Appendix for *Between Resilience and Abandonment: Political Factors Determining Participatory Budgeting through Digital Participatory Platforms*

Joel Peiruza-Parga, Joan Balcells, Rosa Borge, Albert Padró-Solanet
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain

A. Descriptive statistics of the sample

Table A.1 shows descriptive information of the variables employed in the models. The first row includes descriptive statistics for the 270 observations -municipal mandates- while the second row include only the observations finally included in the main model discussed. The differences in the dependent variable between the first and second rows, which sets the sub-sample apart, can be understood as only abandonment and continuity cases are included in the second.

Table A.1 Sample

Characteristic	N = 270[1]	N = 135
PB decision		
Abandonment	42 (16%)	42 (31%)
Adoption	72[1] (27%)	
Continuity	93 (34%)	93 (69%)
No implementation	63 (24%)	
Ideology		
Independent	38 (14%)	19 (14%)
Alternative left	92 (34%)	44 (33%)
Centre-right	75 (28%)	33 (24%)
Centre-left	65 (24%)	35 (28%)
Ruling party change	85 (31%)	39 (29%)
Historical accum. PB		
Mean (SD)	1.996 (1.7)	2.993 (1.7)
Min - Max	0 – 8	0 - 8[2]
Participation reg.	158 (58%)	91 (67%)
Turnout % (stand.)		
Mean (SD)	102.74 (10.8)	101.25 (10.7)
Min - Max	82 - 151	84 - 151
Associative density		
Mean (SD)	1.35 (0.89)	1.31 (0.91)
Min - Max	0.52 - 6.29	0.52 - 6.29
Majority	99 (37%)	48 (36%)
Size (inhabitants)		
<=4,999	78 (29%)	33 (24%)
>=5,000	192 (71%)	102 (76%)
IST[3]		
Mean (SD)	102 (11)	102 (11)

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[1] There are not 90 mandates of adoption because some municipalities adopt the *Decidim* platform at a certain point, but in previous mandates, they had already implemented participatory budgets using their own means.
[2] There are 4 observations with 0 PB historic, even though being continuity cases, because the variable accounts for PB precedent experience through the *Decidim* platform.
[3] IDESCAT. (2021). Small Area Socioeconomic Index (IST in Catalan). The indicator evaluates each territorial unit in comparison with the average value for Catalonia, which is set at 100. In cases where the small area defined by the index is supra-municipal, the value is shared with other municipalities.

Characteristic	N = 270[1]	N = 135
Min - Max	71 - 126	71 - 126
Debt per capita		
Mean (SD)	0.35 (0.38)	0.28 (0.30)
Min - Max	0.00 - 2.45	0.00 - 1.86
Mandate		
2015	90 (33%)	4 (3%)[4]
2019	90 (33%)	45 (33%)
2023	90 (33%)	86 (64%)

[1]n (%)

B. Alternative models explored.

Additionally, to the logistic model exposed in the paper, different models have been explored. Firstly, a logistic regression mode, including the size variable in logarithmic form, and, secondly, a multinomial model, employing the four categories of the dependent variable, can be found.

Table B.1 Binomial logistic regressions (with size as logarithmic)[5]

	Model 1 PB continuity	Model 2 PB continuity
Ruling party change	-2.55***	-1.65*
	(0.91)	(0.99)
Ideology 4 cat: alternative-left	2.12**	
	(1.06)	
Ideology 4 cat: centre-right	1.77	
	(1.26)	
Ideology 4 cat: independent	3.87**	
	(1.19)	
Ideology 2 cat: centre-left		-2.30**
		(1.11)
Ruling party change*centre-left		-5.36**
		(2.14)
Historical accumulated PB	1.85***	2.10***
	(0.41)	(0.48)
Participation Regulation	1.82**	2.04**
	(0.90)	(0.90)
Turnout % (stand.)	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Associative density	0.36	0.83
	(0.52)	(0.58)
Majority	0.28	0.39

[4] A minority of cases adopted the *Decidim* platform in the 2015-2019 term but implemented participatory budgeting in the previous mandate; therefore, they have been tagged as continuity observations.
[5] Model 1 and 2 deploys the same model as article's Table 1.1 but employ a logarithmic measure of inhabitants. These models show a poorer fit than those presented in the paper; however, they are included in the supplementary materials as they reveal certain sensitivities regarding these coefficients

	(0.77)	(0.78)
Inhabitants (log)	0.49	1.09**
	(0.47)	(0.55)
IST	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Debt per capita	-0.54	0.73
	(1.54)	(1.48)
Mandate 2019	-2.15	-1.04
	(1.66)	(1.61)
Mandate 2023	-5.92***	-5.29***
	(1.82)	(1.78)
(Intercept)	-21.84**	-33.03***
	(10.49)	(12.42)
N	135	135
AIC	99.93	93.66
BIC	143.50	134.33
Pseudo R2	0.58	0.60
Chi-square	97.46	101.73
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.		

Table B.2 Multinomial regression (reference: Abandonment)[6]

	Adoption	Continuity	No impl.
Ruling party change	-0.49	-2.31***	-1.22
	(0.85)	(0.81)	(1.06)
Ideology: alternative-left	1.62	1.77*	0.20
	(1.02)	(0.98)	(1.36)
Ideology: centre-right	2.14*	1.80	0.64
	(1.19)	(1.14)	(1.47)
Ideology: independent	2.28	1.95	1.31
	(1.45)	(1.36)	(1.80)
Historical accumulated PB	1.65***	2.43***	-3.10***
	(0.46)	(0.44)	(1.01)
Participation regulation	0.39	0.94	0.46
	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.92)
Turnout % (stand.)	0.09**	0.13***	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Associative density	-0.03	0.91*	0.39
	(0.64)	(0.53)	(0.89)
Absolut majority	0.88	0.75	2.05*
	(0.85)	(0.78)	(1.13)
Inhabitants: >=5,000	1.74	4.45***	0.82
	(1.12)	(1.10)	(1.27)
IST	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Debt per capita	0.38	0.14	0.29
	(1.14)	(1.16)	(1.47)
Mandate 2019	-2.28*	-0.76	-24.70***
	(1.29)	(1.47)	(0.00)
Mandate 2023	-23.32***	-5.35***	-4.07**
	(0.00)	(1.70)	(1.62)

[6] The reference category of the dependent variable is Abandonment, to be compared with the subsequent three categories of the dependent variable: Adoption, Continuity and No implementation/No adoption.

(Intercept)	-12.76***	-23.64***	-4.01
	(3.47)	(3.91)	(4.58)

N: 270
AIC: 324.97
BIC: 486.90
Chi-square: 234.96

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

C. Marginal effects plot

**Fig. C.1 Marginal effects of Table 1.1 Regression Logistics Model.**

Fig. C.2 Marginal effects of Table 1.1 Regression Logistics Model with interaction.

Average Marginal Effects