

Partisanship and the Gender Gap in Perceptions of Election Integrity: Gender Accentuates the Winner-Loser Gap

Samantha J. DeRagon  and Caroline Tolbert 

Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, USA

Correspondence: Samantha J. DeRagon (samantha-deragon@uiowa.edu)

Submitted: 29 October 2025 **Accepted:** 12 February 2026 **Published:** 15 April 2026

Issue: This article is part of the issue “Causes and Consequences of Confidence in Democratic Elections” edited by Shaun Bowler (University of California – Riverside) and Todd Donovan (Western Washington University), fully open access at <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.i478>

Abstract

Confidence in the accuracy of elections and ballot counting is a foundation of representative government. In the US and cross-nationally, a substantial body of research demonstrates that partisanship and electoral outcomes are the strongest and most consistent predictors of trust in elections. Against this backdrop, the role of demographic factors, and gender in particular, is less well understood. Building on previous research, we expect women to have lower confidence in US elections than men. Since women tend to be stronger partisans than men, we also expect that gender accentuates the winner–loser gap. Using the 2024 Cooperative Election Study, the results show women are less likely to believe national, state, and local elections were conducted fairly. As electoral losers, women Democrats and independents have lower election confidence than men in their parties. As electoral winners, men and women Republicans have similar electoral confidence. We also analyze the 2022 and 2020 elections and find that our results are robust among the electoral losing party; women again have lower election confidence than men. This gender gap in election integrity attitudes has important implications for women’s political participation and polarization in the US.

Keywords

election administration; election confidence; election integrity; partisan winners; partisanship; women in politics

1. Partisanship, Gender, and Election Integrity Beliefs

A critical foundation of representative government is that citizens have confidence in the administration and accuracy of elections. In the US and cross-nationally, a substantial body of research demonstrates that partisanship and electoral outcomes are the strongest and most consistent predictors of trust in elections

(Anderson et al., 2005). That is, public perceptions of whether elections are conducted fairly are shaped primarily by whether an individual supported the winning or losing political party, the election outcome, and citizens' direct experiences at the polls. Individuals whose preferred candidate or party wins express significantly higher confidence that ballots were counted accurately than those whose side loses, a pattern observed repeatedly across recent national elections (Sances & Stewart, 2015; see also Atkeson et al., 2025; Bowler & Donovan, 2024; Clayton et al., 2021). This winner–loser gap has become a central lens through which scholars explain variation in perceptions of electoral integrity.

Other influential factors include individual voting experiences and the administration of elections. Studies show that smooth interactions with poll workers, clear ballot design, and efficient polling place operations contribute positively to perceptions of fairness, while negative experiences depress confidence (Atkeson & Saunders, 2007; Bowler et al., 2015). People living in counties that do a better job administering elections have consistently higher perceptions of polling place quality in both the 2016 and 2020 US elections (Abus et al., 2025); this is especially true for people living in places with more local news. Voters who report having experienced problems when voting (e.g., long lines, difficulty casting ballot) and those who believe fraud has occurred report lower confidence, especially in local ballot tabulation and local election administration (Alvarez et al., 2021).

However, these effects are generally smaller than those associated with partisanship and winning. In addition, elite rhetoric and narratives of fraud can shape mass attitudes, often reinforcing partisan divisions (Clayton et al., 2021; Miller et al., 2025). Research on elite cues finds that when political leaders cast doubt on the electoral process, confidence declines among their partisan supporters, regardless of objective conditions of how well the election was conducted (i.e., election administration; Mongrain, 2023).

Against this backdrop, the role of demographic factors, and gender in particular, is less well understood. A long tradition in political behavior research highlights how men and women differ in political attitudes and participation, raising the question of whether such differences extend to trust in elections. To our knowledge, there are no previous studies exploring if there are gender differences in attitudes about election integrity. Yet studies examining perceptions of fraud and candidate gender cues suggest that men and women may sometimes respond differently to contextual factors, such as when female candidates are perceived as less corrupt (Barnes & Beaulieu, 2014).

While many cross-national studies have shown that individuals who voted for the winning party in an election tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who did not, Williams et al. (2021) find that gender moderates the effect of winning on election satisfaction. They argue the effect should be smaller for women due to gender differences in (a) political socialization and (b) connection with candidates and parties. They find the gender gap is smaller where women are well represented. While related, this study is about election administration, while Williams et al. (2021) focus on satisfaction with democracy, and those authors do not analyze the US case. The US's single-member districts and winner-take-all rules may cause a different gender gap than proportional or mixed systems, which often increase satisfaction (Karp et al., 2003).

Taken together, the limited published literature suggests that gender is not a robust independent determinant of election confidence, but it may condition other factors such as partisan environments. By situating gender alongside well-established predictors—partisanship, winner/loser status—this study

seeks to clarify whether gender represents an overlooked source of variation in democratic attitudes. We investigate these expectations using survey questions asked for the first time on the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES; 50,000 respondents) immediately post the 2024 presidential election. Paralleling well-known gaps in political knowledge, the results find that women have lower confidence in the conduct of national and state/local elections. Additionally, there is a partisan dimension. Reflecting a stronger attachment to political parties (Norrand, 1999), women Democrats have lower confidence in both national and state/local elections than men of the same party if their party loses. In the same election, men and women who are Republicans have the same level of election confidence in state and local elections. There is thus an asymmetric gender gap in election confidence, depending on whether one wins or loses.

To investigate the robustness of these findings, we measure the partisan gender gaps in electoral confidence in prior elections under reverse party control of government using the 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey. The Republican Party lost the 2020 presidency, and the expected “red wave” did not materialize in 2022. To investigate election confidence in the 2022 election, we utilize a question that asks respondents whether ballot counting in the US is trustworthy. In 2022, women still have lower confidence in election administration than men. Consistent with results from 2024, women who are electoral losers report lower confidence in ballot counting than men. An extension to the 2020 presidential election finds the same pattern using the Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPA), with women Republicans having the lowest election confidence after their party’s candidate lost the presidency compared to men.

This gender gap in election integrity attitudes has important implications for the representation of women, the gender gap in voting behavior, and the gendered nature of political polarization in the US. Lower electoral trust matters and has been linked to more non-voting political participation (Fitz & Saunders, 2024).

2. Gender and Confidence in US Elections

While trust in the national government has been low for more than half a century, confidence in US elections was fairly high until the last decade. “Voter confidence” is a distinct construct from broader measures of trust in government or political efficacy (Atkeson et al., 2015). Today, some people lack confidence in the process of democratic elections. Nearly one-third of Americans believed that fraud occurred in the 2022 US midterm elections (Holliday et al., 2025), a percentage comparable to that in 2020. But confidence in elections rebounded in 2024 under Trump’s second-term presidential victory.

Information environments and cues—elite rhetoric, news, and misinformation—are powerful forces in shaping public opinion and confidence, more so than technical security measures, such as election audits (Clayton et al., 2021). The 2020 presidential election produced stark partisan divides and widespread doubts among Republicans that the election was fair, particularly regarding the counting of mail-in ballots that soared during the Covid-19 pandemic (McDonald, 2022). President Trump repeatedly claimed the 2020 election was stolen (over 800 times according to the Washington Post database between Nov 4, 2020, and the end of his presidency; Kessler, 2021). President Trump’s 2024 election win offers an opportunity to reevaluate the factors that shape public trust in US elections.

While belief in election-related conspiracy theories partially arises from information environments and elite cues, other factors also play a role. One such factor is that individuals who feel they are powerless tend

to believe election conspiracy theories (Prooijen & Willem, 2018). Research on racial backlash and election conspiracies finds that white Americans who believe that they are losing their rights and power in government are far more likely to believe that the election was stolen than those who do not share this “white grievance” (Filindra et al., 2024). Put together, these findings suggest that individuals who feel like they do not have influence in government should be more likely to be skeptical of election administration.

How does gender influence confidence in elections? Women have historically been excluded from holding public office and have lower self-reported political knowledge (Dolan, 2011), interest, and efficacy than men (Hinojosa & Kittilson, 2020; Verba et al., 1997), although women’s representation improves their engagement in politics (Wolak, 2024). Women may be more skeptical of how the government is run and how elections are administered.

In addition to these broad expectations, we suspect that the effect of losing an election on trust in elections is stronger for women than men. Women tend to be stronger partisans (Norrander, 1999) and have a large social group component to their party identification (Greene & Elder, 2001). In contrast, men are more likely to be political independents and thus have weaker social-group attachment to their partisanship (Norrander, 1999). For women, this combination creates a stronger social attachment to their partisan group and should exacerbate the effect of a partisan electoral loss, while the effect should be smaller for men. In the context of the 2024 election, when Republicans won control of the presidency and Congress, we expect women Democrats will be less likely to agree that elections at the state/local and national levels are fair in the US relative to men who are Democrats.

Beyond a stronger attachment to the parties for women than men, political socialization can also play a role, as women can feel excluded from the political process (Bos et al., 2022; Williams et al., 2021). As children grow, they learn more about the political world; namely that politics is associated with conflict and competition, and of the contributions of men to American politics (Bos et al., 2022; Cassese & Holman, 2018; Lay et al., 2023). Additionally, media coverage of political campaigns and elected officials shows that, while there are women in office, most elected positions in the American government are held by men; women are significantly underrepresented in local, state, and national government (Center for American Women in Politics, 2024). This process can lead to fewer women being involved and interested in government and expressing lower self-reported political knowledge, while men are, on average, more engaged and have higher levels of self-reported political knowledge.

We believe a gender gap in election confidence may parallel existing gender gaps in knowledge, as confidence in election administration and ballot counting may be a form of political knowledge. Using 2024 CES data, we find that the correlation between the belief that US elections are fair and political knowledge is 0.22 ($p < 0.05$), and the correlation between the belief that state/local governments conduct fair elections and political knowledge is 0.26 ($p < 0.05$). Existing research on political knowledge found that women, on average, know less about politics than men (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). They explain this from a socialization perspective, arguing that women have less time to focus on politics because they do a larger share of the child-rearing and household work relative to men. More recent research attributes the gap in political knowledge to women answering knowledge questions with “don’t know” more often than men (Mondak & Anderson, 2004) and women knowing different types of political information than men (Barabas et al., 2014; Dolan, 2011; Kraft, 2024; Kraft & Dolan, 2023). In fact, the gap between women and men

closes when asking about state and local politics, and it reverses when individuals are asked about women's issues, with women knowing more. Both men and women perceive women to be less knowledgeable about politics (Morehouse Mendez & Osborn, 2010).

Given the gender gap in political knowledge, and that election confidence may require some knowledge of election administration more generally, we hypothesize that women are less trusting of how elections are administered at both the state/local and national level than men, all else equal (H1).

3. Winner-Loser Gap in Election Integrity: Gender as a Moderator

In addition to the above factors that influence trust in election administration, partisanship has become a major factor in election confidence in the US. Research finds that objective, empirical measures of the quality of election administration in a respondent's state have a positive effect on attitudes that US elections are "fair," all else equal (Bowler et al., 2015; see also Abus et al., 2025). But in 2020, powerful partisan cues about a flawed election process drowned out other positive cues; one study found little relationship between "election performance" (as measured by the Election Performance Index [EPI]) and perceptions that vote counts are accurate, and instead, partisanship and the winner-loser gap dominated (Bowler & Donovan, 2024).

The published research finds that partisanship and the winner-loser gap dominate perceptions of election integrity, with confidence tracking whether "your side" won (Sances & Stewart, 2015). Republican trust remained persistently low compared to Democrats after the controversial 2020 election because of elite cues about the election being stolen (Clayton et al., 2021). Analyzing post-2020 opinion, Bowler and Donovan (2024) find that partisanship is the most important factor in believing that the election was stolen and is the strongest predictor of low election confidence and beliefs that officials manipulate results—patterns not present in the 2016 election. The authors argue this may reflect a structural shift in Republican mass attitudes rather than routine winner-loser cycling. This is one reason why studying the 2024 election, under a Republican presidency victory, as is done here, is important.

Despite this general shift, it is important to note that there is a significant difference in the extent to which partisans trust elections when they win compared to when they lose. Bowler and Donovan (2024) find that in 2016, Democrats are, on average, less confident in the results of the national election than they are in 2020. This provides evidence that, while Democrats continue to have a net higher average confidence in elections, people in both parties react to losing the election through lowered trust in election administration.

Importantly, these effects are exacerbated for those who are stronger partisans relative to those who are weaker partisans. When individuals have strong social group attachments, and attachment to a political party, they engage in behaviors and believe narratives that are consistent with improving their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, it logically follows that those who have strong attachments to political parties will be more likely to believe that their party loses elections because the elections were administered unfairly rather than due to flaws with how the political party campaigned in the election. In this study, we seek to separate the effects of strong partisans from those of any partisan, with separate covariates for party strength vs. party identification (Weisberg, 1980).

Notable for this study is the consistent finding that women are stronger partisans than men are (Norrander, 1999; Ondercin & Lizotte, 2021). This gender gap in partisan strength stems from two gender differences in partisanship. First, men are more likely than women to not identify with a political party (Norrander, 1997). This indicates that men, in general, are less likely to identify as part of a partisan group. Second, even among partisans, women are more likely to identify as strong partisans than men are. This second element likely stems from women having a stronger social identity component of partisanship than men do (Greene & Elder, 2001). This means that women relate to their party more as a social group than men do.

From their stronger partisanship and greater social identity component of their partisanship, we argue that the winner–loser effect will be exacerbated among women. Specifically, in the context of the 2024 election, we expect that democratic women will be less trusting of how elections were administered at both the state/local and national level than democratic men are (H2).

In sum, we expect there will be gender gaps in confidence in US elections. We model political knowledge alongside election confidence to provide context to the size of these gaps. Election confidence is also colored by the winner–loser gap, with women being less likely to believe the ballot counting was trustworthy when their political party loses, under both Democratic and Republican presidencies. We seek to extend the gender gap literature to perceptions of election confidence and evaluate party winner–loser status, with asymmetries based on gender.

4. Data and Methods: 2024

To test our expectations, we rely on large sample survey data from the 2024 CES of 50,000 respondents, conducted immediately after the 2024 presidential elections (Schaffner et al., 2025). The CES is a panel survey and includes questions before and after the election. The CES is a random national survey of American adults first conducted in 2006 by a consortium of 39 colleges and universities to study public opinion and political behavior. When using weights, these data are representative at the national, state, and congressional district levels (Schaffner et al., 2025).

In 2024, for the first time, the CES asked respondents two new questions on this topic. Respondents were asked if they agree with the statements “Elections in the U.S. are fair” and “Your state and local government conducted a fair and accurate election in 2024.” These questions were asked immediately following the 2024 election, from November 6 to December 10, 2024. These data represent current metrics of confidence in US elections based on the 2024 election results. The Likert scale was collapsed with *strongly agree* and *agree* coded 1 and *strongly disagree*, *disagree*, and *neutral* coded 0. Since most individuals think of national elections when asked about elections in general, we will refer to the question asked about elections generally as a question about national elections. Overall, 64% of Americans agree that national elections are fair, while 75% agree that their state and local government conducted fair and accurate elections in 2024. Consistent with prior research on political trust, Americans have higher trust in their state and local governments to conduct elections fairly than national elections.

Our primary predictor variables are gender and party identification. For gender, we use a binary indicator, where women are assigned a value of 1 and men are assigned a value of 0. We opted for an indicator because only 321 observations in our sample were not missing on our dependent variables and identified in

some way other than man or woman (see Bittner & Goodyear-Grant, 2017, for a discussion of ways to measure gender other than binary indicators). We use two measures of partisanship: One is an indicator for being a self-reported Republican (winner at the national level), with Democrats and independents set to zero; the other is a standard three-point party identification measure. As mentioned above, a separate variable measures the strength of partisanship (the variable is a four-point scale; *pure independents* are coded to 1, *leaners* are coded to 2, *regular partisans* are coded to 3, and *strong partisans* are coded to 4). We use these two variables (i.e., partisanship and party strength) instead of the seven-point scale because we are interested in isolating the effects of party identification and winner/loser status on election confidence, after controlling for party strength.

Table 1 shows descriptive data for a gender gap in confidence in elections across partisan groups (i.e., crosstabs). Overall, 69% of men but only 59% of women agree that “elections in the U.S. are fair,” a 10-percentage point gap. Seventy-nine percent of men believe their state and local governments conducted fair and accurate elections, compared to 72% of women, a 7-percentage point difference. Overall, by party, Democrats have the highest levels of agreement: 72% agree that elections are fair, and 82% agree that their state and local governments conduct fair elections. Independents have the lowest levels of trust: 56% and 67% agreement, respectively, for national vs state. Republicans fall in the middle: 64% of Republicans agree that elections are fair, while 77% of Republicans agree that their state and local governments conduct elections fairly. Notably, men’s perception of election fairness changes from a low of 62% among independents to 67% among Republicans (electoral winners) to 81% among Democrats (electoral losers); male Democrats have the highest confidence in the 2024 election being fair, even though their party lost.

Table 1. Crosstabs of agreement elections are fair (2024) by gender and party.

| Statement | Republicans | | | Independents | | | Democrats | | |
|--|-------------|-------|--------|--------------|-------|---------|-----------|-------|---------|
| | Men | Women | Diff. | Men | Women | Diff. | Men | Women | Diff. |
| Elections in the U.S. are fair | 67% | 61% | 6% pts | 62% | 49% | 13% pts | 81% | 65% | 16% pts |
| Your state and local government conducted a fair and accurate election in 2024 | 79% | 76% | 3% pts | 73% | 61% | 12% pts | 88% | 73% | 15% pts |

Note: Survey weights used; for each partisanship subgroup, election confidence and gender are statistically correlated; for national election fairness, Republicans have a χ^2 statistic of 49.3, Democrats have a χ^2 of 518.4, and for independents it is 344.6 ($p < 0.001$); on the state and local variables, Republicans, Democrats, and independents have χ^2 statistics of 19.7, 423.0, and 351.6, respectively ($p < 0.001$).

More importantly, Table 1 also explores these relationships by examining gender-partisan combinations across subgroups of the American population based on party ID. Notably, the largest gender gaps exist among Democrats; there is a 16-percentage point difference between men and women in agreement about U.S. election fairness among Democrats, and a 15-point gap in agreement for state and local governments. Men are much more likely to believe the election was fair, especially among the losing partisan groups. Regardless of party identification, a greater proportion of men believe that elections in the US are fair relative to women. This provides preliminary evidence for H1, that men are more likely than women to believe elections are fair.

To control for overlapping factors that may predict confidence in elections at the individual level, we control for race (binary indicator variables for racial group, with white non-Hispanic as the reference category), age (measured in years), education level (1 = *No HS*, 5 = *post-grad*), political interest (1 = *hardly interested*, 4 = *very interested*), political ideology (5-point ordinal scale, higher more conservative), marital status, and family income (1 = *less than \$10,000 per year*, 16 = *\$500,000 or more*, missing values were imputed based on race, education, gender, employment status, region, and marital status). Research also finds that exposure to observable facts about election administration can shape election trust. People living in counties that do a better job administering elections have consistently higher perceptions of polling place quality in both the 2016 and 2020 US elections (Abus et al., 2025).

To control for the state electoral environment of the respondent, we include the EPI from the MIT Election Lab, which measures election administration quality in a state on a 19-component metric capturing convenience, integrity, and accuracy, developed with expert input, scoring from 0 to 1, where higher scores mean better administration. Mississippi has the lowest and New Mexico the highest score. We also include a covariate for the Cost of Voting Index (COVI; Schraufnagel et al., 2020). The COVI combines over 30 electoral reforms across seven major electoral reform issue areas to form a single index where higher scores indicate more restrictions on voter registration and voting (Pomante, 2025; Pomante et al., 2023). Research has found that individuals living in states with more restrictive registration and voting laws are less likely to vote (Coll & Juelich, 2022; Ritter et al., 2024). Higher values mean more voting restrictions. The index ranges from Washington state lowest to Mississippi highest. EPI and COVI are weakly correlated, with a coefficient of 0.053 ($p < .0001$; Ritter et al., 2024).

To contextualize our findings on election integrity, we compare these results to the well-documented gender gap in political knowledge. To measure political knowledge, we measured the proportion of 15 non-gender-relevant (see Dolan, 2011) knowledge questions a respondent answered correctly. On average, respondents answered 67% of questions correctly. The text of the questions and the percentage of respondents who answered each question correctly are listed in Appendix 1 in the Supplementary File. On average, women answered 62% of questions correctly while men answered about 74% of questions correctly, a 12-percentage point gender gap in political knowledge. The overall gap in election confidence in 2024 is 10-percentage points, a comparable size to the knowledge gap.

To test our hypotheses, we use OLS for our continuous dependent variable, measuring political knowledge, and logistic regression for our binary election integrity outcome variables. The models are estimated using survey weights, robust standard errors, and fixed effects for the respondent's state to capture any unmeasured state-level factors that could affect trust in elections.

5. Results: 2024

After controlling for both demographic, partisan, and contextual factors that may shape confidence in elections, the multivariate results presented in Table 2 show a significant and persistent gender gap, with women having lower confidence in the conduct of US elections. As a baseline comparison, the coefficient for women (compared to men) is statistically significant and negative in model 1. This indicates that, on average, women answer 7% fewer political knowledge questions correctly than men do. This is consistent with previous findings on political knowledge (Barabas et al., 2014; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In models 2

and 3, the coefficients are again statistically significant and negative. This indicates that women are less likely to agree that the US elections are fair and less likely to agree that their state and local governments conduct fair and accurate elections.

Table 2. Gender gaps in 2024 election confidence.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|
| | Political Knowledge (OLS) | Trust in National Elections (Logit) | Trust in State/Local Elections (Logit) |
| Woman | -.07*** (.003) | -.44*** (.034) | -.39*** (.040) |
| Black | -.09*** (.006) | -.38*** (.060) | -.65*** (.068) |
| Asian | -.03*** (.009) | .20** (.100) | .19* (.116) |
| Latino | -.04*** (.007) | -.19*** (.071) | -.10 (.079) |
| Other Race | -.02** (.008) | -.43*** (.073) | -.40*** (.083) |
| Age | .003*** (.000) | .01*** (.001) | .01*** (.001) |
| Education | .04*** (.002) | .13*** (.018) | .17*** (.020) |
| Political Interest | .11*** (.002) | .21*** (.020) | .33*** (.022) |
| Democrat | -.12*** (.010) | .30*** (.088) | .21** (.101) |
| Independent | <i>Reference Category</i> | | |
| Republican | -.10*** (.009) | .09 (.087) | .04 (.099) |
| Party Strength | .08*** (.004) | .14*** (.037) | .23*** (.041) |
| Conservative Ideology | .005** (.002) | -.14*** (.019) | -.17*** (.024) |
| Married or Civil Partnership | .003 (.004) | -.04 (.038) | -.03 (.044) |
| Family Income | .01*** (.001) | .03*** (.006) | .04*** (.007) |
| COVI | | .02 (.012) | .16 (2.482) |
| EPI 2022 | | .59* (.322) | 1.31 (21.335) |
| Constant | -.17*** (.026) | -1.34*** (.285) | -1.59 (23.527) |
| State Fixed Effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 58,895 | 48,964 | 48,965 |
| Log Likelihood | 6,647.65 | -31,701.57 | -25,852.00 |
| R-squared/Pseudo R-Squared | .50 | .06 | .10 |
| BIC | -12,592.36 | 63,586.73 | 52,395.13 |

Notes: Models 2 and 3 are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Since the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are not directly interpretable, we calculate predicted probabilities for men and women for these models, holding all other covariates at their mean values. These predicted probabilities and predicted values for men and women are reported in Table 3. Women do 7-percentage points worse on political knowledge questions than men, and they are 7-percentage points less likely to believe their state/local government conducted a fair election in 2024, all else equal. They are 10-percentage points less likely to believe national elections are fair. These differences provide support for our first research hypothesis, that women, on average, have lower confidence in elections than men. The gaps in confidence in elections align with well-known knowledge gaps in politics.

Although the 2024 election outcome returned a Republican president to the White House and Republican Party control of both houses of Congress, Table 3 results indicate that Democratic partisans still had higher confidence in the conduct of elections both nationally and at the state/local level, compared to independents (reference category), while Republicans were not statistically different than independents. These patterns show the lasting effects of election-related conspiracy theories in 2020 (Bowler & Donovan, 2024; Clayton et al., 2021). People who are stronger partisans, regardless of whether they are Democrats or Republicans, have higher political knowledge and are more likely to believe the election was fair. The negative sign for Democratic and Republican partisans in predicting political knowledge is a function of the modeling and the inclusion of the party strength variable. True independents do report lower levels of political knowledge than Democrats and Republicans, while leaners report similar levels of political knowledge to partisans and strong partisans of both parties when using the seven-point scale for partisanship and omitting the use of the two covariates.

Table 3. Predicted gender gaps in 2024 election confidence.

| | Knowledge (Percent Correct) | National Elections (Probability of Agreement) | State/Local Elections (Probability of Agreement) |
|------------|--------------------------------|--|---|
| Men | 67% | 69% | 79% |
| Women | 60% | 59% | 72% |
| Difference | 7% pts | 10% pts | 7% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins from Table 2; differences are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Appendix 2 in the Supplementary File replicates the two election confidence models (2 and 3) but includes political knowledge as a predictor. The findings align with our theory that there is a parallel between political knowledge gender gaps and election confidence gaps, but election confidence gaps also include a sore-loser component. Higher political knowledge is a statistically significant predictor of more election confidence. When political knowledge is excluded, men have a 69% probability of election confidence and women a 59% probability, resulting in a 10-point gender gap. When political knowledge is included as a predictor, the gap reduces by 2 points to an 8-point gender gap. The gender gap in confidence in state elections drops from a 7-point gap without political knowledge to a 5-point gap with political knowledge. Thus, accounting for knowledge helps close the gap, but the gender gap by political party remains strong and significant.

Do these patterns change for people in states that make it easier or harder to vote, given research findings that voter access laws are important for confidence in elections (Atkeson et al., 2025), or in states that do a better job administering elections? In terms of state context, only the EPI is positively related to more confidence in elections (column 2 of Table 2) with a 90% confidence interval, consistent with prior research (Abus et al., 2025; Bowler et al., 2015) that quality election administration can lead to greater public confidence. Also, as

the cost of voting increases, people know less about politics overall, which makes sense. But people living in states with higher or lower voter access are not more or less likely to believe the 2024 election was fair.

We find gender gaps in election confidence are relatively consistent regardless of whether the state makes it easier or harder to cast a ballot (see Table 4). The gender gap varies by only 1 or 2 percentage points across state election contexts. This indicates that the gender gap in election confidence is robust to the restrictiveness of voting laws in a state (see Appendix 3 in the Supplementary File). We find a similar-sized gender gap in election confidence when we subsample by people living in states with high and low election performance quality, as measured by above and below the mean on the EPI (see Appendix 4 in the Supplementary File).

Table 4. Predicted 2024 gender gaps in election confidence subsampled by state COVI.

| | Knowledge (Percent Correct) | | National Elections (Probability of Agreement) | | State/Local Elections (Probability of Agreement) | |
|------------|--------------------------------|-----------|--|-----------|---|-----------|
| | Low COVI | High COVI | Low COVI | High COVI | Low COVI | High COVI |
| Men | 66% | 68% | 70% | 68% | 77% | 80% |
| Women | 60% | 60% | 60% | 59% | 72% | 73% |
| Difference | 6% pts | 8% pts | 10% pts | 9% pts | 5% pts | 7% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins from Table 1 in Appendix 3 of the Supplementary File; gender differences are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

6. Interacting Gender and Partisanship

Most importantly, does gender condition the effects of partisanship on perceptions of election integrity? Models 1–4 in Appendix 5 of the Supplementary File test our second research hypothesis, which posits that the impact of being a partisan whose party lost the last election (i.e., partisan loser), is more substantial for women than for men. Models 1 (national) and 2 (state) investigate this relationship using a binary Republican variable, who in the wake of the 2024 election were political winners compared to all other respondents. Models 3 (national) and 4 (state) show the results interacting gender and three-point party identification. Both strategies are useful because models 1 and 2 allow us to investigate the differences between political winners and political losers, while models 3 and 4 allow further granularity to compare Republicans (political winners) to Democrats (political losers) and independents who may feel like either winners or losers, or neither, based on the election outcome. Results are in Table 5.

Figure 1 shows the results of the interaction between gender and indicator variable Republican partisans, holding constant party strength (columns 1 and 2 of Appendix 5 in the Supplementary File). In the left there is a statistically significant gender gap in overall election confidence, regardless of political party. However, as shown in Table 5, this gender gap is over twice as large for Democrats (electoral losers in 2024) and independents as it is for Republicans, 12-percentage point compared to a 5-percentage point gap. Similarly, on the right side of Figure 1, there is a large gender gap for Democrats and independents in believing state/local elections were conducted fairly, but the difference between men and women Republicans is not significant (i.e., no gap). These data suggest that women Democrats and independents lost more confidence in the fairness of elections than their male counterparts, consistent with our expectations.

Table 5. Predicted 2024 gender gaps in election confidence by Republican ID.

| | National Elections (Probability of Agreement) | | State/Local Elections (Probability of Agreement) | |
|------------|--|-------------|---|-------------|
| | Non-Republicans | Republicans | Non-Republicans | Republicans |
| Men | 72% | 65% | 83% | 77% |
| Women | 60% | 60% | 74% | 76% |
| Difference | 12% pts | 5% pts | 9% pts | 1% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins; gender differences are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level except for among Republicans on state/local elections.




Figure 1. Predicted 2024 election confidence by gender and party.

Figure 2 and Table 6 present similar results for the interaction between gender and three-point party identification (columns 3 and 4 of Appendix 5 in the Supplementary File). In the left pane of Figure 2, there is a large gender gap of 16 percentage points in the probability of agreement among Democrats. This gap is slightly smaller, 10-percentage points, for independents, and disappears to no longer be statistically significant among Republicans, electoral winners. This trend is echoed in the three-point party identification interaction results for state and local election confidence, shown in the right pane of Figure 2. Again, there is a large gender gap, 11-percentage points, between Democratic men and women, a smaller gap, 7-percentage points, for independent men and women, and no statistically significant gender gap between Republican men and women. Put together, the results of the gender and party identification interaction models provide support for our third research hypothesis: that women who are electoral losers have lower confidence in elections than men who are electoral losers.

Table 6. Predicted 2024 gender gaps in election confidence subsampled by three-point party ID.

| | National Elections (Probability of Agreement) | | | State/Local Elections (Probability of Agreement) | | |
|------------|--|--------------|-------------|---|--------------|-------------|
| | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
| Men | 77% | 67% | 66% | 86% | 80% | 78% |
| Women | 61% | 57% | 61% | 75% | 73% | 77% |
| Difference | 16% pts | 10% pts | 5% pts | 11% pts | 7% pts | 1% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins; gender differences are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level except for among Republicans on state/local elections.




Figure 2. Predicted confidence in elections in 2024 by gender and party identification (3-part).

7. Robustness Tests: Democratic Winners and Republican Losers

In 2022 Democrats retained control of the Senate with Democratic President Biden in the White House. To investigate the robustness of our results, we investigate these relationships further using the National Science Foundation-funded 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University (Barry et al., 2023). Three teams of scientists collected the nationally representative data of 6,400 respondents each, with a combined total of over 19,000 respondents. We rely on a post-election question asked by the Gradient Metrics team that asks the extent to which the respondents agree with the statement “The process of counting ballots for American elections is trustworthy.” While the magnitude of estimates using this variable is not directly comparable to those in our 2024 analysis, given changes to question wording, we expect related trends between 2022 and 2024, but different electoral winners and losers.

Appendix 6 in the Supplementary File shows logistic regression models and use the same set of controls coded identically as for the 2024 analysis to optimize the comparability of our results. For reference, these controls include race, education, political interest, party strength, ideology, marital status, and family income. We continue to control for the COVI and the EPI and estimate the models with state-level fixed effects, survey weights, and robust standard errors.

Consistent with the results from 2024, the models in Appendix 6 of the Supplementary File include an interaction between gender and partisanship shows a negative and statistically significant effect of being a woman on the likelihood of agreeing that the process for counting ballots in the US is fair. Men have a 59.4% chance of agreeing with this statement while women have a 55.7%, a statistically significant difference of 3.7 percentage points ($p < 0.07$). This provides evidence that our support for H1 is consistent across the 2022 and 2024 elections; overall, women have lower confidence in elections.

Model 2 in Appendix 6 of the Supplementary File shows the results of the interaction between gender and party ID. The interaction of women and Democratic partisanship and women and Republican partisanship is statistically significant. Table 7 shows the predicted probability values for men and women in each party, all else equal. As expected, there is a statistically significant gap in election integrity beliefs between men and women who are electoral losers, which in this context are Republicans, with women having less confidence in the election. Notably, there is no gender gap in election confidence among Democrats and independents. This provides further evidence to the robustness of our finding that gender exacerbates the winner/loser gap, in support of H2.

Table 7. Predicted gender gaps subsampled by three-point party ID.

| | Process of Counting Ballots is Trustworthy (Probability of Agreement) | | |
|------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
| Men | 87% | 46% | 48% |
| Women | 82% | 48% | 37% |
| Difference | 5% pts | -2% pts | 11% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins; only the gender difference among Republicans is significant ($p < .06$).

8. 2020 Replication

The 2020 US presidential election was held during the height of the Covid pandemic, and Democratic President Joe Biden won by a slim margin. We used similar coding as described above to analyze the 2020 SPAE from the MIT Election Lab (Stewart, 2021). The 2020 SPAE reports 58% were confident that “your vote in the General Election was counted as you intended?” Similar response options were used for confidence in state elections: “Now, think about vote counting throughout [respondent’s state]. How confident are you that votes in [respondent’s state] were counted as voters intended?” We use simple crosstabs of these two variables by gender and subsampled for the respondents’ party using the three-category party ID variable (survey weights were used). These crosstabs are shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Crosstabs of election confidence from the 2020 SPAE.

| | National | | State | |
|------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|------------|
| | Democrats | Republicans | Democrats | Republican |
| Men | 91% | 21% | 93% | 62% |
| Women | 91% | 25% | 93% | 58% |
| Difference | 0% pts | 4% pts | 0% pts | 4% pts |

Notes: Values are predictive margins; only the gender differences among Republicans are significant ($p < .05$).

Results find the gender gap in confidence in national elections, broken down by party, was insignificant among Democrats, the winning party; 91% men and women were confident in how their vote was counted generally, and 93% thought their state counted their vote properly. But among Republicans, the losing party, the gender gap was much larger. Women were 4-percentage points less likely to believe their ballot was counted accurately in the general election and 4 points less likely to believe their state and local election ballot was counted accurately, statistically significant differences. This is evidence that Republican women, the electoral losers, were less likely to have confidence in ballot counting, but among women Democrats (the winners), there was almost no gap. This pattern follows the 2022 and 2024 data, even though the party controlling the government changed. The consistent pattern over three elections, varying party control of government, survey sample, and question wording, provides confidence in the results.

9. Conclusion

The analyses presented here provide clear evidence that gender accentuates the partisan winner–loser gap in perceptions of electoral integrity in the US, a finding that most scholars and policymakers have not discussed. Across three recent US elections and multiple specifications, women report significantly lower confidence in national, state, and local elections than men, and the effect is robust to controls for demographic covariates and state-level electoral environments.

The results further demonstrate that gender interacts with partisanship in systematic ways: Democratic women exhibit the sharpest declines in confidence when their party loses, while gender gaps largely disappear among Republican respondents following their party’s 2024 electoral victory. When Republicans are the electoral losers, Republican women report less trust in the process by which ballots are counted than Republican men, and there is no gender difference among Democrats. Findings from 2020 and 2022 are consistent with those from the 2024 election, providing further evidence for the moderating effects of gender in the partisan winner–loser gap.

Differences in political socialization and women’s greater partisan attachment shape evaluations of democratic processes in ways that extend beyond traditional accounts centered on partisanship and elite cues alone. By identifying a durable and substantively meaningful gender gap in election confidence, this study contributes to both the literature on electoral trust and gendered political behavior. The evidence suggests that gender is not simply an ancillary demographic variable but an important moderator of the winner–loser dynamic.

These findings also speak to the broad implications of women being stronger partisans than men. Previous work on this topic finds that women are more affectively polarized than men (Ondercin & Lizotte, 2021).

Future work should continue to investigate the consequences of this difference in partisan strength, including gender differences in how individuals form social group attachments.

A systematic difference between men and women in the extent to which they trust elections to be fair is problematic, since it can be linked to lower political participation (Fitz & Saunders, 2024). When individuals do not trust the electoral process, they are less willing to accept the results of elections and less willing to participate in future elections. These consequences have important implications for the descriptive and substantive representation of women. Further, these results underscore the importance of studying the intersection of gender and partisanship to truly understand how these identities interact and shape our political system.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback to improve the manuscript.

Funding

Publication of this article in open access was made possible through the institutional membership agreement between the University of Iowa and Cogitatio Press.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

Data Availability

All data used in this article are publicly available. Visit the CES (<https://tischcollege.tufts.edu/research-faculty/research-centers/cooperative-election-study>), 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey (<https://socialsciences.cornell.edu/funding-programs/2022-collaborative-midterm-survey?tabSettingAtom=%7B%22tabIndex%22%3A1%7D&question=%5B%22Q15%22%2C%22Q15B%22%2C%22Q15C%22%2C%22Q16%22%2C%22Q17%22%2C%22Q18%22%2C%22Q19%22%2C%22Q19A%22%2C%22Q20%22%2C%22Q20A%22%2C%22Q22%22%5D>), and SPAE website (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/FSGX7Z>) for access.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the authors (unedited).

References

- Abus, M., Bai, K., & Dunaway, J. (2025). Local news, partisanship, and perceptions about election administration. *Electoral Studies*, 97, Article 102970.
- Alvarez, R. M., Cao, J., & Li, Y. (2021). Voting experiences, perceptions of fraud, and voter confidence. *Social Science Quarterly*, 102(4), 1225–1238.
- Anderson, C., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005). *Losers' consent: Elections and democratic legitimacy*. Oxford University Press.
- Atkeson, L. R., Alvarez, R. M., & Hall, T. E. (2015). Voter confidence: How to measure it and how it differs from government support. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 14(3), 207–219.
- Atkeson, L. R., McKown-Dawson, E., & Stein, R. M. (2025). The costs of voting and voter confidence. *Political Research Quarterly*, 78(1), 22–37.

- Atkeson, L. R., & Saunders, K. L. (2007). The effect of election administration on voter confidence: A local matter? *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 40(4), 655–660.
- Barabas, J., Jerit, J., Pollock, W., & Rainey, C. (2014). The question(s) of political knowledge. *American Political Science Review*, 108(4), 840–855.
- Barnes, T. D., & Beaulieu, E. (2014). Gender stereotypes and corruption: How candidates affect perceptions of election fraud. *Politics & Gender*, 10(3), 365–391.
- Barry, C. L., Schuldt, J. P., & Enns, P. K. (2023). 2022 Collaborative Midterm Survey [Data set]. Cornell Center for Social Sciences. <https://socialsciences.cornell.edu/funding-programs/2022-collaborative-midterm-survey?tabSettingAtom=%7B%22tabIndex%22%3A1%7D&question=%5B%22Q15%22%2C%22Q15B%22%2C%22Q15C%22%2C%22Q16%22%2C%22Q17%22%2C%22Q18%22%2C%22Q19%22%2C%22Q19A%22%2C%22Q20%22%2C%22Q20A%22%2C%22Q22%22%5D>
- Bittner, A., & Goodyear-Grant, E. (2017). Sex isn't gender: Reforming concepts and measurements in the study of public opinion. *Political Behavior*, 39(4), 1019–1041.
- Bos, A. L., Greenlee, J. S., Holman, M. R., Oxley, Z. M., & Lay, J. C. (2022). This one's for the boys: How gendered political socialization limits girls' political ambition and interest. *American Political Science Review*, 116(2), 484–501.
- Bowler, S., Brunell, T., Donovan, T., & Gronke, P. (2015). Election administration and perceptions of fair elections. *Electoral Studies*, 38, 1–9.
- Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (2024). Confidence in US elections after the big lie. *Political Research Quarterly*, 77(1), 283–296.
- Cassese, E. C., & Holman, M. R. (2018). Party and gender stereotypes in campaign attacks. *Political Behavior*, 40(3), 785–807.
- Center for American Women in Politics. (2024, March 26). *Women still hold fewer than a third of all municipal offices* [Press release]. [https://cawp.rutgers.edu/news-media/press-releases/women-still-hold-fewer-third-all-municipal-offices#:~:text=The%20Center%20for%20American%20Women,31.8%25\)%20\(+5%20spots\)](https://cawp.rutgers.edu/news-media/press-releases/women-still-hold-fewer-third-all-municipal-offices#:~:text=The%20Center%20for%20American%20Women,31.8%25)%20(+5%20spots))
- Clayton, K., Davis, N. T., Nyhan, B., Porter, E., Ryan, T. J., & Wood, T. J. (2021). Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118(23), Article e2024125118.
- Coll, J. A., & Juelich, C. L. (2022). Electoral double-bind: How electoral environments affect racial and ethnic youth voting behavior. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, 7(3), 544–571.
- Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press.
- Dolan, K. (2011). Do women and men know different things? Measuring gender differences in political knowledge. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(1), 97–107.
- Filindra, A., Kaplan, N. J., & Manning, A. (2024). Who buys the “big lie”? White racial grievance and confidence in the fairness of American elections. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, 9(1), 182–203.
- Fitz, E. B., & Saunders, K. L. (2024). Distrusting the process: Electoral trust, operational ideology, and nonvoting political participation in the 2020 American electorate. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 88(SI), 843–857.
- Greene, S., & Elder, L. (2001). Gender and the psychological structure of partisanship. *Women & Politics*, 22(1), 63–84.
- Hinojosa, M., & Kittilson, M. C. (2020). *Seeing women, strengthening democracy: How women in politics foster connected citizens*. Oxford University Press.
- Holliday, D. E., Grimmer, J., Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2025). Who are the election skeptics? Evidence from the 2022 midterm elections. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 24(1), 1–17.

- Karp, J. A., Banducci, S. A., & Bowler, S. (2003). To know it is to love it?: Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(3), 271–292.
- Kessler, G. (2021, January 23). Trump made 30,573 false or misleading claims as president. Nearly half came in his final year. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-fact-checker-tracked-trump-claims/2021/01/23/ad04b69a-5c1d-11eb-a976-bad6431e03e2_story.html
- Kraft, P. W. (2024). Women also know stuff: Challenging the gender gap in political sophistication. *American Political Science Review*, 118(2), 903–921.
- Kraft, P. W., & Dolan, K. (2023). Asking the right questions: A framework for developing gender-balanced political knowledge batteries. *Political Research Quarterly*, 76(1), 393–406.
- Lay, J. C., Holman, M. R., Greenlee, J. S., Oxley, Z. M., & Bos, A. L. (2023). Partisanship on the playground: Expressive party politics among children. *Political Research Quarterly*, 76(3), 1249–1264.
- McDonald, M. (2022). *From pandemic to insurrection: Voting in the 2020 US presidential election* (1st ed.). de Gruyter.
- Miller, J. M., Farhart, C. E., & Saunders, K. L. (2025). Losers' conspiracy: Elections and conspiracism. *Political Behavior*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10063-1>
- Mondak, J. J., & Anderson, M. R. (2004). The knowledge gap: A reexamination of gender-based differences in political knowledge. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(2), 492–512.
- Mongrain, P. (2023). Suspicious minds: Unexpected election outcomes, perceived electoral integrity and satisfaction with democracy in American presidential elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 76(4), 1589–1603.
- Morehouse Mendez, J., & Osborn, T. (2010). Gender and the perception of knowledge in political discussion. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(2), 269–279.
- Norrander, B. (1997). The independence gap and the gender gap. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61(3), 464–476. <https://doi.org/10.1086/297809>
- Norrander, B. (1999). The evolution of the gender gap. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 63(4), 566–576.
- Ondercin, H. L., & Lizotte, M. K. (2021). You've lost that loving feeling: How gender shapes affective polarization. *American Politics Research*, 49(3), 282–292.
- Pomante, M. J. (2025). Cost of voting in the American states: 2024. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 24(1), 52–61.
- Pomante, M. J., Schraufnagel, S., & Li, Q. (2023). *The cost of voting in the American states*. University Press of Kansas.
- Prooijen, V., & Willem, J. (2018). Empowerment as a tool to reduce belief in conspiracy theories. In J. E. Uscinski (Ed.), *Conspiracy theories and the people who believe them* (1st ed., pp. 432–442). Oxford University Press.
- Ritter, M. J., Coll, J. A., & Tolbert, C. J. (2024). Can election administration overcome the effects of restrictive state voting laws? *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 23(1), 19–38.
- Sances, M. W., & Stewart, C. (2015). Partisanship and confidence in the vote count: Evidence from U.S. national elections since 2000. *Electoral Studies*, 40, 176–188.
- Schaffner, B., Shih, M., Ansolabehere, S., & Pope, J. (2025). *Cooperative Election Study Common Content, 2024* (Version 9.0) [Data set]. Harvard Dataverse. <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/X11EP6>
- Schraufnagel, S., Pomante, M. J., & Li, Q. (2020). Cost of voting in the American states: 2020. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 19(4), 503–509.
- Stewart, C. (2021). *2020 Survey of the Performance of American Elections* (Version 1.0) [Data set]. Harvard Dataverse. <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/FSGX7Z>

- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–48). Brooks/Cole.
- Verba, S., Burns, N., & Schlozman, K. L. (1997). Knowing and caring about politics: Gender and political engagement. *The Journal of Politics*, 59(4), 1051–1072.
- Weisberg, H. F. (1980). A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification. *Political Behavior*, 2(1), 33–60.
- Williams, N. S., Snipes, A., & Singh, S. P. (2021). Gender differences in the impact of electoral victory on satisfaction with democracy. *Electoral Studies*, 69, Article 102205.
- Wolak, J. (2024). Partisan bias and evaluations of women in Congress. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 12(5), 1074–1092.

About the Authors



Samantha J. DeRagon is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Iowa. Her published research focuses on gender in political attitudes and behavior in American politics.



Caroline Tolbert is a University of Iowa distinguished professor researching voting, elections, and public opinion. She was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow for her work on state election laws. She is coauthor of *The Problem with Primary Voters* (2026) and *Accessible Elections: How the States Can Help Americans Vote* (2020).