**Politics and Governance**
2027 • Volume 15 • Article 12764
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.12764

cogitatio

ARTICLE

Open Access Journal

# Digital Food Justice: Equitable Governance of Food Platforms

**Nevin Cohen**

Graduate School of Public Health and Health Policy, City University of New York, USA

**Correspondence:** Nevin Cohen (nevin.cohen@sph.cuny.edu)

**Submitted:** 9 May 2026 **Accepted:** 25 June 2026 **Published:** 29 July 2026

**Issue:** This article is part of the issue "Urban Food Governance Beyond 2030: Resilience, Justice, and the Politics of Sustainability Transitions" edited by Anna R. Davies (Trinity College Dublin), Dean Phelan (University College Dublin), Yuliya Voytenko Palgan (Lund University), and Ana Moragues-Faus (Universitat de Barcelona), fully open access at https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.i544

## Abstract

Platform-mediated food systems are changing how food is provisioned, marketed, delivered, and governed in cities. Yet major urban food governance frameworks, including the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact and the FAO Urban Food Agenda, were designed before digital platforms became central to food access, labor, marketing, pricing, and logistics. This article develops digital food justice as a framework for understanding how platforms reorganize food inequity and what this means for a post-2030 urban food agenda. It identifies four connected features of digital food injustice: temporal asymmetry between rapid platform change and slower public governance; spatial decoupling of food provisioning from the visible places urban food policy has traditionally addressed; behavioral data extraction with racially and economically uneven harms; and algorithmic opacity, which makes consequential platform decisions difficult to see, contest, and regulate. Drawing on a qualitative case study of New York City and New York State from 2020 through early 2026, the article examines labor standards, land-use rules, food safety disclosure, digital food access programs, child data protections, and public food data infrastructure. It finds that subnational governments can govern parts of platform-mediated food systems, but that single-domain interventions remain vulnerable to platform adaptation. Effective digital food governance requires enforceable rules, public data capacity, worker and community power, and coordination across governance scales.

## Keywords

algorithmic opacity; digital food justice; food justice; food platforms; platform governance; post-2030 agenda; public data infrastructure; urban food governance

## 1. Introduction

The 2030 horizon that has shaped urban food governance is approaching just as digital technologies are transforming food systems in ways existing policies did not anticipate. Over the past decade, the Sustainable Development Goals, the FAO Urban Food Agenda, the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, and the Food2030 framework have established cities and other subnational governments as food-system actors. These initiatives linked food access, nutrition, sustainability, public health, and equity to urban and regional development, and encouraged cities to act through food strategies, planning, procurement, and food policy councils (FAO, 2019; Moragues-Faus & Battersby, 2021; Moragues-Faus et al., 2024; University of Copenhagen et al., 2026). Yet these approaches were designed for food environments in which stores, transactions, workers, and policy targets were at least partly visible to advocates and policymakers. Urban food systems are now being reshaped by digital platforms that influence food provisioning, labor, marketing, pricing, and logistics in ways that have outpaced policies designed for an earlier era (Lundberg et al., 2025). These platforms make food environments more data-intensive and less transparent, while concentrating decision-making power in a small number of digital intermediaries whose operations remain difficult for existing governance tools to scrutinize (Pasquale, 2015; Srnicek, 2017; Zuboff, 2019). A key question is how a post-2030 urban food agenda can enable cities to govern food systems whose consequential decisions are increasingly made through digital infrastructures they do not control.

This article focuses on networked digital intermediaries, or platforms, that organize food-provisioning transactions among consumers, retailers, workers, and other actors. It does not examine the full range of digital technologies present in food environments (Farhangi et al., 2025). The distinction matters because platforms create different governance problems than those posed by digital tools more generally. Drawing on an in-depth case study of New York from 2020 through early 2026, the article connects platform-mediated food systems to the five guiding principles of the post-2030 urban food agenda advanced in this thematic issue: time, place, diversity, power, and relationships. It identifies four structural features of digital food injustice that are connected features of a political-economic system sustained by corporate power: temporal asymmetry, spatial decoupling, behavioral data extraction with racially uneven harms, and algorithmic opacity. The case illustrates the possibilities and limits of digital food governance even under comparatively favorable institutional and political conditions.

## 2. Background and Theoretical Framework

This section develops digital food justice by extending food justice scholarship to the governance challenges created by food platforms. Food justice scholarship shows that food production, distribution, marketing, and consumption are shaped by racial inequality, economic exploitation, disinvestment, and unequal political power, with racial justice at the center of the analysis (Alkon & Agyeman, 2011; Gottlieb & Joshi, 2010). This literature has shown how disinvestment, deindustrialization, gentrification, and disenfranchisement have weakened local food economies and limited food retail in Black communities (Reese, 2019); how precarious labor disproportionately affects immigrants, women, and workers of color across the food chain (Minkoff-Zern & Mares, 2025); and how targeted marketing of unhealthy food to Black and Latino consumers links corporate business models to structural racism and diet-related health disparities (Barnhill et al., 2022). Food justice is both a way to analyze these structures and a project aimed at changing them.

Food justice scholarship was developed largely for an analog food environment, where retailers, restaurants, distribution facilities, public food programs, and labor relations were at least partly visible to residents, regulators, and institutions. Platform-mediated food provisioning reorganizes that environment through data, algorithms, interfaces, logistics systems, and platform labor relations (Srnicek, 2017; van Dijck et al., 2018). It intensifies racial and economic inequalities while also making those inequalities harder to observe and address (Pasquale, 2015; van Doorn, 2017). Platform-mediated food provisioning therefore requires a clearer account of how digital systems change the ways food inequity is produced, observed, and addressed.

### *2.1. Four Structural Features of Digital Food Injustice*

Four features distinguish platform-mediated food provisioning from analog counterparts. Each has its own scholarly grounding, but they are not separate problems. They are connected features of a food system increasingly organized by platform firms, their business models, and the regulatory gaps in which they operate.

The first feature, temporal asymmetry, is the mismatch between the speed of platform change and the slower pace of democratic governance. Platforms can redesign apps, pricing systems, labor rules, delivery zones, and consumer interfaces quickly, often through routine software updates. Public governance moves more slowly, through rulemaking, hearings, litigation, budget cycles, and elections. This gap gives platform firms a strategic advantage. Mazur and Serafin (2023) describe this dynamic as "stalling the state," in which platforms benefit from regulation and enforcement delays. Cioffi et al. (2022) place this asymmetry within a longer history in which unchecked corporate power produces disruptions that eventually provoke public regulation. Temporal asymmetry is therefore both a technical feature of platform systems and a political resource firms use to preserve their advantage.

The second feature, spatial decoupling, is the separation of food provisioning from the places through which urban food governance has traditionally operated. Place-based food justice interventions have focused on visible infrastructure such as supermarkets, farmers markets, urban farms, and corner stores. Platform-mediated provisioning adds physical infrastructures, including ghost kitchens, dark stores, micro-fulfillment centers, and last-mile warehouses, as well as algorithmic geographies, including delivery zones and service areas that determine which addresses receive coverage. These forms fit poorly within governance tools built for physical food infrastructure. Shapiro (2023) shows how dark stores and ghost kitchens replace consumer-facing retail spaces with online fulfillment infrastructure that can harm historically disenfranchised communities. Other studies show that privately determined delivery zones and algorithmically managed service areas create uneven geographies of digital food access that vary by income and community scale, with service concentrated in cities and thinning across suburban and rural areas (Brandt et al., 2019; George & Tomer, 2022). These patterns extend spatial inequalities scholars have identified in algorithmic systems more broadly (Benjamin, 2019; Noble, 2018).

The third feature, behavioral data extraction, is the capture and use of detailed data from food provisioning. Orders, searches, ratings, coupon clicks, and delivery interactions reveal what people eat, what they can afford, when they shop, where they live, and how they respond to prices and promotions. Platforms use these data to personalize prices, target advertising, classify consumers and neighborhoods by profitability, and shape food choices. Surveillance capitalism scholarship explains how behavioral data are converted into

predictive value (Zuboff, 2019), while scholarship on automated inequality and racialized algorithmic systems shows how seemingly neutral technologies can reproduce existing hierarchies (Benjamin, 2019; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018). In food systems, this extraction is especially consequential because the people most exposed to scrutiny of their food choices, and to food insecurity, diet-related disease, and precarious food work, are often the same people whose behavior becomes most visible to public and private data systems. Treating data extraction as a feature of digital food injustice, rather than only as a privacy concern, makes clear that platform business models extract value from the same populations whose racial and economic marginalization food justice scholarship has long documented.

The fourth feature, algorithmic opacity, is the concealment of consequential decisions within proprietary technical systems. In analog food environments, inequities are often visible in the built environment, such as a shuttered supermarket, a cluster of fast-food outlets, or a long food pantry line. In platform-mediated food systems, inequities are also produced through proprietary algorithms that determine search rankings, discount targeting, delivery coverage, order assignment, account deactivation, and exposure to food marketing. These systems are difficult for regulators, workers, consumers, and communities to inspect or challenge. Pasquale (2015) describes such systems as part of a "black box society," in which consequential decisions are made by private technical infrastructures the public cannot inspect. Van Dijck et al. (2018) similarly show that platforms increasingly perform functions in sectors of public importance while resisting democratic oversight. Opacity becomes a form of power because regulators cannot respond quickly to systems they cannot observe, communities cannot fight spatial exclusion when delivery boundaries are hidden, and workers cannot challenge unfair treatment when pay formulas and deactivation rules remain inaccessible. Algorithmic opacity therefore compounds the other three features.

### *2.2. Corporate Power as the Structural Condition*

The four features cohere because they are produced by firms that exercise power across technical, economic, legal, and political domains. Törnberg (2023) shows that platforms use digital infrastructure not only to organize business, but also to control participation, set rules, and compete with public institutions for authority over the markets they create. In food systems, this means that platforms can shape access, labor, pricing, marketing, and logistics through the same technical systems that mediate everyday transactions. Food platforms also exercise power through more conventional channels, including litigation, lobbying, campaign contributions, and market leverage.

This combination matters because public governance often treats labor, food access, land use, consumer protection, and data governance as separate domains, while platform firms operate across all of them at once. A labor regulation can be weakened through consumer-interface design, a food access program can become dependent on a private platform's pricing decisions, and a zoning rule can address a facility without regulating the algorithmic logistics network that makes the facility work. Treating these as separate governance problems misses the corporate power connecting them, as power is the structural condition that allows the four features to persist.

### 2.3. Relationships as Governance Capacity

The four features persist not only because of corporate power, but also because platform systems weaken the relationships through which urban food governance has traditionally operated. Workers increasingly encounter employers through apps rather than workplaces where they can organize; residents encounter food assistance through digital eligibility systems that may be far from caseworkers and community organizations; and communities experience logistics infrastructure through traffic, emissions, and blocked streets rather than through institutions they can hold accountable.

These changes matter because food governance depends on more than formal rules. It also depends on worker organizations, community participation processes, trusted service providers, and public data systems that help residents, workers, and agencies identify problems and act on them. Platform systems can weaken these forms of capacity by individualizing and isolating workers and consumers, limiting public visibility, and shifting decisions into private technical systems.

Relational and institutional capacity is therefore not a fifth feature alongside the four, but rather the capacity cities need to address them. When this capacity is weak, platform harms are harder to see, contest, and regulate; when it is strong, public agencies and communities are better able to document harms, respond to platform adaptation, and enforce rules.

## 3. Methods

This article develops the digital food justice framework through a single qualitative case study of New York City and New York State from 2020 through early 2026. Following Yin's (2018) approach, a single case is appropriate for theory-building when it provides a critical or revelatory site for examining a phenomenon whose dynamics are not yet well specified. New York is a critical case because it shows what subnational digital food governance can accomplish under comparatively favorable institutional conditions, including municipal rulemaking capacity, state attorney general enforcement, organized worker constituencies, and political willingness to legislate on platform power. It is revelatory because New York has developed one of the most multidimensional subnational responses to digital food systems in the United States, spanning platform labor regulation, online grocery access programs, zoning responses to logistics infrastructure, algorithmic pricing disclosure, digital marketing regulation, and public food data initiatives.

Because regulatory authority in the United States is divided across municipal, state, and federal levels, the case is one of layered urban governance, encompassing New York City and New York State responses that shape platform-mediated food provisioning. It supports analytic rather than statistical generalization. The four embedded units of analysis are the four structural features of digital food injustice: temporal asymmetry, spatial decoupling, behavioral data extraction, and algorithmic opacity. Corporate power is treated as a cross-cutting theme that becomes visible when the four features are analyzed together.

The analysis is based on a theoretically guided document review. Sources included legal and regulatory materials, government and agency reports, campaign finance and lobbying disclosures, scholarly literature, advocacy and evaluation reports, and investigative journalism. I identified sources through targeted searches of government, legal, scholarly, and news databases. Analysis proceeded deductively and inductively.

Deductively, I coded materials using the four features and the concept of relational and institutional capacity developed above. Inductively, I tracked recurring governance mechanisms, including litigation, disclosure, interface redesign, licensing, procurement, co-design, enforcement, and public data production. I used secondary data to analyze the Farragut Food Project and the Food Environment Equity Dashboard NYC, two projects I participated in.

## 4. Findings: Digital Food Governance in New York

The findings examine New York's digital food governance through the four structural features developed above. The section is organized around temporal asymmetry, spatial decoupling, and behavioral data extraction. Algorithmic opacity is not treated in a separate subsection because it runs through each of the other features, shaping what regulators see, what workers and communities can contest, and how quickly public agencies can respond.

### *4.1. Temporal Asymmetry*

Temporal asymmetry has substantially influenced New York's efforts to regulate food platforms. Platforms can change labor processes, pricing systems, delivery rules, and consumer interfaces quickly, often through routine software updates. Public agencies move more slowly: They must document harms, conduct rulemaking, defend rules in court, and enforce protections (Mazur & Serafin, 2023). Opacity widens this gap because regulators, workers, and consumers often cannot see how platform systems work until harms have appeared. This pattern has been visible in two areas of policy: app-based delivery labor regulation and algorithmic pricing.

App-based food delivery is now part of New York City's food infrastructure and among the faster-growing forms of platform labor, with an estimated 80,000 workers active each week on restaurant and grocery delivery platforms (New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection [NYC DCWP], 2024). These workers are classified as independent contractors and are therefore excluded from minimum wage, overtime, paid sick leave, workers' compensation, and employer-sponsored health insurance (NYC DCWP, 2022; Workers Justice Project & Cornell University ILR Worker Institute, 2021). The platforms adopted the independent-contractor and algorithmic-management model that ride-hailing firms such as Uber and Lyft established earlier, including the political strategies used to defend it. Yet platforms still control worker pay, order allocation, routing, ratings, and account access through systems workers cannot fully observe. Because the workforce is largely immigrant and disproportionately composed of workers of color, these harms are racially and economically uneven.

New York's response began with worker organizing. Los Deliveristas Unidos, a project of the Workers Justice Project, transformed a dispersed workforce into a collective political actor through street-level organizing, worker surveys, rallies, and alliances with city legislators (Workers Justice Project & Cornell University ILR Worker Institute, 2021). This organizing helped redefine app-based delivery as part of the city's food infrastructure and therefore a legitimate object of public regulation, rather than a private contractual relationship beyond the reach of city policy. It also led to municipal legislation and agency rulemaking on pay, data transparency, bathroom access, and tipping practices.

The minimum pay standard was the most consequential intervention. Local Law 115 of 2021 required the Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP) to study delivery-worker pay and working conditions (New York City Council, 2021). DCWP's 2022 report found that workers earned an average of $7.09 per hour before tips, well below the legal minimum wage, while also covering their own vehicle and equipment costs, and proposed a minimum pay rate of $23.82 per hour (NYC DCWP, 2022). After rulemaking and substantial platform lobbying, DCWP issued a final rule in June 2023 setting an initial minimum of $17.96 per hour, which has since increased with inflation (NYC DCWP, 2023). The major platforms immediately sued to block implementation, but state courts upheld the rule, and enforcement began in December 2023, establishing that platform pay falls within the scope of labor regulation (*Uber Tech., Inc. v. New York City Dept of Consumer & Worker Protection*, 2023). New York later extended minimum-payment protections to grocery delivery workers, broadening municipal oversight of app-based food labor (New York City Council, 2025c).

The platforms adapted to the pay rule faster than the city could respond. Uber Eats and DoorDash redesigned their consumer interfaces to remove or bury the tipping prompt at checkout. The change did not formally violate the rule but it shifted costs back onto workers. Average weekly tips on those platforms fell from roughly $10 million to $3.5 million after the redesign, which DCWP estimated translated into hundreds of millions of dollars in reduced earnings annually (NYC DCWP, 2026). The city responded with legislation requiring platforms to offer a tip option before or at checkout and establishing new gratuity standards for food and grocery delivery services, bringing interface design itself within the scope of labor regulation (New York City Council, 2025a, 2025b; NYC DCWP, 2026). The sequence shows how an opaque design choice, such as the placement of a default, a button, or a prompt, can redistribute income at a large scale before regulators can see the full effect and respond.

The interface redesign was not the platforms' only response. The design of the pay rule created an incentive for platforms to limit the number of idle workers by requiring advance scheduling, limiting access to shifts, and increasing deactivations. These changes shifted compliance costs onto workers, who lost income when access to the apps was restricted or they were deactivated. Los Deliveristas Unidos and allied organizations then pressed for protection against arbitrary deactivation. The result was a 2026 local law, effective in 2027, prohibiting delivery services from deactivating workers except for just cause, legitimate economic reasons, or legal requirements, and requiring advance notice and a right to challenge deactivation decisions (New York City Council, 2026b). This law illustrates the iterative character of digital food labor governance in that each platform response to one rule can necessitate another rule addressing other parts of the same labor process.

Labor organizing also resulted in new physical infrastructure for a workforce without a shared workplace. The City Hall Park Deliverista Hub, created in April 2026, is the first of several planned worker-designed rest and service facilities for app-based delivery workers (New York City Mayor's Office, 2026). Developed through advocacy by Los Deliveristas Unidos, the hub will provide e-bike charging, bike repair, and worker support services, an attempt to use civic infrastructure to rebuild collective capacity among delivery workers.

The same temporal pattern appears in the case of algorithmic or surveillance pricing. Online retailers and delivery platforms typically use their software to vary the prices individual consumers see based on personal data such as location, browsing behavior, inferred income, and purchase history (Federal Trade Commission, 2025). These practices are difficult to detect because consumers usually cannot see what others are charged

for the same product at the same time. Similar concerns are emerging in physical stores as electronic shelf labels allow grocers to dynamically change food prices, raising equity concerns (Warren & Casey, 2024).

Following a federal investigation of surveillance-pricing intermediaries serving grocery retailers, New York enacted the Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act in May 2025. The law requires retailers using personal data to set individualized prices to display a conspicuous notice of the practice (Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act, 2025). One month after taking effect, investigative journalists documented a major online grocery platform charging different consumers different prices for identical items from the same stores, with average differences of 13 percent and outliers as high as 23 percent (Groundwork Collaborative et al., 2025). The platform announced within two weeks that it would end what it called "item price tests" (Consumer Reports, 2025). The following month, the New York Attorney General issued an enforcement demand arguing that the announcement did not address pricing experiments still being run by the platform's retail partners (Office of the New York State Attorney General, 2026). The sequence shows how platform firms can reorganize around specific rules while preserving the underlying technical capacity those rules do not fully reach.

In both labor regulation and algorithmic pricing, public agencies responded more effectively when worker organizations, advocates, journalists, and investigators revealed practices that platforms had kept difficult to see. Worker organizations made opaque labor harms visible and sustained pressure through lobbying, litigation, and enforcement. Independent investigators produced evidence of pricing practices that consumers and regulators could not easily observe. In both cases, opacity intensified temporal asymmetry by delaying when public institutions could see, contest, and regulate platform behavior.

### *4.2. Spatial Decoupling*

Platform-mediated food provisioning separates food access from the visible places that have traditionally been the focus of urban food governance. Supermarkets, corner stores, farmers markets, and other food retail sites remain important. The trust, familiarity, and product quality built through in-person experience partly explain why a subset of these provisioners can extend successfully into digital channels that newer platform-only entrants cannot. They are now joined by less visible infrastructures, including ghost kitchens that produce meals for delivery without a customer-facing restaurant, dark stores and micro-fulfillment centers that fulfill online orders without walk-in shopping, and last-mile warehouses that move goods from regional hubs to homes or pickup points. These businesses create both physical and regulatory opacity: They can be difficult for residents to identify, and they often fall between rules built for conventional food businesses (Shapiro, 2023). New York's response therefore has two parts: regulating hidden platform infrastructure and adapting digital food access tools for populations commercial platforms were not built to serve.

New York's response to hidden food infrastructure began with rapid-grocery ("15-minute delivery") platforms. Starting in 2021, firms opened micro-fulfillment centers in commercial storefronts across the city, often with obscured windows and no walk-in access (Adams et al., 2022; Shapiro, 2023). City officials responded by treating the facilities according to their actual functions rather than their retail appearance. Although the platforms occupied commercial storefronts, their delivery-only operations functioned more like warehouses, making them vulnerable to zoning rules that excluded warehouse uses from commercial streets. Their obscured windows raised additional urban planning concerns (e.g., loss of street-level visibility

along commercial corridors), and by requiring payment through an app they violated local law requiring businesses to accept cash payments from customers. Enforcement contributed to the closure or withdrawal of several operators by the end of 2022. The episode shows that existing rules can constrain new platform uses when agencies actively interpret and enforce them, but that platform infrastructure can remain opaque until residents and regulators recognize and respond to new business models.

A second response addressed last-mile logistics infrastructure, warehouses less visible to consumers than dark stores but that generate substantial traffic, emissions, and worker-safety concerns in surrounding neighborhoods. Analysis by the Last-Mile Coalition documented that millions of square feet of new e-commerce warehouse space had concentrated in lower-income communities of color where pollution levels already exceeded federal air quality standards ("Strengthening zoning regulations," 2023). Multi-year organizing produced two governance responses. In 2024, the city adopted a zoning amendment that created a new land-use category for "micro-distribution" facilities and committed to developing a special permit requirement for last-mile warehouses, so proposed facilities would require discretionary public review rather than being permitted automatically (New York City Department of City Planning, 2024). In 2026, a City Council bill proposed requiring last-mile facility operators to obtain a license, with provisions for environmental review and worker safety (New York City Council, 2026a). These responses brought some visibility to food distribution facilities whose neighborhood impacts were tangible, but whose role in the wider platform logistics network remained difficult to see.

A third response concerned food safety transparency in app-based ordering. New York City requires restaurants to post sanitary inspection grades in their windows, allowing customers to assess food safety before dining, yet online ordering prevents customers from seeing the posted grade. New York State enacted a 2024 law, effective in March 2025, requiring food service establishments and third-party platforms that accept online orders to display a conspicuous hyperlink on their apps to the city Health Department's inspection database (New York State Senate, 2024). This response extends a place-based rule into the digital ordering environment by linking consumers to public inspection grades.

Spatial decoupling also appears when residents who are physically separated from food retail depend on platforms whose designs were not built for their needs. The Farragut Food Project worked with residents of a New York City public housing development whose predominantly low-income Black and Latino households faced both spatial and economic barriers to food access. The project tested whether online grocery shopping could lower these barriers by organizing residents to negotiate with online retailers to waive minimum-order requirements, secure a community center delivery and storage site, arrange peer technical support, and create a system to consolidate deliveries and transport them to homebound residents. Its most important finding was not that residents adopted online grocery shopping, but that adoption required them to design solutions to issues facing low-income households the commercial platforms had not considered. Residents found that online prices were often higher than in-store prices, ordering systems were poorly aligned with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program food assistance benefit cycles, and platform interfaces did not reproduce the discounts and circulars they relied on. The point is one of relationality in that the intervention worked because resident leadership, peer support, physical delivery infrastructure, and negotiation with retailers rebuilt the relationships among residents, retailers, and institutions that platform designs had bypassed (Cohen et al., 2020).

The Groceries to Go program addressed a related problem. Operated by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, it provides monthly food subsidies for eligible households at elevated risk of food insecurity and diet-related disease, allowing them to purchase groceries through an online marketplace linked to independently owned neighborhood supermarkets (Dowling et al., 2025). By partnering with a smaller e-commerce platform rather than a dominant national provider, the city directed public food assistance spending toward local retailers and kept food dollars circulating in participating communities. An evaluation found high participation and significant improvements in food security and self-reported diet quality (Dowling et al., 2025). Yet the program remains dependent on a private platform whose fees, coverage, and interface design are not controlled by the city. Its impact therefore depends on the city's ability to monitor performance and negotiate contract terms.

The Digital Choice Pantry offers a different model. Operated by the Westside Campaign Against Hunger, a long-established emergency food pantry that provides free food to low-income households, the program allows participants to pre-order groceries through text messaging and a simple online form. Participants select among available options before picking up food at distributed community sites, rather than waiting in line at the main pantry location (Ng et al., 2025). Pre-ordering reduced the visibility and stigma of queuing for emergency food assistance while helping the pantry match supply to demand. The use of simple technology rather than a complex app lowered access barriers and gave participants more control over food choice. An evaluation found positive user experiences, although 40 percent of pantry users reported challenges with this basic technology, pointing to digital literacy support as a governance lever itself. Investing in staff-supported assistance for users who struggle with even simple tools is a way to widen access and participation (Ng et al., 2025). The technology worked because it was embedded in a trusted organization with staff relationships and hands-on assistance.

Read together, these examples show that spatial governance can adapt in part to platform-mediated food systems. Land-use rules can determine where facilities are sited, licensing can bring logistics operators into public view, and disclosure mandates can extend food inspection information to online ordering. These tools have less reach over routing algorithms, delivery coverage, service fees, and platform interfaces that shape how food is distributed and who has access. The digital food access interventions show that technology became useful for food-insecure residents only when accompanied by relational and institutional capacity, including resident organizing, trusted community sites, staff support, and public oversight. Without that capacity, commercial platforms reproduced barriers such as high prices, rigid ordering systems, limited choice, and uneven coverage, but with participation in design and implementation, the digital tools could be adapted to serve low-income residents.

### *4.3. Behavioral Data Extraction*

Behavioral data extraction is the feature most hidden inside proprietary technical systems and least addressed by traditional food governance. Platforms collect detailed data from food provisioning and use it to personalize prices, target advertising, classify consumers and neighborhoods by profitability, and determine the products users see (Zuboff, 2019). These harms fall unevenly because platforms extract data from populations already subject to disproportionate scrutiny across food assistance, employment, and consumer markets (Benjamin, 2019; Eubanks, 2018). New York's response addresses this problem in two

ways: by regulating the data and design practices that make digital food marketing to children effective, and by building public data infrastructure that produces independent evidence about food environments.

Digital food marketing to children shows how behavioral data extraction intensifies a long-standing food justice concern. Marketing now reaches children in algorithmically curated environments where promotion is embedded in entertainment, social interaction, gaming, and influencer content. It draws on behavioral data to deliver food cues when children are most susceptible, and it disproportionately targets Black and Hispanic children with high-calorie, low-nutrient products, reinforcing diet-related disparities (Harris et al., 2022, 2024). These practices are harder for regulators to identify and contest than the print, outdoor, and in-store advertising formats around which public health policy has traditionally been built (World Health Organization, 2023). New York responded not by regulating food advertising directly, but by targeting the data and design systems that make digital marketing effective. The Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation for Kids Act (SAFE for Kids Act) and the New York Child Data Protection Act restrict engagement-maximizing algorithmic feeds for minors and limit the collection and processing of children's personal data (New York Child Data Protection Act, 2024; Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation for Kids Act, 2024). This approach reaches some of the infrastructure behind digital food marketing, but does not distinguish healthy from unhealthy foods, regulate influencer marketing as food advertising, or set nutrition standards for child-directed content.

Public food data infrastructure addresses a different side of the same problem. Private firms extract behavioral data and convert it into proprietary value, while public agencies and communities often lack the data needed to understand food environments independently. Participatory food dashboards can help close that gap by combining public and quasi-public data, including administrative records, online reviews, supermarket website prices, and community-generated knowledge, in formats that policymakers, researchers, and community organizations can use. The Food Environment Equity Dashboard NYC (n.d.) illustrates what this kind of public infrastructure can reveal. It documents complexities of the food system, including that participation in universally free school food programs varies across schools serving similar populations, suggesting that take-up depends on factors not visible in standard public datasets; that food-insecure residents often travel past nearby emergency food pantries to use others farther away, complicating proximity-based assumptions in food access mapping; and that prices for an identical market basket can vary substantially across stores in the same supermarket chain within the same neighborhood. These patterns are not visible through licensing data, store locations, or aggregate participation statistics alone, but become apparent only when administrative, commercial, and community data are combined at fine geographic resolution.

Together, these responses show that governing behavioral data extraction requires attention to both private data systems and public data capacity. The SAFE for Kids Act and the New York Child Data Protection Act address the data and design infrastructure that makes digital marketing effective, but they do not regulate food marketing as such. The Food Environment Equity Dashboard NYC builds public capacity to see patterns that conventional datasets miss, but visibility matters only when agencies and communities have the authority and resources to act on what becomes visible.

## 5. Discussion

The New York case shows the promise and limits of governing platform-mediated food systems one problem at a time. City and state agencies developed meaningful responses to specific issues, including delivery-worker pay, hidden logistics infrastructure, online food safety disclosure, marketing protections, online grocery subsidies, and public food data. These interventions mattered, but a rule aimed at one part of the platform system often left another available for adaptation. Labor standards could be offset through changes in tipping interfaces or deactivation. Land-use rules could address facilities without controlling last-mile delivery systems. Public food programs could expand access while still depending on private marketplaces whose fees, coverage, and interfaces remained only partly under public control. The central problem is therefore not that cities lack tools, but that their tools are usually organized by policy domain while platforms operate across domains.

Opacity intensifies this problem because consequential platform decisions were often difficult to see at the moments when workers, residents, consumers, and regulators most needed to understand them. In the New York cases, this opacity took different forms: Delivery workers could not fully observe the formulas and interface designs that shaped pay, scheduling, job offers, and deactivation; residents and regulators had to determine when storefronts were no longer functioning as stores but as logistics infrastructure; online customers could not see restaurant inspection information within the apps; and consumers and public agencies lacked independent evidence about individualized pricing, digital marketing practices, school food participation, pantry use, and neighborhood price variation.

The findings also show that regulation worked best when formal authority was paired with relational and institutional capacity. Worker organizations made platform labor harms visible and pressured lawmakers. Community organizations and resident-led design processes made digital food access tools more responsive to households whose needs platform designers had not anticipated. Public agencies used rulemaking, procurement, and enforcement to shape platform behavior, while advocates uncovered practices that platform systems concealed. These cases suggest that effective digital food governance depends not only on legal authority, but also on the relationships, organizations, and public data systems that allow agencies and communities to identify harms and solutions.

Corporate power helps explain why the four features persist. Platform firms in New York used each of these channels at a scale that shaped the governance process itself. They litigated to delay and reshape labor standards, lobbied against the grocery delivery and paid sick leave bills, redesigned consumer interfaces to offset the pay rule, and spent at record levels in the 2025 municipal elections, including expenditures aimed at legislators who had sponsored worker protections (Walsh et al., 2025). Corporate power therefore did not only resist particular rules but worked to set the political conditions under which rules could be proposed, weakened, delayed, or enforced. This combination allows platforms to respond to regulation within the same technical systems that public agencies are trying to govern, while also influencing who writes and votes on the rules.

The racial and economic dimensions of this power are visible across the findings. Platform-mediated food systems reproduce long-standing food justice concerns, but they do so through systems that are faster, less visible, and harder to contest than many earlier forms of food-system inequity. Delivery-worker precarity,

barriers to food assistance, logistics-related pollution, and targeted digital food marketing are concentrated among low-income households, immigrants, and communities of color, the same constituencies food justice scholarship has long identified as bearing the greatest burden of food-system inequity. Digital food injustice does not replace earlier forms of food injustice but rather reorganizes and intensifies them through platform systems that concentrate decision-making power while making the exercise of power harder to see.

The case also shows that digital food technologies are not inherently harmful. Online grocery tools, choice-based food pantry ordering systems, public dashboards, and digital disclosure mechanisms can improve access, strengthen public evidence, and make food assistance more responsive. They do so, however, only when they are shaped by public leverage, enforceable standards, transparency requirements, and accountability to workers and communities. The lesson is not that technology can solve urban food inequity, but that technical systems increasingly organize food systems and therefore must themselves become objects of democratic governance.

### *5.1. Limitations and Future Research*

Three limitations shape the analysis. First, the single-case design supports analytical rather than statistical generalization. New York is useful as a critical case because it shows what subnational digital food governance can accomplish under favorable conditions, but New York's experience does not reflect what will happen elsewhere. Comparative research is needed to examine how the framework applies in cities with less regulatory authority, weaker worker organization, different welfare state arrangements, or different platform market structures.

Second, the analysis relies on documentary sources rather than primary interviews with workers, agency staff, platform representatives, or community organization members. Their perspectives are reconstructed from public statements, litigation records, government documents, and existing research rather than gathered directly.

Third, the article examines governance responses rather than measuring their effects on populations they are meant to protect. Future research should evaluate whether the interventions discussed here improve worker well-being, food access, and neighborhood conditions, examine actors that operate before public governance becomes engaged, such as venture capital firms and suppliers of technology, and assess how generative AI and other emerging automated systems may intensify the features analyzed here.

## 6. Conclusion

Digital food justice describes a governance problem for which existing urban food frameworks were not designed. Platform-mediated food systems should not be treated like more advanced analogue food systems. Rather, they need to be treated as political-economic arrangements in which firms use speed, spatial decoupling, behavioral data extraction, and algorithmic opacity to reorganize food access, labor, marketing, and logistics faster than public agencies can observe and respond. Corporate power helps keep these arrangements in place because the same firms that run the technical systems also control much of the data needed for oversight and help shape the political conditions in which regulation occurs.

The New York case shows that local governments can regulate significant parts of this system through labor standards, disclosure requirements, land-use rules, digital food access programs, and public data infrastructure. It also shows that platform firms adapt to governance by reorganizing around the features regulations do not reach. Governance approaches that address several features together, supported by worker organizations, community participation, public data systems, and enforcement capacity, are more likely to constrain platform behavior than any single regulatory tool on its own.

A post-2030 urban food agenda built on these findings would treat digital food systems as central to urban food governance, bringing algorithmic pricing, app-based labor, digital marketing, platform data extraction, and platform logistics into the same policy frame as physical retail, food assistance, nutrition, and sustainability. Rather than treating workers and food-insecure communities as subjects brought in for advice after policies are designed, it would give them lasting roles in shaping, monitoring, and contesting digital food systems. It would also make public visibility a core governance function by giving agencies the authority and resources to audit algorithmic systems, require data reporting, and produce independent evidence about prices, coverage, labor conditions, and logistics impacts.

Local government will often be insufficient, especially where regional, national, or supranational rules limit what cities can require of platform firms. A post-2030 agenda therefore needs to identify the appropriate scale of governance and support coordination among cities, regional and national governments, and transnational urban policy networks. The work ahead is to build the legal authority, evidence systems, and relationships needed to govern platform-mediated food systems at the scale at which they operate, so that platform technologies serve democratic and equitable food provisioning.

## Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

## LLMs Disclosure

I used Claude Opus 4.7 to assist with citation formatting and manuscript proofreading.

## References

Adams, A. E., Powers, K., Brewer, G., Menin, J., Salamanca, R., Sanchez, P. A., Velázquez, M., Riley, K., Cabán, T., Marte, C., Restler, L., & Rivera, C. (2022, March 1). *"Dark stores" and non-complying warehouse uses* [Letter]. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KJFE6e3SvHzz2iqOdM8HMYkst7ISfmHO/view

Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-a (2025). https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/349-A

Alkon, A. H., & Agyeman, J. (Eds.). (2011). *Cultivating food justice: Race, class, and sustainability*. MIT Press.

Barnhill, A., Ramírez, A. S., Ashe, M., Berhaupt-Glickstein, A., Freudenberg, N., Grier, S. A., Watson, K. E., & Kumanyika, S. (2022). The racialized marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages: Perspectives and potential remedies. *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, *50*(1), 52–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/jme.2022.8

Benjamin, R. (2019). *Race after technology: Abolitionist tools for the new Jim Code*. Polity Press.

Brandt, E. J., Silvestri, D. M., Mande, J. R., Holland, M. L., & Ross, J. S. (2019). Availability of grocery delivery to food deserts in states participating in the online purchase pilot. *JAMA Network Open*, *2*(12), Article e1916444. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.16444

Cioffi, J. W., Kenney, M. F., & Zysman, J. (2022). Platform power and regulatory politics: Polanyi for the

twenty-first century. *New Political Economy*, *27*(5), 820–836. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2022.2027355

Cohen, N., Tomaino Fraser, K., Arnow, C., Mulcahy, M., & Hille, C. (2020). Online grocery shopping by NYC public housing residents using Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits: A service ecosystems perspective. *Sustainability*, *12*(11), Article 4694. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12114694

Consumer Reports. (2025, December 9). *Instacart ends AI-driven pricing practice following a joint Consumer Reports investigation with Groundwork Collaborative and More Perfect Union* [Press release]. https://www.consumerreports.org/media-room/press-releases/2025/12/instacart-ends-ai-driven-pricing-practice-following-a-joint-consumer-reports-investigation-with-groundwork-collaborative-and-more-perfect-union

Dowling, E., Dreisbach, N., Andersen, N., & Solomon, E. (2025). Groceries to Go: An innovative approach to improving food security among at-risk New Yorkers. *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior*, *57*(8, Suppl.), S26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2025.05.059

Eubanks, V. (2018). *Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor*. St. Martin's Press.

FAO. (2019). *FAO framework for the Urban Food Agenda: Leveraging sub-national and local government action to ensure sustainable food systems and improved nutrition*. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca3151en

Farhangi, M., Rohracher, H., Cohen, N., Ilieva, R., Brückner, M., Brettin, S., & Veen, E. (2025). Digitalization of food provisioning: A scoping review of social implications and pathways to equitable futures. *Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development*, *14*(3), 233–250. https://doi.org/10.5304/jafscd.2025.143.017

Federal Trade Commission. (2025, January 17). *FTC surveillance pricing study indicates wide range of personal data used to set individualized consumer prices* [Press release]. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-surveillance-pricing-study-indicates-wide-range-personal-data-used-set-individualized-consumer

Food Environment Equity Dashboard NYC. (n.d.). *Food Environment Equity Dashboard – NYC (beta)*. https://sites.google.com/view/feed-nyc/home

George, C., & Tomer, A. (2022, May 11). Delivering to deserts: New data reveals the geography of digital access to food in the U.S. *Brookings*. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/delivering-to-deserts-new-data-reveals-the-geography-of-digital-access-to-food-in-the-us

Gottlieb, R., & Joshi, A. (2010). *Food justice*. MIT Press.

Groundwork Collaborative, Consumer Reports, & More Perfect Union. (2025). *Same cart, different price: Instacart's price experiments cost families at checkout*. Groundwork Collaborative. https://groundworkcollaborative.org/work/instacart

Harris, J. L., Fleming-Milici, F., Mancini, S., Kumanyika, S., & Ramírez, A. G. (2022). *Targeted food and beverage advertising to Black and Hispanic consumers: 2022 update*. UConn Rudd Center for Food Policy & Health.

Harris, J. L., Reed, L., Maksi, S., Ananthan, S., Chenault, G., Story, M., & Lott, M. (2024). *Evidence-based recommendations to mitigate harms from digital food marketing to children ages 2 to 17*. Healthy Eating Research. https://healthyeatingresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/HER-Digital-Marketing-Report-2024.pdf

Lundberg, K., Moragues-Faus, A., Thornton, L., Cohen, N., Diekmann, L., & De Regil, L. M. (2025). Paving the way: Urban health, food systems, and the imperative for holistic city-led action. *F1000Research*, *14*, Article 513. https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.163042.1

Mazur, J., & Serafin, M. (2023). Stalling the state: How digital platforms contribute to and profit from delays

in the enforcement and adoption of regulations. *Comparative Political Studies*, *56*(1), 101–130. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089651

Minkoff-Zern, L.-A., & Mares, T. M. (2025). *Will work for food: Labor across the food chain*. University of California Press.

Moragues-Faus, A., & Battersby, J. (2021). Urban food policies for a sustainable and just future: Concepts and tools for a renewed agenda. *Food Policy*, *103*, Article 102124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102124

Moragues-Faus, A., Clark, J. K., Battersby, J., & Davies, A. R. (2024). The potential of urban food governance to transform lives, cities, and the planet. *Global Food Security*, *40*, Article 100751. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2024.100751

New York Child Data Protection Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 899-ee to 899-mm (2024). https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/A39-FF

New York City Council. (2021). *Local Law No. 115 of 2021. A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to establishing minimum per trip payments to third-party food delivery service and third-party courier service workers*. https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=10425172&GUID=0271CC18-BFBC-4AA7-B376-EB5373344214

New York City Council. (2025a). *Local Law No. 107 of 2025. A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to establishing gratuity standards for food delivery workers and grocery delivery workers*. https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2025-107

New York City Council. (2025b). *Local Law No. 108 of 2025. A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to requiring third-party food delivery services and third-party grocery delivery services to provide an opportunity to pay a gratuity before or at the same time an online order is placed*. https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2025-108

New York City Council. (2025c). *Local Law No. 124 of 2025. A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to minimum payments to grocery delivery workers*. https://intro.nyc/local-laws/2025-124

New York City Council. (2026a). *Int. No. 518-2026. A local law to amend the administrative code of the City of New York, in relation to requiring the licensing of last-mile facilities*. https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7879110&GUID=BDDD32F1-1178-492D-80F2-205845356FD2

New York City Council. (2026b). *Local Law No. 34 of 2026. A local law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to the wrongful deactivation of app-based contracted delivery workers*. https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=15344055&GUID=B29A2128-5B73-4B6E-9520-8588ADEEA7E5

New York City Department of City Planning. (2024). *City of yes for economic opportunity: Proposal details (as adopted)* [PowerPoint presentation]. https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/city-of-yes/economic-opportunity/economic-opportunity-adopted-details.pdf

New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection. (2022). *A minimum pay rate for app-based restaurant delivery workers in NYC*. https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Delivery-Worker-Study-November-2022.pdf

New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection. (2023, June 11). *Mayor Adams, DCWP Commissioner Mayuga announce nation's first minimum pay rate for app-based restaurant delivery workers* [Press release]. https://www.nyc.gov/site/dca/news/025-23/mayor-adams-dcwp-commissioner-mayuga-nation-s-first-minimum-pay-rate-app-based

New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection. (2024). *Restaurant delivery app data:*

*October–December 2024*. https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Restaurant-Delivery-App-Data-Q4-2024.pdf

New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection. (2026). *Uber Eats and DoorDash engineered a $550 million pay cut. NYC is fighting back*. https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Delivery-Worker-Tipping-Report.pdf

New York City Mayor's Office. (2026, April 7). *Mayor Mamdani, Senator Schumer, Worker's Justice Project announce nation's first Deliverista Hub* [Press release]. https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/04/mayor-mamdani--senator-schumer--worker-s-justice-project-announc

New York State Senate. (2024). *N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 139-e. Posting of sanitary inspection grade*. https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GMU/139-E

Ng, Y., Tomaino Fraser, K., Stamou, A., Rosenthal, A., & Cohen, N. (2025). Using digital technology to facilitate choice for food pantry customers: An evaluation of a pilot program. *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior*, *57*(6), 471–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2025.02.011

Noble, S. U. (2018). *Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism*. NYU Press.

Office of the New York State Attorney General. (2026, January 8). *Instacart's pricing practices & New York's Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act* [Letter]. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/letters/letter-to-instacart-on-pricing-practices-letters-2026.pdf

Pasquale, F. (2015). *The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money and information*. Harvard University Press.

Reese, A. M. (2019). *Black food geographies: Race, self-reliance, and food access in Washington, D.C.* University of North Carolina Press.

Shapiro, A. (2023). Platform urbanism in a pandemic: Dark stores, ghost kitchens, and the logistical-urban frontier. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, *23*(1), 168–187. https://doi.org/10.1177/14695405211069983

Srnicek, N. (2017). *Platform capitalism*. Polity Press.

Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation for Kids Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 1500 to 1508 (2024). https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/GBS/A45

Strengthening zoning regulations on last-mile warehouses. (2023, March 30). *Earthjustice*. https://earthjustice.org/feature/last-mile-warehouses

Törnberg, P. (2023). How platforms govern: Social regulation in digital capitalism. *Big Data & Society*, *10*(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517231153808

Uber Tech., Inc. v. New York City Dept of Consumer & Worker Protection, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op 51048 (U), Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 27 (2023). https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2023/2023-ny-slip-op-51048-u.html

University of Copenhagen, CLEVERFOOD, IPBES in Denmark, State of Green, & Ministry of Green Transition. (2026). *Transformative governance for food systems & biodiversity: Towards a common framework for implementation across sectors and governance levels*. University of Copenhagen. https://food2030.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Transformative-Governance-for-Food-Systems-and-Biodiversity-Conference-Report.pdf

van Dijck, J., Poell, T., & de Waal, M. (2018). *The platform society: Public values in a connective world*. Oxford University Press.

van Doorn, N. (2017). Platform labor: On the gendered and racialized exploitation of low-income service work in the 'on-demand' economy. *Information, Communication & Society*, *20*(6), 898–914. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1294194

Walsh, L., Samuel, M., Maldonado, S., & Custodio, J. (2025, July 2). PAC spending in council races more

than doubled, fueled by money from DoorDash, Airbnb and Uber. *The City Reporter*. https://www.thecityreporter.nyc/2025/07/02/outside-spending-city-council-2025-election

Warren, E., & Casey, R. P., Jr. (2024, August 5). *Letter to Rodney McMullen regarding electronic shelving labels and price gouging*. https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/warren_casey_letter_to_kroger_re_electronic_shelving_and_price_gouging.pdf

Workers Justice Project, & Cornell University ILR Worker Institute. (2021). *Essential but unprotected: App-based food couriers in New York City*. Workers Justice Project.

World Health Organization. (2023). *Policies to protect children from the harmful impact of food marketing: WHO guideline*.

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). Sage.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.

## About the Author

Nevin Cohen is an associate professor at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Public Health and director of the CUNY Urban Food Policy Institute. His research explores the policies, governance systems, practices, and infrastructure to support just, healthy, and resilient urban and regional food systems.