Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo–Dutch Cooperation during World War II

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Abstract
Secrecy and informal organization produce, sustain, and reinforce feelings of loyalty within intelligence and security services. This article demonstrates that loyalty is needed for cooperation between intelligence partners as well as within and between services. Under many circumstances, loyalty plays a larger role in the level of internal and external collaboration than formal work processes along hierarchical lines. These findings are empirically based on the case study of Anglo–Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. By demonstrating that ‘loyalty’ critically affects the work of intelligence communities, this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions.

Keywords
emotions; history; informal organization; intelligence; international relations; loyalty; secrecy; World War II

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1. Introduction
Secret intelligence is the missing dimension in the history of international relations, as Christopher Andrew and David Dilks argued (Andrew, 1998; Andrew & Dilks, 1984, p. 1). Since this famous observation, a new generation of scholars has challenged this neglect, leading to the emergence of ‘intelligence studies’ as a new field of historical research. We now know more about the operational history of intelligence and security services, their sources and methods, and to a lesser extent, their role in political decision-making processes. For example, we know that secret services can be of decisive operational and political importance, as shown by the significance of signals intelligence (SIGINT) for the Allied victory of World War II, the decisive role of Stalin’s spies in copying Anglo–American plans to build an atomic bomb, and the repressive and ever-present East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (‘Stasi’) (Childs & Popplewell, 1996; Lichter, Loeffler, & Siegloch, 2015).

However, we still know little about the social fabric that binds intelligence communities together. Scholars of intelligence primarily focus on the (at times spectacular) operational history of services, putting adventurous agents and their handlers in the limelight, who seem to act in a strategic and calculated manner. This focus neglects both a broader selection of intelligence personnel and the less-adventurous emotions that influence their actions, which have not been given much thought when reflecting upon intelligence and its institutions. More knowledge on a broader variety of internal socio-cultural factors and dynamics and better insights into structural characteristics and factors of influence contribute to our understanding of intelligence communities and similar organizations that deal with classified information. Relating to the growing body of literature on emotions in international relations (Clément & Sangar, 2018, pp. 3-4), this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions. I show how loyalty as an emotion may become institutionalized within secret services (Crawford, 2014).

In this article, I argue that secrecy and informal organization produce, sustain and reinforce feelings of loyalty in the socio-cultural structure of intelligence and se-
curity services. Loyalty is crucial to the level of cooperation between intelligence partners, within and between services. As such, I argue that loyalty, as a building block of the relationship between individuals, plays a larger role in the level of internal and external intelligence cooperation than formal work processes which occur along hierarchical lines. In order to assess the role of loyalty in intelligence communities, I focus on the Dutch secret services-in-exile in London and their British counterparts during World War II. We know Dutch wartime intelligence history mainly through the lens of operational causes célèbres such as the Venlo-incident (1939) in which the Sicherheitsdienst trapped two SIS officers and a Dutch officer (e.g., De Jong, 1969), the disastrous Engländspiel (1942–1943) that drove 40 agents on Dutch soil right into German hands, eventually killing most of them (e.g., Foot, 2005a, 2005b; Wolters, 2005), and the motives of the double agent Christiaan Lindemans, nicknamed ‘King Kong’ (De Graaff, 1997). Lou de Jong’s work on wartime intelligence (De Jong, 1979) has a broader strategic-political and socio-cultural focus. For the purposes of this article, de Jong’s work has proven particularly interesting due to the combination of its detailed operational account and its eloquent and detached insights into the characteristics of the Dutch wartime intelligence community. Finally, the meticulous, encyclopaedic work of Kluiters (1993) provides an impressive amount of detailed information on services’ official tasks, organisation, addresses, dates, and agents.

The case study of the Dutch secret services-in-exile and their British counterparts is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, during World War II the Dutch intelligence community was forced to collaborate not only internally, but also externally with their British counterparts on whom they depended heavily. The relatively high, external dependence (or low organizational autonomy), strong internal dependency relationships, and the ‘young’ age of the Dutch organizations involved, make it a case in which it is likely that loyalty would strongly influence working relationships. At the same time, the secret nature of the work of intelligence communities, as further noted below, seems to encourage loyalty-based relationships. Even if the wartime secret services-in-exile are an atypical context for 20th and 21st centuries intelligence and security services, the secretive environment in which the services functioned made it to a large extent a typical case study with relatively broad external validity for contemporary and historical intelligence organizations.

Second, this case study provides us with unexplored historical sources giving insights into the specific emotions that shaped the socio-cultural characteristics of the Dutch intelligence community. A most valuable, detailed and colourful historical source to partly reconstruct the socio-cultural atmosphere of the Anglo–Dutch wartime intelligence community are the reports of the post-World War II Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Policy of the Wartime Government-in-Exile. This commission was set up in 1947 to hold the government-in-exile retrospectively accountable due to the lack of parliamentary oversight during the war. This commission, initially aiming to complete its work within one year, worked between 1947 and 1956 and produced eight large reports in 20 volumes. These contain the commission’s findings and, more interesting for the purpose of this article, the word-for-word testimonies of 850 witnesses. Five out of these eight volumes relate to the Dutch secret services-in-exile.

Another valuable source is the ‘London Archive’ of the Ministries of the Interior and of General Affairs in the Dutch National Archives. It contains, for example, information on Dutch personnel, correspondence between ministers and heads of Dutch services and their British opposite numbers, reports on the training of agents as well as on the division of labour between Dutch and British services. Also, the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam has a small number of files on the ‘Bureau Inlichtingen’. Finally, this research draws on memoirs of individuals involved in the Dutch wartime intelligence community.

Below I first conceptualize loyalty in secretive environments and then briefly introduce Anglo–Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. The empirical part of the article scrutinizes the two phases (crisis and recovery) of the Dutch services’ work, the key players, and their collaboration with their British opposite numbers. In conclusion, I assess how secrecy and informal organization sustain and reinforce feelings of loyalty in intelligence communities, and I suggest ways to further integrate research of emotions into intelligence studies.

2. Conceptualizing Loyalty in Secretive Environments

‘Loyalty’ is a special attachment to a state (‘our country, right or wrong’), an individual or an organisation (Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). In the context of this research ‘loyalty’ concerns the attachment to individuals (colleagues) and organisations (the Dutch secret services-in-exile and/or their British counterparts). It is related to, but distinctive from sympathy. While ‘sympathy’ is understood as a feeling of likeness and recognition towards another person (Schliesser, 2015), I understand ‘loyalty’ is possible on both the individual and the group level. ‘Loyalty’ presupposes that feelings of sympathy towards another individual are related to the other’s affiliation and the connotations that this affiliation evokes. As such, loyalty can be closely related to individual and collective interests, and can also be understood from the perspective of path dependency. In the empirical section of this article, I analyse first-hand descriptions of interaction between (groups of) individuals who show strong feelings of (unconditional) likeness and recognition towards the other.

The secretive environment of intelligence and security services is likely to reinforce feelings of loyalty. Loyalty becomes part of a mutually, beneficial and reciprocal
relationship in which secrets and loyalty are exchanged between organizational members (Blau, 1964, p. 30). In addition, a shared secret can bring great joy, relief and intimacy with others who share the same secret (Bok, 1989, pp. 36-37). It fosters a strong sense of community (Braat, 2012; Gusterson, 1998), so strong that keeping the secret can become more important as a purpose than any other specific purpose the community officially has (Bok, 1989, p. 46). Accordingly, secrecy functions as an organizing principle of social relations: it sets barriers and presupposes separation, between the secret and the non-secret, between insiders and outsiders, creating and reinforcing feelings of loyalty among the secret-keepers (Horn, 2011, p. 110). Members of the insiders’ community, well-organized and tightly knit, may feel superior vis-à-vis the often unorganized community of outsiders. In this sense, (the pretence of) secrecy strengthens the elitist nature and the social exclusiveness of the group of insiders and raises the walls between insiders and outsiders (Simmel, 1906, pp. 486–487, 489).

Feelings of loyalty within the insiders’ community are further strengthened because secrecy may function as a means to wield power. Being part of a secretive community is a means to increase one’s influence and to maintain and strengthen the status quo. Accordingly, the use of secrecy by governmental bureaucracies extends far beyond the functionally motivated secret (Weber, 2013, pp. 992–993, 1271), and may have a self-reinforcing effect: the socio-cultural and political benefits of secrecy incite more secrecy.

3. Disentangling the Anglo–Dutch Intelligence Community during World War II

No other policy area of the Dutch wartime government-in-exile, the Parliamentary Commission stated, required so many hearings as the area of military and civil intelligence. This was ‘an extraordinarily elaborate and complex’ subject. ‘The number of questions was so abundant and problems appeared to be so intensely interwoven, that two years were needed to manage this information and to process it in such a way that could result in a good overview of the matter’ (Enquêetecommissie, 1950, vol. 4A8, p. 2). Even Minister of War Van Lidh de Jeude, responsible for the Dutch subversive services between 1942 and 1945, had clearly lost track, and complained in June 1942 that ‘there are now so many commissions [sic] that overlap and obstruct each others’ work that I am getting mind-boggled’ (Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 727). Indeed, there was a large number of Dutch intelligence and subversive services which succeeded each other, worked in parallel, and completed or overlapped each other’s work, as Figure 1 clarifies.

Secret services-in-exile were essential in order to know what was going on in occupied Holland. Queen Wilhelmina even considered the services the most important of all government institutions-in-exile (according to van ‘t Sant, as cited in De Jong, 1979, pp. 843, 973). They gathered military and political intelligence through the Centrale Inlichtingendienst (CID) and the Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), and they committed subversive acts through the Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (BVT), Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (MVT) and the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO). The Allied forces, including the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), prioritized military intelligence, aimed at collecting data on the number of German forces in The Netherlands, and the location of their headquarters and military stock points. Political intelligence, aimed at grasping public opinion and the needs of the resistance movement in occupied Holland, was of mostly Dutch interest. Therefore, it remained a secondary matter throughout the war, sometimes to considerable frustration of the Dutch intelligence community. Sabotage, finally, was of British and later Allied interest and was intended to harm the German presence in occupied Dutch territory. It was the field of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Dutch subversive services.

![Figure 1. Schematic overview of the Dutch secret services-in-exile by years in function, May 1940–May 1945 (Kluiters, 1993). Abbreviations: CID: Centrale Inlichtingendienst (Central Intelligence Service); BI: Bureau Inlichtingen (Bureau Intelligence); BVT: Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MVT: Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Military Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MID: Militaire Inlichtingendienst (Military Intelligence Service); BBO: Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (Bureau for Special Assignments).](image-url)
The Dutch gathered military and political intelligence and committed sabotage through nine services and several separate intelligence channels. Each service collaborated either with the Dutch section of SIS under W.J. Hooper (until December 1940), then C.E.C. Rabagliati (until June 1942) and finally C.O. Seymour, or with the Dutch section of SOE under R.V. Laming (until autumn 1941), Ch.C. Blizzard (until August 1942), S. Bingham (until November 1943), and finally R.I. Dobson. Seymour, Laming, Blizzard and Bingham all spoke fluently Dutch.

4. The Years of Crisis

On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded The Netherlands. Three days later Queen Wilhelmina escaped to London and the Dutch government followed her soon after. On her journey to London, the Queen was accompanied by François van ’t Sant, a former chief superintendent of police in The Hague and former liaison officer of GS III, the Dutch security service before World War II. An enigmatic and stern man both respected, feared and hated, he had become the subject of numerous rumours (Van der Zee, 2015). Nevertheless, van ’t Sant had become Queen Wilhelmina’s confidant, a position he had earned by preventing scandals due to the Queen’s unfaithful husband Prince Hendrik (De Jong, 1979, pp. 844–859; Verburg, 2001, pp. 274, 378–388). Upon arrival in London, he became head of the first secret service-in-exile. And although he would not remain in this position for long, his presence in London would leave a strong mark on the functioning of the subsequent Dutch secret services and their collaboration with their British opposite numbers.

In many ways Francois van ’t Sant— with his secretive nature, the personal and exclusive character of his connections, and the strong feelings of loyalty and animosity he aroused— exemplified some important characteristics of Dutch intelligence during the war. During the wartime years, the Dutch secret services experienced a long period of institutional and operational crisis (1940–1942/1943) followed by a period of recovery (1943/1944–1945). The years of crisis, between July 1940 and November 1942, were characterized by feelings of both loyalty and rivalry. Several services succeeded each other rapidly and there was hardly any operational continuity or success.

François van ’t Sant headed the first intelligence service CID, founded on 19 July 1940. He was strongly supported by Queen Wilhelmina and, more importantly, he was the only Dutchman with whom Menzies, head of SIS, wanted to collaborate and whom he trusted (De Jong, 1979, p. 861). Van ’t Sant was a familiar face to SIS; during and after World War I he had successfully established and maintained connections between GS III and SIS (De Jong 1979, p. 845). Indeed, van ’t Sant had proven to be a keen assistant to his British opposite numbers, even though he had strong British opponents too. For example, Laming, the first head of SOE Dutch section, was convinced van ’t Sant was unreliable, he refused to work with him, and made it a personal quest to convince others of his suspicions against van ’t Sant. Finally, possibly because of his quest against van ’t Sant, he was transferred to another position (De Jong, 1979, pp. 836–837). In Dutch governmental and resistance circles van ’t Sant also suffered from a rather negative reputation. He was considered a traitor and a ‘sinister figure’ (De Jong, 1979, p. 972; Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4AB, p. 32). A later head of a Dutch subversive service, van Oorschot, declared that ‘van ’t Sant meddling with everything. He was a dictator...We escaped Hitler and his likes and we got van ’t Sant instead’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 342).

Van ’t Sant’s CID was based in 77 Chester Square and had four members as of August 1940. It had to establish connections with occupied Holland and coordinate intelligence activities from the departments of Justice, War, and Home Affairs. Van ’t Sant collaborated harmoniously with Hooper, head of SIS Dutch section. He collaborated even more harmoniously with Hooper’s successor, Euan Rabagliati, ‘a lean, impeccably dressed short Englishman’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 130). Van ’t Sant and Rabagliati intensified their collaboration when Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions, Chris Krediet and Peter Tazelaar, offered to work for them. The ‘Hazelhoff Roelfzema group’ became noted for establishing a risky transportation service between the Dutch and English coasts. Of all drop-offs at the Dutch coast, the most innovative drop off was the one from Tazelaar at Scheveningen, near The Hague, in November 1941. As a convincing guest of the pro-German dancing party in Scheveningen, Tazelaar defied the wave breakers and arrived at the beach in a ‘waterproof cocoon’ within which he was dressed in a dinner jacket, sprinkled with a substantial amount of rum (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 546).

Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered he was serving the Dutch Queen directly, rather than any Dutch bureaucratic intelligence organisation. Not surprisingly, he entitled his memoirs ‘Soldier of Orange’ in which the Queen figured as a distant mother. Van ’t Sant had provided Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions with an office and apartment behind 77 Chester Square, where van ’t Sant himself, Queen Wilhelmina and Prince Bernhard had their offices. The choice of this location indicates a degree of likeness and appreciation between the Queen, Van ’t Sant and Hazelhoff Roelfzema. Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions lived in a coach house, next to the Queen’s garage and with a view on van ’t Sant’s office. Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered the ‘Mews’,

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1 I specifically exclude the Bureau voor Bijzondere Aangelegenheden, which functioned between 8 February 1941 until mid-June 1941 and came under the Ministry of War. Its work and influence seem negligible (Kluiters, 1993, pp. 102–103).
2 With the general term ‘secret service’ I refer to all Dutch security, intelligence and subversive services. I specify when needed.
3 All addresses, dates of foundation and liquidation of services are from Kluiters (1993).
4 The Dutch Queen is a member of the House of Orange-Nassau.
as he called it, ‘his base and all official Dutch services outside the Mews as hostile’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 122). Even if Hazelhoff Roelfzema did as he pleased, lacked modesty and was difficult to keep in check, he made a good match with van ‘t Sant and Rabagliati, who he affectionately nicknamed ‘the Rabbi’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 132). Their collaboration was to out-last van ‘t Sant’s brief period as official head of service:

The reason why we got to van ‘t Sant’, Hazelhoff Roelfzema explained later, ‘was that he was the only man in the whole of London who could get things done when you needed something. Every time I needed backing and special things, I went to van ‘t Sant. All Dutchmen who escaped the Netherlands and arrived in London in 1940-1941 to join the Allied forces...eventually all ended up with van ‘t Sant. They all knew that under his guidance something happened at least. We needed someone important who supported us. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, pp. 544–545)

On van ‘t Sant’s position in relation to SIS Dutch section and the Hazelhoff Roelfzema-group, Hazelhoff Roelfzema wrote in his memoirs that:

From the moment the Rabbi...entered the scene, the Mews were fully on steam. We collaborated directly with SIS where nothing seemed impossible. Nevertheless, van ‘t Sant mysteriously remained the centre of the enterprise...It seemed as if we were involved in an important family project of which General van ‘t Sant, modest, silent, in the background, nevertheless firmly retained the lead. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, pp. 132–133)

Van ‘t Sant had a diplomatic approach to his British opposite numbers. This amounted to an efficient way of acquiring his say in controlling contacts with the Netherlands without, however, explicitly demanding more influence. According to himself, this was due to his basic assumption that:

We worked jointly for the greater goal, and the English were in the lead in England. So we provided assistance to the English through our local knowledge of Dutch contacts and circumstances and we gave our most able fellow compatriots to contribute to this goal. But the highest leadership has always been with the English; they were, after all, the experts on intelligence services in their country. (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 486)

Even if SIS preferred military intelligence, van ‘t Sant made sure to ‘satisfy...those who wanted to know something positively’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 483). By this he meant Queen Wilhelmina and several ministers. They were accustomed to turn to van ‘t Sant every time they required non-military information, for example about an individual’s political inclination or reliability.

Accordingly, van ‘t Sant had surrounded himself with a number of influential actors in the intelligence community, who appreciated the combination of van ‘t Sant’s servitude toward the British services and his skills in obtaining operational means. These loyal individuals were his British opposite numbers, Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions, Prime Minister Gerbrandy, Queen Wilhelmina and her son-in-law Prince Bernhard.

By the summer of 1941 van ‘t Sant’s position as head of the service became difficult as he was plagued by persisting rumours, in the Netherlands and London, that he was responsible for arrests by the Sicherheitsdienst in the Netherlands, and the rumours continued until the end of his life (De Jong, 1979, pp. 863–870). On 14 August 1941, R.P.J. Derksema succeeded him in the second CID, which had about ten members. Derksema, a former lawyer, lacked management skills and had little sense of security. He was, according to Hazelhoff Roelfzema, ‘a charming, friendly man, way too decent for the tough world of secret services’ (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 128). Under his leadership, he did not manage to send out even one agent (De Jong 1979, pp. 888–889). Rabagliati refused to work with him and objected that ‘nothing ever happens there. There are never any results. They cannot be galvanised into action’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 543). Hazelhoff Roelfzema complained that ‘from Derksema I didn’t get the slightest support. Every time I wanted to talk to him, he was on leave’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 542). ‘While we were all possessed with that sense of urgency...The less business we had to do with them [from the CID], the better we worked’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 544). Prime Minister Gerbrandy, however, did not seem to care much for the weak guidance of the CID because he knew that van ‘t Sant continued to collaborate with Rabagliati and Hazelhoff Roelfzema behind the scenes and outside the realm of the CID. Not only did Gerbrandy know about this rather singular construction, he supported it (De Jong, 1979, p. 833). Correctly, Rabagliati described van ‘t Sant’s dismissal as head of the service as ‘kicking him out through the back door and letting him back in again through the back door’ (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 515–516). And not surprisingly, relations between Derksema and Rabagliati were bad, and collaboration between the CID and SIS Dutch section was negligible.

Besides these personal rivalries and the loyal bonds between the trinity Hazelhoff Roelfzema-van ‘t Sant-Rabagliati that by-passed Derksema, there were other reasons for the poor relations between the CID and SIS Dutch section. Derksema had a radically different approach to working with Rabagliati and obtaining the control he wished to have on operational matters. In the first meeting he had with ‘the English’ he ‘explicitly required that [he] have a bigger say in the future deployment of
agents than the Dutch institutions had had until then. [He] wanted to be completely informed of the aim of the missions, the preparations etc’. What Derksema probably did not realise well enough was that van ‘t Sants diplomatic approach had, unofficially and implicitly, provided him with substantial knowledge and influence on operational matters. Derksema further hardened his position, and between August 1941 and the beginning of 1942, he refused to provide new agents for deployment to SIS (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C2, pp. 1110–1111). Rabagliati, in turn, found it ‘impossible to work with the man’ (van ‘t Sant, as cited in Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C2, p. 1565)

With Colonel M.R. de Bruyne, Derksema’s successor, relations with SIS Dutch section deteriorated even further and reached an all-time low in the spring of 1942. De Bruyne assumed office on 5 February 1942 and resigned on 31 May 1942; frustrated, disillusioned, and tired of intelligence work. His character was surely a significant contributory factor as were the loyal bonds between Hazelhoff Roelfzema, van ‘t Sant, and Rabagliati who continued working behind his back, irritating him severely.

De Bruyne was ‘fully reliable and straightforward’, as Minister of War Van Lidth de Jeude (September 1942–February 1945) described him. ‘A fair soldier’, he continued, ‘but politically completely unskilled, who has become the victim of those who are more experienced in the profession’ (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 692, 712, 812, 973–974). ‘Completely honest’, according to Hazelhoff Roelfzema, ‘he didn’t appear to me as the typical intelligence guy’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 550). De Bruyne preferred to stick to his own concepts and ideas, he was proud, with little fantasy and little flexibility, and he liked to see hierarchical relations respected (De Jong, 1979, p. 900). He was also anxious not to be bypassed.

De Bruyne, like Derksema, decisively launched himself into a power struggle to acquire more control of contacts with occupied Holland. His personality, keen on clear agreements, openness and hierarchy, was not able to solve the matter in a diplomatic way.

The ‘small clique’ of Hazelhoff Roelfzema (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 692), which officially worked under de Bruyne’s supervision but in practice ignored him completely, was another source of irritation to de Bruyne. Hazelhoff Roelfzema’s powerful supporters also annoyed him, van ‘t Sant in particular (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 450).

Every time I went to Chester Square, I noticed Rabagliati was talking to van ‘t Sant. I did not know anything about the finer points of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema-case. So I said to Rabagliati: what are you doing here? He would say: these are matters that are none of your business….So I stopped sharing information with van ‘t Sant, but Rabagliati was informed on everything and he used to tell everything to van ‘t Sant. The effect was therefore zero.

(Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 453)

De Bruyne and Rabagliati were in violent dispute, and in the subsequent months, the situation exacerbated even further, with Hazelhoff Roelfzema’s and van ‘t Sant’s loyalty to Rabagliati being the principal source of unrest within the Anglo–Dutch intelligence community. As a result, de Bruyne resigned in May 1942 and Minister Van Lidth de Jeude noted in his diary that: ‘the “clique” had won the battle again’ (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 704).

While de Bruyne led the CID and maintained his embittered relations with Rabagliati, he also led the subversive services BVT and MVT: the Dutch opposite numbers of SOE. De Bruyne’s relations with SOE concerned primarily Blizard and Bingham, heads of SOE’s Dutch Section, Hambro, deputy head of SOE, and Gubbins, head of operations at SOE.

In the course of 1942, SOE approached de Bruyne with the purpose to arrive at some degree of collaboration in sending out agents to the Netherlands for sabotage activities. In April 1942 this resulted in the ‘Plan for Holland’, and in June 1942 the first agents were sent out and BVT and SOE started collaborating on a more structural basis. However, the realisation of the ‘Plan for Holland’ had to first overcome the obstacle of de Bruyne’s insistence that he acquire more control over operational matters.

From the summer of 1942, de Bruyne, worn out by his power struggle with Rabagliati, began distancing himself from intelligence and subversive matters. And in November 1943 the first disconcerting signs of the tragic Englandspiel were noticed: the German Abwehr had captured Dutch agents who had been dropped by SOE into the Netherlands and repeatedly fooled SOE into sending more agents, eventually resulting in 54 deaths.

As a result, De Bruyne was no longer allowed to collaborate with SOE and in February 1944, when the full extent of the Englandspiel was discovered, de Bruyne resigned. The MVT, including the MID, ceased to exist.

5. Sudden Recovery

The years of crisis ended around 1943/1944 with the Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), the Dutch intelligence service,
and the Bureau voor Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO), the Dutch subversive service, as new actors within the Dutch intelligence community. This was ‘the last chance’ to organize a new Dutch subversive service and to find a means to collaborate efficiently, as Lord Selborne, then minister of Economic Warfare and responsible for SOE said to Gerbrandy. With BI and BBO, the Dutch services finally acquired a larger say in agents’ training, assignments, and communications; Anglo-Dutch collaboration became more efficient, fairly equal, and competition softened considerably. Strikingly, the change had been sudden rather than gradual. Undoubtedly, the discovery of the Englandspiel contributed to this turning point. And possibly, the years of rivalries, incompetence and inefficiency prompted fatigue and the willingness to change among several actors within and outside the intelligence community.

BI’s existence was steady, its personnel diligent, and its collaboration with the British efficient especially when compared to the years of crisis. Its most influential head of service was J.M. Somer, a major in the Dutch East Indies Army and former staff member of GS III. Under Somer, BI played a leading role in the Dutch intelligence community until the end of the war. Even if quick-tempered, keen on a fight, provocative in his extramarital contacts and his authoritarian views, (De Jong, 1979, pp. 949–953) Somer was the right person to head BI. Under his guidance, BI managed to collaborate with SIS on an almost equal footing, in the fields of agents’ recruitment, training, and assignments. (De Jong 1979, pp. 957–958) Simultaneously, Hazelhoff Roelfzema disappeared from the centre of attention and as the principal source of unrest within the Dutch intelligence community.

On the subversive side, BBO armed and trained the Dutch Forces of the Interior that were created in September 1944 to coordinate the Dutch resistance, and it collaborated with SIS and SOE (De Jong, 1979, p. 960). After the discovery of the Englandspiel BBO was a fresh start with initially no office and no personnel. Head of service Major-General J.W. van Oorschot, former head of GS III, staffed BBO together with two colleagues. All three agreed that ‘we need to change, collaboration with the English should become much heartier’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 344; De Jong, 1979, pp. 964, 967–968). And indeed, Anglo-Dutch collaboration became ‘very pleasant’, and Dobson, head of SOE Dutch section, was ‘a very suitable man to work with’, Van Oorschot explained (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, pp. 344–346). Even if SOE Dutch section was responsible for technical matters, BBO and SOE Dutch section collaborated on an almost equal footing.

Van Oorschot was not easily offended, a calm and modest person, conscious of what he knew and what he did not. And importantly, one of his key concerns was to avoid fights:

If secret services fight, they won’t get much work done. That’s the biggest disaster there is. I always told [my colleagues De Graaf and Klijzing]: whatever you do,...never get into a fight....Because you’ll start competing with each other and you’ll keep things concealed from each other and you’ll get nothing but trouble.’ (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, pp. 345–346)

6. Conclusions

Nobody within the Dutch intelligence community made better use of secrecy as a means to foster loyalty and wield power than van ‘t Sant. It suited his personality and it came naturally to him. He never properly explained his actions and hardly left any written accounts of his involvement in intelligence matters: no agreements on his collaboration with Rabagliati, no diary, and no memoirs. Together with Eric Hazelhoff Roelfzema, and Queen Wilhelmina, he was in his native element in informal organisational forms.

Loyalty was a major determinant in the level of collaboration within the Dutch intelligence community and between the Dutch and British intelligence communities. This case study suggests the existence of an inverse correlation between a strong emphasis on personal loyalty and informal relations in intelligence relationships, on the one hand, and a certain level of professionalism and organisational stability on the other. As such, it argues that loyalty has two interrelated force multipliers: secrecy and informal organisation. First, shared secrets sustained and reinforced the loyal bonds between Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Van ‘t Sant, Rabagliati, and Queen Wilhelmina. These bonds of loyalty disregarded and thwarted formal work processes along bureaucratic and hierarchical lines. The Hazelhoff Roelfzema group was spectacular in terms of the social and institutional turmoil it caused within the Dutch intelligence community and its counterproductive effect on formal intelligence collaboration. Derksema and de Bruyne—as outsiders—underestimated the strong ties, fostered by secrecy, among members of this group. Naively, they expected to be included in the circle of insiders by forceful demands or by official agreement.

Second, informal organisation strengthened loyalty as a basis for efficient collaboration. During the years of crisis, the Dutch services functioned informally, allowing ample leeway for the ‘clique’ of van ‘t Sant to carry out business as usual, based on feelings of loyalty. Only after the discovery of the Englandspiel Anglo-Dutch intelligence collaboration was formalized (instead of personalized) and its efficiency improved. As the prominent significance of loyalty receded to the background, Anglo-Dutch collaboration finally professionalized.

Intelligence and security services are an inherent part of international relations. Arguments in favour of research on emotions in the field of international relations, as put forward by for example Bleiker and Hutchison (2018), also apply to intelligence studies. Moreover, the secretive environment of intelligence is likely to mag-
nify certain emotions and increase their significance in intelligence communities, such as trust, distrust, and fear. Research on emotions in intelligence communities could add to our knowledge on, for example, the motivations of intelligence officers and agents, the psychological benefits and costs of operational work, and community feeling. Also, the great importance of emotions in the relationship between a case officer and his agent can hardly be overstated, even though systematic analysis of this topic is scarce in intelligence literature. Research on these topics would require the use of (historical) sources such as interviews, memoirs, and personal files. By adding emotions to the dominant operational focus of intelligence studies we can further deepen our understanding of intelligence communities and, as such, contribute to a further professionalization of the field of intelligence studies.

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Conflict of Interests

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References


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