate messages globally via social media (Danziger & Schreiber, 2021; Manor & Segev, 2023) and use both text and images strategically to frame conflicts and wars in ways that help to legitimize their policies (Manor & Crilley, 2018).

Many researchers are increasingly concerned with the rise of “computational propaganda” (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018) and disinformation spread internationally by governments of authoritarian states, such as Russia (Freelon & Lokot, 2020; Nissen, 2015; Soares et al., 2023). For example, as part of its hostile foreign influence operations, the Russian government has been shown to employ automated agents—bots—on digital platforms to disseminate false narratives that serve the interests of President Vladimir Putin’s regime and harm Western democracies (Dawson & Innes, 2019; Doroshenko & Lukito, 2021; Marigliano et al., 2024). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also uses its social media profiles to make uncivil and aggressive statements and offend Western policymakers and diplomats (Hansson, 2024; Massa & Anzera, 2024).

3.4. Military

Governments are responsible for defending the nation against hostile and aggressive external actors and, when needed, deploying armed forces. Within military studies, social media communication has been researched under the monikers of “cyber warfare” and “information warfare.” This research shows how social media tools may be “weaponized” for the purposes of attacking an enemy or defending one’s population (Nissen, 2015; Prier, 2020; Singer & Brooking, 2018) as well as for cyberespionage (Bossetta, 2018).

Several studies have explored how soldiers represent war in their social media posts (e.g., Desoutter, 2025; Shim & Stengel, 2017). The use of social media by individual military professionals may pose security risks and governments have enforced social media policies/strategies to regulate their use (Hellman et al., 2016;

Lawson, 2014). Military personnel are also receiving new media literacy training to recognize disinformation on social media and build resilience against hostile foreign influence operations (Ventsel et al., 2024).

4. Future Directions

The review above shows that government social media communication research should be regarded as a multidisciplinary endeavor that combines theoretical insights and analytical approaches from different fields. Approaches from political science, public administration, and sociology can improve our understanding of the political, institutional, and cultural contexts where governments and citizens use social media, as well as the broader societal effects of social media communication. Approaches from linguistics and (multimodal) discourse studies can provide a more fine-grained picture of the content of government social media messaging as well as public responses to official messages. Approaches from media and information technology research help to create new knowledge about the affordances and usage patterns of communication platforms as well as the related risks, such as algorithmic manipulation and privacy concerns.

While the early studies mainly charted the overall social media adoption in government (and many still do as new platforms emerge and gain traction), later work has more often focused on the specific functions and content of government social media profiles. As of yet, relatively little has been written about the ways in which the public engages with governments online (beyond “following,” “liking,” and “sharing”) and the organizational and societal outcomes of their social media activity.

Importantly, the heuristic categories used in this review to organize the literature on government social media communication are not mutually exclusive. The proposed classification reflects significant areas of emphasis within particular pieces of research, but admittedly, a single study may address several research questions, apply mixed methods, and thus fall under multiple categories. For instance, researchers may look at both message design and audience engagement (e.g., DePaula et al., 2022; Page & Hansson, 2024) or explore the possible societal effects of audience behavior (e.g., Hagen et al., 2018). Future research might benefit from assembling multidisciplinary research teams and systematically combining more foci, for example, to explore the links between specific contexts of social media use, message content, and its effects within several policy domains.

Notably, if a study focuses on a particular sender, this tends to determine the policy domain of the study because each government agency and officeholder is tasked with developing or implementing policies within specific domains. Our review suggests that significant academic attention has been paid to government social media use within policy domains concerning health and safety, public order, and national security. There are other major domains of government policy the communication of which deserve further study, such as economics (concerning, for instance, fiscal and monetary policy, taxation, trade, regulation of businesses), social welfare (e.g., social security, welfare programs, poverty reduction, housing assistance), education (e.g., funding for schools, special education, vocational training), transportation (e.g., public transportation, traffic management), energy (e.g., renewable energy, energy efficiency), and environment (e.g., climate change). Future research could produce comparative studies of social media communication in different policy domains to facilitate the diffusion of good practices and lessons learned. Moreover, diachronic studies could detect shifts or trends in social media communication over time along each research focus and within various policy domains.

A cross-cutting issue for future research within all policy domains is how government communication on social media could better support deliberative politics, that is, democratic decision-making that involves mutual respect between participants in argumentation who seek to reach mutual understanding (Habermas, 2023). Methods of dialogic analysis (e.g., Page & Hansson, 2024) could be applied to study how people respond to government messages and how governments interact with citizens in a variety of contexts and on various topics. Moreover, there is little research on what government communication means to different groups in society and how it could improve their lives.

While social media have been discussed as technologies of democratization, they are also often associated with promotional culture and misinformation (Harsin, 2018) and even the rise of political polarization and authoritarianism (e.g., Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). There is a widespread concern that social media platforms play a role in democratic backsliding as they algorithmically amplify disinformation and extremist content (Bennett & Livingston, 2025). While government agencies have been interested in tackling false information in society, especially in health and safety contexts (e.g., Lovari, 2020; Torpan et al., 2021; Vraga & Bode, 2017), there are also concerns about governments in democratic countries spreading disinformation themselves (e.g., Pentney, 2022; A. S. Ross & Rivers, 2018). Future research could further explore the causes and forms of government misinformation on social media and its effect on public trust in government.

Politicization of government agencies—that is, officeholders moving away from their mission of serving the public interest and getting involved in party-political messaging—may have a negative impact on their social media communication practices (DePaula & Hansson, 2025; Zhou et al., 2023). Comparative and diachronic studies are needed to better understand the administrative and political factors of politicization, how agency politicization is manifested on different media platforms, and what its effects are on different audiences and, more broadly, on the quality of democratic debates in society.

Governments need social media platforms to capture people's attention, but governments also try to regulate platform companies that have become extremely powerful actors in society (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022). As social media companies gain more political power and create greater restrictions on data access, it complicates the work of government communication scholars and undermines the democratic potential of social media communication. Therefore, the study of media and information policy (including the ways to increase data transparency) remains especially relevant to the field of government communication research.

Governments have started to integrate chatbots (and other so-called artificial intelligence or machine learning tools) into their online public communication workflows, which may eliminate human roles, reduce interpersonal interactions, and transform citizen-government communication in multiple ways (Androutsopoulou et al., 2019; T. Chen & Gasco-Hernandez, 2024; T. Chen et al., 2024; Kaun & Männiste, 2025). As this is a novel and rapidly developing technology, the practices and broader societal and political effects of automated social media communication deserve critical scholarly scrutiny in the coming years.

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