Media and Communication
Open Access Journal | ISSN: 2183-2439
Volume 6, Issue 1 (2018)

Media History and Democracy

Editor
David W. Park

COGITATIO

Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1
Media History and Democracy

Published by Cogitatio Press
Rua Fialho de Almeida 14, 2º Esq.,
1070-129 Lisbon
Portugal

Available online at: www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 1–4
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1356

Editorial

Introduction to Media History and Democracy

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Submitted: 12 January 2018 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
This thematic issue of *Media and Communication* features articles that address the workings of democracy as understood through the lens of media history. The intersection of democracy and media history brings together two impossibly expansive terms, so expansive that the articles herein cannot provide any meaningful closure to the questions that even a cursory consideration of media history and democracy would provoke. Instead of closure, what these authors develop is a demonstration of the value of media history to our understandings of democracy. Historical methods of inquiry are necessary components for any meaningful understanding of media or democracy, and the authors gathered here work from a multi-hued palette of historiographical approaches. One finds in this issue a careful attention to how issues related to media history and democracy can be investigated through consideration of intellectual history, the history of political debates, journalism history, and the history of media organizations and institutions. These articles make a strong case for the continued relevance of media history to understanding the democracy and the media.

Keywords
communication history; democracy; journalism; media; media history; public

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

It is customary for thematic issues of journals in the field of communication to be dedicated to interrogating the significance of recent events or to showcasing a novel methodology or theoretical approach. This thematic issue does neither. Neither democracy nor media history is new. To the extent that there is any recent development that this thematic issue reflects, it is the place of historical inquiry in the field of communication.

Communication history—an inclusive descriptor for all manner of scholarly combinations of history and communication, including media history—is now well-primed to play a major role in the study of communication and the media. In the history of communication study, history itself has often played a marginal and limited role. Certainly it would be unusual to find anyone mistaking the field of communication for being primarily or unavoidably historical in tone; across much of the world the dominant schools of thought in the field of communication are tied (perhaps rather loosely) to norms of inquiry imported from the positivist social sciences. The 21st century has witnessed an intensification of interest in communication history and an attendant binding together of those who pursue its study. In 2006, John Nerone offered an appropriately ambivalent take on communication history's recent strides. Nerone described communication history as displaying "galloping theoretical incoherence", and observed that communication history "is as interdisciplinary and eclectic as any neighborhood of scholarship anywhere" (p. 259). Though this may seem like a fatal flaw, there is glory nonetheless. As Nerone observes, "historical practice doesn't need theoretical coherence beyond what is required to be able to tell a compelling story" (p. 260).

With galloping theoretical incoherence and compelling stories alike both very much at hand, communication history has made important strides within the field of communication. This development has been most noticeable in the emergence new divisions in scholarly associations associated with communication history. The International Communication Association (ICA) and the Eu-

ropean Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA) both adopted sections dedicated to communication history in 2007, adding their voices to the long-established history section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (Simonson, Peck, Craig, & Jackson, 2013, p. 39). Communication history (including media history) turns up in a frequent-if-haphazard manner in journals of communication, and numerous journals are dedicated entirely to media history. What we have witnessed is exactly what Nerone saw coming: a continuing interest in communication and media history that lacks disciplinary orthodoxy but provides compelling narratives. As is true of the broader history of communication study, where one searches in vain for the kind of disciplinary coherence that we sometimes pretend exists (significantly, it is historians of communication study who call our attention to the field's lack of coherence), communication history itself is fragmented. Media history has its own tendencies toward fragmentation and incoherence. Even to consider the category of "media history" leads one quickly to consult the only occasionally overlapping worlds of those who address the history of film, broadcast media, journalism, the book, the public sphere, the audience, and media technology. I should point out that this list of types of media history itself naturalizes and reproduces distinctions between types of media history as if each sub-specialty enjoys some Edenic authenticity. "Media history" itself is hard to separate from other forms of history, though the term serves us quite well if the goal (as it is here) is to pull together a relatively diverse lineup of historical manuscripts.

This issue of *Media and Communication* is not intended to assert a new order for the world of media history but instead to provide a demonstration of the power of media history to tell us something important. The unifying theme of democracy helps to show us that even media historians working in widely divergent domains have something important to say to each other and to everyone else. The point is not to attempt to force some cleanly drafted schematic onto the messiness of media history, or to show that each of these articles is to be combined with others to form the kind of objective history that historians have long known could no longer be constructed (Novick, 1988). The point, instead, is to demonstrate that media history can help us to think about what democracy and communication have to do with each other by showing through historical inquiry how media have played a role in constituting, sustaining, eroding, or otherwise shaping democratic processes.

2. Articles in This Thematic Issue

Given that this thematic issue's theme is so hopelessly broad as to foreclose any hope for finality, I suggest instead that the articles herein be read at least in part as demonstrations of how media history can be deployed to connect the infinitesimal detail to the grand narrative, and the empirical to the critical. Within media history there are numerous divergent interpretive communities, and this thematic issue gives us a taste of what some of these variants of media history resemble.

One recognizable genre of media history takes as its domain the history of media systems and institutions. Here is where the alignment between critical political economy of the media and media history is made most apparent. Inspired largely by the work of Herbert Schiller, whose *Mass Communications and American Empire* (1969) fitted a taut critical narrative to data drawn from US government and media systems archival documents, histories of media systems and institutions make connections between the overarching features of media systems and the countless stipples of archival data.

Kathryn Montalbano's lead article (2018) gives us a sense of how "history always constitutes the relation between a present and its past" (Berger, 1972, p. 11). Montalbano expertly charts how the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) have operated on a grassroots level in opposition to the US Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Fairness Doctrine, and how this history of opposition in turn informed the NRB's opposition to the FCC's Net Neutrality rules. By digging this up, Montalbano offers an innovative approach to how media history of systems and institutions can be informed by the work of grassroots activists. Beyond this, Montalbano takes the NRB's opposition to the Fairness Doctrine and Net Neutrality as a way to make plain how these potentially neutral-seeming rules (one has "neutral" in its name, after all) can highlight some particular and interested ways to conceptualize the public and how democracy ought to function.

Much as Montalbano derives historical interest from the parallax at work when regarding secular and religious understandings of free speech and the public in a communication policy context, Anne F. MacLennan (2018) finds a parallel benefit to historical understanding that can come from focusing on how national media systems impinge upon each other. MacLennan begins with the situation of Canadian broadcasters in the 1920s, when it was decidedly unclear how to arrange broadcasting, a situation made all the more complex by American broadcasting neighbors having already reached across the US/Canada border, and by the very available model of the BBC across the Atlantic. Drawing from archival sources, MacLennan argues that the emergent broadcasting system in Canada, with its blended incorporation of private and public programming, was the result in large part of the national network's relatively slow emergence, which allowed for local control to develop deep roots. MacLennan's account provides an accounting of how the contradictions at work in democratic parliamentary processes can be linked to specific media system outcomes.

This is succeeded by Bryce Peake's (2018) sweeping-yet-forensic history of telegraphy in British Gibraltar, as after World War I it became transformed by wave after

wave of reorganization and privatization. Peake's analysis benefits from a carefully explicated historiography that itself represents a break from media history as usual. Peake asserts that neoliberalism—often thought to have originated in the 1960s—is a technique that emerged from particular colonial sites of power, and his adherence to archival sources helps to underwrite the legitimacy of using the word "neoliberalism" to refer to telegraphy in the early 20th century. Peake arrives at a "prehistory" of neoliberalism, where the system in control of telegraphy in British Gibraltar can be taken as evidence for how "political economic rationality in Europe has deeply set imperial roots" in "neoliberal transformation".

In contradistinction to the histories of media systems and institutions we find in the first three articles in this thematic issue, the fourth article, by James Anderson (2018), is intellectual history. As is often the case in intellectual history, Anderson writes about ideas, the person who developed those ideas, and the context surrounding the person and those ideas. Anderson concerns himself with one of the most familiar figures in communication study: John Dewey. Dewey's writing was not always directly relevant to media history, but Anderson focuses on how Dewey's articles for *The New Republic* exemplified his ideas regarding public pedagogy. Instead of simply demonstrating this rather basic and not-surprising consonance between Dewey's philosophy and his words for the public, Anderson points to the slipperiness of Dewey's attempts to shore up distinctions between individuals and society, and between public and private. Building on Randolph Bourne's criticisms of Dewey's philosophy, Anderson pushes us to imagine "the pragmatic overcoming of the private/public distinction".

A third genre of media history that receives healthy representation in this thematic issue is journalism history. Journalism history and media history have often sat at separate tables, with differently inflected observations of professional correctness, different historiographical norms, and different institutional contexts for their work. John Nerone (2011) has exhorted journalism historians to "welcome an engagement with communication as a field" (pp. 22–23), and the journalism history we find in this thematic issue represents exactly this engagement. The last three articles in this issue give us a vivid sense of how journalism history that engages with communication as a field could work to the benefit of both communication study and journalism history.

The first journalism history entry in this issue comes from Ned Randolph (2018), whose sketch of 19th century US federal river management leads into a discussion of publicly organized river conventions, and then into a consideration of the progressive era attempts to direct public and elite opinion regarding river policy, with a strong emphasis on the role played by lobbying groups. The result of this inquiry is a decentered understanding of journalism history, where the journalism itself is made out to be only a part of a process of constituting the public in the face of a pressing issue.

Another way to decenter classic journalism history is to look beyond the hard news sections of newspapers of record, much as Barbie Zelizer (2005) suggested that journalism studies must do. In her article, Birgitte Kjos Fonn (2018) tells the story of the Norwegian business magazine Farmand, and its longstanding editor, Trygve J. B. Hoff. Fonn (2018) employs a biographical approach, focusing on Hoff himself, and how his experiences and surroundings came to shape the reporting in *Farmand*. In a manner that parallel's Peake's unearthing of continuities between present-day neoliberalism and colonial practice, Fonn finds in Hoff a neoliberal *avant le mot*, a media presence whose stubborn words in his own magazine lay plain some of the intellectual roots of what we now call neoliberalism.

The last entry of journalism history here, by Sandra Méndez-Muros (2018), considers Spanish journalism during the transition to democracy in the 1970s. Again we find a decentering move at work in this journalism history. This is not just the story of a newspaper's reporting from yesteryear. Méndez-Muros puts the reporting from the Seville newspaper (*El Correo de Andalucia*) in the context of social movements at the time, pairing her description of news reporting with a functional take on how this reporting came to matter to the formation of a democratic order. After situating the political backdrop of post-Franco Spain, Méndez-Muros reclaims the legacy of the neighboring movement, showing us how it has been occluded in other historical accounts, and how coverage of this movement in *El Correo de Andalucia* came to be linked to the goals of the demonstrators.

Taken together, the authors of these articles exemplify media history's potential. They pair an attention to evidentiary detail with cognizance of the bigger picture; they have constructed histories that connect the empirical to the critical. Put simply: these are the qualities we associate with excellent communication scholarship.

Acknowledgments

David W. Park would like to acknowledge the unstinting assistance and counsel of Rodrigo Gomes Quintas da Silva at Cogitatio Press, without whom this thematic issue could never have been created.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 5–12
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1198

Article

Net Neutrality, the Fairness Doctrine, and the NRB: The Tension between United States Religious Expression and Media Regulation

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Submitted: 29 September 2017 | Accepted: 15 November 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
This article analyzes the historical continuity between the opposition of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) to the Fairness Doctrine (1949) and to the contemporary Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Open Internet principle, net neutrality. These debates demonstrate how media policy discourse has shaped democratic ideals, including by designating whose voices are or are not included in broadcast and digital communication spaces. The discourse emerging from both media policy debates reveals that fears concerning cultural hegemony and the diversity of expression in the United States have intertwined with fears concerning the invasion of foreign ideologies. The article then considers the possibility of reconciling religious and secular discourse in the mediated public sphere.

Keywords
evangelicals; Fairness Doctrine; Federal Communications Commission; media regulation; National Religious Broadcasters; net neutrality; public sphere; radio; religion; secularism

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) net neutrality rules (2017, para. 2) aim to ensure the Open Internet by prohibiting Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from blocking access to legal content, applications, or services; throttling lawful Internet traffic; and favoring Internet traffic that benefits their own interests. Robert McChesney's (2007, pp. 184–185) characterization of net neutrality provides a useful framework for analyzing the opposition of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) to both net neutrality and the Fairness Doctrine:

> The story was too often miscast in the press as a corporate clash of the titans—Google versus AT&T, or Yahoo! versus Verizon—when the real story was the unprecedented involvement in a media policy issue from the grassroots.

Observing media policy debates at the grassroots reveals not only how actors directly effect change, but the ways in which media policy discourses have shaped democratic ideals, including by designating whose voices are or are not incorporated into broadcast and digital communication spaces.

Evangelical broadcasters and leaders formed the NRB in 1944 in response to the influence of the Federal Council of Churches, now the National Council of Churches, which convinced United States radio networks to deny evangelical broadcasters access to the airwaves for failing to serve the public interest and use the airwaves responsibly. As E. Brandt Gustavson, NRB President from 1990 to 2001, testified before the House (*Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000*, 2000, p. 20), the Federal Council of Churches had tried to "strike an agreement with the networks and the large stations in communities across the Nation to act as gatekeeper for all religious programming". These events preceded the Fairness Doctrine (1949), which formalized this framework for broadcast communication through two principles. Broadcasters had to: (1) cover controver-

sial issues of public interest, and (2) provide balanced accounts by allotting free time to opposing voices. It was a response both to the dissemination of propaganda on the airwaves abroad in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, foreshadowing the rhetorical intertwining of media policy and allegedly pernicious Islamic ideology in twenty-first-century NRB discussions about net neutrality, as well as to racial and religious attacks at home, such as those cultivated by the anti-Semitic priest, Father Coughlin, in the early 1930s. The NRB, nonetheless, characterized the Fairness Doctrine as censorship of religious expression.

The NRB praised the decision of Ajit Pai, the current FCC chair, to regulate the Internet through a small government approach. In July of 2017, NRB President Jerry Johnson appealed to the FCC to minimize Internet regulation and reduce Title II powers as a means of promoting global Internet freedom (Johnson, 2017, p. 2). The NRB has repeatedly argued against the use of Title II to regulate ISPs (Parshall, 2014, p. 3). The connection to United States foreign policy in the NRB stance on net neutrality traces back to its concern about the Fairness Doctrine, which was also laced with Republican-infused rhetoric about foreign policy. Discourse emerging from the net neutrality debates, drawing from the possibility of a revived Fairness Doctrine and the concerns NRB leaders had previously harbored about the policy in the mid-twentieth century, reveals the fears of the NRB about cultural hegemony and free expression at home alongside peripheral fears concerning the invasion of foreign ideologies.

2. Religious–Secular Conflict in Unites States Media Policy

2.1. Theoretical Framework

José Casanova (1994, p. 53) wrote in his sociological analysis of modern religions that, "by the 1830s, evangelical Protestantism, organized denominationally, had become de facto the culturally, though not politically, established American religion". By the twentieth century, however, the contributions of the NRB to media policy debates demonstrate how an evangelical organization—that was not even mainstream Protestant—had evolved to execute both cultural and political agency in the United States. NRB leaders believed they could feasibly challenge the boundaries between secularism and religion through the policies governing the radio and Internet, respectively. NRB opposition to both the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality not only constituted explicit critiques of media policy, but also tacit critiques of secularism in the public sphere.

Charles Taylor (2007) argued that secularism arose with the increase of alternative options of beliefs, as well as with cultural shifts in ideas toward the religious and the secular. Secularization, for Taylor, is therefore a byproduct of religious processes. This distinction would be important for NRB leaders who are critical of how media policy is itself rooted in a legal, cultural framework that seemingly treats secularization as replacing an "enchanted world". For example, Taylor (2011, pp. 35, 40–41) noted that legal formulas such as the religion clauses in the First Amendment are built on tensions, showing that "there is no such set of timeless principles that can be determined…by pure reason alone" and without conflicts. Secular laws and cultures include many different goals that often collide with one another, which the disparity between censorship of free expression, as characterized by the NRB, and regulation of content for the public interest, as characterized by the FCC, demonstrates.

Taylor (2007, p. 451) detailed the ways in which religion is always secularizing, including through evangelicalism, which he characterized as, historically, "basically an anti-hierarchical force, part of the drive for democracy". This characterization is perhaps a rather appropriate way to frame how NRB leaders have understood their role as protectors of conservative, fundamentalist views in the public sphere, fighting for balanced, democratic discourse through media policy. This article seeks to extend Taylor's framework by probing, as the NRB has done, the position of all religious citizens in the United States public sphere, including those who do not espouse mainstream, conventional ideologies, and the role of media policy in defining that position.

2.2. The Rise of the NRB in a Mediated Public Sphere

The NRB formed in the 1940s, uniting fundamentalist groups as a direct response to the Federal Council of Churches, which claimed to speak for all Protestants. The opposition of the NRB to both the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality is instructive of how it has challenged mainstream Protestantism through media policy. By the mid-1940s, the NRB had become "the nucleus of a vibrant media subculture both serving the growing evangelical movement and popularizing its worldview—developments that were hard won by forties commercial religious broadcasters" (Hangen, 2002, p. 141). By 1947, two prominent issues regarding conservative religious voices on the radio had surfaced: first, whether religious broadcasters, in particular, Christian station owners, should be able to use controversial language in broadcasts and editorial opinions; and second, whether conservatives were unfairly denied access to the airwaves.

Religious radio paved the path for evangelical voices to enter the public sphere (Hangen, 2002, p. 158). Steiner (2016, p. 184) has observed the ongoing role of radio in evangelical culture: "even a generation after the dawn of the digital age, the 'old media' of radio continues to have a key role in setting the evangelical agenda". Additionally, religious radio has shaped the evangelical agenda regarding media policy, as the legacy of the Fairness Doctrine debates have shaped contemporary NRB opposition to net neutrality. Ward (in press, p. 2) insightfully ar-

gues: "NRB opposition to net neutrality arguably reflects the fact that the 'electronic church' has, like the rest of the media industry, become consolidated". In other words, religious media conglomerates would be able to pay large fees that would increase in the absence of net neutrality (Ward, in press, pp. 3–4), thereby explaining why key actors in the religious media industry, such as the NRB, might oppose net neutrality.

2.3. Negotiating Net Neutrality

The irony of NRB opposition to the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality, two policies that have protected or aim to protect minority or non-commodifiable viewpoints, lies in the history of the NRB as a disempowered collection of voices that sought to carve its space in the mediated public sphere. To further complicate that irony, the NRB at points has supported net neutrality—when its leaders believed the principle could transform in accordance with NRB interests. For example, it joined the SavetheInternet.com coalition, formed by the Free Press in 2006, as an advocate of free speech (McChesney, 2007, p. 184). The NRB penned a letter to Chairman Sensenbrenner in April of 2006 expressing its support for network neutrality protections (*Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access*, 2006). In May of the same year, the NRB firmly supported net neutrality alongside left-wing coalitions (*S. 2686, Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006 (part II)*, 2006). During a 2006 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing, Frank Wright, NRB President from 2003 to 2013, officially endorsed net neutrality. Wright had submitted a letter to the chairman, Hon. Ted Stevens, in support of the renomination of Kevin Martin as Commissioner and Chairman of the FCC, while acknowledging that the NRB and FCC did not always coexist in perfect harmony: "While NRB members have not seen every issue before the FCC go their way, we have always found an open door to make our thoughts and concerns known" (*Nominations to the Federal Communications Commission and to the Department of Commerce [National Telecommunications and Information Administration]*, 2006, p. 41).

In 2010, one year before the escalation of the 2011 net neutrality debates, the NRB founded the John Milton Project for Religious Free Speech in response to alleged threats of anti-Christian censorship on new media platforms. One year later, senior NRB vice president, Craig Parshall, discussed in a white paper report for the Project how media policies of technology companies undermined the First Amendment. Parshall characterized the "Open Internet" as inadequate in addressing new media platforms, as well as filled with "broad, complex, free market-inhibiting rules with vague standards of application, and short on the provision of basic guarantee to citizen users that their content will not be censored because their ideas are unpopular, controversial, or politically incorrect" (NRB, 2011, p. 4). The NRB (2011, p. 8) sought greater regulation of new media platforms that otherwise limited "lawful religious expression".

Parshall also lamented the lack of support from the ACLU in acknowledging "anti-Christian censorship" (NRB, 2011, p. 7). It supported new media regulation, but not the particular iteration of net neutrality that already existed at that time (NRB, 2011, p. 7). Rather than embracing regulation of ISPs, the NRB wanted government-promoted, uninhibited speech built into the rules of new media businesses, such as Google or Facebook. Citing Rob Frieden, Professor of Telecommunications and Law at Pennsylvania State University, Parshall contemplated the lack of concern for free speech and religious expression in the FCC Open Internet rules: "his primary concern is that the FCC's rules should serve to 'safeguard competition,' admittedly an important principle, but at the same time [it is] an approach that fails to recognize the fundamental free speech rights of citizen users" (NRB, 2011, p. 8). He suggested that FCC regulation of digital media businesses would have to parallel government regulation of public utilities (NRB, 2011, p. 13). In short, he declared: "the actual provisions of the Order fail to implement any real protections for free speech" (NRB, 2011, p. 29).

2.4. Fearing the Resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine

This fixation of NRB leadership on "free speech" traces back to the Fairness Doctrine. The legacy of the Fairness Doctrine within the NRB remains central to the means by which its leaders have resisted net neutrality. For decades after the Fairness Doctrine became law in 1949, the FCC avoided disputes regarding whether religion was even an issue of fairness (Gentry, 1984, p. 262). A handful of cases in the late 1920s to the early 1930s contributed to the rise of the Fairness Doctrine. By the postwar 1940s, as Pickard (2013) has shown, a broadcast reform movement that included religious organizations (and, in particular, liberal Protestants, led by Everett Parker), laid the foundation for the Fairness Doctrine and other future radio reform. FCC Commissioner, Clifford Durr, acknowledged that United States radio at the time did not consider the voices of many, including religious minorities (Pickard, 2013, pp. 318–319). Hendershot (2011, p. 140) has argued that the FCC was largely reactive by implementing the Fairness Doctrine, passively responding to only a few of the handful of citizen complaints. The Fairness Doctrine was designed to fail, Hendershot (2011, p. 18) added, "in part, because it was an attempt to serve an inchoate idea of the public". Pickard's (2015, p. 122) similar analysis of the Fairness Doctrine has confirmed that a "vague public interest obligation", rather than a concerted effort to fortify public interest standards, has shaped United States mass media industries today. This ambiguous framework has particularly neglected the voices of those who fall beyond the purview of the public interest.

At the core of the NRB religiously-motivated argument against the Fairness Doctrine was the idea that

broadcasters should receive First Amendment protection. In 1975, Reverend James Nicholls testified before the Subcommittee on Communications against the Fairness Doctrine. His frank testimony suggests that the battle for religious expression on the airwaves, led by the NRB, was not merely a fight for the freedom of uncontested religious speech, but a far more complex religious battle over the survival of less powerful Christian denominations through mass media, very much reflecting the marketplace of religion itself. Nicholls was represented by Benedict P. Cottone, the lawyer for Carl McIntire and a former advocate of the Fairness Doctrine. Cottone had become a "strong opponent of the doctrine" (Hendershot, 2011, p. 146). He mused on the problems of the Fairness Doctrine for religious broadcasters who espoused "unpopular" religious or political ideologies, and whom he characterized as "a frustrated minority…trying desperately to get their voices heard" (Hendershot, 2011, p. 325) but were afraid of being censored. Nicholls had conducted a survey of the broadcasters at the 1975 NRB Convention, as well as of the attendees at the annual Christian Beacon Press convention (*Fairness Doctrine*, 1975, pp. 318–319). From this survey, Reverend Nicholls claimed to have discovered that, of these respondents, 73.3% believed the Fairness Doctrine abridged the First Amendment; 80% believed the Fairness Doctrine limited speech in broadcast media; and 73.3% believed the Fairness Doctrine censored speech in America, broadly speaking (*Fairness Doctrine*, 1975, pp. 332–333). The rigor of his study is indeterminable, but his attempt to offer these findings as evidence suggests he recognized the NRB as a representative, if not central, example of conservative, evangelical public opinion.

FCC chairman Mark Fowler, whose goal was "to eliminate government action that infringes the freedom of speech and the press" by creating an unregulated, free market (Jung, 1996, p. 32), appealed to the NRB on February 9, 1982, for its support to repeal the doctrine: "spectrum scarcity has been used as an excuse to regulate, not a reason!" (Jung, 1996, p. 40). He viewed the policy as excessive government intervention and characterized spectrum scarcity as a facade constructed by an anti-religious FCC. Between 1983 and 1985, broadcasters and media organizations more publicly opposed the doctrine, concerned about appealing to the largest public possible rather than minority voices, such as those of the NRB, whose unpopular ideas were less commodifiable for advertisers (Jung, 1996, p. 108).

Nonetheless, the legacy of the Fairness Doctrine did not die with the 1987 repeal but intensified during the 2011 net neutrality debates, thereby demonstrating the cultural and legal significance of radio to the NRB. In this year, the NRB consistently published press releases to its official Web site denouncing net neutrality. NRB President Frank Wright (2011, para. 2) penned a letter implying that, in the heat of the net neutrality debates, the NRB was largely concerned about the Fairness Doctrine resurfacing in other arenas: "Now that the letter of this rule has been eliminated, NRB stands ready to work with you to ensure that the spirit of the Fairness Doctrine does not creep into other rules or proceedings".

Fear within the NRB resurfaced with the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1993. A Democratic representative from North Carolina, W. G. Hefner, advocated for the amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 by supporting the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine with his Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1993, much to the distress of the NRB. The NRB did not know that just a few years later, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 would effect an even more monumental overhaul of media law since the Communications Act of 1934, one that would decrease the number of independent syndicators and, consequently, lesser known preachers (Ward, 2009, p. 94).

E. Brandt Gustavson, NRB President from 1990 to 2001, opposed the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine before the House in 1993 (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, pp. 39–41). He attempted to reconfigure the public sphere as the participation of the most number of people, including minority voices, rather than the participation of the most while accounting for the maximum number of interests at one time. He claimed that since the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, small religious stations had flourished, benefitting the nation by removing barriers to free exercise of religion and discussion of controversial issues (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, p. 39). However, he warned that government interference with religious broadcasting remained due to the "cultural environment" in which "many traditional topics of religious teachings" had "become highly controversial" (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, p. 39). Gustavson's understanding of "traditional" resided at the core of the issue, that is, whether non-traditional religious identities needed to conform to the mainstream values of the public sphere.

In an NRB white paper submitted for this hearing, "Statutory Reimposition of the 'Fairness Doctrine' Would be Unconstitutional", the NRB praised the increase of direct citizen participation through radio call-in formats "that was never before possible" (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, p. 40), following the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine. This priority within the media policy agenda of the NRB demonstrated that it was concerned with unveiling the discussion of private matters: "sexual morality, marriage, parental responsibility, and the sanctity of human life are now hotly contested by an increasingly secularized society" (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, pp. 40–41). In a 2007 updated version of this white paper with the same title, Frank Wright, then NRB President, even went so far as to predict that, should the Fairness Doctrine resurface, it could lead to a "continuing state surveillance" that ensured religions broadcasters adhered to the fairness guidelines: "such a pervasive 'entanglement' of government regulators into the speech of religious entities would be incompatible with the religious liberties protected by the First Amendment" (NRB, 2007, p. 12).

Gustavson's testimony (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, pp. 39–40) showed that the NRB tried to redefine the boundary drawn around the organization despite acknowledging that the religious community was itself diverse and entitled to access to the airwaves. He suggested unity amongst all conservative religious groups against their progressive counterparts:

> In making this argument on behalf of religious liberty, we would like to stress that NRB is not advocating rights that are beneficial only to one side of a public policy debate. In fact both sides of our Nation's cultural divide are well represented in the religious broadcasting community….Both camps currently benefit from their ability to have access to the airwaves free of governmental oversight and supervision.

He rhetorically denounced the Fairness Doctrine as "a government-mandated system of enforced fairness" (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, p. 40), and therefore a hindrance to uninhibited religious expression, which subsequent NRB rhetoric concerning net neutrality would mimic. Edward J. Markey of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, nonetheless, assured Gustavson that the Fairness Doctrine would not apply to broadcasters wishing to present controversial viewpoints regarding religious issues (*Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine*, 1993, p. 66). Several years later, Gustavson would testify in support of the Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000 against the FCC, which had "overstepped its authority" by making decisions that restricted the "fundamental freedom of religious expression" (*The Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000*, 2000, p. 20). Gustavson channeled anti-elitist, populist rhetoric, endorsing a more aggressive approach to creating a religion-friendly, mediated environment that accounted for religious minorities when crafting media policies in the public interest (*The Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000*, 2000, p. 21):

> Thus, in effect, the FCC created a category of politically correct government-approved, religious speech and that is abhorrent to us and unacceptable. Essentially, the FCC seems to think it is permissible for programs to talk all about religion in academic or intellectual terms but when the programs become more passionate, emotional, personal or originates from a church, it is somehow less educational, instructional or cultural.

Nonetheless, the support of the NRB for these acts did not avoid criticism. In a written rebuttal presented at this hearing by a sociology professor and co-chair of the Save Pittsburg Public Television Campaign, Starr argued that the NRB was a predator, not a victim, since educational licenses were reserved for the whole community (*The Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000*, 2000, p. 60). Starr's rebuttal suggests that, from an outsider's perspective, the NRB wanted to redefine the "public sphere" to one that supported the rights of the few to voice their opinions, even if it threatened the well-being of the many.

2.5. Thwarting the Threat of Foreign Ideologies

One of the most powerful political allies of the NRB was President George W. Bush. President Bush attended the annual NRB convention in 2008, characterizing the Fairness Doctrine as a question of the freedom of speech and religion alongside a broader discussion of the World Trade Center attacks. Bush characterized the prospect of reinvigorating the Fairness Doctrine as "an effort afoot that would jeopardize your right to express your views on public airways" and require many programs to "meet Washington's definition of balance" (White House, 2008, para. 9). He then shifted to discussing violent extremism in the Middle East, "the region of the world that is the least free" (White House, 2008, para. 14) and that cultivated the suicide bombers of September 11, 2001, "directly" (White House, 2008, para. 16) affecting United States safety. Hibbard (2010, p. 196) has characterized Bush at this convention as having portrayed United States power as a "fundamentally benign force in the world that is '[once again] called into action for the defense of liberty'". Hibbard demonstrated, through this example, how the United States has systematically garnered domestic support from groups such as the NRB in order to justify its discourse and policies regarding Islamo-fascism and dysfunction in the Middle East and South Asia.

At the 2011 NRB Convention, attended by NRB ally James Dobson and NRB President Frank Wright, John Boehner (2011) adopted Bush's 2008 rhetoric of freedom to criticize the Fairness Doctrine by amassing support for United States foreign policy. The merging of religion and politics in the rhetoric of Republican leaders, a common tactic employed when communicating with religious conservatives, seemingly persuaded an already defensive NRB that ideological and militaristic foreign invasion threatened the cultural, political center of the United States. In addressing the national debt, Boehner predicted that the FCC may serve "as Internet traffic controller" and possibly run "roughshod over local broadcasters" who had provided "free content" to their communities for decades (Boehner, 2011, para. 22). In discussing net neutrality, he linked the freedom of expression in the United States to the repression of free thought and economic suppression of the national debt, much as Bush linked his Fairness Doctrine speech to Islamic suppression of free thought in the Middle East. Boehner (2011, para. 57) claimed: "gone is our culture of

independence—in its place, a cycle of dependence". He also strategically addressed a point of interest to the NRB: the persecution of "religious minorities in Iraq" (Boehner, 2011, para. 108), given the organizational identity of the NRB itself as a persecuted religious minority within its own homeland.

This point of interest provided a segue to discussing net neutrality as an attack on the expression of religious minorities that would allow the FCC "free reign" (Boehner, 2011, para. 21): "right now, freedom and free expression are under attack by a power structure in Washington populated with regulators who have never set foot inside a radio station or a television studio" (Boehner, 2011, para. 19). Boehner (2011, para. 24), speaking on behalf of the House Republicans, encouraged the NRB to combat the FCC through Congress: "as far as I'm concerned, there is no compromise or middle ground when it comes to protecting our most basic freedoms". He furthermore connected this larger conversation to the Fairness Doctrine, "another threat to freedom with an innocuous name" (Boehner, 2011, para. 31) and a "censorship scheme from the 1940s" that represented "Washington's definition of 'balance'" (Boehner, 2011, para. 32), that is, an attempt by Congress "to silence ideas and voices they don't agree with" (Boehner, 2011, para. 36). Although neither President Obama nor Congress showed interest in reviving the Fairness Doctrine, the NRB welcomed Boehner's critique of a government trying to regulate the media in order to craft its own vision of a fair and balanced mediated public sphere.

3. Conclusion

Jürgen Habermas (2011, pp. 25–26) recognized that, although religious reasons are insufficient for substantiating arguments in the public sphere, citizens could translate religious language of public reason in order to provide a common moral ground in the public sphere. This framework for compromise suggests that the NRB failed to effectively achieve its goals in broadcast and digital media policy because it neglected to translate its religious discourse into the language of public reason, while instead attempting to either restructure or even eradicate media policy conflicting with its organizational goals. Taylor (2011, pp. 36–37) disagreed with Habermas by claiming that religious belief should not receive special status over nonreligious belief, since these disagreements could not be resolved through public reason. The tension between these two approaches for reconciliation provides a theoretical framework for understanding the connection between the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality in the history of the NRB.

The Fairness Doctrine fostered a media environment in which diverging viewpoints remained distinctive but balanced. NRB leaders' resistance to net neutrality has been seemingly non-rational but consistent with an environment of religious media conglomeration (Ward, in press, pp. 3–4). Additionally, NRB discourse fused domestic concern for freedom of expression with the militaristic concern for freedom from foreign invaders, a tactic frequently employed by Republican politicians in discussion with conservative religious figures. Yet through government regulation, net neutrality protects NRB content and delivery from both economic as well as cultural constraint, such as by preserving delivery of the content on the NRB Web site directly or, more indirectly, the content of streaming video "intervangelist" preachers who have replaced NRB-supported 1960s televangelists (Bekkering, 2011, p. 105). Megachurches that have streamed religious services online raise new problems for ISPs seeking to fairly implement net neutrality, such as the rise in conflicts occurring between evangelical Christian broadcasters and Islamic leaders, who feel their communities are targets of this broadcasting (Wikle, 2015).

Secularism, according to Taylor (2007, p. 53), has not displaced religion but rather constitutes a byproduct of religion itself. Even prior to the rise of Habermas's public sphere, medieval reform in the Catholic Church tried to reconcile the disparity between the elites and masses, much as the Reformation challenged the status quo of Catholicism, thereby secularizing societies using the very fabrics of religion itself (Taylor, 2007, p. 82), rather than, as the common narrative claims, supplanting religion. The obligation to speak truthfully in the United States press was partially rooted in religious beliefs, noticeably in the significant Zenger (1735) trial that helped to shape the First Amendment: "The Zenger case, then, was as much a religious as a political or legal phenomenon" (Nord, 1985, p. 15), demonstrating that religious and secular matters were, in fact, interlaced in language in the emerging United States public sphere. Talal Asad (2003) similarly noted that secularism is a byproduct of religious endeavors, but he critiqued the Western, Christian lens through which scholars have distinguished between religion and secularism, and which itself has a politicized history. This history has contributed to a secular myth of liberal democracy, excluding non-Western religions from the discourse of public reason by embracing "only religions that have accepted the assumptions of liberal discourse" (Asad, 2003, p. 183). Asad's critique is particularly indispensable for future research on the place of Islam in United States public discourse and media policy.

These critiques of secular discourse prompt us to trace its legal, political, and cultural history in the United States to reconsider precisely what secularism means in media policy that organizes societies, shapes communicative practices, and governs public discourse. Contemporary media policymakers aiming to reconcile tensions between religious and non-religious beliefs in the mediated public sphere might consider whether a myopic engagement with secularism overlooks the intertwining of religious and secular concerns that have historically shaped religiously-grounded freedom of expression cases, overshadowed by the secular victors. Such heightened awareness could enable media policymak-

ers to better understand the stakes that religious actors perceive—justified or not—in media policy debates.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Randall Balmer, Pat Farabaugh, and Ann Neumann for their ideas and inspiration in the preliminary stages of this research. I would also like to thank Courtney Bender and Samuel Cruz for providing me with the theoretical framework to illuminate this analysis of religion in media policy. I owe a special thank you to Mark Ward Sr. for graciously sharing access to his work in accordance with the open access philosophy that supports this very journal. I am extraordinarily grateful to my graduate school mentor, Richard R. John, for his unwavering support, as well as to Brian Dolber, Dave Park, and Ben Peters, for sharing my belief in the contribution of religion and media scholarship to our field. Finally, thank you to the editors and staff of *Media and Communication* for supporting me in the beginning of my scholarly career.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 13–20
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1219

Article

Private Broadcasting and the Path to Radio Broadcasting Policy in Canada

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Submitted: 6 October 2017 | Accepted: 6 December 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
The largely unregulated early years of Canadian radio were vital to development of broadcasting policy. The Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting in 1929 and American broadcasting both changed the direction of Canadian broadcasting, but were mitigated by the early, largely unregulated years. Broadcasters operated initially as small, independent, and local broadcasters, then, national networks developed in stages during the 1920s and 1930s. The late adoption of radio broadcasting policy to build a national network in Canada allowed other practices to take root in the wake of other examples, in particular, American commercial broadcasting. By 1929 when the Aird Report recommended a national network, the potential impact of the report was shaped by the path of early broadcasting and the shifts forced on Canada by American broadcasting and policy. Eventually Canada forged its own course that pulled in both directions, permitting both private commercial networks and public national networks.

Keywords
America; broadcasting; Canada; commission; frequencies; media history; national; networks; radio; religious

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

Early Canadian broadcasting policy was marked by a few key events. The stage was set by the first Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting commissioned in December 1928, more popularly known at the Aird Commission, followed by the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act of 1932, and the Act to amend the Canadian Broadcast Act in 1936 (Bird, 1988; Peers, 1969; Prang, 1965; Weir, 1965). From 1922 to 1929 before the Aird Report was released, radio was influenced not only by debate over its content, but also its control. The resulting struggle over frequencies was affected by scarcity and by the reality of North American broadcasting. The American Radio Act of 1927 and General Order 40 of August 30, 1928 changed Canadian broadcasting in ways that may have made the Aird Report and subsequent legislation more urgent. Local and international interests stepped into the vacuum prior to the establishment of a public or national broadcasting network. Both broadcasters and the audience were accustomed to this commercial environment prior to the establishment of a true national network and it was within this environment that the push for a Canadian broadcasting originated.

2. Regulation

The Department of Marine and Fisheries was the regulatory agency charged with radio in Canada, making the conceptualization of the new medium as distinct from the United States, where it was regulated by the Department of Commerce, and in Britain by the British Post office.[1] The Naval Service took over during the war, but in 1922 the Department of Marine and Fisheries resumed regulation of radio and started to issue private, commercial broadcasting licenses and receiving licenses. By 1923

[1] Canada's first effort to regulate what would become radio was the Wireless Telegraphy Act in 1905, designating the authority to license radio to the Department of Marine and Fisheries. Surrounded by three oceans, ship-to-shore communications dominated the early notion of radio's role and regulation. Control over all aspects of radio in the Radiotelegraph Act of 1913 was granted to the federal government and from 1913 to 1922 the Radio Branch continued its work under the Department of Naval Service.

there were 51 private, commercial broadcasting stations; that number grew to 77 by 1929 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1926, 1931). As radio stations multiplied so did the number of listeners, but concentrated listening audiences only reached numbers profitable for commercial broadcasting in a few cities.

The commercial imperative that drove the rapid growth of American broadcasting met with limited success in Canada, not only because its population was slightly less than a tenth of the United States, but also, since radio signals travel across national borders, which forced Canadian radio to compete with American radio.[2] Without language barriers, physical barriers, such as mountain ranges or technological barriers, the drift of radio signals across the national border is inevitable. The larger American audience guaranteed advertisers, rapid expansion of their commercial networks, and eventually triggered the consideration of the audiences north of the border in Canada, as part of an ever-expanding commercial broadcasting system.

Long before nation building interests were central to discussion of Canadian broadcasting, the impact of commercial broadcasting on the growth of radio networks was crucial (Allard, 1979; MacLennan, 2001; Skinner, 2005; Vipond, 1992). Although the Radio Branch of the Department of Marine and Fisheries regulated licensing, a larger void was left without a network of stations or a plan beyond permitting and facilitating commercial broadcasting. The closest to a national network was the Canadian National Railway's network of stations across the country, but there were only three production studios: in Moncton, New Brunswick, Ottawa, Ontario, and Vancouver, British Columbia. The remaining stations were available to the train's passengers as they passed through cities where programs were broadcast at pre-arranged times by "phantom" stations, hosted on other stations a few hours a week. Due to the limited frequencies to allocate, under the Gentleman's Agreement of 1924 with the United States, only Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver had two wavelengths, but every other Canadian city was forced to share one wavelength (MacLennan, 2016, p. 198). American programming was only available to Canadian listeners until 1928, if they resided within reception range of stations located in the United States. This crowded space on the radio dial initially did not allow American affiliate expansion into Canada, however, debates about content and changes to American regulation soon created spaces on the dial for American networks in Canada.

3. Exercising Regulatory Power, Frequency Assignment and Religious Broadcasting

A variety of factors coalesced to change the distribution of radio frequencies, make American broadcasting feasible inside the national boundaries of Canada, and move Canada toward the development of a national network. The most controversial radio debate in the House of Commons and the newspapers focused on complaints about the International Bible Students' Association (IBSA) and their programs on several stations across the country. The granting or denial of radio licenses remained one of the few powers exercised by the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries. Minister P. J. A. Cardin decided not to renew the licenses of the IBSA stations after letters complaining about their broadcasts were received (Johnston, 1994, p. 379; McGowan, 2008, pp. 8–9; Opp, 1994, pp. 103–104; Prang, 1965, pp. 4–5; Vipond, 1992, pp. 197–198, 2010, p. 79). The decision came under criticism in the House of Commons, in particular from J. S. Woodsworth, Labour MP from Winnipeg North Centre, who wanted "to protest against…the very arbitrary action on the part of the department with regard to the cancellation of these licenses" (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1928). Woodsworth acknowledged the stations' connection to the IBSA, but noted that its status a business was also a consideration (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1928). As noted by Mark McGowan, one of the incidents that sparked religious controversy was Judge Joseph F. Rutherford's talk on the radio in 1927 about Catholics and Protestants, while in Toronto (Toronto Star, 1927, as cited in McGowan, 2008, pp. 8–9). Woodworth further argued in the House of Commons that the correspondence tabled upon which these decisions were based were files comprised, in large part, of newspaper clippings focused on the discussion of the decision, not complaints prior to the decision (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1928, p. 3618). Woodsworth also noted the hypocrisy of one "correspondent [who] complained that the programs of the Bible Students' Association were too American, and then he went on to say in the very same letter that they prevented the receiver from getting American stations" (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1928, p. 3619). The religious controversy on the radio focused on questions of censorship and favoring one religious group over another.

One of the significant outcomes of the denial of the license renewal was the shift among the remaining stations. In 1927 before the IBSA stations were revoked, the Christian and Missionary Alliance station, in Edmonton, started broadcasting, but with the winnowing of the competition, was able to survive and eventually grow (Opp, 1994, p. 104). The change in the distribution of radio stations may have had a greater impact than the debate over religion on the radio. The interruption by CKCX, an IBSA phantom station, during CFRB's popular Baptist sermon on their shared frequency, provoked complaints (Bone, 1924, as cited in McGowan, 2008, p. 9). Hon. Donald Kennedy, United Farmers of Alberta Member of Parliament from Peace River, asked if there was a "complaint that the Bible Student's Association had interfered

[2] The American population at 124,039,648 in 1931 and Canadian population at 10,376,379 in the same year was also a crucial factor in the cross border relationship (Statistics Canada, 2011; United States Census Bureau, 2000).

with the advertising of Gooderham and Worts whisky?" to which Hon. J. S. Woodsworth replied in the affirmative (Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, 1928, p. 3619). The conflict over religious broadcasting and the subsequent denial of license renewals created a furor in the press over censorship, possible religious alliances, and the power of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, concealing the other factors at work. The removal of the IBSA from their stations licensed in 1924 in Saskatoon, followed by Vancouver, Edmonton, and Toronto in 1926, generated a space for the growth of other stations on their shared frequencies. The centralization and dominance of traditional voices was swifter and more consistent in the United States, where the Bible Students and Judge Rutherford more rapidly removed from the airwaves (Goodman, 2014; McChesney, 1993). The availability of these new frequencies coincided with the development of broadcasting policy in the United States that was soon followed by legislation and the redistribution of radio frequencies throughout North America.

4. Station Reallocation

By the late 1920s, many smaller American radio stations could not compete due to technical requirements, the requirement to produce live programming, and the reallocation of frequencies (McChesney, 1993). The opposite was true in Canada. Canadian radio stations ranged from small local stations with very little equipment, low power, and shared facilities, to the larger stations that continued to make investments in their stations and lobby for their continued presence on the radio dial. The movement of American affiliate stations into Canada came at an opportune time, prior to the establishment of a Canadian national network and immediately after the censure of religious broadcasts that resulted in the loss of stations operated by the IBSA. American affiliates managed to acquire existing Canadian stations for their chains prior to any potential regulations that might forbid the process or limit American program content (MacLennan, 2016, p. 197). The immediate affiliation of four stations with NBC and CBS also coincided with the reallocation of frequencies under the American General Order 40 and three of the affiliates were each recipients of one of the six clear channels assigned to Canada, held exclusively or were offered a shared position on the dial. The American Radio Act of 1927 and the subsequent reallocation of stations under General Order 40 were disruptive to listeners in Canada and their stations (MacLennan, 2016, 2017; Socolow, 2008). The greater conflict over the American Southern border with Mexico about frequencies remained unresolved until 1941; Mexico received no clear channels in the reallocation of stations in 1928 (Fowler & Crawford, 2002; Kahn, 1996, p. 206). The reallocation in the United States resulted in the major commercial broadcasting chains, NBC and CBS, acquiring the clear stations.

Results were similar in Canada, when many of the radio stations assigned clear stations became American network affiliates almost immediately afterward. CFRB in Toronto as principal station, on clear channel 960, became a CBS affiliate directly following the change. The frequency, however, remained a shared frequency with CKGW, a station that would become an NBC affiliate in 1928. CKAC in Montreal also shared the clear channel of 730 with CFCF. CKAC became a CBS affiliate almost immediately afterward. CFCF, however, moved to 1030 as principal station on its own clear channel by March 1929, and became an NBC affiliate (Federal Radio Commission, 1971, pp. 201–204; The National Broadcast Authority, 1928, 1929). Toronto's oldest station, operated by *The Toronto Star*, became principal station with CNRT, a Canadian National Railway station on clear channel 840 (Federal Radio Commission, 1971, pp. 201–204; Gabriele, & Moore, 2012; The National Broadcast Authority, 1928, 1929). The clear stations in Canada were assigned primarily to large stations that were to become American affiliates. The remaining two clear channels were 910, shared by CFQC Saskatoon; CJGL London, CJWL Saskatoon, and CNRS Saskatoon, and 690 shared by CFAC Calgary; CFEN Calgary; CHCA Calgary; CJCJ Calgary; CKCO Ottawa; CNRC Calgary; and CNRO Ottawa (The National Broadcast Authority, 1928, 1929; United States Department of Commerce, 1926). The lack of regulatory barriers in Canada permitted the entry of American affiliates into the country. The reallocation of frequencies, however, allowed the clear channels to be assigned mainly to stations large enough to become American affiliates.

This concentration of clear channels among powerful stations, particularly stations broadcasting as American affiliates, intensified the impact of American programming within Canada. Prior to this reallocation and the agreements to become affiliates, these stations were successful in their own right with Canadian content. CKAC, CFCF, CKGW and CFRB all added to their broadcast days, by supplementing or replacing Canadian programs with American programs, once they were affiliates (MacLennan, 2001, 2005). In part, the sought-after clear channels made this possible, especially if they were not shared. Prior to this change, American content was not as readily available to Canadian listeners, except after dusk.

5. The Case of CKGW

CKGW was one of the first Canadian stations to become an American affiliate as part of NBC, but did not receive a clear channel in the reallocation. Its active campaign to acquire a clear channel, without sharing broadcast time with another station on the same wavelength, demonstrates the importance of a full broadcast day the Canadian market. Without a doubt the most ambitious private Canadian station, CKGW the "Cheerio station", was very concerned about the station's place on the dial. In 1926, CKGW installed its transmitter in Bowmanville, east of Toronto, making its station at 5,000 watts the most powerful station in Canada, rivaling some American stations (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1926). The last

two call letters in CKGW stand for Gooderham and Worts, a Toronto whiskey distillery on Lake Ontario, broadcasting during the American prohibition. Whisky advertising was not the station's goal; instead it aimed to become the hub of Canadian broadcasting. CKGW's vigorous pursuit of a separate frequency for its station is evident in the letters the station manager exchanged with any person or agency that might assist in the goal of a separate frequency. In the wake of the reallocation of radio frequencies, CKGW's manager wrote to the Liberal MP for Perth North, Francis Wellington Hay, with extensive plans for the reorganization of the six exclusive wavelengths and eleven shared wavelengths, providing for an exclusive frequency (Ashcroft, 1928). May 14, 1928, shortly after the announcement of reallocation of wavelengths for November 11, 1928, M. B. Mayersmith, General Manager of CKGW, wrote to the Deputy Minister of the Department of Marine and Fisheries to explain that the station frequently received criticism for interference from KDKA (Mayersmith, 1928). Interference from or with American stations was successfully presented by other Canadian stations seeking their own wavelength. R. W. Ashcroft, General Manager of the Trans-Canada Broadcasting Company, outlined the problem that until March 31, 1928: CFCA of *The Toronto Star*, CKNC of Canadian National Carbon Co., and CKCL of Dominion Battery Co shared one wavelength; CFRB of Standard Radio Manufacturing Corporation and CJYC with CKCX of the IBSA shared a second; and CKGW of Gooderham & Worts, Limited had its own wavelength. With the plan for a major redistribution of stations across North America in April 1, 1928, CFCA acquired its own wavelength; CKNC and CKCL would share a wavelength; and finally CFRB and CKGW would also share a wavelength (Ashcroft, 1928). Not only had CKGW lost its separate wavelength, but it was being forced to share a wavelength with its biggest competitor. In Toronto, *The Globe* jumped into the fray with an editorial that argued, "Many of [its] family of radio fans declare that conditions are many times worse…and that the United States wave-shifts have not only spoiled reception of many of their favorite United States stations" (The Globe, 1928). The editorial also explained that the newspaper received letters complaining about the changes in the American stations "destroyed reception of Canadian stations as well…where Toronto stations were formerly heard…we now cannot get…Canadian programs" (The Globe, 1928). The newspapers, as one of the largest radio ownership groups, and commercial radio stations, jumped into the debate about the future of radio, as the federal government moved out the period of benign neglect in the early 1920s. The debate, intensified by newspaper involvement, that ensued prior to and in the wake of the frequency reallocation, heightened public awareness debate with regard to the control of radio.

Ralph Ashcroft, General Manager at CKGW, proposed three alternatives that included moving CFRB to share a wavelength with any other stations and leave CKGW on a wavelength of its own. Ashcroft further explained CKGW was the most powerful and modern, with a great range and sponsored Canadian programs. The station was also "the 'key' station in the Trans-Canada Broadcasting Co., an organization functioning in Canada, similarly to the National Broadcasting Co., in the United States" (Ashcroft, 1928). Chain broadcasting, Canadian quality programs, and the fact that the $75,000 CKGW had already spent on Canadian talent that could be doubled with twice the air time, were enumerated as the relative merits of CKGW in comparison to other stations, particularly in Toronto (Ashcroft, 1928). Broadcasters considered viability and profitability of commercial stations as crucial to the evaluation of Canadian stations, just as the Federal Radio Commission did in the United States (McChesney, 1993). Hon. Francis Wellington Hay did follow up on CKGW's request explaining, "It does seem strange that a very much inferior Broadcasting station in Toronto shall be permitted full time, and a wholly, or practically no commercial broadcasting station, prepared to serve the public is only allowed part time" (Wellington Hay, 1928). He was warned by the Deputy Minister A. Johnston that Gooderham & Worts, Limited should be ready "for the contingency of sharing time with not more than two other stations" (Johnston, 1928). This was a follow up to a previous communication to Gooderham & Worts's legal representatives on March 28, 1927. CKGW's attempts to secure its own wavelength and relocate to Toronto were central to its plan to become anchor station for its own network, in order to become an American affiliate station and a hub for the production or original programming.

6. Mixed Reaction

The North American reallocation of wavelengths disrupted the balance of the distribution of Canadian radio stations and provoked letters to the Ministry from both radio stations and listeners. The reallocation and subsequent conversion of Canadian stations to network affiliates changed the content of the stations that were in reception range. Finally on December 6, 1928, the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, more popularly known as the Aird Commission, was created by Order in Council P. C. 2108 to investigate radio broadcasting and to advise on future management, control, and financing. It has been argued that the withdrawal of the IBSA licenses provoked the formation of the Commission (Vipond, 2010); however, it is also clear that additional pressures were exerted on the Radio Branch of the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries by radio stations eager to form their own networks and become American affiliate stations. Ralph W. Ashcroft, General Manager at CKGW, continued to press the Minister of Marine and Fisheries for a power increase to "10,000, 20,000 and/or 50,000 watts" (Ashcroft, 1929). Ashcroft also favorably compared his station's program offerings to that of other stations; CKAC owned by *La Presse* and CFCF owned by Canadian Marconi Company, both in Montreal

that were given assurances of power increases (Ashcroft, 1929). He finally stressed that "CKGW, under its present management, has done more to elevate the standard of Canadian programs than anyone else in the Dominion. A number of these programs are being supplied to stations in Montreal, London, Winnipeg and other points by means of inter-city telephone lines" (Ashcroft, 1929). Ashcroft may have been the most outspoken critic of the government's plan to create a national network, potentially harming CKGW's interests and that of commercial broadcasters; pockets of resistance to a national network came from all quarters across Canada.

Suspicions about the goals of a government broadcasting monopoly appeared in newspapers across Canada. An editorial in *The Ottawa Journal* warned "limited knowledge of what the government has in mind there are many apparent dangers in any scheme of national broadcasting in this country" (The Ottawa Journal, 1928). The real fear may have been encapsulated in the conclusion: "All of these are practical issues quite apart from the strong obligation many entertain to the idea of giving any Government exclusive access to such a powerful agency of propaganda. Conscious or unconscious, as the radio. But the whole question is one of great and growing importance and worthy of the Government's careful study" (The Ottawa Journal, 1928). The newspapers fanned the fires of debate by encouraging readers, who were also listeners, to participate by sending letters to the newspapers. They were then happy to pepper their pages with public opinion through publication of the letters.

Loyal listeners were eager to protect their already familiar local programs, American programs that could be heard over the border, and American programs broadcast by Canadian radio stations, as affiliates or by employing electrical transcriptions (MacLennan, 2001, p. 24). Federal Radio Commissioner Harold La Fount, writing to station owners and operators, discredited listener opinions, "Letters from listeners commenting on the allocations indicate that, although many people have a fair knowledge of radio, they do not understand the allocation of regulation of broadcasting stations" (The Globe, 1929a). "Radio Regulations", in the *Manitoba Free Press*, predicted that Winnipeg would have a 5,000 watt station like CKGW in Toronto that would make Winnipeg "clearly audible in Japan, Australia and possibly even Mars and Venus" (Radio Regulations, 1928). Listeners' eagerness to join the discussion of the new national network was compounded, not only by the cases made for and against the Canadian network, but a fear of the unknown. "National broadcasting", an editorial in the *Halifax Chronicle*, explained that any change would be an improvement, but sided with public regulation:

> Considerable friction has developed, and complaints have been numerous as to reception being spoiled and to objectionable propaganda being put on the air. It is difficult to regulate or to maintain a proper control over radio broadcasting in the hands of so many private interest operation without co-operation and probably often at cross purpose. (Halifax Chronicle, 1928)

The editorial went on to make comparisons to the BBC, but the focus was on the system and its benefits. "All that is desirable is that there should be a unified control over the broadcasting system of the country to the end that the best results in reception may be ensured and that the service may be kept free from objectionable programmes and other features that offend the moral sense of the public" (Halifax Chronicle, 1928). In the months that preceded the establishment of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, in December 1928, there were radio stations and listeners on both sides of the debate.

By the late 1920s in the United States, NBC and CBS were clearly dominant and growing broadcasters (McChesney, 1993). In Canada, however, the more powerful stations central to the discussion of national broadcasting were stations, such as CKGW, CFCF, CKAC, and CFRB, all corporately owned and American affiliates. Not to be overlooked are the many independent stations across Canada that operated alone, with very few resources that catered exclusively to local listeners. Local independent radio stations included those with faulty equipment (Duffy, 1983), those with local business support (Kozak, 2016), and those that supplied local content across the country, outside the limits of Canadian regulations (MacLennan, 2010). The first seven years of broadcasting established private broadcasting as an option. Both established local stations, serving their communities, and larger stations, affiliated with networks, developed during the 1920s, demonstrating that private broadcasting could rival public broadcasting.

By the time the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting produced its report on September 11, 1929, four radio stations in Montreal and Toronto had arranged to join CBS and NBC as affiliates and the country was divided about the future impact of a Canadian national network. The major recommendations of the committee were to create a national broadcasting company with provincial representation. The most contentious of the recommendations was the first one that endorsed a national company to operate all Canadian radio stations: "A national company which will own and operate all radio broadcasting stations located in the Dominion of Canada, the company to be called the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Company" (Royal Commission of Radio Broadcasting, 1929, p. 4). As noted by Gasher (1998) and Vipond (1992), Charles Bowman thought that the American view of Canada, as part of the North American market, changed John Aird's sense of national broadcasting. Certainly the broadcasters visited by the Commission in New York were quite correct in this assumption, since the American affiliate stations in Canadian cities were included in rates sold for broadcasting in regions that in-

cluded these cities (Columbia Broadcasting System Correspondence, 1935). During this early period of private broadcasting, through the work of a few American network stations in Montreal and Toronto, Canada became part of a North American market.

While local independent stations feared the possibility of elimination and being replaced by larger regional stations, the American networks had no interest in surrendering their larger stations to a national network. Thus far the major changes to Canadian broadcasting were the elimination of stations due to objectionable content and the reallocation of radio stations on the dial, due to the new American Radio Act in 1927 and subsequent General Order 40. The views of private broadcasters, however, were not the only ones represented in the pages of the newspapers. At best, as suggested in *The Globe*, the much-anticipated report could bring order to a neglected system. It explained:

> Obsolete equipments [sic] have monopolies on wavelengths [with]…limited range and which they fail to use, even within their own short scope, for hours daily. At the same time high-class modern stations, ready, anxious and able to serve listeners wherever located in Canada, are forced to divide wavelengths with one or two others similarly embarrassed. Whatever else the Commission does or fails to do, it can hardly fail to suggest means to bring order out of chaos in this respect. (The Globe, 1929b)

While there were perceptions of wasted capacity and uneven distributions that contributed to the "chaos" of the system prior to the Aird Report, once the report was delivered, the reaction against it was so passionate and heated that the report did not immediately result in the nationalization of radio, as recommended. At the conclusion of this period of private broadcasting, the opportunity to establish a national network was introduced by the Aird Commission. It became a reality after a decade of private broadcasting. Marc Raboy (1990) argues that this system "of the 1930s, evolved as a hybrid of the British and American public service and commercial models" (p. 48). The greater considerations of the political economy of broadcasting overshadowed the impetus for a national broadcaster until the Aird Commission, followed by the establishment of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, and then the Canadian Broadcasting Commission.

7. Conclusion

During the early period of Canadian private broadcasting, private investment in the industry served local and independent interests freely, until the creation of a national network. The censure of religious speech on the radio provoked debate about the role of government in broadcasting. The opening up of licenses for frequencies due to censure and the reallocation of frequencies throughout North America permitted a few Canadian radio stations to also become American affiliates. The changes wrought by the regulator in the censure of religious stations and the impact of station reallocation strengthened the case for a public or national broadcasting system. The real debate about system of national broadcasting and first steps towards its establishment occurred in the wake of the changes to Canadian commercial broadcasting in the 1920s. Without a Canadian system or network, listeners were vulnerable to external forces of change, whether religious, censure through the regulator, or the profit motives of large profitable radio stations that intensified the American content within Canada, where Canadian programming had previously flourished. Significant delays in policy development allowed the local interests of listeners and their attachment to local broadcasting, as well as Canadian and American commercial broadcasting, to help ensure the possibility of continued private broadcasting alongside the new national network. The compromise of private and public broadcasting in Canada emerged from the remnants of the existing private system and a new public system that grew to resolve some of the inequities of the initial private, commercial system.

Acknowledgments

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of York University Libraries, Open Access Fund. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers whose comments were valuable in the revision of this article. Thanks also go to the Media and Communication's Managing Editor, Rodrigo Gomes Quintas da Silva. As always it is wonderful to be able to hire the wonderful students of York University to support this research and I am grateful for the assistance of the York University work study and RAY programs. A portion of this research was first presented at the first conference of the Radio Preservation Task Force, February 2016 in Washington, DC.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 21–33
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1197

Article

Methodological Perspectives on British Commercial Telegraphy and the Colonial Struggle over Democratic Connections in Gibraltar, 1914–1941

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Submitted: 29 September 2017 | Accepted: 24 November 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
This article examines the privatization of telegraphy in the British Empire from the perspective of Gibraltar, an overseas territory in the Mediterranean. While the history of international telegraphy is typically written from a world-systems perspective, this article presents a key methodological critique of the use of collections spread across many institutions and colonies: archival satellites are not simply reducible to parts of a scattered whole, as archival collections are themselves curations of socially-positioned understandings of Empire. This is especially true of the "girdle round the world" that was British telegraphy. At a meta-historical level, individual archival collections of the global British telegraphy system can be read as histories of colonial administrators' geographically- and socially- situated perspectives on Empire—namely through what archives have, and have not, preserved. I demonstrate how the documents about telegraphy collected and maintained in the Gibraltar National Archives reflect pre- and post-World War I English, anti-Liberal colonial administrators' and military officials' fear that privatization was an opening salvo against the democratic web that held the last vestiges of Empire together.

Keywords
British Empire; colonial management; historical methodology; media archives; media history; telegraphy

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

In 1933, Cable and Wireless LTD began what was a tumultuous cohabitation with the British postal service in Gibraltar. The telegraphy company was initially forced to conform to the reduced hours, limited housekeeping, and staffing sacrifices required of the Main Street Postal Office amidst the post-World War I austerity measures. Heated exchanges regarding democracy and public interest ensued between the colonial postmaster H. G. Jessop and L. C. Hopecraft, the manager of Cable and Wireless, LTD. Despite Jessop's rhetorical victories in the names of honor, glory and public interest for Gibraltar, however, the private economic interests of the Cable and Wireless, entangled as they were with the political interests of politicians in the UK, gained the economic high-ground. The immediate result: a grille funded by the local government (Figure 1) to block off the postal office, allowing Cable and Wireless to remain open in a government-funded building—while the government service was forced close by post-war austerity measures. Eventually, the Postal Office was nearly expelled completely from its own building, and a significant amount of funding was redirected to Cable and Wireless, LTD.

Telegraphy in Gibraltar became a primary means for military communication in the years preceding World War I, replacing postal carrier and carrier pigeon as the most secure and efficient way of moving intelligence throughout the British Empire. Gibraltar, importantly, served as the node through which the Eastern and Southern empire was connected to the metropole via the Indian cable (a line that ran from Falmouth to Malta to Egypt, operated by one of Pender's many international cartel operations). Following the war, telegraphy began to take on a more commercial role by communicating to private ships; while the military owned the infrastruc-



Figure 1. Gibraltar post office brass-wire grille schematics, 3 February 1954.

ture of telegraphic communication, the colonial state and entrepreneurs sent messages through a commercial service, then called The Eastern Telegraph Limited, closely monitored by British Intelligence. Between the years of 1914 and 1944, this commercial service had cycled through 10 different names, at least 20 different heads and leaders, each of whom were called any number of titles—first superintendent, then director, then manager, indicative of telegraphy's transformation from state, to public, to corporate entity.

This article examines the historical implications of privatized telegraphy on Commonwealth postal service in the British Mediterranean from the perspective of Gibraltar, an overseas territory that precipitated the cannibalization of public services thought to be core to democracy (to the English colonial administrators who ran it) in the name of "recovery" after World War II. I argue that telegraphy was the locus of a post-World War I struggle between British aristocrats, Gibraltarian merchants, and English liberals, which marked an economic transition that reverberates into the contemporary moment. This claim comes by way of a secondary methodological argument: in general, archives are not capable of creating a "global" historical account of any communication institution, let alone as it regards telegraphy. Using historical anthropological approaches to archives that contextualize the practice of archiving, this article demonstrates how Gibraltar's collection of archival documents give not only a history of telegraphy, but a story about Gibraltar's colonial administration's *perception of* and *perspective on* the relationship between colonial administration, class hierarchy, colonial legitimacy, and communication capitalism. Historians, then, must engage in a meta-historical practice as well: documents were institutionalized by Gibraltar's officials in order to curate a narrative about privatization as an incursion on the democratic web that held the last vestiges of Empire together.

2. The Telegraphic History of Archiving Telegraphy

Gibraltar is a small 2.5 sq. mi. territory located on the Iberian Peninsula that became a British Crown Territory in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht, and remains a British overseas territory today. Gibraltar was an asset to the British principally for controlling access to the Mediterranean. In 1727, considering various European conflicts (e.g., the War of Austrian Succession, the Anglo–Mysore Wars, the coming Napoleonic Wars) Gibraltar was refortified and re-weaponized as a necessary asset to the British War Department. Repairs of similar scale were not undertaken again until just prior to World War I. By that time, an immigrant civilian population had also taken up residence in Gibraltar. Two bodies governed this group of individuals: the colonial administration (principally a governor and colonial secretary appointed by and from the Royal Army, charged with ruling citizens on the King's behalf) and the Admiralty (typically a senior Naval commander charged with control over military operations and personnel, answering to the secretary of state of

the colonies).[1] In addition to modernizing the armament, garrison, and weaponry in 1907, these two governing bodies initiated the widespread installation of electricity in military establishments, including those commercial civilian establishments where military personnel ate and drank. Alongside this, commercial telegraphy was officially institutionalized on the peninsula, plugging Gibraltar into the commercial "girdle round the world" (Barty-King, 1980; see also Winseck & Pike, 2007).

Through the commercialization of the girdle, class hierarchies were carved into the colonies connected by telecommunications infrastructure. As Bernard Porter (2006) remarks, the post-World War I empire was a zone of conflict between an emerging capitalist class and descendants of the historically-grounded aristocracy, itself constantly in struggle over who was "truly" English. While the aristocracy was believed to have "stayed at home" to govern in cabinet positions, its lowest-valued members were typically sent throughout the Mediterranean colonies in service of those offices, or as military commanders without military power—creating a community of resistance to liberalism that strategized around, among other institutions, telegraphy. As the dwindling aristocracy stepped away from ruling empire, they devoted energy to training the upper middle class, themselves aspirationally, if not previously consanguineously, aristocratic, to run the empire from an aristocratic epistemology that centered moral duty in Empire. To the aristocracy, this small group of the upper middle class "made the best colonial administrators precisely because they could rise above the sordid motives that were attributed to the commercial bourgeoisie" (Porter, 2006, p. 61). The petty aristocracy and upper middle class officials in places like Gibraltar, regardless of pedigree or education, were viewed as incompetent figureheads at best, there simply to sign colonial directives pushed by their more established and successful kinsmen at home.[2] Confident of their place in society, by the end of World War I the aristocratic cabinet ministers at home came to happily collaborate with capitalists abroad, alienating the lower aristocratic and upper-middle class outcasts who continued to be committed to Empire as a service to the world by the State. The history of telegraphy in Gibraltar, then, is a story about capitalism's attempts to replace "old" money imperialism with globalized business to build Great Britain's next age of greatness.

Just as the history of telegraphy in Gibraltar is grounded in a complex class politics, so too does the archival preservation of telegraphy history reflect this struggle. Anthropologist Nicholas Dirks has argued that archives are "that primary site of state monumentality…the very institution that canonized, crystallized, and classified the knowledge required by the state even as it made this knowledge available for subsequent generations in the cultural form of a neutral repository of the past" (Dirks, 2002, p. 61). As admiralty, colonial governors, and capitalists fought over telecommunications ownership, so too did they fight over how telegraphy would be represented in the metropolitan monument to the British Empire. The narrative about telegraphy contained in the National Archive, then, is more a narrative composed about the political struggles of state imaginaries in the core than telegraphy as it ran throughout the peripheries.

Yet, Great Britain's smaller State archives, such as that in Gibraltar, which continue to escape any oversight from archival authorities, could institutionalize local administrators' perceptions of how telegraphy was stolen from Gibraltar at the twilight of aristocratic rule. Although "the colonial archive was not just the record of the colonial state but also the repository of the sources for an imperial history whose public was the metropole rather than the colony" (Dirks, 2002, p. 63), Gibraltar's archives tell a story of a colony where its administrators felt "shut out" from the process of deciding the best directions for Empire. More directly, then, while documents may hold content about telegraphy, the pragmatics of their archiving (and the decision not to archive certain materials) Gibraltar's colonial administrators' perceived slight against their ruling birthright; a slight that was facilitated by the domestic aristocracy's collusion with liberal internationalism. In short, the history of telegraphy according to Gibraltar (the narrative that a state tells about infrastructure and colonialism) is an utterance separate from, and frequently contradicting, the history captured by collections at the National Archives.

This marks a methodological problem relatively unaddressed in media history. While historians scour multiple archives to piece together histories from documents scattered around the world, they often forget that these documents are not so much part of a global whole as they are the materialization qua preservation of local colonial histories from grounded and conflicting perspectives on telegraphy's promise and place in imperial state-making. This is a problem at a disciplinary level, as well. Media history as a practice was grounded in the professional archiving of corporate media entities, where institutional historians focused on the storing and sometimes preservation of materials—not what the keeping of those materials necessarily meant (Startt & Sloan, 1989). The dominant positivist paradigm of classical historicism (which dominated lay and administrative archiving) largely ignored the various turns of historiographic debates, from Marxist Historicism to French Annales to Italian Microhistory to the American and French Linguistic turn (to name just a few). And, without historians to bring these

[1] There is a terminological problem here: The secretary of state of the colonies is sometimes given in shorthand as the colonial secretary. In Gibraltar, colonial secretary is the name of the position called Lieutenant Governor in other spaces. In this paper, I use the full title for the secretary of state, and colonial secretary for the local lieutenant governor.

[2] While Empire provided an upwardly aspirational middle and artisanal class with forms of education that would lead to prestige-generating jobs, it was supervised by the lower rungs of the aristocracy (whether aristocratic proper or upper middle-class proxies), whose higher achieving kinsmen and peers remained at home to direct the empire from afar.

perspectives into the field of media and communication studies, subfields like cultural/critical media studies and media sociology have largely ignored debates about the nature and social production of historical time and artifacts.

In what follows, my argument is not that there is one undisputable history of telegraphy that we have access to via primary sources contained at either archive. Rather, I simply demonstrate the history preserved in the selected archiving of documents in Gibraltar, and argue that this collection reflects more about the struggles of administrators than an objective and true history. In other words, the history of telegraphy contained in the Gibraltar archives preserve a struggle over the communication infrastructure necessary for modern state-making. As becomes clear, the Gibraltar Archives represent the voices of an oft forgotten resistance to the privatization of public communication infrastructure, namely that of an anti-Liberal military and civilian colonial aristocracy doing the work of (and not simply legislating) making empire.

3. Democracy and Telegraphy in Gibraltar

Wireless telegraphy (W. T.) in Gibraltar was originally the property and service of the military.[3] In 1904, regulation of telegraphy fell under the Summary Conviction Ordinance of 1885, sections 37–40, "Carrier Pigeons and Wireless Telegraphy Apparatus" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1922b). Under this legislation, all long-distance transmissions in fortifications were strictly under the control of the British military: the messaging apparatus, the service provided, and the employees who received and sent messages fell under control of the Colonial Post Master, who reported directly to the Admiralty *and* Colonial Governor in Gibraltar. This norm, established while the War and Colonial Department (1801–1854) oversaw the colonies and dependencies, remained in place when the supervision of colonial governors was transferred to the colonial office (1854–1966). Under various schemes, telegraphy became a mixed private-public endeavor on occasion, until World War I.

On the heels of the World War I *Defence of the Realm Act* (DORA) in September 1914, which gave the military total control over any publicly- or privately-owned infrastructure that would aid in the war effort, the British Admiralty claimed total control over inbound and outbound communications. As a colony where the fortress came first (Finlayson, 1996), the Great War had required so much labor and communication time that any commercial service was completely disregarded by December 1914. To mediate the effects of total military control over telegraphy, the Colonial Governor's office proposed that a secondary station, the "Windmill Hill telegraphy station", be completely leased to the Colonial Government, who would in turn allow Eastern Telegraph Company to use the facilities for commercial service—the Eastern Telegraph Company had always used colonial and military infrastructure to provide their service in Gibraltar, and thus existed only insofar as the British state allowed it to (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1914).

The secretary of state of the colonies, siding with the Admiralty, refused this proposal for a private, commercial service twice, first in December 1914 and then revising his stance (but not his decision) in May 1915.

The first refusal was on the grounds that "Owing to possibly closing for Naval purpose and shortage of operators, Windmill Hill W. T. Station cannot be placed at disposal of colonial government at present" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1914). While "naval use" remains ambiguous in the archival documents, the admiralty is clearly concerned with labor. A well-paying commercial service might have seized the most qualified telegraph operators in Gibraltar from the military, or rendered conscripted operators resentful. Other documents argue that a commercial station could also attract spies intending to use the privatized equipment to undermine British control.

The secretary of state's second refusal came between January and May 1915, only recorded in a précis of communication exchanges regarding telegraphy written by the colonial secretary in 1930 (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1930b). According to this précis, the admiralty believed the commercial station would also cause "interference" with the military W. T. stations. However, a change in admiralty leadership later in 1915 created the potential for changes in telegraphy station ownership. The new Senior Naval Officer (SNO) Admiral Borck was "informed of arrangements contemplated and a review of the situation given to him: his opinion requested on the subject, particularly as regards "interference" from other stations in vicinity". By June 1915, however, the commercial proposal was abandoned both by the Eastern Telegraphy Company, who had been conversing with Marconi Wireless Telegraphy Company about gutting older public buildings and infusing them with the new Marconi technology. The reason for their abandonment of this issue, according to the colonial secretary and governor, is "owing to impossibility of non-interference with Naval W. T. work". Admiral Borck responded that this was for the best, as Gibraltar's primary telegraphy station, Europa Station, could not possibly monitor and censor commercial messages in addition to other naval duties in the future: "the working of more than one wave-length by one station being unsuitable" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1915a).

Eastern Telegraphy Company's abandonment of the use of state infrastructure occurred against the property laws of wartime Great Britain. In 1915, DORA meant that all forms of infrastructure, especially state-subsidized infrastructure, could be coopted by the military, which would result in heavy business losses for the Eastern

[3] Telegraph was originally privatized in Great Britain, which came to an end in 1870 in the UK. However, given Gibraltar's primary function as a military base, and not a colony proper (i.e. an imperial relationship), the infrastructure had always belonged to the State.

Telegraphy Company. The enlistment of Marconi by Eastern Telegraph Company suggested that the company was considering a makeover of the then current technology, to increase the efficiency, and thus profit, of telegraphy. However, had the Eastern Telegraph Company become more powerful in communication than the state itself, their W. T. station would have become a prime target for military seizure under DORA. As stated in Clause B of Section 1 of DORA, the Majesty in Council, or any military member acting on his behalf, would take any means necessary to "secure the safety of any means of communication" (DORA, 1914). In short, Eastern Telegraphy Company abandoned their pursuit of a telegraph station because they refused to build new communications infrastructure for inevitable military seizure.

Despite the Eastern Telegraph Company's abandonment of the project, the colonial secretary pressed on with the need for a commercial wireless station. In October 1915, he requested the admiralty consult and obtain an expert opinion on the question of employing multiple wavelengths from a station. Additionally, to sweeten the deal for the admiralty, he stated in his message to Admiral Borck that the citizens and government would subsidize the military's use (and monitoring) of the Eastern Telegraphy Company's new Marconi technology (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1915b).

Privatization, according to the colonial secretary, would lessen the military's financial burden of providing communication infrastructure for itself and surrounding civilian labor force. Going one step further, the Governor suggested that the "Admiralty's responsibility should be extended to financial control and that any expenditure involved should be defrayed from Admiralty Votes, the interests of the Admiralty and Colonial Government not being regarded as divergent" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1915b). In a follow-up letter to the secretary of state of the colonies from the Admiralty dated December 1915, the Admiralty notes that the issue of multiple wavelengths had not been considered—perhaps because it was a fabricated non-issue—and that the use of Windmill Hill station by the Colonial Government is "anticipated to provide a service more efficient than could be obtained through any *private company*" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1915c). In January 1916, the station was reopened by the Admiralty for limited, well-monitored and often censored, private and commercial purposes. However, by August 1917, the Admiralty closed the station, greatly reducing commercial service to government needs only until well after the war (Gibraltar Archival Document, n.d.).

In July 1922, four years after World War I and the fear of the DORA, the colonial government made a significant pivot in its own position regarding privatization. The Admiralty proposed constructing a new W. T. station at the South of Rock Battery, abandoning the North Front Station. As the Admiralty wrote in a telegraph to the secretary of state of the colonies, "Enquiry whether Colonial Government would be prepared to make an offer for the present W. T. Station and to operate it for commercial purposes" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1922a). Contacted assumedly by the secretary of state, the colonial secretary responded as such on 6 October 1922:

> I have the honour to state that I consider the maintenance of a wireless station here, available for commercial purposes, to be of considerable importance to the mercantile community. At the same time, I should hesitate to make an offer on the part of the Colonial Government for the purchase of the present Rock Wireless Telegraph station with a view to operating it as a commercial station since Government methods do not, generally speaking, lend themselves to commercial enterprises of this kind, nor has Government the expert knowledge required to make it a success. I would therefore suggest that the Eastern Telegraph Company might be approached with a view to ascertaining whether they would make an offer to purchase and operate the Admiralty's Wireless Station. If however the Company is unwilling to do so on reasonable terms, I should be prepared to consider making an offer on the part of the Colonial Government, as a commercial Wireless Station here would certainly be of benefit to the trade of the port, and if properly managed, should pay its way. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1922c)

No longer interested in state run infrastructure with private service, the colonial administration argued for state-facilitated private investment in the entirety of communications—a clear, early example of the State's divestment of nationalized infrastructure. Either the Eastern Telegraph Company would buy the telegraph company, and the entire system would be privatized, or the colonial administration would buy it, and as stated in a private communication dated 12 October 1922, would "make considerable concessions" (i.e., hand it over) to the Eastern Telegraph Company, because it would prove "of benefit to both merchant and citizen" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1922d).

The war office agreed with hesitation. By the end of September 1924, The Committee for Imperial Defense noted that communication stations have become a necessary part of the British military complex, but that they have also come to be expensive to maintain during times of peace. In a circular, the Committee states:

> It is clear that the cost of, and time required, to recondition stations that have not been kept in good order by continuous work makes it most unwise to allow stations that will be required in war to drop out of use. Nor should important Dominions and colonies be isolated and dependent solely on cable communication at critical periods. It is therefore important to have the largest possible number of W/T stations in operation in peace time consistent with economy. To meet the interest on capital charges and the cost of

> maintenance it is desirable to get what assistance is possible from commercial work, as is done on a small scale today in Gibraltar, Aden and Bermuda Dockyard, as well as at all stations operated by the Dominion and Colonial governments. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1924)

By the Committee's logic, if W. T. stations went unused, they would become worn down and thus useless for the next war—"the next war" being a popular theme in British military rhetoric and history (Robbins, 1996). But the logic here is inherently capitalist. Depreciating machinery at rest directly reduces the potential for capital, noting that the industrial slump and degradation of factory production capacities were one of the principle drives of World War I in Gibraltar and Great Britain (Caruana, Rockoff, & National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006). If left unused, the telegraphy machinery would neither be able to repay its cost, nor generate the surplus needed for maintenance before going obsolete. Thus, the logic at work here is that it was better to privatize the telegraphy machinery and receive some return on investment than for the state to become "a prisoner of his investment" (Landes, 1969). And so, it was reasoned that the state should find ways for private groups to manage telegraphy during peacetime—a pivotal moment in the privatization of nationalized infrastructure—and that the admiralty could hypothetically re-seize the means of communication in Gibraltar in future war efforts with minimal investment. Notably, the admiralty would continue to control and maintain the cable lines in and out of Gibraltar, but colonial government would leave the telegraphy business.

As a result, the Eastern Telegraph Company controlled all telegraphy service, save for communication between the Admiralty, Colonial Government, and British State. Their demands on the military, as the owner of the infrastructure, had become quite costly. However, Eastern Telegraph Company's heavy use of the infrastructure, and their constant needs for repair, was far less than the cost the Empire would endure to replace outdated and depreciated machinery in the event of another war. Where the state hoped to privatize the communication infrastructure with the intent of simply reappropriating it for the next armed conflict, at little cost to the state, Eastern Telegraphy Company refused to purchase the outmoded infrastructure. Instead, they relied on the state to technologically facilitate their constant attempts to generate profit.

As a colony tasked with connecting the whole of the Eastern and Southern British Empire through W. T., Gibraltar was thrust into the international-turning-global telecommunications infrastructure. However, the metropole-run telegraphy service was not simply a part of a network of global communication, but simultaneously a competitor. In 1925, a letter from the Post Master General to the Post Master of Gibraltar states that the State-owned transatlantic message cables were not receiving *any* commercial traffic from the colonies, "despite connecting Great Britain with the rest of the world more or less. In many countries, the Imperial cable service does not even appear on maps and message routes" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1925). In Gibraltar, civilians and military personnel alike were drawn to the cheaper and more reliable commercial service being offered by private companies in Spain. This cost the British W. T. companies considerable money, as official government use of the transatlantic line was free in exchange for friendly regulations of commercial W. T. ventures. This telecommunication-oriented connection to the world, however, is not simply a participating in a global network, but the insertion into a global communications regime.

In 1927, both the British state and various British private commercial enterprises took part in the Washington International Radiotelegraph Convention—the first convention in which International Radiotelegraph and Telegraph Conventions were fused. 80 countries and 52 private companies sent representatives to the convention, making it the largest since the formation of both original conventions.

While there were numerous treaty articles with substantial impact on the way telegraphy was operated globally, the most substantial article was one that dictated the grounds of participating in the international wireless community, entitled "Article 7: Connexion with the General Communications System". In this article, as it was interpreted by the British secretary of state of the colonies in a letter to the colonial secretary and admiralty in September 1929, colonies would no longer be allowed to participate in international radiotelegraph telecommunications under the banner of their mother country; Gibraltar would no longer be represented by, and afforded access through, Great Britain (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1929b). This left colonies like Gibraltar with two options: either pay an undisclosed sum of money to become a participating country—an amount well outside the means of Gibraltar according to a response from the colonial secretary; or, should these countries wish to remain connected, they would be required to contract all of their commercial telecommunications needs to a private company that held a position in the organization, all of which were part of a mutually beneficial cartel (Winseck & Pike, 2007). Even if these colonies bought into the system, they would still be denied a vote; instead, their voting would be represented by the one voted allotted to their respective metropole. This regulation, it appears in the proceedings of the conference, were done in fear that Britain would strong-arm its colonies into voting to Great Britain's benefit (and the possible loss of other countries lacking the colonial influence of the Empire). Gibraltar would pay large sums of money, but would yet be denied any form of independent participation (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1930a).

All those colonies of the British, French, German, Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese who did not have the

monetary means to participate as a state would have their infrastructure sold—by the metropole, no less—to a private company. Such was the case in Gibraltar, where the privatization of telecommunications infrastructure was an articulation of the need to participate in the global economy and the crumbling British Empire. Recovering from World War I, Britain began struggling to maintain the capital to both refurbish its Royal Navy and fund colonial administration (Broadberry & Harrison, 2009). In 1934, seven years following Article 19 the Admiralty in Gibraltar responded that it would not pay into this system. "We are part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, allotted one vote and thus willing only to pay once" (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1934c). The Admiralty, with its aristocratic officers, would fold neither to the "lesser" aristocrats put in charge of colonial management at home or abroad, nor to the Liberals with no claim to title.

However, the Admiralty's protest had come years too late: the government-controlled commercial service had been sold by the metropole and incorporated in 1929 in order to meet the interpretations of the convention, among other reasons. A letter from the secretary of state of the colonies to the colonial secretary in August 1929 states:

> That the arrangements for the fusion of the Principal British cable and wireless interests and the transfer to the Company so formed of the greater part of the governmental activities of this kind in the United Kingdom have now been completed. The merger company (Cables and Wireless Limited) and the communications company (Imperial and International Communications Limited) were formally incorporated on the 8th of April last and the Agreement between the Companies and the Governments concerned was signed on the 29th of May 1929. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1929c)

The Admiralty would still control the government-owned and operated service, as well as have the power to overtake the commercial system in times of war would it have been necessary—as would be the case in smaller colonies like that of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands. Commercial interests, however, now belonged purely to Cable and Wireless LTD, including national communiques:

> They will at all times during the continuance of this Agreement maintain an efficient and regular communications service between all those parts and places in the British Empire heretofore served by the various communications services to be acquired by them and will not without the consent of the Advisory Committee sell, lease, charge, or otherwise dispose of any property rights or assets of the Company for the time being used for the purposes of communication between the parts and places aforesaid otherwise than in the ordinary course of administration or management or for the purpose of replacing worn-out, disused, or obsolete plant. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1929a)

Great Britain, again according to the story told by this one archive, had decided that, to best control its communications interests, it would sell the telegraphic infrastructure that connected all of its colonies to a British company, lest the colony be exploited by some other national entity other than the British.[4] The decision was such: As part of a *British* private holding, the telegraphic industry would pay taxes and be under the control of the British government; otherwise, as independent countries exercising their rights in the international convention, the colonies would command more power against the metropole. Further, the metropole would maintain some "control" over the privatized company by providing subsidized labor and protecting its ability to thrive as a private entity (i.e., protect its ability to compete).[5]

If telegraphy had been governed by the DORA during the war, telegraphy would be governed by perceptions of the global economy in the post-war period. If the DORA was a means of asserting the state's control over the process of telegraphy, then the international regulations asserted the British State's control over the profitability and commerciality of communications in Gibraltar. This shift was from control over infrastructure to control over profitability, or more clearly from power to profit. The British state did so through the privatization of infrastructure, much to the chagrin of Gibraltar's admiralty and colonial administrators. At its core, the privatization of telegraphy in Gibraltar is a case of global superpowers like Great Britain attempting to absorb money from the colonies, developing the superpower metropolitan's infrastructure on the material and financial backs of the colonial periphery. To the administrators and admiralty in Gibraltar, this pivot was done on *their backs*.

4. Private Telegraphy, Public Inconvenience

> I am instructed to offer your company accommodation in the General Post Office, Main Street, Gibraltar at an inclusive rental of £100 per annum. The Government undertake to carry out all the necessary alterations and additions, and I forward you herewith two

[4] As Winseck and Pike (2007) argue, telegraph entrepreneurs rarely if ever displayed the form of jingoism projected on them by parliamentary advocates.

[5] Simultaneously, Marconi's wireless telegraphy company demanded that states privatize the telegraphy industry in exchange for "free" hardware installation, gaining much ground throughout Europe. There was a great deal of fear that this service, if given the chance, would buy out the whole of Europe's telecommunications and disrupt and usurp imperial communication. "The president of the [Radiotelegraphy] conference, in his opening remarks, stated that the development of radio, which was still in its infancy, would be unduly hampered by any attempt to monopolize facilities and that, therefore, rules should be made to block any attempt to impose one system upon others. His attack was made directly at the Marconi Company, and the Marconi Company's restrictive practices were cited as an example of an attempt to force one system on all the world" as cited in George Codding Jr. (1972).

> copies of the plan showing the nature of the proposed alterations &c. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1933a)

Having gutted the public service of telegraphy, Cable & Wireless LTD existed parasitically on the back of another public system in Gibraltar: the postal service. The post office served simultaneously as competition and sacrificial offering to the privatized W. T. industry in Gibraltar. And in doing so, incensed the defenders of the colonial state in Gibraltar. Importantly, this problem was one that plagued the entirety of the British Empire. As *Wireless World* reported in 1918, the conflict between Marconi wireless and the Post Office was so intense that it appeared to be littered with conspiracy, affairs, spies, plots, and secret documents more the making of Jacobite conspiracies and war fantasy, than the type of catalog expected of British history (Wireless World, 1918).

In the 1930's, the postal service and savings bank existed as a paired institution in Gibraltar, with post being sent from the same counters and by the same individuals who were enlisted as bankers. This pairing started in Great Britain in 1861 by Sir Rowland Hill and William Gladstone, who saw it as a cheap way to finance public debt—particularly through war bonds in the 1920's (Kelsey, 2004). The colonial secretary's notes in August 1925 describes merchants complaining to the secretary of state of Foreign Affairs about profits garnered from the banking system by the State (Gibraltar Archival Document, n.d.). Their principle complaint: that the public debt held by the postal bank was of little to no benefit, or investment, to Gibraltar itself. The Colonial Administration's answer to this was, quite simply, to raise the postage fee to increase the funds available for Gibraltar—not redirect the spending to minimize debt. This caused further concern by the local merchants, who began advocating for a privatized postal service and against the direct and/or indirect taxations that would "reduce" their "hard earned profits". These merchants suggested that the government was devaluing the commercial opportunity through its monopoly over communication. While it would have been simple to convert and privatize telegraphy, the privatization of telegraphy in 1929 posed a threat to national security: the largely immigrant citizenry of Gibraltar would hold the capacity to send messages out of Gibraltar at a far cheaper rate with far less surveillance than they were able to send postage out of Gibraltar. The decrease in postal profits would make it near impossible to pay interest to account holders through the bank, and discourage diverse ways of reducing the danger of investing those funds and enticing savings holdings.

As the postal service began to compete against the newly privatized Cable & Wireless, LTD for state money and support to meet its obligations, so too did the postal office begin competing for space. In 1933, Imperial and International Communications LTD—the privatized company renamed—began talks to move into the post office. In a letter to the administration, the public manager of IIC LTD described the ways in which the military interferes with the work necessary of a private company, and simultaneously of the lack of space in Gibraltar to establish enough space to perform the tasks required of them by a telegraph-hungry public (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1933b). Overall, the letters between London investors, the Admiralty, and colonial secretary reflect a concern for Gibraltarians' "access" to W. T., as well as a concern that the accessibility of the postal service's greater accessibility would prove problematic for the newly privatized telegraphy company. The move of Cable and Wireless into the postal office, then, should not be understood as integration into the public economy, but rather the use of the public economy to support and develop the private enterprise of W. T., and the state's implicit preparation for divesting the public economy.[6] The capitalist city council understood the steps towards divestment as a sign of the government "regulating" its monopolistic tendencies, protecting the competition distinctive of a "free market".

Cable & Wireless LTD began working out of the postal office on 1 June 1934 (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1934a). To accommodate the company, the postal office shrank its offices, reconfigured multiple counters, and agreed on a joint managerial relationship between the government and the company workers. Two months later, the manager sent a letter requesting that a sign be placed outside the post office to mark the newly established telegraph office—which had otherwise been overlooked (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1934b).

By this time, however, governance of Gibraltar had changed so radically that approval was not just in the hands of the colonial secretary, but also an elected city council composed mostly of local business-owners (Archer, 2006). The city council approved the sign posting with no debate, enthused by the private alternatives to state services being offered.

By February 1936, the Colonial postmaster asked for a reduction in Cable & Wireless' space, as its business had come to dominate the postal office to the point of legitimating the addition of a sign (Figure 2, Gibraltar Archival Document, 1936a). As the W. T. business expanded in 1933, the Colonial postmaster gave up his office "in the public interest". As part of the World War I effort to make government efficient, the Colonial postmaster had been given residence in the Postal Office, where he was forced to work and sleep for the time being. As space became an issue, Cable & Wireless asked for him to give up—or move—that space too. In a letter from March 1936, the manager of Cable & Wireless made two suggestions, based on avoiding a rewiring of the entire building for providing "adequate" telegraphic power: first, Cable and Wireless could return the upstairs southerly room for the Postmaster's quarters for a reduction of £25 per

[6] Private economy, here, refers to capitalists and business services outside of state ownership and regulation, while the public economy refers to those services and businesses that both provide essential services and are subsidized by the state (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).



Figure 2. Proposed hanging sign for post office branch of imperial cable and wireless (1934).

annum, or give up the downstairs southerly room for a reduction of £40 per annum (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1936b). Neither, however, proved satisfactory to the postmaster general. Both rooms were plagued by both the noise of vehicles in the street and the noise of telegraphy, and that clatter was conducive to neither sleeping nor working (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1936c).

This moment marked an attempt to gain space back from privatized telegraphy industry on the part of the colonial administration—manned by aristocratic retirees of the admiralty. In a letter dated November 1940, the Colonial postmaster wrote to the Manager of Cable and Wireless. Cable and Wireless was occupying its previous location next door to the post office in addition to its postal facilities, and the post master was notifying him that the post office would thus reserve all counter space for parcel operations (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940b). However, the Manager of Cable and Wireless responded promptly, sending a copy to the city council as well.

> My clerical staff at present occupy part of the Anchor Line offices and not our former premises as you suggest, and, to the best of my knowledge, my company has not considered the question of vacating the General Post Office….It is hardly necessary to point out that throughout the past year our counter traffic has increased to an extent not contemplated when the move to the General Post Office was made and it seems very probable that this traffic will continue for

> some time, providing it is possible to maintain a cable office in town. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940c)

The colonial postmaster's frustration would only continue to grow, as would the antagonistic behavior of Cable and Wireless LTD. On December 1940, Cable and Wireless took out an advert in the Gibraltar Chronicle funneling its holiday traffic to the post office, "inviting the public to hand in telegrams to the Company Offices at the General Post Office" (Figure 3). The advertisement focused two spaces worth of customers—Cable and Wireless LTD was running another office on Barracks Road at the same time—into the small, already over-occupied space of the post office. In a letter to the manager of Cable and Wireless, dated December 1940, the Colonial postmaster responded to both the advertisement and the increased traffic.

> The position today is that the Cable Company's customers are so numerous and the congestion is such that inconvenience is experienced by those having legitimate postal business to transact: e.g. Post Office customers wishing to prepare money order requisitions, Savings Bank withdraws and Parcel Post Customs Declarations find all space at the Post Office writing tables and benches occupied by Cable Company's customers engaged in the construction of telegrams; and post office customers instead of being able to avail themselves of the facilities *provided by this Department for their use* are obliged to fill in their forms at the public counter thereby congesting that section of the office which is reserved for *public business*. In these circumstances…it was agreed that the public should have reasonable access to that portion of the counter provided for the Company's uses not contemplated that the increase in the cable company's traffic would prove to be embarrassing to this administration. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940d)

While this struggle between private and public service was occurring, World War II began having dire effects on Gibraltar. As funding became tighter within the war-loan torn British government, still reeling as it was from World War I, public infrastructure was reduced and privatized. Surely, given the antagonism between the colonial postmaster and imperial wireless manager, it was then no trouble for the Colonial postmaster to write the manager of Cable and Wireless to note the decrease in Postal Office hours instituted in response to government austerity orders. According to the Colonial postmaster, the Postal Office would open at 0900, close at mid-day, reopen at 1500 hours, and close at 1700 hours—a total of 4–5 hours of open time a day (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940e). Incensed, the manager of Cable and Wireless responded that the decision was "detrimental to the people of Gibraltar". The demand for telegraphy services, he argued, had increased because the colonial government continued to introduce more people (troops) into Gibraltar, despite having just forced thousands of people out (evacuated Gibraltarians). Throughout the letter, he implies that "government" had lost its guiding purpose, and that it was now *private business* that must look after the welfare of the people—whom, for the state, are defined as citizens and for Cable and Wireless were defined as consumers. Responding to the manager's anger, the Colonial postmaster suggested that they are not closing Cable and Wireless out, that Cable and Wireless was welcome to perform tasks in the building, but that the front



Figure 3. Cable & wireless ad (16 December 1940). Source: *Gibraltar Chronicle* (1940, p. 3).

doors and hall would be closed to the public during those hours. This decision, the Post Master continues, is not a restriction, but a form of austerity expected of Britons in wartime (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1941a).

The Manager's complaints did not go unheard, however. The city council, made of prominent business peoples in Gibraltar who, as described earlier, had advocated for a privatized alternative to the postal service, would vote to subsidize the expenses of Cable and Wireless maintaining hours during the closure of the Postal Office. The city council funded the installation of a grille in front of the counters of the Postal Office, so as to protect it from potential theft (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1941b). Otherwise, the hall of the postal office would remain open and available for the Company's customers.

This is not the only time the privatized service was rescued by the city council and colonial government. Between 1930 and 1940, Gibraltar received the news about the empire increasingly through telegraph. These began to include updates of Rugby scores "on the moment", as well as emergency news regarding the Empire's various military endeavors (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1939). Furthermore, individuals began purchasing private W. T. installations to take part in experiments around the broadcast of musical performances and individual messages. This provided a great challenge to Cable and Wireless LTD's monopoly on transcontinental and colonial–metropole information exchange, particularly in Gibraltar. In March 1940, the head of the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee—a London-based committee established at the merger and privatization of all W. T. companies—sent a letter regarding both practices:

> Whilst foreign countries I am unable to intervene, I do ask, in view of the recommendation of the Committee who dealt with the Empire Rate Scheme, that the countries of the Empire will *prevent this invasion into the telecommunications field proper to this company* by newspapers, news agencies, and other unauthorized bodies. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940a)

Reuters was the sole source of news on the wire. While starting independently, however, by 1940 it was fully owned by the Press Association, an organization of the provincial press of Great Britain (Crisell, 2002). In short, it was a private service that had returned to public ownership, just as telegraphy had done half a century earlier. What remains in the tone of the Manager's letter is a fear that the functions of a public company are beginning to seep into the cable business; Cable & Wireless was *expected* to carry the news wire, and not given the option to refuse. Seeing a potential road to the renationalization of wireless, Cable & Wireless turned to the government(s) of the empire, notably Gibraltar in this instance, to ask for protection against the public economy—news and information provided to citizens to imagine a nation—coming to dominate the private economy—services provided to "desiring" and "paying" consumers. In response, the colonial secretary refocused the newswire to the military W. T.; however, he did maintain private citizens' rights to own W. T. systems (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1040a). And while this was some protection from the so-called evils of nationalization at a local scale, they would be rendered moot when Cable and Wireless LTD became nationalized by the Labour Party in 1947.

5. Conclusion: Privatization, Perspectivism, and the Coming Neoliberal Moment

The above is not *the* history of telegraphy, so much as a perspective on the history of telegraphy enshrined by the Gibraltar Archives. From this perspective, W. T. in Gibraltar was the site of a complicated and shifting relationship between metropole and colony, between governor and admiralty, and between State and private enterprise. Installed initially to enable faster communication among armed forces, the perfect storm of interwar economy and crumbling empire pushed Britain to sell off Gibraltar's telegraphic infrastructure. The result was a private business that relied on the state to protect it from nationalization, recruiting domestic cabinet members in the UK to wage ideological and economic war against their lesser kinsmen that held outposts in the colony itself. The Gibraltar Archives represent the voices of an often forgotten resistance to the privatization of public communication infrastructure, namely the voice of an anti-Liberal colonial administration doing the work of managing and building Empire.

According to this archive, then, W. T. in pre-World War II Gibraltar was the site of a complicated and shifting relationships between colonial governor, admiralty, and private enterprise. Installed to enable faster communication between the armed forces of the empire, the perfect storm of a failing interwar economy and crumbling empire pushed Britain to sell off Gibraltar's telegraphic infrastructure. The result was a private business that relied on the state to protect it from nationalization, whether that nationalization was the threat of the state's "monopolistic tendencies" (Hayek, 2005), or the threat of government take over amidst declines in consumer appreciation and participation. Thus, contra a world systems theory that posits economic models coming from the core and exported to the periphery, I am arguing that the neoliberal mode of production was a material condition formulated in the colony before returning to the metropole as a systemic relationship facilitated through privatization—long before it was a formulated economic rationality to be deployed in that very metropole. This argument is *not* to suggest that Gibraltar was the birthplace of neoliberalism; but rather, that what is narrated as a post-World War II political economic rationality in Europe has deeply set imperial roots as part of a long, colonial history of neoliberal transformation.

Opening that argument out to the present, it becomes clear that the contemporary neoliberal moment—

wrapped as it is in struggles over the privatization of public infrastructure—did not spring forth from Athena-like from the post-1968 world. Rather, neoliberalism is the colonial formation of a type of capitalism that, at very least, played out in the telegraphy economy of Gibraltar (and undoubtedly in countless other places), hidden in the strata of world history. Whether we're speaking of Atlee's and then Thatcher's British government, or the policy and institution shifts in the US driven by Lewis Powell's 1971 US Chamber of Commerce memo or the policies put into place by Ronald Raegan's administration (Harvey, 2007), each pulled its models for economic change from the modes of production that made the pivot from colonialism to imperialism possible.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to my colleagues at the Gibraltar Museum, Institute for Gibraltar Studies, and the Gibraltar Archives who made this research possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Janet Wasko and Dr. Elizabeth Patton for their thoughtful comments on early and later drafts of this article, as well my colleagues from the Social Science Research Council *Mediated Future* cohort and the department of media and communication studies at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Finally, I am indebted to the careful work of the editors and peer reviewers, who provided a great deal of direction for this final draft.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 34–42
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1172

Article

From the Old New Republic to a Great Community: Insights and Contradictions in John Dewey's Public Pedagogy

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Submitted: 22 September 2017 | Accepted: 4 December 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
This article draws from John Dewey's philosophy of education, ideas about democracy and pragmatist assumptions to explain how his articles for The New Republic functioned pedagogically. Taking media as a mode of public pedagogy, and drawing extensively from Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, as well as from his book *The Public and its Problems*, the article explores the relationships between communication, education and democracy using the expanded conceptions of all the aforementioned advanced by Dewey. Borrowing insights from Randolph Bourne, who used Dewey's own ideas to criticize his mentor's influence on intellectuals who supported US involvement in World War I, the analysis explores the contradictions within Dewey's public pedagogy. The article suggests Dewey's relevance as a public intellectual in the liberal-progressive press, his view of the State and some of his related presuppositions produced a tension in his thought, delimiting democratic possibilities while simultaneously pointing toward greater democratic potentials. The essay concludes by suggesting that learning from both Dewey and Bourne prompts us to get beyond the former's public/private dualism to realize what he called the "Great Community" by communicating and practicing the Commons.

Keywords
John Dewey; media; media history; public pedagogy; Randolph Bourne; The New Republic

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

The same year *The New Republic* (hereafter, TNR) published its first issue, John Dewey penned his first of many contributions for the weekly magazine. Dewey, the pragmatist philosopher perhaps best known for his philosophy of education, would go on to write well over 50 articles for TNR. To examine Dewey's role as a public intellectual, played out in the pages of TNR, this analysis borrows the notion of "public pedagogy", popularized in the last two decades by Henry Giroux (Sandlin, O'Malley, & Burdick, 2011, p. 341). Public pedagogy is used here as a concept for understanding mediated culture as a site (or as sites) of informal, often under-acknowledged education (Giroux, 2004, 2008). A public pedagogy lens brings into focus how desires are mobilized and moral values are shaped (Giroux, 2000, p. 349). Public pedagogy serves here as a concept for critiquing forms of education occurring in and through mediated culture. Below I use the concept to critically understand Dewey's relevant work, found in TNR archive. Using ideas from Dewey's philosophical work—and drawing especially from *Democracy and Education* and *The Public and its Problems*—I examine how and why Dewey's contributions to TNR functioned pedagogically. I try to sketch the contours of the bounds within which Dewey's public pedagogy operated and which it helped reconstruct. To do so I relate Dewey's ideas to those of Randolph Bourne, who was mentored by Dewey at Columbia University and who worked as an editor for TNR for a time before becoming a prolific critic of his colleagues' support for World War I.

I hope to show how Dewey's relevance was in part related to his role as an influential thinker as well as to how he understood and communicated the role of the pub-

lic in relation to education, democracy, community and especially the state. Dewey was not content to offer interpretations of the world; he applied his interpretations to problems and when possible tried to influence outcomes (Tiles, 1992, p. 2). Given that his written word had such influence, understanding the public pedagogy he propounded in the pages of a prominent journal of popular progressive opinion assumes added importance. Notably, Dewey also conceived of the public and the state as necessarily linked—he roughly conflated "the state" with "the public" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 21) in his major work on the subjects—and that conceptual knot appears to have produced a tension in his public pedagogy. Writers have posited Dewey's philosophy as commensurate with a social anarchism critical of arbitrarily justified authority and concentrated power, wielded by the state or otherwise (Chomsky, 2013, pp. 692–693; Mancias, 1982). What has not been explored is how Dewey's contributions to TNR reveal a pragmatism and idea of democracy fraught with potential for progress but bounded by his role as a public intellectual and by his related understanding of the state.

2. Divergent Philosophies and Differing Ideas of Democracy

Dewey's influence among educators became so strong within his lifetime that it prompted the formation of a society in his name (Tanner, 2015), while he was still contributing to TNR. His idea of education emphasized cultivation of a common understanding of means and ends necessary for intelligent control of the world we help comprise (Dewey, 1916/1997). As opposed to external control over others, education in this vein involves the freeing of individual capacities for flourishing directed toward social aims. Education in a democratic society implies providing "individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control" (p. 99) so that people can be active agents determining the direction of social change. Dewey's idea of education was intimately bound up with his idea of democracy. "Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority", he wrote, "it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education" (p. 87). Moreover, "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 87). Writing a decade later, Dewey (1927/1954) referred to democracy as "the idea of community life itself" (p. 148). It is "clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications", which "constitutes the idea of democracy" (p. 149).

Upon first inspection, Dewey's ideas stand in contrast to what one of his famous contemporaries wrote about democracy. Walter Lippmann, who was recruited by TNR's first editor-in-chief, Herbert Croly, to start as an editor at the magazine upon its inauguration, was comparatively sceptical about a democratic public. Others have highlighted the Dewey–Lippmann "debate" and emphasized its implications for the understanding of media and democracy (Crick, 2009; DeCesare, 2016; Dolber, 2017). Lippmann (1922/1997) believed news media are incapable of offering the truth to the public, insofar as that would entail bringing to light concealed facts, relating them and providing a picture of reality for people to use to act and participate in self-government (pp. 214–232). Lippmann's (1927/2017) "thesis" was that those constituting the public must remain "spectators of action" (p. 93), tasked merely with determining "the actor in a controversy who is most worthy of public support" (p. 120). Knowledgeable experts are needed, he thought, to manage people's affairs for them. Public constituents are a trampling "bewildered herd" (p. 2), and the herd "must be put in its place", Lippmann (1927/2017) claimed. But Dewey (1927/1954), it is worth noting, also considered the existing public to be "bewildered" (p. 123), "inchoate" (p. 147), "confused and eclipsed" (p. 121). A tension within Dewey's philosophy, unpacked below, drew him closer to Lippmann in certain respects, even as they strongly diverged.

Dewey was arguably more concerned than his TNR colleague with how the public could "function democratically" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 147) and better recognize and communicate people's shared consequences. Dewey was an early proponent of what is sometimes called "public journalism"—reporting rooted in active civic involvement and committed to clearly communicating issues of social consequence (Perry, 2003). For the extant public to emerge out of eclipse required searching for (or creating) new "conditions", as Dewey put it, the characteristics of which bear striking resemblance to his ideas of education. An individual ought to have "a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain"; creating conditions conducive to a democratic public implied "liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interest and goods which are common" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 147).

For Dewey, democracy could only be realized through education enabling individuals to play a role in consciously constituting collective life, and for that to occur education must be community based (Višňovský & Zolcer, 2016, p. 58). Dewey understood democracy as a personal way of life and as a commitment to a community, to a social organization which helps individuals develop the capacity, and practice the ability, to criticize popular notions of what is right and good (Putnam, 2009). He envisioned democratic practice as providing the education necessary for the emergence of the "Great Community" (Dewey, 1927/1954), a consociation of self-organized individuals conscious of and each participating in decisions and actions shaping the consequences of the social life which in turn shapes them. Social psychologist Graham Wallas (1914) introduced a similar notion—the "Great Society"—the year TNR first hit the press, empha-

sizing the greater nexus of connectivity created by industrialization and the expanded limits to communication characterizing a new social environment. Two years later, idealist philosopher Josiah Royce—who had three years earlier coined the related phrase, the "Beloved Community" (Royce, 1913/2001)—also popularized the notion of the "Great Community" in a book containing a title with the term (Royce, 1916), published the same year as Dewey's *Democracy and Education*. Both Royce and (later) Dewey took the "Great Community" as the ideal of a bonded humanity, but Dewey placed greater faith in the role of experimental inquiry and scientific advance as guiding its realization (Oppenheim, 2005). Pappas (2008) argued Dewey took the "Great Community" and democracy both as ideals and simultaneously as ethical instruments for negotiating the tensions and extremes located within our social experience; he took them as tools to tackle public problems to be assessed on the basis by which they enrich—and successfully address the problems of—present experience (pp. 217–259). As Bishop (2010) observed, Dewey believed the evolution of this "Great Community" required (among other conditions) freedom of inquiry and unrestricted production and dissemination of knowledge; member participation in achievements and struggles; cooperation among groups; and maintenance of shared means of communication (pp. 107–114). Notably, for Dewey, negative freedom of communication (i.e. freedom of the press from government censorship) was not enough (Pappas, 2008, p. 222). Democratic communication, for Dewey, necessarily entails education, understood broadly to include the teaching and learning taking place through culture. Dewey did not discuss in detail the number of individuals or the level of wealth necessary for a "Great Community" to thrive (Bishop, 2010, p. 114), although he was aware of the limits imposed by distance and scale, even if he never discussed how far we ought to extend our sense of self and the communal (Pappas, 2008, p. 229). Neither Dewey nor students of his philosophy interrogated fully, though, the limitations and obstacles inbuilt in the way humans have organized that extension, as with instruments like the nation-state. Also absent in the literature is a critique of the tensions within Dewey's role as a public intellectual, via his extensive TNR oeuvre, vis-à-vis his views on the relationships between values, democracy and the state. While there are early histories of TNR, some of which evaluate how values are shaped within the magazine and even some which highlight the magazine's relationship to education and Dewey's contributions (Nuechterlein, 1980; Peterson, 1999; Turner, 1983), little work has focused specifically on a constructive critique of Dewey's public pedagogy operating in TNR. What follows is an attempt to begin filling in those gaps.

3. Education and/for Democracy in TNR

At least 10 of the articles Dewey penned for TNR from the time the magazine was first established, in 1914, through 1916, the year *Democracy and Education* was published, were explicitly about education. Some of Dewey's contributions came in the form of a dialogue, insofar as that mode of education is possible through the press. In a reply to one critic, he argued against the kind of vocational education "which will 'adapt' workers to the existing industrial regime"—wryly remarking, "I am not sufficiently in love with the regime for that"—and he called instead for education "which would have as its supreme regard the development of such intelligent initiative, ingenuity and executive capacity as shall make workers, as far as may be, the masters of their own industrial fate" (Dewey, 1915a, p. 42). Those interested in practical education could "strive for a kind vocational education which will first alter the existing industrial system, and ultimately transform it" (p. 42). He warned of educational reforms which would rigidify the class system (Dewey, 1915b, p. 238). After a National Education Association meeting on education and culture, Dewey (1916a) defended the NEA aims of transmuting "a society built on an industry which is not yet humanized into a society which wields its knowledge and its industrial power in behalf of a democratic culture"—endeavors requiring "the courage of an inspired imagination" (p. 215). He claimed "the only test and justification of any form of political and economic society is its contribution to art and science—to what may roundly be called culture. That America has not yet so justified itself is too obvious for even lament" (p. 216). Dewey's contributions connect public education to a formative culture and the relationship of both to an expansive practice of democracy, extended into the economic sphere, but also as part of the production of new political-community and aesthetic life.

Dewey also applauded experiments in education focused on the experimental method. Concordant with his later philosophical work (e.g. Dewey, 1930/2013, pp. 284, 260, 1939/1991, pp. 51, 66), in TNR he called the scientific method "the spirit in which a social problem is to be approached" (Dewey, 1917a, p. 16). The public should, he suggested, become familiar with a method of education emphasizing experiment and discovery (p. 16). In one of many book reviews he wrote for TNR, Dewey (1918a) applauded Helen Marot, author of *Creative Impulse in Industry*, for stressing, as he put it, "the importance of such conditions and methods as will give each student-worker personal experience in the *administrative control* of the processes of production and marketing" (p. 23). Not only did he connect education to economic democracy in his articles. He also related those processes to the experimental method as a tool for understanding and mediating social consequences.

Expounding upon claims made by the American Association of University Professors, which he helped found, Dewey (1916b) claimed the "real question of academic freedom" had to do with the liberty of educators and students to engage in "serious thought on social difficulties and conflicts" (p. 16). Some two decades later, when he announced the formation of a committee to raise funds

for a professor who staged a hunger strike to protest persecution of students at Polish universities and was subsequently fired from the City College of New York (Dewey, 1937a), he underscored for TNR readers that democratic freedoms imply education beyond academe.

4. Lessons and Contradictions Regarding Democracy and the State

The assumptions required for entrance into the range of debate in the progressive press appear to have made the breadth of Dewey's public pedagogy possible while simultaneously shipwrecking it on the shoals of the liberal-democratic state. Despite chiding others for generalizations, Dewey (1927/1954) suggested, sans historical evidence, that once "indirect consequences are recognized and there is effort to regulate them, something having the traits of a state come into existence" (p. 12). When people "indirectly affected" by consequences of interconnected human activity "formed a public", Dewey presupposes, this presented "in embryonic form the traits that define a state, its agencies and officers" (p. 17). He cautioned against this "notion of 'The State'", which can draw "us imperceptibly into consideration of the logical relationship of various ideas to one another, and away from facts of human activity" (pp. 8–9). He warned against focusing on "causal agency instead of consequences" (p. 20) in an investigation of the state's emergence. Yet he drew conclusions from select consequences without sufficient focus on how people acted in relation to others to bring states into existence historically. Once people recognized "evil consequences", he abstractly avers, they then arrived at a "common interest" which they all decided, readers are told, required rules and thus selection of "guardians, interpreters, and, if need be, their executors" (p. 17).

Those under-examined presuppositions undergirded his understanding of the public and its potential. The tensions and tendencies played out in his TNR contributions. In an article about force, violence and law, Dewey (1916c) criticized those opposing the state and the use of police force, claiming that being "interested in ends and to have contempt for the means which alone secure them is the last stage of intellectual demoralization" (p. 296). The claim rests upon an untested assumption about what "alone secure" ends he presumed others desire. The assumption excludes alternative ideas about both means and ends, educating readers within the liberal-progressive frame. Dewey further criticized the peace movement—admonishing its "hostility to force" (p. 296) and reproaching pacifists for their failure to focus on organizing existing forces for more desirable and efficient ends. He rebuked peace activists for appealing to emotions without advocating for laws—or, perhaps for not also advocating for different social arrangements, although Dewey is somewhat ambiguous on that in the piece. Although he unpacked the appeal to ends as referring to actual results, not simply aspirations (p. 296), he placed the onus of responsibility not on those supporting militarized force pitting armies of states against each other, but instead on those opposing specific (not just any and all) uses of "force", a euphemism referring to the state-sponsored bullets and bombs already ripping open and burning human flesh throughout the European theatre.

The above bears resemblance to other commentaries Dewey authored for Croly's magazine which were later rebuked by the young writer Dewey once mentored. Randolph Bourne, who like Lippmann was one of the first recruited by Croly to join TNR, broke with the journal because of the publication's embrace of Woodrow Wilson's about-face away from neutrality toward intervention in World War I (Dos Passos, 1993/2000, p. 80; Westbrook, 2007, p. 105). The sentiment appears to have been mutual at the time, as "prowar progressives at TNR wanted nothing to do with him, of course" (Blake, 2014, p. 86).

Yet in earlier writing for TNR, Bourne (1915) commented favorably on Dewey's philosophy and character. He credited Dewey "with some of the wisest words ever set to paper", referred to Dewey's mind as "ultra-democratic", and called him "a prophet dressed in the clothes of a professor of logic" who "seems almost ashamed that he has seen the implications of democracy more clearly than anybody else in the great would-be democratic society about him, and so [has] been forced into the unwelcome task of teaching it" (p. 154). Bourne claimed that no one else "with such universally important things to say on almost every social and intellectual activity of the day, was ever published in forms more ingeniously contrived to thwart the interest of the prospective public" (p. 154).

Within two years Bourne would be critiquing Dewey, and his influence on progressive intellectuals, in *The Seven Arts*, a small and short-lived literary magazine. On Dewey's pragmatism-turned-realpolitik, Bourne (1917a) saw someone incredulously "more concerned over the excesses of the pacifists than over the excesses of military policy" (p. 689). Under-examined assumptions about using means at odds with democracy to achieve democratic results led Bourne (1917a) "to suspect that no programme is presented" by intellectuals under Dewey's sway—while lack of a pacifist program is chastised in TNR—"because they have none to present. This burrowing into war-technique hides the void where a democratic philosophy should be" (p. 694). Of special concern "is the relative ease with which the pragmatist intellectuals, with Professor Dewey at the head, have moved out their philosophy, bag and baggage, from education to war" (p. 692). Rather, Dewey and TNR turned, pragmatically the weekly commentaries implied, to a pedagogy of and for war. Bourne (1917b) satirized the sentiments expressed by TNR intellectuals: "War in the interests of democracy! This was almost the sum of their philosophy" (p. 142).

Dewey (1917b) elsewhere cautioned against efforts to silence anti-war activists, arguing that censorship and

repression aimed at imposing uniformity of thought—a "conscription of mind" (p. 129)—only fuel the flames. But in so doing he chided "the spectacle of ultra-socialists" and took issue with the "inefficacy of the conscription of mind as a means of promoting social solidarity" (p. 129), the sort of solidarity he called necessary "in war times" (p. 128). In another piece he distinguished the pacifistic American people from the "professional pacifists" (Dewey, 1917c, p. 358). He dismissed pacifist literature leading up to the war as "opportunistic—breathlessly, frantically so", deriding "the failure of the pacifist propaganda to determine finally the course of a nation which was converted to pacifism in advance", and lamenting "that the pacifists wasted rather than invested their potentialities when they turned so vigorously to opposing entrance into a war which was already all but universal" (p. 359).

Bourne offered two indirect rejoinders to that assertion, using parts of Dewey's own philosophy as tools for critique. If we had practiced Dewey's "revolutionary conceptions of what education means", as well as his "intellectual strategy" for such an education, the nation might have used its isolation to educate itself for democracy instead of engaging in war, which inevitably undermines democratic values (Bourne, 1917a, pp. 691, 698). And would Dewey's progeny "have turned their intellectual energies not to the problem of jockeying the nation into war, but to the problem of using our vast neutral power to attain democratic ends for ourselves and the rest of the world", avoiding militarism irreconcilable with democracy (in the sense Dewey once understood the idea, as ultimately incommensurate with the State), "They might have failed. The point is that they scarcely tried" (Bourne, 1917b, p. 136).

Known for making his mark between extremes (Hickman, 1990, p. 179), Dewey brought that tendency into the pages of TNR, pitting severe repression against anti-war socialism (and pacifistic Americans against peace activists) as opposing poles both deserving censure. But that liberal-progressive proclivity—occupying a supposed socio-political middle ground—like the emphasis on journalistic objectivity that arose with the advent of commercially-controlled media during Dewey's day, can result in false equivalencies and normalize arrangements which otherwise might be criticized as "extreme" were other criteria used to make the determination.

Echoing (or influencing) the ideas of TNR's editor-in-chief Croly, who deemed US involvement in World War I a "rare opportunity", and a new "chance to focus the thought & will of the country" (as cited in Levy, 2014, p. 249), Dewey told readers that war "must make" a "contribution" "to the creation of a united America" (Dewey, 1917b, p. 130). He presupposed the benevolence of US state policy objectives when he lamented in TNR "that some of our intolerance at diversity of opinion and our willingness to suppress civil liberties of democracy in the name of loyalty to democracy is merely a part of our haste to get into the war effectively, a part of the rush of mobilization, which, thank heaven, had to be improvised because of our historic and established unmilitarism" (Dewey, 1917d, p. 18). He also referred to those in the US as "more highly socialized" (Dewey, 1918b, p. 232). His American exceptionalism as a mode of public pedagogy failed to teach about the history of international US military intervention and deployment of the military for domestic control. Echoing the American instrumentalism he popularized, the author called criticizing "the wickedness of war" and indulging "in asseverations of the obligations of states to act upon the basis of the most enlightened code" a "Pharisaic luxury", unless the critics would "fight for the establishment of a social organization which will make moral responsibilities and regulations a fact" (pp. 232–233). Dewey thereby dismissed vocal anti-war criticism (ignoring the mobilization that often accompanied it), excluding any consideration that organizing against international war could be part of that struggle for a more moral social organization. But he also levelled a tacit criticism regarding the morally questionable function of nation-states, implying states are at odds with forms of social organization in which real democratic sensibilities could be part and parcel.

In light of the support for war at TNR, the "philosophy upon which I had relied to carry us through", Bourne (1917a) lamented, "no longer works" (p. 690)—a wryly ironic condemnation of the popular Deweyan pragmatism, given its concern for what is functional. Presumably less than pleased with the criticism, Dewey surreptitiously forced Bourne off the editorial board of the *Dial*, another alternative weekly where he had been working (Blake, 2014, p. 86; Phelps, 1998, para. 3). While Dewey might not have fully grasped the lesson from the man he mentored at Columbia—the man who wrote "War is the health of the state" (Bourne, 1918/1998, p. 9) in an unfinished manuscript published soon after he died of influenza at 32—Dewey would later regret his full-fledged support for World War I, and TNR editors would go on to print a formal *mea culpa* regarding their support for it (Bennett & Howlett, 2014, p. 29; Levy, 2014, p. 266).

5. Conclusions and Consequences: Communicating the Commons

Examination of the consequences of Dewey's insights and contradictions reveals some of the shortcomings in his public pedagogy, but perhaps that pedagogy provides lessons to be learned regarding how to act going forward. Central to Dewey's pedagogical project was the translation of philosophy into the language of the broader public. He tried to make the philosophies of Charles S. Peirce and George H. Meade accessible to those outside his discipline through TNR (Dewey, 1936, 1937b). Likewise, he wrote an article in TNR about the need for a new individualism years before his book on the subject (Dewey, 1930/1999) came out, arguing democracy "denotes faith in individuality" and a "willing acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed by

the release of individualized capacities" (Dewey, 1922, p. 62). "Democracy will not be democracy until education", he added, promotes "release of distinctive aptitudes" (p. 63) of individuals across a variety of spheres.

In his work on the public, Dewey (1927/1954) posited that it is "only by distribution" that experimentally attained knowledge could "be either obtained or tested" (pp. 176–177). He went so far to refer to any "fact of community life" which isn't communicated so as to become a "common possession" a "contradiction in terms" (p. 177). He even equated the "formation of public opinion" with such mediated communication (p. 177). Functioning public opinion implies both "methods of investigation and reporting constantly at work" (p. 178). Indeed, while "news" denotes what just occurred in a way that contrasts with what was, individuals cannot derive meaning from it unless its mediation facilitates a consideration of possible "social consequences", which cannot be seriously considered "unless the new is placed in relation to the old, to what has happened and [has] been integrated into the course of events" (p. 180). Otherwise, sensationalism ensues. The sensation of the new becomes the reigning objective for journalism given how events are "so completely isolated from their connections" (p. 180). The sensationalist prerogative of the press had become so hegemonic "that it may well sound ridiculous to say that", as Dewey had it, "a genuine social science would manifest its reality in the daily press" (p. 180), with scholarly articles and books providing tools for inquiry. Dewey's ethics held science and morals to be reconcilable (Welchman, 1995), and there is reason to believe Dewey would have wanted his TNR contributions to be a mode of scientific public pedagogy.

His rejection of the dualism between theory and action reveals itself in TNR as intrinsically tied to both his ideas about education and democratic control, which appear inextricable from his emphasis (epitomizing an important tension) on experimentation as crucial for knowledge and progress in a variety of human domains. After the US had entered World War I, Dewey (1918b) referred to the belief that international law expressed "not true but only moral law" as a "striking indication of the widespread absence of scientific understanding of morals" (p. 232), reaffirming his commitment to scientific explication of values and his belief in a bonded humanity, albeit one premised upon interlocking nation-states. "States", he claimed "are non-moral in their activities just because of the absence of an inclusive society which defines and establishes rights" (p. 232), thereby underscoring a contradictory assumption: States are insufficient when it comes to creating a moral order, but at least here Dewey assumes that they can be compatible with and do not militate against the morality of a Great Community. The untested assumption contributes to a public pedagogy overlooking ideas about experimenting with alternative institutions which could prove more supportive of such a community than the political state. Later, during the Depression, Dewey (1934) reminded TNR readers of his position that "no genuine education is possible without active participation in actual conditions", pointing out again "that economic interests are the chief cause why this change in education is retarded and reflected" (p. 307). The great achievement of the physical sciences is that they showed action—"namely, action that changes conditions that previously existed" (p. 307)—to be a necessary aspect of intelligence. Dewey (1930a) claimed the experimental attitude prompted adherence to "new truth" discovered, that science was "the foe of every belief that permits habit and wont to dominate", and that it would be "dangerous only for those who would maintain affairs in the existing social order unchanged because of lazy habit or self-interest" (p. 185). Responding to Nietzsche's notion that human beings now must create their own values, he told TNR readers when we start taking "science (including its application to the machine) for what it is", then "we shall begin to envisage it as a potential creator of new values and ends" (p. 186).

Yet Nietzsche (1918/2010) also understood the conditions prompting the "transvaluation of all values" (p. 149)—conditions arising from the ascendance of science and eclipse of religion—could have "catastrophic consequences", as one of Nietzsche's posthumous editors put it (Williams, 2001, p. xiii). Not for nothing, then, did Bourne (1917a) label his print media critique of Dewey *Twilight of Idols*, a title akin to Nietzsche's (1889/1997) *Twilight of the Idols*, save for the omitted article. Tellingly, Bourne cites Nietzsche approvingly in the final paragraph of his *Seven Arts* piece. Moreover, he remarked that progressive intellectuals in the wake of war "failed us as value-creators, even as value-emphasizers" (1917a, p. 700).

To be sure, the appeal and promise of Dewey's philosophy lies in part with his argument against acceptance of what exists based upon untested convention as well as the implications for understanding knowledge as tethered to intelligent action in the world. Yet questions remain. How are values to be tested (aside from perhaps democratically, insofar as that's possible)? How are tested values to be judged? What precepts, insights and means ought to be used in arriving at experimentally determined value judgments? How is the existing good—the material for guidance and hope, Dewey suggests—to be identified as such? The problem announces itself in the last line from that same TNR article. In "accepting the corporate and industrial world in which we live, and thus by fulfilling the precondition for interaction with it, we", Dewey (1930a) avers, "who are also parts of the moving present, create ourselves as we create an unknown future" (p. 188). Why "accepting the corporate and industrial world" is a prerequisite for a proper remaking of the individual—and why the state should be presumed amenable for truly democratic community life—when other hitherto facts and habits are identified as outmoded—remains unclear. As Bourne (1917a) observed, "there was always that unhappy ambiguity in his

doctrine as to just how values were created, and it became easier and easier to assume that just any growth was justified and almost any activity valuable so long as it achieved ends" (p. 697).

Tension and ambiguity notwithstanding, Dewey educated the TNR public, in ways hard to dismiss. Pitting the individual and social in opposition "distracts attention", he explained, from the crucial question of how the individual can "refind" himself "and what qualities the new individualism will exhibit" (Dewey, 1930b, p. 14). The insight parallels his previous call for the necessary restoration of "local communal life" lest the public be unable to "resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify itself" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 216).

According to Hickman (1990), throughout his work Dewey demonstrated the "individual versus society" dilemma ceases to be an issue because there is "a problem of reconciling the extremes only if one has made the mistake of separating them in the first place" (p. 169). If you avoid taking the individual as a concept abstracted out from lived consociation with others—preconditions for actual human individuality—the dualism dissolves and the objective of greater freedom from the restrictions of nature and society is converted into the more productive desire for greater intimate relations with the world allowing for heightened capacity to understand and transform it (Hickman, 1990, p. 171).

Dewey, however, also advanced a dualism of his own. Dewey had no ontology of the state (Hickman, 1990, p. 172); he had none, though, because as suggested, he naturalized the state as an emergent property of the consequences of conjoint action extending beyond those persons directly responsible (Dewey, 1927/1954, pp. 24–27). The omission informed his qualified acceptance of the state as a tool for a democratic public. He explicitly stated his "thesis": that in the distinction between public and private "we find the key to the nature and office of the state" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 15). Therein lies the rub. In Hickman's (1990) words, "what is private and what is public are treated by Dewey as tools that may be brought to bear on problematic situations in ways that 'individual' and 'society', because of the ontological baggage they carry, cannot" (p. 170). For, Dewey, though, the notions of public and private are more than "functional concepts" (p. 170), as Hickman (1990) would have it. They are keys "to the nature and office of the state", if also "tools" for reconstructing the state. The characteristics, limitations and range of possible functions of tools make them useful for particular tasks and counterproductive when used for others. "Dewey is unequivocal in his view that the state is a technological artifact" (Hickman, 1990, p. 173), a constructed and specific tool. It admittedly assumes various forms and functions from one society and epoch to the next, but it indisputably has certain defining characteristics (e.g. division between the public and private) which permit us to refer to the State. Yet even as he acceded to a state-centric framework, Dewey (1927/1954) also referred to the "idea of democracy" as "a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best" (p. 143). Perhaps better tools than the state exist for practicing democracy and for creating the conditions needed for a Great Community to emerge.

Dewey (1916/1997) famously related the revelation and comprehension of previously unacknowledged connections to education and the communication of knowledge. To study and learn from Dewey prompts us then to follow Bourne and take the democratic idea of the Great Community further. "Bourne was the first American to"—40 years before Martin Luther King Jr.—borrow the "Beloved Community" ideal "from the work of the philosopher Josiah Royce and hold it up as the ultimate fulfilment of our national project" (McCarter, 2017, para. 8). One lesson to be learned from both could be the pragmatic overcoming of the private/public distinction. That dualism could be displaced by the "commons", what Linebaugh (2009) calls "the theory"—and, we could add, informed action—"that vests all property in the community and organizes labor for the common benefit of all" (p. 8). A precondition for such a community, then, involves communicating the commons so that individuals can consociate without coercion and together seek to better understand and control the consequences of their mediated social existence. The commons could then begin to displace technological artifacts, like the state, which unnecessarily encourage individuals to exercise control over each other. Future research could unravel the lessons, found in the public pedagogies of both Bourne and Dewey taken together, for translating such a democratic experiment into action.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Nick Smaligo, Eli Kramer, Noah Springer, Phil Brewer and Larry Hickman for sharing ideas relevant to the research for, and writing of, this article.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 43–51
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1179

Article

River Activism, "Levees-Only" and the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927

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Submitted: 26 September 2017 | Accepted: 15 November | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
This article investigates media coverage of 19th and early 20th century river activism and its effect on federal policy to control the Mississippi River. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' "levees-only" policy—which joined disparate navigation and flood control interests—is largely blamed for the Great Flood of 1927, called the largest peacetime disaster in American history. River activists organized annual conventions, and later, professional lobbies organized media campaigns up and down the Mississippi River to sway public opinion and pressure Congress to fund flood control and river navigation projects. Annual river conventions drew thousands of delegates such as plantation owners, shippers, bankers, chambers of commerce, governors, congressmen, mayors and cabinet members with interests on the Mississippi River. Public pressure on Congress successfully captured millions of federal dollars to protect property, drain swamps for development, subsidize local levee districts and influence river policy.

Keywords
activism; commerce; democracy; floods; levees; media; media history; Mississippi River; river conventions

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

River conventions and river activism in the 19th and early 20th centuries shaped federal responsibility over U.S. waterways, unifying geographical and political groups around a common policy of flood and navigational improvements on the Mississippi River. Through written "memorials" sent to Congress and published in newspapers to drum up public pressure, conventions repeatedly tied the Mississippi River to national identity, framing the river as a unifying force in a divided nation, particularly after the Civil War.

The question of how to manage navigation and prevent catastrophic floods along the Mighty Mississippi provided a common exercise for Americans of different geographic areas and political stripes. This shared problem among Southern and Midwestern states also created opportunities for the emerging West to flex its growing political might by leveraging congressional votes for Mississippi improvements in exchange for interventions to Western waterways.

This article focuses on discourses that emerged from conventions and considers the press's role in producing public sentiment. The rise of river conventions coincided not only with an improvement in transportation that allowed delegates to travel longer distances for meetings, but also the rise of the advertising-driven "penny press"—whose business model eschewed partisanship for increased circulation (Schudson, 2003). Penny papers were at the leading edge of journalistic innovation before the Civil War. Horace Greeley, for instance, not only published the influential penny paper, *New York Herald Tribune*, but he also helped organize the largest river convention ever in 1847 in Chicago. Publicity for the Chicago convention in Greeley's and other Whig papers attracted 10,000 delegates to a "mud-flat" city of only 16,000 people (Williams, 1949, p. 607).

This article also posits that the press is both an effect and a producer of public consciousness. It enables cultural citizenship through the ritual of common readership. Newspapers organized what Benedict Anderson called "imagined communities" by creating the ceremony of common readership. Each reader knows that "the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not

the slightest notion" (1983, p. 35). While river conventions gained popularity through engagement with a common object of the Mississippi River, they spoke to a reading public that was organized around event-driven news. Convention delegates staged their events for news coverage, which often focused on the size and atmosphere of crowds in attendance. Delegates explicitly performed emissary-like roles on behalf of a presupposed public at home. They promoted conventions through newspaper announcements and generated news reports from the convention floor. Memorials of resolutions that emerged at a convention's conclusion were printed in newspapers and sent to Congress. They often invoked the iconic imagery of the Mississippi River such as the "Father of Waters", "the Nation's Canal", and "A Ribbon of Commerce and Empire".

These 19th gatherings would seem to be on their face the archetypal public sphere that Jürgen Habermas (1974, p. 50) idealized: one that mediated between society and the state through a salon of private citizens to air public opinion. This public opinion emerges "when a reasoning public is presupposed". Specifically, it is an opinion directed at power. It can happen formally through voting or informally through a kind of demonstration. Explicating Habermas, Nancy Fraser (1990) identifies this public as one of "discursive relations" and a theater for debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling. These self-appointed members must represent their interests as being aligned with that of a presumed public by using newspapers as their instrument.

Convention delegates performed before multiple audiences: those in attendance, as well as an audience mediated through newspapers, which included the congressional representatives they hoped to impress upon. I argue that the audience of delegates—which Michael Warner (2002) calls a public witnessing itself in visible space with a "sense of totality bounded by the event or shared physical space"—was a critical ingredient of staging news events that allowed delegates to speak to a presupposed reading public. This latter public "comes into being only in relation to texts and their circulation" (2002, p. 50). It is through this mediated public that discourses circulate. Imagining this reading public was a critical function of not only the delegate performances but also of congressional representatives who received reports about the conventions. These articles produced an image of the Mississippi River that exceeded even its vast material body. Discourses positioned the river as an organizing force of a political economy of culture and trade as it flowed through a divided nation, connecting free and slave states. The river was not only an object of intervention, but a political canvas over a diverse and contentious nation.

Methodologically, I've relied on news accounts from the period, convention proceedings, congressional records, memorials, publications by river lobbies and secondary scholarly sources. This article comes out of my ongoing dissertation research on the cultural history of the Mississippi River Delta and Louisiana coast.

2. Gibbons, Federal Jurisdiction and Political Organizing

Congress's official oversight of the Mississippi River followed the 1824 U.S. Supreme Court decision, *Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824), which upheld that the "Commerce Clause" of the U.S. Constitution gave the federal government the power to regulate river navigation. The Gibbons case, which was regularly cited as constitutional justification for federal intervention into the economy, allowed Congress to direct the Army Corps of Engineers to make navigational improvements to river channels. Early surveys of the Mississippi River revealed that the Ohio River at Louisville was crossed by 21 sandbars that "render it impassable by steamboats six months in a year". Reports confirmed that the Lower Mississippi held thousands of submerged trees or "snags" that were fatally hazardous to riverboats, while the river itself, because of its alluvial nature, constantly tried to change course (Lippincott, 1914, p. 636).

The General Survey Act, passed in 1826, provided $75,000 in appropriations for "internal improvements" in what was the first Rivers and Harbors legislation to improve navigation (Pabis, 1998). Yet flood control was officially relegated to local interests. Relying on private landowners generally led to uneven construction standards. A weak levee upriver might collapse and spread misery to all. Major storms also brought fears of saboteurs who would intentionally severe a levee across the river to release pressure on their own defenses. Without official federal oversight on flood control, any significant levee aid required political pressure on congressional representatives.

A number of destructive floods between the years 1828 and 1849 in the lower portion of the Mississippi River stoked early political stirrings for federal river and levee improvements. Advocates argued through the press that only a central government could provide enough resources for complex surveys and levee projects that individual states could not muster. Local resources were further hampered by the Panic of 1837, which coincided with multiple presidential vetoes of River and Harbor bills, as well as the Mexican War, the Seminole uprising in Florida and the advent of the railroads (Cotterill, 1919):

> Hardly a day passed that did not see the assembling of a mass meeting at some point in the quest to urge on their representatives and prepare memorials. The improvement of the Western waters, the building of hospitals and armories, the construction of levees and military roads, all these the general government was called upon to do by a people whom the panic of 1837 had left entirely without resources of their own. (Cotterill, 1919, p. 18)

Even Southern states-righters, who otherwise fought expansion of federal power, acknowledged that only fed-

eral engineers had the expertise and resources necessary to survey the Mississippi River.

An 1844 flood broke the levee at Bonnet Carré, 30 miles upriver from New Orleans, and sent the river into Lake Pontchartrain for six months, disrupting traffic. By early 1845, calls for a Southern and Western Convention came from many sources. The "river problem" provided commercial organizations and local governments in the Middle West and the South a common interest to ward off challenges from emergent railroads and the Erie Canal, both of which were publicly subsidized and capturing trade. The Port of New York prior to the Erie Canal's completion counted $33 million in imports and $31 in exports. By 1845, exports grew to $45 million, and to $75 million two years later. The increasing rivalry of the Great Lakes turned into a contest between North and South, both of which were attempting to secure an economic and political allegiance with the West (Cotterill, 1919).

The resulting Mississippi River Improvement Convention in Memphis that opened July 4, 1845 marked the first ever multi-state convention for river work. A Southern Democrat, named John C. Calhoun, was elected chairman. He called the Mississippi the "great inland sea of the country" that the government was obligated to protect and improve just as it did the Atlantic Seaboard. The memorial sent to Congress and published in newspapers called for the improvement of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and their tributaries, the deepening of the mouth of the Mississippi, and the connection of the river and the Great Lakes by ship canal. "Similar resolutions were adopted at other conventions, except that assemblies north of St. Louis were often called more specifically to (remove) rapids of the Mississippi" (Lippincott, 1914, pp. 644–645).

The *Richmond Times* published a letter by Calhoun that the river was "the common highway" among states and should be regulated by the Commerce Clause (Calhoun, 1846a). A similar report ran in *The Mississippian* that the "conclusion is irresistible that its commerce comes as fully within the power to regulate commerce as that of the coast itself" (Calhoun, 1846b). But Calhoun's preference for boosting Southern infrastructure alienated many legislators from the North and Middle West, who felt that the Upper Mississippi interests were neglected (Williams, 1949). This came to a head in August 1846, when President James Polk vetoed the Rivers and Harbors Bill, condemning the ''disreputable scramble'' for aid (O'Neill, 2006, p. 47). After the veto, William Hall, a "disaffected" Democrat and member of the Lake Steamboat Association, reached out to his contacts in Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester, Utica, Albany, Hartford, New Haven, Springfield, Boston and Providence (Williams, 1949). They hastily gathered at the Rathburn Hotel in New York to plan a second convention (American Whig Review, 1847). Organizers held pre-convention press briefings in several cities. They placed news stories featuring the coming convention and printed the lists of delegates. Whig papers such as Greeley's *New York Herald* claimed the convention was non-partisan. The *American Whig Review* stated that the convention was "so thoroughly Whiggish in its aims, although studiously and designedly divested of any mere party organization" (American Whig Review, 1847, p. 112).

Greeley in regular dispatches argued the convention would permanently guarantee the welfare of the North and West (Lippincott, 1914). The convention was preceded by a grand procession "staged with floats, bands, military units, and the inevitable gorgeously caparisoned volunteer fire companies" (Williams, 1949, pp. 608–614). The *American Whig Review* swooned:

> nothing could be better arranged, or better adapted to the ends in view, than the preparations and accommodation for the Convention, both while assembled as a body, and when scattered amongst the various public and private houses in the town. (1847, p. 112)

The paper praised the decisive unanimity of the convention "that not a case occurred, during the whole deliberations, where a sort to division by states was necessary—all questions having been carried by acclamation that amounted almost to absolute unanimity" (American Whig Review, 1847, pp. 112–113). In the convention's memorial to Congress, delegates repeatedly cited the Commerce Clause and its interpretation by multiple administrations from Jefferson to Polk to argue for river improvements (Semi-Weekly Union, 1847).

3. Flood Control and Swamp Busters

Private landowners, planters and municipal authorities couched their arguments for flood control through economic imperatives. As American settlers in the 1830s and 1840s began clearing the alluvial lands in Arkansas and Mississippi, it became increasingly clear that reliance on private landowners to provide levees was insufficient (Saikku, 2012). Yet Congress was still unwilling to dispense direct appropriations for levee building. Political pressure mounted from the South as flooding threatened newly claimed agricultural lands and growing townships. An 1849 flood deluged New Orleans when it broke through the levee at Pierre Sauvée's plantation 17 miles upriver. Within three days the water reached the French Quarter. Nervous uptown residents considered severing the levee at the New Basin Canal behind the French Quarter, soliciting the threat of armed response by downtown residents (Rogers, 2008). Three weeks later, the upper New Basin Canal collapsed, which deluged 220 midcity blocks and forced the evacuation of 12,000 residents (Colten, 2009).

After the 1849 flood, Congress acceded to pressure from Southern constituents to pass the Swampland or "Swamp-buster" Acts, which provided a mechanism for levee construction through land reclamation. Millions of acres of federal riverine bottomlands on the Mississippi

were turned over to states, which sold them to pay for levee building and flood control. As states from other parts of the country demanded similar grants, Congress extended the program in 1850 to California, Florida, Oregon, and eleven states in the Ohio–Mississippi Valley. Historian John Barry argues that Eastern politicians agreed to pass the swampland grants to keep the South from forging a political alliance with the West (Barry, 1997). By 1909, nearly 82 million acres had passed into private hands through the swampland program, some for as little as ten cents to $1.25 per acre (Wright, 1907).

The swampland program also boosted the flood control cause by sponsoring Army Corps of Engineers surveys, which consistently recommended that the federal government build protective levee projects (Barry, 1997). The program led to the formation of state levee districts which directed construction work and provided flood control advocates with a political base for lobbying efforts (O'Neill, 2006).

4. Civil War Disruptions

But the issue of slavery would shatter national political parties into sectional interests. By the 1860s, Democrats had split into Northern and Southern organizations. Regions competed for new settlement and private investment. Newspaper editors in Mississippi, for instance, recruited planters from states bordering the Mason–Dixon line, where abolitionist sentiments were growing (Harrison, 1951). A settlement boom in the Delta was comparable to a second gold rush. Cheap farmland attracted thousands of white slaveowners from the Atlantic seaboard to make their fortune. Slaves were brought in forced migration over land and sea from the older slave states to the newer cotton states. By 1850, a quarter of New Orleans' population had come from the North (Dattel, 2006).

An article reprinted in the New Orleans-based *De Bow's Commercial Review* in 1858 touted the strength of local levees to protect newly reclaimed delta farmland:

> We can levee successfully!…We have but one outlet, the Yazoo Pass, and the levee there, the heaviest and highest in the world, has stood the flood. It stood because it was properly and securely built. (Harrison, 1951, p. 13)

The population in Mississippi and Alabama doubled between 1840 and 1860 from 179,074 whites and 195,211 slaves in 1840 to 354,000 whites and 436,631 slaves in 1860. Cotton production more than doubled in half the time, from 194 million pounds in 1849 to 535.1 million pounds in 1859 (Dattel, 2006).

5. Post-War Unification

After the wholesale destruction from the Civil War, calls for river improvements focused on repairing the war-torn infrastructure and, ostensibly, the national psyche. During the 1867 St. Louis River Improvement Convention, the chairman, Gen. William Vandever of Iowa, noted sacrifices of "immense treasures of blood and money" and said the Mississippi had the power to unite "heart and hand now in burying the animosities of the past" by improving common prosperity (St. Louis Proceedings, 1867). A *New York Times* article described an 1869 river convention in New Orleans in which the Chamber of Commerce convention hall was decorated with such mottos as: "The South extends to the Northwest a cordial welcome"; "The West and the South join hands"; "The river to the sea and the sea to the river" (1869).

From 1866 to 1882, Congress passed a Rivers and Harbors bill each year which pleased local merchants, many of whom turned to river shipping to avoid the cost of railroad monopoly rates. A *New York Times* reporter in 1878 wrote from a convention in New Orleans that, "Railroads might come and go but this Mississippi River would flow on to the end of the time" (New York Times, 1878). Conventions called in St. Louis, Chicago and Quincy issued extensive arguments about freight cost savings from river shipments and the potential of new inland markets. They argued that domestic commerce was far more important to the U.S. economy than international commerce and, therefore, deserved the same congressional support as lighthouses and harbor construction. At an 1877 convention in St. Paul, one of the speakers argued that it took less time to sail across the Atlantic from Europe than to traverse 800 miles from St. Paul to St. Louis because of rocks and low water. The memorial to Congress stated, "No valid objection to improvement of our seaports, but the rivers of the Mississippi Valley are entitled to equal commercial facilities" (Waterhouse, 1877).

In the Lower Mississippi Valley, Southern activists argued that the difficulties of maintaining levees and shipping channels on the river had to be solved in tandem because they were caused by the same thing: a river that carried large volumes of silt and rapidly shifted its banks (O'Neill, 2006). Floods also crossed state borders and disrupted the political economy of the nation. Southern interests argued then (as they do now) that they carried the burden of the nation's floodwaters. States along the lower portion of the river couldn't maintain bridges and levees used by trains for interstate commerce. It was, therefore, clearly a duty of the central government to facilitate commerce (St. Louis Proceedings, 1867). Arkansas delegates said the lack of levees left the National Road from Memphis to Little Rock frequently under water and impassable (Cotterill, 1919).

6. Public Relations

Appeals for intervention were explicitly aimed to apply pressure through the press. An 1877 call by businessmen from 18 states to convene a Mississippi River Improvement Convention in St. Paul specifically focused on public relations: "to organize the public sentiment of the Mississippi Valley in support of a systematic pressure upon

Congress to recognize the importance of navigation from St. Paul to St. Louis, which was impassible during low water stages" (Waterhouse, 1877). The *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* published a call by the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce for a convention of "representative men of the Mississippi Valley, including editors of newspapers, to meet in that city, Oct. 11, for the consideration of the river improvement question" (St. Louis-Globe-Democrat, 1877). Separately, the *Daily Arkansas Gazette* out of Little Rock reprinted a column from the *Memphis Appeal*, entitled "Facts and Figures are an Unanswerable Argument in Favor of the Improvement of the Mississippi" (Young, 1877). The column was written by Rep. Casey Young, a Democrat from Tennessee, to the president of the Memphis Chamber of Commerce requesting an appointment of delegates to the St. Paul convention.

At the 1881 Mississippi River Improvement Convention meeting in St. Louis, the president of the Merchants Exchange called for the general desire "communicated through the press, emanating from various commercial bodies recognizing the importance of united and intelligent action on a subject of the most vital importance" (Official report of the proceedings of the Mississippi River Improvement Convention, 1881, p. 5). News stories of the day may have elevated self-appointed insiders as representatives of "the public", but printed accounts also reflected the complexity of satisfying the different needs of states affected by the river:

> If all the members of the eighteen great states directly interested in this grand work would pull together, they could pass a bill that would provide for the immediate commencement of the work on the Mississippi on a scale commensurate with the importance of the undertaking. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1881)

The undertaking was vast indeed and was rationalized through not only commercial appeals, but also the cultural importance of the river as an object of unification. The *New York Times* gave a hero's welcome to Jefferson Davis, the defeated president of the Confederacy, who walked into the 1878 river convention hall to a standing ovation in New Orleans. In his speech, he claimed solidarity with not only the state of Mississippi but "every state bordering upon that great river" (New York Times, 1878).

The Washington Post reported from a river convention in 1884 where the Mississippi was called the "Father of Waters" by the convention secretary GL Wright, who said:

> In no manner had the provident care of the creator for the ideal Republic been so manifested as in the location of the Mississippi River. The great empire in the West now demanded the full improvements of that great river so that it would not only float the commerce of the country, but would remain a bond of good will and fellowship between the sections. (Washington Post, 1884)

Clearly cultural appeals were common currency in tying the river to federal oversight. One question that continues to vex historians is what effect these discourses had on the Army Corps of Engineers' "levees-only" policy that increased the danger of flooding to the constituents it attempted to appease.

7. The Birth of "Levees-Only"

The disastrous 1949 floods that inundated most of the Lower Mississippi Valley and resulted in the 1849–1850 Swampland Acts also increased congressional focus onto the river itself. Floods were not the only river problem. "At the mouth of the Mississippi enormous sandbars often blocked access to the Gulf of Mexico. Sometimes 50 ships waited there for the sandbars to dissipate enough to allow passage into or out of the river; the largest ships sometimes waited as long as three months" (Barry, 1997, p. 34). There was still no consensus on how to best to control floods and improve navigation. On September 30, 1850, Congress authorized a complete survey of lower valley from Cairo, Illinois to the Gulf. "The aim was to discover the laws governing the Mississippi River and determine how to tame it" (Barry, 1997, p. 35).

Two competing reports were assigned, one to the civilian engineering faction and one to the Army Corps of Engineers. The corps report, which would take 11 years, had a lasting impact on national river management policy. Its author, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys of the U.S. Topographical Corps, suffered multiple health problems during the survey work, but finished his *Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River* just months before the Civil War. Humphreys concluded that building continuous levee lines would ''concentrate'' the flow of the river (Pabis, 1998). Assisted by Lt. Henry L. Abbot, a fellow West Point alumnus, Humphreys' survey teams painstakingly obtained data on riverine channel cross sections and topographical and geological formations. They took measurements from the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers to the mouth of the Mississippi at the Gulf of Mexico. They studied the tributaries of the Lower Mississippi. They applied insights from geology and European hydraulics to challenge the conventional wisdom about alluvial deposits.

The result, declared the *American Journal of Science*, was "one of the most profoundly scientific publications ever published by the U.S. government" (Shallat, 1990, p. 41). Their final analysis recommended closing the remaining natural outlets to maintain all water flow within the main river channel. This endorsement of a "single-channel theory" tied flood control interests to navigation interests, which was politically attractive (Pabis, 1998).

But the survey was fundamentally flawed. It assumed the riverbed consisted of hard blue clay, based on discoveries of clay deposits at the head of Bayou Plaquemine, in Bayou Lafourche and on the prairies in between. Blue clay was found in an artesian well in New Orleans and in the Yazoo Swamps in Mississippi. "Although not

one of these facts may be considered itself conclusive, it must be allowed that together they afford good grounds for doubting the recent alluvial character of the bed of the Mississippi, even as far down as the head of passes", Humphreys concluded erroneously (Pabis, 1998, p. 440). He argued that since the bed of the Mississippi River was made of clay, it could not be sufficiently "scoured" through flow restriction (Reuss, 1985).

The Corps of Engineers accepted these conclusions for decades. Though it was challenged by other civil engineers and powerful individuals, it provided political cover for Southern flood control interests. When an 1874 flood upriver from New Orleans broke the levees and deluged swaths as wide as 50 miles in some places, Congress turned to Humphreys loyalists. An appointed commission was headed by Gen. G. K. Warren, who had served under Humphreys. Henry Abbot, who coauthored the Humphreys report, sat on the commission board (Reuss, 1985). The Warren Commission conducted no fieldwork and looked only at Humphreys' report. It subsequently endorsed "levees-only" policy and blamed uncoordinated levee building by local levee districts for producing a defective system. It proposed creating regional districts with federal aid to build a system of levees, which Humphreys and Abbot had recommended in 1861. On the basis of the Warren Commission's report, in 1875 Representative Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana created a House Committee on Mississippi River Levees, which "became a battering ram for flood control interests for 35 years" (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).

By the 1880s, army engineers were building flood control levees all along the Lower Mississippi River. As the levee lines became more complete, downstream residents continued to suffer. The "levees-only" approach was causing the river to carry a greater volume of water thus forcing engineers to construct taller levees. A break in the larger, modern levees wreaked tremendous devastation. Yet other proposals to manage river flooding, such as opening spillway outlets into bayous, required the government to appropriate private lands, which was met with resistance. "Levees-only" represented a political compromise. It was supported by enough engineers and scientists, along with Delta landowners.

By the turn of the century, Southern and Western activists seeking federal flood control aid for the Mississippi and Sacramento rivers were working alongside activists seeking federal flood control aid for all navigable rivers. They broadened their public appeals and traded votes in Congress, which often passed veto-proof legislation with something for each region, giving birth to the phrase "pork-barrel" construction (O'Neill, 2006). In this sense, activists began to professionalize.

8. Professional Lobbies

In the 1880s, the Reform Movement began emphasizing rational informed citizenry and professionalism. Reformists favored pamphlets over parades and urged voters to make a rational choice among candidates and policies over emotional allegiance (Schudson, 2006). Newspapers began to open bureaus in the nation's capital at the same time as lobbyists and press agents proliferated. "One journalism critic noted that by 1920 there were nearly a thousand 'bureaus of propaganda' in Washington, D.C." (Schudson, 2003, p. 83). New lobby groups used the rhetoric of efficiency and progress favored by the Progressive Movement. The first permanent river lobby was formed in 1890 by planters and levee district boards from Louisiana and Mississippi, called the Interstate Mississippi River Improvement and Levee Association. Like the Corps of Engineers, the association opposed outlets and promoted levees, citing statistics. They established a bureau of correspondence in Washington, D.C., sent speakers to other river organizations and circulated thousands of documents.

The group's strategy was to arm delegations with "facts and figures to demonstrate the right of the people of the Mississippi Valley" and create "continual agitation" to strengthen public sentiment in favor of larger appropriations by the central government (Thompkins, 1901, p. 4,). A column by the group's president, Mississippi planter Charles Scott, addressed to "America's Businessmen", touted millions of acres of potential farmland that awaited cultivation in the Delta. "The total value of the staple crops raised on these lands heretofore brought under the plow, will approximate seventy-five millions of dollars per annum!! What a wonderful empire of richness lies here yet undeveloped". The group published columns in the Southern *Manufacturers Record* by Louisiana Supreme Court Judge N. C. Blanchard who rationalized constitutional authority for congressional intervention, as well as articles by former Mississippi Attorney General, State Senator T. C. Catchings, and Corps of Engineers officers James A. Quinn, Smith S. Leach, and T. G. Dabney among others (Thompkins, 1901).

In 1901, a separate group of New Orleans shippers and bankers formed the National Rivers and Harbors Congress in protest of the filibuster of a Rivers and Harbors bill. Adopting the slogan, ''a policy, not a project", they were the first group to consult directly with congressional committees. They held each annual meeting in Washington, D. C., where they relocated their headquarters in 1911. The group lobbied initially for flood control on the Lower Mississippi River, but eventually promoted nationwide flood control. Sen. Joseph E. Ransdell of Louisiana chaired its executive committee and traveled with other legislators in 1906 to meet with waterway associations around the country. They attracted members from shipping companies, regional trade and river organizations, chambers of commerce, farming organizations, and levee districts from other river valleys. Their 1906 convention drew 189 commercial associations and 14 governors. The 1908 convention drew 287 mayors (O'Neill, 2006). Ransdell, on his way to view the Panama Canal with a contingent of Congressmen, was quoted in the *New York Tribune* as saying the country is

waking up to the importance of a settled water policy: "We believe that the people of the country are coming to feel that in view of the terrible congestion of traffic on the rail ways, the demonstrated cheapness of transportation by water…and efficiency of water competition (to be) the best regulator of railway rates" (New York Tribune, 1907). In their 1911 convention in New Orleans, Ransdell said they had increased $20 million in expenditures to $30 million in the six years since the group was formed, and turned semi-annual bills into annual appropriations (New York Times, 1911).

By 1917, Ransdell and the National Rivers and Harbors Congress came under intense criticism for their lobbying methods. A *New York Tribune* article cites multiple examples of targeted campaigns by the NRHC against critics. Sen. Jones from Washington State accused the group of trying to "enlist the newspapers of Washington State to make a campaign against him". Sen. Kenyon of Iowa said that one of his Davenport constituents had received a letter from Sen. Ransdell regarding Mr. Kenyon's opposition to a bill. In response Sen. Ransdell said he had merely advised the Davenport correspondent to "to do all that he could with his friends to support the bill" (New York Tribune, 1917).

9. Multipurpose Approach

Despite the Corps' resistance, many engineers began to advocate various combinations of outlets and spillways at the turn of the century to address flooding. Capt. John Millis of the Fourth Mississippi River Commission District recommended construction of two artificial outlets in the levees to disperse floodwaters (Reuss, 1985). At a 1911 National Rivers and Harbors Convention, Corps' Chief Engineer W. H. Bixby said individual Corps engineers recognized the need for multipurpose developments, including power, irrigation, drainage, and bank and levee protection. The New York Board of Trade and Transportation in 1913 published a report from its members supporting multipurpose development. The president of the Mississippi River Commission, Army engineer C. M. Townsend, went on record supporting multipurpose development. The National Drainage Congress created in Chicago in 1911 called for the conservation of water and land and tied drainage improvements to public health. Some convention speakers argued that the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution justified drainage in part because of the connection of malaria to swamps (O'Neill, 2006). Yet the corps argued that such projects could harm navigation.

Meanwhile, a devastating flood in 1912 broke water records at 17 of the 18 river gauges south of Cairo, Ill., even though its volume was far less than the volume of the 1882 flood. This indicated that the riverbed of the levee-constrained river was rising. That same year, a convention of planters and levee district officials in Memphis formed the Tri-State Levee Association (later renamed the Mississippi River Levee Association), which used the devastation of the 1912 flood to argue for stronger levees. The group included business owners, lawyers and planters from Chicago to New Orleans. They lobbied for aid to the Lower Mississippi River and eventually allied with the National Rivers and Harbors Congress to support flood control aid for the Mississippi and Sacramento rivers. The group's secretary-manager, John A. Fox, wrote letters, pamphlets, and several books, and he organized a speaker's bureau (O'Neill, 2006). A book printed by the group, *A National Duty*, featured endorsements by the Democratic, Republican and Progressive parties. It featured a prominent article by the Mississippi River Commission, entitled "The Bed of the River is Not Rising" (Fox, 1914). It also included sympathetic photos of flood victims, tenants and black farm laborers stranded in the 1912 deluge (Fox, 1914).

The public relations campaign that coincided with the 1912 flood and another devastating flood the next year garnered enough public sentiment to sway all three major political parties to incorporate planks in their platforms "recognizing the national character" of the disasters and committing their candidates "to the speedy solution of the problem". The presidential nominees all specifically subscribed to declarations (*Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River Supplemental Report*, 1914). President Taft declared that the 1912 flood demonstrated that flooding on the Lower Mississippi River is a national problem. His 1912 reform party platform stated that the federal government should assume a ''fair portion'' of the burden in building levees, which also included opening Western and Southern waterways to federal protection (O'Neill, 2006, p. 118). An expanded federal presence was endorsed by the Louisiana Bankers Association, the National Drainage Congress, the New Orleans Progressive Union, and the National Flood Prevention and River Regulation Conference in New Orleans, as well as newspapers across the country (*Proceedings and Debates of the Congress*, 1912). A renewed alliance was forged between the West and South.

After years organizational work, personal politicking by activists, actions by sympathetic legislators, flood control supporters eventually won official aid for the Mississippi and Sacramento rivers with the 1917 Ransdell-Humphreys Flood Control Act (Pearcy, 2000). It directed the Corps of Engineers to provide levee aid for the Mississippi and Sacramento rivers. The federal government would pay up to two-thirds of levee construction. Local interests remained responsible for acquiring the rights-of-way and some maintenance costs.

Yet, in the spring of 1922, the lower Mississippi River flooded again. The river was so high that its tributary waters flooded six Yazoo–Mississippi Delta counties. Some critics blamed the flood on the closure of the Cypress Creek Gap by the Corps of Engineers the year before. The only remaining outlet on the Mississippi was at Old River, which was created by Captain Shreve in 1831 to shortcut the Mississippi to the Red River. The cut would later threaten to open a permanent course for the Missis-

sippi down the Atchafalaya River away from New Orleans, which is a story for another article.

10. Conclusion

During the winter and spring months of 1927, the Mississippi River well surpassed record flood stages. Prolonged rainfall in the headwaters swelled its tributaries and increased the already elevated water levels in the Lower Mississippi. In April 1927, waters began to rise precipitously, approaching 60 feet above mean sea-level. Federal levees along the Lower Mississippi began to breach. By May, floods had devastated 32 towns and cities and pushed the Ohio tributary backwards (Saikku, 2012). On May 24, the river broke through Old River and sent 30-foot waters down the Atchafalaya. The breach panicked New Orleans authorities, who convinced the Corps of Engineers and Mississippi River Commission to dynamite the levee south of the city. They used 39 tons of dynamite over 10 days, sacrificing rural farmers and fur trappers downstream to save the city. When it was over, 20 percent of the river's volume poured through a 3,200 feet wide breach into St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes (Barry, 1997).

Referred to as the greatest peacetime disaster in U.S. history by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, the 1927 floods caused staggering economic losses and human suffering. Over 16 million acres in seven states were inundated and property loss estimates varied from $236 to $363 million. Nearly 700 people are known to have died. Another 637,000 were left homeless. The American Red Cross, responsible for most of the relief work, provided food and shelter for more than 300,000 people in refugee camps. As suggested by Charlie Patton's "High Water Everywhere", black refugees were particularly harmed. Imprisoned in refugee camps, they were coerced to perform manual labor and prevented from fleeing the Delta because planters were afraid of losing their workforce (Saikku, 2012). In the aftermath of the devastation, Congress ordered the Army Corps of Engineers to examine the flood problem in a national context. As a result, the Corps Chief Lt. General Edgar Jadwin proposed a nearly $300 million program of multipurpose development for the Mississippi and its tributaries, named Project Flood (Reuss, 1982).

It would be inaccurate to attribute the failed "levees-only" policy to any one group, agency or even government. It was a manifestation of political agendas that evolved over a century. This article focuses primarily on the role of river conventions in fomenting public discourse through the press and memorials to Congress to justify federal intervention in the Mississippi River, which flowed through a diverse and contested nation. An oft overlooked form of democratic practice, river conventions organized political action that preceded the professionalized state and special interest groups we associate with contemporary democratic practices. To respond to the Mississippi River in those early American decades was to respond to changing physical and political variables. Moving through states and jurisdictions, the river forged alliances with divergent and convergent interests that swirled together for a common application or outcome, much like a whirlpool or eddy that kicks out and then re-emerges into the main current.

The Mississippi River helped suture the public body consciousness by giving conventions and newspapers a common frame of focus. It functioned discursively as an object of unification, and materially as a potentially catastrophic force. The politics of river improvement and the growing weight of the conventions and press were entangled components of emerging forms of democracy that saw a public growing in power and advocating for a larger role of its national government.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 52–61
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1189

Article

"Approaching an Abyss": Liberalist Ideology in a Norwegian Cold War Business Paper

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Submitted: 29 September 2017 | Accepted: 24 November 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
The international business press has been a powerful and influential voice in modern societies and, as its formative years took place during the Cold War, a closer look at the ideologies that were promoted in this part of the press is of interest. Until the 1970s, *Farmand* was the only Norwegian business magazine of any size and standing. Trygve J. B. Hoff, *Farmand*'s editor from 1935, was part of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), a neoliberal intellectual collective established in 1947 with participants such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. This article is a study of the ideas that Hoff promoted, particularly in *Farmand*, from the 1940s to the 1970s.

Keywords
business press; Cold War; democracy; liberalism; media; media history; Mont Pèlerin Society; Norway

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

During the Cold War, throughout the Western world business media extended its readership and increased its influence over the production of public knowledge, ideology and meaning in society—in particular with regard to what we understand as "neoliberal" ideas (Kjær & Slaatta, 2007; Parsons, 1989). According to Kjær and Slaatta (2007, pp. 35–36), the business press has been so significant that it should be considered a noteworthy element in the writing of the modern history of Western countries.

In the Nordic countries, the main expansion of the business press took place from the 1970s onwards, coinciding with a general rise, internationally, of neoliberal ideas. New business magazines emerged and existing business newspapers went "pink" (assuming the colour associated with the *Financial Times*). They all extended their scope far beyond their traditional readership.

This expansion does, however, have a prehistory in the Nordic countries as well: In Norway, the only business magazine of any considerable size and standing, until the 1970s, was *Farmand*. This magazine, first established in 1891, is an interesting case because it was an early proponent of neoliberalism in the media during the post-war era—a time when neoliberal thought was still rather marginal. Despite the hegemony of social democracy and Keynesian economics, *Farmand* doubled its number of subscribers six times during the post-war period (Eia, 1992, p. 34). Post-war Norway experienced unprecedented social mobility and increasing prosperity and, consequently, an increasing number of potential business press readers. *Farmand*'s success, however, also owed much to its longstanding editor, the economist Trygve J. B. Hoff. Hoff "was" *Farmand* from 1935 until around 1970, when his son took on an increasing responsibility for the magazine. In the 1980s its circulation dropped, partly as a result of competition from new business publications but probably also because the voice of Hoff Sr. had disappeared (he died in 1982). In 1989 (ironically, the same year as the Berlin Wall came down) the magazine ceased publishing.

Farmand is also—and by no means least—interesting because Hoff was one of the approximately 40 founders

of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), a neoliberal intellectual collective named after the place in Switzerland where it first met. The MPS was established in 1947 with prominent members like Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, and was made up of scholars, politicians, corporate leaders, and journalists, all of whom developed a long-term strategy to secure liberal ideas and free markets (Plehwe, 2009). In order to achieve this goal, the MPS used what they termed "long-range artillery" (e.g. publications and think-tanks) and "short-range artillery" (e.g. book reviews and interviews) throughout the post-war decades. According to Plehwe (2009, p. 3), the strategy gained these intellectuals increasing and considerable influence—he describes neoliberalism as "one of the most powerful bodies of political knowledge of the current era".

Liberalism is a difficult ideology to pin down because it can be interpreted in so many ways. There were also differences between the MPS members, a group with a range of different backgrounds, aspirations and goals. In Plehwe's words, neoliberalism consists of several different schools and varieties and is a "major ideology that is poorly understood but, curiously, draws some of its prodigious strength from that obscurity" (2009, pp. 1–3).

Hoff was one of the original journalists in the MPS; he was among those who attended the greatest number of its meetings—and he was the only Norwegian. As the owner and editor of the only proper Norwegian business magazine, Hoff was consequently the MPS's spearhead into the Norwegian public space. In this article, I assess the kind of political opinions that Hoff promoted by examining, in particular, samples of his editorials in *Farmand* at regular intervals during the first three post-war decades. I analyse the rhetorical strategies Hoff used and interpret them in light of the ongoing ideological war, but I also discuss the type of liberalism—or political views at large—that he represented. Finally, I briefly discuss whether the views he represented have had any long-term influence.

There have been some earlier studies on *Farmand* and on Hoff, but they concentrated either on the transition from "old-school" to "new-school" business media in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly after Hoff's active period (Eia, 1992), or on Hoff as an economist (Mjøset, 2011a, 2011b; Sæther & Hanisch, 2005). Although Hoff can be regarded as one of the progenitors of neoliberalism in Norway, the contents of *Farmand* during his reign have not been studied systematically. There are, however, good reasons for doing so. Hoff was an influential editor, but the value of studying a magazine like *Farmand* also lies in its broad focus on ideology, history and culture. It published essays and op-eds on business but also on art, philosophy and politics during the Cold War, and these traits also characterise its editorials. The new business media, on the other hand, was far more technical, news-oriented and investigative (Eia, 1992); hence Hoff's writings can provide an insight into a broader "cosmology" of thought, as far as both business issues and wider societal issues are concerned.

It should also be noted that in 1939 Hoff defended a doctoral thesis, having been encouraged to do so by the professor of Economics—and later the very first winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics—Ragnar Frisch. The thesis was praised in several newspapers and international journals (Sæther & Hanisch, 2005, p. 1), but in later years scholars disagreed on the importance of Hoff's academic work (Mjøset 2011a, 2011b; Sæther & Hanisch, 2005). After his PhD, Hoff never used his training in economics to seek a career in academia, but it was an important backdrop to his use of the magazine to advocate a political and economic ideology that would eventually exert considerable influence in society.

2. Corpus, Literature and Approach

This article is largely a study of *Farmand*'s editorials from two months of a year, every fifth year, from the late 1940s through to the early 1970s. I have also read Hoff's commentaries in other issues, or on other pages, in cases where they were referred to in the selected editorials, as in certain cases this has supplemented the depiction of the themes he brought up in his editorials. Public access to *Farmand* is limited, as it is one of the few Norwegian publications unavailable at the Norwegian National Library.[1] To make sure the limited number of issues studied—49 in all—does not give a distorted impression of Hoff's writing, I also consulted the book *Trygve J. B. Hoff. Tanker og ideer* (*Trygve J. B. Hoff. Thoughts and Ideas*), which was published in connection with his 80th birthday in 1975. One must assume that the excerpts of Hoff's texts collected in this book—from *Farmand* and elsewhere—were picked because they were regarded as particularly representative of the messages he wanted to convey. In addition, I scrutinised his book *Fred og fremtid* (*Peace and Future*), a combination of a political philosophy and a liberalist manifesto of 1945, written during the war. Media texts are immediate reactions to ongoing events, and sometimes need more contextualisation—and thus both these books have contributed to my attempts to draw a picture of Hoff that is as accurate as possible. Finally, I based my article on other studies of Hoff, and on other relevant literature.

Most of the editorials are from March and October in 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1973, although the last week of March 1948 is replaced by the first week of April due to the Easter holiday. October 1963 was unavailable and therefore replaced by September. Most of the main editorials are more like op-eds in scope, but many issues also include one or two shorter editorials. I decided not to extend my study beyond the first half of the 1970s because at that point many of the editorials no longer bear Hoff's unmistakable signature (they were all unsigned, but Hoff Sr. had his own, easily detectable style).

[1] I am therefore very grateful to the Norwegian Central Bank for having lent me the volumes in their possession necessary to carry out this study.

My approach is based on critical discourse analysis, an approach in which text is analysed according to its political and social context. Fairclough (2016) has developed a three-dimensional framework describing discourse as a "mode of political and ideological practice" which "establishes, sustains and changes power relations" in society and "contributes to reproducing and to transforming society and to the construction of knowledge and belief" (Fairclough, 2016, pp. 62ff.). In Fairclough's view, the text cannot be seen independently of the discursive practice surrounding it (production, distribution and consumption)—or of the outer layer of social practice—and all these layers also overlap to a degree. I will present examples that are representative of Hoff's views on a set of issues, more specifically the relationship between economic and political freedom, his views on political friends and foes, the relationship between liberalism and conservatism, between economic and cultural liberalism, and between liberalism and democracy.

3. Context and Biography

3.1. National Context

First, some context. In the post-war years, the Norwegian Labour Party was more or less permanently in office until 1965, its position only being disrupted by a two-month centre-right government in 1963. The party had a revolutionary past, but defined itself as reformist from the 1930s onwards. The Soviet Union's contribution to winning the war in 1945 prompted a short-lived but strong surge of support for the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP). The NKP gained almost 12 percent of the votes in the general election, and the party even had two seats in a post-war national government coalition (which included all political parties) for just over four months. The public sentiment that brought the communists to power, however, soon changed. As we step into *Farmand*'s universe in 1948, the Czech Communist Party had just staged its *coup-d'etat*, and the Soviet Union offered Norway's neighbour Finland a so-called friendship pact. There was widespread fear that Norway would be subjected to the same treatment, and the Communist Party was reduced by half in the ensuing general election and it became politically marginalised. After this, no totalitarian party emerged in Norway until a minor Marxist-Leninist party was established in the early 1970s.

There were naturally profound differences between the two major political parties of the country, Labour and the Conservatives, but there was also a certain degree of consensus during the post-war era, and the Conservatives were even Keynesians to some extent (Sejersted, 1984, pp. 61ff.). Partly as result of Norway's participation in the Marshall Plan, the country was rebuilt after the war within the frames of what Ruggie (1992) termed "embedded liberalism"—a liberalisation of the international trade regime combined with sufficient domestic elbow-room to build up a well-functioning welfare state at home. Some Labour politicians advocated a bridge-building approach to Moscow but, as a NATO member from 1949, Norway also became one of the US's most loyal allies, so loyal indeed that representatives of the Labour Party's left wing later broke away and established a new party.

3.2. Hoff's Background

Born in 1895, Hoff had been opposed to communism since being a young man, and he had feared the European Labour parties since they started to gain power. As a young economist who had studied in the US and France, he worked for a time as a financial commentator, including at *Dagbladet*, a major Norwegian daily, under the name "Investor". In 1935 he bought *Farmand* as a reaction to the first Norwegian Labour government (after a 1928 government that had lasted less than three weeks) and immediately started using the magazine to advocate individualism against collectivism.

Hoff was also a staunch anti-Nazi. When German warships sailed unhindered into Norwegian harbours in 1940, his worst expectations of Nazism—but also of the Labour government—were confirmed. The occupation was made possible partly by the government's neutrality policy, which made Norway quite unprepared when the German attack struck (Sverdrup, 1996, pp. 17ff.). To Hoff, this event remained—throughout his many years as a *Farmand* writer—an illustration of the many deficiencies of social democratic politics (see, for instance, 4 October 1958, 9 March 1963; see also "Day of shame", 18 April 1970, as cited in Hoff, 1975, p. 217). That in June 1940 *Farmand* was forbidden "forever" (*für immer*) by the occupiers probably contributed to his disapproval of both the Germans and the poor Norwegian defence—as well as the fact that he also spent time in a Nazi prison camp.

In the 1930s, he had taken an interest in the so-called calculation debate—a debate regarding whether or not it is possible to perform economic calculations in socialist societies. This debate had been initiated by the economist Ludwig von Mises (Plehwe, 2009, p. 20) and was followed up by Friedrich Hayek, a later winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics. Although Hoff first published the study as a book, Ragnar Frisch recommended that he submit it as a dissertation—but Frisch also disagreed with Hoff's conclusions and in 1941 the two had a fierce exchange of letters initiated by Hoff (see e.g., Hoff, 1975, pp. 49ff.). *Fred og fremtid*, published a few years later, has been described as the Norwegian version of Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* (Mjøset, 2011a). After the war, Hoff resumed publication of *Farmand*, and when the MPS was established in 1947 he was invited to join by Hayek.

The MPS consisted of a wide range of groups and individuals with differing ideas about what liberalism meant. As the scholars included people as diverse as Mises and Hayek or other economists such as Wilhelm Röpke and Milton Friedman, as well as the philosopher Karl R. Pop-

per, their viewpoints varied a great deal. The first detailed ten-point draft amendment proved too explicit for the attendants to agree on, and had to be redrafted into a more diluted "statement of aims" stating that the central values of civilisation were in danger. It pointed out that the crisis had to be analysed and the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds hostile to liberty had to be combatted; rule of law re-established; private rights secured; minimum standards for the functioning of the market established; and an international order conducive to peace and liberty encouraged (Plehwe, 2009, pp. 22–26).

Hoff translated and published material from the MPS network in *Farmand*, and he also circulated *Farmand* articles to the network. In a special issue on the magazine's 50th anniversary in 1951, most of the founders of the MPS were represented (Mjøset, 2011a, p. 184). In a foreword to *Trygve J. B. Hoff. Tanker og ideer* (Hoff, 1975), Arvid Brodersen, professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research in New York, made special mention of the numerous contributions from people such as Mises, Hayek, Friedman and Popper (but also Gottfried Haberler, Joseph Schumpeter and Jacques Rueff) in *Farmand* through the years (Brodersen, 1975, p. XX). Hoff, on his part, described the prominent MPS members Mises and Röpke as his personal friends (8 March 1958). In connection with the tenth anniversary of the MPS, Hoff wrote an article touching upon the difficulties that the MPS had had in overcoming their differences, but he also asserted that there had been common ground: "Everybody present agreed that a socialist economy will end in serfdom and misery. They all regarded collectivism as a serious danger to our Western civilisation", Hoff wrote (22 March 1958).

4. *Farmand* in the Post-War Years

4.1. Economic and Political Freedom

Hoff used his magazine to criticise taxation, price regulation and all other kinds of state intervention. In his opinion, regulation was at the root of all economic problems. Price subsidies would not speed up the economy and would only impose more taxes on the citizens (30 October 1948). The cause of rising prices was the politics of the Labour Party (14 March 1953). The reasons behind housing shortages in the capital, Oslo, were the mortgage regulations and the interventions in the real estate market (31 October 1953, 18 October 1958). In Hoff's view, Norwegians quite simply did not understand the laws of economics. This caused him a lot of frustration, but it also provided him with an important mission:

> We regard the Norwegian people as uneducated when it comes to economics, and they know depressingly little about the connection between politics, economics and individual existence….There is everywhere a need for ever new knowledge and new recognition about how humans live together. We see it as our clear duty to do what we can to share this knowledge. (17 October 1953)

So far, Hoff's opinions are in line with how mainstream economic liberalism is normally understood: regulation is bad for the economy, deregulation good. However, Hoff was also of the opinion that economic and political freedom were inseparable. And not only did he regard political liberalism as a prerequisite for economic liberalism, he was also of the opinion that political freedom could not exist without economic freedom. This is evident, for example, in one of the excerpts that he chose for his 80th birthday collection: "A consistent state price regulation is not only an economic measure. If it is to be implemented, it is not only the free price formation that will be destroyed but freedom itself" (1 March 1952, as cited in Hoff, 1975, p. 201). According to Tribe (2009, pp. 75–76), this turning of the idea of classical liberalism on its head was in itself one of the defining characteristics of the new liberalism found at the MPS: economic liberalism became a prerequisite for a free society, not a part of it.

In several of his texts, Hoff expressed serious concern for what regulation of business would lead to in terms of political freedom—as, for example, in 1953, when he opposed the proposal for a law on the date stamping of eggs and milk. He claimed that he was not against date stamping, but that it was something consumers and housewives should take care of, not the state. "If the state begins to protect us in one way, then it will start protecting us in another way, and then the next thing we will have is the entire absolutist state that also tells us what to say and write" (14 March 1953).[2]

Hoff repeatedly expressed support and concern for human rights (see, for example, 20 March 1948, 25 October 1958, 9 March 1963). In 1975 he also reprinted text samples—from both the beginning and the end of his career—in which he stressed the importance of a free press. In 1949 he wrote:

> Our modern democracy must build on the principle of the rights of the opposition. But no opposition is able to perform activities that are important for society without press organs as a mouthpiece. This principle must always be maintained and honoured. (30 July 1949, as cited in Hoff, 1975, p. 195)

This point was repeated again in 1973: "A free press—a prerequisite for the freedom of the people" (17 November 1973, as cited in Hoff, 1975, p. 221).

As the relationship between the allies and the Soviet Union cooled after the Second World War, the mem-

[2] The discussion about the relationship between economic and liberal freedom was also a main topic in Hoff's correspondence with Frisch from 1941. He did not understand how Frisch could be in favour of a free intellectual life and at the same time in favour of regulating business. "If you want to fight for a free intellectual life, you have to fight for free business as well. It is the same front" (Hoff, 1975, p. 53).

ory of Nazi totalitarianism was transformed into an argument against the Soviet Union and also against any real or assumed sympathisers with the Soviet Union. Hoff was not alone in this. For many Norwegians, the coup in Czechoslovakia and the "offer that Finland could not refuse" in the spring of 1948 were defining moments. In fact, by the end of the 1940s, it became quite common, in both the Labour and the Conservative press, to draw parallels between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union (Skre, 2010), and many Norwegian politicians wanted to take measures against home-grown communists. From 1947 the authorities stepped up a massive but secret surveillance scheme directed against anyone believed to have any kind of (widely defined) communist sympathies—a scheme that later became a scandal when its full scope was revealed. In 1948 the parliament's foreign affairs committee was actually closed down in order to keep the communist MPs out and was not reopened until 1950 when the NKP was no longer represented in parliament (Løvold, 2002).

The fear of a new totalitarian occupation remained a recurrent theme in Hoff's writings throughout his life. But as a liberal who claimed to be in favour of all manner of freedom of speech and other political freedoms, his reactions to the communist threat were conspicuous. In practice, he was willing to impose both *Berufsverbot* and press censorship if necessary.

In Hoff's opinion, Norwegian NKP members should not only be excluded from the foreign affairs committee, but should also not be allowed to work in the army, in the police—or even in the higher ranks of the Norwegian equivalent of the BBC, the Norwegian Broadcasting Company, NRK (6 March 1948). This was in stark contrast to his liberal views on the rights of the opposition cited above—as well as, for that matter, in the same editorial, where he also stated that he was against press censorship. He said that he was aware of the kinship between his opinions and the McCarthyism of the US—which, he assured his readers, he did not like.

But this incident apparently called for an exception and is an indication that he did not always grant his opponents the same political freedoms that he enjoyed himself. A similar episode took place some years later when Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen visited Tito's Yugoslavia (often called a socialist state with a human face). The prime minister was heavily criticised for being "celebrated by communist executioners and enemies of the West" (4 October 1958). To have these opinions was, of course, Hoff's democratic right, but the interesting thing is that he also stated that there should not have been any press reports of the visit. Apart from his opinions of the NRK, this is the only instance of opposition to press freedom in my limited sample. On the other hand, it is a rather strong view—an influential editor in the free Western press publicly stating that a Norwegian state visit to another country should have been censored.

4.2. Social Democrats

In Hoff's view, one did not have to be a communist to be a threat to society. He regularly also indicated that representatives of the elected Labour government were unreliable in that respect.

The relative consensus in practical politics between Labour and the Conservatives did not make a particularly strong impression on Hoff. He accused the Labour leaders of being liars and of "deceiving their voters" (3 October 1953), and he did not shy away from exaggeration, as when he stated that Labour assured everyone of their "indomitable love of freedom, but all attempts at independence from workers, shop stewards, managers are smashed" (25 October 1958). Sometimes he seemed indifferent to the fact that Norwegian post-war politics was run by an elected government in a parliamentarian democracy, and he expressed a measure of offence at the fact that it was "obvious" parliament was "going to pursue the politics of its majority" (10 October 1953). Lawmaking that introduced even minor levels of increased planning in the mixed economy—as was the case in Norway (and most nations)—was equal to "going East", or "going to Moscow" (8 March 1958, 21 September 1963), and was even described as "infiltrating the economy" (10 October 1953).

Some of his statements could be seen primarily as the rhetoric of a man who disagreed with the current government and hoped to convert a few voters to the right. But the way in which allusions to the lack of "freedom" was regularly used to try to create a link between social democracy and totalitarianism was rather more serious. He indirectly accused the elected government of "depriving Norway of the freedom we have had for a 150 years" (10 October 1953) (since independence from Denmark in the nineteenth century—author's note)[3] or used phrases such as "[i]n 1945 Norway regained its freedom, at least from its Hitlerian oppression" (1 March 1958). According to Hoff, Norway had even "slid away from rule of law, from a state which takes care of *individual* rights, to an administrative state which exercises close to unrestricted power in the name of the *collective*" (22 March 1958, italics in original).

In the first issue following Constitution Day (17 May) in 1954, he wrote that instead of talking about the constitution and the freedom the Norwegian people had gained one and a half centuries earlier, the speakers should have called for the freedom that the Norwegian people had *lost* (22 May 1954, italics in original, as cited in Hoff, 1975, p. 203).

On some occasions, he was also close to alleging that the Labour Party was secretly trying to impose socialism (understood as communism, not social democracy). An article with his signature from autumn 1963, entitled *Society's Danger no. 1*, following up the editorial in the same issue, is particularly interesting. It problema-

[3] Norway was under Danish rule for 400 years until 1814, then in a union with Sweden, headed by the Swedish king, until 1905.

tises Labour's own use of the word "socialism", which Hoff found unclear. In a public document, the Labour Party had defined socialism as quite simply the direction that Norway had taken during the last decades—in other words, social democracy. But Hoff insisted that socialism was something else: state ownership of the means of production and total state control of business. Hoff's underlying argument was that when Labour did not admit this they were trying to blur their real intentions (28 September 1963).

In all the cases above we see that Hoff uses different rhetorical strategies to promote his views. Examples are *presuppositions* (a communist is by definition disloyal to his nation); *metaphors* ("going East" for social-democratic lawmaking); *coherence* (connecting Stalin to Hitler and social democrats to Stalin, or connecting the loss of freedom during the German occupation to post-war lawmaking), and *straw man argumentation* (arguing against his own definition of post-war social democracy). But Hoff's terminology also frequently indicates that this is more than strategy and that he really expects social democracy to deprive Norway of its freedom. Sometimes his expressions are so conspicuously controversial that it is unlikely he would have risked the social costs of uttering them if he had not meant what he said. For example, ahead of the general election of 1953, Hoff not only expressed concern for the country but even alarm, if Labour were re-elected. "When you see individuals or groups of people march steadily towards an abyss, it is our simple human duty to stop them", he wrote. It was necessary to act before it was too late: "For we are approaching an abyss, the abyss that is called the slumming of society and the debasement of the individual" (10 October 1953).

4.3. Non-Socialist Parties

Hoff's fear of totalitarianism did not apply only to the political left. The non-socialist party "Venstre" (Liberal Democrats) represented a danger as well: the politics of Venstre was "just as dangerous as socialism itself. If the weak gives the strong his little finger, he can be sure he will lose his whole hand" (10 October 1953). He later claimed that the Conservatives cooperated with both "total and half-socialist parties" (8 March 1958), and the term half-socialist for the Liberal Democrats was repeated when Liberal Democrats and Conservatives (and two additional non-socialist parties) formed a coalition government in 1963 (21 September 1963).

To Hoff, even the Conservatives were playing with dangerous socialist thoughts. In 1953 there are several interesting references to an important ongoing debate, a debate that contributed to changing the Norwegian Conservative party. Some prominent younger members of the party had set out to disclose the ideological roots of conservatism, inter alia by studying the eighteenth-century philosopher Edmund Burke (see, for example, Langslet, 1975; Sejersted, 1984, pp. 172ff.). Burke was a deeply conservative philosopher who was disgusted by the social uprooting that had resulted from the French Revolution but who was nevertheless in favour of personal freedom and careful social reform because he was ultimately of the opinion that society had to change. He also acknowledged that free people needed to live in a community with others—he did not understand freedom as something "lonely, individual, detached, egotistic" (as cited in Langslet, 1975, p. 34). In other words, Burke took a position not only in opposition to totalitarian communism, or to what would later be known as fast-track social democratic reform, but also in opposition to the most extreme forms of liberalism.

In Hoff's view, this was also too leftist. The young Conservatives had moved to the left, and the mother party with them: "We, who think it is more important to be non-socialists than conservative, characterise it as regrettable that Norway does not have a real conservative party" (8 March 1958, italics in original). When in 1963 the Conservatives proposed a programme for old age pensions, it was *Farmand*'s opinion that this would lead to the state taking control of "almost all private savings in Norway" (30 March 1963). The conservative-centre coalition in the autumn of 1963 was also commented on in this way: the non-socialist parties "would in the long run gain from stating that they do not want a socialist society with full state-directed corporate governance and with the abolition of private ownership of the…means of production" (21 September 1963). He again regretted that the Conservatives had "ceased being a conservative party and become liberal", which made him miss "having a really conservative party in Norway".

5. Hoff's Liberalism

5.1. A Liberal Dilemma

How could it be that Hoff, a declared liberal, could use "liberal" almost as a word of insult, and at the same time regret that the Conservative Party was not conservative enough? One reason, of course, is that the word "liberalism" entails different meanings. Both Plehwe (2009, p. 2) and Hoff himself touches upon the fact that "liberal" is also used to describe more leftist views. As Hoff puts it on 8 March 1958: "Even opponents of free markets call themselves liberal".

However, from a democratic perspective, there is a problem with a liberalism where political freedom presupposes economic freedom, as it practically rules out political opinions which limit economic freedom in any way, as the examples above indicate. Hoff's writings display these tensions in full.

At this point, it is important to step out of *Farmand*'s universe again and consult Hoff's *Fred og fremtid*, his overall manifesto of 1945, which gives an even more comprehensive account of his worldview. The book was written in the middle of a devastating war, but there is little doubt that he continued to stand by many of the opin-

ions it expressed—over 100 pages of it were reprinted in *Tanker og ideer* in 1975.

The main theme in *Fred og fremtid* is how to avoid war. It was difficult, but not impossible. The argument, which is built up over almost 500 pages including notes and an appendix, goes partly like this: human beings have three basic needs and instincts—for nutrition, sex and recognition (Hoff, 1945, p. 395). If they get these things, they will be less aggressive and war will be easier to avoid.

That nutrition, sex and recognition are fairly basic needs is relatively uncontroversial. From this point of departure, however, Hoff concluded that societies under economic liberalism were best at avoiding war whereas war propaganda would find particularly fertile soil in authoritarian societies. Socialist societies were the case in point, as they reduced the populace to poverty and unhappiness, and made them long for improvements (Hoff, 1975, pp. 386ff.).

But even societies with economic freedom had to overcome a few challenges. Hoff then embarked on a lengthy discussion about the possibilities of achieving sexual happiness, which is of little interest to this article. More relevant were his opinions on nutrition and recognition. The best way of securing the maximum amount of *nutrition* for human beings was by allowing free enterprise (Hoff, 1945, p. 395). *Recognition* was a concept with two sides, one related to envy—which was normally fuelled by the fact that a society contains different social strata. This was impossible to change. But there was a solution: to teach children from an early age that there are differences in talents and rank and that there are winners and losers. People accepted this in sport and they should accept it in society as well, and thereby become more tolerant, as they would then understand that this was only part of the natural order (Hoff, 1945, pp. 399ff.).

In a society with noticeable inequality, a certain degree of unemployment was unavoidable. The solution was to teach people that unemployment was not shameful but a necessity, and a prerequisite for the economy to function. Unemployment was, of course, a strain for those affected, but this could also be solved by offering them therapy. "Mental-hygienic measures of this kind can contribute strongly to reducing friction, discontent and aggression, and is, therefore, an important tool to eliminate war", Hoff wrote (1945, p. 404).

This, in short, was Hoff's recipe for avoiding war. The book gives the impression of a man with a total belief in liberalism as the solution to all problems. This may explain his denouncement of all kinds of politics that did not guarantee full freedom. It also explains why social democracy—and most other democratic approaches that did not stand for total liberalism—could only be regarded as different degrees of totalitarianism.

But this also poses an intriguing paradox. It may seem that Hoff was a victim of what the philosopher Hans Skjervheim has called "the liberal dilemma". In an essay from 1968, Skjervheim claims that unlimited liberalism has a totalitarian side because it demands that everybody subscribes to it—otherwise they would not be proper liberals. The protagonist in Skjervheim's example "accepts and tolerates everything, as long as it does not conflict with his fundamental view: everybody should be free, but within the frame that he has defined" (Skjervheim, 1968, p. 13). In other words, there are types of liberalism that are so extreme that they become illiberal.

5.2. Cultural Liberalism

It should be noted that Skjervheim's essay included all kinds of liberalism—including what we could call cultural liberalism—and argued that the liberal dilemma also affected the most consistent cultural liberalists. There is, however, little evidence that Hoff was a liberal in the cultural sense of the word, but this only proves the point. For one thing, his magazine is relatively devoid of the liberal currents that characterised the period from the 1960s at least—for example, women's liberation. *Farmand* was not only a magazine by business people and economists for business people and economists, it was also a magazine by men for men. The women were always very few and far between, and they were mostly found in jokes or cartoons—as buxom, blonde secretaries or even more buxom, fur-clad, discontented, middle-aged wives. This joke is typical: a wife disapproved with her husband's propensity to watch other women's legs. The husband answered: "When on a diet, is a man not even allowed to look at the menu?" (23 March 1963). I see no visible change in the presentation of gender from the 1940s to the 1970s.

In fact, Hoff directly opposed measures that were liberal in the cultural sense. The debate about a new and more modern orthographic norm in the 1950s is illustrative. After 400 years under Danish rule, Norway's official written language had come to be based on Danish. As part of the democracy and independence movement of the nineteenth century, a new written language was constructed, based more on vernacular Norwegian. In the twentieth century, there were attempts to merge the two into so-called *samnorsk*, and fierce debates about this took place in the post-war decades. Hoff was very much against not only this reform (11 October 1958), but also against the fact that people campaigned for this and for other issues he disapproved of. When the possibility that both *samnorsk* campaigners and teetotallers—another group he disapproved of—could establish new political parties was discussed, he scorned the idea and claimed that these were already minorities with too much power (23 March 1963). There may have been good reasons for his disapproval, but it also indicates that when it came to cultural issues Hoff was not particularly supportive of the diversity he promoted in business life.

The interesting thing, however, is the element of alarmism also in his argumentation against orthographic reform, and the cultural conservatism it displays: "*Samnorsk* will contribute to Norwegians continuing on their

way to becoming a people of slobs", he wrote (11 October 1958). The reform was dangerous in both a cultural and national sense: For one thing, he feared that it would affect the precise language of science—but he also pointed out that language was one of the most important factors for binding a nation together. Fortunately, he concluded, human beings, after all, had a "natural urge to better their position" and there were subsequently people in all parts of society who wanted "their children to speak a language…that reveals that they are cultivated people" (11 October 1958).

It is natural to see his opposition (or indifference, as with regard to women's liberation) to cultural change in connection with his fears for Western civilisation. His forceful wording when it came to cultural matters indicates that he regarded not only the demise of economic liberalism but also the rise of more cultural liberalism as a threat to the world as he knew and preferred it.

5.3. "The Best of Liberalism, Democracy and Aristocracy"

So, to return to the initial question, what kind of liberalism, or political views, was Hoff promoting? Was Hoff, born in 1895, just an old-fashioned man with limited ability to accept that he was living in a new world? He could definitely be seen that way—after all, when he wrote *Fred og fremtid* he was already nearing 50, an age considered fairly old a few generations ago. In one editorial, Hoff harked back to the "free circumstances in an internationalised world as we knew it before 1914", when "free conditions" were still "a natural world order" and "the economic approach based on Adam Smith's ideas was…still dominant" (20 March 1948).

Could it be that he was not really a liberal in any sense of the word, but a conservative free-market supporter? If one accepts Skjervheim's "liberal dilemma", his "liberalism" excluded most other views—and, in a way, representative democracy as such. His programme in *Fred og fremtid* supports this interpretation. In this book, he invented what he called "liberocracy—a government by the free for the free". He elaborates: "The word was originally a combination of 'liberalism' and 'democracy'. My enthusiasm for democracy is however relatively restrained and in some cases, I prefer the aristocratic (not by birth) government, in which 'the best' will govern". He proposed a kind of half-representative government, where the worthy would govern and the unworthy were kept out: liberocracy was, therefore, a combination of "the best of liberalism, democracy and aristocratic government" (Hoff, 1945, p. 46).

6. Wider Implications

What are the wider implications of this? Based on one single outlet and a book from 1945 we cannot, of course, draw the conclusion that this is what neoliberalism has really been about. But we may suggest that this is what one of the different neoliberalisms was about. Plehwe (2009, p. 26) has noted that the MPS manifesto had a notable lack of reference to the range of human and political rights traditionally embraced by liberals. They were all "driven by the desire to learn how to effectively oppose what they summarily described as collectivism", but the democratic spirit of the members varied (Plehwe, 2009, p. 6). Some kinds of liberalism may subsequently be seen more as a replay for the idea of free markets—a contest that had been lost following two devastating wars and the Great Depression—than a fight for liberal societies as such.

Based on the corpus presented above, it seems that the liberalism that Hoff promoted was primarily another such chance to fight for free markets, and maybe also for the world of yesterday. But did the fact that Hoff was an influential Norwegian journalist affect Norwegian politics, or the Norwegian press, in the long run?

There was some kind of continuity between the old and new school business press in Norway. Some prominent representatives of the new outlets did write in *Farmand* at an early stage of their careers. When the Berlin Wall fell, the new business press often took it more or less for granted that a victory for democracy and a victory for free markets were the same thing (a paradox, since most democracies at the time were, and still are, mixed economies in one sense or other of the word) (Fonn, 2015). But as Tribe (2009) noted, this was an idea that originated much earlier and was shared by far more people than Hoff alone.

There were occasions where the opportunity to confuse social democracy with communism was happily seized upon in the new school outlets as well (Fonn, 2015), but it was generally obvious that this was primarily used as an effective rhetoric tool. The mixture of free-market ideology and cultural conservatism that Hoff represented seemed to be less common in the business press of the early post-Soviet era.

The Conservative Party in Norway did also not develop in this direction. The party has been characterised by a tension between more free-market liberalism and the socially responsible conservatism that the discussion in the 1950s was all about (Notaker, 2013), but it has not in general combined extreme economic liberalism with alarmist cultural conservatism. Mjøset (2011b, pp. 55–56) also points to the fact that the neoliberal ideology that eventually did gain ground in the Norwegian political administration was different from the ideas promoted by Hoff. They were more pragmatic and more indebted to the macroeconomic ideas developed by Ragnar Frisch and his fellow economists during the initial post-war years.

On the other hand, in many European countries, the relatively moderate politics of the conservative parties also opened new opportunities to their right. In modern right-wing populism, the combination of anti-state economic approaches and cultural alarmism is not uncommon. Since 1989, the perceived threat of communism

has furthermore been replaced by a perceived threat from immigration, and in particular from Islam. For example, the Norwegian populist right-wing party, established in 1973, started as an anti-tax and anti-regulation party but developed into an anti-immigration party that has thrived on public concerns for the future of Western civilisation. (This party is currently also in government with the Conservatives, so the political landscape is still changing).

It must be said that Hoff was no racist. On one occasion he claimed to support the American Civil Rights movement (although this editorial, of 22 March 1958, seemed to be as much about the oppression of businesspeople in Norway as of black people in the US). He also found the "broad sympathy" for the black majority in South Africa very understandable—although at one point he described the sympathy as so uncritical that there was "reason to put things a bit in place before the sense of proportion is completely lost" (14 January 1961). It would also be unfair to call Hoff a populist, especially in view of his "restrained enthusiasm for democracy". But there is also little doubt that his anti-state rhetoric and expressed fear for Western culture played on the same strings as has right-wing populism in subsequent years. Some of his phrases bear a significant resemblance to current-day Eurabia conspiracy theories and doomsday prophecies according to which Islam is believed to take over the free world. In other words, right-wing populism could well be the political heritage of the kind of neoliberalism Hoff advocated.

There is an indication of this in the last year of my sample. Despite his criticism, at times Hoff also expressed support for a Conservative government as the best to hope for. However, in 1973 he endorsed Mogens Glistrup, the leader of a new Danish populist party (17 March 1973) which started as an anti-tax party, was a model for the Norwegian populist party established the same year, and later became an anti-immigration party.

Currently, the press and public debate often expresses concern regarding the rapid changes in the political landscapes of the post-war democracies, and many find it difficult to understand their origins. New political currents certainly have multiple backgrounds, but some seem to have developed over decades as a part of the public debate. More research should, therefore, be done into the tensions between various ideologies as they developed in the press during the Cold War.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 62–72
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v6i1.1195

Article

The Media Protest of Neighbouring Associations, Promoter of Citizen Democratic Culture during Transition in Southern Spain

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Submitted: 29 September 2017 | Accepted: 6 December 2017 | Published: 9 February 2018

Abstract
In the current context of placing value on the neighbouring movement within the Spanish democratic Transition, we set out to confirm that the press actively participates in the growing conjunction of neighbouring issues with political content and contributes to the idea that this movement becomes a parameter of the democratic culture for the citizen during Transition. Since the conflict is newsworthy, we conduct a micro-social study of the neighbouring protest in the newspaper *El Correo de Andalucía*, published in the southern Spanish city of Seville. Through analysis of content, we study the informative flow and the repertoire of protest following a typology that distinguishes four formats (demonstrations, strikes, speeches and associations) divided into two levels of conflict. The analysis sample consists of 33 texts published between November 1975 (Franco's death and the accession to the throne of Juan Carlos I) and June 1977 (the first democratic general elections). The main conclusion reveals that the newspaper becomes a platform that gives visibility to the neighbouring movement, normalising behaviours and procedure rules through the protest.

Keywords
civil society; democratic culture; local press; media; media history; neighbouring movement; Spanish Transition

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Media History and Democracy", edited by David W. Park (Lake Forest College, USA).

1. Introduction

In Spain, the resurgence of the civil society in the seventies of the twentieth century acquires particular connotations when counting the democratic Transition as a backdrop, with the desire for freedom and solutions to numerous social and economic problems. In this context, the neighbouring movement emerges with a strongly demanding attitude towards issues related to health, public services, housing, education, etc., along with the request for a democratic political change which places it on a local–global axis (Pérez Quintana & Sánchez, 2008, p. 15) as a powerful pressure motor.

The neighbouring protest of recent years is not an exclusively Spanish phenomenon. Italian cities such as Rome, Milan or Turin also experience a demanding process propelled by the accelerated urban development and ineptitude of the ruling political class to apply reforms capable of solving or mitigating the problems (Alonso, 2011, p. 58; Lowe, 1986, pp. 183–185). The same could be said about France, Portugal (Ramos Pinto, 2005) or Mexico (Borja, 1986, p. 40).

The peculiarity in the Spanish case lies in the fact that the local movement is born within a broader cycle of protest which advocates a political change which conditions the contents of its demands, its organisational structure and its forms of internal and external action (assemblies, direct vote, demonstrations, citizen participation, discussions, traffic cut-offs, etc.) (Sánchez, 2011, p. 104). We can find other differences in which foreign administrations are more efficient and responsive to social demands and, in addition, that trade unions and parties assume them as their own (Angulo, 1978, p. 156).

Since the first decades of the twenty-first century, the neighbouring movement in the public space of the street has been progressively taken into consideration with its own entity and essential contribution for democratic awareness. Until then, despite being defined as

"the most widespread and significant urban movement in Europe since 1945" by sociologist Manuel Castells (1986, p. 299), for decades the Spanish neighbouring movement has been one of the great laggards among the contributions that explain the history of Spanish democratisation. The reasons for their lesser visibility are general, connected with the role of civil society as a whole during Transition and the preponderance of other movements such as the worker or the student, and are concrete, regarding their blurring in interests of other groups, especially political parties.

Contreras (2012, p. 112) argues that the study of the neighbouring movement in Andalusia is far from making new contributions within the narrative published about Transition due to several reasons: 1) the late study of urban social protest beyond the labour and student movement; 2) the documentary losses suffered by the neighbouring associations themselves at their headquarters; 3) legal impediments to the documentation query on the neighbouring movement in historical and intermediate archives as well as in official records; and 4) the biological disappearance of some of the protagonists who may be interviewed.

Although historiography and sociology have been in charge of studying the role of the neighbouring movement in the street, there has not been any in-depth study on the media message about the local movement when the analysis of its forms, contents, and languages may become not only a documentary source to obtain historical data, but also a tool to complete the reasons concerning the lower visibility of the movement as a part of the process of democratic culture of local citizenship, within the recent Andalusian historiographic vision.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Civil Society and Protest Movements in Transition

Franco's dictatorship has ruined most of the framework of progressive civic, cultural, and political popular associations through prohibitions and controls. The tradition of democratic participation is broken with the consequent lack of opportunity of the generations born during Franco's regime to socialise (Institut D'Anàlisi i Social Politiques Pùbliques & Fundaciò Francesc Ferrer I Guàrdia, 2000, p. 205), but it cannot be avoided, since the 1950s of the twentieth century, workers, clandestine political opposition, students, and intellectuals have been organised, given that the dissent is greater than that allowed by the Collective Labour Agreements Act of 24 April 1958 and the Associations Act of 24 December 1964, although there is consent "to persons linked to anti-Francoism to open spaces of freedom that are independent of Franco's officialdom space" (Ferrer, 2014, pp. 83–84). This law brings about the appearance of associations of family heads and housewives in Spain, mainly in the peripheral quarters within the framework of the National Movement as the first step of urban social movement. Other formulas were the municipal collaborating councils, the municipal district councils, the neighbouring communities, and the quarter mayoralties.

In the 1960s, there was a resurgence of social and labour dispute due to economic transformations and, with it, the emergence of a protest movement which proved to be better prepared than the state to solve social problems (Pérez Díaz, 1996, p. 19), in the line posed by Musil (2013, p. 24) where he states that the opposition to Francoism practices its citizenship before becoming a citizen into a democratic system, imposing and practising democratic rights such as freedom of press, opinion, assembly, and association. Until the second half of the 1970s the protest adopted different and multiple formulas (demonstrations, work-ins, sit-ins, work placements, strikes) (Ortega, 2004, pp. 351–370).

From a historical and sociological point of view, there is still no consensus on the civil society's role during the democratic Transition. Theories maintaining that the political change engine is the civil society argue that Transition: 1) is the result of civil society's role which is involved in mobilisations and fights for freedoms and rights within the citizen's resurgence (Pérez Díaz, 1987; Threlfall, 2008) or 2) is a "bottom-up" phenomenon for two decades before the process and "top-down" in the process itself (Musil, 2013, p. 11). Moreover, the theories that support that civil society's role is not essential in the process of change, believe that Transition is: 1) the result of the political and economic liberalisation of Franco's regime during the 1960s; 2) an action taken "from above" (García, 1981, pp. 89, 103) by the political class given the social demobilisation, or 3) the readaptation of the dominant classes of democracy in order to maintain its hegemony (Giner & Sevilla, 1980, pp. 197–229). In this line, Salgado (2014, pp. 271–295) recognises the social movements' role although they are not decisive to stimulate a change in the political system.

All the aforementioned arguments lead those authors who consider that civil society plays a fundamental role in Transition to the study of varied movements (political opposition, students, workers, cultural current), among which the neighbouring movement is not predominant. Over these past few years, a match with other movements has been recognised. Martínez i Muntada (2008, p. 2333) asserts that the neighbouring movement, on par with the labour movement, is one of the most important scopes of participation and mobilisation coming from relatively large sectors of the population during the last years of Franco and Transition in the main urban centres.

The neighbouring associations and the neighbouring movement in general have been recognised as an influence in the building of local democracy, becoming "the first step in the participation of many citizens" (Serrano & Sempere, 1999, p. 176), who learned and developed a democratic culture from the closest scope using their real experience. Furthermore, the neighbouring associations become "schools of democracy and citizenship,

teaching their associates how to relate to administration, participation methods and procedures to choose leaders" (Contreras, 2012, p. 113). Fernandes (2014) also indicates that the revolutionary pathways towards democracy in Portugal and Spain have a positive impact on the self-organising capabilities of popular groups.

Most of the studies on neighbouring associations in Spain during the Transition have a historical nature agree that their emergence is due to the lack of representativeness of local institutions and conclude that these associations play a crucial role in the achievement of a democratic political change. Some of them focus on its placement value in the Spanish context (Bordetas, 2014) or by regions, such as Andalusia, studied by Contreras (2013) and Escaleras and Ruiz (2006), and the cities of Madrid and Barcelona (Gail, 1979) or Zaragoza (Gómez Bahillo, 2006). In these studies, the actions of neighbouring movements, socio-economic-cultural differences/similarities or common points with other movements are analysed from a descriptive perspective.

Something similar has happened with studies in other countries. In Germany, Althaus (2000) studies the development of neighbouring communities at the end of the Second World War as a timely emergency that assumed tasks of the local government under construction; in Italy, Alonso (2011) analyses these movements in Rome between 1968 and 1976, observing their structures, demands, and forms of action; in Venezuela and Colombia, Ramos Rollón (1995) conducts a comparative field study between the cities of Bogotá and Caracas; in Argentina, Oraisón (2011) studies the difficulties of these types of communities to be recognised and legitimised through institutionalisation; in Mexico, Frutos (2002) studies how in 1988 the autonomous neighbouring organizations in the Federal District tried to save their traditions and spaces of coexistence that rejected the narrow legal frameworks of political participation, and Safa (1998) analyses the factors that take part in the neighbouring construction in the Federal District. Bultmann, Hellmann, Maschkat and Rojas (1995) showed interested in the neighbouring associations in Mexico and Chile and their democratization process, studying the behaviour of actors and movements.

We only find recent studies that address the role of neighbouring associations from a communicative point of view in more recent years, such as the one conducted by Gonzalo (2015), who approaches the neighbouring movement of Valladolid from the interview method during the Transition in the press used as a source for History. Outside Spain, Carrasco (2011) analyses the role of communication in a local citizen participation process in a district of Lima, Peru.

2.2. The Newspaper as an Interest Mediator

Any citizen action is essentially expressed in two spaces: the street and the media. Democratic interaction functions through the promotion of interests, and these are usually settled in the media (Luna, 2003, p. 31). As spaces of freedom arise, the media assimilate information from civil society (associations, societies, groups, interest groups, personalities, etc.) and transform and transmit to political power a complex image of society with its contradictions, demands, and requirements. The newspaper exerts a mediating function by relating these demands, especially in unsolved problems, regarding the social environment and decision making by the political system, as well as stimulating citizens towards participation in social life and contributing to general stability (Gomis, 1987, pp. 308–310).

The press facilitates the coexistence and social integration in any socialisation process by showing the neighbour codes, attitudes, values, dominant ideas, visions, expectations, objectives, etc. of other citizens who appear in the media. The neighbour then recognises his social ego through metonymic action by identifying with and facing these various aspects. In this sense, the neighbouring movement gets the media to provide "a growing coverage and expression which becomes a real sounding board for local actions" (Lander, 2006, p. 49) and, ultimately, the newspaper becomes a media source for democratic culture.

The press contributed to the spreading of democratic ideology much more than most political groups (Tusell, 1989, p. 203). Although, both Zugasti (2007, p. 69, 2008, pp. 53–68), when analysing the Madrid press and speaking about "media accommodation", as well as Montero, Rodríguez and García (2008, pp. 293–296, 307), in their study of the Madrid, Catalan, and Basque newspapers, reach similar conclusions on the voluntary collaboration of journalism with the democratising objectives of political power, though the latter refer that this collaboration is not based on an official agreement or an explicit deal to facilitate consensus.

The development of civil society in the Spanish case is inextricably linked to the media, especially encouraged by the promulgation of the Press and Printing Law 14/1966, through which newspapers can inform regarding the institutionalisation of the State, the role of the National Movement in Spanish life, political associations, Monarchy, the Church, the trade union setting, as well as problematic areas of Spanish life: university disorders, labour conflicts, regionalisms, etc. which make the idyllic image of a Spain without problems disappear (Barrera, 1995b, p. 19).

This law, which was in force to a great extent until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1978 where in its article 20, the freedom of expression was fully recognised not only for the journalistic union but for all Spanish citizens, it suppressed the previous censorship, but the editors could check with the ministry in order to publish certain news and opinions in order to avoid administrative records, which could be called self-censorship. Furthermore, the warning cries to the editors continued through personal or telephone conversations. Between 1966 and 1975, 1,270 cases were opened, as well as sanc-

tions (fines, suspensions, confiscations, pressures) and threats of professional disqualification to editors that, in some cases, included arrest and prosecution before the Public Order Court (Barrera, 1995a, p. 106). During these years, a journalist could be judged by six different court categories, including the military.

This did not prevent the growth of the newspaper market and the appearance of new magazines and newspapers. At the national level, new publications reached the number of 129; the circulation of newspapers reached two and a half million in 1967, and 915 publishing houses in 1971, and Spain reached fifth place in the world in number of published titles (Sinova, 1989, p. 267; Tusell, 1989, pp. 190–191).

Until the publication of the Royal Decree-Law 24/1977 on Freedom of Expression, which was created under the Law for Political Reform, the administrative seizure of publications was not partially suppressed, the controversial article 2 was repealed by which freedom of expression was submitted to the Principles of the National Movement and there was a register of journalists and journalistic companies and the previous deposit of copies to be examined and, just in case, allow the seizure of publications.

With all this, an atmosphere of greater freedom of expression was perceived in all social orders and this was reflected in the press: new sections, interpreting journalistic genres, unofficial information, citizen sources, etc. However, the editors had to continue responding to crimes committed by third parties and the accumulation of three files in one year led automatically to their inability to continue conducting their duties, and some aggressions persisted: the Public Order Court continued to act against the press; there were military processes, farces to discredit newspapers, and pressures applied to companies.

3. Methodology

This work aims at confirming that the press actively participates in the growing conjunction of neighbouring issues with political content in its information and contributes to the idea that the neighbouring movement becomes a parameter of democratic culture for the Sevillians during the democratic Transition. According to Héctor Borrat's (1989, pp. 28–29) classification regarding the role of the newspaper in social conflicts, we start from the idea that the newspaper goes through a three-level process: extra level (external observer), inter level (neutral intermediary in conflict relations) and intra level (collective actor involved in internal conflicts).

We conducted a micro-social study of Seville's neighbouring protest in the newspaper *El Correo de Andalucía*—the real geographic coverage makes it a local newspaper in Seville—bearing in mind that the conflict is always newsworthy and that national power is prolonged in every Spanish city without exceptions, which is the reason why Transition to democracy in Andalusia does not differ at all from that of the remaining Spanish territory (Gómez & González, 2000, p. 468; Pérez Quintana & Sánchez, 2008; Vilà, 2016).

El Correo de Andalucía was not the most read newspaper in the study period. In 1976–1977, it had a print run of 35,559 copies and a dissemination of 31,249 readers (Pérez Vilariño, 1982, p. 68), while *Abc de Sevilla*, which was the most widely-read newspaper, had a print run of 61,180 copies and a dissemination of 54,259 readers in the same period (Iglesias, 1980, p. 453). However, it became an anti-Franco emblem that earned him the progressive press profile and the qualification of "red scourge" (De Pablos, 1981, p. 40) since the 1960s.

In 1975, the newspaper left behind its most rebellious period with the two Catholic editors of the progressive lustrum (1967–1971), in which the newspaper hosted topics and principals belonging to social sectors that were not heard in other city media: university students, workers, priests, exiles and political prisoners, trade unionists, among others, with the common idea of their frontal positioning to Franco's regime. This earned the newspaper a multitude of sanctions and kidnappings. The newspaper became one of the most uncomfortable for Franco's regime and one of the twenty Spanish publications that suffered the greatest number of files (Fuentes & Fernández, 1998, p. 298). These two editors accumulated a total of 27 disciplinary actions in five years.

After the passage of the Editorial Católica (1972–1973) to its shareholders, when there was a decline in the struggle for freedom, the newspaper again tried to make use of the right of information. In 1974, the newspaper conducted the first interview in Spain with Felipe González, then general secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party in hiding, which led to his arrest and also the interviewer's. The new editor accumulated new files, fines, temporary suspensions and jail requests, as a result of the repression by the Ministry of Information in the last months of the dictatorship against the most critical publications. During the Transition, the then editor was also the target of telephone threats, fines, and visits to the court, in addition to the censorship regarding information about the visit of monarchs Juan Carlos and Sofia to Seville in March 1976. This did not sway the correspondent team and it was granted the distinction of "Sevillians of the year 1975" in 1976 for being "tireless spokesmen of the most grieving echoes" of the province and promoting colloquiums for dialogue and the national coexistence during the Transition years.

The analysis sample consists of 33 texts (news, declarations, conferences, interviews, and reports) related exclusively to the stream of residents' demands and not those that deal with the decisions made by the municipal political power, which would mean more texts, during 10 two-month periods, which correspond to 100% of the texts published on the subject. The newspaper selection was carried out with copies of *El Correo de Andalucía*, located in the Municipal Newspaper Library of

Seville. We are facing a single media due to its very representative trajectory. We understand that by the own ideological character of the newspaper, it would publish all the demands conducted by the neighbouring associations, which are much less numerous than those originated in worker or student scopes. Moreover, we must bear in mind that no newspaper is a faithful mirror of reality because in its production subjective factors take part in the selection and hierarchy of information.

Through the content analysis (Bardin, 1996, p. 80), we analyse the information flow from the quantitative aspect to measure the evolution during the study period (see Figure 1) and, from a qualitative point of view, we observe the formats of the protest repertoire (see Figure 2), following Méndez-Muros's typology (2013, p. 74). The journalistic texts have been classified based on the four repertoire formats that are as follows: demonstrations, strikes, speeches, and associations. In our case, we focus on three out of the four formats, since the neighbouring protest does not contemplate strikes. The protest formats fall into two levels of conflict: level 1, or high (demonstrations and strikes) and level 2, or low (speeches and associations), according to the public order problems generated and the consequent image of the neighbouring struggle for the democratic rights of the reader. The conflict modulation throughout the analysis period expresses the assumption degree of these democratic values in society which is perceived by citizens as the normalisation of protest. The presentation of the results follows a chronological and diachronic thread in the event progress and is divided into three stages between November 1975 (Franco's death and the accession to the throne of Juan Carlos I) and June 1977 (celebration of the first democratic general elections).

4. Results: The Neighbouring Associations of Seville as a Case Study

4.1. The Awakening of the Neighbouring and Democratic Consciousness

Since the death of Franco until the end of 1975, *El Correo de Andalucía* (hereinafter, ECA) does not publish texts related to the neighbouring protest; in 1976 the newspaper accumulates the highest recorded data in the whole analysis period with 69.6%, which natural taking into account that this is the longest time period, while in the months analysed in 1977, the remaining 30.3% is concentrated. Generally speaking, protest formats used by the neighbouring movement are as follows: demonstrations (48.4%), speeches (33.3%), and associations (18.1%), and the four fundamental thematic axes are based on: 1) the lack of housing, 2) the need for minimum services and infrastructures, 3) disagreement with some public works, and 4) political demands as a direct consequence of the intensification of structural imbalances in the process of political and social transformation.

In January–February of 1976, the protest covers 12.1% of the total, the lack of housing being the main focus. It is a protest expressed mainly through speeches (50%), because the texts dealing with associations and demonstrations encompass the remaining percentage in equal parts. Therefore, the requests of the Association of family heads San Jerónimo revolve around the insufficiency of the works being exercised, the execution in the quarter La Tercia, and a photograph of the affected area of the news "The running construction work in the quarter La Tercia is considered insufficient" is exposed (ECA, 1976a, left central page).



Figure 1. Evolution of the neighbouring protest in ECA (1975–1977).

The political factor soon appears and the newspaper is not indifferent to the implicit political dimension. From the beginning of Transition, the residents of some quarters present evident demands of amnesty such as the one shown in the piece "Residents of five neighbourhoods request amnesty" (ECA, 1976b, p. 20). The same happens with the authorisation or denial of the demonstration permission. The lack of services is behind the demonstrations of neighbours that are carried out illegally in the San Diego quarter by the electric power cutoff as reported in the article "Demonstration of neighbours with lit candles" (ECA, 1976c, p. 19).

The protest percentage (12.1%) is maintained in March and April, although speeches (25%) give way to associations (50%), while demonstrations cover the rest. The lack of services is present in news such as a meeting of the residents of the Palmete quarter to solve their problems of sewerage, lighting, water, etc. ("Palmete's residents insist", ECA, 1976d, p. 15), but social problems are increasingly linked to the political situation, as seen in a piece of news which equates national and local problems:

> A thousand people concentrated on the esplanade of the Nuestra Señora del Pilar church at about eight o'clock. There, once again, the problems of the country were exposed, and more concretely, to the Polígono San Pablo. A special mention was made on the unemployment situation. (ECA, 1976e, p. 19)

The law regulating project of the right of assembly, published in the Official State Gazette on March 1, 1976, does not solve the unlawful situation of the proceedings of the neighbour assemblies. Then, the newspaper uses the multiplier effect of the news that supposes to publish any data on permission or denial of authorisation of demonstrations, assemblies, or meetings. Pieces of information such as "A meeting of neighbours in El Cerezo" (ECA, 1976f, p. 19) often appear in privileged places (cover, back cover, odd pages, local section, or central pages) where the news on the citizen problems define an authentic reclaiming showcase at the time.

This motivates that, although the protest decrease in May–June is three points (9.09%) compared to the previous months, the format associations increases (66.6%) and is the majority, compared to 33.3% of demonstrations. The newspaper continues to inform, in terms of cases, of the demonstrations conducted by some formal associations, through the neighbours associations, and some informal associations that gathers people living in the same neighbourhood of the city and are mobilised for a common good (ECA, 1976g, central pages) or "The residents' assembly of quarter C of the Polígono San Pablo" (ECA, 1976h, p. 19).

Citizens begin to be even more aware that, to problems which are apparently unsolvable, solutions must be demanded from the competent authorities. In this way, a dichotomous relationship between the local political power, the Seville City Council, the mayor, and the neighbours as spokesmen for the interests of the quarters is progressively established. One of the clearest examples is the Palmete quarter. In June, a neighbouring protest meeting asks for solutions to the serious problem of water supply and sewerage in the area. The newspaper collects a photograph of the protesters entitled "Palmete insists" accompanying the piece of information "Almost three million in certificates for works in national schools" (ECA, 1976i, p. 19).

4.2. Protest Rise and Increasing Politicisation

Sevillians begin to observe the results of the first democratising measures of the first Adolfo Suárez's government from July 1976. During the summer period, the information on protests is reduced to 6.06%, of which 100% are speeches. Other citizen requirements, such as housing construction, shelter solution and necessary infrastructure in the neighbourhoods (sewerage, access arrangement, lighting, public schools, outpatient clinics, market, street signage, etc.), the lack of which makes the situation of some quarters unsustainable where the vital conditions are deplorable to subhuman extremes, are added to the demands for amnesty and freedom, a fair wage, or the opening of schools.

This also extends to the disagreement with some public works, in the case of the piece of information "Manifesto of La Corta de la Cartuja" (ECA, 1976j, p. 32), in which the promoter board of the Provincial Confederation of Neighbouring Associations and the neighbouring associations in the process of legalisation, after seeing how they are suffering restrictions in the city in the water supply since the beginning of the year, criticise the works of La Corta de la Cartuja and the delay in the construction approval of the El Gergal reservoir.

The protest returns to recover the pulse in the September–October period, obtaining the highest value of the whole period analysed with 18.8%, which is especially demanding, since 100% of the answer presents the format demonstrations that already have authorisation from which the newspaper provides timely information. In the short news "The Association of family heads requests a demonstration" (ECA, 1976k, p. 39), the San Jerónimo Association of family heads asks the Civil Government permission for a demonstration in which they request a fast regulation of traffic lights in numerous quarter crossings. Three days later, the news "The demonstration of San Jerónimo's neighbours to request traffic lights authorised" (ECA, 1976l, p. 12) is published, where it is specified that signs and posters will not be carried and that "the demonstration will take place despite the news about the City Council having already taken action".

More elements of clear political content are progressively introduced in the texts as seen in the news "More traffic lights!" (ECA, 1976m, left central page), which explains that San Jerónimo's neighbours demand traffic



Figure 2. Typology of neighbouring protest in ECA (1975–1977).

lights holding numerous placards with different slogans, including the white and green Andalusian flags, one of which heads the demonstration with the label "The San Jerónimo association requires traffic lights" and that the episode "develops in the most complete normality". In October, the newspaper echoes the acts of protest in the street as expressed by the demonstrations of the Palmete residents in which they ask for a solution to their eternal water and sewer problem. Additionally, the unfulfilled promises of the mayor that are recurring at the end of the year stand out: "Approximately 1,500 people demonstrated in Palmete" (ECA, 1976n, p. 39), "Palmete's residents cut the traffic on the Su Eminencia road again" (ECA, 1976o, p. 17) or "Palmete's neighbours cut the traffic in Su Eminencia for an hour" (ECA, 1976p, p. 39).

The attenuation of the protest in the months of November and December causes it to return to the indexes at the beginning of the year (12.1%). The speeches reappear and have the same percentage as the demonstrations (50%), such as the one that collects the news "Demonstration of Palmete's neighbours" (ECA, 1976q, p. 38), where a solution is requested to the issue of the canal which hinders the access of children to a kindergarten.

The speeches gather forthright criticisms towards the authorities: "We sincerely think that the action of the Ministry for Housing—if not the same as the Polígono Aeropuerto—can be positive, although somewhat slow" (ECA, 1976r, p. 11) and take ownership of the neighbouring issues: "Palmete is already in the hands of the Ministry for Housing" (ECA, 1976s, p. 15). The newspaper is not only a spokesperson for citizens' needs, but it also criticises the local government, as proposed in the municipal review of 1976 which reflects the feeling of public discontent in contemplating the perpetuation of the problems in the poorest neighbourhoods, essentially of shelters (ECA, 1976t, central pages).

4.3. Drift to the Municipal Opposition

An upturn of the neighbouring protest in the first months of 1977 is noted. January and February are the months with the highest percentage in the texts with the second highest value of the period studied (15.1%). In this case, 20% is the format associations, while the pieces of information on demonstrations in many neighbourhoods in Seville increase to 80% as in the La Oliva quarter which come to shut themselves away in the local community to protest against the negligent attitude of the Municipal Patronage, according to the text "One hundred neighbours were held in the community premises" (ECA, 1977a, p. 31). At another time, expropriation or attachment is the object of the piece of information "Housing and plots will not be expropriated" (ECA, 1977b, p. 11), in which the consequences for the area inhabitants are explained.

The municipal criticism against the mayor is also intensified in pieces of information such as "Protest for the proceedings of the Seville mayor" (ECA, 1977c, left central page), where the newspaper exposes that the respondents are representatives of all neighbouring associations of the seventh and eighth municipal districts because they consider that the mayor must have been contacted by the democratic neighbouring associations to elaborate on the Neighbourhood Emergency Plan.

The Government authorises the registration of the parties in the Register of Political Associations in March. By then, everything is flooded with politics. A month before, one of the promoters of the first neighbouring association in five years, the Unit of the Polígono San Pablo, is interviewed. Among the questions is the political pur-

pose of the association, whose response contains democratic reminiscences of the socio-political moment:

> Apart from the democratic character of the association, we are aware that the social aspect is often intimately related to politics. Any decision between two social and economic approaches is a political decision. Only in this sense can we be considered politicians. (ECA, 1977d, p. 22)

The protest declines in March–April to 9.09%; the speeches capture the 100% which makes the neighbouring answer more based on the dialogue and less combative in the street. There are news in which Sevillians demand public services and infrastructure improvements in the first person or on behalf of an association. Following this line, the headlines begin to be more striking and direct as "City council, what is given is not removed" (ECA, 1977e, p. 17), words taken from the conversation with some members of the La Corza Association of family heads. At the same time, the citizen as an individual or collective entity becomes a protagonist of the piece of information with headlines such as "Do not want to continue living in La Corchuela" (ECA, 1977f, p. 19), news in which the association of family heads of the quarter describes the situation of the inhabitants of the area.

In the last two months of May–June, the claim drops to 6.06%. Speeches and demonstrations divide up to 50%. Among the speeches we find the piece of information "The residents of El Polvorín require green zones" (ECA, 1977g, right central page), where the main source used is the secretary of the owner's community, and is headed by a photograph of one of the streets of the quarter. The baggage of protest actions in June resulted in the frontal clash with the municipal authority in pieces of information such as "Protesters from La Corchuela did not let the mayor drive his car" (ECA, 1977h, p. 1, right central page), where neighbours raise their voices more as journalistic sources.

5. Discussion

The protest of the neighbouring movement in the press during Transition in Seville is a clear example of the citizen dissatisfaction due to multiple urban problems, lack of housing and basic infrastructures. In this way, the newspaper publishes issues related to the conflict and the controversy, altercations, demonstrations, speeches and associations. The strategies used have fundamentally been: timely and repeated information on the holding of assemblies and authorisation of demonstrations; treatment of problems in cases (Palmete and La Corchuela); daily showcase of conflicting news about the world of neighbourhood and urban problems; headlines with direct and controversial language to make the tension states of the neighbours explicit; stories of unlucky encounters with the mayor; the highlights of the continuity of the same problems; usage of photographs with a descriptive function of the social environment and giving evidence of the deficiencies of the most humble quarters, and generalisation of the sources usage as the neighbours and presidents of associations.

We find the accompaniment from the beginning of a clear political content in the texts that increases as Transition advances. Issues related to the neighbouring movement are also newsworthy if they are escorted by an attitude related to democratic change, freedom of association, and requests for amnesty, and replicas in an attempt to promote local debate, enhance the political nuance of neighbouring associations and to establish a set of opposing views in the absence of political parties. The information flow of the neighbouring answer coincides with the political circumstances of the moment, constant in all stages, especially in the first two. The media coverage of the protest of 1976 is managed especially through demonstrations and speeches, although the first are present almost all year which gives an idea of the belligerent attitude within the social mobilisation as a whole.

We observe the awakening of local consciousness (12.12%) between January and April 1976 with the texts published within the format of level 2 of conflict (speeches and especially associations), which expose small local battles. Only at first, the newspaper shows itself as an external observer (extra level), but when the political factor intervened in the neighbouring demands at the beginning of 1976, it assumes a level of neutral intermediary exposing its claims and serving as a platform (inter level). From the autumn months, when the results of the first democratising measures of Suárez's first government begin to be observed, there is a growth of demand which reaches the highest values of the entire period studied in September and October (18.18%), being mostly of level 1, or high level, with high percentages of demonstrations. At a time when anti-Franco political opposition is not legalised, texts dealing with neighbouring issues acquire a greater degree of political content and channel democratising ideas, demonstrating that it does not remain indifferent to political and social reality. The newspaper then reaches an intra level of actor involved when it criticises the local government and is accentuated by giving more strength to the critical voices that come from the neighbours who exercise the municipal opposition in the following year.

The protest resumes to grow in the first months of 1977 (15.15%) with a high increase in demonstrations. As the political parties are legalised and the first democratic elections in June are approaching, the protest decreases until reaching half of the initially achieved (6.06%). During the spring, the speeches are the main protagonists at a time when dialogue prevails, although demonstrations reappear where the role of the neighbour turns up as an opponent of local political authority convinced that the municipal changes go through democratisation. By then, the decline of published texts on the neighbouring movement coincides with the transfer of objectives and personnel to other groups and especially to the political

sphere. In this sense, the absence of texts on associations is notorious until the end of the period.

6. Conclusions

Throughout the Transition process, the neighbour is represented in the press as a citizen in a local democratic environment, normalising behaviours and patterns of action through protest. The press contributes to make the neighbour, who publicly demands, responds, and struggles on the street, becomes an example for the neighbour who observes him, assumes his action and identifies with him by reading the text published in the newspaper. If the neighbouring associations are conceived as schools of democracy, the press—especially for the involvement of the newspaper studied—contributes to the spreading and amplification of citizen awareness and to educate in democratic functioning from the proximity.

With all of this, we can affirm that, at a time when the local movement in the democratic Transition is being valued, the press becomes an ally of the neighbouring movement when it comes to publicising its struggle, and serves as a platform to give visibility to the democratising culture during Transition in Seville, in which the neighbour also learns to be a citizen. Nonetheless, the analysed newspaper is only an advanced example by its own professional trajectory of struggle for democracy. It would be convenient to conduct studies on other contemporary newspapers to compare to opposite or similar views in order to obtain a more complete global overview.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439)

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