Supplementary Materials

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S1. Demographic Composition of the Final Sample

Table S1.1. *Demographic composition of the final sample.*

Variables	Study 1	Study 2	
	W1 = W2	W1	W2
State	Wisconsin: *n* = 228 (61.62) Pennsylvania: *n* = 142 (38.38)	51 States	51 States
Partisanship	Republican: *n* = 194 (52.43) Democrat: *n* = 135 (36.49) Others: *n* = 41 (11.08)	Republican: *n* = 762 (42.52) Democrat: *n* = 819 (45.70) Others: *n* = 211 (11.77)	Republican: *n* = 782 (43.49) Democrat: *n* = 807 (44.88) Others: *n* = 209 (11.62)
Gender	Female: *n* = 234 (63.24) Male: *n* = 136 (36.76)	Male: *n* = 848 (47.32) All others: *n* = 944 (52.68)	Male: *n* = 851 (47.33) All others: *n* = 947 (52.67)
Age	18 to 34: *n* = 61 (16.49) 35 to 54: *n* = 123 (33.24) 55 to 98: *n* = 186 (50.27)	18 to 34: *n* = 444 (24.78) 35 to 54: *n* = 573 (31.98) 55 to 98: *n* = 775 (43.25)	18 to 34: *n* = 439 (24.42) 35 to 54: *n* = 586 (32.59) 55 to 98: *n* = 773 (42.99)
Race	Non-Hispanic White: *n* = 331 (89.46) *The rest include non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian or Pacific Islander, Native American or American Indian, and Other*	Non-Hispanic White: *n* = 1,221 (68.14)	Non-Hispanic White: *n* = 1,240 (68.97)
Education	High school or less: *n* = 80 (21.62) Some college: *n* = 83 (22.43) Associate's degree: *n* = 68 (18.38) Bachelor's degree: *n* = 100 (27.03) Master's degree, Doctoral degree, or Professional degree: *n* = 39 (10.54)	High school or less: *n* = 486 (27.12) Some college: *n* = 424 (23.66) Associate's degree: *n* = 162 (9.04) Bachelor's degree: *n* = 434 (24.22) Master's degree, Doctoral degree, or Professional degree: *n* = 286 (15.96)	High school or less: *n* = 491 (27.31) Some college: *n* = 422 (23.47) Associate's degree: *n* = 159 (8.84) Bachelor's degree: *n* = 436 (24.25) Master's degree, Doctoral degree, or Professional degree: *n* = 290 (16.13)
Income	Less than $25,000: *n* = 52 (14.05) $25,000 to $49,999: *n* = 100 (27.03) $50,000 to $74,999: *n* = 87 (23.51) $75,000 to $99,999: *n* = 55 (14.86) $100,000 to $149,999: *n* = 47 (12.70) $150,000 to $199,999: *n* = 16 (4.32) Over $200,000: *n* = 13 (3.51)	Less than $25,000: *n* = 249 (13.92) $25,000 to $49,999: *n* = 389 (21.74) $50,000 to $74,999: *n* = 357 (19.96) $75,000 to $99,999: *n* = 258 (14.42) $100,000 to $149,999: *n* = 296 (16.55) $150,000 to $199,999: *n* = 135 (7.55) Over $200,000: *n* = 105 (5.87) [c]	Less than $25,000: *n* = 256 (14.27) $25,000 to $49,999: *n* = 398 (22.19) $50,000 to $74,999: *n* = 351 (19.57) $75,000 to $99,999: *n* = 262 (14.60) $100,000 to $149,999: *n* = 285 (15.89) $150,000 to $199,999: *n* = 137 (7.64) Over $200,000: *n* = 105 (5.85) [d]

Total	*N* = 370 respondents (2 waves)	N_{W1} [a] = 1,792	N_{W2} = 1,798

Note. Brackets indicate percentage values. Study 1 has a smaller sample size because fixed-effects logistic regression excludes individuals who record no change on the dependent variable (Allison 2009). In Study 2, the number of observations differs by wave because singleton groups were included when fitting the fixed-effects regression models. Only 1,589 respondents participated in both waves.

[a] The sample size in Wave 1 of Study 2 is based on the respondents employed in the regression model reported in Model 2 in Table 2 in the main text (Attitude Moral Relevance).

[c] There are three additional missing values for income.

[d] There are four additional missing values for income.

S2. Change Scores

Figure S2.1. *Distribution of within-person variation across focal variables (study 1).*



Figure S2.2. *Distribution of within-person variation across focal variables (study 2).*




Distribution of Change in Attitude Moral Relevance
Frequency
600
400
200
0
-4
-2
0
2
4
Change Score (Pre- to Post-Election)


Distribution of Change in Openness to Different Perspectives
Frequency
600
400
200
0
-4
-2
0
2
4
Change Score (Pre- to Post-Election)


Distribution of Change in Aversion to Compromise
Frequency
800
600
400
200
0
-4
-2
0
2
4
Change Score (Pre- to Post-Election)

S3. Media Categorization

Table S3.1. *Media source categorization.*

Left-Leaning Media	Score	Right-Leaning Media	Score
MSNBC cable news programs	–0.710821431	*One America News Network*	0.980182019
Slate	–0.609136604	National conservative talk radio [b]	0.972385286
Vox	–0.597920933	*Breitbart*	0.923599247
HuffPost	–0.569102602	*The Daily Caller*	0.923770869
NPR	–0.402338789	*FOX cable news* programs	0.748285764
Centrist Media	**Score**	**Centrist Media**	**Score**
The New York Times	–0.26903062	*The Wall Street Journal*	0.210025574
The Washington Post	–0.255256399	*The Hill*	0.098739256
CNN cable news programs	–0.216679404	*USA TODAY*	0.001960013
Politico	–0.171398244		
National nightly news on *CBS*, *ABC*, or *NBC* [a]	–0.170769214		

Note. The score columns report the scores of media sources estimated in Faris and colleagues (2020).
[a] The ideology scores for *CBS*, *ABC*, and *NBC* were averaged.
[b] The ideology score for national conservative talk radio used the value assigned to *The Rush Limbaugh Show*. The survey item about national conservative talk radio had asked respondents to report their use of national conservative talk radio, including live radio, podcasts, and streaming, such as the *Rush Limbaugh Show*.

S4. Correlations among Media Indices

Table S4.1. *Correlations among media use indices (study 1).*

		W1				W2			
Wave	Media	C + L	R	C	L	C + L	R	C	L
W1	C + L	1.64 (0.74)							
	R	.52***	1.53 (0.75)						
	C	.98***	.49***	1.72 (0.78)					
	L	.95***	.52***	.87***	1.51 (0.74)				
W2	C + L	.80***	.35***	.79***	.73***	1.62 (0.71)			
	R	.36***	.78***	.35***	.33***	.44***	1.48 (0.68)		
	C	.79***	.33***	.80***	.70***	.98***	.40***	1.71 (0.76)	
	L	.73***	.36***	.70***	.72***	.94***	.46***	.85***	1.49 (0.69)

Table S4.2. *Correlations among media use indices (study 2).*

		W1				W2			
Wave	Media	C + L	R	C	L	C + L	R	C	L
W1	C + L	1.64 (0.65)							
	R	.32***	1.40 (0.64)						
	C	.97***	.31***	1.69 (0.69)					
	L	.89***	.29***	.77***	1.56 (0.69)				
W2	C + L	.70***	.15***	.68***	.64***	1.61 (0.64)			
	R	.11***	.69***	.10***	.10***	.30***	1.39 (0.62)		
	C	.69***	.15***	.69***	.56***	.97***	.29***	1.65 (0.68)	
	L	.63***	.12***	.55***	.69***	.89***	.27***	.76***	1.51 (0.67)

Note. C + L = centrist and left-leaning media. R = right-leaning media. C = centrist media. L = left-leaning media. W1 = values in wave 1. W2 = values in wave 2. Diagonal cell entries are variable means with standard deviations in parentheses.

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

S5. Alternative Models (Left + Centrist Media)

Table S5.1. Within-person effects of partisan media use on the likelihood of aversion to compromise (in log-odds).

	Aversion to Compromise		
Variables	Log-Odds	SE	Odds Ratio [95% CI]
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	0.71*	0.33	2.03 [1.06, 3.90]
Left + Centrist Media	–0.35	0.32	0.71 [0.38, 1.33]
Talk Network	0.02	0.05	1.02 [0.92, 1.13]
Restarted Talking	–0.20	0.35	0.82 [0.41, 1.63]
Attitude Extremity	0.05	0.34	1.05 [0.54, 2.04]
Wave [a]	–0.92***	0.12	0.40 [0.32, 0.50]
Observations		740	
Number of Respondents		370	
McFadden R^2		.1535	

Note. Cell entries are obtained from a fixed-effects (FE) logistic regression model (xtlogit in Stata 18), which excludes individuals who record no change on the dependent variable and conducts listwise deletion on observations with at least one missing value in any variable (Allison 2009). Left-leaning partisan media and centrist media are combined into a single index (i.e., Left + Centrist Media).

[a] The reference category is the pre-election wave (W1).

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S5.2. Within-person effects of partisan media use on aversion to compromise through openness to different perspectives and attitude moral relevance.

	Mediators								Outcome	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Openness to Different Perspectives		Attitude Moral Relevance		Attitude Certainty		Attitude Extremity		Aversion to Compromise	
Variables	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.10*	0.04	0.48**	0.16	0.05	0.10	–0.06	0.09	0.11	0.09
Left + Centrist Media	–0.02	0.04	–0.28†	0.16	0.15	0.10	0.18*	0.09	–0.04	0.09
Talk Network	0.001	0.01	0.03*	0.01	0.001	0.01	0.01*	0.01	–0.005	0.01
Restarted Talking	0.05	0.05	–0.18†	0.10	–0.09	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.06
Political Content on Social Media	0.01	0.02	–0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	–0.01	0.02	–0.01	0.02
Wave [a]	–0.05**	0.02	–0.06	0.04	–0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02
Topic [b]	-		p = .153		p < .001		p < .001		p = .848	
Right-Leaning × Topic [c]	-		p = .011		p = .082		p = .132		p = .354	
Left + Centrist × Topic [c]	-		p = .005		p = .001		p = .003		p = .435	
Openness	-		-		-		-		–0.44***	0.03
Attitude Moral Relevance	-		-		-		-		0.04**	0.02
Attitude Certainty	-		-		-		-		–0.06*	0.03
Attitude Extremity	-		-		-		-		–0.03	0.03
Observations [d]	3,589		3,590		3,590		3,588		3,588	
Number of Respondents	2,000		2,001		2,001		2,000		2,000	
Within R^2	.0114		.0424		.0643		.0687		.1346	

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. The final sample size for each model fitted differs because the fixed-effects (FE) regression conducts listwise deletion on observations with a missing value in any variable (xtreg in Stata 18).

[a] The reference category is the pre-election wave (W1). [b] Topic is a factor variable with nine levels, indicating the policy issue about which attitude moral relevance, certainty, and extremity items were asked. A set of eight dummy variables was created to include topic in the regression model, with tax set as the reference level in the table. The full results can be obtained upon request. [c] The *p*-values are from overall *F*-tests for the interactions between media and topic. [d] The number of observations does not match that of respondents because Stata includes singleton groups when fitting the regression models; however, these unpaired observations do not influence the substantive outcome of interest.

† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

S6. Mean Change and Net Change in Focal Variables (Pre- to Post-Election)

Table S6.1. Mean change in focal variables (study 1; pre- to post-election).

Change in	Change Among All Respondents (*N* = 370)	Change Among Republicans (*N* = 194)	Change Among Democrats (*N* = 135)	Change Among Others (*N* = 82)
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.049†	–0.033	–0.095†	0.029
Left-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.019	0.009	–0.081	0.054
Aversion to Compromise	$\Delta n_{aversion}$ = –162	$\Delta n_{aversion}$ = –88	$\Delta n_{aversion}$ = –49	$\Delta n_{aversion}$ = –25

Note. Negative values indicate the mean value declined from the pre- to post-election period (paired sample *t* tests). Party identifiers and leaners were grouped as "Republicans" or "Democrats," and all other respondents, including true independents and supporters of other parties, as "Others."
† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S6.2. Predicted net change in aversion to compromise (study 1; pre- to post-election).

Change in	*Over-Time Mean Change Among All Respondents*	Change in Predicted Log-Odds of Aversion to Compromise
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.049†; 1.531 → 1.483	–0.009* [–0.016, –0.002]
Left-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.019; 1.510 → 1.491	0.003† [–0.00002, 0.006]

Note. Entries in column 2 are the average changes in right-leaning and left-leaning partisan media use among all respondents from the pre-election to the post-election wave. Entries in column 3 quantify how these mean changes are each associated with the changes in the predicted likelihood of aversion to compromise (in log-odds)—drawing on the fixed-effects logistic regression model in Study 1 (see Table 1 in the main text), with all other variables held at their pre-election means. Negative values denote decreases in the likelihood of aversion to compromise.
† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$



Figure S6.3. Net change in the predicted probability of aversion to compromise based on the observed change in right-leaning partisan media use (study 1; pre- to post-election).

Table S6.4. Mean change in focal variables (study 2; pre- to post-election).

Change in	Change Among All Respondents (*N* = 1,589)	Change Among Republicans (*N* = 648)	Change Among Democrats (*N* = 757)	Change Among Others (*N* = 184)
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.017	–0.033	–0.013	0.025
Left-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.037**	–0.019	–0.056**	–0.021
Openness	–0.048**	–0.057*	–0.013	–0.158*
Attitude Moral Relevance	–0.046	–0.122*	0.033	–0.103
Attitude Certainty	–0.031	0.006	–0.044	–0.107
Attitude Extremity	–0.007	0.012	–0.007	–0.076
Aversion to Compromise	0.045†	0.054	0.015	0.136†

Note. Negative values indicate the mean value declined from pre- to post-election period (paired sample *t* tests). All variables were on a 5-point Likert scales, except for attitude extremity (Min = 0, Max = 2). Party identifiers and leaners were grouped as "Republicans" or "Democrats," and all other respondents, including true independents and supporters of other parties, as "Others."

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S6.5. Net change in openness to different perspectives and attitude moral relevance (study 2; pre- to post-election).

Change in	*Over-Time Mean Change Among All Respondents*	Change in Openness to Different Perspectives	Change in Attitude Moral Relevance for the Tax Topic	Change in Attitude Moral Relevance for the Abortion Topic	Change in Attitude Moral Relevance for the Ukraine Topic
Right-Leaning	–0.017;	0.002*	–0.008**	–0.007*	0.007*
Partisan Media	1.390 → 1.374	[0.0001, 0.003]	[–0.014, –0.003]	[–0.012, –0.001]	[0.0002, 0.013]
Left-Leaning	–0.037**;	0.001	0.011†	0.011*	–0.016*
Partisan Media	1.575 → 1.538	[–0.002, 0.004]	[–0.0004, 0.022]	[0.001, 0.022]	[–0.030, –0.003]

Note. Entries in Column 2 are the average changes in right-leaning and left-leaning partisan media use among all respondents from the pre-election to the post-election wave (also see S6.4, Column 2). Entries in Column 3 quantify how these mean changes (in one partisan media variable at a time) are associated with predicted changes in openness to different perspectives, based on the fixed effects (FE) model presented in Table 2, Model 1 in the main text; entries in Column 4-6 present predicted changes in the attitude moral relevance of the tax (Column 4), abortion (Column 5), and the Ukraine (Column 6) topics, based on the FE model presented in Table 2, Model 2 in the main text. All other variables were held at their pre-election means when calculating the predicted changes. Negative values denote decreases in openness to different perspectives and attitude moral relevance.

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$



Figure S6.6. Net change in openness to different perspectives and attitude moral relevance based on the observed change in partisan media use (study 2; pre- to post-election).

S7. Results Regarding Attitude Certainty and Extremity

To assess if partisan media uniquely influenced attitude moral relevance, we also estimated the comparable models using attitude certainty and extremity as outcome variables (Table 2, Models 3-4 & Figure 2). The interaction term between right-leaning partisan media and topics was not statistically significant for either outcome, *p*s > .157. In contrast, the interaction between left-leaning partisan media and topic was statistically significant for both attitude certainty, $p = .025$, and extremity $p = .029$. Further decomposition revealed that left-leaning partisan media use was positively associated with attitude certainty of the Ukraine topic, $b = 0.27$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = .022$. No significant associations emerged for any other topic or for attitude extremity.

Attitude certainty negatively predicted aversion to compromise, $b = –0.06$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .024$, while attitude extremity was not a statistically significant predictor, $p = .283$.

S8. Supplementary Analysis on Openness to Different Perspectives and Aversion to Compromise

We conducted a supplementary analysis using the post-election wave (W2) responses from the 2020 survey used in Study 1 (N = 1,781).[1] The patterns largely replicated findings from the main analysis reported in Table 2, showing that right-leaning partisan media use negatively predicted openness to different perspectives, which in turn, was linked with reduced aversion to compromise.

For *openness to different perspectives*, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements: "it is important that citizens talk to those with whom they disagree" and "the people who have different opinions than I do are just as valuable as I am" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*). An index was generated by averaging these two responses (r = .46***, M = 4.12, SD = 0.65).

In addition to the dichotomous and continuous measures of *aversion to compromise* employed in Studies 1 (n_{aversion} = 315) and 2 (M = 1.80, SD = 0.77), the post-election wave also included a third item: respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the statement, "lawmakers should talk to lawmakers with whom they disagree" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*). The response was then reverse-coded (M = 1.75, SD = 0.69). Each of the three measures of aversion to compromise was used as the outcome variable in a separate model—Models 2, 3, and 4, respectively—as presented in S8.1.

Consistent with Study 1, *right-leaning partisan media use* (M = 1.39, SD = 0.62), *left-leaning partisan media use* (M = 1.51, SD = 0.69), *centrist media use* (M = 1.81, SD = 0.77) *talk network* (M = 0.29, SD = 2.49), *restarted talking* (n_{restart} = 163), and *attitude extremity* (M = 1.33, SD = 0.42) were operationalized using the same measures.

An index of *strength of partisanship* was generated using the two items that were used to measure partisanship: "generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a(n)…" (1 = *strong Republican*, 2 = *Republican*, 3 = *Independent*, 4 = *Democrat*, 5 = *Strong Democrat*, 7 = *Other*). Using this categorization, strong partisans (i.e., "strong Republican" and "strong Democrat") were coded as 2; weak partisans (i.e., "Republican" and "Democrat") were coded as 1; all other respondents were coded as 0 (M = 1.14, SD = 0.61).

Age (M = 56.17, SD = 14.70) was measured as a continuous variable reflecting respondents' age at the time of the survey, while other demographic variables—*state* of residence ($n_{\text{Wisconsin}}$ = 1,151, $n_{\text{Pennsylvania}}$ = 630), gender (n_{male} = 758, n_{others} = 1,023), *race* (n_{white} = 1,635, n_{others} = 146), *education* (M = 3.04, SD = 1.41), and *income* (M = 3.33, SD = 1.57)—were measured using scales detailed in S1.

The cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models revealed that an increase in right-leaning partisan media was associated with a decline in openness to different perspectives, b = –0.09, SE = 0.03, p = .002, which in turn, predicted a decline in aversion to compromise. Openness to different perspectives predicted aversion to compromise across all three measures of aversion to compromise, Model 2: b = –0.40, SE = 0.10, p < .001, Model 3: b = –0.51, SE = 0.02, p < .001, Model 4: b = –0.58, SE = 0.02, p < .001.

[1] As this supplementary analysis estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, rather than fixed-effects logistic regression, the sample size is larger than the model reported in the main text (see Table 1).

Table S8.1. *Aversion to compromise and openness to different perspectives.*

	Openness to Different Perspectives		Aversion to Compromise					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Variables	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Right-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.09**	0.03	0.76***	0.12	0.10**	0.03	–0.01	0.02
Left-Leaning Partisan Media	–0.04	0.04	–0.05	0.19	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.03
Centrist Media	0.10**	0.03	–0.32†	0.17	–0.13***	0.04	–0.03	0.03
Talk Network	0.001	0.01	–0.12***	0.03	–0.01	0.01	–0.01†	0.01
Restarted Talking	0.08	0.05	–0.18	0.25	–0.001	0.06	0.04	0.05
Attitude Extremity	0.26***	0.04	0.23	0.17	–0.08*	0.04	–0.19***	0.03
Strength of Partisanship	–0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.12	–0.04	0.03	–0.003	0.02
Wisconsin [a]	–0.003	0.03	–0.13	0.14	–0.02	0.03	–0.01	0.03
Male [b]	–0.06†	0.03	0.31*	0.14	0.05	0.03	–0.04	0.03
Age	0.004***	0.001	–0.03***	0.005	–0.01***	0.001	–0.01***	0.001
White [c]	0.11	0.06	–0.80***	0.22	–0.25***	0.06	–0.06	0.05
Education	–0.004	0.01	–0.31***	0.06	–0.04***	0.01	–0.04***	0.01
Income	0.03*	0.01	–0.04	0.05	–0.004	0.01	–0.02†	0.01
Openness to Different Perspectives	-		–0.40***	0.10	–0.51***	0.02	–0.58***	0.02
Observations	1,781		1,781		1,781		1,781	
R^2	.0668		.1441		.2939		.3998	

Note. All models use responses from the post-election wave (W2) of the 2020 survey used in Study 1. Model 2 reports log-odds (and McFadden R^2) from a logistic regression model; Models 1, 3, and 4 report unstandardized coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.

[a] Wisconsin = 1, Pennsylvania = 0. [b] Male = 1, all other = 0. [c] White = 1, all other races = 0.

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

S9. Respondent Distribution Across Topics

Table S9.1. *Number of respondents by topic group.*

	Immigration	Tax	Health	Abortion	Environment	Gun	BLM	MeToo	Ukraine	Total
Wave 1	319	261	214	255	231	263	106	17	126	1,792
Wave 2	274	267	247	230	239	259	98	27	157	1,798

Note. A number of individuals were asked about attitude certainty and attitude moral relevance concerning "crime." These responses were excluded because there were no corresponding measures of attitude extremity.

Table S9.2. *Demographic composition by topic group (wave 1).*

		Immigration	Tax	Health	Abortion	Environment	Gun	BLM	MeToo	Ukraine
Partis-anship	Republican	239 (74.92)	160 (61.30)	70 (32.71)	81 (31.76)	38 (16.45)	97 (36.88)	19 (17.92)	4 (23.53)	54 (42.86)
	Democrat	56 (17.55)	63 (24.14)	116 (54.21)	137 (53.73)	164 (71.00)	140 (53.23)	77 (72.64)	11 (64.71)	55 (43.65)
	Others	24 (7.52)	38 (14.56)	28 (13.08)	37 (14.51)	29 (12.55)	26 (9.89)	10 (9.43)	2 (11.76)	17 (13.49)
Gender	Male	158 (49.53)	154 (59.00)	94 (43.93)	86 (33.73)	125 (54.11)	116 (44.11)	27 (25.47)	7 (41.18)	81 (64.29)
	All Others	161 (50.47)	107 (41.00)	120 (56.07)	169 (66.27)	106 (45.89)	147 (55.89)	79 (74.53)	10 (58.82)	45 (35.71)
Age	18 to 34	39 (12.23)	59 (22.61)	53 (24.77)	77 (30.20)	65 (28.14)	74 (28.14)	45 (42.45)	5 (29.41)	27 (21.43)
	35 to 54	101 (31.66)	91 (34.87)	68 (31.78)	76 (29.80)	76 (32.90)	85 (32.32)	35 (33.02)	8 (47.06)	33 (26.19)
	55 to 98	180 (56.11)	111 (42.53)	93 (43.46)	102 (40.00)	90 (38.96)	104 (39.54)	26 (24.53)	4 (23.53)	66 (52.38)
Race	Non-Hispanic White	242 (75.86)	212 (81.23)	128 (59.81)	193 (75.69)	152 (65.80)	158 (60.08)	34 (32.08)	10 (58.82)	92 (73.02)
	All others	77 (24.14)	49 (18.77)	86 (40.19)	62 (24.31)	79 (34.20)	105 (39.92)	72 (67.92)	7 (41.18)	34 (26.98)

Note. Cell entries are the number of respondents with percentage values in parentheses.

Table S9.3. *Demographic composition by topic group (wave 2).*

		Immigration	Tax	Health	Abortion	Environment	Gun	BLM	MeToo	Ukraine
Partis-anship	Republican	206 (75.18)	168 (62.92)	83 (33.60)	94 (40.87)	40 (16.74)	94 (36.29)	20 (20.41)	9 (33.33)	68 (43.31)
	Democrat	47 (17.15)	69 (25.84)	125 (50.61)	111 (48.26)	158 (66.11)	140 (54.05)	69 (70.41)	16 (59.26)	72 (45.86)
	Others	21 (7.66)	30 (11.24)	39 (15.79)	25 (10.87)	41 (17.15)	25 (9.65)	9 (9.18)	2 (7.41)	17 (10.83)
Gender	Male	150 (54.74)	154 (57.68)	103 (41.70)	75 (32.61)	121 (50.63)	124 (47.88)	22 (22.45)	8 (29.63)	94 (59.87)
	All Others	124 (45.26)	113 (42.32)	144 (58.30)	155 (67.39)	118 (49.37)	135 (52.12)	76 (77.55)	19 (70.37)	63 (40.13)
Age	18 to 34	35 (12.77)	67 (25.09)	43 (17.41)	84 (36.52)	76 (31.80)	59 (22.78)	42 (42.86)	8 (29.63)	25 (15.92)
	35 to 54	68 (24.82)	104 (38.95)	92 (37.25)	56 (24.35)	86 (35.98)	77 (29.73)	37 (37.76)	12 (44.44)	54 (34.39)
	55 to 98	171 (62.41)	96 (35.96)	112 (45.34)	90 (39.13)	77 (32.22)	123 (47.49)	19 (19.39)	7 (25.93)	78 (49.68)
Race	Non-Hispanic White	215 (78.47)	203 (76.03)	163 (65.59)	172 (74.78)	156 (65.27)	161 (62.16)	32 (32.65)	23 (85.19)	116 (73.89)
	All others	59 (21.53)	64 (23.97)	85 (34.41)	58 (25.22)	83 (34.73)	98 (37.84)	66 (67.35)	4 (14.81)	41 (26.11)

Note. Cell entries are the number of respondents with proportions in parentheses.

S10. Limitations in Measurement

Limitations in the measurement of our variables deserve note. First, the outcome variable—aversion to compromise—was measured using a single item in each study, with two distinct items used across the two datasets. Our ability to use multiple items to generate an index was constrained by the availability of relevant questions across the two waves of the panel survey—which is necessary in estimating fixed-effects (FE) models. We report moderate correlations between our focal measures and related compromise items that were only available in one wave (see S10.1 and S10.2 below), providing support for the validity of our measure. That said, prior research on political compromise has similarly relied on single-item outcome measures—some of which are included in our study—without constructing multi-item indices (e.g., Davis, 2019; Ryan, 2017).

Second, the measure for attitude moral relevance was also based on a single item. While we recognize the limitations of single-item measurements, it is worth noting that similar single-item measures have been employed in prior research (Skitka et al., 2005).

Third, the partisan composition of respondents' talk network variable was operationalized using different items in Studies 1 and 2, due to inconsistencies in survey design across the two datasets. In Study 1, we measured the frequency of political discussion with members of each partisan group, while in Study 2, we employed a name-generator-based approach, asking respondents to identify up to three individuals with whom they discussed politics, then rate those individuals' partisan leanings—a method known to capture closer social networks. Admittedly, the two measures reflect different scopes of networks, though we note that our findings remained substantively unchanged when models were estimated without the talk network variable, offering reassurance of the robustness of our findings.

Partisan Composition of the Talk Network and Aversion to Compromise for Non-Partisans

There was a small number of non-partisan respondents who did not indicate a partisan leaning (i.e., true independents or other party supporters) in both Studies (see S1). For these respondents, it is important to clarify the conceptual meaning of a few variables. The talk network variable was coded so that higher values indicate a greater Republican-leaning composition network. As this coding was not based on respondents' own partisanship, it holds the same conceptual meaning across all groups: the extent to which their contacts lean Republican vs. Democrat. Similarly, the outcome variable—respondents' preferences regarding whether lawmakers should make compromises—was also framed without reference to specific party affiliations. That said, it is possible that partisan media may have had different implications for true independents than for partisans, as they may have been less engaged with political cues during the election period. While testing for such differential effects across political affiliation is outside the scope of the current paper, future research should examine how non-partisans respond to partisan media during and after elections.

Validating the Outcome Measure

Study 1

Questions other than FV1 were included only in the post-election wave (W2) of the 2020 survey

- **Aversion to Compromise-Dichotomous (Focal variable in study 1; FV1)**: In general, do you think it is best for lawmakers to stick to their principles no matter what or make compromises to get something done (1 = *stick to principles no matter what*, 0 = *compromise to get something done*)?
- **Aversion to Compromise-Continuous (Focal variable in study 2; FV2)**: Lawmakers should look for opportunities to compromise (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*; reverse coded).
- **Lawmakers Talk (LT)**: Lawmakers should talk to lawmakers with whom they disagree (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*; reverse coded).
- **Support Politicians (SP)**: People should support party politicians who are willing to work with the other party to get things done (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*; reverse coded).

Table S10.1. *Correlations among compromise-related variables in W2 of study 1.*

	FV1	FV2	LT	SP
FV1		.31***	.22***	.25***
FV2	-		.52***	.56***
LT	-	-		.55***
SP	-	-	-	

Note. Correlation coefficients with FV1 are point biserial correlation coefficients, since FV1 was a dichotomous variable. Only FV1 was repeatedly measured in both waves.

Study 2

SP was included only in the pre-election wave (W1) of the 2022 survey

- **Aversion to Compromise-Continuous (Focal variable in study 2; FV2**): Lawmakers should look for opportunities to compromise (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*; reverse coded).
- **Support Politicians (SP)**: People should support politicians who are willing to work with the other party to get things done (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*; reverse coded).

Table S10.2. *Correlations among compromise-related variables in W1 of study 2.*

	FV2	SP
FV2		.57***
åSP	-	

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