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Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes

Editors

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Editorial

Introduction to "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes"

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Abstract
This editorial serves as an introduction to the *Media and Communication* thematic issue on "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes". This thematic issue presents an integrated look at forced migration through the spectrum of media studies and communication sciences. The eleven articles in this volume offer a comparative research approach on different focuses that involve cross-national, cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural frameworks, as well as multi-actor perspectives and methodologies. Altogether, the contributions featured in this thematic issue offer inspiring insights and promote innovative research on the way we perceive implications of media and communication in the field of migration. To conclude, a reflection on the presented research is also included.

Keywords
communications; digital media; forced migration; media; migration; refugees

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes", edited by Vasiliki Tsagkroni (Leiden University, The Netherlands) and Amanda Alencar (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands).

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1. Introduction

Global forced displacements are bringing challenges and opportunities for communication between host and refugee communities on all cultural, social, political, and economic levels. At the same time, the media are playing increasingly important roles in refugee situations around the world. Refugees face complex information and communication challenges that may lead to social, economic and cultural problems (Leung, 2018; Leurs, 2017). Within this context, the use of digital technologies among refugees has been associated with potential for social inclusion and opportunity to enhance access to relevant information for their daily activities such as education, employment, health and well-being, and social interactions (Alencar, 2018). Despite the growing importance of new media technologies for refugees, much uncertainty still exists about the ways in which these communications affect various aspects of refugee lives in different contexts and points in time.

This thematic issue of *Media and Communication* focuses on research at the crossroads of forced migration and media studies and communication sciences. More specifically, the issue aims to develop further the debate on the topic by including research on a different humanitarian and refugee crises from an interdisciplinary perspective. The selected contributions benefit from a comparative research approach on different focuses that involve (but are not limited to) cross-national, cross-disciplinary (politics and media, humanitarian journalism, cultural identity and refugee migration, refugee economies and entrepreneurship-media business model,

etc.), cross-cultural approaches (across different refugee and host community populations), as well as studies that address multi-actor perspectives (across different actors involved in refugee crises and integration processes) and methodologies (qualitative, quantitative and critical studies). The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the eleven articles included in this volume.

2. Presentation of the Contributions in this Thematic Issue

Jay Marlowe (2019) opens this thematic issue with the article "Social Media and Forced Migration: The Subversion and Subjugation of Political Life", which aims to explore the role of digital media technologies in facilitating the formation and maintenance of refugees' political lives through their engagement in transnational networks. Based on digital ethnography with 15 resettled refugees in New Zealand, the author focuses on how social media interactions can foster and affect refugees' political practices, as well as the power dynamics involved in negotiating political identities in home and host countries.

Amanda Alencar and Vasilki Tsagkroni (2019) investigate integration as a two-way process. In their work "Prospects of Refugee Integration in the Netherlands: Social Capital, Information Practices and Digital Media" the authors analyze the newcomers' perspectives and experiences of integration and information in the Netherlands. Their article uses the theory of social capital, along with existing policies and refugee migrant interviews to reflect on the refugees' adaptation processes and explores the role of media in the integration act.

David Ongenaert (2019) takes the discussion to the way refugee organizations' structure their public communication strategies. His conceptual article "Refugee Organizations' Public Communication: Conceptualizing and Exploring New Avenues for an Underdeveloped Research Subject" identifies the gaps within the literature and highlights the scientific and societal relevance of a subject that has been until now relatively unexplored. The author adopts a historical perspective to point that although refugee organizations' public communication has increased, the focus remains limited and mostly text-focused, whereas production and reception dimensions have been ignored. Keeping this in mind, the article puts emphasis on the contribution of the holistic Communicative Constitution of Organizations perspective to exhibit additional approaches for future research.

Philipp Seuferling (2019) conforms the alleged newness of media practices forced migrants engage with. In his article "'We Demand Better Ways to Communicate': Pre-Digital Media Practices in Refugee Camps", the author analyses archival material from refugee camps (a heterotopian space) in Germany between 1945 and 2000, through which he scrutinizes the roles and functions of media practices in the camp experience among forced migrants, in a pre-digital media environment. The author argues that in the end, it this insight on the fight for media practices, that throws light and provide clarity and context to the functions and conflicts around media and communication within this heterotopian space of the refugee camp.

Alessandra Von Burg (2019) in her article "Citizenship Islands: The Ongoing Emergency in the Mediterranean Sea" proposes the concept of citizenship islands, based on the idea of nonplaces for noncitizens, to analyze the ongoing emergency in the Mediterranean Sea. Based on field studies in Italy (2016–2018), with a specific focus on the island of Lampedusa, interviewing migrants and refugees, the author highlights the importance of identifying new language and new research tools to effectively explore and theorize the migrant situation, moving beyond the existing discourses of citizenship, mobility and migration.

Rashid Gabdulhakov (2019), in his article "In the Bullseye of Vigilantes: Mediated Vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia" investigates the gendered dimensions and biases shaping discriminatory discourses and practices that move beyond physical borders and permeate virtual and social environments simultaneously. As the author shows, these gendered practices are further normalized by structural actors in the host country, contributing to creating barriers when it comes to seeking social justice among Kyrgyz migrants who are 'forced' to leave home in search of better economic opportunities.

Anne van Eldik, Julia Kneer and Jeroen Jansz (2019) examine the intersections between social media engagement and urban identification through survey interviews with 324 migrant and non-migrant young people in the Netherlands. In their article "Urban & Online: Social Media Use among Adolescents and Sense of Belonging to a Super-Diverse City", the authors look into possible differences between the ways in which adolescents with both migrant and non-migrant backgrounds make use of social media and the effects of these digital practices for creating a sense of belonging to the super-diverse environments where these adolescents currently live in.

Annamária Neag (2019) brings an original and novel methodological contribution with the article "Board Games as Interview Tools: Creating a Safe Space for Unaccompanied Refugee Children", in which she critically analyses the potential of board games as a creative method for working with unaccompanied refugee children and that can complement more traditional approaches in gathering diverse and rich data. As part of her fieldwork with 56 young people hailed from Eritrea, Afghanistan, Morocco, Somalia, as well as from other Middle Eastern, African or South Asian countries, the author provides some insights into the production of media literacy educational materials that can promote critical literacy skills among refugee children.

Julia Kneer, Anne van Eldik, Jeroen Jansz, Susanne Eischeid and Melek Usta (2019) present an interven-

tion study named "With a Little Help from My Friends: Peer Coaching for Refugee Adolescents and the Role of Social Media". The authors assess the impact of a specific peer-coaching (Peer2Peer) for refugee adolescents has on different factors of well-being for both sides: refugee adolescents and their local peer coaches. Through their analysis the authors highlight the importance of training on social media, through which language barriers can be reduced and relationships between local adolescents and refugee adolescents can be developed.

Adina Nerghes and Ju-Sung Lee (2019) shift the attention away from refugee migrants' use of digital media and focus on the role of traditional and new media in shaping public perceptions of refugees and asylum seekers during the European 'refugee crisis'. Their article "Narratives of the Refugee Crisis: A Comparative Study of Mainstream-Media and Twitter" contributes a systematic investigation of refugee debates and narratives from 21 mainstream news channels and Twitter, following Aylan Kurdi's death. The authors emphasize that while both social media spaces exert complementary roles in reporting refugee stories, they may vary greatly in the kind of information that is disseminated.

Yijing Wang and Vidhi Chaudhri (2019) offer a conceptual study that brings together economic integration and contributions from businesses. In their work "Business Support for Refugee Integration in Europe: Conceptualizing the Link with Organizational Identification" the authors address business support of refugee (economic) integration as a manifestation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and contend that such efforts may enhance employee organizational identification. The authors propose a conceptual model to theorize this relationship among refugee support (as a CSR effort), CSR communication and organizational identification with respect to business firms explicitly claiming their support for refugee integration in Europe.

Melissa Wall (2019) concludes this thematic issue by offering a commentary on the presented research. The author discusses the concept of social navigation in relation to the ongoing uncertainty and precarity that refugees face when experiencing displacement and adaptation into a new environment. In the commentary, Wall highlights the ways in which the papers in this thematic issue contribute to enhancing the debate about the complexity of refugee issues and the role of media and communication.

3. Conclusion

This thematic issue of *Media and Communication* introduces a variety of empirical and theoretical works on the core ongoing debate on forced migration, examined under the scope of media studies and communication strategies. All eleven articles provide fruitful insights on the topic and propose additional approaches to understand the phenomenon and motivate leading-edge future research. The findings presented here have generated many questions in need of further investigation. If the debate around new refugee communications is to be moved on, interdisciplinary, comparative research, that breaks the boundaries by moving beyond the notions of country and culture, as proposed here, could be the key to do so.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Social Media and Forced Migration: The Subversion and Subjugation of Political Life

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Abstract
As social media platforms and the associated communication technologies become increasingly available, affordable and usable, these tools effectively enable forced migrants to negotiate political life across borders. This connection provides a basis for resettled refugees to interact with their transnational networks and engage in political activities in novel ways. This article presents a digital ethnography with 15 resettled refugees living in New Zealand and the role of social media and transnational networks for the maintenance and creation of political lives. Taking a broad interpretation of how political and political life are understood, this article focuses on how power is achieved and leveraged to provide legitimacy and control. In particular, it examines how refugees practise transnational politics through social media as they navigate both the subjugation and subversion of power. These digital interactions have the potential to reconfigure and, at times collapse, the distance between the resettled "here" and the transnational "there". This article highlights how social media facilitates political lives as an ongoing transnational phenomenon and its implications for the country of resettlement and the wider diaspora.

Keywords
digital communication; forced migration; politics; refugee; resettlement; social media

Issue
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1. Introduction

Social media applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, Viber, Instagram, Twitter and a growing list of others now deliver powerful platforms to connect forced migrants separated by distance. In particular, these tools afford refugees the means to communicate and respond to political ideas, events and crises in ways not previously possible. Through a variety of connective media, people can share and disseminate information, offer support, generate social movements and sustain political activities. These platforms powerfully facilitate the negotiation and creation of political lives and action across borders.

This article considers what digitally mediated interactions represent for resettled refugees as they negotiate political lives across geographic distance during times of rapid political, technological and social change. Following Horst (2017), the emphasis on forced migrants as political subjects remains a largely absent presence in much scholarship. In response, this study presents a digital ethnography with 15 people from refugee backgrounds living in New Zealand to highlight how digital technologies influence and enable political lives. Focussing on how social media can sustain ongoing transnational networks and relationships, the article examines the subjugation and subversion of power as refugees negotiate ongoing transnational political activities and commitments through everyday life.

2. Forced Displacement, Politics and Digital Connection

Social media provides a number of platforms to engage in and debate political issues through text-based, audio, audio-visual, synchronous and asynchronous formats. Such interactions are mediated through Facebook posts, Twitter hashtags, WhatsApp encrypted chats and numerous others. Benkler (2006) suggests that these digital spaces represent a "networked public", providing a new space to discuss social and political issues. Connected across distance through the digital environment, this networked public has the potential to convey debates to large audiences in rapid and persuasive ways that range from the European refugee "crisis", the integration of refugees, the securitisation of borders and the politics of asylum. Such platforms offer individuals and groups (defined within various social locations and value positions) to engage with current events, disseminate news and mobilise forms of social action.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ([UNHCR], 2018) estimates that 68.5 million people are currently forcibly displaced, a number which underscores the massive scale of physical separation from family, friends and community. Despite this dislocation, mobile communication technologies provide the opportunity for ongoing connection across geographic distances. Such developments are particularly illustrated by the UNHCR (2016) report entitled "Connecting Refugees" that highlights how 2G and 3G mobile coverage is now available in many sites where forced migrants seek refuge in camps and urban centres. The "networked effects" (Benkler, 2006) of increasingly, though unevenly, available, affordable and usable communication pathways mean that these technologies have greater reach and potential to connect and digitally reunite forcibly displaced people as more are able to join their associated networks.

Over the last five years, the UNHCR has submitted between 65,000 to 163,000 cases for resettlement—the transfer of refugees from a country of asylum to another state that agrees to provide permanent settlement. These numbers represent a durable solution for less than 1% of the world's current forced migrants. Information communication technologies, however, provide potential to connect this minority to the remaining 99%. The UNHCR (2016) emphasises that those in displacement sites can spend up to a third of their disposable income on mobile communications. This reality signals the importance, even necessity, of remaining connected. Whilst the availability, affordability and usability of such communication technologies remains uneven (particularly in Africa and in rural sites of displacement), it heralds new ways that displaced people can practise transnational lives and politics in ways not previously possible.

Powerful actors shape refugees' opportunities for safety and belonging that include states, institutions, non-government organisations and receiving societies. A growing area of scholarship now focuses how digital communication technologies and social media provide a basis for refugees to have stronger roles as political actors—in countries of resettlement and transnationally (Alencar, 2017; Benton & Glennie, 2016; Godin & Doná, 2016; Marlowe, 2019). In particular, there is an increasing recognition of refugees as conscious political actors and the political nature of their flight (Horst, 2017). While the transfer of political remittances across diasporas is not a new phenomenon, the speed at which these can be provided through social media offers new transformative possibilities and extended reach—for forced migrants and powerful state actors (Krawatzek & Funk, 2019).

The term "political" has been used in a variety of contexts, including how refugees utilise social media to discuss policy, influence elections and engage in various forms of advocacy and activism in their country of origin and the wider diaspora (Adan et al., 2018). However, the term is used so uncritically that it often escapes definition. Taking a fairly broad interpretation of how political and political life are understood, this article focuses on how power is achieved and leveraged to influence government and associated structures that give it legitimacy and control. In particular, it examines how social media affords political inclusion and decision making that allow refugees to practise transnational politics within, and beyond, national borders.

As people engage online, they are able to form assemblages or groups with shared interests. These assemblages and the rules that govern its membership may be relatively stable or incredibly dynamic. In particular, it is necessary to examine how power is exercised through the specific platforms (i.e., prohibiting or censoring content) and by its members (administrator rights to include/exclude participants, defining rules of engagement, determining the flow of resources, providing support, etc.). The political activities that such groups can achieve range from the mobilisation of ideas, sharing resources and information, generating and coordinating large-scale social movements amongst many others—at times outside the control and awareness of powerful actors.

Schradie (2015) illustrates through the concept of organising ideology that digital activism can be directed to a variety of stakeholders, which can yield different political outcomes. In some cases, digitally mediated interaction can predominantly have a bottom-up approach that is participatory and tries to mobilise the masses. In others, often through more top-down orientations, online strategies are used as direct conduit to engage with powerful and influential structures. These different political strategies can significantly shape the outcomes of social media campaigns. Thus, the access and use of digital platforms highlights the complex terrain and possible affordances that social media can provide (Leung, 2018).

For instance, the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia and spread to numerous other countries was, in many

ways, facilitated by the smart phone and the loading of data onto various social media platforms (Breuer, Landman, & Farquhar, 2015). During the 2011 Egyptian protests that began in Tahrir Square, half of the protestors communicated the event through social media and their phones to distribute content (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Scholars demonstrate how social media has been utilised to inform and respond to the European refugee "crisis" through initiatives such as #RefugeesWelcome and others that promote campaigns of fear and misunderstanding (Barisione, Michailidou, & Airoldi, 2017).

Within countries of resettlement, numerous studies acknowledge the importance of social media to facilitate local bridging forms of social capital to assist with integration *and* transnational forms of bonding capital that connect proximal and distant networks (Alencar, 2017; Gillespie, Osseiran, & Cheesman, 2018; Leurs, 2017; Marlowe, 2018). Adan et al. (2018) found, in a study of 100 Afghans living in the United Kingdom that nearly all of them closely followed Afghan-based politics and that some had begun lobbying for particular leaders to influence elections. This report also highlights how Somalis settled in Sweden engage with more than 6,000 members of the diaspora to discuss politics and development-related issues occurring in Somalia. These studies illustrate how social media can powerfully connect people to homelands, the wider diaspora and at times, local communities in resettlement contexts.

These interactions support the formation of a counter-public, a group that comes together to challenge dominant discourses, policy positions or values (Fraser, 1990). For refugees, social media can provide the medium to engage with an increasingly intimate, textured and influential transnational counter-public to respond to political events occurring back home. It also provides a "digital escape" whereby refugees can source cultural and social capital that may not be readily accessible in the geographic location where they live (Gifford & Wilding, 2013). These trends highlight how the "connected migrant" is able to maintain transnational links and relationships that defy proximate geography and censorship—people can incorporate such networks and political commitments in instantaneous, intimate and ongoing ways (Diminescu, 2008).

The "openness" of such platforms, however, does not always promote inclusivity. Numerous studies caution the role of social media to support integration outcomes and a sense of belonging. These concerns range from limiting refugees' commitments and activities in everyday public life in settlement contexts to how state actors can use these tools for surveillance, mass communication and to exert influence and control (Gillespie et al., 2018; Loh, 2016; Maitland, 2018). Other scholars have noted how diaspora networks can potentially inflame tensions and destabilise peace-building activities where diaspora networks can play both "constructive" and "destructive" roles (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Orjuela, 2008; Wilcock, 2018).

While social media opens new forms of communication and potential virtual spaces for forced migrants to engage in political lives, it is also necessary to acknowledge how these tools significantly extend the reach and influence of the state. Glasius' (2018) work on "extraterritorial authoritarian practices", for instance, powerfully illustrates how regimes can expand their territorial control as social media increasingly influences dominant debates and representations that advance regime interests across borders. Michaelsen's (2018) work illustrates this trend by presenting how the Iranian state used transnational communication as a way of controlling and monitoring the activities of exiles (horizontal voice) and influencing international spaces and relations (vertical voice). It clearly highlights the scale and potential of social media platforms to wield enormous power and control. Moss (2018) refers to such practices as "digitally-enabled transnational repression".

The speed and accessibility that ideas can be communicated creates contexts where political activity can be subjugated by the state, but it also supports opportunities where people can subvert such power and innovate around it. These dynamics have stimulated the development of complex social and political webs as many refugees find themselves simultaneously connected with the physical location of "here" and their transnational "there" (including the homeland). It is within this awareness and context that this study examines how resettled refugees engage as transnational political actors through a politics from below and a politics from above to navigate power structures, belonging and everyday life.

3. Context and Study Design

New Zealand currently resettles 1,000 refugees as part of its formal resettlement programme each year. Social media can potentially digitally reunite these relatively small numbers across significant geographic distance—in this case across the seas. This article presents a digital ethnography (Murthy, 2008) of how 15 people from refugee backgrounds who have resettled in New Zealand engage in political lives through social media and what it means to be connected to their countries of origin, diaspora networks and country of settlement. Alongside regular informal online meetings, the study data include 50 online interviews (Skype, Viber or WhatsApp), two surveys and 472 social media diaries collected over 12 months. These ongoing interactions provided insight into how participants incorporated political interactions and activities through social media as it related to elections, conflicts, participating in rallies, human rights activity and other political events. Using a constructivist grounded theory methodology and informed by the constant comparative method (Charmaz, 2006), it was possible to understand and theorise how participants' political lives took shape through the social media environment over time. This was achieved through the initial and focussed coding processes that helped to generate

categories related to political lives and the main concept of negotiating power in everyday political lives. All data were imported into NVivo for the focused coding process to manage the large amount of qualitative data to ensure findings were theoretically saturated across participants and various data sets. This iterative process over time was supported through subsequent interviews as a form of theoretical sampling, memo writing and informal online interactions.

Eight females and seven males participated in the study from a range of ethnonational backgrounds. Most participants were well educated and all could communicate in English to participate in the interviews and write the online diaries. They were living across New Zealand in the main refugee resettlement localities: Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Nelson and Palmerston North.

Each participant completed three to four interviews and wrote regular social media diaries in Qualtrics about how they were using social media, with whom and for what reasons. These ongoing forms of data collection and points of interaction provided the basis for theoretical sampling. Refugee-based organisations advertised opportunities to participate in the study as a form of third-party recruitment. Interested individuals then contacted the principal investigator who then established their social media practices and level of interaction with transnational networks. Two participants did not complete the study because the university decided halfway through data collection that participants must be paid for their time instead of providing them with grocery vouchers (value of up $200 per month). The associated tax implications meant that these participants chose not to continue when the university (as opposed to the ethics committee) imposed this requirement. The study received ethics approval from the associated tertiary institution and required an additional two amendments to follow the emergent analysis to ensure that theoretical sampling related to the negotiation of political lives.

4. Findings

The exercise and negotiation of power plays an integral role in determining how people are able to be political. This section is divided into three parts: politics from below; politics from above; and everyday political lives. The participant quotes identify the person by number and at times by ethno-national identification only if they agreed to share this information due to concerns of safety for themselves and/or their transnational networks. Comments about gender and other social locations are made more generally in the sections below and the discussion that follows.

4.1. Politics from Below—Subversion

Participants identified social media as a tool to subvert powerful structures and participate in political activities relating to social change, awareness and action. While the state's power to surveil was something that all participants acknowledged, many found innovative approaches to maintain political lives and activities. One participant notes how they challenged power structures by working with those in government who were secretly supporting resistance efforts:

> Those who are in the [government] system use social media to convey a message. Even if it is top secret, they would use this and then they will not be caught. We share information because in some ways we are trying to keep peace and then try to calm down the situation [in home country] if it's too high. We try to keep the momentum in that way. (Participant 7, country not disclosed)

> Yeah, I started a feminist group on social media. A lot of my friends that are feminists have liked that page and even people that I don't even know have liked the page so that keeps me connected with a lot of people with the same passion as me and the same drive as me in that specific subject. (Participant 2, Eritrea)

In another form of transnational political activity, a participant notes how they administer group chats on Viber and WhatsApp to reduce ethnic tensions in South Sudan.

> It is daily I have to monitor people….Three days ago I shut it down [group chats on Viber and WhatsApp] because some people complained that there were people sneaked in who might be spies….I noticed that some government agents using social media under a different name. I didn't know them and then I would be told this is a spy. It's not easy to identify but you have a network too to identify them. (Participant 3, South Sudan)

Other participants spoke of how they fed misinformation to undercover state agents to confuse them and obfuscate power structures. They found approaches to subvert the state's extended reach and influence on digital platforms.

The South Sudanese diaspora has been recognised as a "global internet warriors" (LeRiche, 2016) due to their transnational reach to respond to ethnic tensions related to the ongoing civil war—for better and worse. As this participant acknowledges:

> I was identified as an "internet warrior" and I accept that title. Because what we do, when the war broke, those vulnerable people we used to transport them because a lot of them were killed. Sometimes if I post I may put a picture in there and people will comment…start writing comments about that. I'm so careful that I should not say anything that can incite a war. That's what I don't want to do. (Participant 3, South Sudan)

What is clear is that involvement on social media can escalate and de-escalate possibilities for violence and provide opportunities for both safety and security. It is also evident that several participants used social media as a means of communicating to international NGOs and supra-national organisations to signal necessary responses to human rights violations and atrocities:

> Last time, I contacted Amnesty International to help them [people in Darfur]. Even from here, from New Zealand. Amnesty International was involved and communicated with me here to support them. (Participant 1, Sudan)

For the participants who were highly active on social media (at times online more than six hours a day), they noted how they strategically used particular social media apps. For some, platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram provided encrypted communication that made surveillance more difficult. At other times, these same participants would disseminate information and the communication of ideas to a wider audience through Facebook and Instagram for greater impact.

> I am focusing on our history [on Facebook] because the young generation have not enough information about our history. For example, how the Iranian government attacked our land for standing against the Iranian government. And what's our responsibility towards our people, how we can make our history, how we can build our culture because our culture is part of our history. So we do think about those kind of things and we do continue trying to get back our rights from government. If we can, maybe…we will have [an] independent country again. (Participant 12, Iran)

> I was added to a group on Viber called "Who is Hussein" which is a global movement with representatives in over 60 cities worldwide. A representative from New Zealand added about over 150 other people mainly from Afghan Community to join in and be a part of this campaign. The volunteers and representatives sign up to do multiple task from helping the homeless and feeding the hungry, to donating blood to save lives and their aim is to inspire and bring positive change to the world. I was active on this group because I wanted to give something back to the society. (Participant 5, Afghanistan, online diary)

Most of the examples provided demonstrate a politics that was focussed on the bottom-up and participatory processes that signals how social media it was used more as a tool to engage the relatively powerless than attempting to reach the powerful (see Schradie, 2015). While such activities have the potential to leverage social and political change, participants rarely used such tools as a conduit to engaging directly with the powerful. Their focus was more in trying to subvert power and hegemonic structures that currently exist. I return to these implications in the discussion.

> I spoke to my friend in Nepal involved with the election activities lately. Their government is changing and hoping that the new government will bring some change which is very necessary. I don't know what it means but according to my friend, Nepal will have a federal government now hopefully for better. Social media enables me to understand many new things. It is always helping me to grow. I know that I will have many more things to learn from social media as I come across every new day. (Participant 15, Bhutan, online diary)

One of the purposes of participants' political activity was to engage with dominant framings that presented issues they saw as unjust and oppressive. The social media space effectively provided a counter-public where interested groups could challenge powerful discourses through information sharing and action. In the next example, the participant focuses on how the Australian government had framed asylum seekers in a negative light that justified oppressive offshore refugee status processing:

> I posted [on Instagram] about the event I attended organised by Amnesty International to stand in solidarity with the men, women and children stuck in offshore detention centres on Manus and Nauru….I felt very strong and passionate about what I was posting because the detention of refugees on Manus and Nauru is inhumane and a clear violation of their human rights. More people need to be aware, more people need to stand out against it. As the neighbour, New Zealand has a responsibility to do more. We need to step up and point the finger when there are human rights violations regardless of where they are occurring. (Participant 10, Kurdish)

These comments support the view that settlement is an ongoing transnational experience. They live both simultaneously "here" in New Zealand and their transnational "there". It highlights how assemblages formed on social media have the potential to collapse geography, bypass censorship and connect proximal and distant networks. The same can be said of powerful state actors who also have found ways to exert power through these digital platforms.

4.2. Politics from Above—Subjugation

This section focuses on the politics from above or the ways in which political lives and opportunities are determined by government and powerful structures. In most cases, participants noted a concern of discussing politics as it could have negative impacts for their friends and family in their countries of origin.

> We avoid that [talking politics], honestly…because it is a big problem because every now and then—they [Government] arrest someone. If they hear you speak or talk about any political or something that they might not like, then they will arrest you. (Participant 9, Syria)

> No, we are quite careful. We almost don't do anything, don't talk about any topic about politics, anything politics….I do refrain from expressing ideas more openly. (Participant 6, background not disclosed)

> Sometimes some people say it's not safe to talk about security things or it's not safe to talk about politics and stuff like that. Normally we're not talking about those kinds of things and just we are talking about normal conversation. (Participant 8, Afghanistan, online diary)

For others, they noted that discussing politics could have negative ramifications for their opportunities to return home or to travel to certain countries thereby constraining their agency to fully voice their views and concerns. In this quote, the participant emphasises how their social media involvement is mediated by the awareness of potential mobility restrictions:

> I find that I've stepped away from criticising the [Turkish] regime as a whole and rather to focus on particular events and acts…I have to go to Turkey to see my family. With the current situation in Iraq borders with the Kurdish airports closed there is a chance that those won't reopen for a while. (Participant 10, Kurdish)

The power of the politics from above is such is that several participants consented to participate only if their country of origin and other demographics were not disclosed. It demonstrates the perceived and actual reach of state apparatus to surveil, oppress and control within and across borders.

> Yes, we can follow everything through Internet here, through news but you know, it is very critical…people there are scared and afraid to talk about such issues because they are afraid…we may talk about general issues but we don't go into details. When I talk to my friend in Europe or other countries I feel free to talk about these issues and details, but not in Syria. (Participant 9, Syria)

The associated reach meant that several participants (predominantly female) were explicitly non-political in their social media activities.

> It depends [on] the secret service policy and strategy. If they want to annoy me through my relatives or my beloved, they can. They can easily find a way, especially if…I say something political on WhatsApp, they can make it…a reason to, for example arrest my friends, my family even. Yeah. So I avoid talking about politics with my family and friends there, for their safety. (Participant 12, Iran)

> I stay away from politics. I'm not a politic[al] person. Just to know what's happening in my country. (Participant 8, Afghanistan)

However, even for these participants, they did note the use of code words that they could use to signify political events or when it was unsafe to have contact with their transnational networks. They offered examples where they could make reference to the government as a sporting team to seem like they were talking about everyday sports to reduce the likelihood of state surveillance and monitoring.

For these "non-political" participants, however, it did appear that political lives did creep in over the 12 months of working with them. Whether this was in relation to a local election, concerns of what was happening in their country of origin or some other development, it became clear that adopting a political life was one of strategy and at times, necessity. What becomes evident in these comments is that political lives are at times incredibly intertwined with everyday lives. While, at times, participants' activities were explicitly and purposefully "political", at others, these activities overlap with such commitments in fleeting and multipurpose ways.

4.3. Everyday Political Lives

Data analysis revealed that maintaining regular, often daily, social media interaction related to political activity with transnational networks was foundational to wellbeing in resettlement contexts that linked people to the country of resettlement (here) and their country of origin/residence and the wider diaspora (there). Participants were unequivocal about its role in helping them and other refugees to integrate by giving them a sense of ongoing purpose.

> Social media is really one of the important life aspects nowadays in New Zealand and all over the world. Even in the conflict area nowadays are using it….We can say this is one of the most important things in the life of the people, in this era. (Participant 1, Sudan)

> [Being online] made me feel like I was still a part of society and made me feel included and caught up with everyone else. Social media is a simple network that keeps you keep updated in every imperative event that happens both within New Zealand and outside New Zealand. (Participant 2, Eritrea)

> I spoke to my friend in Nepal and we discussed about Nepal's political situations and the struggles every per-

> son has to go through to make a simple living. We also discussed about New Zealand's new prime minister. I told my friend about my participation in voting. (Participant 15, Bhutan, online diary)

As political activities on social media become intertwined with everyday lives, all participants noted how being connected to those they are separated from by geographical distance was essential to well-being and participation in resettlement contexts. The survey responses from participants generally showed that twelve of the fifteen estimated spending one to four hours a day on social media. This was generally supported by what was communicated in the diaries and interviews. However, on many occasions it was clear that these activities could easily extend into eight hours or more a day depending on particular cultural, political, religious or social events that were occurring. One participant demonstrated how transnational care and support is tied to political activities and discussions:

> We discussed what's happening in Iraq with so called Islamic State and Mosul. Most of the men in our family are Peshmerga and away in Mosul. They were giving us updates from the ground about how bad things are in the region. We were discussing the current talk of a referendum for an independent Kurdish state and how likely that would be, the ongoing issues with Turkey and how the different Kurdish political parties that can't seem to agree about anything….But it is very frightening to imagine how close my uncles and cousins are to the conflict and the risk[s]. (Participant 10, Kurdish)

As these interactions become increasingly inculcated into everyday lives, it also influences how participants access news. Nearly all participants said the principal way that they accessed news events and information was through their social media feeds (along with several trusted news networks). Their networks were typically composed of people who shared similar views, a high proportion of which often came from similar social locations related to age, gender and ethno-national identifications leading to a potential confirmation bias where people gravitate to perspectives that align with their values and views.

> I have been using Facebook to keep on track on what's going on around the world and even in New Zealand with the election updates. I found it so much easier scrolling my news feed and glancing at the new updates which gave me quick information about elections. I don't watch TV much, so social media is how I keep on track with political matters. (Participant 2, Eritrea)

Several participants were aware of this confirmation bias as a form of interaction where access to information is shared between limited networks of "friends" on their associated social media profiles.

> So I think the problem with that is unless things get shared really widely you are just preaching to people who already are open to your views. So, you are not necessarily influencing those that you perhaps need to influence. (Participant 10, Kurdish)

Participants were asked where they accessed news and this largely reinforced this confirmation bias—the predominant sources of information were through their social network channels. While participants noted trusting other news sources such as BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN and Fox News, most emphasised that news reached them most quickly through their social media feeds.

> First in Facebook, then I will go on newspapers. I don't have TV in my current place. I'd rather do Facebook news. (Participant 11, Sri Lanka)

> Every day, I check my Facebook and people, they are posting things about Afghanistan, about culture, about news, about events, almost about everything. (Participant 8, Afghanistan)

> Yeah, if I'm concerned with something I would go on Facebook because usually that's the first place that I can use so I'm like okay, if it's on Facebook then it's actually happening. (Participant 2, Eritrea)

> I'm on Twitter every day. I follow people that are working in the same area as me. I'm making sure I'm keeping up with any development. (Participant 14, Rwanda)

And finally, for some participants, where ongoing conflicts and persecution are not occurring or as prevalent in their homelands, their everyday political lives may take different shapes and engender different commitments.

> The social media has brought massive changes in social life. (Participant 3, South Sudan)

In addition to providing a basis to enact their citizenship and political lives overseas, there is also evidence that participation on social media can support a sense of meaning and integration in the country of resettlement. While there are potential concerns that ongoing transnational interactions could be a disincentive to engage with everyday lives and local politics in countries of resettlement, participants were nearly unequivocal of its importance to meaningfully settle in New Zealand.

The study findings also highlight how social media effectively collapses physical geographies of distance through incorporating increasingly intimate transnational interactions and political commitments into everyday lives. It is important to recognise that the participants

of this study were generally well educated and fluent in English. Their experiences of social media could be in stark contrast to other people from refugee backgrounds who may not have the same access to various forms of linguistic, social and cultural capital. However, participants were asked to speak on their perspectives of their ethnic based community and noted the centrality of social media for the maintenance of social relations, a sense of belonging and for providing purpose through new ways of engaging in political issues in countries of origin. They also provided examples where they taught their parents and other community members who spoke limited English to use social media with transnational networks and how this inculcated everyday transnational interactions. Thus, while the contexts and situations for refuge differ, the increasingly accessible opportunities for digital connection open further possibilities for the enactment of transnational settlement and online political action.

As was seen over the 12-month study, the articulation of political lives had ebbs and flows that responded to the everyday contexts of transnational lives. At times, these political commitments were intimately woven into people's everyday lives and at others, were largely nonexistent. In many cases, the enactment of political lives through social media facilitated counter-publics of belonging, opportunities to challenge dominant discourses and the possibility of mobilising the masses. Thus, it is clear that social media represents a communication tool that creates new opportunities for the exercise of power to subjugate particular groups. It also offers novel approaches to subvert and innovate against powerful structures, though often not directly. Such activities highlight the new affordances and cautions that communication technologies provide—effectively reshaping political lives and action.

5. Discussion

Social media is increasingly part of people's everyday lives and has powerful potential to shape and reinforce political ideas and practices. Whether refugees are translating news from one language to another, reposting trusted information, participating in protest or engaging in events happening back home—the reality is that refugee settlement is, for many people, an ongoing transnational experience. So too, are the ways that refugees live their political lives.

Through practices of resistance and innovation, refugees are able to forge counter-publics to dominant framings and oppressive authoritarian practices. While not arguing for some sort of digital utopia, it was clear across all participants that social media is intimately embedded in their sense of belonging that connects them from the place of resettlement to their homelands. For many, the incorporation of political lives is an important part of these interactions that highlight the need to consider refugee resettlement that occurs simultaneously with proximal and distant networks.

The data presented show that refugees can be "dual political actors" (Adan et al., 2018) where social media provides refugees the opportunity to live their lives both "here" and "there". In some instances, the space between this binary is collapsed as people live increasingly sophisticated everyday lives in more than one location through social media platforms. Alencar's (2017) work on social media illustrates how online interactions influence the experience of refugee integration and how it is communicated across society through various forms of social capital that provide opportunities to reinforce, and at times, transcend difference. It means thinking through how integration is defined as ongoing transnational commitments, relationships and activities coincide with everyday local life.

For many refugees, regular and reliable access to transnational networks is a growing and an integral part of settlement that sustains and supports people's overall well-being. The involvement of political lives provides the basis for people to connect through common language, culture and history with transnational networks. It effectively creates a space where resettled refugees are not necessarily positioned as the "other" that generate possibilities to practise a politics from below and challenge the dominant and hegemonic framings. Importantly, such interactions provide opportunities to have a voice in situations where forced migrants are often silenced. As the examples in this article illustrates, participants generally used social media to exercise political lives from a bottom-up approach but seldom employed it as a means to communicate with or influence structures directly. Their political lives often tried to avoid the state or perhaps to misinform it, but rarely to communicate with it in a direct sense.

This study also reinforces how social media provides a pathway for powerful actors and institutions (often the state) to exert power within and across borders. Governments and other institutions can use such tools to predict population movements, collect massive amounts of personal data, convey dominant discourses and exert control that powerfully inform people's mobilities and everyday lives. However, state actors can also use online technologies in liberating and empowering ways. There are numerous examples of how government and other institutions are using social media platforms to help refugees integrate and inform them of their rights (Adan et al., 2018; Gillespie et al., 2018; Maitland, 2018). Such initiatives can provide a foundation for the enactment of local and transnational political lives.

Current examples include supporting Canada's private sponsorship programme through digital communication technologies, apps across Europe designed to assist refugees and asylum seekers with integration, and groups such as Techfugees that look for digital solutions to the problems associated with forced displacement (see Benton & Glennie, 2016; Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver, & Vonk, 2018; Lepeska, 2016). Receiving states can also engage with resettled refugees to assist them with elec-

toral processes and other forms of decision making (see Adan et al., 2018). While such actions can obviously connect people dislocated and separated by distance, it may also improve resettled refugees' sense of place in their host country—something powerfully emphasised by the participants in this study. Such processes could create pathways for greater social inclusion and participation in local politics and communication across difference. The associated possibilities include training people in how to use social media, addressing the sources of digital inequality, subsidising costs to access the internet and providing development assistance to develop and build necessary infrastructure to connect refugees' proximal and distant networks.

It is important to stress that technological solutions to dislocation and political voice are not necessarily the best, or even desirable, solution. There were assumptions that the web 2.0 would democratise information and broaden debate—including in the area of politics. The confirmation bias of people seeking views that support entrenched political and value positions is a prime example. Many social media feeds are populated with people "like us" that create echo chambers, which can stifle necessary debate and proliferate fake news as "truth" (Sunstein, 2018). The reality is that "friends" interact on a given platform because they often have similar values. It means that information can become incredibly homogenised and narrowed. These networked publics can limit opportunity to engage with alternative perspectives—something very much needed in the heated debates that occur about displacement and asylum.

Digital inequality provides serious cautions about who is able to access information, support and relationships as content and opportunities are increasingly linked to digital forms of connection. In many respects, digital illiteracy can represent a new form of poverty where those who are not able to engage are increasingly left behind. Thus, as the participants in this study have high levels of education and English language competency, it is also necessary to recognise that the opportunities for the enactment of political lives through digital technologies is powerfully informed by its associated usability, affordability and availability. It is also necessary to acknowledge that not everyone is political. And even fewer would actively engage with online political lives in the way this article has defined it: how power is achieved and leveraged to influence government and the associated structures that give it legitimacy and control. For some, this would be because of concerns of safety and security—for themselves and their transnational relations. For others, it relates to a disinterest or reaction to previous political processes that created their forced migration journey in the first place. Despite these concerns, the increasing reality is that refugees live both "here" and "there" and that the spaces between this binary are becoming more nuanced and complex.

6. Conclusion

The digital environment facilitated through social media is effectively reconfiguring, and at times collapsing, the associated boundaries and borders for the realisations of political life. While the risks to participation are real due to fear of reprisal and persecution, refugees have found ways to subjugate hegemonic power and to find various forms of political involvement from information sharing to bold forms of political action and activism. Such interactions offer possibilities for peace building and political participation in countries of origin. It can also influence how resettled refugees meaningfully feel "in place" within their country of resettlement.

These developments herald a need for methodological innovation that extends beyond borders and captures the digital everyday lives of people forcibly separated and displaced. It highlights the importance of going beyond "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003) or the tendency to approach a research question bounded by national borders. It also signals a new ethics in practice where one must be responsive to participants and their transnational networks, particularly in situations of ongoing precarity. As online methods continue to proliferate and capture new forms of data, there is a need to consider how people's safety and well-being is ensured. These comments highlight a further commitment to ethical responsiveness when understanding how forced migrants use technology to negotiate various social locations, geographic distance, political action and craft meaningful lives and livelihoods across borders.

The fact that refugees maintain contact with their transnational networks is not a new phenomenon. The availability, accessibility and usability of social media platforms, however, opens new possibilities for the reach and shape of refugee's transnational relationships and networks. These trends also highlight that governments have powerful digital tools for surveillance, predicting migratory movements and pathways, influencing humanitarian actions, and collecting massive swathes of information. Thus, a suite of risks and reservations accompany the new possibilities and affordances of digital communications. These platforms facilitate the negotiation of everyday lives, power and relationships. Ignoring these accelerating trends fails to recognise that many refugees maintain ongoing transnational political lives. Such realities have significant ramifications for countries of origin, countries of resettlement, the wider diaspora and the possibilities of forced migration futures.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Prospects of Refugee Integration in the Netherlands: Social Capital, Information Practices and Digital Media

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Abstract
Integration is a highly contested concept within the field of migration. However, a well-established view of the concept draws from underpinning migration and refugee theories, in which integration is seen as a dynamic, multidimensional, and *two-way* process of adaptation to a new culture and that takes place over time. Most studies have focused on the integration perspective of host societies, in particular how governments' understandings of belonging shape legal frameworks of rights and citizenship and their impact on the process of integration itself. With a focus on refugee migration to the Netherlands, this study analyzes the newcomers' perspectives and experiences of integration and information in the host society, as well as the role of digital media technologies and networks in mediating this relationship. Building on policies and refugee migrant interviews, the article sketches out the ongoing dynamics of social capital during refugees' adaptation processes in the country and puts forward a perception of the role of media in the integration act.

Keywords
digital technologies; information practices; refugee integration; social capital

Issue
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1. Introduction

Integration is a highly contested concept within the field of migration. A generally accepted definition, theory or model of integration is lacking (Castles, Korac, Vasta, & Vertovec, 2002). However, a well-established view of the concept draws from underpinning migration and refugee theories, in which integration is seen as a dynamic, multidimensional, and two-way process of adaptation to a new culture and that takes place over time (Ager & Strang, 2008; Phillimore, 2011). The reciprocal nature of integration places demands on both receiving societies and the individual refugees. While most studies tend to adopt state- and policy-centered perspectives for the analysis of economic and sociocultural integration practices and outcomes for refugees (Da Lomba, 2010), there is still a lack of systematic knowledge about the impact of social connections on the information experiences of refugees in this process (Ager & Strang, 2008; Fisher, 2018)—and even more so in relation to digitally mediated communication practices taking place in this context.

This study analyzes the newcomers' perspectives on integration and information in the host society, as well as the role of social media technologies and networks in mediating this relationship. This article builds on both normative and social constructivist approaches to refugee integration (Ager & Strang, 2008) as well as on Putnam's

(2002) social capital theory to explore the refugees' integration and information practices through the digital (Esses, Hamilton, & Gaucher, 2017).

With a focus on refugee migration to the Netherlands, we will first provide a background overview of current integration policies in the country in order to throw some light on the idea of belonging that prevails in the country. Subsequently, we will conduct an in-depth and localised examination of how new arrivals understand and experience these policies and issues related to citizenship, rights and security as well as information access in the context of their own adaptation process and the part played by media and interpersonal networks in shaping the refugees' information practices. Building on existing policies and refugee migrant interviews, the article sketches out the ongoing dynamics of social capital during refugees' adaptation processes in the country and puts forward a perception of the role of media in the integration act.

2. Towards a Conceptualisation of Integration: A Review

According to the EU Common Basic Principles, adopted in 2004, integration is defined as "a dynamic, *two-way* process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States" (p. 15). Similarly, the 1951 Refugee Convention outlines the rights of displaced people to participate in the social, political, economic and cultural spheres of their new society, and highlights the responsibility of host countries to create the conditions that enable integration (e.g., access to jobs and services) and an acceptance of refugees in the host society (Ager & Strang, 2008). Integration has also been assessed as a multidimensional process, going beyond a two-way conception and supporting an alternative perspective on the relationships that are established between refugees and host communities in which all refugees, individuals, institutions and the society play a role (Ager & Strang, 2008). Phillimore (2011) states that most important in this relationship is the recognition that integration is always ongoing and that the notion of an 'integrated society' is hard to be conceived, since the process of integration requires continuous efforts from both sides.

Following on from the notion of integration as a *two-way* process, more recent attention has focused on the adoption of a research approach that also includes the perceptions and experiences of refugees in this process. Specifically, many scholars have repeatedly emphasized the need to focus on sociocultural dimensions of integration to better evaluate the refugees' perspectives, attitudes and behaviours regarding belonging, especially because government policies are primarily concerned about the objective dimensions of political and economic participation to describe the outcomes of integration for refugees (Korac, 2009). At the same time, in relation to this, it is important to look at the government policies themselves, not only in terms of stories and discourses of integration, but also investigate the indicators that accompany the integration framework. Though, as Cheung and Phillimore (2013) highlight, both in academia and in a policy level, much emphasis has been placed on structure and organisation elements of the system on different aspects of integration, excluding a wider range of dimensions that focus on the interconnectedness and the way policies are experienced.

In order to explore the *two-way* process that was mentioned above, the article brings along the notion of social capital theory by Putnam (2001). The aim is to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of (a lack of) social and cultural exchanges and interactions between refugees and host communities within integration processes with regards to the idea of bridges, bonds and links that define different aspects of social capital. Despite the fact that social capital theory has extensively being associated with the issue of integration, what has been underinvestigated in the literature is the communication and information practices among refugees in relation to information and communication technology (ICT) and how social connections can assist in these processes.

3. Bridges, Bonds and Links: Theories on Social Capital and Refugee Integration

In Putnam's (2001) theory, social capital represents the notion that social networks have value. Like any other capital that is, social capital is an equity which can be invested in or depreciated with networks of relationships among people in a community or society that affects the productivity of individuals and groups in such society or community. The stock of social capital lays on the connections among the individuals and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that ascend from them. In other words, feeling safe and secure, have a trust in the society, not being isolated nor have insufficient contacts among other members of the community or society, with a sense of a civic virtue embedded in a strong network of reciprocal social relations. Therefore, in order to be able to measure social capital, someone needs to principally focus on observing attitudes and behaviours and identify the investment on social capital in terms of participation and civic engagement, community activities, connections in work, religious and political environments, volunteering but also social movements and online platforms; symbolic relations of exchange.

An important distinction is the one between bridging and bonding in terms of forms of social capital (Putnam, 2001; Woolcock, 2003). Bonding, a more selected form, tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups (Putnam, 2001, p. 25), in terms of building strong and dense ties in a more relatively closed network, between individuals of primarily common or similar socio-economic status and demographics. Usually associated in the literature with the creation of shared identities and development of solidarity and mobilisation of individuals with a common purpose (Field,

2003; Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 2002). For social bonds to emerge within ethnic groups, community organisations need to be formed in order to strengthen this sense of shared identity and solidarity, something though that may also counter to exclusion from social capital (Zetter et al., 2006). Thus, bonding social capital is interpreted as a key point in order to advance and establish bridging and linking relationships with other groups (Halpern, 2005; Levitte, 2003). Bridging is more about encompassing people across diverse social cleavages (Putnam, 2000, p. 25), Individuals in bridging social capital are less demographically similar and span across different cleavages e.g. ethnicity, race, culture, instilling broader identities and reflecting a generalised trust towards any different type of individuals, that work together to achieve collective objectives and advancing interests. As Dale (2005) specifies, bridging social capital of refugees can be built through dialogue and activity participation, within and between refugee communities, from which collective norms, values and governance processes can emerge. A third type of social capital that extends the bridging/bonding distinction, that is linking social capital, builds on networks across different social hierarchies represented in public institutions and agencies (Healy, 2002), in other words posts and positions of authority and power e.g. NGO's, government agencies, private sector. The main characteristic here is that linking social capital connects people to key political (and other) resources and economic institutions (Woolcock, 2003). In the case of refugees for instance, linking social capital provides the opportunity to gain access to such power and resources and participate in civil society (Elliott & Yusuf, 2014).

Social capital, as pointed above, is an equity based on the sense of belonging. As Portes puts it, in order to have access to use social capital, a person must be related to others, and these others are the actual source of his advantage (1998, p. 7). It is the social networks that provide the platform for social capital establishment. These social networks are formed, operated and preserved by the network members, and are used to share ideas, information, norms and values. The contribution of social capital in the lives of its' members in multiple levels e.g. wellbeing, social support, economic development and outcomes. The quality and therefore the strength of the networks depends on the level of interaction among the members but also on the degree of their maintenance and institutionalisation. As Bourdieu (1983) clarified when referring to networks of social relations, it is 'the product of individual and collective investment strategies within certain social fields, which intended or unintended sustain and create social relations, which promise sooner or later a benefit' (p. 192).

The theory of social capital and the 'centrality of social connection' has been extensively used in order to understand refugee integration in academic and policy making work (Ager & Strang, 2008, p. 596) and as the authors highlight, more specifically the distinction between the three forms of social capital mentioned above: bonds, bridges and links have been broadly developed in the discourse of refugee integration. In an effort to connect functional dimensions and the role of social interactions, Ager and Strang (2008) propose a framework linking various domains as a tool to foster debate and definition regarding normative conceptions of integration in resettlement settings (Table 1).

The four domains of the framework can be utilised from both ways of the two-way process, refugees and host communities, while reflecting on the multidimensional aspect of the process, as discussed above, but also a measuring tool of adequacy of integration policies (Cheung & Phillimore, 2013). The experience from existing cases points to the practicality of supporting asylum seekers and refugees in terms of information, material and other form of resources. That is from providing services e.g. legal, health care, housing, to community development and establishment and effective communication among various involved actors e.g. organisations, institutions, communities, bringing the theory of social capital and its forms of social connection in practice (see Losi & Strang, 2008; Smets & Ten Kate, 2008). What is clear from the ongoing discussion is that more work is required to understand both the benefits of social bonds but also their requirements and responsibilities for the refugee integration. Finally, in relation to this, what also appears to be well-nigh apparent is that social connections and the social capital that is the output of such connections also has a strong impact on the integration process.

Social capital has been reinforcing while having cases e.g. that some kinds of bonding social capital may discourage the formation of bridging social capital. The so-called dark side of social capital in that sense may have high levels within a group, and therefore generating positive returns for the participating members, while at the same time generating negative expanse for other groups and communities. The output of cases as such may contribute to higher crime and discrimination level, and sig-

Table 1. Ager and Strang's (2008) refugee integration framework.

Means and Markers	Employment	Housing	Education	Health
Social Connections	Social bridges	Social bonds	Social links	
Facilitators	Language and Cultural Knowledge		Safety and stability	
Foundation	Rights and citizenship			

nificantly lower level of tolerance, creating and hosting monopoly environments and breeding of negative social norms. As Alesina and La Ferrera (2005) underline, this has relevance for diversity impacts, and in the context of diversity this also applies to cases between e.g. religious and ethnic groups, or in a migration context tensions between domestic and alien groups. The heterogeneity that immigration and diversity bring, foster social isolation and is associated with a distinctive increasement of out-group distrust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2006; Keller, 2001). In other words, we stick to 'our own' and the less we trust the 'other' (Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Putnam, 2007). Reflecting the issues of diversity among different groups and high levels of multiculturalism, the experience so far points to the lack of effective integration, explained by this dark side of the social capital.

Finally, social capital is about networks that enhance the ability to communicate, socially and emotionally. The advance of technology in general assists the progress of broader and assimilated ways of circulating the information. In line with this, the development of ICT and more specifically, the relation between ICT and social capital has drawn the attention both among scholars and policy makers. And while in Putnam's work (2001) the impact on television in everyday life has contributed to a decline of social capital, others pointed out is the benefits that people can get from these social networks and believe that ICT facilitates social capital building (Yang, Lee, & Kurnia, 2009). By limiting the barriers of time and space, social networks preserve ties and connections that provide social support and information in various forms of relationships, while accelerating the way people behave and operate at their communities (Komito, 2011). In other words, the digital and social media fosters social capital and genuine community. Therefore, as discussed above, in this research, we aim to reflect on the standpoints of trust, civic engagement and sociopolitical participation to examine the role of the digital media technologies in social connectedness and information sharing within an integration environment. This will contribute to the ongoing debate on interaction between social capital and ICT in general while adding to the literature on integration strategies.

4. Digital Media and Information Sharing between Local and Refugee Communities

With the focus still remaining on developing and maintaining trust with regards to the formation of social connections among both refugee and host society actors, in order to build 'bridges' between 'bonded' communities, there needs to be the opportunity for people to exchange resources and information in ways that are beneficial for all actors involved (Voigts & Watne, 2018). This could be interpreted as the effort to over the existing gaps between the government's policies promoting bridging social capital and the bonding social capital empowered by the refugee communities. The issues regarding government communication of these policies and actions towards refugees, as well as in relation to the way integration is perceived and experienced by both actors highlight the necessity of the effective circulation of information from both official and informal sources and the potential role that digital media could play in the process.

When it comes to the information practices of refugees, Fisher (2018, p. 82) states that there is a general lack of systematic knowledge of how they have access to information in their host countries and which technologies are being used to support newcomers. Maitland (2018, p. 209) also argues that it is not always clear which organizations have the capacity to develop and implement policies that can facilitate or hinder refugees' access to relevant information and which technologies are utilized in this process. At the national level, the complexity of refugee policies and frameworks of legal rights in destination countries can increase the information needs of refugees as well as their use of technologies (Ager & Strang, 2008; Maitland, 2018). In most Western European countries, for instance, the procedures, requirements and the multiple actors involved in the settlement makes the process for refugees very complicated with information often being presented in a fragmented, dense and digitalised manner. Access to this information requires not only the adequate use of social support networks by refugees (Fisher, 2018), but also the ability to navigate complex information landscapes online (Kaufmann, 2018).

Existing research on refugees' information experiences during settlement highlights the increasingly important role digital technologies play as tools for addressing discrepancies between refugees' information and integration needs and local community expectations (Fisher, 2018; Maitland, 2018). Overall, refugees are embracing the interactivity of digital platforms and therefore recognize digital media's potential to tackle their integration demands and issues through networks of social connections. This statement is in line with the findings of Dekker and Engbersen (2014), who demonstrated that social media are assisting migrants in maintaining connections with strong and weak ties and establishing a new system of latent ties that are key to the migration process. Specifically focusing on the process of refugee integration, it is now well established from a variety of studies, that social media networks can facilitate the acquisition of all kinds of information (Alencar, 2018; Kaufmann, 2018; Leurs, 2017). In their study about smartphone uses and communication practices of Syrian refugees in Austria and the Netherlands, Kaufmann (2018) and Leurs (2017) found, respectively, that these technologies can foster refugees' exchange of information, intercultural communication with the host community, as well as connections with family, friends and refugee networks in both home and host countries. Similarly, Andrade and Doolin's (2016) research on

refugees in New Zealand showed that their use of ICTs can promote social inclusion and greater access to information that enable refugees to feel both socially connected while at the same time, preserving their own cultural identity.

However, the notion that technologies serve to positively connect refugee and local community networks for information sharing and support has been recently challenged by studies demonstrating the use of online networks by different refugee and host actors to disseminate unreliable and unstable information (Wall, Campbell, & Janbek, 2017), promote hate speech (Fisher, 2018), discrimination (Voigts & Watne, 2018) and surveillance (Gifford & Wilding, 2013). Consequently, the dark side of social capital in relation to technology use may also have negative implications for refugee integration, as social actors engage in information practices that hinder social cohesion on different community levels (Ager & Strang, 2008).

Moreover, the process of integration is not homogeneous among refugee populations within a country and the ways in which they experience social connectedness, information and digital technologies may vary enormously, as refugees have different socioeconomic and educational backgrounds (Van Heelsum, 2017). As stated above, research on refugees' access to relevant information through (mediated) social networks remains fragmented and limited to overly general approaches across different groups and settings (Fisher, 2018). Departing from the specificities of the integration experiences characterising diverse refugee populations in the Netherlands, this study offers some important insights into how they manage to build social capital for accessing relevant information, the challenges they face and the extent to which digital media are used to cope with these challenges.

5. Overview of Integration Policies in the Netherlands

The 2015 'refugee crisis' in Europe has contributed to an unprecedented surge in refugee migration in the Netherlands, with a total of 93,890 applications in the period 2015–2018 (Statistics Netherlands, 2019). For a long time, the Netherlands has been celebrated for its tolerance towards other cultures and religions. Over the past decades, however, the country began to experience many changes in its immigration and integration policies, shifting from a multiculturalist approach to an increased emphasis on assimilatory ideals. At the same time, immigration and integration issues have become increasingly important to Dutch politics, as a consequence of the rise of nationalist and anti-immigration political parties (Scholten & Van Nispen, 2015). The rapid number of asylum applications in the context of ongoing refugee crisis has contributed to further polarize the debate in relation to migration and integration in the country. What continues to be stressed extensively is the need for acceleration and intensification of refugee participation in the Dutch society, while overpassing the rising issues of social and labour market integration and the various responses on the matter in public opinion (Scholten et al., 2017).

In the Netherlands, integration policies state that refugees and migrants have to assimilate the sociocultural values and norms of Dutch society and acquire knowledge of the Dutch labour market in order to be granted admission to the country. Integration courses have been implemented as the country's significant efforts to encourage newcomers to integrate by learning the Dutch language courses and acquiring knowledge of its political system, history and Dutch values to become independent members of the Dutch society in terms of civic integration. Refugees are also required to take integration courses and exams, in order to obtain government benefits and the legal right to remain in the country with the potential of facing fines and exclusion from the permanent status of residence or naturalisation in case of failure (Klaver, Luuk, Arend, & Smit, 2015). Management of refugee integration takes place on central, regional and local level. The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for coordinating national integration policies, while municipalities play a crucial role in putting these policies into action and fostering integration at a local level (e.g., support in finding work, participate in the local culture). The type of support provided to refugees may vary, as municipalities have the freedom to shape their local actions regarding the integration.

As mentioned above, the education programme for newcomers is focusing on mainly civic integration, including Dutch language classes but also courses that will elevate the professional skills in a labour market alignment aspect in order to help them orientate in the way of living of Dutch society. There are several organisations that are involved in this stage along with COA, including the Ministry of Education, the Taskforce for the Employment and Integration of Refugees (TWIV) but also a strong corps of volunteers. The organisation of the education programme is directly connected to the labour market participation that will allow and assist the refugees and asylum seekers towards economic independence.

At the same time, various local stakeholders (NGOs, social workers, housing corporations, and civil society actors) are involved in the integration of refugees at a local level. For instance, the accountability for housing accommodation is shared by both the Central Agency of the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). Refugees and asylum seekers are also eligible to public health care which is mainly arranged by the non-profit provider of Regeling Zorg Asielzoekers (RZA) in collaboration with the COA in order to provide guidance through the health care system. However, according to Klaver et al. (2015), the existing reception system in the country creates high rates of isolation with adverse health impacts an issue that could be addressed by stronger focus on the language availability classes (p. 8).

Altogether, these factors make the Netherlands an interesting study case for analysing the level of interac-

tion between host government's integration policies and the refugees' interpretations of integration, as well as the role of communication and media to bridge the existing gaps of those expectations. This section has provided an overview of Dutch integration policies and notions of belonging and citizenship and how they are communicated and implemented on different levels of the integration process. The next sections of this article focus on presenting the methodology employed and the findings, where the refugees' perceptions and practices of integration are theorised and systematically analyzed in relation to (mediated) social networks for information access.

6. A Note on Methodology

Analysis was based on the lived experiences and expectations of integration among refugees in the Netherlands. In doing so, this research builds on the results of 58 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with refugees in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague from 2016 to 2018. These interviews form part of a larger research project aimed at investigating how digital technologies shape and are shaped by individual and contextual factors related to refugee integration in the Netherlands. For the purposes of this study, we emphasize and systematically examine refugees' perceptions and practices of integration while at the same time referring to their social connections and information practices and the ways in which digital technologies are shaping these processes. Participants were refugees with diverse socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds coming from Syria ($N = 46$), Eritrea ($N = 9$) and Afghanistan ($N = 3$), of which 33 were male and 25 were female, ageing from 18 to 60 years, and living in the Netherlands between 9 months and 4 years. All names used to describe participants' quotes are pseudonyms. Snowball sampling was mainly used as a method to recruit the refugee participants for this project. We also relied on the assistance of two cultural insiders to contact potential participants and moderate some interviews. Most interviews were conducted in English; three interviews were held in Dutch, two in Arabic and one in Tigrinya. Interviews lasted for 45 minutes on average and took place in different public places (coffee place and restaurants), private homes and refugee centers. They were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The procedures of this project were approved from the Ethics Board Committee of the Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Data management and analysis were performed using thematic analysis. The data was checked with participants when initially collected and analyzed and then checked again at the end of the analytical process for safeguarding validity and reliability. The analysis of social capital building and information practices among different refugee groups in the study was carried out in the context of the refugees' integration experiences. In this study, the refugees' experiences of integration are defined on the basis of four themed categories: (1) integration is not a linear, uniform process; (2) integration is a negotiation process; (3) integration through shared experienced; and (4) integration at the local level. These categories offer sufficient empirical ground for exploring how the three different refugee populations are making using of different forms of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) to seek, share, and build information and the implications of these practices for their adaptation.

7. Results

7.1. Integration Is Not a Linear, Uniform Process

One important characteristic of integration that has been widely recognized in migration research is that the process of integration for refugees begins upon arrival in the host country (Lewis, 2005). Refugees often report that once reaching their destination society, they are very keen on making progress in learning the culture and language of the host country even before the acquisition of legal status (Losi & Strang, 2008). In general, all participants in this research do not agree that they have to wait until they obtain refugee status to be able to 'integrate'. For instance, refugees showed a great drive to participate within Dutch society, which was reflected in their efforts to learn the Dutch language and culture, getting education, obtaining a job and doing volunteering work. Many participants mentioned that they already used social media apps and websites to learn words in Dutch when they were in the camp and asylum seekers' center. Others revealed they actively reached out to Dutch citizens for the purpose of creating social bonds and learning about the Dutch culture and lifestyle and other employment opportunities in the new environment (Andrade & Doolin, 2016). These connections can be maintained via social media platforms. As Badeed, an 18-year-old high school student from Afghanistan said:

> I knew one Dutch person, I met him by chance, and now we have a contact through WhatsApp and Facebook. I met this person by road, we talked about many different issues for about half an hour, then we gave each other the contacts to communicate, and we communicate periodically.

In line with the findings of Van Heelsum's (2017) study on the aspirations and frustrations of Syrian and Eritrean refugees in the Netherlands, some refugees in this project heavily criticized the fact that they cannot work or study until they are granted asylum. In this regard, Bakker et al. (2014, p. 434) note that authorities do not want to create 'false hope' and therefore discourage asylum seekers from integrating into Dutch society while their asylum request is being processed. At the same time, it is also important to highlight that becoming a status holder does not reduce the barriers to accessing the Dutch labour market and education system, and official government sources do not always provide this informa-

tion in a clear manner. For instance, most refugees taking part in this large project reported not having connections in the host community that could support them in the process of looking for a job. Despite the efforts by formal networks (local municipalities, NGOs, social workers) to provide guidance to refugees and asylum seekers about the Dutch labour market, many still do not know the local community and lack social capital and knowledge of digital initiatives happening in this area. This is very problematic considering the refugees' work eligibility status in the new country and their inability to acquire the adequate resources and guidelines to identify employment opportunities. While all participants agreed that social media networks can help people to obtain relevant information about the job market, they acknowledged limitations regarding the use of social media networks by institutional actors, especially those participants who have been living in the country for a longer period of time.

> It is the responsibility of academic institutions and governments to make extending the role of social media as a strategic objective to help people integrate and to extend the reach of the social media to more segmented people. (Jamal, a 45-year-old Syrian male, health professional who at the time of the study was doing an internship in a pharmacy for one year)

In some cases, however, participants mentioned that the development of informal offline connections among refugees helped mitigate these challenges and ease their access to a range of resources in the course of their adaptation (Phillimore, 2011; Voigts & Watne, 2018). In the case of Rima, a 43-year-old woman from Syria, if she wants to look for information, she will ask a friend who will help her to find the right information.

7.2. Integration Is a Negotiation Process

Many refugees in this study highlighted specific elements that are not necessarily emphasized within Dutch integration policies (Bakker et al., 2014). The values of respect and tolerance are perceived as inherent attitudes of successful processes of integration in the Netherlands. As Amira, a 30-year-old journalist from Syria, said:

> When I have the acceptance I can be flexible easily and I can integrate. When I have the acceptance, for example, when I find something (that is) new to me, I need to respect and accept it. I don't have to oppose this change or this new thing (just) because it's contradictory to my original culture.

This view resonates with a dynamic exchange that requires both parties to treat one and another based on humanistic ideals, such as consideration and respect.

In line with the two-way approach to integration (Ager & Strang, 2008; Berry, 2005), participants believed that successful forms of integration are achieved by means of joint efforts, which promote stronger social connections and familiarization between locals and refugees in order to avoid mutual feelings of alienation (Putnam, 2001). Refugees across the three studies firmly believed that contact and interactions with the local community enable them to acquire knowledge of the Dutch culture, to become more familiar with the ways it differs from their original culture and therefore decreasing cultural shock and isolation. Most of them mentioned that they used social media platforms to socialize with Dutch people as a way to reduce isolation (Leurs, 2017), since constant face-to-face social encounters with local citizens can be more difficult (Van Heelsum, 2017), due to their communication style and the limited amount of time they tend to spend on social interactions.

Similarly, the contact with family, friends and fellow migrants can also function as an online network that can assist them in overcoming feeling of loneliness and separation (Komito, 2011). Arguably, these social connections could impede the process of integration (Putnam, 2002). Contrary to Putnam's assertion, these networks can also help them in accessing relevant information in their new environment. In our research, refugees connected with individuals from their own ethno cultural group, particularly through their voluntary efforts as translators. Jemal from Eritrea, for instance, told us that he started translating material from Dutch to Arabic or from Dutch to Tigrinya with the assistance of Google Translate to help fellow refugees.

In this sense, refugees are not passive subjects whose trajectories are defined exclusively by their new environment through a continuum of assimilation to the host society. On the one hand, it is necessary for refugees to contribute to their host society by being proactive and productive member of society. On the other hand, many participants deemed necessary that, by being a productive member of the host society, refugees have the right to receive governmental support and guidance. In other words, integration should not be a policy goal but an ongoing, long-term process. Much like emphasized by Berry (2005) and Da Lomba (2010), participants perceived integration as a process that places responsibility on both the host country and the newcomers. Overall, refugee participants further argued that integration is only possible when the contact between refugees' culture and the local culture are successfully negotiated. This is illustrated in the following quote by Omari, a 37-year-old Syrian refugee with a background in English literature:

> It will be very nice to make a mutual social media group for both refugees and local community on the level of the municipalities, to be common for Amsterdam for example and those who are interested to join this group. Then you have so many things together, making activities or meetings, it is a local integration on the level of the area. Then we can make this story as a success story on the level of the country.

In line with this, participants expressed the idea that there was a need to re-conceptualize the notion of refugees' integration in the Dutch society. It became clear that the expectations of refugees regarding the dimensions of integration differ from what Dutch legal frameworks expect from them.

> It's something that really needs to be redefined because integration for Dutch people is different. The definition for me, it means that I have a job I have a house, I do my duties to the society and receive my rights without affecting my culture or religious background. (Jemal, from Eritrea, 37 years old, electrician)

Integration was, thus, perceived as a process that needs to be situated in a middle ground, combining both opportunities fostered by the host country and asylum seekers' and refugees' efforts (Da Lomba, 2010), with digital technologies playing a crucial mediating role.

7.3. Integration through Shared Experienced

Knowledge is key in the adaptation process of refugees (Andrade & Doolin, 2016). As stated earlier in the results, participants' social (mediated) connections were able to facilitate cultural knowledge of Dutch society and helped reduce the socio-psychological stress (e.g., cultural shock and social isolation) that the integration process entails when migrants engage in contact with a new environment (Berry, 2005). This comes in line with the argument of Putnam (2000) on how social capital also plays a role on the wellbeing of the members of the community, as it creates a sense of belonging and engagement that minimises the potential of stronger negative psychological situations.

As regards to cultural knowledge, Syrian, Eritrean and Afghan participants greatly emphasized the importance of social media platforms, such as Facebook and Youtube, for learning more about traditions and the daily life in the Netherlands through both local Dutch connections and the experiences of other refugees. By being in contact with Dutch friends and accessing the shared experiences of refugees in both platforms, the participants were able to get to know more about the Dutch culture. There are differences, however, in how female and male refugees in this project make use of social connections, in particular when it comes to learning about the cultural practices of the host society. In contrast to the male participants, the majority of the females do not directly establish social bridges to increase cultural knowledge (Van Heelsum, 2017). Refugee women often learn about their new surroundings through their own family as well as refugee networks online. Although these results are likely to be related to the cultural background of participants, it is also important to highlight the fact that integration policies in the host society may hinder the formation of connections with the local community among refugee women. For instance, integration policies in the Netherlands tend to focus on the most 'promising' individual in the family, and due to the experience of the husband, he is considered the most likely to be able to participate in the host society in the nearby future (Laan Bouma-Doff, 2007).

Aside from cultural learning, social media connections would also share information that can help refugees avoid breaking the rules and regulations in the Netherlands (Leurs, 2017). Participants emphasized the value of sharing bad experiences in these online platforms for making them aware of the existence of such procedures, as illustrated in the following quote:

> You can learn from the mistakes that the others fall. For example, a few days ago I saw on Facebook that somebody have problems with his NS card (public transportation card). I don't know any information about that. And I don't know that my son has to have a NS card so that he can go with the train at this age. Before that, nobody told me that. So I have to order him an NS free card so he can go with the train freely. Otherwise the conductor will come and give me a fine. And I will not be fine after that actually. Nobody can give me this information. (Mohammad, 34-year-old Syrian male journalist)

Finally, refugees' information sharing practices for cultural learning also included a variety of strategies that facilitate this process through offline networks. Contrary to the overall lack of effective professionalization networks fostered by government actors to facilitate knowledge on the labour market, refugee participants mentioned that they often attended events organized by both municipalities and NGOs to share information about the cultural practices in the Netherlands.

7.4. Integration at the Local Level

Several studies have already demonstrated that integration for refugees is more likely to take place at the local level rather than at the national level (Mulvey, 2013). Thus, integration was seen to happen through every day social and information practices (Kaufmann, 2018). Many participants reported seeking, creating and sharing information across social, professional and health online networks. These information practices were often mediated by different forms of online communication, such as google maps for orientation, emailing, WhatsApp and Facebook messaging, and LinkedIn. Similarly, the acquisition of health information and assistance was largely emphasized by participants as an area in which social media networks can be of great help. Most Syrians taking part in this project make use of social media for gathering and sharing practical health information, which can provide them with knowledge of the health system as kind of sociocultural resource. Contact with doctors/health professionals through social media also

emerged as a widespread social media use for health amongst participants.

On the other hand, participants explain that observing what is happening around them they create opportunities to connect with locals and learn about the culture and practices of the host community. One of the interviewees, for instance, plans to visit the Rijksmuseum (national museum) in Amsterdam to learn more about the Dutch culture. For 31-year-old Ajda from Syria, learning about the culture through her surroundings is more valuable than in any other social media network. This local approach was particularly important for one of the illiterate participants from Eritrea. For Tesfay (a 38-year-old Eritrean farmer), observing his surroundings and the environment while engaging in social interactions in those natural settings proved to be the only accessible option that facilitates cultural integration, as many of the other options for instance require (digital) literacy skills.

8. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

The sense of integration lays on the principle that the immigrant and the citizen are assured equality as individuals and are 'entitled to the enjoyment of that security of equality' (Carrera, 2006). Additionally, civic integration reflects the formal obligation for immigrants to familiarise themselves with the civics of the host country/society/community in terms of e.g. language and culture, to be able to forfeit for the social benefits the host country has to offer (Joppke, 2017, p. 1155) and also increase the chances of employment and occupational status, key to successful integration. As seen above, integration is a 'two-way process' one in which both immigrants/refugees and host societies have to actively engage, where 'successful initiatives adopt a pathway to an integration approach that maximises the potential for the interlinkages between integration dimensions while by facilitating a two-way integration process and information practices engaging refugees and wider society' (Philimore, 2011, p. 525).

Social trust and social capital are prerequisites for strong indicators of integration. However, immigration and ethnic diversity tends to lead to a decline in both (see Putnam 2007). And while bonding social capital, including in the form of ethnic networks, can be conducive to integration and knowledge acquisition at the local level, it is essential that it is accompanied by a particular context—or opportunity structure, connected with the form of bridging social capital. In other words 'bonding social capital leads to the establishment of spaces of encounter, which are essential for the formation of bridging social capital' (Kindler, Ratcheva, & Piechowska, 2015, p. 18).

This research by applying the theory of social capital, explored the case of the refugee migration to the Netherlands, looked at current policies of integration, but also the way refugees experience different kinds of information in the context of their integration experiences. The principle regarding policies on integration, in the Netherlands is the one of a faster and effective integration and participation of permit holders through education and employment. As presented above, what is clear in the Dutch case is that the integration model emphasises assimilation ideals of belonging while at the same time involving several actors (NGOs, public agencies, civil society) in the process of refugee integration. The significance of social capital here lies in the big network of public and private actors managing this process. Following the framework of Putnam (2002), it appears that in the Dutch case the strategic action plan in relation to the structure of community development is based on 'bridges' and 'links'. The government seems not to follow necessarily the idea that social bonds are best formed within indigenous (co-ethnic) groups, but rather complementing the need of the balance of social connection from country-of-origin and country-of-residence. The refugees in that sense are not just passive subjects of the government policies but they also build their own online and offline networks for information access and self-support in a non-linear, negotiated, experience-based and localized form.

Regarding the integration process, what has been pointed out by participants, in line with Putnam's theory (2000), is the relation between civic engagement and volunteering and its impact on social capital. Through refugees' participation, the aim is to create opportunities for strengthened social connections between them and the host community. In addition to this, the ineffective circulation of information between the refugees and the formal networks highlight the necessity for more benefiting communication environment for both actors. This is also commended on by the participants, conforming to the two-way process of integration, bringing a stronger sense of a substantial linking social capital.

On the role of the media and ICT technology, questions have been raised about the importance of designing more inclusive online contents that address specific needs of diverse refugee populations as well as barriers of digital access and literacy. Another key aspect is emphasizing the need to ensure that the information provided online is trustworthy due to the perceived lack of professionalism and discontinuity of content that is often shared on social media among informal networks (Leurs, 2017; Voigts & Watne, 2018). Finally, what also arose while evaluating this information is the need for stronger role of the media and interpersonal communication in the process of shaping the sense of belonging and security in the host country. In this case, however, there must be more involvement of key public and private actors in the establishment of initiatives that rely on digital technologies for refugee integration.

This article provides a starting point for further analysis of digital initiatives and how effective they are for communication of policies and existing initiatives, as there is no yet evidence on their forcefulness, something that needs to be yet tested and scrutinised. The main

limitation of the research lays on missing the perspective of integration actors for example policy makers, social workers and practitioners, something that could be addressed by conducting in person interviews to cover more extensively the policy side. Finally, although the focus of the present study was on the Netherlands, the findings could apply to other European contexts provided that more research are conducted on different aspects of refugees' integration.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Refugee Organizations' Public Communication: Conceptualizing and Exploring New Avenues for an Underdeveloped Research Subject

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Abstract
The world has faced a major increase in forced displacement and the theme has also become the subject of many public, media and political debates. The public communication of refugee organizations thereby increasingly impacts their operations, the public perception on forcibly displaced people and societal and policy beliefs and actions. However, little research has been conducted on the topic. Therefore, this conceptual article aims to (1) define refugee organizations' public communication, (2) situate it within broader research fields, and (3) motivate the latter's relevance as research perspectives. In order to be able to achieve these research objectives, the article first discusses the social and scientific relevance of the research subject and identifies important gaps within literature which both form an essential scientific base for developing the main arguments. Adopting a historical perspective, the article demonstrates that in recent decades the social and scientific relevance of research on strategic and non-profit communication in general and on refugee organizations' public communication in particular have increased. Nevertheless, these fields remain underdeveloped and are mostly text-focused, while the production and reception dimensions are barely explored. Remarkably, however, little or no research has been conducted from an organizational communication perspective, although this article demonstrates that the subject can be adequately embedded in and examined from the fields of strategic, non-profit and public communication. Finally, the article highlights the relevance of the holistic Communicative Constitution of Organizations perspective and argues that future research can benefit by adopting multi-perspective, practice-oriented, multi-methodological, comparative and/or interdisciplinary approaches.

Keywords
Communicative Constitution of Organizations; displacement crises; mediated humanitarianism; non-profit communication; public communication; refugee organizations; strategic communication

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes", edited Vasiliki Tsagkroni (Leiden University, The Netherlands) and Amanda Alencar (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands).

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1. Introduction

Although so-called 'refugee crises' have always occurred throughout history, forced migration has increased significantly recently: from 42.7 million forcibly displaced people (FDPs) worldwide in 2007 to 68.5 million in 2017. The largest growth took place between 2012 and 2015, and was largely driven by conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Sub-Saharan Africa (the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2018). Since the summer of 2015, the theme of forced migration has also been ubiquitous in (often polarized, overlapping and interacting) public, media and political debates (Hellman & Lerkkanen, 2019).

Within such contexts, refugee organizations often play key roles. More concretely, they provide aid, assistance and/or protection to FDPs (Betts, Loescher, & Milner, 2012), but also try to inform, raise awareness and set the agenda through public communication (e.g., press releases, news stories, photos, videos, interviews,

etc.). Therefore, they provide diverse communication content to news media and increasingly communicate directly with citizens via social media and websites (Atkin & Rice, 2013). Although these organizations significantly impact how the public perceives FDPs (Chouliaraki, 2012) and as such can have broader policy and societal consequences, few studies have examined how they attempt to influence public, media and political agendas. Therefore, this conceptual article first reflects on the social and scientific relevance of refugee organizations' public communication and provides a brief overview of existing research by adopting McQuail's (2010) frequently used division of the mass communication process into text, production and reception dimensions. Based on and responding to the identified tendencies, and gaps within literature, the third section defines and situates the barely theorized notion of refugee organizations' public communication within various fields of organizational communication research, and motivates their relevance to examine the research subject. This is illustrated by a discussion of the highly relevant Communicative Constitution of Organizations (CCO) perspective. The final section reflects on challenges and new directions for future studies. As such, the article aims to set out lines for further research.

While refugee organizations' public communication is discussed, we first briefly elucidate our notion of the barely theorized concepts of 'refugee organization' and 'forcibly displaced person (FDP)'. Based on the broad statute of key organization UNHCR (2010) and practical knowledge, we consider refugee organizations as a type of humanitarian organization whose main aim is to provide protection, assistance and/or aid to refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced people, stateless people and/or other people in similar situations. We opt for this rather broad definition in order not to exclude, nor ignore the diversity within the working field of refugee organizations (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). Further, this article uses—if appropriate and feasible, and instead of the commonly used but rather narrow, essentializing and legal term 'refugee' (Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 1992), the more comprehensive, humane and correct umbrella term 'FDP'.

2. Social and Scientific Relevance

Adopting a historical perspective, we observe that the relevance, opportunities and limits of refugee organizations' public communication shape and are shaped by various societal trends. We first overview various challenging social tendencies in diverse interacting institutional fields, and then discuss the evolving vital relationship between humanitarianism and journalism.

2.1. Challenging Social Trends

First, as outlined above, the problem of forced migration has expanded considerably recently and, despite many solidarity initiatives, the humanitarian needs are considerable (UNHCR, 2017). However, although there are significant national and socio-demographic differences (age, education, level of urbanization, size and nature of migration, etc.), recent public opinions in Europe about refugees and immigrants seem to be often rather negative and/or more negative than before (European Commission, 2018; Lucassen, 2018). Refugees are often regarded as threats to host countries' welfare, social cohesion, culture, public health and security, and frequently confronted with xenophobia and the populist right's increasing popularity (Frelick, 2007), regularly leading to negative psychosocial consequences (Leudar, Hayes, Nekvapil, & Turner Baker, 2008). However, during the Cold War and in the 1990s refugees were often regarded respectively as freedom advocates and victims of human rights violations and wars (Frelick, 2007).

Lucassen (2018) explains this recently increased social dissatisfaction with (forced) migration by referring to some necessary and sufficient historical conditions which recently merged together: growing discomfort with the immigration and integration of former colonial and labour migrants, Islam, Islamist terrorism and globalization, and a rise of social inequality and right populism. However, the negative public opinions can also be partly explained by the influence and representations of news media. The majority of European citizens sometimes interact with immigrants and refugees—again, with national and socio-demographic variations (European Commission, 2018). However, many still have limited interpersonal contact and base their opinions strongly on news coverage (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009), mostly the main information source on distant suffering (Waters & Tindall, 2011). News media, however, nowadays often produce conflict and human-interest stories, focusing on immigrants rather than immigration (Benson, 2013). While recognizing differences between news media, FDPs are frequently stereotyped, collectivized, decontextualized, given no voice and/or represented as inherently ambivalent: they are simultaneously both a 'victim' of a conflict and a 'danger' for the (inter)national order (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017). Apart from ethics, media representations can have broader societal and policy consequences:

> How we label, categorize and, in turn, differentiate between those on the move…has enormous implications on the kind of legal and moral obligations receiving states and societies feel towards them. This is perhaps even more salient nowadays in the context of the process of reform of the global governance of migration initiated with the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. (Sigona, 2018, p. 456)

Considering the policy level, states have the main legal responsibilities concerning (forced) migration and generally provide asylum and/or other forms of aid and/or assistance. However, in recent decades, various states—

both in the Global North and South, and often electorally driven—have introduced more restrictive asylum legislation, policies and practices and have become more reluctant to cooperate with refugee organizations (Betts et al., 2012). For instance, many border and migration management policies of the European Union and of other states are based on the humanitarian-security nexus. Joint military-policing-humanitarian efforts thereby blur the lines between the involved military, police and humanitarian institutions and operations (Andersson, 2018). This "uneasy alliance" (Walters, 2011, p. 145), characterized by interagency tensions and sharing practices, often "mixes reception and rejection, care and coercion, in complex ways that reinforce the official border security model—a trend that is also (if not equally) in evidence at other borders across the globe" (Andersson, 2017, p. 66).

Many states and bodies legitimize these policies and practices by using security-humanitarian discourses, which reproduce the perceived ambivalent character of FDPs (supra) and war, emergency and rescue imaginaries (Andersson, 2018; Musarò, 2017). Within these imaginaries "the bio-political imperative of managing lives is…expressed through an aesthetic of trauma, where 'war' (on migrants) is represented both as an intimate experience of sorrow and as a public act of peacemaking" (Musarò, 2017, p. 11). This humanitarian-security nexus is enabled by the increasing globalization, and interdependence and interactions between various refugee related regimes that shape states' refugee policies, and also influences refugee organizations' public communication (infra).

Drawing on the above-mentioned observations, it is essential for refugee organizations' operations to create effective public communication strategies (Dijkzeul & Moke, 2005), especially because "humanitarian appeals have the potential to mitigate opposition to immigration, even in the presence of countervailing threats" (Newman, Hartman, Lown, & Feldman, 2015, p. 604). Therefore, refugee organizations promote certain narratives about issues and their causes and solutions (Entman, 1993) and by bringing into being "situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relations between people and groups of people" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258) they attempt to set media, public and political agendas and construct a social reality. Although being far from simple, at the same time critical junctures, such as the current Syrian crisis, can also provide opportunities. More concretely, it could be appropriate periods to influence governmental policies and especially to reassess the own communication policies and practices (Green, 2018). Generally, however, (international) non-governmental organizations review their own communication less than organizations from other sectors. This is largely due to the cost and the (methodological) complexity of campaigns and evaluations (O'Neil, 2013), and forms an additional reason for academics to investigate refugee organizations' public communication strategies.

2.2. Evolving Relationship with Journalism

Since the 1980s, the number of organizations in the humanitarian landscape has increased significantly. This has led to a fierce competition for donations from governments, businesses and citizens and a subsequent struggle for media attention (Cottle & Nolan, 2007), especially because the scale of the provided aid does not necessarily correspond with the scale of the humanitarian crisis, but rather with the degree of media interest (Franks, 2013). In that regard, the perceived newsworthiness of public communication by journalists would increase depending on the conformity to media conventions (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). This 'media logic' refers to (mainstream) news media's news values, formats, organization, working conditions, norms and values (Altheide, 2004; Altheide & Snow, 1979). However, it often results in simplification, polarization, intensification, concretization, personification and stereotyping. Furthermore, individuals and organizations within the public sphere have varying degrees of resources (e.g., funding, knowhow and experience, social relationships, reputation, etc.), which can be valued differently depending on the specific context (Ihlen, 2007). In that regard, public communication generally strengthens the authority of political institutions and multinationals (Wolfsfeld, 2011).

However, given the evolving news ecology and emergence of a global public sphere, refugee organizations and particularly (international) NGOs obtain greater agenda-setting possibilities (Castells, 2008; Van Leuven, Deprez, & Raeymaeckers, 2013). Due to trends of digitalization, cost savings and the associated higher workload (Schudson, 2011), journalists use more pre-packaged information (Reich, 2010), and NGOs' public communication, often largely conforming with mainstream media conventions, has been professionalized (Waisbord, 2011). Furthermore, journalists are often more responsive to information subsidies offered by NGOs than by governments, politicians or firms (Reich, 2011). Hence, NGOs provide diverse content to obtain greater news access and coverage (Castells, 2008) wherein mostly international NGOs succeed (Van Leuven & Joye, 2014).

Regarding academic research, many scholars have studied the agenda-setting efforts of humanitarian organizations in general (Ongenaert & Joye, 2016; Van Leuven & Joye, 2014). Less have done so for refugee organizations (Dimitrov, 2006, 2009). Second, most studies examine first-level or traditional agenda-setting, which want to tell news consumers 'what to think about' (Sallot & Johnson, 2006, p. 152, original italics; McCombs, 2014; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Traditional agenda-setting is concerned with gaining attention for a certain topic. After obtaining news media access, however, public communication continues to influence the media agenda and public opinion in terms of '*what* to think'. This is second-level or attribute agenda-setting and it is concerned with how we should understand a topic and on

which attributes of the topic we consequently should focus (Sallot & Johnson, 2006, p. 152, original italics). As the state of the art will reveal, only few studies have thoroughly examined the discursive strategies deployed by refugee organizations in the context of second-level agenda-setting (e.g., Chouliaraki, 2012; Ongenaert & Joye, 2019), and almost none have investigated their production and reception contexts. These shortcomings are remarkable as refugee organizations' public communication contributes significantly to the public perception of FDPs and displacement crises (Chouliaraki, 2012), and thus can have broader policy and societal consequences (supra). Drawing on the above-mentioned observations, refugee organizations' public communication strategies deserve a more in-depth, multidimensional academic exploration.

3. State of the Art

Given the limited and fragmented research on the production and reception dimensions, we refer, if relevant and possible, to studies on the humanitarian sector and humanitarian communication in general. While many studies on these dimensions often generalize findings to the entire humanitarian sector—mostly in a theoretically sound way, future research should empirically validate these claims for specific types of humanitarian organizations, including refugee organizations.

In line with Orgad's (2018) review of research on humanitarian communication in general, two similar main approaches can be distinguished in research about the subject. The first and most common approach, 'the ethical promise of representation', is text-focused and "examines whether they deliver on their promise to advance understanding and elicit care and responsibility for others in need beyond borders" (Orgad, 2018, p. 68). The second and far less used approach, 'humanitarian communication as a practice, in practice', investigates refugee organizations' public communication as socially situated practices: "the *production* of communication within the changing conditions of NGO operations and the media environment, and its *reception* by certain audiences at certain places and times" (Orgad, 2018, p. 72, original italics).

Within the first approach, several studies investigate refugee organizations' public communication output, and do so from diverse (often interdisciplinary) perspectives and disciplines within social sciences and humanities, including communication sciences, sociology, history, linguistics, (social) anthropology, (international) political sciences and international relations and diplomacy. Discursive strategies that primarily target citizens can be distinguished from those that are mainly directed at governments. Within the first subfield, most research investigates the representation of FDPs, in terms of discursive strategies (e.g., the extent of personalization, individualization, etc.), represented characteristics (e.g., agency, capacities, roles, attitudes, norms and values, etc.) (e.g., Bettini, 2013; Rodriguez, 2016) and sociodemographic categories, 'voiced' people, types of disseminated messages and ethical implications (e.g., Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2007; Malkki, 1996; Pupavac, 2008; Rajaram, 2002; Vasavada, 2016). Few academics, however, investigate the broader regimes of representations and underlying normative concepts that structure these representations and are used as moral justification for solidarity with FDPs (e.g., Chouliaraki, 2012). Nevertheless, research on this subject is particularly relevant to deconstruct refugee organizations' public communication and examine if and to which extent it reproduces and reflects broader societal discourses.

Within the second subfield of strategies mainly directed at states, 'cross-issue persuasion' is very relevant (Betts, 2010). This communication strategy implies that refugee organizations attempt to persuade states to engage in solidarity by relating refugee protection, assistance and/or aid to western countries' self-perceived larger security, economic, humanitarian and/or development interests, but as such represent FDPs as mere objects of negotiations (e.g., on resettlement, refugee protection, etc.). This political realist argumentation strategy is, just as the humanitarian-security nexus (supra), enabled by and a strategic response to the increasing globalization, and interdependence and interactions between various refugee related regimes. For instance, UNHCR nowadays often argues that irregular migration to western states can be limited by supporting refugee protection in the Global South, partially responding to the western security agenda (Betts, 2009, 2010). However, while thus relevant, this communication strategy is rarely examined.

Considering production practices, various authors have investigated trends within the political economy of the humanitarian sector in general and humanitarian communication in particular. This involves attention for the increasing number of organizations in the humanitarian landscape and their growing size, the subsequent rising competition for donations, aid and media attention, and the development of new media and marketing strategies to adapt to these trends, including the use of branding, commodification and celebrities (Cottle & Nolan, 2007; Franks, 2013). However, few studies scrutinize, especially in the context of refugee organizations, the shaping role of organizational characteristics, such as core values and principles, funding structure and relationships with states (Dijkzeul & Moke, 2005), the challenges to meet the media logic (Ongenaert & Joye, 2019) or communication practices as reflections of larger technological, political, economic and/or sociocultural shifts in society (Nikunen, 2016).

Regarding audience receptions, several authors have investigated various audience related challenges for the humanitarian sector in general. Besides negative public opinions (supra), these include fragmentation and individualization of and a diversity of interpretations among audiences, compassion fatigue (Höijer, 2004;

Tester, 2001), states of denial (Cohen, 2001), and a growing cynicism towards and aversion of institutional aid campaigns (Chouliaraki, 2012). However, to our knowledge, little research exists on the perception of refugee organizations' public communication. Likewise, while already various studies have been conducted on factors that increase audiences' responsiveness to humanitarian communications (for an overview, see Seu & Orgad, 2017), specific research in the context of refugee organizations' public communication or on engagement with public attitudes towards FDPs is very limited (e.g., Dempster & Hargrave, 2017).

We can conclude that a significant body of work examines the text dimension, often with normative focuses on representations, but largely ignoring organizational perspectives. However, in order to explain these communication strategies, it is important to examine the underlying production and reception contexts. As Orgad (2018, pp. 75–76) argues: "[f]or scholarship potentially to inform and influence humanitarian communication practice, it is crucial that it is grounded in an understanding of the economic, material, organizational and political conditions of NGOs' work." Therefore, the next section discusses various relevant fields that can provide complementary, holistic perspectives, and sets out lines for further research that bridges normative and organizational perspectives.

4. Situating Refugee Organizations' Public Communication

Responding to the observed gaps in literature, we identified various relevant and (partially) overlapping fields from which the barely theorized notion of 'public communication' of refugee organizations' (called here as such for reasons of clarity, specificity and simplicity) can be approached and defined. This concerns the fields of strategic, non-profit and public communication, which will be discussed in the following subsections. This article does not claim that these are the only or even most relevant fields from which the subject can be approached or defined. It can be argued, for example, that humanitarian communication would be a more specific and relevant starting point. However, as Orgad's (2018, p. 76) remarks:

> Every NGO has idiosyncratic characteristics, related to its orientation (e.g., emergency- or development-focused), size, history, practices, work culture, specific individuals, finances, and so on. Making generalizations or applying findings from one NGO at a particular time to humanitarian communication in general, may be difficult if not impossible.

In addition to and considering their specific orientations and operations, refugee organizations differ from (the more examined) generalist humanitarian and/or development NGOs, and cannot be situated within one of these two categories. Therefore, we opt to discuss broader but relevant fields which (1) provide enough conceptual space to fully comprise and define our subject which can be situated in their intersection; (2) from which the subject—remarkably—has not been examined yet; but (3) which can function as the basis for an innovative and conceptually sound theoretical framework.

4.1. Strategic Communication

We first briefly overview the research field of strategic communication, and then outline its relevance to examine the research subject, also by specifically discussing the CCO perspective.

4.1.1. Defining Strategic Communication

Strategic communication as a practice is increasingly being used as an umbrella term for various goal oriented communication activities that are being investigated within the fields of public relations, marketing communication, organizational communication, public diplomacy, etcetera (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015). Strategic communication, however, is also a research field that transcends and integrates (or at least is assumed to do so) the just-mentioned (formerly separated and often isolated) research domains into an interdisciplinary, unifying framework from which communication processes can be examined and new, complementary insights can be provided (Falkheimer & Heide, 2018).

Within this research field, two main approaches can be distinguished. Within the dominant organizational-centric approach, strategic communication can be defined as "the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission" (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007, p. 3). This approach examines strategic communication's importance for organizational efficiency, management, etc. Frequently addressed subjects—which are often overlooked within research on refugee organizations' public communication, are communication management, planning, audience segmentation, message design, relationship building, campaigns, and evaluation (Heide, Simonsson, von Platen, & Falkheimer, 2017). However, since the beginning of the 20th century, a more socially oriented approach has emerged in which strategic communication is analyzed in relation to citizens' attitudes and/or behaviour, public opinion, democracy, culture, etc. Building on the idea that both approaches and the above-mentioned research fields should be combined in a more holistic perspective, Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2013, p. 74) extended Hallahan et al.'s (2007) definition. They consider strategic communication as "the practice of deliberate and purposive communication that a communication agent enacts in the public sphere on behalf of a communicative entity to reach set goals". However, as Oliveira (2017, p. 57) remarks:

> Although the pillars of the alternative paradigm are described by Holtzhausen and Zerfass as the communication at micro, meso and macro level, by focusing on the public sphere dimension, some areas, like organizational communication and the CCO principle, are excluded (2013, p. 76). [R]esearch would be more fruitful with a cross-fertilization of the three paradigms, meaning that theories, concepts and research focuses could be synthesized in a broader approach…rather than driving an exclusive definition, even if the roots are recognized.

In the section on non-profit communication we discuss Oliveira's (2017) definition.

4.1.2. Relevance of Strategic Communication

Strategic communication's relevance as a framework to examine organizations' communication can be explained by various factors (Hallahan et al., 2007, p. 10), whereby many aspects of refugee organizations' practices and working field are reflected. First, within the 21st century postmodern global society, previously clearly distinguishable types of communication activities and genres (e.g., advertising, product placement, sponsoring) and fields (e.g., public relations, advertising, marketing, etc.) have converged, driven by new (digital) media technologies and economies. Furthermore, people's impressions about organizations are always influenced by previous impressions and experiences. Therefore, it is important to study organizations' communication from a strategic and integrative perspective (Hallahan et al., 2007).

Furthermore, while most studies underwrite a 'being-realism' ontology, and the traditional positivist managerial perspective is still dominant in the field of strategic communication, Falkheimer and Heide (2018) also identify a reflexive turn that investigate the active, subjective role of researchers during research. Additionally, Mumby (2014) identifies an interpretative and linguistic turn, which has led to a shifting (more interdisciplinary) research focus towards themes such as organizations' discourses, narratives and power. These academic turns seem to provide a relevant scientific base for reflexive, critical research on strategic communication in general and on refugee organizations' public communication in particular, which is necessary to facilitate theoretical and methodological pluralism within the field (Heide, von Platen, Simonsson, & Falkheimer, 2018).

4.1.3. The CCO Perspective as a New Avenue

Common within the above-mentioned turns is that communication is no longer seen as an ancillary function of organizations, but as a fundamental building block and signifier (Mumby, 2014). In that regard, it seems relevant to adopt the CCO perspective (more widely) in research on strategic communication and on refugee organizations' public communication in particular. It is important to mention that the CCO perspective, with origins in the subfield of organizational communication, is not a delineated theory. As Putnam and Nicotera (2010, p. 158) state:

> CCO is first and foremost a collection of perspectives about grounding the role of communication in the ontology of an organization. Thus, CCO is a body of work connected by a central question or an overall problem rather than a clear-cut answer.

More concretely, the CCO perspective argues that communication is not just an activity that occurs within or between organizations, but forms the constitutive process of organization. 'Organization' thereby both refers to a process or perpetual state of change, an object or entity, and an entity grounded in action—as organizations are not objective, constant, stable entities but are (re)produced by communication, and these outcomes and processes reflexively shape communication (Putnam & Nicotera, 2010). Heide et al. (2018, p. 456, original italics) remark:

> The CCO perspective makes it clear that communication cannot be reduced to a single profession or organizational function (irrespective of whether corporate communication, public relations or marketing is used), because communication is a process that cuts across the entire organization and is constitutive of its very existence (Kuhn & Schoeneborn, 2015). Regarded this way, communication is not a variable. Rather we understand *communication as a perspective* or lens that can help researchers to understand organizational processes and actions.

Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen and Clark (2011, pp. 1151–1154) identified six premises that are shared by most CCO schools of thought. While the latter three premises are also relevant, the first three premises seem to explicitly respond to gaps and limitations of research on refugee organizations' public communication, and could guide future studies. We briefly discuss their relevance. First:

> *CCO scholarship studies communicational events*. If the CCO perspective is to be taken seriously, it means that one should not only pay attention to language and discourse, but also to the interactional events that constitute the building blocks of organizational reality…[a]ny turn of talk, discourse, artifact, metaphor, architectural element, body, text or narrative should…be considered…[i]t means that one should examine what happens in and through communication to constitute, (re-)produce, or alter organizational forms and practices, whether these are policies, strategies, operations, values, (formal or informal) relations, or structures. (Cooren et al., 2011, original italics, p. 1151)

This premise emphasizes the importance of examining holistically the text dimension, as this will inform our understanding about the production and societal contexts of communication. Second:

> *CCO scholarship should be as inclusive as possible about what we mean by (organizational) communication*. Although we tend to naturally acknowledge that messages, as components of communication processes, take on all kinds of form (kinesthetic, facial, textual, intonational, clothes, body shape, architectural, etc.), it remains that the vast majority of the work on organizational communication and discourse tends to focus almost exclusively on the textual aspects of communication. (Cooren et al., 2011)

This premise pinpoints the relevance of looking beyond the text dimension, and simultaneously examining the production and societal dimensions of communication. Third:

> *CCO scholarship acknowledges the co-constructed or co-oriented nature of (organizational) communication*. If focusing on the performative character of (organizational) communication appears crucial to explore its constitutive nature, one should not neglect that any performance is as much the product of the agent that/who is deemed performing it as the product of the people who attend and interpret/respond to such performance—analysts included (Ashcraft et al., 2009; Taylor & Van Every, 2000). (Cooren et al., 2011, p. 1152)

This premise stresses the relevance of investigating both the production and reception dimensions, and their interactions.

Bearing the lack of research on the production and reception dimensions, and their interactions with the text dimension of refugee organizations' public communication in mind, the adoption of the holistic CCO perspective thus seems very valuable: "partly because it opens up for new metatheoretical approaches, and partly because it invites one to a broadened view of what kinds of actors and communication activities could be perceived as essential to organizational strategic communication" (Heide et al., 2018, p. 455). Given the rather general nature of strategic communication, we discuss the relevance of the more specific, related and partially overlapping fields of non-profit and public communication for examining and defining refugee organizations' public communication.

4.2. Non-Profit Communication

As the visibility and (societal) relevance of non-profit communication recently have grown, scholarly interest in this subfield of strategic communication has increased (Oliveira, Melo, & Gonçalves, 2016). Non-profit communication is mainly (but not exclusively) performed by the civil society, which refers to "the organized expression of the values and interests of society" (Castells, 2008, p. 78). This form of communication is often considered as a facilitator of social transformation and progress, as it creates awareness around international social, political, economic and environmental issues, expresses particular world visions, shapes collective identities and affects corporate practices and government policies (Lewis, 2003; Wilkins, Tufte, & Obregon, 2014). According to Oliveira et al. (2016) it provides an alternative and practical response to problems where both the corporate and the institutional structures are absent or have failed, which is arguably the case in the recent so-called 'refugee crises'. Central to non-profit communication is "humanity and the relations with the fields of life in the public sphere, not mediated directly or subscribed on the first instance to the logics of an institutionalised organisation" (Oliveira et al., 2016, p. 2).

NGOs play a key role in various societies worldwide, strongly supported by their communication practices (Schwarz & Fritsch, 2015). Up to now, however, strategic communication used by NGOs has not received much attention in scientific research (Lewis, 2005; Tkalac & Pavicic, 2009). Furthermore, most studies in the field of non-profit communication have adopted a business- and profit-driven logic to develop (positivist) theories, models and case studies, largely ignoring non-profit organizations' (NPOs) social values and goals (Oliveira et al., 2016). Moreover, only few scholars have investigated non-profit communication practices' discursive and rhetorical nature (Dempsey, 2012; Lewis, 2005).

Research informed by new approaches on NPOs' public communication and adopting a multi-perspective view, for example the CCO perspective, on refugee organizations' communication, roles, operations, values, goals and strategies is thus needed. As better communication strategies facilitate appropriate conditions for social change (Melo, Balonas, Ruão, & Felício, 2016), a revision of the existing literature on refugee organizations' public communication is highly necessary. Oliveira's (2017, p. 59) definition of NGO strategic communication could guide this research, as it attempts to meet "the call for a turn towards a unified or holistic approach to communication within organizational settings, embedded in a social context of postmodernity as defined by Giddens (1991, 1997)." He considers it as: "the practice of symbolic social action (communication) to reach set goals, create the organization, perform civic relations and fulfil its mission by groups of people that pursue the common good for the interests of non-members" (Oliveira, 2017, p. 59).

4.3. Public Communication

While we recognize, in line with the CCO perspective, that the traditional borders between external and internal communication are fading (Cheney, Christensen, &

Dailey, 2014), this article focuses, however, for purposes of feasibility, only on external (public) communication. Likewise, this article recognizes that organizational communication is not only performed by communication professionals, but also by the organization's other employees. However, as communication professionals have considerably more expertise in and produce more public communication (Zerfass & Huck, 2007), the article discusses their communication practices.

Public communication can be defined as a large-scale, often diversified communication genre that consists of both informational and persuasive messages which are strategically directed towards various audiences in the public sphere through an organized and systematic framework of communication activities, channels and interpersonal networks to meet some objectives (Atkin & Rice, 2013; Macnamara, 2016). It occurs both in regular day-to-day communication as well as in campaigns held in specific periods. Target audiences and/or stakeholders include (inter)national governments and bodies, other relevant organizations, private sector organizations, media and/or citizens (Green, 2018; Lang, 2012).

Further, public communication is predominantly 'public' in nature. First, it usually proceeds through publications, photos, videos and other content forms disseminated through traditional mass media, interpersonal networks, public events and, increasingly, websites and social media (Atkin & Rice, 2013; Macnamara, 2016). Secondly, it occurs in the public sphere rather than in the private sphere and is about public themes rather than private affairs, such as refugee protection (Habermas, 1989). As such, we can differentiate communication campaigns from lobbying (Green, 2018). Generally speaking, NPOs use public communication to gain broader visibility, inform, sensitize, influence behaviours and set the agenda (Atkin & Rice, 2013; Lang, 2012). The final goal is to obtain public, political, financial and/or practical support (Dijkzeul & Moke, 2005).

4.4. Refugee Organizations' Public Communication

Integrating the above-mentioned insights on strategic, non-profit and public communication and adapting them to the subject, we propose a definition for refugee organizations' public communication. Important to mention is that we do not consider the following definition as complete and immutable, especially since the subject has hardly been examined, but as a starting point and guidance for future studies.

Strongly influenced by the understandings of Oliveira (2017), Atkin and Rice (2013), and Macnamara (2016), we consider refugee organizations' public communication as the practice of organized and systematic symbolic social action (diversified communication disseminated through a variety of channels and activities) within the public sphere to reach set goals, co-create the refugee organization, perform civic relations and fulfil its mission by groups of people that pursue the (perceived) common good for forced migration.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

This conceptual article discussed refugee organizations' public communication, focusing on its social and scientific relevance, state of the art, and position and opportunities for new perspectives within broader literature, and based on these findings also proposed a definition.

Following the discussed definitions, refugee organizations' public communication can be considered as a particular type of strategic communication. Strategic communication, however, is also a unifying framework which is, especially given the current (postmodern) context and (limited and rather positivist) state of art, highly relevant to examine communication processes (Falkheimer & Heide, 2018; Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015). Not surprisingly, little interpretative and discursive research has been conducted on strategic and non-profit communication (Dempsey, 2012; Lewis, 2005).

However, this article demonstrated that research on refugee organizations' public communication is both highly socially and scientifically relevant. More concretely, effective public communication strategies have become crucial for refugee organizations' operations to attract and influence media attention in response to the increased humanitarian needs (UNHCR, 2017), the growing humanitarian competitiveness (Cottle & Nolan, 2007), and the rather and/or more negative public image of refugees (Lucassen, 2018).

To our knowledge, this is the first academic article which discusses the state of the art of refugee organizations' public communication and defines and situates it within broader fields of research. However, the article also revealed that current research mostly investigates the text dimension, but much less or rather indirectly (cf. research on humanitarian organizations in general) the production and reception dimensions. Future research should examine these dimensions and their interactions more in-depth and can benefit by adopting the holistic CCO perspective in order to meet the need of bridging normative and organizational views (Orgad, 2018). Multi-methodological, comparative, and interdisciplinary approaches should be taken into account, given the above-mentioned valuable insights from and interconnectedness between disciplines such as communication sciences, sociology, history, linguistics, (social) anthropology, (international) political sciences and international relations and diplomacy.

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Article

"We Demand Better Ways to Communicate": Pre-Digital Media Practices in Refugee Camps

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Abstract
This article provides a historical perspective on media practices in refugee camps. Through an analysis of archival material emerging from refugee camps in Germany between 1945 and 2000, roles and functions of media practices in the camp experience among forced migrants are demonstrated. The refugee camp is conceptualized as a heterotopian space, where media practices took place in pre-digital media environments. The archival records show how media practices of refugees responded to the spatial constraints of the camp. At the same time, media practices emerged from the precarious power relations between refugees, administration, and activists. Opportunities, spaces, and access to media practices and technologies were provided, yet at the same time restricted, by the camp structure and administration, as well as created by refugees and volunteers. Media activist practices, such as the voicing of demands for the availability of media, demonstrate how access to media was fought for within the power structures and affordances of the analogue environment. While basic media infrastructure had to be fought for more than in the digital era and surveillance and control of media practices was more intense, the basic need for access to information and connectivity was similar in pre-digital times, resulting in media activism. This exploration of unconsidered technological environments in media and refugee studies can arguably nuance our understanding of the role of media technologies in "refugee crises".

Keywords
communication history; forced migration; Germany; media activism; media practices; refugee camp

Issue
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1. Introduction

It is not new to postulate that media and communication are central to experiences of forced migration. Information scarcity, contact with loved ones left behind, and general disorientation associated with displacement are experiences, which entail mediated practices and are dependent on various forms of communication. Digital media, especially the smartphone, are often described as new empowering tools to navigate the complexities of seeking and finding asylum. Often, the focus lies on identifying practices, experiences, and problems, which had not been possible before.

This article intends to question, debunk, and relativize the alleged newness of media practices forced migrants engage with. Forced migration is older than the Internet, which flags up the question of how different media technologies have engendered media practices amidst refugees in similar or different ways. The aim of this article is, therefore, to identify explicitly *pre-digital* media practices in refugee camps in Germany, between 1945 and 2000. Drawing on archival material from this empirical context, traces of pre-digital media practices among refugees are analyzed, in order to explore how different media practices have emerged from the camp.

The refugee camp represents a continuity of the modern refugee regime, a spatial construct of sovereignty and control grown out of the countless displacements during the 20th and 21st centuries (Gatrell, 2013). Within these enduring spaces, I argue, we can fruitfully

observe changes and continuities of analogue and digital media practices across longer periods of time. Therefore, I am suggesting an exploration of camp-based refugee media practices, which is removed from a digital-only focus and avoids the daunting rhetoric of "digital exceptionalism" (Marwick, 2013). By using the admittedly problematic term "pre-digital", I do not want to draw another techno-centred periodical border and reinforce the meaning of the digital, yet widen scholarly attention to unconsidered technological environments, when analyzing the communication situations of refugees.

Ample research has scrutinized refugees' media practices. The "connected migrant" maintaining a "culture of bonds" (Diminescu, 2008) has been the subject of the emerging field of "digital migration studies" (Leurs & Smets, 2018), evaluating ramifications of digital technologies in fleeing, waiting, arriving, and integrating (Alencar, 2018; Gillespie, Osseiran, & Cheesman, 2018; Graf, 2018; Leurs, 2017; Twigt, 2018, Witteborn, 2014a). Within the refugee camp, media experiences have been described as "information precarity" (Wall, Campbell, & Janbek, 2017), and as spaces of instability and uncertainty, where media provide ontological security (Smets, 2018) and are used to manage (im)perceptibility (Witteborn, 2014b). While these studies provide useful concepts, for the most part, they do not consider the historical trajectories of pre-digital media environments. Digging backwards is a crucial undertaking in media and refugee studies if we want to avoid overestimating the significance of new digital media. Therefore, the following research questions are posed: which media practices emerged from the pre-digital spatial setting of the refugee camp? How did the camps' power structures enable or disable forms of communication? How were the needs and functions of media practices fulfilled in pre-digital times?

Sections 2 and 3 outline the conceptual avenues into historicizing media practices (Couldry, 2004), and theorize the camp as a heterotopian space (Foucault, 1997). The camp is understood as a controlled space of the modern refugee regime (Gatrell, 2013), where refugees draw on different media practices to cope with, comply with, or resist and circumvent the power structures which are imposed upon them. In Section 4, the methods are summarized and background information on refugee camps in Germany between 1945 and 2000 is provided. The empirical analysis in Sections 5 and 6 identifies heterotopian media practices within the space of the camp, produced by a triad of actors: residents, administration, and volunteers/activists. It is demonstrated how media practices responded to the heterotopian conditions, resulting in media activist practices within the limitations of space and power.

2. Media Practices in Refugee Camps—Historical Avenues

"[T]he history of media is never more or less than the history of their uses, which always lead us away from them to the social practices and conflicts they illuminate" states Carolyn Marvin (1990, p. 8). Pre-digital media practices in refugee camps elucidate such marginal "social practices and conflicts" and are thus entry points to the histories of media and communication. In research about media and forced migration, diachronic historical perspectives are vital interventions to the often presentist and digital-centred accounts of media within "refugeedom" (Gatrell, 2017). Peter Gatrell (2017, p. 170) defines "refugeedom" as a "matrix involving administrative practices, legal norms, social relations, and refugees' experiences, as well as highlighting how these have been represented in cultural terms". I argue that media practices are part of such historically constructed and produced refugeedom frameworks. Media technologies have both co-produced refugeedom and can be used by refugees to counteract and resist it. Part of refugeedom is the refugee camp, a symptom of the modern refugee regime, created to control the legal figure of the refugee (Gatrell, 2013). It is a materialized "modern social imaginary" in the words of Charles Taylor (2004), where belongings and exclusions in society are imagined and produced. Therefore, as a specific intersection of media and communication history and refugee studies, this article focusses on media practices in the refugee camp.

The concept of "media practices", most eminently described by Nick Couldry, captures any lose, yet interrelated set of open-ended practices "oriented towards media and the role of media in ordering other practices in the social world" (Couldry, 2004, p. 115). Shifting attention to actions in relation to media allows for interrelational understandings of media and other social practices and their mutual influencing. This "decenter[ing of] media research from the study of media texts" (p. 117) is well suited to situate the refugee and their agency within the material and discursive power structures that camp internment produces. A media practice approach not only includes what people do with media but also what they "say in relation to media" (Couldry, 2010, p. 41). The inclusion of mediated discourses and imaginaries around the roles and functions of media technologies in the refugee camp is methodically helpful when seeking historical avenues. I grasp archival records as traces of media practices in the camp, including all kinds of mediated or media-influenced social practices, discourses, and imaginaries emerging from the camp (cf. similar methodologies in Gitelman, 2006; Marvin, 1990; Kaun, 2016).

Hence, an inquiry of "the open-ended range of practices focused directly or indirectly on media" (Couldry, 2004, p. 117) is a way to uncover the roles and functions of media and communication in pre-digital refugee camps. The examples below will map some of these, focusing especially on media activism (Mattoni, 2012; Pickard & Yang, 2017) and the voicing of demands as a media practice. In research on refugees and media, this approach to what refugees do with digital media has been recognised, too, as outlined above. However, to

contextualize the specificities of the digital, and to serve justice to the longue durée of forced migration and camp accommodation, we need to include empirical material that stands outside the digital.

3. The Heterotopian Space of the Refugee Camp

Refugees accommodated in camps are, spatially and socially, at the margins of media and communication and their histories. Yet, the camp produces a space, which, from the refugees' perspective, is a centre of communication. To understand the spatiality of the camp and how it affects media and communication, it has to be seen as a materially produced, and socially constructed, communicative space, where media practices take place; they are embedded into the spatial structures provided by the camp (cf. Despard, 2016).

In Germany, the regime at refugee camps and shelters has become ever tighter over the years (Gatrell, 2013). If all legal categories of forced migrants created in the post-WW2 refugee regime are counted, hundreds of thousands of refugees, expellees, asylum-seekers, or displaced persons have lived in a camp structure in Germany at some point[1]. These bureaucratic legal definitions, which "make" the figure of the refugee (Gatrell, 2013), are tied to the space of the camp, which controls forced migrants in space and time. Thereby, it is a "social imaginary" (Taylor, 2004), materializing the refugee regime.

To further comprehend how the spatial regime of the camp and media practices intersect, I draw on Foucault's (1997) notion of heterotopias, reading it as a space which enables new practices, politics, and agencies within the power dynamics of its control regimes. Heterotopias are arrangements of spaces with a function in society:

> [A] counter arrangement, of effectively realized utopia, in which…all the other real arrangements that can be found within society, are at one and the same time represented, challenged, and overturned: a sort of place that lies outside all places and yet is actually localizable. (p. 333)

Refugee camps are exactly these "absolutely other" spaces, created to uphold the refugee regime, and are thus "occupied by individuals whose behaviour deviates from the current average or standard" (p. 333), namely the "national order of things" (Malkki, 1995). Thus, they are heterotopias of deviation. The camps' function is to stand in an othering relation to the rest of spaces, by being an institutionalized space, which expresses inclusion and exclusion from the "normal", national society, by putting the refugees into forced immobility. Their function of separating people during the long wait of the asylum-seeking process also creates a heterotopian temporality of the space, or "heterochronism", which works for the refugees as a "total breach of their traditional time" (Foucault, 1997, p. 334). Ultimately, Foucault describes the heterotopian condition as "one thinks one has entered and, by the sole fact of entering, one is excluded" (p. 335), which holds true in a very literal sense for the refugees accommodated in camps.

Still, these spaces can actually be found at the centre of societies, of cities, and rural areas, and thus co-construct utopian imaginaries of (dis)belonging. What does this mean for media practices within the camps? On account that citizenship and political agency are constrained within the refugee regime, other practices have to be employed. As scholarship within refugee studies shows, for refugees, camps have been sites of community-building, a first safe haven, or transitory home, where new identity performances in situations of social arrest and uncertainty have taken place (Malkki, 1996; McLaren, 2010; Turner, 2016).

Media practices are part of these experiences of camp internment, and I, therefore, suggest that they should be understood as heterotopian, too. Firstly, a focus on media practices points at possibilities of agency and political engagement, emerging from the heterotopian space. Media can facilitate articulation and self-organization, of course within the power constraints of the camp and the refugee regime. In this sense, heterotopian media practices respond to the necessities and limitations that the space creates. They are extremely space-related in this context, as they emerge from the heterotopian conditions as outlined above. They are dependent on access to technology within the camp, or on permission only being granted for their use in certain rooms, as well as on the inherent limitations, such as lack of information and connectivity, which internment and immobility produce. Thereby, they are reactions to the heterotopia's functions of separating "deviants", creating new temporal regimes, and othering its occupants into exclusion and invisibility.

Heterotopias "always presuppose a system of opening and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable at one and the same time" (Foucault, 1997, p. 335). Refugee camps are not fully closed entities, certain practices and actors penetrate its boundaries. Media practices are communicatory forms of challenging this spatial regime, of crossing its fences and the refugee regime. The fight for connectivity and ways of communication, often in collaboration with activists and NGOs from outside, are such practices grown out of the heterotopian condition. For the occupants, the goal of certain media practices is hence to make the space less heterotopian, so to speak, to integrate it with the "normal" spaces around the camp through forms of mediated communication, as well as to fight the state of deviation and otherness.

[1] For the sake of readability, yet being aware of its problematic, the term "refugee camp" will be used for all state-run accommodation structures for refugees and asylum-seekers. "Refugee" will equally be used in an all-encompassing sense for all forced migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, not in its legal sense as having gained refugee status.

According to this reading of heterotopias, I want to argue that refugee camps are spaces which enact institutionalized power and undermine citizenship, yet they also provide space for practices, which act against such regimes of control, and emerge from the heterotopian condition. Heterotopian media practices are simultaneously tied to the limitations that the refugee regime produces within the camp space, as well as the subversive forms of negotiating different strategies to be able to cope with the traumatizing experiences of forced migration, internment, and immobility in the camp.

4. Methods and Cases

The archive material analyzed ranges from administrative documents to leaflets and magazines produced by refugees, volunteers, and activists; material included printed interviews, letters, photos, statistical data, minutes from meetings, as well as other sources (see archives in references). The files are archived in relation to a range of different refugee camps in West Germany and were chosen for analysis if they referred to any kind of media practice, as defined above. Qualitative content analysis was employed. The content of the files was categorized according to different forms of media practices (e.g., access to technology, need for connectivity, creation of public sphere etc.). This open coding was boiled down into repetitive concepts. I understand the sources as traces of media practices, which both give insights into discourses and imaginaries around roles and functions of media technologies and provide documentation of actual practices. While being, of course, incomplete and dependent on successful preservation, the variety of sources incorporates governmental sources from the top (State Archives) as well as refugees' and activists' voices from below (Archive for Social Movements). When combined, they complement each other and show the refugee regime as well as the resistance against it.

Refugee camps in West Germany from 1945 up to 2000 are representative of the Western refugee regime. First established in response to mass expulsions of WW1, refurbished after WW2, camp structures were developed further and are still intact today (Gatrell, 2013, p. 5). A multitude of legal regimes created different categories of refugee statuses in both German states, adapted to the respective political contexts. Camps ranged from large camps, almost suburban-like structures for post-WW2 expellees and refugees (who had German citizenship), to more closed institutions for foreign refugees, for example, from Hungary in 1956, or Vietnam and different African and Middle Eastern countries, or the Balkans, in the 1980s and 1990s. In these cases, the refugees had to dwell in institutionalized accommodation, while their asylum claims were processed. Unlike many camps in the Middle East or Africa, the structures were provided by the German state and strictly managed by authorities on site. Social benefits, legal procedures, food, and clothing supplies were organized there and were dependent on exact legislation and the status of the refugee (e.g., asylum-seeker with a pending case, accepted refugee, quota refugee, rejected but tolerated refugee). Changing terminologies reveal evolving political discourses and the tightening of the refugee regime, starting from "Flüchtlingslager" (refugee camp), to "Zentrale Anlaufstelle (ZASt)" (central contact point), "Notaufnahmelager" (emergency reception camp), "Durchgangslager" (transit camp), the derogative "Asylantenheim" (asylum-seeker camp), up to the now still common "Gemeinschaftsunterkunft" (common accommodation). Several thousand of these institutions existed in Germany across the time frame (Beer, 2014). Different laws regulated rights and duties, being revised multiple times into stricter versions with fewer benefits. For foreign asylum-seekers, separated accommodation in camps was set as a deliberate goal in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In East Germany, camps existed for returnees from the West as well as for Communist war refugees, for example, from Greece; they are however not considered in this article.

Living conditions in the camps were highly dependent on these legal regimes (see for overview Hochmuth & Bispinck, 2014; Neubauer, 1995). The architecture of the structures ranged from reused concentration camps, army barracks or simple huts, repurposed hotels or halls, to multiple-family houses or even village-like structures. As housing and administration of refugees are organized at the local level in Germany's federal system, a general account of camp conditions is impossible. However, we know from contemporary reports that conditions were dire. Refugees dwelled mostly in single or shared rooms, or small flats for families, living off a small monthly allowance, benefits in kind, or coupons. Food was either provided three times a day (usually in camps of first arrival, where the regime was often unaware of the various religions and nationalities of the refugees) or had to be cooked by the refugees themselves (in longer-term accommodation). For foreign refugees, working was usually forbidden. Often, staff from social charity organizations, or volunteers and activists, would provide points of contact with the outside world for the refugees, organizing leisure activities or providing legal counselling. Refugees were free to leave the camps, however, the district or commune could not be left. Often hygiene, fire safety, and general conditions were bad, mental health problems and suicide were normal. These dire conditions incorporated precarious privacy, and constant surveillance during long periods of waiting and doing nothing. A refugee, quoted in the source material, described it like this: "When you are an asylum-seeker, you live like in prison, but in prison, you can work a little. Not here, only eat and sleep and do bullshit" (Arbeitsgruppe Asylpolitik des Dritte Welt e.V., 1991; all quotes translated by the author).

In 1983, UNHCR filed a report about the conditions in West Germany's refugee camps (Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2008). The so-called "Toscani-report" heavily criticized the poor conditions in the seven camps that were

visited, causing a minor diplomatic row with the German government. The report clearly links specific policies in relation to the camps and asylum-processing to the bad performance in categories such as staff, community work, hygiene, legal counselling and mental health etc. They called out racist structures and concluded that "it was difficult to imagine how bad the conditions actually are in the centres in the FRG without actually seeing them" (Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2008, p. 163).

Within this context, the material collected points to a diverse range of media practices, including interpersonal contact with family and friends elsewhere, attempts to attain information and access to news, practices of witnessing and remembering, or practices of media activism in the form of voicing demands. Of course, these practices happen today, too. Yet, in pre-digital media environments, they had to be crafted and carried out by other means, leading to different power dynamics. The subsequent examples will firstly analyze how the heterotopian space of the camp affected media practices, and secondly how media activist practices, or the voicing of demands for and through media, emerged from the heterotopian condition as a prevalent practice in pre-digital times.

5. Media Practices in the Heterotopia

Unsurprisingly, camp-based refugees faced an extreme situation of information scarcity in pre-digital media environments as they do today. Responding to the lack of connectivity, instead of hunting signal or Wi-Fi, both refugees and camp administration found alternative media technologies.

In 1952, several refugee camps in West Berlin, accommodating refugees from the GDR, received 65 radios as a donation from the public service broadcaster NWDR in Hamburg. Previously, a government official had asked for the devices in a letter, describing how the lack of radios and news magazines created one of the biggest hardships: "being cut off from the outside world hits the inmates of the camps especially hard", the donation would be an "act of utmost philanthropy" (Eichler, 1952). The imaginaries around the functions of media technology put forward in this letter exchange show how access to information was deemed essential within the confines of the camp and its information precarity. Radio was the only medium at the time that could receive live broadcasts across national borders. Photos show how transistor radios in particular (and later portable TV-sets) were regular features in the refugees' private rooms so that broadcasts from their home countries could be listened to. Radios often were one of the first things newcomers would buy or trade within the camps.

The archival records demonstrate how media and communication opportunities were tied to the physical and architectural structures of the camps, they were included in the spatial conditions or invented in response to them. The transistor radios acted as mobile devices do today as they could easily be taken in case of relocation. A different kind of space-related media practice in the camp can be observed in the creation of designated spaces for communication: e.g. camp cinemas in the 1940s and 1950s, showing newsreels and light entertainment; or TV, radio and newspaper rooms as social gathering rooms. These are reminiscent of today's "Internet rooms", which Saskia Witteborn analyzes as sites for media use. They enable "technologically mediated sociality" (2014a, p. 356), by combining media use and the physical sharing of space to socialize. These possibilities were offered by the camp administration, this offering, however, enabled full control and surveillance of where and when certain media practices could take place. For example, in the so-called Valka-camp in Nuremberg, the main camp for foreigners after WW2, different cinema providers competed for time slots to play their films in the "theatre barracks". A letter from the camp manager to the government reveals that they closely scrutinized the selection of films, as they wanted to boost morale and democratic education among the residents, whereas the providers often brought popular, light entertainment movies (Gewerbebetriebe im Sammellager für Ausländer und Kantinen Allgemein, ca. 1950–1960).

In cases where spaces for specific necessary media practices were missing, this gap could often be filled by an alternative, as Figure 1 shows. Creatively improvising with the means at hand, camp residents in Friedland (1940s/1950s) developed a paper-based way of exchanging information, by posting small sheets of paper on the walls of the huts, mostly trying to find lost family members and friends. The walls and improvised blackboards became communication hubs, an exchange platform for information within and beyond the camp, for information which was desperately needed during the post-war disorientation. With time, these search ads switched medium and became a regular part of a West German radio program, where names and contact details of lost individuals were read out (Wagner, 2014).

Communication spaces and opportunities for media practices were both offered from above, by the camp structures and administration, thereby materializing the refugee regime in place—but also created from below, by the refugees themselves, often supported by volunteers and activists. Possibilities for media practices were a power play between these actors. They responded to the heterotopian condition, both through its othering and excluding dimension that created information precarity, as well as through the creative invention of other media practices which were necessary and responded to the spatial constraints.

If we move to the later context of the 1980s and 1990s, when the asylum legislation had been significantly tightened, camp accommodation was made obligatory for all newcomers, work was prohibited, long waiting times were the norm, and when racist attacks proliferated, we can also see that the control of media practices became stricter. Cinemas or other media-related spaces

Figure 1. Camp residents in Friedland communicating via blackboards and walls of the camp buildings (© Museum Friedland).

were no longer generally available. Only a few references in camps' house rules or inventory lists show that "newspapers in national language" or a TV-room were provided, (Gemeinschaftsunterkünfte und Flüchtlingswohnheime im Regierungsbezirk Braunschweig. 1982–1987, ca. 1982–1987). Media was no longer part of the basic provision and, in the case of camp telephones, the use of this communication technology was often even explicitly forbidden, or only granted in emergencies.

In this situation of high information precarity, the sources reveal the role of volunteers and activists in fighting for, enabling, as well as engaging in media practices for and with the refugees. Often stemming from a left-wing, anti-racist milieu, but also from Christian circles, they interacted with the heterotopian space from outside, stepping in to help:

> Incentives by us helpers to take over the flow of information inside the camp, were deemed positively. They need our material and personal support for that. To proceed in that, the refugees want a space outside the camp to meet. (Gruppe gegen Rassismus, 1993)

As the previous examples have already shown, the control of media practices in the camp was subject to struggle. Imaginaries and ascribed functions of media technologies show how access to certain information and media practices, be it news, legal counselling, entertainment, or personal contacts, is managed within and through space. In the example, activists and refugees fight to transgress the borders of the camp: A physical space outside the camp to manage information flows avoids control inside. In another case in Freiburg, volunteers created an "info café" in a student dorm outside the camp, enabling unsupervised distance and free speech for the refugees (UnterstützerInnengruppe, 1994). Similarly, a letter exchange from 1992 between a volunteer and the camp administration demonstrates that the struggle around access to media technologies was also a struggle to obtain opportunities for socializing and well-being. The activist group suggested to establish a "tea-room" in the camp:

> Refugees are dependent on up-to-date information from their home countries. This information has to reach the refugees – especially during the first months—in their mother tongue. Therefore, we want to offer them newspapers in several languages. Our idea is that the camp Blankenburg offers us a room for two hours per week. The reading time could then be a meeting point for refugees, including coffee and tea. (Zahedi & Walterfang, 1992)

Access to basic information, which today would be delivered through apps, probably used in their rooms, was fought for within the complicated power and communication structures of the camp. In the pre-digital media environment, the need for connectivity was filled by spatial solutions, by places and spaces where certain media practices counteracted information scarcity. In the case of the tea room, however, the reply from the camp manager was a two-page letter, listing bureaucratic reasons why such a tea-room would be completely impossible. He encouraged the volunteers to find facilities outside the camp, adding in a smug tone that it would offer the refugees a "meaningful alternative to their daily stroll around the city's shops" (Zahedi & Walterfang, 1992). Unlike the initial example of the radio donations in 1952, communication possibilities were again actively prevented by the camp administration.

This first step of the analysis shows how media practices were embedded in the heterotopian spatial structure of the camp, within and beyond its fences, circling around three central actors: refugees, administration and staff, as well as activists, situated within the systemic power structures of the refugee regime. Their media practices are both reproducing and contesting the heterotopia, using the possibilities of pre-digital media, and responding to these spatial and social power constraints.

6. Fighting out of the Heterotopia: Media Activist Practices

The heterotopian space of the camp affects the needs and functions of media technologies and respective practices. The examples so far have shown that spatial and power structures affect how pre-digital media practices could be enacted, but also how new practices became necessary. Especially, practices of protest, contention and critique against the effects of the refugee regime are discernible across the materials which were analyzed. These practices are closely tied to media practices and can be examined as media activist practices (Mattoni, 2012; Pickard & Yang, 2017).

The use of media in pre-digital camps was a question of availability and dependent on power structures the triangle of actors created. As media practices had to be actively fought for, they can be understood as intertwined forms of media activism, a concept from social movement studies, grasping the use of media and communication by activists (Pickard & Yang, 2017, pp. 1–5). Activists develop "repertoires of communication" (Mattoni, 2013), which include sets of media practices employed for specific purposes of mobilization.

In this context, I want to demonstrate how both the fight for media technology, i.e. the possibility of media practices, but also the voicing of critique and demands within the refugee regime, were forms of media activism. This includes media practices by both refugees and volunteers, which were used to fight for connectivity, access to media, or the re-negotiating power structures of communication and information in the camp.

As a first example for the negotiation of media practices, camp assemblies of refugees and administration served as a platform for the voicing of demands and critique. Preserved reports show how amidst general problems, such as food, accommodation, or permissions, media practices were also debated:

> Transcript of the discussion with the Hungarian refugees in the transition camp Finkenwerder, Friday, 11 January 1957....German newspapers and magazines are requested. The question if Hungarian music etc. is wished for, is strongly denied. They wish to be acquainted with German culture. Film screenings once a week like in other camps. (Finkenwerder Ungarnflüchtlinge, ca. 1956–1960)

These general assemblies were enacted public spheres within the camps, a form of communication themselves, and a forum for debating media practices, such as access to newspapers etc. Another source from 1993 documents how an assembly was pushed for by the refugees, after a letter with the refugees' demands was handed over to the management (Gruppe gegen Rassismus, 1993). Such demand lists or open letters, formulated by the camp residents, often (linguistically and practically) supported by activists, are well-preserved in the material. Their purpose was to create publicity and awareness of conditions in the camp and were often passed to the press. Concrete issues were protests against deportations, experiences of racism and abuse, bad living conditions and health care, but also the lack of connectivity and the fight for media:

> Public declaration of the refugees in the camp....The 280 refugees living there don't even have a phone booth to contact family and friends. There are no common rooms, where refugees could meet and socialize, read, or watch TV (UnterstützerInnengruppe, 1994)

> List of shortcomings by Iranian women....There is no library, no newspapers. Radios are missing and a TV (a few have private devices), the TV room is always locked, almost all devices are broken, they are not repaired....Too few telephones, only four booths, not enough for all residents. (Anderes lernen e.V., 1996)

Demand lists, often handed over at assemblies, are a form of political action, of fighting for and re-negotiating power in the heterotopia. They document conditions in the camp, by mediating them and making them available to broader audiences beyond the camp. In Friedland, refugees even elected representatives, who would manage communication with the administration. In the pre-digital environment, paper-based lists, open letters, leaflets or magazines were the main form of media activist practices emerging from the camps. These

were one part of the refugees' and activists' "repertoire of communication" (Mattoni, 2013). Connected to this repertoire are other magazines, documentation and reports of camp life or of camp visits, photo collections or even exhibitions, mostly emerging from the activist scene. Under titles such as "I don't know if I can ever laugh again. Bosnian refugees in Hermannsburg tell their stories" (Runder Tisch Hermannsburg, 1994) or "18 weeks of refugee struggle, Neumünster, Greifswald, Norderstedt. A documentation" (Autonome Info Gruppe Kiel, 1992), conditions and voices in the camps were made public. These represent another goal of media activist practices; aiming to show the public and provide insight into the neglected space of the camp as well as to give witness to the refugees' experiences. In analogue media environments possibilities for refugees to have a voice and to create publicity themselves, to managing their perceptibility (Witteborn, 2014b) and to create new "reclaimant narratives" (Bishop, 2018) against negative media coverage, were mostly restricted to paper-based documentation. The invitation of mass media representatives or politicians into the camp was part of this tactic of presenting the problems of camp accommodation to wider circles to foster support.

The story of one concrete camp exemplifies in more detail, what has been elaborated so far. The "Hotel Astoria" in Göttingen had been repurposed as an asylum-seeker accommodation from 1982 to 1991. Due to its generally awful conditions, it quickly turned into a notorious "cauldron of unrest...from which the virus of resistance spread" (Arbeitsgruppe Asylpolitik des Dritte Welt e.V., 1991). The camp was permanently in the press for changing managers (in total 7), including one case of sexual abuse and a very negative report by the health department. Usually, around 130 refugees from 18 different nationalities lived in the "hotel". Things culminated in February 1986 when the residents decided to boycott the in-house grocery shop. The local asylum law had changed the benefits from cash to coupons, following a "principle of material goods". The refugees announced their protest firstly against the shop, which sold overpriced food that had gone off, and secondly, demanded to receive their benefits in cash. A demonstration was organized, leaflets and a protest-telegram informed politicians, media, and the general public. On 6 February, they entered an open-ended hunger strike. The residents had been heavily supported by a local activist group, and during the hunger strike even UNHCR heard about the situation, expressed their support and called for the end of the coupon policy. On 12 February, a camp assembly was held with visiting politicians, the refugees, the mass media, and activists, providing an opportunity for a heated debate about the situation. Further protests against the coupon-system were organized, including a system in which activists would buy food and coupons from the refugees, meaning they effectively got cash. It was ended in 1987. The hotel burned down in 1989 and was finally closed in 1991.

This short history of this specific case illustrates how in the pre-digital era, media activism was created in reaction to the specific (awful) conditions of the space. Especially, the creation of publicity, including interactions with mass media (here, different local newspapers and the public-service broadcaster NDR), was a common practice of high importance, as visibility and publicity successfully created pressure to improve conditions. Leaflets, open letters and demand lists by refugees, activists, and even the social workers in the camp document the protests as traces of media practices. Many preserved newspaper articles document the mediated discourse about this specific camp, sometimes including voices of refugees, who tried to affect narratives and perceptions about themselves, e.g. in interviews in activist magazines or newspapers (cf. Bishop, 2018). The examples illustrate specifically "relational media practices", which Mattoni (2013, pp. 48–50) describes as adapted, tailored interactions with media technologies, outlets and professionals, that activists engage in. Here, the specific technologies of dissemination have been chosen to create both publicity in different circles and communication against the powerful actors in the administration.

The range of examples shows how pre-digital media activist practices have been fostered by the heterotopian space of the refugee camp. The lack of connectivity and other dire conditions which the refugee regime produces have been responded to through media activist practices, as a form of heterotopian media practices. They can be mapped into different categories, fighting for different rights. Firstly, different demands were mediated in the form of paper-based or telegraphed lists and open letters, but also in the production of wider-circulated magazines or leaflets. These media practices were mainly addressing the bad living conditions in the camps, fighting for the right of humane treatment. Secondly, the possibility of media practices themselves was fought for, the necessary media infrastructure. When asking for "better ways of communication" (Gruppe gegen Rassismus, 1993), the right to communication was to be achieved, just as today e.g. hacker activists help to set up Wi-Fi networks in refugee camps (Kubitschko & Schütz, 2016). And thirdly, through the creation of media, which could cross the boundaries of the camp, injustices and experiences, such as the clear lack of media and information or the horrendous costs of phone calls, could be made public, and protests could be documented (e.g. in the case of hunger strikes). Interviews with refugees were published in magazines, everyday life was documented, but much more importantly, mass media were included to create visibility and political pressure. Media activist practices hence helped to push these voices outside of the camp, and mediate and document them, when general information precarity hampered self-articulation and media use in the way we know it from digital technologies today. These media practices ought to support a right to appropriate representation.

7. Conclusion

This article has showcased historical trajectories to "refugee crises" and their interrelation to media and communication. The refugee camp is a space and place, where roles and functions of media in forced migration can be studied historically. It is where analogue and digital media have been used, imagined, fought for, or created—responding to evolving refugee regimes and media environments in a heterotopian space.

In pre-digital media environments of refugee camps in West Germany, media practices were dependent on spatial and social power structures, created and subverted by camp administration, refugees, and activists. Opportunities, spaces, and access to and for media practices and respective technologies were provided, yet at the same time restricted, by the camp structure and administration, as well as fought for and created by refugees and volunteers. Heterotopian media practices emerged, which responded to the spatial restrictions and conditions, which the refugee regime had put the refugees in. In the earlier post-war period and 1950s, material spaces for media and communication, such as camp cinemas, were the norm and opportunities for media practices were created by the administration. By the 1980s and 1990s, media technology was no longer a part of a camp's inventory and possibilities for media practices had to be achieved much more actively. In response to the lack of connectivity and access to media, media activist practices, especially the mediated voicing of demands and the creation of public awareness as media practices, demonstrate how "communication rights" (Leurs, 2017) were fought for; they happened both within the power structures of the refugee regime, and the affordances of the analogue environment. The appropriation of different ways of communicating and the struggle for access to media technologies adapted to the needs of those fighting against information precarity. As a heterotopia, the camp's pre-digital media environment was both maintained control and social arrest, while being undermined by media activism. The media practices analyzed show how the heterotopian conditions of exclusion, othering and deviation were counteracted by drawing upon mediated communication to render the space visible to the wider world and connect it to spaces within the surrounding society. The different actors manoeuvred around the limited temporal and spatial affordances of pre-digital media within the space of the camp, trying to traverse it. Although Koen Leurs' (2017) concept of "communication rights", based on young refugees' smartphone use, focuses on the digital, it provides a perspective on agency, but also on political, social, and cultural limitations affecting refugees' media practices. Digging back into the pre-digital era has shown how communication rights have also been fought for in the past. Media technologies, such as telephones, radios, newspapers, but also letters, magazines, and leaflets, were drawn upon to obtain news, reach loved-ones, or create visibility and give witness to the oppressive structures of the refugee regime. If these findings are compared to the categories describing "information precarity" (Wall et al., 2017) today, it becomes clear that basic media infrastructures had to be established first to be able to access any information, but also to individually mediate communication. This created more direct threats of surveillance and social control by the administration, to enable them to prevent media practices. However, the general experiences of information insecurity—or even the mere lack of any media technology—are very similar, regardless of the technological environment. And moreover, both historically and today, these experiences are reacted to with specific media (activist) practices.

Ultimately, this article shows that it is exactly through this historical insight into the fight for media practices, that the functions and conflicts around media and communication within the heterotopian space of the refugee camp become visible. Of course, this is only a first step to pinpoint the historical trajectories of media practices within forced migration contexts and more detailed discussion, for example, around dimensions of gender or race, are needed, and must be methodically combined with oral history interviews. However, as this first study shows, historical perspectives allow us to reconfigure our understanding of digital media and ask which new problems and opportunities they have really put forward in the realm of forced migration today. We can ask more rigorously whether some of these experiences and problems have already been solved in the past, or even whether certain problems have rather emerged from other, not directly media-related historical contexts of ever-evolving refugee regimes.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Citizenship Islands: The Ongoing Emergency in the Mediterranean Sea

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Abstract
I present the concept of "citizenship islands" to analyze the ongoing emergency in the Mediterranean Sea. Citizenship islands are based on the idea of "nonplaces" for noncitizens who are both constantly present and invisible. Citizenship islands are a test of what is to come, as noncitizens such as migrants and refugees continue to arrive, even as countries refuse their right of entry and of seeking asylum. Based on research in Lampedusa, I argue that as understandings of citizenship change, the ongoing emergency in the Mediterranean Sea forces a focus on noncitizens. What is happening around discourses of citizenship, mobility, and migration requires new language to describe and analyze what is already happening, and to theorize new research tools for the future. Nonplaces invite a paradox between visibility and invisibility, between in-dependence and inter-dependence, highlighting the importance of language in characterizing the experience of migrants and refugees and how that language shapes relationships between newcomers/noncitizens and already established residents/citizens.

Keywords
citizenship; Mediterranean Sea; migrants; mobility; noncitizens; nonplaces; refugees

Issue
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1. Introduction

After a peak in arrivals in 2015, when Europe as a continent was caught off-guard by the influx of migrants and refugees, countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain, scrambled to address the crisis. The images have been in newsfeeds around the world: migrants arriving in boats in the Mediterranean; visa-bearing citizens detained at airports; children being separated from their parents or dying while in custody; environmental refugees leaving places where water and food are already scarce; people in the streets demanding rights for noncitizens. But these are only some of the visible and dramatic images of the ongoing crisis. The policies of dealing with the influx of migrants and refugees presume various states of invisibility, in which individuals are whisked away from public view under ironically named "welcome centers". This paradox of visibility and invisibility emerges in current discourses around migrants and refugees. Countries such as Italy and Greece, along with the rest of Europe, are often in the limelight for sensational arrivals, but the migrants and refugees' matriculation through the processing system is largely unseen. Even in the streets of Lampedusa, a small Italian island north of Libya, migrants walk peacefully among residents and tourists, only to board a ferry to mainland Italy after a few days, where they are discreetly distributed across the country. As of now, however, the dramatic arrivals are under threat. In 2018, the controversy over boat rescues in the Mediterranean left numerous migrants at sea, with more than 2,000 officially reported dead or missing, many more unaccounted for, as nations such as Italy and Malta denying entry at ports (see UNHCR, 2019).

This article presents the concept of "citizenship islands" to theorize the ongoing emergency in the Mediterranean Sea. Based on field studies in Italy in 2016, 2017, and 2018, with a specific focus on the island of Lampedusa, interviewing migrants and refugees, I explore what I define as "nonplaces". Nonplaces are marked by the absence of what citizens of most Western nations

may take for granted: basic legal protections, access to education and health care, even with large disparity, access to political rights that guarantee agency and participation in the democratic and deliberative practices. In a nonplace, the basic legal rights and protections are not guaranteed by a sovereign nation to noncitizens, based on their status as citizens or residents of another nation.

Parts of Lampedusa, Lesbos, Kos, Samos, and other islands serve as nonplaces, both constantly present, engaged, and aware, yet invisible. Throughout short-term and long-term welcome centers in Italy, from small towns and large cities in the North, to rural and urban areas in Sicily, and throughout Lampedusa, we met migrants, refugees, volunteers, local officials and residents who were willing to share their stories. In this article, I use the example of Lampedusa to theorize citizenship islands. The balance between the now-in-peril duty to rescue migrants and refugees at sea and the ever-more-common passive response without a plan for short-term or long-term care, echoes an isolation that is familiar to many islanders, a do-it-yourself survival attitude. Yet, in a crisis of this scope, even the small receiving islands need help from the mainland governments. The now stalled, yet familiar process of arrival and removal from the island and the recent development of refusal of entry in Italian ports reveal the bureaucratic strain that leaves migrants and refugees with nowhere to go, stuck in nonplaces. I argue that citizenship islands are a test of what is to come. Nonplaces are becoming the new norm, as mobility becomes commonplace (see Kight, 2018), and noncitizens such as migrants and refugees continue to arrive.

The examples from Lampedusa force a re-invention of the status and placement of noncitizens. What is happening around discourses of citizenship, mobility, and migration requires new language to describe what is already happening and ways to research future developments in mobility. The language migrants, refugees, and those around them use matters, as it shapes the understanding of their experience, the relationship between newcomers/noncitizens and already established residents/citizens in the counties of arrival, and the policies that regulate their movement.

To that end, this article, first describes noncitizens—the ones identified in the news as refugees, migrants, asylum seekers—as people on the move with or without legal and political rights. They may also be nationals of countries that have abandoned them. Second, I argue that noncitizens exist in nonplaces where they live abandoned, in what I define as "citizenship islands". The process of abandonment is more evident in islands such as Lampedusa, reflecting the paradox of visibility and invisibility, in-dependence and inter-dependence, which is heightened in a state of perpetual emergency.

2. Noncitizens

A citizen is usually a person who has a legal, political, social, and economic affiliation with a specific nation-state, either by natural birth, based on either blood (jus sanguinis) or soil (jus soli), or by naturalization (Benhabib & Resnik, 2009). Citizenship often assumes more than legal rights and duties; it comes with a sense of belonging, rooted in shared language, cultural beliefs, habits, and rituals. As opposed to a citizen, a noncitizen "is someone who is not a member of a state nor owes allegiance to the state he or she currently resides" (University of Minnesota Human Rights Center, n.d.). The terms that describe noncitizens include stateless people, asylum seekers, third country nationals, refugees, migrants, and the more controversial aliens, denizens, illegal, irregular, undocumented citizens, or even "shadow citizens" (Yarwood, 2014, p. 61; see also Said, 2002).

Noncitizens also include expats, émigrés, and other professionals who work and live in a nation other than where they were born. The definition of noncitizens as other than a citizen covers a wide range of people in very different conditions, from asylum seeker to business traveler. The status of noncitizen also covers a long range of time, from short-term, temporary, such as an exchange student or a banker on assignment, to long-term, permanent moves, such as a refugee who leaves her country never to return. Noncitizens also vary in their agency and ability to move, ranging from those who chose to work abroad to those who are forced out of their country of origin (see Adey, 2016; Bloom, 2018; Sassen, 1999a, 1999b; Stonebridge, 2018; Tonkiss & Bloom, 2015; Wigley, 2018).

These definitions capture the understanding of citizenship as a legal possession (de jure), but also question how and why citizenship can be a performed practice (de facto; see Asen, 2004; Rufo & Atchison, 2011) when tied to a place where noncitizens may have no legal rights, but can participate in the community. I focus on noncitizens as those who leave or are forced to leave their home nation because of war, conflict, political unrest, or other conditions that inhibit their ability to stay. Even when noncitizens leave hoping to return, they often have no option of going home, making their move to other nations involuntary and permanent (our interviews with migrants and refugees reflected this pattern). The noncitizens in this definition, as Benhabib and Resnik (2009) note, "sit outside that circle of rights and obligations" allowed to citizens residing in a nation-state. While the relationship between citizens and their nation is "reciprocal", as citizens are "recognized as members entitled to rights, protection, material support, and political loyalty", noncitizens' relationship to the nation where they reside, is one of exclusion (Benhabib & Resnik, 2009, p. 2). Balibar (2015, pp. 15–35) discusses a "dual violence" toward noncitizens who experience both a sense of non-belonging and a recognition of an "us" vs "them" approach, positioning citizens against noncitizens (see also Salter, 2007; Anderson, 2013).

The definitions for noncitizens matter because they shape the way others, including the media, address them and make policies for/about them (Biella, 2018; Dell'Orto

& Wetzstein, 2019). The legal definitions of various types of noncitizens are based on two important principles: the freedom of movement (in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, article 13) and the duty of hospitality (in article 14). From Albert Einstein to Sigmund Freud, Gloria Estefan to Madeline Albright, noncitizens have the right to leave their country (as citizens) and seek refuge elsewhere. The receiving nations have some legal duties to host noncitizens and allow them the opportunity to seek asylum, but they also hold the right to reject their requests for permanent resettlement.

I argue that there are two types of noncitizens: the dependent noncitizen and the hyper noncitizen. The two types of citizenship capture how discourses around noncitizens shape how others treat them, individually and politically. Scholars of human rights, migration, race, post-colonialism, and post-modernism have written about the dichotomy between the good and the bad immigrant, the model minority and the dangerous threat (Lyon, 2013; Sassen, 1999a, 1999b). The definitions of dependent noncitizen and hyper noncitizen generate from Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), who writes about exile and the noncitizens who move for political, geopolitical, humanitarian, and economic reasons. Refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Sudan, Mozambique, and migrants who move within at times non-defined borders, or socio-political confines, often become either dependent noncitizens or hyper noncitizens. For this dichotomy, I start with Agamben's return to classical Greek, with Aristotle and Sophocles, in *Antigone*, where he sees the oxymoron "*ypsipolis apolis*" (literally, superpolitical-apolitical). Agamben's argument focuses on how and why the one who is outside the polis is both inferior to a human and stronger than he is (Agamben, 1998).

Adding to Agamben's paradoxical, lose-lose positioning of the outsider as always otherized, both my definitions of noncitizens, as either dependent or hyper, are not alternatives to Agamben's taxonomy. Rather, my definitions highlight a state of abandonment (*al bando*), as citizens distance themselves from noncitizens as always outside of the traditional legal and social contracts (Agamben, 2005, pp. 34–35). The definitions as noncitizens capture key characteristics of survival necessary in a nonplace such as refugee camp, a welcoming center, or other temporary spaces for migrants and refugees, where citizenship is neither possession nor performance. In a state of abandonment, with no national or governmental support, the dependent noncitizen relies on national, international, supra-national organizations for aid, shelter, food, and health care. In contrast, the hyper noncitizen must "rise above" as superhuman to survive. The hyper noncitizen may gain legal status first as an asylum seeker (an option also for the dependent noncitizen) before becoming a full-fledged, integrated, functional member of the community.

The process of naming noncitizens as either dependent or hyper defines their status (especially between asylum seekers and economic migrants) and their identity as either expendable or desirable. Examples of definitions that lead to policies about noncitizens and who they become politically include Angela Merkel's now infamous and contested welcome to more than a million Syrian refugees in 2015 ("We can do it"; see Dell'Orto & Wetzstein, 2019). Other defining moments include Denmark passing legislation to seize refugees' possession to cover their expenses; Sweden closing its bridge to Denmark for migrants; Hungary's Prime Minister Orban closing its borders and calling for a referendum on immigration; the European Union deals with Turkey and Libya, stalling refugees and migrants who arrive there, preventing them from reaching European Union nations; and Australia keeping migrants and refugees away from its shore, either at Nauru or at sea. The recent loss of a navigating license and eventual seizure of the *Aquarius*—one of the most visible, bright orange rescue ships in the Mediterranean—is the latest example of marking noncitizens as more than expendable, as a continent refuses noncitizens even the basic human right of rescue at sea.

The limiting definition of noncitizens as either dependent (with possible positive and negative valence) or hyper (also possibly negative or positive, but mostly positive) reduces stories into categories that determine how citizens engage with noncitizens. The classification as either expendable or desirable is always contingent upon legal arguments that can activate rights for those who seek asylum based on a combination of horror stories and proof of exceptionality. Examples of migrants and refugees as dependent noncitizens often mark them in urgent need of help, not necessarily desirable, but not expendable either. Hyper noncitizens include those who speak English or the language of the host countries; they may have an advanced education or the desire to be educated or trained professionally. The hyper noncitizen is desirable but also at risk of expendability, because there is no urgent need. This paradox positions all noncitizens as "others". A few examples from Lampedusa include numerous stories of young women arriving pregnant, as a result of sexual assault in Libya. We heard from both migrants and volunteers that captors and smugglers would force pregnant women on boats when close to term. In a few cases, these women gave birth at sea. A volunteer medical assistant explained that women, and their newborns, along with other medical emergencies, were often transported to hospitals in Sicily. As dependent noncitizens, women, children, and urgent medical cases got immediate attention and a ride off the island, only to be placed in welcome centers elsewhere, as their status as noncitizens persisted.

We also met a former professional soccer player from a Western African nation. He had spent several months traveling through Africa and had been waiting in Lampedusa for almost a month. He was confident that his skills, his education, and his fluent English would make him stand out from the hundreds of other young men in a similar situation. His plan was not to stop, or

be stopped, in Italy, as he had friends waiting for him in Germany, where he would hopefully go back to training on the football pitch. As a hyper noncitizen, his narrative of success and resilience made him confident in his ability to persuade the legal authorities that he could contribute again, just like he did in his native country. Nevertheless, as a noncitizen, his athleticism and confidence did not protect him from waiting among many others.

From stories in the streets of Lampedusa, the definition of noncitizens as dependent, hyper, positions them as "other", separated from citizens, local authorities, and volunteers who respond to them based on this paradoxical classification. Noncitizens, be they in need of help as dependent, or ready to contribute as hyper, still have to present themselves as easy-to-categorize options. The limits of a definition that only captures being an outsider highlight the tie to nationhood as the only acceptable way to be a citizen. Both sad and success stories reveal the noncitizens' vulnerability, their status as outsiders who still must start from scratch, stuck in a nonplace.

3. Nonplaces

The island metaphor highlights the lack of citizenship rights for both dependent noncitizens and hyper noncitizens within a nonplace. In a nonplace, "the right to have rights" (Arendt, 1958) is absent, and migrants and refugees are noncitizens who always have to prove that they belong (Arendt, 1943). In political nonplaces, rules that regulate interactions have high impact on passers-by, migrants and refugees who are defined by a lack of rights and benefits from whence they come, legally determining their status as in legitimate need of asylum to escape possible atrocities.

The definition of nonplace emerges from Marc Augé, who defines a nonplace as a "space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity" (Augé, 1995, p. 63). Nonplaces become "the real measure of our time" (Augé, 1995, p. 64). Building on what de Certeau had defined as a nonplace, Augé argues that mobility is a key feature of a nonplace, as places turn into "passages" where movement is the norm (Augé, 1995, p. 69). Augé's examples of nonplaces include airports, supermarkets, but also "extended transit camps where the planet's refugees are parked" (Augé, 1995, p. 28).

Nonplaces challenge the assumption that there is a home, where language and identity are based on the discourses of those who established what he calls "anthropological places". The home-bound story becomes a "half fantasy", "the fantasy of a founded, ceaselessly refounding place is only a 'semi-illusion'", because mobility is the norm (Augé, 1995, pp. 38–39). Where people are born, by chance or through the stories which become the identity of the place we may call home, people exist through only memories, rituals, and language (Augé, 1995, p. 47). Nonplaces emerge in relation to "certain ends" such as transport or leisure, and "the relation individuals have with these spaces" (Augé, 1995, p. 76). Augé writes that "certain places exist only through the words that evoke them" as nonplaces, imaginary places whose myths, images, texts make them what they are, even as they regulate behavior and movement (signs that order "no entry" and "no smoking" in airports; Augé, 1995, p. 77). Since nonplaces are there to be passed through, they are not only the measure of our time, but they are measured in units of time: how long are we there for? (Augé, 1995, pp. 83–84). Nonplaces exist in what Augé calls an "acceleration of history" (Augé, 1995, p. 23). This excess in time and space creates a new understanding of identity, for individuals who exist in a place defined by meaning, relationship to others, and a new view on mobility.

Augé argues, however, that nonplaces are non-political, unlike citizenship islands, which are political. Nonplaces are a form of "smooth space", a "horizonless milieu" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 379) for nomadic existence, always "in between" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 380–381) an intermezzo. Noncitizens in nonplaces are like a rhizome, no roots, no beginning and no end, only in between, no end goal and no origin story, and no long-lasting relationship. Their stories are a series of truncated conjunctions (…and…and…and…). The metaphors of the nomad, traveler, desert, island exist not just as an exercise in thinking that pushes an imagining of what life is "as" a nomad. They are an invitation to understand why and how meaning emerges in nonplaces, how and why power dynamics shape noncitizens and reinforce their positionality as abandon*ed* and citizens as the ones abandon*ing* (see Chavez, 2014, 2015; Duneier, 2016; Hauser, 2012; Nevins, 2018).

4. Citizenship Islands

Citizenship islands are geographically and metaphorically isolated from a land, other citizens, and assistance from government and nongovernmental agents. They often escape media attention. I argue that, in addition to *non-place-ness*, citizenship islands are also marked by the paradox between visibility and invisibility, and independence and inter-dependence. As I develop these concepts around language to theorize noncitizenship and non-place-ness, I use examples from interviews we conducted in the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018. We met about 50 migrants and refugees, 20 local residents and volunteers, 20 international agencies/NGOs workers, and 20 local government officials. We asked them to share their stories and experience. We distributed surveys to ask about the migrants' life before they traveled to Lampedusa, but the open-question method resulted in more meaningful conversations, after the initial survey, lasting from 20 minutes to 2 hours. Most of the migrants and refugees we met in Lampedusa were from various nations in Africa (Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan), mostly young

males, as young as 14 and as old as 50, with most of them in their 20s. In Northern Italy and across Sicily, we also met migrants and refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, in addition to the same countries listed above. We interviewed only migrants who spoke Italian, English, or French, without translators. While we engage the data in other projects, in the next sections, I only include examples from our interviews to demonstrate how and why noncitizens exist in nonplaces.

4.1. Islands as Nonplaces

The non-place-ness of islands such as Lampedusa, similar to other islands where migrants and refugees land, marks their temporary status because neither the passers-by nor the authorities have the desire to stay. As Pugliese (2009) narrates, Lampedusa has a history as part of the penal archipelago in the South of Italy, on the border with Africa. On the island stands the symbolic Gate of Lampedusa, Gate of Europe, a monument dedicated by artist Mimmo Paladino to the dead and missing migrants (see Figures 1 and 2), ambiguously open as a welcome and a farewell. Lampedusa's history as a nonplace for out-laws makes it part of what Khrebtan-Hörhager (2015, p. 88) calls "the turbulent Italian south" which "faces a 'double trouble': as if being the backyard of Europe would not be challenging enough, the tiny island of Lampedusa—the infamous 'unsafe harbor'—currently serve as the troublesome gates of Europe". She adds that Lampedusa "is one of the nearest gateways to Europe for Africans fleeing poverty and conflict" (see also Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2013) making it an island marked by non-place-ness, time-less-ness, and possible law-less-ness.

Citizenship islands are nonplaces because the relationship between citizens and noncitizens are framed by the limited stay and eventual movement. In Lampedusa, we spoke with many residents who, regardless of their view on immigration, had been welcoming people who came to their shore for more than 30 years. In an island of fishermen, one Red Cross volunteer who was at the center of the 2013 accident that left about 360 dead and who helped rescue 13 (out of the 150 survivors) on his boat, said that island people know the sea. They know it well enough to respect it, so they understand that nobody would take the risk of crossing if they were not desperate. When people arrived on the tiny island after the Arab Spring, residents in Lampedusa opened their homes, shared pasta in large tables in the street, and allowed the migrants and refugees to shower in their bathrooms. When the 2013 disaster happened, a local official told us that there were literally not enough coffins to bury the dead. They had to wait for days before coffins arrived from the mainland. Death proved an inconvenience in an island of 6,000, where migrants and refugees, whether dead or alive, are only there temporarily.

As a citizenship island, Lampedusa is a nonplace for migrants and refugees who arrive there as their port of entry, in transition to the next destination. In Figure 3, migrants and refugees are entering the harbor in Lampedusa, after being transferred from the ship that rescued them at sea. This is the first step in a series of transfer from nonplace to nonplace for migrants and

Figure 1. Porta di Lampedusa, Porta d'Europa/Gate of Lampedusa, Gate of Europe, by Mimmo Paladino, 2008. Photo taken by the author in May 2017.

Figure 2. Porta di Lampedusa, Porta d'Europa/Gate of Lampedusa, Gate of Europe (detail), by Mimmo Paladino, 2008. Photo taken by the author in May 2017. The caption reads: "A monument to the migrants who deceased and disappeared in the sea".

Figure 3. Lampedusa, May 2017. Used with permission from Red Cross Volunteer.

refugees, most of them from various African countries, their black skin immediately marking them as strangers, outsiders, noncitizens (see Fanon, 2008), in contrast to the white Red Cross volunteers.

The status of migrants and refugees as temporary passers-by, even for those who remain on the island for hundreds of days or the few who make Lampedusa a home, remains as noncitizens even as they move North through Italy and Europe, existing in masked presence and visible neglect. For example, in Figure 4, migrants and refugees line up, waiting for the send-off in a commercial ferry to Porto Empedocle, Sicily. They arrive in green military buses, exit in orderly lines, and wait patiently for the ferry, embarking before all other passengers. Their race, and in most cases their gender and age, as they are mostly young black males, highlight them as "others". Frantz Fanon powerfully describes the "*visible appearance*" that makes them "watched" (Fanon, 2008, p. 18). The migrants are guarded, controlled, shuffled through the process of departure in ways that dehumanize them as cargo. While in line, everyone stayed silent, following the rules of the transition, marked as

Figure 4. Lampedusa, June 2017, taken by the author.

another step in the migrants' non-place-ness as outsiders, outlaws, others.

The non-place-ness characterizes both their origin and their destination. In Lampedusa, we met young men who paused, quietly mentioned Libya and the length of time there, suggesting an unspoken understanding of incredible hardship. Their journey before the waiting period in Libya took months, with no option of turning back. After the boat rescue that got them to the tiny Italian island, many young men spoke of going to the mainland as their next stop, on their way to northern Italy, Germany, or meeting relatives in the UK, but without the certainty of a secure path there.

4.2. Islands as Visible and Invisible

In-visibility, as connected to the rhetorical trope of *ennoia*, the rhetorical strategy of masking the present, is another characteristic of a citizenship island. The move is masking while exposing, holding back information even when the meaning is made apparent, as citizens help noncitizens and ask for help, but simultaneously carry on as if they were not there. Migrants and refugees are ubiquitous in Italy, Greece, and across Europe, yet they seem invisible to citizens. Their invisibility is paradoxically visible in the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, those who never made it to Lampedusa. Writing in 2015, Khrebtan-Hörhager (2015, p. 92) noted that "death is the most commonly used word in the current discourse of Lampedusa crisis". Even before the term crisis was used to describe the increase in arrivals, she argued that "there is hardly anything more real than the countless stories of normative human deaths of anonymous alien African bodies in the Mediterranean" (Khrebtan-Hörhager, 2015, p. 92). Although in the first 3 months of 2019, deaths are down, compared to the past 4 years, mostly due to harsh policies of refusal of entry by European governments, the number of confirmed deaths soared over 5,000 in 2016, and averaged about 3,000 in 2015, 2017, and 2018, according to the Missing Migrants Project, totaling about 20,000 death in the last 10 years (see also Olivieri et al., 2018). There are many more migrants who go missing and unreported. While those who make it to Lampedusa are the lucky ones, the invisibility of their "anonymous alien African bodies" (Khrebtan-Hörhager, 2015, p. 92) persists.

In nonplaces, migrants and refugees exist as temporary, non-permanent passers-by with no rights and benefits, even as NGOs and international organizations provide shelter, food, and basic medical assistance. In both official and unofficial camps, short-term hot spots and long-term welcome centers, the presence of migrants and refugees is hidden in plain sight, always at the margins of cities (Athens, Milan), abandoned airports (Ellinikon), unused parts of busy ports (Pireus), and islands. The geographic position of islands such as Lampedusa places them "naturally" on the trajectory of migrants and refugees, but even on these small masses of land on the sea, migrants and refugees reside in nonplaces at the outskirt of villages, away from where citizens, residents, and tourists stay (see Bayraktar, 2012). Pugliese (2009), following Foucault's heteretopia, defines "asheterotopic space" as one marked by invisibility, "the absolutely other space, the penal colony". He argues that these spaces, or nonplaces, become "invisibilized and unintelligible within the enframing discourse of

Western tourism". In Lampedusa, while vacationers were in plain sight on the beaches and throughout the city center, migrants and refugees walked through a hole in a fenced wall to escape "the squalor and suffering of the immigration prison" (Pugliese, 2009, p. 673).

The welcoming center in Lampedusa is not a detention center, even if regulated by police. Technically, the center does not allow migrants and refugees to leave, but the unwritten rule is that they can come and go from an "open" fence in the back. During our days in Lampedusa, migrants and refugees walked freely in the main street, made calls at an internet café, and waited in line at a local church where they could search through donated clothes and shoes. We were among the few nonlocals to engage them. The residents paid no attention to them, seemingly used to them as they are of each other, just as they would ignore anything else that is always there. Besides a local man warning the young woman/co-researcher to be aware of the migrants, and a few puzzled looks when we sat to talk, the local residents ignored the groups of mostly young men strolling through the streets. The migrants who talked to us were open to share their stories. As Khrebtan-Hörhager (2015) argues in her analysis of the Lampedusa-based film *Terraferma*: "The immigrants are either still or quiet, they are longing, instead: longing to belong to the world, profoundly marked by diminishing humanity as the meta-cause of institutionalized Othering in all its manifestations" (Khrebtan-Hörhager, 2015, p. 94). The invisibility of their presence was far from neutral. Shortly after we visited Lampedusa in 2017, the residents elected a new right-wing mayor who had campaigned on an anti-immigration platform, ousting the award-winning mayor who had made it a priority to rescue and welcome migrants.

The contrast of highly visible cases in Lampedusa, such as the October 2013 shipwreck, and the daily invisibility of the migrants and refugees is politically orchestrated by the Italian government and European Union officials, including Frans Timmermans, the European commission's first vice-president, who recently declared that the migration crisis is over (Smith, 2019). As Giannacopoulos, Marmo and de Lint (2013, p. 561) argue, writing about high profile cases in Lampedusa and Australia:

> These militarised *rescue* missions not only function to normalise exclusions at the borders of the global North, but set in place a climate of fear and silence that functions to *disappear* the real structuring dimensions of migratory movements, thereby curbing the possibility of moving towards equitable resolutions in the global governance of irregular migration.

Invisibility, for them, is an "epistemic and material phenomenon" that leads to "the *disappearance* of the asylum seeker" as "both literal and figurative" (Giannacopoulos et al., 2013, p. 569). The carrying-on as if the migrants were not there is powerful in the non-place-ness of an island where citizens treat noncitizens as non-present, non-permanent, non-people who are worthy of emergency care, but not long-term relationships. With the exception of three families adopting young men who had first arrived in the 1990s, and volunteers who stay in touch with migrants from the 2013 boat rescue, no local resident we met had a story of a migrant who had made the island a home. To be sure: many local residents travel and study in the mainland, as it is typical for a small village with limited jobs and resources. It would not be fair to expect an island to provide a home for passers-by when the local themselves make mobility a habit. The temporality and contingency of the migrants and refugees, however, become a characteristic of their status as noncitizens, non-residents, passers-by in the first of many nonplaces.

4.3. Island Mentality as In-Dependent and Inter-Dependent

As migrants and refugees remain invisible to citizens even when in plain sight, the temporality of noncitizens and the long-term nature of the "emergency" arrivals make the relationship between the islanders and other citizens one of dependence, no longer based on independence. The *connection* between the non-place-ness of a citizenship island and the "other" citizens, be they those on the mainland of a nation such as Italy, those of international organizations such as UN, UNHCR, MSF, and many others, highlights the inter-dependence among agents who operate as if nonplaces may be kept at a distance, geographically and metaphorically; hidden away as a temporary abnormality, but they are not.

Islands are distant from a mainland, with the possibility and/or risk of isolation, often marked by the ability to be independent, resilient, relying on their own resources in time of need. But they also depend on others, especially in times of crisis (see Pugliese, 2009), practicing reciprocity among themselves and with others (see Hau'ofa, 2017, p. 12). Hau'ofa protests the notion that islands are isolated, as not to mask the richness in culture, economic opportunities, and the ability to move freely in the sea. Writing about Oceania, Hau'ofa uses the examples of resources from islands as "no longer confined to their national boundaries; they are located wherever these people are living permanently or otherwise". He also argues that islands extend far beyond their perimeter, "their universe comprised not only land surfaces, but the surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit it". He cites a poem narrating the perspective of a fisherman on a boat, as static, not navigating the sea, rather letting the sea come to him. This reversed relationship between land and sea captures the paradox of dependence and inter-dependence, redefined not as needing assistance from others, but as opportunities for others to encounter the richness of islands. In Figure 5, migrants and refugees who have just arrived in the port of Lampedusa are in line, awaiting examination, before

leaving for the welcoming center. This moment is usually one of the happiest in their journey, after the peril of the sea, and before the realization that the welcome is not one that leads to the life they had imagined in Europe. In this brief moment, the encounter of the island, the arrival of the migrants as the African others, the bodies that risked death at sea, exemplify the lesson from the fisherman's tale: "In search of new land, confident in the belief that, as usual, islands would rise over the horizon to meet him" (them; Hau'ofa, 2017, p. 16).

Figure 5. Lampedusa, May 2017. Used with permission from Red Cross Volunteer.

As the residents of Lampedusa know, migrants and refugees have been landing on their shores for decades, long before the world turned their attention to the tiny island of 6000. In 2011, residents welcomed more than double their population after the Arab Spring, then the turmoil in the Middle East, and the ongoing unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. The residents of Lampedusa had their in-dependence and resilience challenged by the need for resources beyond their control. The example of the lack of coffins is one of many lessons in dependency on others.

Another story from a resident of Lampedusa demonstrates the paradox of in-dependence and inter-dependence of a nonplace. Late one night in 2011, the resident recounted hearing a noise from the kitchen and thinking his wife may be awake. When he saw her in bed, he decided to check what may be happening downstairs. He found a young man, an African migrant, taking food from the fridge. Instead of being scared or angry, the resident shared his story as one of extreme sadness. The young man had nowhere to go, no welcome center or NGO to feed him on the overcrowded and under-resourced island, so the only place to find food was a private home. The young man had to depend on the kindness of residents, and residents had to rely on each other, while waiting for more resources from the mainland, to deal with the influx of migrants and refugees. During this state of emergency, the non-place-ness of Lampedusa also allowed for what authorities may consider a crime, breaking into a home, not to be reported, but rather considered in the context of extreme need.

Isolation and dependence on others, however, do not mean that Lampedusa, or other islands, are weak or do not function well. The tension between independence, strength, survival typical of islands in the Mediterranean and elsewhere (Haiti, Puerto Rico, Indonesia) relates to the abandonment of noncitizens. The increase in arrivals, the new presence of more migrants, and the absurdity of a prolonged, extended time of crisis, force a dependence on others that makes Lampedusa more visible on the map of humanitarian agencies. Yet, Lampedusa's dependence on others and continued calls for assistance remain invisible, far away enough to avoid tackling the issue of mobility in the Mediterranean, the ongoing departures from Libya and other parts of Northern Africa as more than a seasonal or temporary phenomenon.

The weakness of isolation and dependence is strategic when governments such as the far-right-ruling party in Italy and others across the Mediterranean decide to block or detain rescuing ships such as the *Aquarius* and the *Mare Jonio* (see Euractiv, 2019). Hau'ofa (2017, p. 9) writes in *Our Sea of Islands*, referring to Oceania, that "in the days when boundaries were not imaginary lines in the ocean, but rather points of entry that were constantly negotiated and even contested, the sea was open to anyone who could navigate his way through". He argues for defining islands together, showing their force through their multiplicity, as a sea of islands, rather than islands in the sea. This strength emerges in the stories we heard from all Lampedusa residents, who came together to rescue migrants and refugees at sea, feed them, and provide a first-landing place, but also realized that supporting them long-term and providing them a permanent home in Lampedusa is not an option.

What a government official in Agrigento, Sicily, called an "ongoing emergency" challenged Lampedusa's ability to stay independent, to protect their isolation to outside sources, as Italian and international aid agencies arrived in the hotels now deserted by tourists. The very independence that relied on people visiting the beautiful island for leisure, sustaining its economy, crumbled under the un-sustainable, never-ending flow of migrants and refugees. The now defunct Lampedusa model, as locals call it, had been a semi-efficient way to ensure that migrants and refugees only stay on the island for an average of 10 days before they line up on the commercial

ferry to Sicily, off to their next nonplace. The island mentality is tested by the need for others to keep the process moving.

5. Conclusion

The non-place-ness of citizenship islands presents unique characteristics. As noncitizens in nonplaces, the examples from citizenship islands demonstrate the paradox of visibility/invisibility and in-dependence/interdependence. Even in Huxley's (1962/2009) utopian island of Pala, isolation and distance are prerequisites for testing a perfect society, but in the end, others make it to the shore. Recently, as arrivals in Lampedusa have slowed due to the Italian Government's refusal to rescue migrants as sea, migrants and refugees have found alternative routes, with Spain and Greece seeing an increase in arrivals. What has now become an example of an island "of despair", the Moira camp in Lesbos (see Magra, 2018; McElvaney, 2018; Psaropoulus, 2018) shows the need for others. Migrants and refugees have been waiting, losing hope, and dying in the overcrowded camp, as the Greek authorities have nowhere to send them.

In *Exit West*, Mohsin Hamid (2017) writes about a young refugee couple in a semi-imaginative apocalyptic world where newcomers and natives are displaced. Hamid writes that "we are all migrants through time", and it is only a matter of time until others may constantly be the move, with no home. The non-place-ness of citizenship islands has moved to the few rescue ships that still have permits, or to commercial ships willing to risk breaking national laws to save lives, as nations refuse the right of entry to noncitizens. The ongoing emergency continues. On 20 March 2019, Lampedusa was back in the news, as a commercial ship challenged the Italian government and disembarked 49 migrants, who once again quickly disappeared into non-place-ness.

In this article, I challenge traditional notions of citizenship and place-based identity to present a model of belonging and engagement, based on the assumptions that noncitizens exist in nonplaces. This new mobility paradigm theorizes non-place-ness as a discursive norm, a practice and habit for migrants and refugees who move, leaving everything behind, to adapt, forge new relationships, establish a new life in a place other than where they were born, but without the option of returning "home". Both as dependent and hyper, whether they are expandable or desirable, from the perspective of citizens, residents of hosting nations, even the volunteers and NGOs workers who rush to Lampedusa and other hotspots to help, noncitizens are otherized.

As scholars of communication and media, it is important to recognize how metaphors authorize new arguments. I introduce language to invite citizens and noncitizens to process what is already happening: Stochasticity, mobility, noncitizenship, non-place-ness, islands (see Braidotti, 2011; Lyon, 2013; Von Burg, 2012, 2014). This is not just an exercise in imagination that risks an "asymmetrical role reversal" (Lyon, 2013) or a naïve invitation to put oneself in other people's shoes. Kant's (and Arendt's) invitation to "go visiting" starts with the imaginary idea of understanding others, even developed as a duty to hospitality (Arendt, 1992), but citizenship islands are not places for citizens, privileged scholars, or diplomats to "go visiting" and return with horror tales of inhumane conditions.

Citizenship islands are important theoretically, as they become sites to reconsider the notions and practices of citizenship. What I define as nonplaces for noncitizens reveal lessons for the studies of mobility and migration, and how to study them in communication and media. Nonplaces are the new norm, noncitizens are here to stay, non-visibility will eventually make itself apparent, inter-dependency will overcome isolation, as citizenship islands are a test of what is to come.

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Article

In the Bullseye of Vigilantes: Mediated Vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia

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Abstract
Hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz labour migrants seek opportunities in Russia where they fall target to retaliation of vigilante citizens who find offence in the presence of alien labourers in their homeland. Vigilantism also takes place within this migrant 'community' where male Kyrgyz labour migrants engage in retaliation on female migrants over perceived offences such as dating non-Kyrgyz men. On several occasions between 2011 and 2016 videos featuring honour beating of female labour migrants by fellow countrymen shook the internet. The selected case illustrates vulnerabilities experienced by migrants due to xenophobia and hostility of the host state, as well as additional layers of vulnerabilities linked to gendered biases that 'travel' across borders along with compatriots in migration. The study argues that offline structures, norms, biases, violence, and stigma not only reincarnate online, where they culminate in vigilante acts, but consequently, they re-enter the offline discourse and go through further normalization and justification.

Keywords
digital divides; digital vigilantism; layers of vulnerabilities; labour migrants

Issue
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> It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing. (Foucault, 1977, p. 10)

1. Introduction

Social media and smart mobile devices brought about intrinsic changes to various aspects of modern life, including the process and experience of migration. Digital media attests its unprecedented affordances for migrants, such as access to crucial information, on-the-spot translation, navigation tools, and other services conveniently accessible through a single device. As is evident from recent literature on the role of digital media in the lives of refugees, displaced people, and migrants—smart mobile devices, social media, and connectivity that they afford can be positively instrumental during and after the migratory journey. From coordination with others in the community, to maintaining contact with people back home, to document storing—smartphones provide a "sense of security" and help with "preserving memories" of the journey (Alencar, Kondova, & Ribbens, 2018, pp. 12–13). Social media is used by refugees for "acquisition of language and cultural competences" and helps with "contacting family and friends in the home country in order to obtain social and emotional support" (Alencar, 2017, p. 1600). At the same time, there are certain "information precarities" experienced by refugees and displaced people; such precarities constitute instabilities and vulnerabilities to "misinformation, stereotyping, and rumors" (Wall, Otis Campbell, & Janbek, 2017, p. 240). This article aims to make a scientific contribution by addressing mediated vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia who are pushed out of their home state by economic factors, and whose precarious status in the

host state amplifies their fragility in the digital domain. In particular, the article inquires into how digital vigilantism affects female labour migrants in the framework of the *digital divides* (Miller & Norris, 2016; Ragnedda & Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017; among others) that imply divergence across groups and individuals in their access to digital media, respective skills, as well as various capitals and benefits of using these media. By addressing the selected case, this article aims to further inform the scientific discussion, debate, and exchange on the role, benefits, and harms that digital media can bring into the lives of migrants. The study considers how the established social, political, and economic inequalities, as well as racial, ethnic, and other biases transfer into the digital sphere, thus reinforcing the "existing social relationships" (van Dijk, 2012, p. 243), where they "culminate in a coordinated mass persecution of a targeted citizen" (Trottier, 2017, p. 61), and then re-enter the offline sphere and discourse.

Falling target to vigilante citizens in the host state, labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan engage in mediated moral policing within their own perceived community. On several occasions between 2011 and 2016 videos featuring honour beating of female Kyrgyz labour migrants by fellow countrymen shook the internet. Referring to themselves as 'patriots', men, who do not reveal own identity in the videos, humiliate and punish women over perceived offences, such as being seen in public with non-Kyrgyz males. Having found offence in women's behaviour, the 'patriots' capture and beat their targets, threaten them with knives, sexually assault them, film the process, and spread the footage online (Beishinbek Kyzy & Bigg, 2012; Botoeva, 2012; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2012; Ibraeva, Moldosheva, & Ablezova, 2015; Lelik, 2016). Beyond the suffered embodied harms, *visibility* of the targets is exploited (Trottier, 2017) as they are forced to reveal their names and home addresses on camera, which intensifies harms and sets paths for further online and offline retaliation, shaming, and harassment.

Certain identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and gender, as well as social norms, and perceived obligations, affect the subjection to and experience of digitally mediated citizen-led retaliation. The selected case illustrates vulnerabilities that migrants experience due to xenophobia and hostility in the host state, as well as gendered biases and violence inside of the migrant 'community'. Such vulnerabilities are, of course, numerous and extend across economic factors, education, healthcare, employment conditions, immigration status, and so on. This article focuses on vulnerabilities associated with subjection to vigilante acts that instrumentalise embodied and digitally mediated retaliation.

After elaboration on its methodology, the article provides a theoretical framework for digital vigilantism and digital divides. In doing so, it covers respective literature and the encompassing scholarly discussions. The article proceeds to elaborate on various threats and vulnerabilities faced by Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia amid the multitude of 'offences' that certain targets emit. Women are targeted by vigilantes in the host-state and by compatriots in migration. In this case, there are vulnerabilities applicable to the general group 'Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia', as well as additional vulnerabilities experienced by women within the group. Beyond this, women experience barriers to seeking legal help, as sexual violence, shame, weak rule of law, and uncertain legal status in Russia prevent them from being vocal. Appalling public solidarity with vigilante acts in the home state of Kyrgyzstan is informed by stigma, victim-blaming discourses, and vulnerable positions of women within the set social norms.

2. Methodology

Being part of the larger international and interdisciplinary project that investigates the manifestation of digital vigilantism across various political and social contexts, the study relies on a mixed methodology. Though scarce, the existing literature on the selected case assisted in constructing an understanding of perceptions and public reactions to instances of digitally mediated vigilante retaliation. Semi-structured in-depth interviews with vigilantes (1), human rights defenders (3), police (2), academics (1), NGO representatives (1), and journalists (3), conducted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan in person and via Skype, have further informed this research. Interviews were conducted between April and June 2018. The option of interviewing targets of digital vigilantism was intentionally avoided due to ethical considerations and *do no harm* approach of the researcher. All featured interviewees in the study are anonymised, which has no impact on the substance and quality of the data. Interview material particularly helped with the contextualisation of digitally mediated retaliation and its impacts on targets within the Kyrgyz migrant 'community'. Interviews revealed instances of collaboration between law enforcement officers and vigilante citizens in Russia, disclosing curious nuances of acquired capitals and powers that allow media-savvy participants to apply pressure on the police. Furthermore, the informants helped shed light on the barriers that prevent targets from seeking legal help both in the host state and in their home country.

3. Digital Vigilantism

Finding offence in other citizens, taking personal retaliation measures while filming the process and subsequently disseminating the footage online is a rampant practice among various vigilante groups in Russia. In the majority of cases, participatory practices are group acts where citizens organise themselves around a selected offence theme, such as exposing and punishing alleged paedophiles, countering 'unscrupulous' merchants, shaming parking 'violators', or busting 'illegal mi-

grants'. This article relies on the concept of *digital vigilantism* to address such acts. Researching vigilantism through the prism of its *digital* manifestations should not be perceived as a phenomenon limited to hacking and doxing. Instead, digital vigilantism can be defined as "a process where citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and coordinate retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms" (Trottier, 2017, p. 56). As such, embodied acts performed by vigilantes and broadcasted online are also regarded as acts of digital vigilantism. The element of *digitally mediated exposure* of targets can bring about longevity and recurrence of the waves of harms that a sole physical assault would not be able to enact, thus intensifying and amplifying the impact of retaliation. Russia's neo-Nazi vigilante group Occupy Paedophilia, for instance, engaged in intentional dissemination of the footage of their punitive acts "in order to extend the sexual humiliation and punishment beyond the actual physical assault behind closed doors" (Kasra, 2017, p. 185). While such "unwanted', "intense", and "enduring" (Trottier, 2017, p. 56) visibility is forced on the targets, publicity can be the desired opportunity for vigilantes, granting them social recognition as informal justice providers; although participants too can experience negative consequences of own visibility.

Moncada (2017) proposes five core definitional dimensions of vigilantism, namely, social organisation, targets, repertoire, justification, and motivation (pp. 407–408). Here it is important to consider respective biases that might subject certain categories of people to being vulnerable to retaliation in specific contexts; i.e., ethnic/religious/sexual minorities, representatives of a certain socio-economic class, women, migrants, etc. As digital media brought about "dramatic increases in harassment, abuse, and threats targeting women" (Jane, 2017, p. 186), the very biology as an identity marker can lead to vulnerability. When it comes to citizen response to perceived offences, questions of motivation, legality, and proportionality of retaliation arise. These questions are, of course, also applicable to the authorised state forces such as the police and the Federal Migration Service. Unlike conventional vigilantes, who, according to Johnston (1996), constitute *autonomous citizenship*, in digital vigilantism participants assert "new boundaries" (Trottier, 2017, p. 59) in their relationship with authorised powers. Political, ideological, and other convictions of vigilantes can be shared by members of the state apparatus, and other functionaries holding legal power and authority. Some vigilante groups in Russia have even received presidential grants in support of their activities (Favarel-Garrigues, 2018; Gabdulhakov, 2018) in exchange for loyalty.

3.1. Vigilantism in the Absence of Police

When migrant communities find themselves in the situation where they are reluctant to turn to the formal police due to brittle immigration status in the host state, resorting to informal policing within own group is a way of maintaining unity and order. In his study on undocumented Mozambican migrants in Johannesburg, Madsen illustrates how internal migrant-over-migrant "policing produces the moral community and not the other way around" (2004, p. 174). As interaction with the formal police forces can lead to "harassment and deportation", migrants rely on each other in the phenomenon which Madsen describes as "neither policing in the traditional sense nor vigilante activity, but rather, a form of communally effected non-violent policing" (2004, p. 173). Migrants develop a dependency on each other for moral policing, where "social exclusion is a highly effective form of sanctions as survival depends on inclusion" (Madsen, 2004, pp. 188–189). Contrary to the case of Mozambican migrants in Johannesburg, actions of the so-called Kyrgyz 'patriots' largely fit the definition of digital vigilantism. Acts of retaliation are filmed and distributed online while shaming "serves as a moral justification in order to facilitate information sharing and socially harmful visibility" (Trottier, 2018, p. 171) where the subjective moral motivations of the 'patriots' lead to acts of community policing.

Vigilante acts can be centred around offences that imply the breaking of the law—"formal legal orders"; as well as offences based on the violation of subjective social norms—informal "not legally codified" orders "established and enforced by a range of non-state actors" (Moncada, 2017, p. 407). Applying this scheme to the selected case of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia stipulates that unlawful employment and violation of immigration regulations resemble the breaking of the formal orders in the host state. At the same time, migrants whose immigration status is in accord with the law still violate the informal orders in the perception of certain groups and individuals who view the very fact that foreigners live in Russia as offensive. In addition to this, the case illustrates that informal orders can be further violated within the target group, creating layers of vulnerabilities that subject targets to retaliation.

3.2. Image as Power

In their 2015 study on media discourses surrounding the case of Kyrgyz 'patriots', Ibraeva et al. conclude that "male migrants find themselves in a situation of identity destabilisation" amid the "loss of the normative role for a traditional society model of masculinity" (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 24). Furthermore, the authors discover that respective discourses in the Russian and Kyrgyz media have "framed violence as patriotic, truly male and ethnic" and "became the backbone for new legitimation of violence" (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 25). These findings raise concerns over frames and discourses that surround such acts of crime. Traditional media reports not only justify violence but can also aid the offenders in amplifying the harms of undesired visibility by revealing the identity of targets in the reports. In cases where online content would other-

wise not be available to some audiences, traditional media reports assist in disseminating the message.

In its turn, social media enables spectators to participate in digitally mediated retaliation. As a result, the audience is not just a passive observer; it plays an instrumental role in retaliation, intensifying and surpassing the impact of embodied assaults. Members of the audience can take sides and express their position on the issue through 'likes', 'dislikes', shares, and comments. Some vigilantes in Russia maintain an active and systematic approach to uploading videos on YouTube, with respective viewings counting in millions. Although select videos can get removed by platforms due to violent content, the nature of file storing and sharing on social media enables their continuous circulation. Besides, legal frameworks, approaches and capacities for removal of harmful content from platforms vary across contexts. While each wave of circulation of media material exposing the targets brings about new waves of harms, the longevity of online availability of these media implies the longevity of their damaging impacts on the targets.

In mediated retaliation, traditional media reports play a crucial role as their coverage of a given incident can boost online searches and *hype* a particular case. Furthermore, traditional media frame cases, participants, and targets in their reports. If the victims are unable to speak up (out of fear of further retaliation, shame, and due to other reasons), their voice is missing. As is argued by Jane (2017), in *gendered cyberhate* there is a "silencing effect" that leads to self-censorship of female targets (p. 191). Meanwhile, vigilantes who have an interest in instrumentalising their visibility enjoy the publicity. On top of this, participants' (in)formal collaboration with the police further limits targets in options for seeking legal help, as dysfunctionality of the legal system and structural advantages of vigilantes prevail.

4. The Digital Divides…and Unites

Scholars working on theorisation of the notion of digital divides (among others: Miller & Norris, 2016; Ragnedda & Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017) suggest a three-level distinction where the first level concerns physical and material access to electricity, the internet, and devices; the second level focuses on the character of use of digital media, respective skills and savviness of the users; while the third level of digital divides looks into different types of capital and benefits of using digital media. Within their definition of the digital divide, Miller and Norris (2016, p. 2) suggest that:

> [S]ocial inequalities and power relationships that exist online at any given moment or in any given space shape, and are shaped by, access to and uses of ICT. To the extent that men and women are socialized differently and unequally, offline gender roles, responsibilities, and opportunities influence online behaviour and any corresponding benefits.

As such, at the third level, people's background and various types of acquired capital influence how they "reinvest valuable information in the social realm" (Ragnedda & Ruiu, 2017, p. 25). Certain discourses and acts can create *a sense of unity* for specific audiences in the *us* versus *them* representation of targets, i.e., men versus women, migrants versus locals, sexual minorities versus majorities, drivers versus pedestrians, merchants versus consumers, etc. These unifying sentiments are constructed over the condemnation of perceived norm breaching. The "imagined" online communities (Gruzd, Wellman, & Takhteyev, 2011) inform and inspire offline discourses and acts. Among the many examples, this dynamic can be illustrated by a vigilante group based in Chechnya where participants find offence in how some Chechen women dress. Vigilantes take pictures of their targets and make use of the images that targets share on social media. They expose women to the digital audience, but also provide addresses of targets and call on offline actions, urging the relatives to take measures such as honour murder for the perceived misconduct (BBC, 2017). On their public platforms, participants warn the audience that only men can leave comments and that non-Chechens will be banned from the discussion. Such categorisation creates a sense of unity among participants and the audience. Online perceptions of unity are intertwined with the offline contestations of norms and negotiation of *us* and *them*.

The discrepancy in the acquired benefits of social media use is evident in vulnerabilities and immunities of different users. The third level digital divide can be applied to mediated capacities of actors involved. Users with a social media following counted in millions, obviously have a greater audience outreach than those with just a few subscribers. Respective traditional media framing and official endorsement can turn vigilantes into informal public leaders. In this regard, such publicity and endorsement can grant vigilantes greater respect and support from the audience than the official state police could enjoy. Furthermore, traditional media and public discourses over viral cases of digital vigilantism can further inform collective perceptions and reactions to these events and practices, and in doing so, further inform social frustrations, biases, divides, and vulnerabilities.

In contexts where citizen involvement in justice matters is encouraged by the highest authority (in the case of Russia, by President Putin), the police are by default invited to collaborate with vigilante citizens (Gabdulhakov, 2018, p. 325). In this regard, the police can initiate *formal collaboration* with vigilantes by calling for public involvement in investigations and in the enforcement of legal orders through citizen-led surveillance, snitching, and denunciation of fellow citizens (The Moscow Times, 2018). Such practices, however, are not limited to formal orders and formal collaboration. The police and vigilantes can engage in *informal solidarity* and patron-client relations. Beyond this, police officers are also subjected to the power of visibility and can be respectively framed

by vigilantes and/or by traditional media. As a Moscow-based leader of a vigilante group explained:

> Sometimes I blackmail the police. For instance, I made a critical post on Facebook and exposed the investigator, and so on and so forth. At first, I received a phone call from the assistant of the Head of the press service and he asked me to remove the post. I said, "I will not remove anything, you deal with it yourself". To this, he said, "how can I help you?" I said, "put the paedophile in prison, and I will write positively about you…[i]f you take action, I will tell all media outlets how great you are". (Vigilante I)

This case exemplifies different media capacities of actors involved, which further complicates the relations between vigilantes, police officers, and targets.

5. Migrants in the Bullseye of the Host State

Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are large suppliers of labour migrants for Russia. This section of the article addresses vigilante acts where labour migrants are targeted by 'concerned' citizens in Russia. Described to be "the most violent country in the former Soviet Union for ethnic and racial minorities" (Arnold, 2015, p. 243), Russia presents a challenging environment for migrants as the perceived offence they emit is rooted in being foreign and non-Slavic. Vulnerable status induced by corruption, lawlessness, legal bureaucracy, legal illiteracy, language barriers, and fear of deportation, subjects Central Asians to abuse and retaliation performed both by the police (Alekseyeva, 2013; Kaliyev, 2018; Kislov & Zhanaev, 2017; Sindelar, Bobomatov, Doorov, & Kholov, 2013) and by the citizens in Russia (Kimmage, 2006; Parkin, 2018; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2014; Yudina & Alperovich, 2013, 2014). As one researcher from a Moscow-based NGO explained, "In the past, there was a negative perception of people from the North Caucasus republics, now the focus has shifted towards people from Central Asia…they are now perceived in sociological terms as 'the other'" (NGO I).

5.1. Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia: A Brief Profile

Out of Kyrgyzstan's 6.2 million citizens (The World Bank, 2017), state migration service estimates 800 thousand people to be living abroad (Interfax, 2018). Precise information on the number of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia is not available. While Kyrgyz State Migration Service officials declare this number to be 640–650 thousand (Interfax, 2018); Russia's Ministry of Interior is suggesting "more than 800,000" (Hasanova & Kapushenko, 2018). Beyond this, Kyrgyzstan is leading globally in the share of remittances in the gross domestic product (GDP), with "nearly 40%" of its GDP comprised of the money transferred by labour migrants (Hasanova & Kapushenko, 2018, para. 20). Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH) reports that in 2016 women constituted 40% of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia (2016, p. 4). In comparison, female migrants to Russia from other Central Asian republics, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, represented less than 20% in each case (FIDH, 2016, p. 19). Based on the data available for 2014, estimated 60% of all Kyrgyz migrants did not possess proper documentation "to comply with current migration rules of countries of destination" (FIDH, 2016, p. 6). These data illustrate several important factors. Contrary to the case of other labour migrant-supplier states in the region, where men dominate the composition of this labour force, migrants from Kyrgyzstan are nearly equally balanced in the representation of men and women. While there is a domestic dependency on income from labour migration, lack of proper documentation during the stay in the host state creates a fertile ground for exploitation and abuse by the police, the employers, human traffickers, vigilantes, fellow migrants, etc.

5.2. Migrant-Focused Vigilantes

Among Russia's numerous citizen groups who have taken justice into own hands and retaliated on migrants and other minorities are the nationalists, football hooligans, pro-Kremlin youth groups, and neo-Nazi movements. Migrant-focused vigilante groups include *Occupy Viselay* [Occupy Evict], *Mestnie* [The Locals], *Russkie* [Russians], Movement Against Illegal Immigration, *Scheet Moskvi* [The Shield of Moscow], and numerous other formations that are in the constant flux of appearing and disappearing across the country. In most cases, social media is used by these groups to coordinate activities with the members and to spotlight these activities to the broader audience. Such visibility subjects the targets to greater retaliation and "further dehumanizes and relentlessly shames" them, while the punitive show is also used "to intimidate anyone who may have been watching and violating social rules" (Kasra, 2017, p. 185). Photo and video materials produced by such vigilantes not only harm the targeted individual, but serve as tools for mapping and targeting the larger 'other'—the alien group that these individuals represent, i.e., migrants, Central Asians, Muslims, non-Slavs, homosexuals, and other 'deviants'.

Having peaked in the mid-2000s, Russia's racist and neo-Nazi violence is experiencing a decline. As such, in 2008 Moscow-based SOVA Center reported that across Russia, "no less than 525 people were the victims of racist and xenophobic violence, 97 of whom died" (Kozhevnikova, 2009, para. 10). In 2010 "42 people died and 401 were injured" while in 2011 "23 people died and 154 received injuries" (Yudina, Alperovich, & Verkhovsky, 2012, para. 11). Preliminary findings for 2018 report on 57 victims of "racist and other ideologically motivated violence" and "at least 4" deaths (Yudina, 2019, para. 6). The precise number of attacks on migrants is difficult to acquire as targets avoid the police, while

the "attackers, who used to brag about their 'achievements' online, have grown more cautious in the wake of more active law enforcement pushback" observable in the last few years (Yudina, 2019, para. 7). Russia's vigilantes, thus, are manoeuvring between the benefits and the threats of visibility. Traditional media portrayal of events and actors further informs the audience. Framed as invaders and dangerous outsiders (Tolz, 2017), migrants have fewer chances for the compassion of the host state public in Russia. Respective legitimising framing of vigilantism, on the other hand, can inspire and attract supporters.

5.3. Solidarity of Police and Vigilantes

Until recent state-sanctioned crackdowns on the far-right groups and movements in Russia (Lenta.ru, 2017, 2018; Petkova, 2017; Yudina, 2017), the police largely neglected cases of vigilante attacks on migrants and other minorities. Beyond this, a collaboration between vigilantes and the police was not an unusual arrangement. This collaboration concerned not only the pro-Kremlin youth groups but extended to the nationalists who joined the so-called raids and "were also going side-by-side with the police and UFMS [Federal Migration Service]" (Rights defender I). While one of the interviewed law enforcement officers in Russia explained that rogue vigilantes more often get in the way of the police, rather than providing real assistance; collaboration, nevertheless, was viewed as a plausible option.

> If they [vigilantes] want to help us, they should turn to us; we will find a job for them. Therefore, I, in fact, propose acting in accordance with the principle in which the Soviet *druzhinas* [volunteer militia] functioned. They did not determine the area of own work and own actions, but the police did so. The police determined where it needed assistance. This is exactly the key difference between the currently present movements and their help…although it is hard to even refer to this as help. There were druzhinas that were really of help for the police or the militia of that time. There is a huge difference between the two. (Police I)

Other interviewed law enforcement officers shared the sentiment of collaboration and stated that when it comes to law enforcement, "the police alone cannot manage, the society should be involved" (Police II).

Among the many disturbing acts performed by vigilantes targeting ethnic minorities in Russia were the so-called "white wagon" flash mobs, where the nationalists attacked "non-Slavic" people on a "train or subway car" (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2014, para. 1). Sometimes in groups as small as five people, other times in mobs of 40–50 people wearing "knitted and medical masks" ultra-right groups committed hate crimes in public transport across Russia and while doing so, enjoyed "relative impunity" (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2014, para. 10). Moscow-based rights defender further explains this police patronage over vigilantes as follows:

> The main idea here is to have some fun, to beat someone up, and to have some coordinated relation in collaboration with the police. Without this link to the police, this activity would not be possible. No neighbourhood officer needs this amateur activity at all. This is only tolerated because there is some order for patronage from above. This is done to prevent mass fights. If they [nationalist vigilantes] are already going to be there anyway, it is better to take them under the patronage and to take their side as these are authorised activities, in a rather broad sense. (Rights defender I)

An academic specialising in Russia explains this relationship as a *grey zone* where state forces find some benefit in collaboration with vigilantes. "The state is not interested in completely eradicating this grey zone as there is always space for negotiation here. I don't think the state is very much interested in protecting gay rights or protecting migrant rights" (Academic I). Beyond media savviness, vigilante citizens are savvy about the methods they use in the context of Russia's legal system. When someone is murdered, a legal investigation has to be launched by default, but when someone is beaten and humiliated, the victim must first appeal to the police. "When the nationalists switched their methods and went from murder to beating and humiliating, it became even harder to keep them accountable, as no one files any complaints" (Rights defender II). Naturally, within the state-vigilante tandem and amid an array of other nuances and barriers, the process of seeking justice after subjection to retaliation is challenged. "If a person turns to the police, especially in a small town, they essentially bury themselves"—a Moscow-based rights defender explained (Rights defender II). Furthermore, "turning to the police would cause recurrence of trauma, as victims would have to face their perpetrators again" (Rights defender III). Thus, even if the police were willing to take measures against vigilante forces, technically they would be lacking legal grounds to do so. A journalist from Kyrgyzstan who extensively researched and covered the life of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia explained the absence of legal appeals to the police as follows:

> There are several reasons why the targets are silent. One of the reasons is that whenever there are illegal activities performed affecting the target, the target cannot necessarily turn to the police, because many migrants are undocumented or have an illegal registration. If such a person turns to the police for help, they would have to present an immigration card, but they cannot. They cannot present one, because their employers do not register them. There is a violation on top of a violation. (Journalist I)

Even if the victim decides to turn to the police "in many cases the perpetrators are not arrested—and when some of them are, they are quite unlikely to be prosecuted for what their actions really consist in, that is, hate crimes" (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2014, para. 10). These arrangements leave labour migrants with scanty options for seeking justice. Gender biases, patriarchal structures and traditional masculinity accompanied by social frustrations in the host state, subject female labour migrants to yet another stratum of violence.

6. Female Migrants in the Bullseye of the Home State

Female labour migrants are not only subjected to nationalism-based violence of host state vigilantes but also fall target to fellow compatriots. Weaponising the methods similar to those used against them by host state vigilantes, self-proclaimed 'patriots' target women for being "morally loose 'traitors' of the nation" because they establish relations with "men of other ethnicities (most often Tajiks)" (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 4). While the target is humiliated and exposed, vigilantes prefer to remain anonymous. One of the obvious reasons for anonymity is "the opportunity to avoid punishment", yet it apparently also serves a purpose of symbolising "a depersonified category of 'defenders of the fatherland, patriots'" (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 7). Expert interviews reveal that the 'patriots' are not a single or necessarily unified formation. Groups appear to be acting spontaneously across Russia. Much like in the case with anti-migrant vigilantes, after experiencing retaliation, targets are limited in their options for seeking justice and face the same barriers and obstacles that prevent them from turning to the police, i.e., fear, lack of proper documentation, shame, the unreliability of the legal system, etc.

6.1. Challenges in Being Vocal

Journalists covering the case hold an important role in their interactions with the targets. Sometimes, during their interviews with the targets, the journalists persuaded them to be vocal and to turn to the police, with the hope that publicity of the case would scare the perpetrators and, as a result, would prevent future attacks. A journalist who worked closely with victims of the 'patriots' recalls: "One girl had written an appeal. I asked her to write it. She wrote an appeal to the police, to the local police [in Kyrgyzstan]. They started the case. They identified these men. But nothing happened. No one was brought to justice" (Journalist III). Sometimes the journalists covering the case are the only party the victim can rely on for assistance:

> I found her [target of the 'patriots'] phone number and I called her, and I talked to her. Another girl, she came back to Kyrgyzstan and I found her with the help of the local police. They found her for me, as she was living with her parents. Her mother died and they [the police] helped me find her. I went there and interviewed her. She told me everything. We helped her. We took her to the crisis centre; we helped her out financially. (Journalist III)

At the same time, there are also concerns about the manner in which the journalists, the experts, and rights defenders respond to the issue. "What is interesting is that the experts and rights defenders, while having the desire to express their own stance on the matter, they share the videos. They, thus, contribute to the dissemination of these videos" (Journalist I). The stance on the issue of harms caused by traditional media reports is contested among the journalists themselves:

> On the one hand, yes, you can view it as a perpetuation of retaliation. But, on the other hand, you also attract the attention of the society to a given issue. Many people were sharing [these videos] not because they support such acts, but because they were disturbed by them. (Journalist II)

Having failed to find justice, targets prefer to stay out of the media spotlight and are reluctant to continue cooperating with the journalists or other parties interested in the case. One of the interviewed journalists who had extensively written on targets of the 'patriots' attempted to write a follow-up story on a prominent case a few years after the initial coverage, but the victim refused to participate. "She does not want us to write about her, because she has children and they might read this material" (Journalist III). Additional harms erect when media coverage does not lead to the accountability of the perpetrators and instead intensifies the suffering of targets.

6.2. No Support on the Home Front

The society in the home state was polarised in its stance on the issue of digitally mediated honour beating of women by their male compatriots. One of the interviewed journalists provided the following account: "many were against the methods [of the 'patriots'], but some were in support. This may sound wild, but some people were supporting [the 'patriots'] and saying, 'yes, this is right, our girls should not be dating others'" (Journalist II). The appalling supportive moods are also evident in the survey conducted by the United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], according to which:

> [A] fairly large proportion of respondents (38% of women and 45% of men) believe that women in migration, working away from home, begin to lead immoral life. On this basis, 51% of women and 55% of men support the activities of nationalist organizations, who "follow/or trace" the moral image of women from the Kyrgyz Republic, stripping, raping them and uploading their photos and "punishment" videos for bad behavior. (2016, p. 155)

While condemning broader violence, state officials provide further legitimisation of the activities of the 'patriots' by scrutinising the victims. Kyrgyzstan's Interior Ministry representative in Moscow, for instance, made the following statement on Facebook after the punitive videos spread online:

> The view of knives and stun guns should scare anybody who has seen these videos. But naturally, as a brother and future father, I cannot support the lifestyle that some of our young women lead, which provokes a strong reaction amongst Kyrgyz countrymen. (FIDH, 2016, p. 38)

The official also added that "when they [Kyrgyz women] come to Russia in search of work, they cannot resist all the challenges they encounter, and they become the playthings of Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek and Caucasian men, who take advantage them" (Lelik, 2016). These perceptions, moods and discourses constitute social realities where female targets of digitally mediated abuse are further blamed offline.

Beyond this, back in the home state, nationalist movements engaging in moral policing with the focus on women, sexual minorities, and foreigners are also prevalent. An example of such forces is the so-called *Kyrk Choro* [Forty Knights] movement claiming membership of 5,000 across Kyrgyzstan (Lelik, 2015). Kyrk Choro carried out several nightclub raids in the country's capital of Bishkek where they have "lined up local women before a video camera" accusing them of prostitution (Lelik, 2015). Just like the Kyrgyz 'patriots' in Russia, Kyrk Choro members are concerned about Kyrgyz women dating foreigners and express anti-Chinese and anti-Uyghur sentiments (Chynybaeva & Najibullah, 2015). These cases illustrate contested morality and nationalism in the host state of Kyrgyz migrants and raise important questions over the perceived roles and positions of women amid these contestations.

7. Conclusion

Digital media render important affordances in the lives of migrants, providing the ability to connect with friends and family, to store and access important documents, to connect with people in the host state, and numerous other possibilities. Yet, it is evident that offline inequalities, biases, and divides transmit into the digital sphere. Groups and individuals vulnerable offline are also vulnerable to online threats, such as digital vigilantism, where visibility is exploited as a magnifier of embodied harms. Through the selected case study of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia, this article illustrated how digital divides affect vulnerabilities across and within groups. Namely, the study presented a scenario where offline biases penetrate online and consequently re-inform the offline sphere. The study, in particular, demonstrated how within such a structure, women are subjected to multi-vector scrutiny, while their ability to be vocal and seek justice is challenged and jeopardised. Having crossed the Russian border, a female labour migrant from Kyrgyzstan is subjected to police abuse, retaliation by host state nationalist groups, and retaliation performed by male compatriots in migration. Falling victim to citizen-led retaliation in the host state, labour migrants are reluctant to turn to the police, as the police itself is an abusive force, which engages in patronage over vigilantes. As such, turning to the police can lead to abuse and deportation, while chances of bringing perpetrators to justice are minimal. Moreover, female labour migrants experience additional barriers to seeking justice in the home state due to social norms and biases that culminate in online and offline victim-blaming and shaming. Upon returning home, they are confronted by their relatives, by domestic nationalist groups, and by the greater community in the neighbourhood, village/town, and beyond. Digitally mediated retaliation, in its turn, brings about globality and permanence of exposure.

Further cross-national empirical research is necessary for a nuanced assessment of the digital divides and vulnerabilities in the context of social change, social benefits, and social harm that digital media renders. Specific contexts can include variant political environments as well as divergent social dynamics, positions, and norms. Studies could look beyond South-North migration and address cases in South-South and North-South migratory scenarios.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Appendix

Interview data

Academic I. Professor specialising in Runet (Russian internet). Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. April 2018.

Journalist I. Extensively covered Central Asian labour migrants in Russia. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.

Journalist II. Extensively covered the case of Kyrgyz 'patriots'. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.

Journalist III. Has access to the targets of the Kyrgyz 'patriots' and extensively covered the case. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.

NGO I. Public opinion researcher in Russia. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Rights defender I. Specialises in cases of xenophobia. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Rights defender II. Specialises in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Rights defender III. Specialises in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Police I. Lieutenant colonel. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Police II. Moscow, Russia. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

Vigilante citizen I. Paedophile buster. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

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Article

Urban & Online: Social Media Use among Adolescents and Sense of Belonging to a Super-Diverse City

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Abstract
In a world of continuous migration, super-diverse cities consist of a multitude of migrants and non-migrants from a variety of cultural backgrounds. Yet one characteristic they all have in common is the place where they currently live. In addition, both groups are active users of social media, especially the young. Social media provide platforms to construct and negotiate one's identity—particularly the identity related to where one lives: urban identity. This article presents the results of a survey study (N = 324) investigating the relationships between social media engagement and identity construction among migrant and non-migrant adolescents in the super-diverse city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. It was found that urban identity was significantly higher for migrants than non-migrants. Certain aspects of social media engagement predicted urban identity in combination with social identity. Finally, social media engagement was found to be positively related to group self-esteem.

Keywords
adolescents; identity construction; migration; Rotterdam; self-esteem; social media; super-diversity; urban identity

Issue
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1. Introduction

In recent history, migration has resulted in the creation of a multi-cultural society. Ranging from forced to voluntary, at the end of their migration process many migrants find themselves in a multi-cultural environment. Newcomers often settle in cities which consequently increase in ethnic, cultural and socio-economic diversity. Vertovec (2007) has labelled this dynamic urban environment a *super-diverse city*, a concept that comes with many opportunities and challenges—from cultural richness to socio-economic inequalities and stereotyping. The concept of super-diversity is characterized by the idea that diversity should be viewed beyond ethnicity, and should also take into account a wide range of other factors (Vertovec, 2007). Its complexity covers not only elements such as country of origin and the details of one's migration history but also factors in their current social and living situation (Vertovec, 2007). While the super-diverse group of citizens possess a rich array of identities, there is one common characteristic: place. Previously discussed in many fields and from different points of view, place identity can be looked at from an urban perspective: urban identity (Lalli, 1992; Proshansky, 1978; Proshansky, Fabian, & Kaminoff, 1983). As the city is a shared space and a shared part of its inhabitants' identity, the urban identity can be considered a connecting element, especially for migrants. We conducted our research in Rotterdam, a super-diverse city in the Netherlands. With 638,712 inhabitants it is the second largest city in the country and home to people from around 200 different nationalities and many different ethnic backgrounds

(Jennissen, Engbersen, Bokhorst, & Bovens, 2018; Statistics Netherlands, 2018a). Rotterdam was chosen not only due to its super-diverse character, but also for its position as a minority-majority city, and its articulated identity and (urban) youth culture (Fortuin & van der Graaf, 2006; JongRRKC, 2008; Kanne & van Engeland, 2019; OBI, 2018). Moreover, this city is located in the Netherlands, a country in which nearly everyone has internet access (Statistics Netherlands, 2018b; van Deursen & Helsper, 2015).

Adolescence, particularly early adolescence, is an important period marked by rapid development, including identity (Delfos, 2013; Valkenburg & Piotrowski, 2017). Answering the "Who am I?" question is particularly relevant in a super-diverse environment where adolescents have to make sense of their relations to groups with different identities. Research in different countries has shown that media use plays an important role in this development (boyd, 2014; Ito et al., 2010; Valkenburg & Peter, 2011). Social media, as a shared space with limited parental interference and the strong presence of adolescent peers, affords socializing practices and the construction and negotiation of one's identity (boyd, 2014; Valkenburg & Peter, 2011). Adolescents may use this space to deal with the intricate dynamic environment in which they find themselves and need to position themselves through different forms of social media engagement. The construction of identity, particularly in the context of a city, may create a sense of belonging, which in turn develops self-esteem.

In light of the super-diverse environment in which these adolescents find themselves, and the broader question of identity construction and a sense of belonging, our aim was to investigate the social media use of adolescents in the city and how this is related to a sense of belonging to the city through identity development. Moreover, we aimed to investigate the potential differences between migrant and non-migrant adolescents in terms of their social media use and identity development, and how these two are related to each other. Resulting from these aims, the research questions were:

> RQ 1: To what extent does social media engagement influence identity development (in terms of social identity, urban identity, and self-esteem)?
> RQ 2: To what extent do migrant and non-migrant adolescents differ concerning social media engagement and identity development?

Answering these questions helps to understand the role of social media in adolescents' everyday lives and its role in the social and psychological well-being of (migrant) adolescents. Moreover, it contributes to the body of knowledge on the role of the urban environment in the everyday life of adolescents, and its importance in making sense of themselves and their group in relation to others. Surveys were employed to explore the multiple relations between (social) media usage of our participants and their social and urban identities.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Social Media Use and Types of Engagement

In this study, we conceptualize social media as online spaces, or platforms, that afford communication and the uploading and sharing of content and thus foster interaction and self-presentation (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Carr & Hayes, 2015). They include, but are not limited to, social networking sites, instant messaging platforms, apps for content sharing, and other content sharing platforms. On these platforms, one can share user-generated content, including in very mundane, everyday ways.

Social media are central to the everyday lives of many teens (boyd, 2014; Ito et al., 2010). Throughout the years, various social media platforms have come and gone, gaining and losing popularity. As research by Anderson and Jiang (2018) shows, whereas Facebook used to be most popular, the attention of teens has shifted to platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Snapchat. Research conducted in the Netherlands revealed that while Facebook is still popular among adolescents in the Netherlands, YouTube, Instagram, and Snapchat are challenging Facebook's popularity (Kennisnet, 2017).

Previous studies have identified various categories of social media engagement (Ito et al., 2010; Jansz, Slot, Tol, & Verstraeten, 2015; Shao, 2009). Shao (2009) differentiates between consumption, participation, and production. Jansz et al. (2015) categorize communication as a separate type of engagement from participation. Studies have found that only a small number of people choose to engage actively (Kushner, 2016; Nielsen, 2006). Due to factors underlying the digital divide, it is more likely that it will be the more privileged minorities who create online content, resulting in material that is largely catered to those groups (Brake, 2014). Migrant adolescents might, therefore, be more inclined not to take part or might feel culturally underrepresented by content creators. However, as the internet has become more easily accessible, and as platform preferences have changed, thresholds for participation and production have lowered in an age of online content creation involving small, private audiences, such as those on Snapchat or Instagram. Adolescents can send pictures or videos to their friends through Snapchat but may choose not to upload public YouTube videos.

Positioning this in the context of our research, we first need to ask about what access migrant adolescents have to social media and the availability of digital devices, such as smartphones, computers, or tablets. We expect the following due to mainly socio-economic reasons (particularly material-, temporal- and social resources) of physical or material access (van Dijk, 2012):

> H 1: Non-migrant adolescents have greater access to digital devices than migrant adolescents.

As a result, we need to question whether their social media use differs from that of non-migrant adolescents.

Q 1: Do migrant and non-migrant adolescents differ in their social media engagement?

2.2. Identity Development and Social Media Engagement

Early adolescence is a period characterized by rapid social and psychological development, which includes the construction and development of the adolescent's identity (Delfos, 2013). Previous research has shown that social media plays an important role in the construction and negotiation of identity, where social media function as shared spaces where they can hang out with peers and explore the boundaries of their identities, with parents being mostly absent (boyd, 2014; Delfos, 2013; Valkenburg & Peter, 2011).

Various forms of social media engagement may accommodate identity development. In terms of consumption, media idols play a crucial role. Media idols can function as role models, especially for adolescents because they prefer to identify with someone who is quite similar to them (Valkenburg & Piotrowski, 2017). Due to the abundance of user-generated content and an increasing amount of social media influencers (SMIs), a diversity of role models have become available from and for different groups in society. Adolescents from different backgrounds may find SMIs who are similar to them, which helps reinforce their identities. In terms of participation and communication, adolescents can develop their social identity by communicating with peers and sharing their opinions in comments sections or by rating content (boyd, 2014; Ito et al., 2010). Finally, adolescents can express their identities by creating and sharing their own content (boyd, 2014; Ito et al., 2010). The online environment offers a place where adolescents can test boundaries in their social environment, seeking approval in the process, which helps them in building self-esteem and identity—an essential part of adolescent development (Valkenburg & Piotrowski, 2017). Developing self-esteem is also saturated by social factors because it is embedded in the groups they belong to.

2.3. Migrant Youth, Identity Formation, and New Media

Previous studies on migrant adolescents and media have shown that media production can help construct and negotiate individual and collective identities (de Block & Buckingham, 2007; de Leeuw & Rydin, 2007; Leurs, Omerović, Bruinenberg, & Sprenger, 2018). From a transnational point of view, research has argued that media afford migrants the opportunity to cross borders and maintain their connections with their (parents') country of origin, yet research shows that young migrants often focus more on their local environment, some creating hybrid identities in the process (Rydin & Sjöberg, 2008). Such hybrid identities offer space for more than one place of belonging (de Leeuw & Rydin, 2007; Rydin & Sjöberg, 2008). This offers young migrants the opportunity to identify with and have a sense of belonging to different places or cultures. Social media can thus play a crucial role in developing an identity and a sense of belonging, especially for adolescents with a migrant background who may have lost their city, family, culture, and with it, consequently, part of their identity.

2.4. Urban Context, Migration, and Identity

Rotterdam, as a super-diverse city, holds great ethnic, cultural and socio-economic diversity, which is partly a result of previous and continuous forms of migration. In 2018 there were 80,742 western migrants (12.6%) and 244,109 non-western migrants (38.2%) (Statistics Netherlands, 2018a). Rotterdam is so-called a majority-minority city, in which the majority of the citizens have a migration background from a large diversity of countries (Jennissen et al., 2018). Economic inequality is also present in Rotterdam. In 2016, 20% to 22% of minors were living in poverty (Hoff, 2017). Moreover, it has a high percentage (54%) of schools where more than 80% of the students are non-western migrants (Herweijer, 2008). This "segregation" among schools is reinforced by young people's socio-demographic backgrounds (e.g., parents' education level and their neighborhoods) and it affects their social networks as well as their opportunities because migrant and non-migrant youth are often separated according to the school that they attend (Herweijer, 2008). Despite these inequalities, previous research has shown that 77% of the population of Rotterdam are proud of their city—a number that has risen from 55% in 2009 (OBI, 2018). This provides an interesting background when investigating Rotterdam's urban identity, as this positive evaluation underlines the importance of the urban environment.

When one lives in a certain place for a while, one begins to feel attached to the environment, and, in due course, people might start feeling that they belong there. Previous research has, from different disciplines and points of view, focused on a sense of belonging and attachment to a place, which can be central to personal and social identity (Lalli, 1992; Proshansky et al., 1983; Tuan, 1977). Place-identity is constructed through defining oneself in relation to the spatial environments that are central to their everyday lives, which are central to how they understand and experience the world around them (Proshansky et al., 1983; Tuan, 1977). Place-identity stresses the physical setting of the human being, and how this is perceived in everyday experience and the resulting memories and ideas, without neglecting the individual, interpersonal, and social group factors (Proshansky et al., 1983). Previous research has also focused specifically on the urban environment (Lalli, 1992; Proshansky et al., 1983). Urban identity entails a similar idea to place-identity, yet focuses on the city in particular. Here, the city "provides an identity-enhancing context for one's biography, and thus a continuity which is relatively independent from definite (e.g., social) changes"

(Lalli, 1992, p. 294). It also helps citizens to differentiate themselves from people in other cities, which creates both an idea of attributes associated with the city, as well as a sense of belonging to a social group (Lalli, 1992).

From a social perspective, Lalli (1992) argues that a sense of "we", and thus belonging to a social group, is created as part of urban identity. Migrant and non-migrant adolescents may, therefore, feel like they belong to "Rotterdammers" as a social group, and thus self-categorize as such. Especially in the context of the super-diversity, where many "Rotterdammers" have a migration background, both migrant and non-migrant adolescents may feel like they belong to the city. As migrant adolescents may not easily identify with the host country's national identity or any other (national) identity of other social groups in their lives, it should be easier for them to identify with the city they live in. Thus, we assume:

H 2: Migrant adolescents have higher social identity than non-migrant adolescents.
H 2a: Migrant adolescents have higher self-categorization than non-migrant adolescents.
H 2b: Migrant adolescents have higher group self-esteem than non-migrant adolescents.

2.5. Migration and Media in the Urban Context

Social media use plays an important role in this identification process (de Block & Buckingham, 2007; Rydin & Sjöberg, 2008). Georgiou (2010), who discusses media and place from a diasporic position, emphasizes that identification takes place on various spatial levels: home, city, national, and transnational. These are interconnected and can be combined. For migrants, media allows for identification both on the level of the homeland, particularly through people with a similar background, as well as the often culturally diverse environment of the destination city (Georgiou, 2010). The city, in particular, offers a space where media production can be used as a form of political and cultural representation (Georgiou, 2010). As Georgiou (2010) argues, "[p]erformative urban identities increasingly move away from the national imaginary and media and communications become experimental tools in this process" (p. 31). Here, the nation may become less dominant and central to the debate of identity, and can be replaced with an urban or transnational perspective (Georgiou, 2010, 2014). This can be related to adolescents' everyday social media engagement. Adolescents may have particular media idols, often SMIs, who are from the same city, and perhaps the same cultural or socio-economic background. A YouTube vlogger from Rotterdam, or even the same neighborhood, might, therefore, function as a media idol. Adolescents may also engage in discussion about what it means to live in the city, or rate, praise, or criticize others' content about it. Finally, adolescents may create and share their own content in which they construct and negotiate their urban identity. As the city can be considered part of their identity, this negotiation of identity could be found in their everyday uses of social media. Thus, we assume:

H 3: Social media engagement has positive impact on self-categorization.
H 4: Social media engagement has positive impact on group self-esteem.

Next to the social perspective, urban identity can also be viewed from a personal perspective. This perspective focuses more on the physical and symbolic aspects of this urban identity. It must be said that while this spatial dimension could potentially function as a cause for this identity, this causality is not assumed in our argumentation. It could be argued that if one feels connected to the social group, one might also feel more at home in the city (Lalli, 1992). Following this argumentation, we hypothesize:

H 5: Migrant adolescents have higher urban identity than non-migrant adolescents.
H 6: Social media engagement has positive impact on urban identity.
H 7: Social identity has positive impact on urban identity.

Finally, belonging to a place or belonging to a group, and thus identifying with it, can be seen as a key factor in a person's self-esteem (Lalli, 1992). However, migrants might lack a stable national and/or cultural identity, which may impact their personal self-esteem. Compared to group self-esteem, personal self-esteem (from here on referred to as "self-esteem") does not belong to one's social identity but can be influenced by it. This raises the following question and hypotheses:

Q 2: Does self-esteem differ between migrant and non-migrant adolescents?
H 8: Social media engagement has positive impact on self-esteem.
H 9: Social identity has positive impact on self-esteem.
H 10: Urban identity has positive impact on self-esteem.

3. Methods

3.1. Sample and Procedure

Our survey sample was made up of 324 participants, including 160 boys and 159 girls. The ages of the 321 participants who filled this out ranged from 9 to 13 (M = 10.65; SD = 0.88). The father's country of origin (304 reported cases, 35 countries in total) was mostly the Netherlands (51.6%), Morocco (18.8%), or Turkey (9.9%). The mother's country of origin (312 reported cases, 38 countries in total) was quite similar: the Netherlands (51.9%), Morocco (17%), and Turkey (8.3%). Statistics Netherlands (2015) defines individuals as migrants when at least one of their parents was born abroad. This, therefore, includes first- and second-

generation migrants. Based on this definition, 41.8% of the participants were migrants and 58.2% were non-migrants (20 cases could not be allocated to a group because they did not answer this question).

Rotterdam was chosen as our case study because of its super-diverse character in relation to, among others, socio-economic, ethnic, and cultural levels (Statistics Netherlands, 2018a; Vertovec, 2007), as well as its position as a minority-majority city (Jennissen et al., 2018), which both make for an environment that is characterized by various identities and accompanying differences on multiple levels. Moreover, it has a rich (urban) youth culture and articulated identity (Fortuin & van der Graaf, 2006; JongRRKC, 2008; Kanne & van Engeland, 2019), demonstrated not only by its many cultural products but also its reported pride among citizens (OBI, 2018). This shows the importance of urban culture and hints towards possible identification with the city. Finally, Rotterdam is located in the Netherlands, a country where almost all inhabitants have internet access (Statistics Netherlands, 2018b; van Deursen & Helsper, 2015). This widespread access to the internet is crucial in our research, as it provides youth with a relatively equal opportunity to engage with social media.

Our collaboration with three schools from two different neighborhoods in Rotterdam helped us find adolescents from different backgrounds. These ranged from a strong to a weak socio-economical position and differed in the number of migrants (35.9% versus 78.5%) (Statistics Netherlands, 2018a). The data collection took place in November 2018. The survey was conducted in classrooms at the participating schools, using paper and pencils, and took 15–20 minutes to complete. A researcher and a research assistant were present to introduce the survey and the research, inform the participants about the voluntary nature of the survey and answer any possible questions. The first part of the survey asked the participants a number of demographic questions and questions about access to digital devices. The second part focused on questions about social media use, social media engagement, SMIs, and locality of engagement. Finally, the survey included measures for self-esteem, urban identity, and social identity. Afterwards, participants were thanked for their participation.

3.2. Measures

All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS Statistics (v25). Please see the results for more details on each analysis used.

3.2.1. Access to Digital Devices

In order to measure access to digital devices, we asked for ownership of certain digital devices and made a distinction between privately owned and shared devices to take into account the privacy of use of such a device. The device options were smartphone, tablet, and computer/laptop, as these provide the most options for social media use.

3.2.2. Social Media Use

Social media use was measured by presenting a list of social media platforms and a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Never; 5 = Always). We based the options for social media platforms on findings regarding the platforms most frequently used by adolescents in the Netherlands: WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, Snapchat, Pinterest, and Musical.ly (recently renamed TikTok) (Kennisnet, 2017; van der Veer, Boekee, & Peters, 2017). Additionally, to measure general social media usage, the items were merged into one scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .66$).

3.2.3. Social Media Engagement

Social media engagement was measured by four questions covering consumption, participation, production, and communication. We created a new measurement tool, asking for each platform if they consume content (viewing), participate (comment/like/rate content), produce content (make their own content and upload it), or communicate (use the platform to communicate with others). Following this, four new variables were calculated based on the sum of all platforms (0 = no platform used, 9 = all platform used).

3.2.4. Intensity of Following Local SMI

Regarding preference of media consumption, participants were asked to list two of their favorite content creators and the platform they follow them on. This same question was also asked for local content creators. In order to use this local SMI measurement in analysis with regards to intensity of following local SMIs, a new variable, named intensity of following local SMI, was calculated counting the number of platforms used for following the first local SMI mentioned, ranging from 0 to 9.

3.2.5. Self-Esteem

Self-esteem was measured both on a personal and a social scale. Rosenberg, Schooler and Schoenbach's (1989) 6-item Self-Esteem scale was used to investigate personal self-esteem. This was done using a 4-point Likert (1 = Strongly disagree; 4 = Strongly agree). Four of the questions were positive, whereas two were originally negative. To avoid confusion among the young participants, the latter two were rephrased to be positively phrased (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$).

3.2.6. Urban Identity

Identification with the city from a personal perspective was assessed using the 4-item sub-scale ("general attach-

ment") from the Urban Identity scale (Lalli, 1992) because we considered this shorter scale more suitable for adolescents. This was done using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree; Cronbach's $\alpha = .82$).

3.2.7. Social Identity

To measure social identity in terms of self-categorization and group self-esteem, two subscales from Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk's (1999) social identity scale were used. To measure a sense of belonging to the city from a social point of view, we used the 3-item self-identification subscale (adapted from Ellemers et al., 1999), which was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). These questions focused on identification with others living in the city or "Rotterdammers" in this case (Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$). To measure group self-esteem (in context of their city-related group) the 4-item group self-esteem subscale (Ellemers et al., 1999) was used, which was also measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree; Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$).

3.2.8. Demographics

Socio-demographics such as age, gender, nationality, and education level were also gathered. As a measure for nationality and cultural background, we asked for the participants' parents' country of birth, as a migrant is defined as having at least one parent born in a foreign country (Statistics Netherlands, 2015). In order to establish a better idea of their relationship to the city, we asked for the participants' home neighborhood as well as the length of time that they have lived in the city.

4. Results

4.1. Comparisons between Migrant and Non-Migrant Adolescents

Chi-Square tests were conducted to see if migrant and non-migrant adolescents have different access to technological devices. Migrant adolescents more frequently reported that they had their own smartphone than non-migrant adolescents, countering our first hypothesis that non-migrant adolescents have greater access to digital devices. The opposite was found for owning a laptop or a tablet, which was in line with our first hypothesis. Migrant adolescents were less likely to share smartphones, computers, or laptops but more likely to share tablets (See Table 1 for %).

Independent *t*-tests were conducted to analyze if migrant and non-migrant adolescents differ concerning their social media usage to answer our question of whether migrant and non-migrant adolescents differ in their social media engagement. Facebook, YouTube, and Snapchat were used more frequently by non-migrant adolescents than by migrant adolescents (See Table 2 for all *M*s, *SD*s, and *t*-values). No further comparisons among social media use frequency were significant.

Independent *t*-tests were run for social media consumption, social media participation, social media pro-

Table 1. Comparison of access to digital devices.

Access to digital device	Migrant	Non-migrant	χ^2 (1, N = 304)
Own smartphone	91.3%	78.0%	9.62**
Own computer/laptop	29.1%	45.8%	8.61**
Own tablet	30.7%	47.5%	8.61**
Shared smartphone	5.5%	10.7%	2.58
Shared computer/laptop	67.7%	71.8%	0.57
Shared tablet	56.7%	41.2%	7.08**

Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 2. *M*s and *SD*s for social media usage for all participants.

Activity	Migrants		Non-migrants			All	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*-test	*M*	*SD*
WhatsApp	3.84	1.00	3.76	1.26	ns	3.79	1.16
Facebook	1.12	0.49	1.29	0.68	2.42*	1.21	0.60
Instagram	2.74	1.46	2.53	1.52	ns	2.60	1.49
YouTube	4.10	0.81	4.41	0.87	3.10**	4.29	0.84
Twitter	1.08	0.39	1.20	0.63	ns	1.14	0.53
Snapchat	2.17	1.23	2.62	1.41	2.86**	2.41	1.35
Musical.ly	1.92	1.37	2.25	1.55	ns	2.09	1.49
Pinterest	1.23	0.66	1.40	1.00	ns	1.32	0.86
Other	2.63	1.74	2.46	1.73	ns	2.45	1.71

Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01.

duction, social media communication, general social media usage, intensity of following local SMI, self-categorization, group self-esteem, urban identity, and self-esteem. Comparisons were made between migrants and non-migrant adolescents. Migrant and non-migrant adolescents only differed significantly for urban identity, in line with our fifth hypothesis, yet countering H2 and answering Q2. Migrant adolescents scored higher on the urban identity than non-migrant adolescents (See Table 3 for *M*s, *SD*s and *t*-values). This was in line our fifth hypothesis that urban identity is higher among migrant adolescents, yet countered the second hypothesis that migrants have a higher social identity. It also negatively answered our question on possible differences in self-esteem.

4.2. Influences on Social Identity

Multiple linear regression analyses with self-categorization and group self-esteem as criteria were run with migrant status, social media consumption, social media participation, social media production, social media communication, general social media usage, and intensity of following local SMI as predictors. The model for self-categorization did not reach significance, $R^2 = .050$, $F\,(9,266) = 1.56$, $p = .129$. This rejects our third hypothesis, as social media engagement did not have a positive impact on self-categorization. For group self-esteem we found a significant model, $R^2 = .07$, $F\,(9,266) = 2.07$, $p = .032$. Both confirming and rejecting our fourth hypothesis, intensity of following local SMI was found to be a significant positive predictor and social media participation was revealed to be a negative predictor (See Table 4 for all ßs). Social media engagement had both a positive and negative impact on group self-esteem.

4.3. Influences on Urban Identity

To analyze influences on urban identity, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted using social media consumption, social media participation, social media production, social media communication, general social media usage, intensity of following local SMI, self-categorization, and group self-esteem as predictors. The model was found to be significant, $R^2 = .55$, $F\,(11,263) = 29.48$, $p < .001$. Positive predictors were self-categorization, group self-esteem, migrant status, intensity of following local SMI, and general social media usage, confirming our sixth and seventh hypotheses on the positive impact of social media engagement and social identity on urban identity.

Given the significant differences found for the comparison between migrant adolescents and non-migrant adolescents on urban identity, two separate multiple regression analyses were conducted with general social media usage, intensity of following local SMI, self-categorization, and group self-esteem as predictors.

For migrant adolescents, we found a positive influence of self-categorization and group self-esteem,

Table 3. *Ms*, *SDs* and *t*-values for social media usage and engagement, social identity, urban identity, and self-esteem.

	Migrants		**Non-migrants**		
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*-test
social media consumption	3.05	1.26	3.30	1.47	ns
social media participation	2.07	1.23	2.37	1.49	ns
social media production	1.81	1.35	1.99	1.59	ns
social media communication	1.76	1.01	2.01	1.29	ns
general social media usage	2.36	0.64	2.47	0.68	ns
intensity of following local SMI	0.49	0.81	0.57	0.84	ns
self-categorization	4.82	1.39	4.55	1.67	ns
group self-esteem	5.26	1.17	5.23	1.25	ns
urban identity	4.20	0.76	3.91	0.91	2.86 **
self-esteem	3.12	0.49	3.20	0.51	ns

Note: **p < .01.

Table 4. Predictors for self-categorization and group self-esteem.

	Self-categorization ß	**Group self-esteem ß**
migrant status	−.08	−.01
social media consumption	.08	.15
social media participation	−.06	−.22 *
social media production	−.04	.08
social media communication	−.14	−.14
general social media usage	.02	−.04
intensity of following local SMI	.10	.13 *

Note: *p < .05.

R^2 = .46, F (4, 120) = 25.15, p < .001. For non-migrant adolescents, self-categorization and group self-esteem were again found to have a positive impact on urban identity. In addition, intensity of following local SMI was also found to be a positive predictor, R^2 = .53, F (4,171) = 48.93, p < .001 (See Table 5 for all ßs).

4.4. Influences on Self-Esteem

Self-esteem was analyzed using a multiple linear regression analysis with social media consumption, social media participation, social media production, social media communication, general social media usage, intensity of following local SMI, self-categorization, group self-esteem, and urban identity as predictors. The model reached significance, R^2 = .15, F (12,260) = 3.81, p < .001. The only positive predictor found was self-categorization, partly in line with our ninth hypothesis, but at the same time countering it, as well as our eighth hypothesis on the positive impact of social media engagement and the tenth hypothesis on the positive impact of urban identity (See Table 6 for all ßs).

5. Discussion

This study investigated the social media engagement and identity development of adolescents in the superdiverse city of Rotterdam and analyzed the potential differences between migrant and non-migrant adolescents. We found that migrant adolescents more often had their own smartphone and shared a tablet than non-migrant adolescents (≠ H1), yet non-migrant adolescents had more access to their own computer/laptop and tablet (= H1). The higher number of smartphones among migrant adolescents could, to a certain extent, be explained by the important role of the phone- and internet access in the experience of migration through, for instance, keeping in touch with family, as was found in previous research (Alencar, 2018; de Leeuw & Rydin, 2007). This difference could also be explained by socioeconomic differences, as well as parental mediation (Livingstone, Mascheroni, Dreier, Chaudron, & Lagae, 2015; van Dijk, 2012). Computers, laptops, and tablets are generally more expensive than smartphones. Smartphones can also be hand-me-downs from other family members, while some parents may consciously try to restrict their child's digital media use (Livingstone et al., 2015). Investigating social media engagement differences between migrant and non-migrant adolescents (Q1), analysis showed that non-migrant adolescents were more likely to use Facebook, YouTube and Snapchat than migrant adolescents.

In terms of (urban) identity construction, we differentiated between social identity, urban identity, and self-esteem. We found no differences for social identity between the two groups, both in terms of self-

Table 5. Predictors for urban identity.

Urban identity	All ß	Migrant ß	Non-migrant ß
migrant status	−.13 **	—	—
social media consumption	−.06	—	—
social media participation	−.02	—	—
social media production	−.12	—	—
social media communication	−.06	—	—
general social media usage	.13 *	.10	−.01
intensity of following local SMI	.13 **	.06	.12 *
self-categorization	.53 ***	.51 ***	.59 ***
group self-esteem	.16 **	.22 *	.16 *

Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 6. Predictors for self-esteem.

	self-esteem ß
migrant status	.09
social media consumption	−.03
social media participation	.18
social media production	.04
social media communication	−.01
general social media usage	.03
intensity of following local SMI	.01
self-categorization	.22 *
group self-esteem	.08
urban identity	.01

Note: *p < .05.

categorization and group self-esteem (≠ H2, H2a, H2b). Social media engagement did not have an influence on self-categorization (≠ H3). When investigating the influences of social media engagement on social identity, we found that following local SMIs positively predicted (= H4) and social media participation negatively predicted (≠ H4) group self-esteem. Following local SMIs may help to construct a local identity, as adolescents might find the SMIs to be similar to them. When following these media idols from the same city, adolescents may feel a sense of pride or shared identity, focusing on the idea that they both live in the same city—something that binds them and creates a sense of "us" (Lalli, 1992). On the other hand, social media participation might be directed at a larger, perhaps more global audience and the evaluation of their content. While liking, commenting, and sharing, adolescents may find also themselves comparing, contrasting, and judging. Social media engagement might, therefore, inspire a more critical stance towards one's own local social group. Previous research has also found a reversed argument: those with a negative group self-esteem used social media to engage with others outside the group (Barker, 2009). This could mean that those who are not fond of the city and its inhabitants might aim to actively engage with content that is not related to this group.

Urban identity was found to be significantly higher among migrant adolescents than non-migrant adolescents (= H5). This could be explained by the fact that migrant adolescents, having different national backgrounds than the one they currently live in, may have less coherent national identities in comparison to non-migrant adolescents. Therefore, our participants identified more strongly with Rotterdam, when asked, than they might when relating themselves to wider notions of identity, such as a Dutch national identity. This is in line with earlier research pointing out the significance of the city in the migration process, as well as the identification on different spatial levels (Georgiou, 2010; Rydin & Sjöberg, 2008). While identifying on one particular spatial level does not exclude identification on the other levels, and identification on one spatial level is not limited to one particular place (as proven by hybrid identities) (Georgiou, 2010; Lalli, 1992; Rydin & Sjöberg, 2008), the significance of the city in the everyday lives of the individual, particularly in the case of a migrant (Georgiou, 2010), may strengthen that sense of belonging. This may especially be the case in a super-diverse majority-minority city, where individuals are generally surrounded by others with similarly diverse identities.

The intensity of following local SMI and general social media usage were positive predictors of urban identity for both groups (= H6). The influence of SMIs on identity, particularly as role models and inspiration, is in line with research in other fields (Gomillion & Giuliano, 2011). When one's media idol, a person that is often admired, lives in the same city, this may foster a sense of similarity and recognition, and, as a result, a sense of belonging. Just as is the case with other citizens (Lalli, 1992), the influencer may become important to the individual's identity construction through the construction of "us" versus "them", differentiating themselves from other people outside the city (Lalli, 1992). This also connects to the idea that adolescents prefer media idols similar to themselves whom they can identify with (Valkenburg & Piotrowski, 2017).

In terms of social identity, it was found that both self-categorization and group self-esteem were positive predictors of urban identity (= H7). This suggests that if one feels like one belongs to the group of "Rotterdammers", and when they feel good about this group, they also identify with the city personally. This is in line with the argument that well-being is connected to the urge to belong to a social group (Lalli, 1992). Moreover, it also supports the previous argument that the super-diverse group of citizens harbors a sense of similarity in its differences.

When testing separately for migrant and non-migrant adolescents, notable results were found. While for both group self-categorization and group self-esteem remained a positive impact on urban identity, differences were found in the impact social media engagement had on urban identity. The intensity of following local SMI was only a positive predictor for non-migrant adolescents. This might be explained by the finding that migrants already have a higher urban identity than non-migrants, possibly due to previously mentioned reasons, and therefore the intensity of following local SMI cannot increase urban identity much more. Non-migrant adolescents, on the other hand, might feel more connected to the city when they engage with local influencers who may strengthen their sense of belonging, as previously argued.

Finally, we found no difference for self-esteem between migrant and non-migrant adolescents (Q2). When analyzing possible influences on self-esteem, only self-categorization was found to be a positive predictor (= H9), whereas group self-esteem, social media engagement, and urban identity were not (≠ H9, ≠ H8, ≠ H10). Self-categorizing with the local social group could create a sense of belonging, which is connected to the promotion of self-esteem (Lalli, 1992). Resulting from our previous argumentation on urban identity, one could expect self-esteem to be higher for migrants as a result. However, our results go against the idea that high urban identity results in high individual self-esteem. This could be due to the complexity of self-esteem, especially in the life of migrants, where numerous other factors, such as ethnic background and socio-economic status, may also play important roles (Rumbaut, 1994).

6. Conclusion

This study investigated adolescents' urban identity from a personal and social perspective and related this to their social media use. Building on the notion of urban identity (Lalli, 1992; Proshansky et al., 1983), and positioning

this in a framework of the super-diverse city (Vertovec, 2007), as a central space for the negotiation of identity of migrants and non-migrants (Georgiou, 2010; Lalli, 1992), we have found that this urban identity is particularly present among migrant adolescents. Here, social media engagement plays different roles, mostly positively associated with various forms of identity and self-esteem, yet, in one case, also negatively. Furthermore, differences were found between migrant and non-migrant adolescents in terms of access to digital devices and their preferences for social media platforms.

In this project, we have been able to gather data from migrant adolescents—a group generally hard to reach in survey research. The colorful survey, adapted to the interests of this particular age group, worked well in the school setting in which the surveys were conducted. The results may have important implications for studying the well-being of young migrants in super-diverse cities, where urban identity should be taken into account as an important factor in settling in and dealing with differences surrounding them. Taking into account urban identity might be particularly crucial to research involving migrant adolescents who have just arrived in the new city, as they may have to reestablish a sense of belonging in a new place. Having access to and using these social media might prove an essential tool for identity development and for creating a sense of belonging. Finally, future research should investigate in more detail how social media use and engagement plays a role in the construction of the urban identity.

This study has several limitations. The first one entails the distinction made between migrants and non-migrants. Migrants are not a homogeneous group and differ according to their reasons for migration, cultural background, socio-economic status, and the length of time that they have lived in the country (de Block & Buckingham, 2007; Jennissen et al., 2018). Future research should, therefore, take into account the length of residence when investigating the strength of experienced urban identity. Second, due to the age of the target group, the length of the survey prohibited in-depth questions about engagement. More in-depth research on social media engagement on particular platforms could give a more complete image of the types of social media use among different groups in society. Thirdly, it should be noted that the model for self-categorization did not reach significance, and the variance was relatively limited. Assumptions on the relationship between urban identity, social identity, self-esteem and social media engagement were based on theory. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of our study, causal assumptions are difficult to make. Finally, this research does not explain differences in urban identity between groups. A qualitative study could further investigate how adolescents actively identify with the city by engaging them in making media content about their own situation. All in all, this survey has contributed to the literature on online identity construction among adolescents in super-diverse cities. While some of the findings proved to be largely in line with existing research, our survey has demonstrated that theory can be enriched by incorporating urban identity as part of the identity development of young people in urban environments, particularly in the case of migrant adolescents. As our findings have shown that urban self-categorization is a positive predictor of personal self-esteem, urban identity might play an important role in adolescent empowerment, in which social media is used as a tool for this creation and negotiation of identity.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Board Games as Interview Tools: Creating a Safe Space for Unaccompanied Refugee Children

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Abstract
Since the emergence of the new sociology of childhood in the late 1980s, there has been an increasing expectation to engage children actively and to take their views seriously throughout the research process. This is even more important when it comes to unaccompanied refugee children, whose voice is seldom heard. In this article the author builds upon her project of exploring unaccompanied refugee children's lived media experiences and argues that—in order to have meaningful results and to create safe spaces for those who need it most—we need to search beyond traditional research tools. Specifically, she proposes to bring into research the concept of "play". The article presents the use of bespoke, artisanal board games in cross-national interview settings with unaccompanied refugee children. It is argued that these creative tools can help in collecting diverse and rich data that can successfully complement traditional research methods.

Keywords
unaccompanied refugee children; board games; interviewing; media literacy; qualitative methods

Issue
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1. Introduction

The latest UNICEF *State of the World's Children* report contains a statement that today is perhaps more important than ever: "Children use digital technology for specific reasons and it is important to take their opinions and explanations seriously" (2017, p. 119). In the last decades, a growing number of scholars have been advocating for making children's voices heard in scientific research (Cannella, 1997; MacNaughton & Smith, 2015; O'Loughlin, 2001; etc.). However, there are specific difficulties in researching children's and teenagers' perspectives and even with the best of intentions, it is sometimes quite challenging to navigate through the many rules and recommendations that need to be taken into consideration. While some of the issues, such as creating safe spaces where children feel comfortable (MacNaughton & Smith, 2015), are crucial and obvious, others, like the increasing surveillance of children in research (James & Prout, 1997) can hinder projects. These difficulties are further compounded, if one is interested in the perspectives of unaccompanied refugee children, as I was, through a project that investigated the digital and social media use of these children, after their arrival to Europe. Moreover, specific ethical and methodological considerations have to be acknowledged when it comes to researching unaccompanied minor refugees. Apart from the well-known issue of these children's vulnerability, one has to consider the specific life experiences and difficulties of those migrating without parents or guardians (Hopkins, 2008). Previous research studies have also drawn attention to the question of failing to understand cultural nuances and sensitivities (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003; Kabranian-Melkonian, 2015; Voutira & Doná, 2007); the importance of using gatekeepers to access the field (Charmarkeh, 2013); or the importance of "highly charged policy and political environments" (Schmidt, 2007, p. 92) in influencing method-

ological choices. Similarly, we are also reminded that:

> Knowledge production within the social sciences and humanities tends to be culturally specific, and as a consequence, the particular knowledge generated is designed to articulate particular and most often Eurocentric ideological and philosophical worldviews, and further serves the interests of proponents of those ideologies and world views. (Blay, 2008, p. 61)

The aim of this article, however, is not to focus on the main difficulties in doing research with unaccompanied refugee children, but rather to present a unique approach to interviewing that proved to be successful in gaining in-depth data. The research tool used (a board game) helped overcome some of the issues highlighted above by addressing the challenges of vulnerability, cultural differences and diverging world views through focusing on the universal language of "play". The research project that this article draws upon was a two-year long cross-national study that analysed unaccompanied refugee children's (social) media experiences in the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy. These three European countries had the largest share of unaccompanied minors among asylum seekers at the time of the research design (Eurostat, 2016). A total of 56 young people participated in this project: in terms of nationalities, most of the teenagers came from Eritrea (16), Afghanistan (15), Morocco (4), Somalia (4), with one or two participants coming from other Middle Eastern, African or South Asian countries. In terms of gender distribution, most of the participants were boys, with 11 girls participating in this study. The field-work lasted for two weeks in each country. The project aimed to understand their media use in order to create media literacy educational materials that can help these children in becoming critical media users and creators. The research relied on a mix of qualitative methods that involved an online media diary, participant observation, interviews and digital ethnography. This methodology is in line with what Yalaz and Zapata-Barrero (2018) note as an increasing focus on employing qualitative methodology in the field of migration studies. Qualitative projects are becoming more prominent as these produce nuanced and rich data (Morawska, 2018). In terms of methods then, most projects in this field are reliant upon interviews, participant observation, focus groups, historical analysis, and much less on internet-mediated research or visual analysis (Yalaz & Zapata-Barrero, 2018, p. 15). From this analysis it is clear that more "unconventional" qualitative research methods are perhaps used by researchers, but are not frequently reported in key migration journals, in spite of the fact that scholars have advocated the use of collaborative and participatory projects as early as 2007 (e.g., Ellis, Kia-Keating, Siraad, Lincoln, & Nur, 2007). In the last couple of years some methods such as photo-elicitation within participatory action research or ethnographic films have started gaining attention (e.g., Francisco, 2014; Leurs, Omerovic, Bruinenberg, & Sprenger, 2018). In light of recent developments, I aim to strengthen these initiatives by focusing on creative research methods in the field of migration studies. More specifically then, the goal of this article is to present the use of artisanal board games in research settings. Through these board games, the interaction with the unaccompanied refugee youth provided not only much richer data, but also an opportunity to transform an otherwise formal "traditional" interview setting into one that evolved around the concept of "play". For education scholars, such as Eugen Fink (1960, p. 101):

> Play is itself a fundamental phenomenon of existence…we play with the serious, the authentic, the real. We play with work and struggle, love and death. We even play with play…joy reigns in it as undisputed master at each moment, carrying it forward and giving it wings…it is a joy rooted in the most special…activity, open to many interpretations. It can include profound sadness, a tragic suffering. It can embrace the most striking contraries…[m]oved to tears we may be, we smile at the comedy and tragedy which are our life and which the play represents to us.

In the digital world in which our unaccompanied refugee youth operate at the fringes of, "play can be the beginning of a conversation (dialogue) which children begin to have with different texts and experiences" (Berger & Zezulkova, 2016, p. 3). In this note then, I will first position the study in the context of digital migration studies, and then focus on the methodological choices that were made based on the experiences of the field work and on my re-considering of the traditional interviewing methods. The article ends by reflecting on the possibilities of altering our research approaches, in order to create a more equal relationship between researchers and participants.

2. Researching Migration and Digital Media Use

By 2017, more than 150,000 unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers reached Europe (Eurostat, 2017). Mass media reported intensely on how smart phones became crucial tools for young people during their journey, with Google-map functionality, for instance, playing a crucial role in assisting families and unaccompanied children navigating themselves out of the crisis zones across the Middle-East and Africa. Recent scholarship focusing on information and communications technology use by refugees on their migration journey highlighted that most of refugees have relevant IT skills, but with the plethora of information available, they do not know whom to trust (Gillespie et al., 2016). After this journey, unaccompanied children and teenagers have had to further navigate themselves through the physical and digital haze of European public systems, cultures, and institutions. Kutscher and Kreß (2018) highlight in their arti-

cle that digital media became a basic necessity for everyday life for unaccompanied refugee children in the new home countries. Moreover, social media networking sites were also found to be important for refugees in the process of language learning and forging new relationships (Alencar, 2017).

Despite the ubiquitousness of smart phones and social media, an important question that has to be answered is whether digital technology and media can be a useful tool for tackling the challenges of building a new home. In servicing the research aim of creating media literacy education materials, it was imperative first to explore everyday media practices among unaccompanied refugee children seeking asylum in EU nations. As previously mentioned, the fieldwork was carried out in three EU countries, as multi-sited ethnography is essential when one wants to understand migration as a human process that itself is about crossing borders and mobility. FitzGerald (2012) further argues that it is important to do comparative studies of migration, in order to be able to analyse both similarities and contrasts and to overcome "methodological nationalism" (p. 1731). In order to counteract the criticism that multi-sited research loses the deeper knowledge of a locality (FitzGerald, 2012), I collaborated with local academics and NGO experts in order to combine their insider understanding and my own outsider fresh perspective.

In terms of research strategy, it was important to adopt one that is as complex as "the object of the study itself" (Beneito-Montagut, 2011, p. 725). Scholars highlight the fact that the methods used to study the social practices of young people have to take into consideration key issues, such as the blurring of the boundaries between their online and offline experiences or the importance of young people's self-representation and performativity in the online world (Vittadini, Carlo, Gilje, Laursen, Murru, & Schrøder, 2014). Researchers are now noticing that, "teens struggle to make sense of the networked publics they inhabit—and the ways in which their practices reveal cultural fractures—highlight some of the challenges society faces as technology gets integrated into daily life" (Boyd, 2014, p. 212). Related studies with digitally connected youth have found that, "[o]nline communication seemed to reinforce (rather than undermine) the importance of relationships with family and local friends, built primarily through face-to-face communication" (Livingstone & Sefton-Green, 2016, p. 84). I was interested thus in whether these previous findings can be replicated in the case of unaccompanied refugee children.

3. The Messiness of the Research Process

The initial research design was intended to capture the lived media experience of unaccompanied refugee children (aged 14–18) through a combination of semi-structured interviews, participant observation and the use of an online media diary. We built this online media diary upon the principles of participant-driven diary studies, a type of diary study in which participants use media to record events (Carter & Mankoff, 2005). We customised it to mobile devices and translated into Tigrinya and Arabic, the two most used languages among refugee children in the Netherlands, the country chosen for the pilot project. The participants were contacted through NGOs who acted as gate-keepers. I was invited to present the research project to young people, who could ask questions and voice their opinions about it. They could then decide whether they wanted to participate, based on the presentation and on information sheets that were available in English, Arabic and Tigrinya.

Upon entering the field and carrying out the initial interviews with the young people, it became immediately apparent that doing field work can become a messy endeavour. Although in many instances, the research process is presented as a straightforward, precise practice (Lambotte & Meunier, 2013), I realised that in this case, the research tools would have to be substantially re-adjusted to the local conditions and contexts. Although the online media diary was purposefully created in an accessible manner for these children, and the I explained in detail the use of this tool after the interviews, the young people did not engage with it as thoroughly as was envisaged. The reasons why they did not fill in the online diary were varied: some of them were illiterate, while others were not accustomed to writing longer texts. Some others then did not feel secure in sharing information about their media experiences in their diaries. This was similar to what Block, Warr, Gibbs and Riggs's (2013) experienced with migrant youth in Australia. Just as in our case, the Australian research team chose a specific method (focus groups), because this method is regularly used with vulnerable groups, as it can give participants more control over the process. However, they also found that the chosen method did not help in eliciting meaningful responses (Block et al., 2013).

Therefore, it was necessary to re-set and build a research tool that can more effectively capture broadly the similar data as the online media diary would have had. The main condition that had to be taken into consideration was that I needed a tool that can be used during the interviews, as I found that the refugee children were unlikely to take part 'remotely' in the research, by filling in an online diary. This was not because they needed adult supervision in anyway. I could infer from my first experiences that unaccompanied refugee youth live very much in the immediate moment, and previous research shows that the future is always an uncertain prospect for displaced and state-less peoples (El-Shaarawi, 2012). For this reason, I was compelled to go beyond the advice to use research methods that complement each other and help in understanding a complex reality (Vittadini et al., 2014); I needed a tool that engages unaccompanied refugee children.

Another aspect that I had to consider was power imbalances. Uncertainty about the roles and powers of

different people and organisations in a specific refugee situation influences not only verbal answers—often designed to fit what a respondent may see as a reasonable expectation to have from outsiders—but also habits of interaction. This power asymmetry between researchers and participants has been critiqued, for instance, by Bourdieu (1996), who also highlights the social asymmetry, that happens when the "investigator occupies a higher place in the social hierarchy" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 19). Often the questions refugees are asked by researchers and agencies overlap. As a similar research project notes: "many of our interviewees were unable or unwilling to distinguish between our role as researchers, and the role played by a needs assessment team" (Hovil, Lomo, & Kaiser, 2005, p. 45). And finally, because the process of migration is so politically charged, Leurs and Smets (2018) remind us that the figure of 'the migrant' is performatively constructed and that "researchers are complicit in this process" (p. 10).

Although it is well-known that research with children has to be more captivating, it is important to consider relational ethics (Ellis, 2007) when it comes to researching the media worlds of unaccompanied refugee children. Relational ethics has been defined as being "true to one's character and responsible for one's actions and their consequences on others" (Slattery & Rapp, 2003, p. 55). More specifically then, mutual respect, dignity and connectedness are the values recognised by relational ethics (Ellis, 2007). While respect and dignity were values imbedded in the interview situation, I aimed to create a research tool that could build a more playful connectedness between researcher and participants.

A different element that I had to consider is the pervasiveness of the digital world. However, the experience of the pilot project suggested an approach that involves both the "new" (apps, smart phones) and a return to the "basics" (regular play). Moreover, as I watched young people play football in the courtyards of their accommodation centres—from countries vastly different, such as Afghanistan or Eritrea—I realised that "playing" can become a "language" that all children are familiar with. Another reason for deciding upon using a board game were the two main characteristics of play, as noted by Huizinga (1949). One of these characteristics is that play is free, no one can be obliged to play (Huizinga, 1949), and in terms of relational ethics and unaccompanied refugee children, this is extremely important. The other feature of play is that it is not "ordinary" life: "it is rather a stepping out of «real» life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own" (Huizinga, 1949, p. 9). With vulnerable participants, the option of offering a possibility to "leave" the difficult everyday realities even for just a limited time, it seemed to be a something worth exploring. Therefore, together with an artist, we turned our attention towards making a creative research tool that could capture unaccompanied refugee children's daily media use.

4. Board Games as Creative Research Tools

Researching children's experience has dramatically changed over the last couple of decades from seeing children as merely objects of research to children as subjects, as emphasized by the "new social studies of childhood" (Greene & Hogan, 2005). In order to involve children and young people, creative methods have been proposed in order to "assist research participants to describe and analyse their experiences and give meaning to them" (Andersson et al., 2005, p. 1). Creative research methods (Gauntlett, 2007) have been gradually accepted in recent years across a multitude of academic fields. From storytelling to photo-elicitation, photovoice or drama, there have been a number of methods that researchers used to complement or replace data gathered through traditional methods. Researchers employing creative methods argue that these methods provide "new ways of understanding people's real lived experiences…and offer ways to give back and contribute to a community" (Vaart, Hoven, & Huigen, 2018, p. 1). Similarly, children's visual methods are also becoming more popular in migration studies. Some of these studies make use of drawings (Fernandez, Liamputtong, & Wallersheim, 2015; Liamputtong & Fernandez, 2015) or mental maps (den Besten, 2010; Moskal, 2017) to gather data that otherwise cannot be obtained or to enrich findings. All these new ways of working sit very much outside the more "traditional" approaches to conducting research but are becoming more widely used.

Upon reflecting on the pilot experiences with my NGO contacts, it became clear that I needed to alter my approach in order to create a more playful and engaging communicative space with my participants. Participatory research is a type of research that is in essence "collaborative and aims to achieve social change from below" (Doná, 2007, p. 214). My aim was thus to use elements of participatory research in order to make the whole project process more cooperative. As a first step towards such an approach, I consulted with mentors and NGO professionals, and they advised to employ a method that uses less text and more images, and to transform the whole experience into one that is more interactive. While I could have chosen one of the existing creative research methods, after carefully balancing the pros and cons of each of these methods, I realised that I needed a tool that fulfils a number of criteria. First of all, I needed a tool that is not built on the premise that young people should create or prepare something before our interview (e.g., taking photos), as this proved to be challenging when I first tried to use the online media diary with them. Therefore, photo elicitation or photo voice had to be ruled out. A second important criteria was the need for a tool that it is easy to engage with for participants with different literacy skills and language knowledge. Storytelling or drama would have excluded those young people who felt unsecure about their language skills. And thirdly I needed a tool that builds upon

something familiar to the young people, irrespective of their country of provenience. My attention, thus, turned to the universality of playing games and to the specific tool of board games.

The origins of board games go back to the sixth century BCE, when the world's oldest board game, "Go" ("Weiqi") was created in Asia (Driscoll, 2018). From divination purposes to imparting Christian values or teaching good manners, board games have always had an important role in society. As Donovan (2017) argues, across the centuries, board games always reflected the values of time. Board games also sit neatly on the axis between "play" and education, and gaming is becoming a useful element of a researcher's toolkit.

As a result, scholars started investigating the educational aspect of board games: Chou (2017), for instance, showed the role these games have in developing pupils' aesthetic experience and interpersonal understanding, while another study (Wu, Chen, & Huang, 2014) confirmed the capacity of board games in encouraging communication and context-relevant immersion in English as Foreign Language classrooms. In the case of these two studies, the target groups were children or young learners, however, researchers have also looked at how board games can help in adult education. Mouton et al. (2017) investigated how a giant exercising board game can improve the overall health of nursing home residents, while Ladur, van Teijlingen and Hundley (2018) explored the possibility of using a board game in order to better engage Ugandan men to help improve health outcomes for pregnant women. A recent report discussing innovation in pedagogy, also highlights that play "evokes creativity, imagination, and happiness" (Ferguson et al., 2019, p. 3). Taking all this into consideration, in order to engage young unaccompanied refugees, I decided to create two board games that combined media experiences with regular everyday practices. Besides building upon the advices of NGO experts, I also involved in this creation process an artist. O'Donoghue (2011) argues that artists "will bring to research…very different ways of seeing, imagining, understanding, articulating, and inquiring, which leads to better questioning and more robust inquiry practices" (p. 649). Beyond helping with the visual design, this collaboration helped in refining my interview approach.

5. Board Games for Unaccompanied Refugee Children

The first board game was nicknamed the "app o'clock", as it explored the media experiences of refugee children's around the face of a clock (see Figure 1). Participants were asked to either talk about or write on a post-it-note the technology, websites, or apps they were using during the day.

The rule of the game was that they had to think about apps they use on a daily basis. For moving on the board game, one was asked to name an app/website she/he uses for a specific activity (e.g., during breakfast, at school, or during leisure activities). The activity proved to be a good "ice-breaker", as the participants were more open to talking about their everyday activities and how these tie-in with their phone use. An interesting aspect of the game was the interaction among the refugee children, as they sometimes made jokes, or they were surprised by each other's (over)reliance on social media, for instance. Beyond gathering relevant data, for the purpose of this project, the "app o'clock" proved to be a great tool for the children to reflect on how their lives has changed. While at no point of the "game" did I ask about their experiences during their journey to Europe, the participants while looking at the playing field were more prone to discuss how their use of technology differed to what they had used back home. In one of these instances, an Afghan boy, when he stepped on the "school field", and was asked about the regular websites he uses during that time, he mentioned Google Classroom. After this, he talked about how different school was in Sweden in comparison with Afghanistan:

Figure 1. The "app o'clock".

> It's too different because I didn't have a computer in Afghanistan and we have to write in Afghanistan in pen and notebooks, and we don't have too much notebooks here in Sweden because we're working on the computer all the time. (author's notes)

In terms of the aim of the overall project this information is then extremely valuable, as it shows how the transition from their home country to a new one has influenced

unaccompanied young people's technology use. Moreover (and perhaps more importantly) it casts light on the everyday struggles of getting used to a new environment and the tenacity of those children who come to Europe on their own.

For the qualitative researcher then, it was an opportunity to become more reflexive and empathetic, and it provided a space for a better understanding of the lives of these children. While engaging with participants over seemingly mundane topics, such as a participant's favourite meal, the board game became a tool for a more equal relationship. In terms of rational approaches, one could argue that these "side discussions" offered no "real" empirical evidence. However, I argue that in the case of children, and moreover, unaccompanied refugee children, this first board game further drew quite defined lines of disembarkation between the researcher (and participants) and the other adults they would encounter, most of who had quite strong professional identities. Studies on post-migratory stress (Sack, 1998) have shown that unaccompanied refugee children struggle because of the difficulty to cope with new rules and regulations and the nightmare of navigating a "maze of systems" (Kohli & Mather, 2003, p. 21). By "playing" a board game however, my aim was to open up a world of possibilities that was not led by a quest for data through any means possible, but by an approach in which all participants are more equal than in traditional research settings. In the vein of relational ethics (Ellis, 2007) then, this first board game created a ludic atmosphere where the researcher also shared personal stories, and thus a safe environment was created where children could openly talk about their experiences. For instance, during one of the interviews, with an Afghan girl, with the help of the board game we were going through her regular daily activities and the apps she uses. When she got to "lunch time", I humorously remarked that I am not a great cook, so I often need to look up recipes on the internet. At that point she wrote Youtube on the post-it and started telling me that she likes cooking and she also looks up recipes on the app:

> Interviewer: And what kind of recipes do you look up? In what language?
> Afghan girl: If I want to make a Persian dish, I look of course in Persian language, and if I want to make something Swedish, I will use Swedish, but if I want something like cupcakes, I will search in English. Depending on what I am looking for. (author's notes)

This seemingly prosaic discussion was actually incredibly relevant in understanding how unaccompanied young refugees use digital technology for solving everyday problems in their country of asylum. During the pilot project, before using the board games, I frequently received very short answers on how the young people were using apps. For instance, when asked about YouTube, the usual answer was that they use it to listen to music. However, as the above fragment shows, this specific app can mean much more to young people living without their parents, such as connecting them to the (food) culture left behind or the one recently discovered in the new country. The board game thus provided an opportunity for researcher and participants to share common (digital) experiences and connect through play.

Going further, the next step was to explore the use of pre-selected applications through a second artisanal board game (see Figure 2). I called this the "app board game".

Participants were asked to connect specific activities to apps they use for these activities. The apps they were able to choose from were created as laminated "buttons"



Figure 2. The "app board game".

that could be moved around on the board. These buttons were reflecting the most popular applications in the country of the research, based on the number of downloads in the previous month, as reported by App Annie, an app market data platform. The participants were able to choose from more than 50 apps such as the one(s) they used for keeping in touch with friends, to shop online or to relax. In the case that a certain app they used was not among these buttons, the participants had the opportunity to create a new one on the spot. This way, the children could actively participate in the co-creation of the game. The second board game offered an opportunity for the young people to share their opinions about the apps they used the most. Apart from selecting a button, the game was an opportunity for them to consider their own media or social media use. This led to many "aha moments" when, for instance, a young person looking at the board, realised the over-reliance on some platforms. At the end of one of the interviews, a young Somali girl looked at the board and realised that there were basically two buttons (apps) used for most of her social interaction. She started laughing and admitted to being worried about being addicted to these:

> [She is looking at the board and starts laughing:] It's all Snapchat and Facebook.
> I sleep with Facebook. I sleep while I am talking on Facebook. Most of the time I use Facebook, I talk to a lot of people, Messenger [laughing]. (author's notes)

6. Reflection on Using Board Games as Research Tools

Many textbooks and articles highlight the requirement for academics to be flexible in order to adapt to specific research situations (e.g., Block et al., 2013). This project has showed us, however, that beyond being responsive to local conditions, one can think outside the traditional research tool box and bring into it elements from other aspects of life.

By using the two artisanal game boards, I found that in contrast with the pilot project, when answers were short and lacking depth, the children participated actively and were immersed into the game. One of the reasons of this was the fact that the board games were designed to appeal to children and young people. With colourful drawings and very little text, these board games offered a totally different experience to what the unaccompanied refugee children have previously seen when in formal interview settings. In line with Gauntlett's (2007, p. 182) argument, by using a creative research tool, participants communicated different kinds of information. So, I am not claiming here that I got "better" data, from side-lining more "traditional" approaches to research interviews, but I certainly feel that our tool, and the attendant activities, did produce "different" and more nuanced data.

In connection with this, however, I need to highlight some limitations of this research tool. One potential pitfall lies exactly in its engaging and fun nature. While on one hand this can help in easing the pressure of a formal interview setting for children and teenagers, its use can also become ambiguous in case the participants think that they are only taking part in a game. This is why it was important for me to highlight that although it's a board game, the answers and information shared will be used for scientific purposes. A crucial aspect then is that of language use. During the games I would use either English (in Sweden), or Italian and English (in Italy), as the young people knew these languages to different degrees. This does not mean that the board games cannot be used when an interpreter is present. However, besides the well-known issues of interpreters' position in a community or their experience (see Bergen, 2018), when using board games, a researcher needs to consider the level of involvement of the interpreter and power balances. And finally, as mentioned before, it has become highly relevant to strive to make research with children as participatory as possible. For this project then, I involved NGO experts and an artist in the creation of the board games. The participants had also the possibility of creating new app "buttons" on the spot, which some of them did, for instance when adding the "button" for VClass, a learning platform used in Swedish schools. However, the daily activities in the "app o'clock" board game were pre-set (e.g., having breakfast, going to school). In a truly participatory fashion that looks beyond rationally designed activities, one could co-create these board games with the unaccompanied refugee children, based on the activities they deem important to appear on the board. This would ensure that these children's views will be not be forgotten, because as Donovan (2017) writes "wherever the future takes us, board games will be there, mirroring our choices and our attitudes on paper and cardboard" (p. 256).

7. Concluding Thoughts

As researchers, we must continually examine our research approaches and the field-sites in which we operate. This is even more important when doing research with vulnerable groups. Moreover, we must not accept that these approaches are just there, but we must continually be critical of the conditions which brought them about and make the necessary changes in order to meet the needs of our participants. Through this research project I realised that I need to think out of the box and create a research tool that speaks a universal language: that of "play". The ultimate aim of the board games was, of course, to collect data that can inform the creation of media literacy education programs for refugee children. However, the way this data was collected helped in creating an environment that was both safe and at times, whimsical for the participants. This is not to say that traditional interview tools should be replaced when working with refugees. However, I argue for a greater openness in bringing in tools from other aspects of life in order to not to just collect research data from our participants,

but to offer them something in return. In this case, it was perhaps a short respite of playfulness. Denzin (2016) argues "this is a historical present that cries out for emancipatory visions, for visions that inspire transformative inquiries, and for inquiries that can provide the moral authority to move people to struggle and resist oppression" (p. 8). One small step towards this is to modify our research tools in order to create collaborative spaces for those who have been voiceless for a long time.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author

Annamária Neag is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at Bournemouth University. Her research project is looking at how unaccompanied refugee children use digital and social media. The aim of the project is to develop media literacy education tools that can help unaccompanied refugee children's integration into their new culture and society. Her research interests include media literacy education, media history and digital citizenship.

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Article

With a Little Help from My Friends: Peer Coaching for Refugee Adolescents and the Role of Social Media

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Abstract
This intervention study investigated how much impact a specific peer-coaching (Peer2Peer) for refugee adolescents has on different factors of well-being for both sides: refugee adolescents (peers, $N = 16$) and their local peer coaches (buddies, $N = 16$). Next to pre- and post-tests, four buddies reflected on the process via weekly media diaries. We found that higher peer-loneliness and lower self-esteem was reported for peers in the beginning but these differences disappeared. These results were confirmed by buddies' media diaries: language and communication barriers reduced and friendships between buddies and peers grew. Buddies also reported high feelings of responsibilities in their media diaries which led to worries about their peer, but also to pride due to peers' improvement. Online communication was used on an almost daily basis to stay in contact each other. Snapchat was found to influence emotional and affectionate support. In sum, Peer2Peer as a program showed positive effects for both sides. Future Peer2Peer programs should include trainings on social media as well, as most apps are able to be used independent of own language skills. Thus, social media can help to overcome language barriers and intensifies the feeling of being supported.

Keywords
adolescents; peer coaching; refugees; social inclusion; social media; well-being

Issue
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1. Introduction

Contemporary Europe is characterized by increasing cultural diversity. It not only results in issues with respect to communicating in different languages, but also in concerns that stem from different cultural values, norms, and behavioural standards. Many adolescents have to adapt to a new cultural environment including a new language, a new school, and new peers (Kammerl & Kramer, 2016; Titzmann & Jugert, 2015). Adolescents with and without migrant backgrounds have to find their way. Parents and teachers who are historically the experienced, wise ones are often overwhelmed themselves by cultural differences which may result in increased stereotype based behaviours (Glock, Kneer, & Kovacs, 2013).

Independent of the changing world, adolescence is a time in life youth turns more and more away from parents and teachers and same-aged peers become more important (Wentzel, Russell, & Baker, 2016). Youth that just arrived in a new culture and therefore have a strong

need for orientation need peer orientation especially. If refugee adolescents receive such help from peers their well-being can increase. Same-aged peers that offer orientation might increase their own well-being since helping someone was found to impact self-status for adolescents (Schwartz, Meisenhelder, Ma, & Reed, 2003).

Another contemporary development that is especially interesting for adolescents, targets new forms of communication such as social media. Communication via social media takes place without adult involvement and youth create relationships and new networks (Jansz, Slot, Tol, & Verstraeten, 2015). Research on refugees and communication technologies found that social media helps with social inclusion in cases of forced migration (Díaz Andrade & Doolin, 2017). Media usage as a new communication channel can impact the development of new friendships and therefore influence well-being as well. Handling social media including media based communication comes naturally for most adolescents and social media is now also a place for peers to meet (Kneer, Glock, Beskes, & Bente, 2012; Kneer, Jacobs, & Ferguson, 2019; Shifflet-Chila, Harold, Fitton, & Ahmedani, 2016). Special social media apps such as Instagram and Snapchat are more or less language free since visual content is more emphasized (Kennisnet, 2017). Thus, language barriers might be reduced when communication happens via such social media and this form of communication can strengthen the development of friendships between local adolescents and refugee adolescents. With this intervention study we investigated the effects of a specific project that trains native Dutch adolescents to help refugee peers that just settled in the Netherlands and which role media communication plays. In other words:

RQ1: To what extent can peer coaching help to establish well-being for both sides: for native Dutch adolescents and refugee adolescents that just came to the Netherlands?
RQ2: To what extent does social media impact the change of well-being of Dutch and refugee adolescents?
RQ3: Does media usage impact well-being of Dutch and refugee adolescents that joined the project more than adolescents that did not join?

2. Peer Coaching and Impact Adolescents

2.1. The Peer2Peer Approach

The Dutch Peer2Peer institute is a social enterprise; its legal predecessor started in 2010. The method is now implemented at more than 55 secondary schools in the Netherlands. The Peer2Peer approach is a method of coaching aimed at making adolescents more successful in their school career. The idea is that coaching through peers helps to prevent frustration during the learning process, prevents possible isolation, and helps to develop 21st century skills such as self-reflection, working together and the integration in a new culture when children are from abroad. The peer coaches (buddies) are native Dutch adolescents and the trainees are refugee children that are new to the Netherlands (peers).

Buddies are trained in social and communicative skills. They learn to empathize with the situation of the peers they accompany and to explore the type of guidance they need. The buddy training takes place on three days and each of the sessions lasts approximately four hours. The training is conducted by at least one adult supervisor who has been educated by Peer2Peer and works as a teacher. After the initial training, each buddy meets with the adult supervisor at least once a month. When the need arises, buddies can consult their adult supervisor for mentoring in between times as well.

Buddies and peers meet during the last training day and are matched by gender, age, and neighbourhood areas. After this final training, buddies and their peers are supposed to meet up approximately once a week. Several activities are planned by the adult supervisors to support further relationship building between buddies and peers.

2.2. Motivation and Well-Being of Native Dutch and Refugee Adolescents

Research on youth showed a broad range of factors that influence individual well-being (e.g., Bradshaw, Keung, Rees, & Goswami, 2011; Fattore, Mason, & Watson, 2007; Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2015; Perreira & Ornelas, 2011). Well-being is broadly defined as having positive feelings and control over what happens in one's life. Key aspects of well-being are self-esteem, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth (Ryff, 1989). We focused on social factors and educational motivation as Peer2Peer projects target specific social skills, relationships, and educational development.

It is important to see the reasons which are given to join such projects, hence, what motivates adolescents to become coaches for their peers and also what motivates refugee adolescents to learn more about the new culture in which they are living. One significant factor is the importance of education (e.g., Ager & Strang, 2008), thus, the motivation to go to school. If motivation is high—especially for refugee adolescents—the motivation to integrate should rise, too, in order to gain from the new education system.

Another factor for joining such projects is social support. In the case of Dutch adolescents, high social support can induce the wish to help others (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997), and thus, increase the motivation to become a buddy. For refugee adolescents, the *need* for social support might be high due to their own families being either overwhelmed themselves with the new culture and situation, or sometimes even due to being on their own because they might not live with

their families at all. Therefore, these factors (school motivation and social support) have to be evaluated in order to see if they differ between adolescents that joined or did not join such projects. We assume that:

H1: School motivation should be higher for refugee adolescents (peers) that joined the project than for refugee adolescents (control peers) that did not join the project.
H2: Social support should be higher for Dutch adolescents (buddies) that joined the project compared to Dutch adolescents (control buddies) that did not join the project.

The goal of the Peer2Peer approach is to help refugee adolescents to orient themselves in their new culture and to build new friendships (Peer2Peer, 2018). Thus, loneliness of refugee adolescents should be reduced after joining, and understanding the native Dutch culture aims to contribute to self-esteem and life satisfaction in general (Klemens & Bikos, 2009; Ng & Fisher, 2013). We expect that:

H3: Life satisfaction increases for refugee adolescents that joined the project.
H4: Self-esteem increases for refugee adolescents that joined the project.
H5: Peer loneliness decreases for refugee adolescents that joined the project.

Media usage as a communication channel can impact the development of new friendships and thus, influence well-being as well. While using social networks and media based communication comes naturally for most adolescents, such media is also a place for peers to meet (Jansz et al., 2015; Kneer et al., 2012, 2019; Shifflet-Chila et al., 2016). The use of digital communication showed promising results concerning social inclusion of refugee youth and therefore social media has high potential for social capital in Australia (Wilding, 2009). In addition, research on phone use showed that peer help via telephone lead to better integration and better understanding of the new culture: adult refugees in Australia reported that their mobile phones helped relieve loneliness and increase feelings of social support (Walker, Koh, Wollersheim, & Walker, 2015). These studies focused on digital communication such as SMS and classical phone calls and peer to peer was arranged between persons who spoke the same language. Integration in a new culture might improve even more when including social media such as Instagram and Snapchat which are less language based (Kennisnet, 2017) and therefore can offer and support language-free communication when language barriers arise. Since we know that mobile communication plays a crucial role for social inclusion of refugees (Díaz Andrade & Doolin, 2017), it is important to investigate if social media usage for the project group impacts the social factors of well-being more than for adolescents that are not part of the Peer2Peer project.

H6: Social media use has positive impact on social relatedness for the participants of the Peer2Peer project.

As this is an intervention study, we needed to investigate not only changes due to a Peer2Peer project but also focus on the process during the first weeks. For this purpose, we asked a number of participants from the buddies group to fill out a weekly media diary via WhatsApp, talking about their week with their peer. These media diaries gave insight into the experiences of the buddies and their perceptions of the experiences of the peers. While semi-structured through a number of questions, these media diaries offered the participants the opportunity to communicate freely without interruption, and to reflect upon the week at their own convenience/in their own time (Berg & Düvel, 2012).

3. Method

3.1. Sample

For the Peer2Peer project, 16 adolescents from Dutch schools (buddies) and 16 adolescents from international schools (peers) were recruited. In order to have control groups, we also asked 16 adolescents each from the same schools that were not part of the Peer2Peer project to participate in our surveys (control buddies and control peers). Due to dropouts and illness on the data collection days, the final sample included 16 buddies, 14 peers (from Syria), 15 control buddies, and 12 control peers (most from Syria). All participants were aged 13–18 years ($M = 14.09$, $SD = 1.65$) and 61.7% of the sample were female.

3.2. Procedure Surveys and Media Diaries

Before the first meeting between buddies and peers took place, the pre-test was conducted. Two Dutch native and one migrant research assistant introduced our study to the participants and helped with filling out the questionnaire in case there were questions. The order of questions is visible in Table 1 (including Cronbach's αs for both data collections).

3.3. Procedure Media Diaries

Four of the buddies were asked to answer five questions every week via WhatsApp and were handed mobile phones as well as sim cards for this. The questions were: 1. Did you have contact with your peer this week?; 2. In case you did not have contact, what was the reason?; 3. How do you think your peer is doing?; 4. How are you doing as buddy? How do you feel in your role?; and 5. Did something special happen this week? If so, what happened?

Table 1. Measurements for pre- and post-tests.

Measurement	Items	Scale	α_1	α_2	Reference
Demographics	gender, age, nationality				
Leisure activities	team sports, individual sports, time spent with friends, passive activities (TV, books etc.),	1 = never; 5 = always cultural activities			
Media usage	online games, Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat	1 = never; 5 = always			
School connectedness	3 items	1 = never; 6 = everyday	.51	.61	Lee (2009)
School motivation	8 items	1 = strongly disagree, 8 = strongly agree	.81	.80	Huebner (1994)
Peer norms for school performance	3 items	1 = not important; 5 = very important	.81	.86	Sokatch (2006)
Self-esteem	10 items (one dismissed)	1 = totally disagree; 4 = totally agree	.75	.79	Rosenberg (1965)
Life satisfaction	7 items	1 = totally disagree, 6 = strongly agree	.74	.82	Huebner (1994)
Emotional support	4 items	1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree	.87	.90	Sherbourne and Stewart (1991)
Social distraction	3 items	1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree	.77	.75	Sherbourne and Stewart (1991)
Affectionate support	3 items	1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree	.87	.86	Sherbourne and Stewart (1991)
Social anxiety	9 items	1 = never true; 4 = always true	.65	.67	Crick and Ladd (1993)
Peer loneliness	16 items	1 = never; 4 = often	.90	.91	Crick and Ladd (1993)

3.4. Analyses of the Media Diaries

A thematic analysis approach was used to analyse the media diaries (Braun & Clarke, 2006). After the process of transcribing and familiarizing with the data, 100 initial topics were found, thus, 100 codes were established. In searching for themes, a number of 5 themes, with 3 to 6 subthemes each, were found, after which these were limited to a number of 5 themes, which then were further defined and specified.

4. Results: Pre- and Post-Tests

Paired sample t-tests were run for each group to analyse if differences after 14 weeks of the projects occurred. Neither buddies nor peers nor control peers showed any significant differences between pre- and post-tests. Only control buddies showed a higher school connectedness at the second data collection ($M_{pre} = 4.08$, $SD_{pre} = 0.68$; $M_{post} = 4.50$, $SD_{post} = 0.72$), $t(15) = 3.87$, $p = .002$.

4.1. Comparisons between All Groups for Pre- and Post-Tests

All measurements were compared for buddies vs. peers, buddies vs. control buddies and peers vs. control peers. *t*-tests for independent samples for pre- and post-tests were used.

4.1.1. Buddies vs. Peers

For the pre-tests we found that buddies compared to peers showed higher self-esteem ($M_b = 2.88$, $SD_b = 0.51$; $M_p = 2.34$, $SD_p = 0.69$), $t(27) = 2.41$, $p = .023$, less peer loneliness ($M_b = 1.32$, $SD_b = 0.46$; $M_p = 1.92$, $SD_p = 0.62$), $t(27) = 3.03$, $p = .005$, higher emotional support ($M_b = 4.50$, $SD_b = 0.45$; $M_p = 3.60$, $SD_p = 0.58$), $t(27) = 4.73$, $p < .001$ and higher social distraction ($M_b = 4.35$, $SD_b = 0.86$; $M_p = 3.41$, $SD_p = 0.85$), $t(27) = 2.94$, $p = .007$. Compared to buddies, peers scored only higher on school motivation ($M_b = 4.06$, $SD_b = 0.21$; $M_p = 5.14$, $SD_p = 0.21$), $t(27) = 3.63$, $p < .001$.

For the post-tests we found significant differences between buddies and peers again for emotional sup-

port (M_b = 4.31, SD_b = 0.15; M_p = 3.52, SD_p = 0.82), $t(28) = 3.06$, $p = .004$, and social distraction, ($M_b = 4.38$, $SD_b = 0.14$; $M_p = 3.60$, $SD_p = 0.94$), $t(28) = 2.80$, $p = .009$. This time, affectionate support was found to be higher for buddies as well (M_b = 4.36, SD_b = 0.56; M_p = 3.29, SD_p = 1.09), $t(28)$ = 3.47, p = .002. Peers scored again higher concerning school motivation (M_b = 4.08, $SD_b = 0.79$; $M_p = 4.90$, $SD_p = 0.75$), $t(28) = 2.93$, $p = .007$. Interestingly, buddies showed less life satisfaction than peers (M_b = 3.74, SD_b = 0.38; M_p = 4.32, SD_p = 0.62), $t(28) = 3.10$, $p = .004$.

4.1.2. Buddies vs. Control Buddies

Analyses of pre surveys showed that buddies scored significant higher than control buddies on school connectedness ($M_b = 4.62$, $SD_b = 0.80$; $M_{cb} = 4.08$, $SD_{cb} = 0.68$), $t(30)$ = 2.06, p = .048 and on emotional support (M_b = 4.50, SD_b = 0.45; M_{cb} = 3.83, SD_{cb} = 0.76), $t(30)$ = 3.04, p = .006. No further comparisons were found to be significant for the pre survey. For post-tests only life satisfaction revealed significant differences showing lower scores for buddies than for control buddies (M_b = 3.74, SD_b = 0.38; M_{cb} = 4.04, SD_{cb} = 0.39), $t(30) = 2.20$, $p = .036$.

4.1.3. Peers vs. Control Peers

For the pre-tests we found that peers showed higher school motivation than control peers (M_p = 5.14, SD_p = 0.21; M_{cp} = 4.38, SD_{cp} = 0.55), $t(30)$ = 3.13, p = .004. Self-esteem was found to be lower for peers than for control peers ($M_p = 2.34$, $SD_p = 0.69$; $M_{cp} = 2.77$, SD_{cp} = 0.27), $t(30)$ = 2.30, p = .029, and peers scored also higher on peer loneliness (M_p = 1.92, SD_p = 0.62; $M_{cp} = 1.36$, $SD_{cp} = 0.39$), $t(30) = 3.02$, $p = .005$.

No significant differences were found for any measurement for the post-test.

4.2. Influence of Free Time Activities and Media Usage on Social Well-Being

We analysed if social activities and social media usage can predict well-being. We included time spent with friends as predictor because this free time activity was reported most. Snapchat was included as it is known to be on the rise especially for younger generations (Anderson & Jiang, 2018; Kennisnet, 2017; Smith & Anderson, 2018). Snapchat uses less language and is more about sharing pictures, etc., so language barriers should not play a major role.

Multiple linear regression analyses for emotional support, social distraction, affectionate support, and peer loneliness as dependent variables and time spent with friends and Snapchat usage as predictors were calculated for the project group (buddies and peers) and the control group (control buddies and control peers) for the second survey round.

Time spent with friends had no predictive value for any of the social well-being criteria, however, Snapchat usage was a positive significant predictor for emotional and affectionate support (See Table 2 for all βs and F-values). No regression model or predictor was found to be significant for the control group.

5. Results Media Diaries

5.1. Hanging Out Online and Offline

The first theme to be discussed is the space where communication took place—where the peer and buddy essentially hung out. Here one can find an important distinction between online and offline (face-to-face).

Online or other mediated communication refers to all forms of non-face-to-face communication that happened between the peer and buddy that included a medium. This was done by the use of social media (e.g., Whatsapp, Instagramm, Snapchat). What is interesting is that although online communication was not always explicitly mentioned as hanging out, it did not make this contact any less important. When the two did not meet up face-to-face it was often mentioned that social media was used to keep in contact:

> I did not have [face-to-face] contact with my peer (except via WhatsApp). (Buddy #1)
> We did not have contact outside of WhatsApp. (Buddy #4)

Social media, therefore, played a central role in keeping in contact and also initiating contact, micro-coordination, and even hanging out.

Offline contact entailed meeting up face-to-face, either in a public or private space, and either with two or

Table 2. Time spent with friends and Snapchat usage as predictors for social well-being variables for the Peer2Peer group.

Criteria	$F(2.27)$	R^2	Friends β	Snapchat β
Emotional support	12.15***	.48***	.07	.65***
Social distraction	4.48*	.27*	.30	.31
Affectionate support	6.41**	.33**	.32	.36*
Peer loneliness	4.13*	.24*	−.26	−.33

Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, p < .001.

more people, doing different activities. The distinction between meeting in private or in public showed quite large differences: out of the 32 instances of meeting up, 20 were in a public location and 8 were in a private place, such as the buddy's home (6 times) or the peer's home (2 times). The four other meetings were not specified.

This result is in line with findings that showed that hanging around online can enhance the development of a friendship (Buote, Wood, & Pratt, 2009) and that online contact is seen as similar to offline communication (Reich, Subrahmanyam, & Espinoza, 2012). Social support offline can even be established via online friendship (Trepte, Reinecke, & Juechems, 2012).

6. Communication and Conflicts

The introduction of culturally different people in the lives of both the buddies and the peers—both from a different perspective—was also found as a central theme in the media diaries, as this was a source of confusion and sometimes conflict on different levels. Buddies expressed that they tried hard to help their peers, but that in different ways language or miscommunication obstructed this. As a participant explained:

> I think [he has] improved in asking stuff, although I have the feeling that the language barrier is bigger than I anticipated. I had to teach him how to work at a different station [at work], and I had to explain 500 times before he did it right. He said he understood, but this wasn't the case. (Buddy #3)

Most buddies indicated that the communication skills of the peers improved with time, which also increased the ease with which relationships between the buddies and the peers were established.

Not all interactions remained conflict-free. While it did not occur frequently, the media diaries showed a specific situation where true conflict arose. A peer was invited to a social event that included the buddy's friends and food. Without communicating a reason, the peer quickly left before the end of the event, leaving the buddy in distress. The buddy explained:

> He left rather quickly and I didn't feel like he was having a good time. I felt quite bad about him having a bad time, but I didn't really know what I should have done differently or what I should do about it now. (Buddy #4)

This conflict was first reported to have caused some worries on the buddies side. Later on this buddy reported that there was a lack of communication that caused the conflict, however, it was resolved quickly afterwards. Solving the conflict did indeed lead to a better understanding and contributed to intensifying their relationship which is in line with findings that show that conflict resolution matures friendships (Nelson & Aboud, 1985; Vera, Shin, Montgomery, Mildner, & Speight, 2004)

7. Development of Friendship

Overall the media diaries showed development of friendships. Participants sometimes communicated at first that they felt a little awkward or unsure of what to do, and noted many ups and downs along the way, but often they reported an increase in feelings of friendship. This links to the findings for communication and conflicts; solving conflicts helped to develop friendships and/or showed that friendships were already established (Nelson & Aboud, 1985). Over time, buddies mention this as well in their media diaries: Two examples illustrate:

> It's become less awkward between us, so communication has become easier and the atmosphere has improved. (Buddy #2)
> I have the feeling that we [have become] really good friends. (Buddy #1)
> We have already built a good relationship. (Buddy #2)

These expressions show that the buddies are aware that relationships with their peers improve, which in most cases resulted in the development of friendship. This requires an idea of mutual feelings, indicating that they feel this is the case for their peer as well. In addition, all buddies report that the language skills of peers improved which led to a better understanding and also supported the development of friendships. As a buddy illustrates: "I think he is doing better and better, also on a social level. Communicating seems to become easier for him" (Buddy #3).

8. Peer's Well-Being

Changes in peer's well-being were central to the media diaries. Generally, the buddies reported that the peer felt good, only in small number of instances, they interpreted their peer's mood as moderate or bad. One important topic was peers' need for help and their responses to it. They needed help for a variety of reasons, among which were school, work, and language. Buddies explained that there were different ways for the peers to deal with their need for help:

> I think he is doing better, he is better at answering than before, and he takes initiative to ask more questions. (Buddy #3)
> I asked her if I could help her with something, but [she said] I didn't have to. (Buddy #2)
> My peer is doing well. I think my role as a buddy is becoming easier, because my peer is making it increasingly clear what they want to do and what I can help them with. (Buddy #2)

Buddies sometimes initiated the support themselves. One buddy arranged a job for their peer, which was accepted. The positive shift in which peers ask for help more often over time relates to an increased self-

efficiency of peers which was perceived by the buddies and is a well-known key element of well-being (Perreira & Ornelas, 2011; Vera et al., 2004). The increased well-being of peers also positively influenced the well-being of their buddies. Clearer communication, increased self-efficiency, and the development of friendships were reflected on the buddies' side.

9. Buddy's Experience

Buddies rarely reported on feeling bad or having big issues. Many reported feeling good about their peer's improvements and the establishment of friendship. In those cases, the buddy expressed a sense of pride in his or her diary.

This pride seems to partly come from their sense of responsibility. Throughout the media diaries, buddies reported a strong sense of responsibility which caused both positive and negative feelings. Whenever their peer succeeded or friendship grew, they felt proud and happy. However, this sense of responsibility also seemed a burden in some cases. Some felt guilty for not being able to meet up often enough, others wanted to offer help but did not know how or were declined. A buddy explained: "I have the feeling that I should do more for [the relationship with the peer], take the lead a little more" (Buddy #3).

Some reported that they felt like they had to take constant initiative, but wanted their peer to do so, too. The media diaries showed a quite a strong drive among most of the buddies to help their peers, but these responsibilities sometimes turned out to be a great burden to the young participants. Overcoming these issues seemed to strengthen pride even more. As one participant argued:

> I think my peer is doing well, because she keeps saying that she feels like meeting up. I, as a buddy, feel good, [and] because she says she wants to meet up, I look forward to it more and more as well. (Buddy #2)

Again, the increased self-efficiency of peers is reported and leads to a stronger relationship which in turn has impact on the buddies' well-being; especially if this process is experienced with a sense of pride (Schwartz & Sendor, 1999).

10. General Discussion

The findings from the pre- and post-tests on motivational factors and well-being show: 1) as assumed (H1) peers have higher motivation than control peers for education which explains their interest in joining the Peer2Peer project. This is in line with research that argues that educational motivation plays an important role in adolescents' integration into a new culture (e.g., Ager & Strang, 2008). Good education is only possible if school systems including language adaption are understood. Projects like Peer2Peer can help with integration which again leads to a better education. This means that the wish for motivation for education influences the motivation to integrate into the new culture. Motivation for education is therefore crucial for integration motivation. 2) Buddies indeed feel high social support (H2) which can be interpreted as their main motivation to join and "give to others" (Cialdini et al., 1997). This result from the surveys is supported by buddies' media diaries. They not only report strong feelings of responsibility towards their peers, but they also act on this and try to support them socially. In sum with the finding that peers show high motivation for education, the reason for adolescents to join such integration projects is twofold: for peers it's the wish for a good education, and for buddies it's the wish to give back to others. 3) In contrast to our assumptions (H3) life satisfaction was found to be lower for buddies during the post-test. It is important to note, that life satisfaction was quite high for all groups, thus, this is not a reason to worry that Peer2Peer has negative impact on buddies. The analyses of the media diaries reveal that feeling responsible for their peer seems to overwhelm buddies from time to time. Buddies know that they can meet and talk about issues with their adult supervisors, however, want to react faster to their peers. This can influence life satisfaction (Proctor, Linley, & Maltby, 2009). 4) Somewhat in line with the argument that self-esteem should rise for peers (H4), we found that peers did show lower self-esteem in the beginning but did not differ from buddies and control peers after 14 weeks of the project. Thus, self-esteem for peers increased. Still, we don't know why self-esteem was lower for peers in the beginning. Low self-esteem could be seen as further motivation to join a project like Peer2Peer to feel better on that well-being concept. Future studies should address the question if low self-esteem increases the wish for integration. 5) Similar to self-esteem and partly in line with our assumptions (H5), peer loneliness for peers was first higher but these differences disappeared later. The media diaries support that peers have fewer problems with communication and contact overall became easier. This explains why self-esteem levels become similar and why peer loneliness is no longer higher compared to other groups. Buddies report about the development of their friendships, how conflicts were solved, and their perspective of their peer's well-being. Buddies describe a good development of their relationship to the peers. In addition, conflicts that arose helped each other understand the other's culture and personality. Peer loneliness in the beginning was alleviated by the development of a good relationship with the buddies. These findings are in line with research on adult refugees and the importance of social support for successful migration (Bierwiaczonek & Waldzus, 2016; Schweitzer, Melville, Steel, & Lacherez, 2006; Simich & Mawani, 2003) and especially backing the argument that social support from locals is of high significance for integration (Oppedal, 2011; Podsiadlowski, Vauclair, & Spiess, 2013). Thus, programs like Peer2Peer that are supporting the develop-

ment of such social networks are of great importance for successful migration.

Besides, the changes due to the Peer2Peer project we analysed the influence mobile communication has on different aspects of well-being. The idea was based on studies that highlight the importance of mobile use for refugees in general (Alencar, Kondova, & Ribbens, 2018) and especially on social inclusion (Díaz Andrade & Doolin, 2017) as well as on the argument that social media can be used as "adult-free" zone (Jansz et al., 2015). We found that Snapchat could explain emotional and affectionate support—but only for the Peer2Peer project group—which is in line with our assumptions (H6). Snapchat influences the emotional side of support but only for the children that were included in the project. Snapchat is quite popular among children while usage amongst adults is relatively low (Anderson & Jiang, 2018; Kennisnet, 2017; Smith & Anderson, 2018). This is supported by the reports of buddies: Hanging around online via specific social media such as Snapchat was reported to be high, especially if there was little time to meet face to face. The use of social media supported the development of friendship.

This study has several limitations. First and most importantly, the sample size was considerably small. Due to the time intensive training of buddies (and peers) it was not possible to include more children in the project and in the accompanying study. Results—especially for the quantitative pre- and post-tests—have to be treated carefully. Still, findings of these surveys are supported by the weekly media diaries which speaks for the positive influence of Peer2Peer projects. Another criticism can be that we only asked buddies for their perspective during the process but did not involve peers in the media diaries. In future studies, it is advisable to include peers and their perception of the progress of the peer coaching as well. Due to the given length of the surveys we did not include other interesting scales such as cultural openness and empowerment. Cultural openness might be one of the main motivations to join such projects and should even increase due to joining and also have impact on well-being. One factor that can be considered to be important in terms of well-being is empowerment. Not only peers but also buddies should be affected with regard to empowerment by joining such projects and this should be included in future intervention studies.

In sum, our study showed that the Peer2Peer intervention had positive impact for both Dutch and refugee children. Not only peers but also buddies gain positive insights and develop soft skills that are important for present day societies that will become more and more culturally diverse. Even if buddies felt overwhelmed from time to time, they did enjoy their role and were able to help their peers when needed. Important to note is that media usage is a supportive factor—especially social media that are used for fun and communication that goes beyond language or does not even need language at all (such as Snapchat). One suggestion for future migration programs is to include trainings in media literacy for the participants and for supervisors. Research on training programs for teachers in Nairobi, Toronto, and Vancouver indicated that group chats between teachers and participants as well as single communication could solve problems such as fights and lead to higher learning outcomes in actual classrooms (Dahya et al., 2019). Applying these results to programs that involve supervisors and participants with and without migrant background, social media can improve the communication between all parties. Participants can learn how to overcome language barriers by using specific social media, while supervisors might be able to help sooner by being available online in addition to personal meetings. This can reduce the feelings of being overwhelmed with responsibility on the buddies' side. Communication happens quickly nowadays, and adolescents use it for the establishment of friendships. Thus, including social media usage in the Peer2Peer training and process can: 1) improve its already existing positive effects on the development of friendships between buddy and peer; and 2) help buddies and their adult supervisors to stay in touch and solve upcoming issues for buddies faster.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Narratives of the Refugee Crisis: A Comparative Study of Mainstream-Media and Twitter

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Abstract
The European refugee crisis received heightened attention at the beginning of September 2015, when images of the drowned child, Aylan Kurdi, surfaced across mainstream and social media. While the flows of displaced persons, especially from the Middle East into Europe, had been ongoing until that date, this event and its coverage sparked a media firestorm. Mainstream-media content plays a major role in shaping discourse about events such as the refugee crisis, while social media's participatory affordances allow for the narratives to be perpetuated, challenged, and injected with new perspectives. In this study, the perspectives and narratives of the refugee crisis from the mainstream news and Twitter—in the days following Aylan's death—are compared and contrasted. Themes are extracted through topic modeling (LDA) and they reveal how news and Twitter converge and also diverge. We show that in the initial stages of a crisis and following the tragic death of Aylan, public discussion on Twitter was highly positive. Unlike the mainstream-media, Twitter offered an alternative and multifaceted narrative, not bound by geo-politics, raising awareness and calling for solidarity and empathy towards those affected. This study demonstrates how mainstream and social media form a new and complementary media space, where narratives are created and transformed.

Keywords
mainstream-media; narratives, networks; refugee crisis; social media; Twitter

Issue
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1. Introduction

In 2015, more than 1.3 million refugees arrived at the borders of the European Union (European Parliament, 2017), with many in need of protection from war, violence, and persecution. The complexity and duration of this influx of displaced individuals have created a climate of uncertainty over the political, economic, and societal implications. In such times of uncertainty, individuals orient themselves towards various types of media (Perse, 2001) in an attempt to understand who the refugees are and what their arrival means for their respective countries. The different media channels used in this search for information (e.g., mainstream-media [MSM] or social media) put forward different affordances and perspectives on the refugee crisis. As perceptions of refugees and migrants have been shown to be rather volatile and easily susceptible when those consuming information feel threatened (Esses, Medianu, & Lawson, 2013), the type and characteristics of such information are of crucial importance. Consequently, the ways in which refugees are perceived become even more important when considering

their (social) integration into the societies hosting them. As previous research demonstrates, media coverage contributes greatly to the construction of socially shared understandings and dominant representations of migrants and refugees, which have further consequences on attitudes, sentiments, and even behaviors towards refugees (e.g., Quinsaat, 2014; Robin, 2004; Zembylas, 2010).

In today's complex media environment, MSM outlets—formal news organizations—remain powerful entities, constructing narratives on major events such as the refugee influx into Europe as public issues and/or crises. For instance, as Eberl et al. (2018) show, coverage of immigration is often negative and conflict-centered in European media, with migrants and refugees generally underrepresented and portrayed as delinquents or criminals. Previous studies have also shown that, in an attempt to reduce the complexity of such events, the mainstream mass media use competing frames to create narratives that normalize dominant perspectives on refugees and migrants (Quinsaat, 2014). Two of the most dominant and contrasting frames employed by the MSM in their refugee crisis reporting are those portraying refugees as innocent victims and, simultaneously, as invaders and threats to the physical, economic, and cultural well-being of the respective host country (e.g., Gemi, Ulasiuk, & Triandafyllidou, 2013).

Since the 9/11 attack on the United States of America, MSM have played an important role in promoting a culture of fear and hostility towards immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Furedi, 2006), portraying refugees as part of plots that threaten our very existence. Such imagery creates a 'fear of the other' and it can be used to achieve political and economic goals (Robin, 2004; Zembylas, 2010).

Refugees are also often portrayed as victims (Harrison, 2016). The picture of the body of toddler Aylan Kurdi's being pulled out of the Mediterranean Sea is just one example of imagery that identifies refugees as victims. The image of Aylan Kurdi, a figure with which the audience might be able to empathize and sympathize, is meant to elicit a feeling of shared humanity (Mamdani, 2010). Sharing personal stories of refugees and victimizing them creates frames that are in direct contrast to the dehumanizing perspective created by the threat and 'fear of the other.'

As Gamson and Modigliani (1989) propose, frames guide comprehension of relevant events and they "work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world" (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 140). When creating frames, the media select, emphasize, and exclude actors, events, and issues (Entman, 1993). The narratives created through framing of events can systematically affect how those consuming these narratives come to understand these events (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). Such narratives play a crucial role in the ways crises evolve (Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt, 2012) and the ways meaning is attributed to a crisis (Van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013).

The two examples above—characterizing refugees as threats or as victims—show how the media employ contrasting frames to construct the refugee narrative as national security vs. humanitarian concerns. Such narratives have led to contradictory and inflammatory discourses, with nationalist and racist discourses being countered by liberal-humanitarian discourses (Harrison, 2016). Because the media can empower and disempower governments, citizens, refugees and asylum seekers, such ideological battles and the circulation of polemic imagery can become important aids or obstacles to civic agency and social change (Harrison, 2016).

While in the past MSM channels served as the dominant source of information and the main creators of narratives, with the advent of social media, the public is now able to collaborate in crisis narrative building (Van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013). Social media channels have changed the conditions and rules of social interaction (van Dijck & Poell, 2013), allowing users to challenge media narratives by introducing new/different perspectives into debates (Liu, 2010). Several studies have shown that during crises, people now spend more time online. Especially in the incipient stages of a crisis, when the demand for information transcends what is available, social media users tend to create and disseminate content that significantly differs from that of the MSM (e.g., Liu, 2010). There is a general agreement that debates in social media are not only different from the MSM, but that they also serve omitted or marginalized audiences (Watson, 2016).

1.1. The Refugee Crisis in Mainstream-Media

In most societies, the media play a major role in shaping discourses on immigrants and refugees, and the uncertainty and unease their presence evokes (Esses, Brochu, & Dickson, 2012). Through their reporting, the media construct and promote certain positions on these issues. Such reports on immigrants and refugees have become increasingly negative in the last two decades, with a predominant focus on the threats immigrants and refugees pose to the host societies.

The arrival of refugees on European shores in 2015 has been framed as a crisis, with the refugees themselves being portrayed as different from Europeans, either as vulnerable or as dangerous outsiders. Hate speech and hostility towards migrants and refugees has been systematically and persistently promoted in press coverage, while little attention was paid to the context of the refugees and migrants (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). This abundance of negative narratives, that ultimately result in the dehumanization of refugees and migrants, may appeal to audiences as they can reinforce the status-quo and strengthen the 'us' versus 'them' boundaries (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). These types of in-group and out-group divisions can become insurmountable obstacles to civic agency and social change (Harrison, 2016) or even a safety con-

sideration for the lives and well-being of the refugees and migrants.

1.2. The Refugee Crisis in Social Media

While the effects of MSM narratives are not negligible, the dominant narratives they create are, more often than not, both perpetuated and challenged on social media platforms (Siapera, Boudourides, Lenis, & Suiter, 2018). By allowing users to consume information and also share perspectives on particular events or stories, social media has created a new space of participation in narrative shaping (Papacharissi, 2015). Social media platforms, such as Twitter, also have the potential to reinforce or alter personal opinions (Papacharissi, 2002), be a significant influencer of emotions (Sobkowicz, Kaschesky, & Bouchard, 2012), and even impact behavior (Walther, DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony, 2010).

Although Twitter has been shown to be a primary site for information dissemination during rapidly developing events or fast paced societal crises (e.g., Papacharissi, 2015), studies investigating Twitter debates and user perspectives surrounding the refugee crisis have been slow to emerge. The few studies that do address the topic of the refugee crisis on Twitter expose discourses from solidarity to xenophobic (Gualda & Rebollo, 2016), emerging frames, elites, and alternative perspectives (Siapera et al., 2018), and a strong dichotomy between the 'deserving' refugee versus the 'undeserving' migrant (Nerghes & Lee, 2018).

Despite the differing affordances, a complete separation between MSM and social media is no longer realistic. As studies have shown, the sharing and discussing of news between news outlets and Twitter users is a genuine bi-directional exchange, with journalists often quoting tweets and using Twitter as a news-gathering tool, and with many Twitter users sharing and discussing news items (An, Gummadi, Crowcroft, & Quercia, 2012; Moon & Hadley, 2014). Thus, Twitter functions as an awareness system for journalists and individuals alike, allowing them to maintain a mental model of news and events (Hermida, 2010).

In the contemporary media environment, MSM and social media actors are involved in a dynamic interplay in which narratives are co-created. In examining the construction of the refugee crisis as a social problem, it is thus essential to investigate the differences and similarities in how the narratives of the crisis are built across these information channels. While such investigations may uncover discussions of alternative perspectives (Milliken & O'Donnell, 2008), emerging patterns of discursively and socially constructed categorizations of events (Augoustinos, 2001), and marginalizing discourse practices (Fairclough, 2000), not many studies have endeavored to compare narrative building across mainstream and social media. One such study, comparing Twitter and traditional news content, is that of Zhao et al. (2011). While their study is mostly methodologically oriented, their results reveal patterns of general topic similarity and distinction between the two sources. The study of Van der Meer and Verhoeven (2013) examines framing of organizational crises in news and Twitter and reveals the dynamic characteristics of crisis framing and their potential to prevent crisis escalation. Lastly, Watson (2016) compares the ways in which journalists and Twitter users covered the BP oil spill, and concludes that news and tweets were shaped by similar social and economic factors. When specifically looking at the refugee crisis, and to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have compared narrative-building across mainstream and social media.

In the present study, we aim to address this lack of research in comparing and contrasting social media and MSM content. Specifically, we explore the construction of the refugee crisis as a social problem by news outlets and Twitter. Employing quantitative text analysis and network analysis, we compare the ways in which Twitter users and MSM shape and magnify different understandings of the refugee crisis, through the emphasis they place on themes portraying refugees. Ultimately, we seek to contribute to the understanding of how the discourse surrounding the refugee crisis has been constructed and the manner by which narratives of the crisis are built across these information channels.

2. The Case of Aylan Kurdi

For our analysis, we focus on a high-intensity episode that took place in the incipient stages of the refugee crisis and substantially increased its visibility, namely the tragic death of toddler Aylan Kurdi[1]. The three-year-old Syrian boy of Kurdish ethnic background, who fled the Syrian war-torn town of Kobane with his family and got to Turkey, drowned when the family boarded a small inflatable boat in an attempt to travel from Turkey to the Greek island of Kos (Rayner, 2015). Aylan's body was discovered by locals on the shore of the Akyarlar area of Bodrum, Turkey (Roberts & Altin, 2015) and later photographed by Turkish journalist Nilüfer Demir.

The images of Aylan's lifeless body have arguably been the most poignant and powerful images to surface in the media at the peak of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015. The transformative power and iconic potential of Aylan's images have been recognized and emphasized by many, with studies finding that narratives of threat and harm elicited by these images were later related to expressions of solidarity with refugees (Smith, McGarty, & Thomas, 2018), that the images offered different actors in the refugee debate with new symbols and themes to construct meaning (Bozdag & Smets, 2017), and that the image of Aylan had value as an agent for social change (De Andrés, Nos Aldas, & García Matilla, 2016).

[1] We note that while the correct spelling of his first name is Alan, both the news and Twitter at the time of his death spelled his name more frequently as Aylan, and so we retain this variant throughout the paper.

While Aylan was by no means the first child to drown en route to Europe (his brother for example being one of the victims of the same accident), nor the last—as Save the Children reported more than 70 children drownings within two months of Aylan's death (Save the Children, 2015)–the image of his body reached the screens of almost 20 million people around the world within 12 hours, generating more than 30,000 tweets (D'Orazio, 2015). The virality of these images shifted popular interest towards the topic of migrants and refugees. As Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown (2007) demonstrated, when a social event's intensity increases so do the numbers and variations of frames used to characterize such events. Thus, as this tragic event demarcates one of the most intense periods of the refugee crisis, it allows us to examine the incipient stages of narrative building, when audience attention and involvement are heightened (Liu, 2010).

3. Data and Methods

Focusing on the period when the tragic death of Aylan Kurdi sparked wide social media engagement to the refugee crisis, we analyze news items from major world publications and tweets published between September 3rd 2015 and September 5th 2015.

For Twitter, 369,485 historical tweets, from 220,710 unique Twitter users, were collected using the ten most popular and relevant hashtags surrounding the refugee/migrant crisis. The following hashtags have been used when collecting our data: #migrantcrisis, #migrants, #migrant, #refugee, #refugees, #refugeecrisis, #syrianrefugees, #syrianrefugeesgr, #refugeeswelcome, and #muslimrefugees. The data was obtained from historical Twitter data provider Gnip/Sifter and constitute 100% of the available tweets within our search criteria (similar to the Twitter Firehouse data). Retweets are retained as they are critical in information dissemination and indicate interest in and endorsement of a tweet (Metaxas et al., 2015).

The 1,935 news articles analyzed in this study were obtained from the LexisNexis database by applying a search for the following subjects to all English languages, major world publications: migration issues, immigration, illegal immigration, refugees, displaced persons, and refugee and relief camps. The collection of our news items from all the major world publications was chosen in an attempt to replicate and match the wide and international character of our Twitter corpus. A detailed account of the 89 unique news sources and the number of items collected from each of these sources can be found in the Annex.

The textual content of the newspaper and Twitter data constitutes our corpora. Prior to analysis, the data were cleaned; stop words (aka noise words), numbers, and punctuation were removed, and nouns and verbs were lemmatized and stemmed to their root forms. All words were lower-cased.

Focusing on uncovering and understanding how the narratives of the refugee crisis are constructed across Twitter and MSM, in particular their underlying themes, we employ topic modeling and network analysis.

3.1. Topic Modeling

In order to extract the most dominant themes from each corpus, we employ computational topic modeling, specifically latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003), as implemented in the 'lda' R package (Chang, 2015). Topic models are a class of automated text analysis tools that seek to identify, extract, and characterize the various latent topics contained in collections of texts. Individual topics are identified based on word co-occurrence patterns across a corpus of text documents, where a cluster of words that co-occur frequently across a number of documents constitute a topic. Topic models connect words with similar meanings and expose those within distinct themes and differentiate between uses of words with multiple meanings. Each identified topic is separately meaningful and represents a consistent cluster of correlated terms (Blei et al., 2003; Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004). We also refer to the prominently identified topics as 'themes' when discussing them more qualitatively.

In order to determine the ideal number of topics for our LDA topic modeling, we employ the diagnostic metric proposed by (Deveaud, SanJuan, & Bellot, 2014), based on which we determined the optimal number of topics for our newspaper data to be 20 and for our Twitter data to be 11. However, after a qualitative inspection of all the topics generated by the LDA model, we report 18 topics for the newspaper corpus and 11 topics for the Twitter corpus.

We report the top 10 most-relevant words for each topic. Relevant words are computed as

$$r(w, k|\lambda) = \lambda \log\log(\phi_{kw}) + (1 - \lambda) \log\log\left(\frac{\phi_{kw}}{p_w}\right)$$

where ϕ_{kw} is a word w proportion within a given topic k and p_w is the word's overall proportion in the corpus (Sievert & Shirley, 2014). A $\lambda = 0.4$ yields the best interpretable topics. Finally, we assign a label for each topic based on a qualitative inspection of each topic's words (topic members) and the news articles or tweets strongly associated with the topics. The topic's weight is also reported and it indicates its relative prominence with its respective corpus. Topics are then labeled through qualitative interpretation of their member words and consultation with the source text. Less relevant topics to the refugee crisis can then be identified in this manner.

To further assess the semantic similarity of the topics, we construct a 2-dimensional latent space to position each topic, where their similarities yield positions via an MDS (multidimensional scaling); for the MDS' distance calculation, we use the Jensen-Shannon divergence—a method of measuring the (dis)similarity between two

probability distributions—on the pairwise topic-word distributions (Fuglede & Topsoe, 2014). For this, we use the LDAvis R package (Sievert & Shirley, 2014). Thus, dimensions (and axes) represent the first two principal components that maximize the variance in topic dissimilarities and thus a latent space where similar topics are positioned nearer one another.

3.2. Topic Networks

To go beyond the identification of themes constructed in MSM and Twitter, we extend our topic model analysis to include the source of the data. For the news and Twitter data, respectively, the publication (e.g., New York Times) and tweeting usernames (e.g., @Pink) are considered as the sources. Thus, tweets from news source Twitter accounts are included to permit comparison of their positioning via their topics, alongside those of other users. Inclusion of the source results in a 2-mode topic-to-source affiliation matrix or network. These networks represent the association between MSM outlets or Twitter users and the content they generated, in the form of topics. We respectively fold each network, via matrix multiplication, yielding source-to-source networks through which one can identify communities of thematic affiliation. For example, if the New York Times and BBC are strongly connected, we can infer that that these two outlets reported on similar topics and jointly contributed to similar narratives.

To uncover these communities, we use the Newman algorithm. This algorithm assigns nodes into the same group when they appear in dense clusters or subgraphs (Newman, 2006). We distinguish the Newman communities by coloring the nodes in our network visualizations, with each color representing a different community. Furthermore, we identify those MSM outlets and Twitter users that are most vocal—bringing a higher contribution to the creation of narratives—through a measure of volume, of news reporting (number of news items produced) or tweeting (number of tweets produced by each user). These measures are presented by the sizing of the nodes in our network visualizations.

Rather than displaying these networks in their entirety, the interpretation of which would be difficult, we filter them such that only those linkages exhibiting strong topical affiliation (at least 0.7 out 1.0 in the document-to-topic matrix) are displayed. For the Twitter network, we further filter the node set by selecting only those nodes whose followers count exceeds the median of 1,526 in order to also examine the embeddedness of such influential users. In each network, we label the top ten nodes to see how these top most prolific sources are embedded in the community network.

4. Results

We begin reporting our results with topic modeling, followed by semantic similarity of topics, and the communities of thematic affiliation identified in the networks.

4.1. Topics in News and Twitter

In Tables 1 and 2, the topic labels, topic weight, and the top 10 most relevant words are reported. The news' topics paint a more nuanced picture of the themes MSM focused on in the days surrounding the event. Among the prominent topics—those having the highest relative weights—are those focused on ongoing developments: the refugee crisis developing in Europe, general discourse on policy and politics in the context of the crisis, the UK's dealing with the crisis, and events in Hungary, the country through which many refugees endeavored to cross on their way to Western Europe. More specific reporting of the Kurdi family and the virality of the drowned child's images, especially on Twitter, also appear among the top topics. Only one of these topics identified in the news items appear to discuss aid in the context of reports of donations and volunteerism through football clubs. The lower-weighted topics then touch upon issues arising from both the crisis and immigration in other geographic areas and other less relevant themes. Thus, we observe some diversity in the emergent topics, that point to both general and very specific discussions. These results point towards the journalistic process of selecting and prioritizing newsworthy events, where attention to the crisis at large and its political implications supersede the story of Aylan and other stories that could more evoke sympathy or hospitality.

The Twitter topics show similar focus on the overall crisis in Europe and the Kurdi family, as well as developments in Hungary. However, the terminology displays greater specificity than in the news, such as references to the 'March of Hope' film, that documents the refugee plight and journey. Even more specific is the 3rd topic that refers to frequent criticism of UK's Prime Minister David Cameron, comparing his stance on the crisis to that of Finland's Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, who at the time, reportedly, offered his own home to asylum seekers. Interestingly, Twitter users appear to pay more attention to the situation in the Middle East (4th topic), more so than the news, where the topic appears 13th. The prevalent tone in the topics is of both sympathy and optimism, with calls for hospitality (Topic 5), aid, donations, mobilization and activism (Topics 7 and 10), and empathy (i.e., tweets that exhort others to imagine the journey of the refugee, Topic 11). Another fascinating set of tweets draws attention to the fact that the late founder of Apple and "inventor" of the iPhone, Steve Jobs, is a descendant of a Syrian migrant, as a strongly positive framing of migrants and refugees. Thus, we show how the narrative of the refugee crisis in Twitter is transformed beyond the mere factual and informative accounts from MSM into one that can be characterized as stand-taking and activism, designed to raise sympathy and support for refugees.

Table 1. Topic modeling for the newspaper data.

ID	Label	Weight	Topic Members
1	Refugee Crisis	0.116	refugee europe country asylum war people flee million syrians crisis
2	General Discourse	0.115	history political policy world idea prove fact mind wrong hard
3	United Kingdom	0.102	cameron britain uk refugee scheme scotland accept moral crisis leader
4	Hungarian Border	0.085	station budapest hungary police austria hungarian migrant railway border camp
5	Kurdi Family	0.065	kurdi abdullah boat bodrum brother turkey aylan body capsize rehan
6	Refugee Quotas	0.065	eu orban schengen italy germany quota france migrant slovakia hungary
7	Travel	0.056	hotel book flight shop room festival restaurant museum park driver
8	Viral Aylan	0.049	image child aylan beach shocking dead wash toddler death tweet
9	Football Club Donations	0.044	club donation calais charity football bayern celtic volunteer support raise
10	Israel-Palestine	0.039	israel idp gaza unicef palestinian israeli displacement borno jerusalem development
11	China Economy	0.037	market china chinese worker investment growth trade investor bank economy
12	Canada—Kurdi Family	0.031	canada aylan sponsor ottawa toronto sponsorship lifeline trudeau quebec citizenship
13	Middle East Situation	0.031	assad military isil syria iraq arab strike troops islamic militant
14	UK Politics	0.031	corbyn vote labour referendum party election voter key contest candidate
15	Baltic affairs	0.030	russia putin ukraine moscow vladivostok kurdistan report forum kiev rossiya
16	Australia	0.030	australia dutton law fairfax offence citizenship court detention sydney jihad
17	Nigeria	0.026	customs enforcement corruption defence nigeria suspect lagos arrest sextortion buhari
18	United States Politics	0.019	trump bush republican clinton american christie mexico reagan presidential iowa

4.2. Similarity of Topics

Figures 1 and 2 display the MDS layouts of the topics from each corpus, in which similar topics appear closer together. The axes thus represent the first two principal components (PC1 and PC2)—latent dimensions—from the dissimilarity matrix. One distinguishing feature between the two corpora is that the news topics are more widely distributed than the Twitter topics, confirming the divergent attention in the news we observed from the topic labels alone. Still, most of the news topics reside in or near the upper quadrants. The one isolated topic of 'Travel' is unsurprisingly dissimilar as it discusses migration and immigration in the context of travel and tourism. Despite the latent nature of these dimensions, we can qualitatively interpret the horizontal dimension to be an approximate geo-political spectrum of proximity, hence relevance, to the viral event, with the topics of 'Viral Aylan' and 'Kurdi Family' on the far left. Topics linked to direct developments—such as refugees crossing the Hungarian border, the contention that Canada did not receive a bid for asylum from the Kurdi family, the UK's response to the growing crisis—are more closely positioned to the left while secondary topics, that also involve nations geographically less proximal to the crisis, are farther away.

Many of the Twitter topics exhibit considerable overlap in the upper right quadrant of the space, partly due to the overall sympathetic tone of the tweets, in contrast with the neutral reporting found in the news. Still, some topics stand apart. The 'Welcoming Refugees' topic is dominated by tweets with succinct but clear messages of hospitality employing the hashtag #RefugeesWelcome in retweets such as "Take a stand with us; help make #RefugeesWelcome" as well as other tweets referring to the Messe Hall in Hamburg that served as a refugee aid center. The 'Call to Action' topic bears some similarity as indicated by its proximity and through its frequent use of #RefugeesWelcome in tweets such as "#Aylan–Europe: no more drownings! #RefugeesWelcome–Join the global call now!". While the last isolated topic, 'Relating to Refugees', also bears similarity along the horizontal dimension and consequently its solicitous tone, its contents differ by adopting a passive-aggressive tone in

Table 2. Topic modeling for the Twitter data.

ID	Label	Weight	Topic Members
1	Refugee Crisis	0.154	europe crisis eu refugeecrisis refugee migrant politics protection smuggle plight
2	Hungarian Border	0.125	hungary budapest refugee train border marchofhope migrantmarch exodus bicske police
3	Sipila vs. Cameron	0.103	finland home cameron offer house david pm refugee uk sipila
4	Middle East Situation	0.097	middle east syria arab saudi qatar muslim war refugee kuwait
5	Welcoming Refugees	0.094	stand make refugeeswelcome body hospitality messehallen hamburghilft stranger angel cloud
6	Kurdi Family	0.094	kurdi father toronto aylankurdi syrianrefugee humanitywashedashore dead tribute world drown
7	Mobilization of Aid	0.086	donate syrianrefugee human clothes shelter raise kiyiyavuraninsanlik fruit education organize support
8	Refugee Journey	0.084	germany munich applaud conditions arrive greet westbahnhof refugee hellish trainofhope
9	Steve Jobs	0.070	wealthy steve job iphone invent apple accept man migrant syria
10	Call to action	0.048	global join aylan call drown refugeeswelcome demand propagate europe refugee
11	Relating to refugees	0.045	imagine boat worth missing living life die safe danger family



Figure 1. Intertopic distance map (via classical multidimensional scaling) of the newspapers' topics.

its solicitation of sympathy: "If you can't imagine yourself in one of those boats, you have something missing. They are dying for a life worth living." Despite Twitter topics' exhibiting specificity due to use of distinct hashtags, many are in fact similar to one another–more so than MSM topics–due their consistent sympathetic and activist nature, and less attention to geo-political issues surrounding the crisis.



Figure 2. Intertopic distance map (via multidimensional scaling) of the Twitter topics.

4.3. Communities of Thematic Affiliation

In Figures 3 and 4, we present networks containing news outlets and Twitter users as nodes and the extent of shared topical contributions as edges.

The news network has two prominent communities of the four detected, the larger one being dominated by UK news outlets. The dominance of UK news in this community reveals a lack of relative diversity in the topics they report. The news outlets of the blue community, of which Africa News and BBC are the most vocal, report on a separate set of topics, namely the 'Nigeria' topic, immigration issues in 'Israel and Palestine' as well as 'Balkan issues', that is also of interest to ITAR-TASS, a Russian news outlet. The yellow community, with nodes unlabeled due to their fewer publications on the crisis, comprise Australian news outlets concerned with the 'Australia' topic as well as those relating to the UK. The New York Times remains apart from these other communities with its focus lying solely on 'United States Politics' and developments at the 'Hungarian Border'. Thus, the geo-political separation implicit in the topic similarities becomes starkly clear through distinct communities in the network depiction: news outlets' attention to the refugee crisis was more regionally focused.

Despite the fewer topics and terseness of tweets compared to news articles, we observe more diversity in how Twitter users are affiliated with topics, with the detection of seven communities. The most prolific and influential users are embedded in two central communities (green and blue) and span international and UK news outlets and accounts of activists and joined by the topics of the overall 'Refugee Crisis', the 'Kurdi Family', and the 'Hungarian Border'. Interestingly, the news outlets on Twitter focus on a smaller subset of topics than in their non-social media publications. The positioning of the other influential users is also revealing. The tweets of celebrities—such as the music artist Pink and authors John Green and J.K. Rowling in the yellow community—link solely with 'Mobilization of Aid' while bloggers, such as Perez Hilton, tweet on 'Welcoming Refugees' and 'Relating to Refugees'. Fox News reports solely on the general 'Refugee Crisis'. Thus, the presence of activist discourse on Twitter clarifies the homogeneity in the news outlets' topical affiliations. That is, despite the diversity of news topics observed earlier, their lack of focus on exemplars (e.g., the reference to Steve Jobs and the Finnish PM), humanizing perspectives, and sympathy on Twitter confines them to a distinct and restricted narrative space.

5. Conclusion

This study investigated how MSM and social media have built narratives on the early developments of the crisis through comparison of emergent narratives, concen-



Figure 3. Thematic affiliation network for newspapers ($N = 60$, 4 communities).



Figure 4. Thematic affiliation network for Twitter ($N = 188$, 7 communities).

trated on the firestorm reaction to the death of Aylan Kurdi. MSM and social media have emerged to become complementary and competing venues through which the public can become informed as well as engage in building narratives, specifically through the participatory affordances of social media and other online venues (Van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013).

The distinctions we found between the themes of the two media environments revealed that the two environments are primarily complementary rather than competing. Unlike previous studies, we found evidence of neither competing frames (Quinsaat, 2014) nor the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomies (Leyens et al. 2007) in MSM and Twitter. Rather, we found a neutral and broad discourse in MSM and a focused, highly sympathetic one in social media. While some of the themes on Twitter corresponded to those in the news, Twitter users introduced new themes into the discussion, which should not be surprising since social media afford users with near unlimited opportunities to push debates into new directions (Liu, 2010; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). This distinction remains even though MSM organizations participated in the Twitter discourse. Attention to prominent strands of discussion over the crisis—in public debate and academic research—was fragmented in each environment (Dines, Montagna, Vachelli, 2018). Both MSM and Twitter discussed issues surrounding borders and border control. This commonality can be partly explained by the sharing of news items on Twitter (An et al., 2012; Moon & Hadley, 2014). However, only MSM politicized the crisis, while Twitter created an alternative narrative of the refugee crisis through solicitations of sympathy and prominent calls-to-action. Thus, news outlets were more geo-politically-oriented in their publications. At the same time on Twitter, these news outlets were topically restricted, and their discussion was disparate from the rest of the Twitter debate.

Most notably, the solicitations of sympathy on Twitter were multifaceted and included placing oneself in the shoes of the refugees, promoting a migrant success story, and exhortation to empowered figures to follow a sympathetic example. Thus, Twitter users contributed to an alternative narrative by calling upon feelings of shared humanity (Harrison, 2016). This humanization and individualization of refugees may empower refugees (KhosraviNik, 2010) and can address uncertainties and anxieties the public experiences (Esses et al., 2013).

The alternative narratives presented on Twitter reflected digital activism, which has been shown to intensify during periods of heightened awareness of a crisis (Mahabir, Croitoru, Crooks, Agouris, & Stefanidis, 2018). The power of such forms of activism in raising awareness and in placing such issues on political agendas (Yang, 2016)—while at the same time aiding civic agency and social change (Harrison, 2016)—cannot be contested.

Through this study, we contribute to a more nuanced understanding of crisis narrative creation in our current media environment, in which MSM and social media interact in a new participatory media space (Papacharissi, 2015). Showing how the refugee crisis narrative—created by MSM and social media—converged and diverged has enabled us to expose emergent perspectives and how they have become dispersed and challenged (Siapera et al., 2018). Most importantly, we show that in the initial stages of a crisis and following the tragic death of Aylan, public sentiment on Twitter was highly positive. Twitter offered an alternative and multifaceted narrative, not bound by geo-politics, to that created by the traditional media. Our study underlines the important role of social media in transforming narratives by creating awareness and calling for solidarity and empathy towards those affected (De Andrés et. al, 2016).

This study was constrained in its scope of three days, to allow for comparison between news and Twitter just when the trigger event occurred. Earlier studies have shown that negative imagery—such as portrayals of refugees as invaders (Gemi et al., 2013) using inflammatory rhetoric (Harrison, 2016)—pervade debates on newcomers. While this was not evident in our analysis, one would expect such discourse to emerge as the uncertainties and implications continued to develop. Thus, future collection and analysis of news coverage and social media content between September 2015 and the present, especially those surrounding the intervening events concerning the crisis, would shed light on the trajectories of news and social media and their evolving thematic focus. Similarly, this study's focus on textual discourse leaves for further study other forms of media that may appear in a tweet, including images and emotionally-charged symbols such as emojis.

Furthermore, as the Twitter data included news organizations in order to observe their topical community embedding alongside that of other users, further study distinguishing the tweets from news and non-news sources would expose a more nuanced comparison. Similar distinctions can be made in comparing the topics and communities between the global news against local/regional news. As for the method of topic modeling, the value of such automated text analytics can be found in the processing of large volumes of data, beyond what is feasible for qualitative analysis, which is capable of uncovering some of the nuance that automated methods may miss. However, 'big data' methods such as topic modeling can still expose linkages in the discourse, despite the variety in language use and semantics (Mohr & Bogdanov, 2013). Lastly, we note that some of our findings may have been impacted by the different content production rules that govern MSM and social media. While MSM content is produced under specific rules, procedures, and structures—for instance content that is considered sellable (Fuchs, 2010)—social media users can freely create content as individuals (Meraz, 2011).

While MSM coverage of migration issues has been shown to play a significant role in the shaping of public opinion on such issues (Eberl et al., 2018), studies like

ours contribute towards a more holistic understanding of migration narratives. Such comparative assessments of narrative building in MSM and social media become even more important as anti-immigrant parties rise throughout Europe and open border policies within Europe are increasingly challenged.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Annex



Figure 1A. News outlets and the number of items collected.

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Article

Business Support for Refugee Integration in Europe: Conceptualizing the Link with Organizational Identification

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Abstract
The ongoing refugee crisis presents a plethora of challenges and requires systematic contributions from public and private entities—e.g., governments, non-governmental organizations, community organizations and businesses. Relative to the other three, (explicit) business efforts toward refugee (economic) integration are yet sporadic, limited to a few large organizations. While acknowledging that integration encompasses multiple spheres and is complicated by national and local variations across EU member states, this conceptual article treats business support of refugee (economic) integration as a manifestation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and contends that such efforts may enhance employee-organizational identification. Drawing on scholarship from CSR and organization–employee identification, we develop a conceptual model including propositions about mediating and moderating mechanisms of the relationship among refugee integration, CSR communication and employee-organizational identification. Our study offers a conceptual bridge between what is known about the importance, barriers and enablers of refugee labor market integration with the lesser-known organizational, specifically employee, perspectives on the issue. Leveraging on this conceptual framework, further research may focus on testing the relationship empirically through collecting field data from business firms which have made an explicit claim on refugee support.

Keywords
business; company; corporate communication; corporate social responsibility; employees; organizational identification; refugee integration

Issue
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1. Introduction

In December 2018, the LEGO Foundation announced a $100 million commitment to the Sesame Workshop (makers of *Sesame Street*) to develop play-based learning programs for children affected by the ongoing refugee crisis, particularly Syrian and Rohingya refugees (Zraick, 2018). The IKEA Foundation's "Brighter Futures" initiative aims to support Syrian refugee by providing (solar) power and electricity to refugee camps which, in turn, enables a range of seemingly mundane tasks such as food preservation, street safety and children's education, among others. Others such as Deutsche Telekom set up a dedicated task force already in 2015 to enable refugee labor market integration and continue to provide apprenticeships and internships, reportedly offering 420 positions to refugees in 2018 alone. At the EU level, 2017 saw the launch of the European Commission's "Employers Together for Integration" initiative aimed at urging business organizations "including large companies, SMEs

and public employers" to support refugee integration in the labor market and giving more visibility to such efforts (European Commission, 2017).

These initiatives illustrate a few ways in which leading global business firms are contributing to alleviating the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe. Aside from launching independent initiatives, some (e.g., Unilever, BMW, SAP) have also partnered with humanitarian organizations such as the International Rescue Committee to support refugees in manifold ways including "hiring refugees, speaking out for refugees and creating products and services tailored to their needs" (The International Rescue Committee, n.d.). However, these efforts are only the tip of the iceberg. The scale of the refugee crisis in Europe necessitates long-term, multi-stakeholder solutions. We argue that relative to governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and/or community organizations, businesses have—with notable exception—been on the sidelines of the conversation. Moreover, there is no formalized or regulatory imperative, yet, for businesses to actively support refugee integration and many efforts remain largely sporadic and relief-based as opposed to systemic, long-term solutions targeting refugee integration (Ioannou, 2015).

Premised on the importance of refugee integration, this article offers a multilevel conceptual framework to advance the goal of business participation in the conversation. First, following Scholten et al. (2017), we acknowledge that "integration" itself is a contested and multi-faceted term including different spheres such as economic, social, health, education, housing, etc. Unlike legal reforms that fall squarely in the government domain, efforts toward integration are seen as a multi-stakeholder imperative that requires "the close support and co-ordination of governing structures at the national, regional and municipal levels" (OECD & UNHCR, 2018, p. 5). While efforts to socially and culturally integrate are indeed the steppingstone and the priority for civil society, we concern ourselves with integration primarily in economic terms, i.e., access to employment and the labor market, skill development, etc. Here, the role(s) of business and the private sector assume importance.

Second, even as our article makes the case for business involvement in supporting and advancing refugee integration in the labor market, we should note that such efforts can take diverse forms, from "offering opportunities, valuing and further developing skills and competences and facilitating the creation of an inclusive workplace" (European Commission, 2017). Further, it is important to note that arguments for business involvement in the refugee crisis are often riddled with tensions attributable, among others, to differences in labor market structures and policy context across EU countries (e.g., Scholten et al., 2017) and skeptical public opinion (e.g., OECD & UNHCR, 2016). Extant surveys confirm that even when businesses are "enthusiastic" or "interested" in employing refugees, they are often deterred by "misperceptions about refugees or lack information relating to their potential as prospective employees. Many seek legal and regulatory guidance around employing refugees" (Betts & Buith, 2017, p. 5).

Third, we conceptualize business support and efforts toward refugee integration as a manifestation of corporate social responsibility (CSR), broadly defined as "context-specific organizational actions and policies that take into account stakeholders' expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social and environmental performance" (Rupp & Mallory, 2015, p. 212). Variously labeled as sustainability, citizenship, corporate responsibility, etc., CSR may take a diversity of forms from philanthropy to producing quality products and services, employee welfare, education, community involvement and so on. More recently, the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), ratified by all UN member states, has provided a transnational imperative for businesses to play a vital role, together with other institutional actors, in solving grand societal challenges.

Despite the growing import of CSR across disciplines, its relevance for the ongoing refugee crisis has not been explored. Evidence (e.g., OECD & UNHCR, 2018) suggests that supporting refugee integration as a specific manifestation of CSR is not unprecedented. However, complicating economic support for refugees are a multitude of factors including attitudes and expectations, legal ambiguity, costs and business incentives and matching skills and qualifications (OECD & UNHCR, 2016). Particularly from a CSR standpoint, research suggests that not all CSR efforts are created equal. In other words, companies are often advised to stick to CSR issues that are related to their core business and/or most strategically important for their business if they are to reap the benefits of doing well and doing good (e.g., Serafeim, 2015).

Given the aforementioned complexities surrounding refugee integration (and elaborated in the next section), supporting refugee integration as a form of CSR necessitates more complex theorizing about the role of business. Our article seeks to respond to this challenge by employing a multilevel perspective outlining the relationship among refugee integration, CSR communication and organization–employee identification. These interlinkages, we contend, may be decisive in shifting refugee support as CSR from a discretionary and ad-hoc activity to a more sustainable approach, embedded in organizational culture. Attending to the perspective of employees is especially meaningful for although CSR activities are conducted for and by corporations, it is the employees "who advocate for, comply with and participate in CSR" (Rupp & Mallory, 2015, p. 212).

Coupled with the support of employees is the importance of communicating CSR efforts. If business firms intend to achieve legitimacy by supporting refugee employment and integration, they need to communicate this endeavor to their employees proactively and effectively. In other words, refugee integration as a CSR activity must be integrated into the organizational diversity culture—"seen as not simply 'talking the talk', but rather 'walking

the walk'" (Brunton, Eweje, & Taskin, 2015, p. 32). After all, although refugee employment and integration may heavily depend on the aspiration of managers, the employees are the internal stakeholders who translate this vision into their daily actions. The support of employees is therefore integral to the (newly formed) culture of a business firm (Hatch & Schultz, 2004).

To unpack our argument, we start by mapping out the current, relevant, arguments surrounding the role of business as an important societal actor in the ongoing refugee crisis, paying specific attention to the challenges and opportunities for business involvement in refugee (economic) integration. Within this macro context, we propose a conceptual model to theorize the relationship among refugee support (as a CSR effort), CSR communication and organizational identification with respect to business firms explicitly claiming their support for refugee integration in Europe.

2. The Role for Business in Refugee (Economic) Integration

As previously noted, integration has become both a key policy objective related to the resettlement of refugees and a matter of significant public discussion. Among the research conducted regarding refugee integration, Ager and Strang (2008) identified employment as a key area of activity in association with refugee integration in the public arena. As one of their refugee interviewees put it: "To me integration is work, if we work, we are integrated" (Ager & Strang, 2008, p. 170). Undoubtedly, for refugees who are inclined to integrate to local community, employment has an important impact on many issues related to them, from promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host society (e.g., colleagues at workplace), providing opportunity to develop language skills, to restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance (Tomlinson & Egan, 2002). Employment, as a result, is not only a direct route to integration, but also the driving force of public confidence on immigration and integration systems, not to mention the long-term sustainability of welfare systems which depends on a greater number of newcomers entering work quickly (Ager & Strang, 2008).

The engagement of business firms in refugee integration is not without a reason. Narratives in favor of business involvement range from leveraging a ready source of talent and partnering public organizations in finding collaborative (policy) solutions to business responsibility in shaping societal attitude and perception toward refugees (Marcus, 2015). Further, it has been argued that diversity can lead to a stronger workforce where employees can share and learn from each other (Koser, 2013). Also, hiring refugees is believed to enhance global competitiveness and allow companies to address labor shortages and specific skill needs. Koser (2013) found that refugee employees often display stronger loyalty towards their employer as opposed to other employees, due to higher motivation. Additionally, governments can hardly solve complex social challenges alone and initiatives driven by non-governmental actors, such as business firms, are more likely to be seen as a collective project rather than something imposed from above (Vision Europe Summit, 2016). Harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of employers (e.g., business firms) is therefore critical both to the long-term resilience and well-being of societies and to ensuring that significant government investment in newcomers bear fruit. Small wonder, then, that policymakers encourage business firms to see hiring refugees as a business-savvy proposition aligned with the long-term economic interests of employers.

Co-existing with the business case is the ethical perspective that "addressing the refugee crisis is as much about sustainable growth as it is about respecting and defending human rights" (Unilever, 2017). In their report titled *Refugees and Migrants: An Opportunity for Humanity*, the B-Team (2016) urges business to reframe the refugee crisis as an opportunity. An excerpt from the report highlights the manifold benefits of such a perspective:

> Welcoming refugees is not only a humanitarian and legal obligation; it is an investment that can yield significant economic dividends. Indeed, investing one euro in refugee assistance can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years….Refugees contribute economically in many ways: as workers, entrepreneurs, innovators, taxpayers, consumers and investors. Their efforts can help create jobs, raise the productivity and wages of local workers, lift capital returns, stimulate international trade and investment and boost innovation, enterprise and growth. (B-Team, 2016, p. 5)

On the flip side, some have argued that business involvement is complicated by and highly contingent on national policies, given that the EU is not a unitary entity. Business initiatives for economic integration may be derailed in the face of unfavorable government policies toward refugees, legal uncertainties, and/or by societal pressure especially if providing jobs is viewed as the loss of local employment opportunities (Ioannou, 2015). Other reports confirm that initial language barriers, uncertainty about rules and regulations and skeptical public opinion are perceived impediments in business efforts toward recruitment and integration (e.g., OECD & UNHCR, 2016). Confounding this picture are the volatile perceptions of refugees, triggered by specific incidents and/or negative mediatized images such as those surrounding the violence in Cologne, Germany, and/or the emergence of anti-immigration movements in many EU states (Scholten et al., 2017) that further impede refugee integration.

The preceding discussion highlights arguments in favor of and against refugee support by businesses. While

desirable in principle, the case for business involvement in refugee integration is complicated by several factors ranging from policy variation across EU member states to societal attitudes to the pragmatic concerns of language proficiency, qualifications and skills. Not undermining the need for holistic, multi-stakeholder, solutions, our article focuses on theorizing a central role for business firms. In doing so, we seek to offer a conceptual bridge between what is *known* about the importance, barriers and enablers of refugee labor market integration with the *lesser-known* organizational, specifically employee, perspectives on the issue. Whether organizational members support their employer's stance on refugee integration may be decisive both for employee attitudes towards the organization as well as the employer's ability to accomplish its objectives of supporting refugees.

In our next section, we outline the links between refugee integration (as a form of CSR) and employee-organizational identification. We hypothesize that employee alignment and support is critical to finding sustainable solutions for business involvement in the refugee crisis especially in the face of perceived risks identified in the sections above. Guided by the need to incorporate the employee perspective, we theorize the relationship among refugee support (as a CSR effort), CSR communication and organizational identification with respect to business firms explicitly claiming their support for refugee integration in Europe.

3. CSR, Employees and Organizational Identification

Like integration, CSR is an "essentially contested concept" (Okoye, 2009). Albeit a contested construct, CSR broadly refers to the role(s) of business in society and can take varied forms from environmental sustainability to supporting diversity to providing quality products and services. The European Commission (2011) defines CSR as a company-led effort to take "responsibility for their impact on society" via legal compliance and by "integrating social, environmental, ethical, consumer and human rights concerns into their business strategy and operations". Being socially responsible is purported to yield tangible business benefits in the form of a positive reputation, customer loyalty and advocacy, financial performance, employee recruitment and retention and organizational commitment, among others (see Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Indeed, survey data confirm CSR as a primary motivation among a majority (80%) of employers that reported hiring refugees in 2017 (OECD & UNHCR, 2018).

CSR is also a draw for (potential) employees. According to a Nielsen study from 2014, 67% of respondents reportedly prefer to work for socially responsible companies and this dynamic is often more accentuated among Millennials (Deloitte, 2017). In particular, Millennials not only actively consider CSR in their employment decisions, but three-fourth would reportedly take a pay cut to work with a socially responsible company (Cone Communications, 2016). While these indicators affirm the import of employee support for CSR, previous studies also point to differences in employee attitudes toward CSR attributable to personal priorities (e.g., career development), workplace experiences, academic background and the nature and importance of their work in the organization (e.g., Rodrigo & Arenas, 2008).

So how might organizational support of refugees as a specific form of CSR influence employee identification with their employer? Employee identification with their employer is a perception of oneness with or belongingness to an organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Riketta, 2005). The social identity theory (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) suggests that employees may define themselves in terms of their organization (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). For example, a key feature of identification is emphasized by Bauman and Skitka (2012) as the value congruence between stakeholders and an organization. Podnar, Golob and Jančič (2011) point out that identification not only comprises identification with the corporate identity, but also with the collective of individuals with whom employees work. To achieve a high identification, employees' value proposition should be aligned with that of the organization.

In the refugee crisis context, employees who believe in the value of refugee integration the same as their employer in promoting societal peace and stability are more likely to commit to their organization. Such an identification may occur in the business that explicitly state their support of refugee integration in alignment with their proactive engagement in, for example, enhancing diversity at the workplace. Once employees identify strongly with their organization, they view its successes as their own, which further determines their self-image (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2007). Indeed, Haski-Leventhal, Roza and Meijs (2017) argue that overlooking employee engagement in CSR may oversimplify the situation, as the congruence between employees and organizations with regard to this issue may lead to deterministic impact on possible outcomes. Likewise, a high employer-employee congruence on refugee integration, if realized, can generate several positive outcomes in the workplace, such as higher level of job satisfaction and employee identification. So how might organizations accomplish this goal and what are the factors need to be considered?

4. Theoretical Prediction, Propositions and Conceptual Model

Our conceptual model (see Figure 1) outlines the relationship among refugee integration, CSR communication and organizational identification.

A previously mentioned, engaging employees in refugee integration (as a form of CSR) is vital if businesses aim for long-term solutions. A key challenge here may stem from the low awareness of a company's CSR activities among its internal stakeholders in general. Recent studies show that CSR awareness is typically



Figure 1. The mediating and moderating mechanisms of the relationship of refugee integration and organizational identification.

low among both internal and external stakeholders (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007). Without understanding why and how a company should contribute to refugee integration, employees are likely to question their employer's motivation to engage in this issue. Strong attributions of extrinsic motives (i.e., the company is seen as only attempting to increase its profits) will lead to unfavorable attitudes among stakeholders (e.g., employees) toward the company (Foreh & Grier, 2003).

Another key challenge relates to how business may minimize employee skepticism and convey intrinsic motives (i.e., the company is seen as acting out of a genuine concern for the focal issue) for their CSR activities (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sem, 2010). While employees claim they are interested in knowing about the good deeds of their employer, they also "quickly become leery of the CSR motives" if their employer aggressively promotes their CSR activities (Du et al., 2010, p. 9). Along with this line, if the value of creating a diversity corporate culture through employing refugees is not effectively communicated internally, employees may commit to a discrimination at the workplace (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2006). This challenge can disrupt refugee adaptation to the workplace, flowing on to negatively affect the corporate culture as well as other employees at work (Newman, Nielsen, Smyth, Hirst, & Kennedy, 2018). Needless to say, the success of refugee employment and integration is contingent on overcoming these challenges, i.e., to raise awareness among employees and to manage their attributions towards a business firm's engagement in this issue. Therefore, in this section, we conceptualize the importance of CSR communication in the relationship of refugee integration and organization–employee identification. We also propose a multilevel framework, incorporating not only corporate-level factors (e.g., CSR communication and perceived external prestige [PEP]), but also employees' personal-level determinants (e.g., social dominance orientation [SDO] and ethnic identity), which may affect the relationship of refugee integration and organizational identification. We hope the proposed conceptual framework can be decisive in shifting refugee support as a novel and important CSR type from a discretionary activity to a more sustainable approach.

4.1. Refugee Integration (CSR) and Organizational Identification

Due to the desire to make a social contribution and the feeling of pride to work for a good citizen, employees may identify strongly with an organization which proactively engages in CSR (Rodrigo & Arenas, 2008). Refugee employment and integration, if recognized by employees as valuable as other CSR initiatives (e.g., the adoption of clean energy, corporate philanthropy), will be desired to meet the social norms. Thus, for business firms with a clear claim on refugee support, employees are likely to value the endorsement of refugee employment and integration and perceive it as enforcing the organization's diversity culture while conforming to their own expectations.

> *Proposition 1*: The endorsement of refugee employment and integration are valued by the employees and are positively associated with their identification with the organization.

4.2. Mediating Mechanisms: The Role of Corporate Communication

Employee identification with the organization is an active process that is mediated by communication, particularly the efforts of the organization in raising awareness and mitigating stakeholder (employee) skepticism of CSR, as well as showcasing the fit with organizational goals and

the actual impact of CSR activities. First, the importance of refugee employment and integration as a social issue must be clearly communicated to internal stakeholders, in particular, if this engagement is not logically related to the company's business. By doing so, employees' concern about ulterior motives of their employer can be allayed to a certain extent (Menon & Kahn, 2003).

Corporate communication can also focus on CSR motives with the purpose of reducing employee skepticism (Du et al., 2010). In practice, business firms vary as to extrinsic or intrinsic motives they communicate to internal stakeholders. Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that a company should draw on the convergence of social and business interests, while acknowledging the benefits of CSR endeavors to the company itself as well as to the society as a whole. Take Unilever for example, both aspects are clearly communicated on its corporate webpage with regard to helping address the refugee crisis in Europe:

> Businesses can and must play an active role in helping address the refugee crisis, as the cost of inaction is greater than the cost of action. Doing so can help create jobs, raise the productivity and wages of local workers, lift capital returns, stimulate international trade and investment and boost innovation, enterprise and growth. (Unilever, 2017)

While both the importance and motives focus on the input side of corporate endeavor, the output side is also a key matter to communicate, that is, the actual impact (Du et al., 2010). As CSR communication often generates the impression of "bragging" nowadays (Sen, Du, & Bhattacharya, 2009), to focus on factual social impact of a refugee integration endeavor may serve as supporting evidence confirming underlying motives of a company and thus is an effective communication strategy. Communicating about actual CSR impact affects employees' attitudes as well as behaviors towards their employer positively (Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & Williams, 2006). Therefore, we conjecture that employees perceive "actual impact" valuable for judging the commitment of their employer. Unilever, for example, listed the refugee entrepreneurs who were chosen for their integration initiative and presented their personal perspectives about how they developed their career with this support (Unilever, 2018). The "real impact" of the refugee integration on people out of the refugee community (e.g., the business leaders) should be communicated as well.

Last but not the least, Du et al. (2010) argue that CSR fit, i.e., the perceived congruence between a social issue and the company's main business is also a vital factor to communicate. Employees may expect their employer to commit to refugee employment and integration if these social issues have a logical association with corporate core activities. Simmons and Becker-Olsen (2006) show that without a clear logical connection between a social issue and a company's main business, stakeholders are likely to attribute corporate engagement in the social issue to extrinsic motives and thus react negatively to it. Therefore, in CSR communication, a company should provide sufficient information with respect to the rationale for its refugee employment and integration, in order to achieve a perceived fit.

In summary, in the context of refugee employment and integration, corporate communication plays an important role in reducing employee skepticism. This role is in particular relevant to the business firms which made a clear standpoint in public that they are in support of integrating refuges at the workplace. The importance and motives of the endeavor, actual impact as well as the fit of the social issue and a company's core acidifies are identified as important factors to be addressed in corporate communication. They will mediate the positive impact of refugee integration on employee identification.

> *Proposition 2*: The impact of the endorsement of refugee employment and integration on employee identification will be mediated by the extent to which the importance, motives, actual impact and fit of this endeavor is communicated within an organization.

4.3. The Moderating Roles of Perceived External Prestige, Social Dominance Orientation and Ethnic Identity

Parallel to CSR communication, PEP is a relevant corporate-level factor to consider in the context of refugee employment and integration. It entails how employees perceive outsiders view their organization as well as themselves as a member of it (Dutton et al., 1994; Mignonac & Herrbach, 2004). It is contrary to "organizational associations" (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006), or "organizational identity" (Dutton et al., 1994), which employees form directly from attributes of an organization. When employees believe that important outsiders, such as investors, customers, governments or the general public, see their employer in a positive light, they will feel proud to belong to the organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Riel, 2001). The positive impact of PEP on employee identification has been found in empirical studies. For example, Bhattacharya, Rao and Glynn (1995) show that identifying with an organization enhances an individual's self-esteem. Thus, the more prestigious an organization is perceived by its employees, the greater the potential boost to self-esteem through identification.

PEP may be built by a variety of sources such as word-of-mouth, publicity, company-controlled external information and even internal communication about how the company is thought by external people and entities (Smidts et al., 2001). In the context of CSR, Kim, Lee, Lee and Kim (2010) argue that with these sources, employees will formulate their perceptions of the organization's CSR activities, while comparing the PEP of their employer with that of other business firms. In the refugee integration context, if an organization's CSR effort is considered

as central, enduring, distinctive and superior to others', employees will perceive their employer with a strong PEP. Thus, they will feel rewarded to be a member of a socially valued company and the resulting self-esteem will trigger a higher degree of identification (Dutton et al., 1994; Kim et al., 2010) and, accordingly, higher commitment to supporting refugee integration, relative to a firm with lower PEP.

> *Proposition 3*: PEP moderates the impact of the endorsement of refugee employment and integration on employee identification. The endeavor of an organization with a strong PEP will be assessed by its employees more positively than an organization with a low PEP.

In addition to the corporate-level factors summarized in Proposition 2 and 3, how the refugee employment and integration endeavor of a business firm will lead to employee identification is also determined by employees' individual beliefs. In particular, two important factors that shape employees' attitudes and perceptions and are likely to moderate the linkage of refugee integration and organizational identification include: SDO and ethnic identity.

The social dominance theory refers to SDO as a "general attitudinal orientation toward inter-group relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). SDO argues that discrimination of different social groups is triggered by the same psychological background and appears in a similar pattern in all kinds of societies (Sidanius & Pratto, 2003). Despite so, people's attitudes toward group equality versus group dominance is different (Sidanius & Pratto, 2003). It implies that while some people see inequality as normal and consider certain societal groups as better than others, others however may favor social equality. It is a personality trait predicting individuals' preference for specific social and organizational settings (Haley & Sidanius, 2005). SDO is relevant in the context of refugee integration particularly in light of the often-negative perceptions of refugees, for example in terms of job loss at the organizational as well as societal level. Accordingly, within business firms, employees with high SDO may tend to promote intergroup hierarchies and to rank social groups in a superior-inferior hierarchy (Snellman & Ekehammar, 2005). Pratto and Lemieux (2001) further investigated SDO with respect to the ambiguity towards immigration. They argue that the refugee integration policy, for example, may bring out people' prejudicial aggressive natures. As a consequence, employees with high SDO are unlikely to find a corporate policy aiming at increasing equality between groups (e.g., integration employment and integration) appealing to them, in comparison to employees who are low on SDO.

Although some scholars have criticized the social dominance theory for displaying human as "primitive hordes at constant war with each other" and suggested that in human history, people have shown mutual respect and unity, as opposed to dominating one another (Turner & Reynolds, 2003, p. 200), the relevance of SDO in explaining the context of immigration and refugee crisis is confirmed in literature (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001). Along this line, we argue that SDO moderates the linkage of refugee integration and employee identification: As high-SDO employees are in favor of intergroup hierarchies and intend to rank social groups in a superior-inferior hierarchy, they will assess their employer's endeavors in employing and supporting refuges less positively than low-SDO employees.

> *Proposition 4*: SDO moderates the impact of the endorsement of refugee employment and integration on employee identification. Employees high in SDO assess their employer's endeavor less positively than employees low in SDO.

A second factor to consider is ethnic identity, defined by Tajfel (1981) as the "part of an individual's self-concept which derives from [one's] knowledge of [one's] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Accordingly, it is considered as part of an individual's self-concept emerged from one's knowledge of his/her own ethnic group, as well as the values attached to membership of that group (Lee & Yoo, 2004; Newman et al., 2018). As a key aspect of an individual's social identity, ethnic identity not only fosters an individual's sense of belong to his/her ethnic group, it also leads an individual to make a conscious effort to learn about his/her ethnic group (Yoo & Lee, 2008). Empirical work has found that refugees from the Middle East often hold a strong ethnic identity, partially because of their cultures which are with high levels of collectivism and partially due to the trauma and negative experiences resulted from the individual's refugee status (Hattrup, Ghorpade, & Lackritz, 2007; Newman et al., 2018). In contrast, individuals who are born in individualistic cultures are less sensitive about their ethnic identity and thus less eager to connect to others with the same cultural background and beliefs.

Yet, recent studies on ethnical identity in the context of organizational diversity communication conclude that individual's ethnic identity shapes their response to corporate diversity policy. Individuals with high ethnic identity will respond more negatively to discrimination than those with low ethnic identity (Downey & Feldman, 1996) and thus more positively to organizational policies and practices that support diversity (Newman et al., 2018). As employees high in ethnic identity are more sensitive to racial discrimination, an organizational culture in which diversity is valued and cultural differences are respected is likely to resonate more positively with them, in comparison to other employees with a low ethnic identity (Newman et al., 2018). Refugee employment and

integration as part of corporate diversity culture, thus, would make employees with strong ethical identity develop more positive attributions for things that happen to them at work. As a consequence, they will identify more strongly with their employer, as opposed to those low in, ethnic identity.

Proposition 5: Ethnic identity moderates the impact of the endorsement of refugee employment and integration on employee identification. Employees with a strong ethnic identity assess their employer's endeavor more positively than employees with a low ethnic identity.

5. Conclusion

In this conceptual article, we have theorized the role of business in supporting and advancing refugee integration, specifically, economic or labor market orientation. We posit that business responsibility toward the ongoing refugee crisis stems from its (influential) position as a societal actor; however, we contend that a sustainable business case for refugee integration rests on the support and engagement of a key stakeholder aka employees.

In light of the yet limited theorizing on business involvement in the refugee crisis, our article contributes by adding the perspective of employees in business organizations that have made an explicit commitment to supporting refugees as a form of CSR. Considering the perspective of employees and the (potential) consequences on organization–employee identification can serve as a basis for future empirical research. Such a perspective shifts the often-disproportionate emphasis on refugees' (own) responsibility for economic integration, for example, through the acquisition of language skills, toward understanding organizational attitudes towards refugee integration (e.g., Lundborg & Skedinger, 2016).

Further, we conceptualized a multilevel framework, combining the role of corporate-level factors (e.g., CSR communication and PEP) and personal-level factors (e.g., SDO and ethnic identity) in mediating and moderating the relationship of refugee integration and organizational identification, respectively. Such an endeavor is the first to link refugee integration literature and the CSR communication literature through developing a conceptual model.

Our arguments rest on the current state of business involvement, which is rather sporadic and ad-hoc, led by a few large, multinational, organizations (MNCs) that have made an explicit commitment to supporting refugees. We recognize that there may be smaller, regional or local organizations that play a vital role in this domain and/or that their approach to refugee support may be decisively different from that of multinationals; paradoxically, these organizations may not enjoy the same visibility and attention as large organizations. On the one hand, by taking the lead on refugee integration (as select examples in the article illustrate), large organizations may serve as an example for others. On the other, we do not undermine the importance of other organizations, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that constitute a sizable proportion of employers especially in Europe. Using our conceptual model, researchers may conduct empirical research among SMEs that have made an explicit commitment to refugee support and compare results with that of MNCs. Likewise, given the scope of our article, we are unable to focus on entrepreneurship as an example of "bottom up" refugee innovation (Betts, 2014), efforts that are equally valuable as solutions for integration and economic self-reliance.

Our focus in this conceptual piece is on the organizational, specifically employee, perspective. Even when business may principally agree with the call to actively promote labor market integration of refugees, the translation to practice may be challenging for the multitude of reasons noted early on. While more have joined forces in recent years, for example, UNHCR's #WithRefugees coalition, these efforts are inadequate given the scale of the refugee crisis. Moreover, the need of the hour is to formulate long-term solutions in which the private sector is deemed "an essential partner" (Martinez, 2018).

Guided by the goal of advancing sustainable solutions around business involvement in refugee integration, we conjecture that the success of refugee employment and integration is contingent on managing employees' attributions toward a business firm's engagement in this issue. The effectiveness of CSR communication plays an important role in garnering support and reducing employee skepticism. We suggest that the importance and motives of the endeavor, actual impact, as well as the fit of the social issue with a company's core activities are four important factors to be addressed in corporate communication. They may mediate the positive impact of refugee integration on employee identification.

Simultaneously, how the refugee employment and integration endeavor of a business firm will lead to employee identification is also determined by employees' individual beliefs, in particular, SDO and ethnic identity. These are likely to moderate the linkage of refugee integration and employee identification. Leveraging on the conceptual framework, further research may focus on testing the mediating and moderating mechanisms of the relationship of refugee integration and organizational identification empirically through collecting field data from business firms.

Important to note is that both at the corporate and the individual level, one might expect that cultural and contextual differences (e.g., integration policies, societal attitudes) across EU states will likely shape the specific manifestations of refugee support, as well as the response to it. Although we focus on large multinationals with an expressed commitment to refugee integration as a form of CSR, no business exists in isolation from its social context. How a business communicates its rationale for supporting refugee integration is an important and complementary goal that can further advance

the understanding of CSR communication outlined in our model. The conceptual model may also form the basis for future experiments to assess the impact of specific mechanisms (e.g., CSR communication) on organization–employee identification.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Commentary

Social Navigation and the Refugee Crisis: Traversing "Archipelagos" of Uncertainty

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Abstract
This reflection considers the thematic issue "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes" through the lens of social navigation which takes into account the fluidity and uncertainty of the refugee and forced migrant condition whether in flight, emplaced, or at a temporary stopping point. Refugees who are able to "read" their social environment will be more successful in developing practices to navigate through unpredictable migration processes, including responding to information uncertainty. Yet even as some of the displaced adapt, other actors—particularly those part of the refugee regime—are also operating in unstable conditions such that the actions of refugees/forced migrants may in turn keep the circumstances of those purporting to help also in flux.

Keywords
belonging; digital environment; information precarity; migrant; refugee; social navigation; uncertainty

Issue
This commentary is part of the issue "Refugee Crises Disclosed: Intersections between Media, Communication and Forced Migration Processes", edited by Vasiliki Tsagkroni (Leiden University, The Netherlands) and Amanda Alencar (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands).

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This thematic issue on "Refugee Crises Disclosed" provides a window into the constellation of adaptive tactics enacted by refugees and forced migrants as they respond to both "radical and protracted uncertainty" (Horst & Grabska, 2015, p. 1). While 21st century social life in general has been described as insecure, liquid and marked by risk, the ways refugees and forced migrants experience such conditions is further shaped by the reasons for their flight (often violent political or economic conflict) as well as the nature of their movement in terms of sudden, often unplanned dislocation. In response to these uncertainties, refugees deploy practices of social navigation or the ways "people act in difficult or uncertain circumstances…[as] they disentangle themselves from confining structures" (Vigh, 2009, p. 419). The concept of social navigation "directs our attention to both the way people engage in the world and the way they move toward positions they perceive as being better than their current location" and is intended to capture the flows of actions across ever changing social environments (Vigh, 2009, p. 432). In sum, social navigation consists of dynamic movements carried out by actors "within a moving environment" or what Vigh (2009) calls "motion squared" (p. 420).

A common thread in this special issue's collection of studies is the documentation of the ways refugees and forced migrants engage in social navigation of displacement. Some refugees enact this navigation using "*visão*" (vision), an ability to read "the wider social environment [with] the poise and cunning required for successful living" (Archambault, 2013, pp. 89–90). We see this in Von Burg's (2019) consideration of the ongoing landings of refugees on Lampedusa, where those making unsanctioned arrivals must navigate their legal status as they aim for the perceived safety of Europe. As with most refugees, their wayfaring is complicated by the "archipelago" of actors and actants found in the transnational migration process (Triandafyllidou, 2019,

p. 1). Here, refugees' social navigation tactics include determining whether to exert independence as they seek a new future or submit to dependence by placing themselves solely within the care of the refugee system.

Even for those who get off islands both real and metaphoric, their navigation must remain fluid because reaching a destination is never really "final" as dynamic changes in policies, who carries them out and how they do so continue upon arrival at the next depot wherever that may be (Triandafyllidou, 2019; Van Neste-Gottignies & Mistiaen, 2018). As Alencar and Tsagkroni (2019) find, for example, refugees granted asylum in the Netherlands come to understand that navigating new lives in the context of Western Europe is an ongoing process of adaptation and negotiation, one in which they volunteer, visit cultural sites and carry out observations in public spaces as they place themselves into dialogue with their social environment and networks, creating their own trajectories toward the expectations of official integration, which are themselves subject to ever-changing social forces. As refugees move within social environments, those environments are also in motion. Such is also the case of refugees in New Zealand examined by Marlowe (2019) who engage in political activities through transnational networks with goals of remaking the countries they have fled from, and, in taking such action, potentially remaking themselves. Their navigation processes enable them to "develop different forms of agency" unavailable or even unimaginable to them in their pre-exile lives (Triandafyllidou, 2019, p. 6).

Finally, across the various cases presented here, one notable uncertainty of migration consists of "information precarity" (Wall, Otis Campbell, & Janbek, 2017), a condition in which access to information is limited leaving those who experience it "vulnerable to misinformation, stereotyping, and rumors that can affect their economic and social capital" (p. 240). Increasingly, this condition is navigated by refugees in the digital environment (see Alencar, 2018; Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver, & Vonk, 2018; Gillespie, Osseiran, & Cheesman, 2018; Leurs & Smets, 2018; Witteborn, 2015). This issue's scholars demonstrate how refugees challenge information and emotional deprivations by engaging in online spaces that provide a means to enact a present and/or imagine a future of belonging (Marlowe, Bartley, & Collins, 2017). This may encompass political belonging launched from within new homelands such as Marlowe (2019) describes as well as affective belonging to new and old networks as they use social media platforms to elicit emotional support (Kneer, Van Eldik, Jansz, Eischeid, & Usta, 2019), as a strategy to build self-esteem (Van Eldik, Kneer, & Jansz, 2019) or for staying in touch with culture from their homeland (Neag, 2019). Yet for other refugees and migrants the digital space can facilitate violent threats (Gabdulhakov, 2019); in these cases, migrants may use social navigational tactics such as self-protection through silence and isolation. In sum, refugees and forced migrants are constantly negotiating with their social environments whether online or offline, sometimes creating resistant visions of their futures to liberate themselves from the present. Ultimately, as Horst and Grabska (2015) argue, responding to uncertainty—viewed here through social navigation practice—opens up unexpected new ways of acting in the world.

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Conflict of Interests

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