

Human Security of Inuit and Sámi in the 21st Century: The Canadian and Finnish Cases

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Abstract

In a changing territorial and geopolitical moment of the Arctic region, are the Indigenous Peoples Organizations heard at the regional level and are the Arctic states working to keep them safe and secure? To safeguard the human security of Arctic Indigenous peoples, Arctic states (and their governments) have to understand the needs and changes that are affecting their way of life as well as to be able to cooperate between them. In a comparative study of Canada’s and Finland’s Arctic policies—Canada’s *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (2019) and *Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy* (2021)—it is possible to identify the applicability of the human security approach, which is influenced by the truth and reconciliation process between Canada and Inuit and Finland and Sámi. This process is a main factor in having their human rights respected and their human security safeguarded, considering that the relation between the countries of the North and the South of the Arctic countries is a discovery of their diversity (linguistical and cultural) in the 21st century. In my perspective, and for a participative democracy to be applied as mentioned by the green political theory (following the views of scholars like Barry, Eckersley, and Goodin), states and governments need to be open and recognise the gaps identified by those communities and transnational organisations.

Keywords

Arctic; Canada; Finland; human security; Inuit; Sámi

1. Introduction

The *désert de glace* (i.e., the Arctic) is scary but at the same time fascinating. Millions of years of ancient ice and rock are part of the Earth’s four billion years old history. An ocean that “covers an area of 14 million km²” (Dodds & Woodward, 2021, p. 18). In this century, the melting of permafrost is happening very rapidly, causing

difficulties that affect local life, culture, and knowledge. Indigenous communities know how to live in difficult conditions and have the ability to connect with nature and with spiritual comfort (Heinämäki, 2010), something that has been lost in the Western world due to an underestimation of popular knowledge (Favier, 2019).

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change AR6 Report states that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean, and land (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022). The rapid and abrupt changes have direct and indirect implications in the Arctic region. The direct impacts are the ones “caused immediately by climate change” (Kirchner, 2021, p. 1) and can be identified as follows: (a) melting of sea ice and glaciers; (b) rising maximum and minimum atmosphere temperatures; (c) rising sea levels; and (d) thawing permafrost. The indirect effects are the biodiversity and ecosystem changes and the repercussions on Indigenous peoples’ way of life.

Indigenous peoples are realising this new reality is affecting their ancestral way of life and culture, which includes fishing and harvesting. The environment, the landscape, the ecosystem, everything changes and leads to the vulnerability of Indigenous communities, who must quickly adapt to new realities while also being resilient in new contexts where ‘traditional diets, their well-being in society and society is affected” (Eskeland & Flottorp, 2006, p. 88).

While states and governments have not assimilated the need to involve communities in their decision-making, especially in the case of Arctic Indigenous peoples, transnational organisations have posed their own policies in the face of government and states’ disinterest and separation from a reality that is changing the Arctic region in a rapid way. Facing a new reality, Arctic Indigenous peoples shall be part of the decision-making at the national level. This would put into practice the bottom-up approach.

Following the green political theory, a participatory democracy (Barry, 1999; Eckersley, 2004; Goodin, 1992) contrasts with an authoritarian vision (historically associated with the green theory). Barry (1999, p. 118) argues that a “collective ecological management” democratises “decision-making processes” with “popular participation” in a healthy state involvement, acknowledging and recognising that “the state should not do everything” and consequently should decentralise “decision-making, where appropriate, to the local state level.” Have Canada and Finland been able to develop a participatory democracy, envisioning a bottom-up approach?

In the following sections of this article, I will try to demonstrate how Canada and Finland have approached participatory democracy in different ways, which has an impact on how their Arctic policies are developed and prepared. It is expected that these policies will incorporate the human security approach. It is important to emphasise that Arctic policies are both national and foreign policies, not just domestic ones. The internationalisation of Indigenous issues is considered to have its roots in colonialism in the case of the Arctic, as claimed by Wilson (2020). Exner-Pirot (2020) states the same: a period of history that has endured and is still relevant in the 21st century when it comes to Arctic policy and strategy.

Are Canada and Finland able to safeguard and secure Indigenous populations (Inuit and Sámi, respectively)? By comparing the Arctic policies of Finland and Canada, this article seeks to provide an answer to that query. The reasons to compare Canada and Finland are: (a) there is no comparative research on those two countries’ Arctic policies; (b) there is no comparative research on the populations of Inuit and Sámi living in

these countries; and (c) both countries deal differently with the truth and reconciliation process, being at different stages of it. Despite the argument that the selection should not be based on “geographic proximity” (Collier, 1991, p. 17), Canada and Finland are two Arctic countries located on different continents, connected by a shared regional identity and alliance (Østhagen, 2021). So, for those reasons, the analysis of the Arctic policies is the foundation of the comparison work.

In this article, I will briefly explain human security; present and summarise Canada’s *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (Government of Canada, 2019) and *Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy* (Finnish Government, 2021), where the main points will be exposed and I will show how those documents were elaborated; and, as stated previously, do a comparative analysis (illustrated in Table 2 of the Supplementary File).

The conclusions of the comparative analysis will confirm the differences in the applicability and assimilation of the human security approach in both countries and enhance the relationship between governments and their respective Indigenous communities as an expression of the major difference between Canada and Finland in safeguarding and securing them.

This article aims to fill the research gap previously mentioned and to provide insights regarding human security in the Arctic region, leading the path to other comparative works and future studies that can also be related to the violation of human rights in democratic and autocratic Arctic countries.

Additional information about Canada and Inuit, Finland and Sámi, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and the Sámi Council can be read in Table 1 of the Supplementary File.

2. A Brief Introduction to Human Security

The idea of human security remotes to the *Illuminisme* period (Hossain & Cambou, 2018) when the goal was to define a common idea of security to safeguard humans in order to warrant freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. However, the concept of human security emerged in the Human Development Report, led by Mahub ul Haq under the United Nations Development Programme (1994), having four characteristics: (a) it is a universal concern; (b) its components are interdependent; (c) it is easier to ensure through early prevention; and (d) it is people-centred (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, pp. 22–23). Hence, it is an extension of the meanings of security and human rights (Commission on Human Security, 2003) and expands the notion of security, transferring the focus from the nations to the people/individuals.

The above-mentioned 1994 report takes a people-centred approach and emphasises the need to protect individuals from a wide range of threats, i.e., economic deprivation, environmental degradation, poverty, disease, and political violence. Consequently, seven dimensions that express the inter-disciplinarity of this concept are identified: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, pp. 24–25). It shall be noted that this concept varies according to the place and region where it is applied, which is why it is relevant to highlight that the above dimensions are interrelated.

In the case of the Arctic region, the protection of Indigenous peoples is linked to climate change, which is becoming a security problem and is already a human security concern. Additionally, the 2009 and 2016

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security reports highlight the principles of this approach: (a) people-centred, (b) multi-sectoral/comprehensive, (c) context-specific, and (d) prevention-oriented (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009, 2016). These demonstrate the inter-disciplinarity of the concept, which human security application shall happen in three phases, as indicated in Table 2 of the Supplementary File and according to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2009, 2016). Phase one shall focus on analysis, mapping, and planning; phase two on implementation; and phase three on the impact assessment (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009)/rapid assessment (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016).

Another aspect to be emphasised is the distinct understanding by ul Haq (United Nations Development Programme, 1994) of the gap between responsibility to protect, also pointed out in numbers 8 and 23 of the Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations, 2012, p. 3), while academics tend to intersect (Hossain, 2013) and interlink (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2011) human security and responsibility to protect. The disparity between ul Haq (United Nations Development Programme, 1994) and other scholars lies in the interpretation of this approach, which is perceived as ambiguous among scholars, with no precise definition (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2011; Hossain, 2013), or as a *fuzzy word* (Estevens, 2019). Despite the criticism, the UN General Assembly 66th session clarifies that “human security is an approach to assist member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (United Nations, 2012, p. 1). A statement in the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2016) handbook and the United Nations Development Programme (2022) special report reinforced the practical value and role of this approach, that is used in programme design and policy recommendation.

Are Canada and Finland able to implement this policy approach in practice through their Arctic policies to secure and safeguard the human security of Inuit and Sámi, respectively?

3. Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019)

The Government of Canada has been working on a people-to-people relationship or a nation-to-nation relationship (Government of Canada, 2019, 2021) with Indigenous communities since 2015, the year Justin Trudeau assumed functions as prime minister.

Before entering into the details of Canada’s *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (2019), it is relevant to mention that this document was based upon other relevant documents, such as the *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (2015), the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016), the report *A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model* (2017), and the *Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples* (2018).

Between 2016 and 2019, the new Arctic policy was prepared collaboratively and cooperatively with the Aboriginal populations. The recommendations specified by the current Governor General Mary May Simon, in the *A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model* report, were taken into consideration. Since the Indigenous, territorial, and provincial partners helped the Government of Canada to better understand the Arctic region, collaborating and cooperating in a constructive healthy relationship (in the view of the government), the elaboration of the document took some time, but it helped to regain the trust of the Indigenous

peoples. This example of meeting and listening was then replicated. In the document's elaboration over 25 Indigenous partners representing First Nations, Inuit and Métis, including governments and regional and national organisations, territorial governments (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut), and three provincial governments (Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador) participated (Government of Canada, 2019, p. 12). Their contribution resulted in policies that are included as partners' chapters, though the introduction to this chapter clarifies the fact that "they [framework chapters] do not necessarily reflect the views of either federal government, or the other partners" (Government of Canada, 2019, p. 73).

While perusing the document, the initial observation that captures our attention is the utilisation of terms like "Arctic" and "North" in the heading, which means that these specific areas are being incorporated as a component of Canada's character, comprehending and acknowledging their disparities, so that no one is left out. During the meetings held for the elaboration of the policy/document, the Inuit organisations explained that they were excluded from the previous Arctic policies when the word North was used because it does not comprise the area where Inuit communities live. As such, the Government of Canada included the Inuit homeland in this 2019 policy.

Canada's *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* has eight goals and its beginning states that these goals are to be executed with the dedication of all parties, who will behave accordingly and convene at various intervals until 2030. It is anticipated that within a time frame of no more than a decade, the instruments will aid in constructing and fortifying the basis of a domestic and global approach to the perception of the collective, including Indigenous and non-Indigenous. This framework aspires to eliminate disparities and bring the Northern and Southern regions into closer proximity. The main points, which are connected to climate change, are:

1. Overcoming inequalities in sectors such as transportation, health, or education;
2. Working on the reconciliation process to stop the intergenerational trauma of residential school and the lack of opportunities for younger generations that deserve access to an education that accepts their culture and language. In this regard Canada assumes the will to be a global leader promoting "values and interests such as human and environmental security" (Government of Canada, 2019, p. 47);
3. Facilitating access to education will also help to improve health quality (mental health included) and job opportunities for the local partnerships, that can develop infrastructures, such as rail networks, airport facilities, and roads to access communities;
4. Using Indigenous knowledge and science to continue to care for the environment and biodiversity;
5. Following international norms, rules, and institutions, including the engagement of Indigenous partners at the international level;
6. Keeping the commitment to implementing the UN's Agenda 2030 for sustainable development;
7. Establishing a foundation for a future based on a trust, inclusive, transparent, and transformative partnership (Government of Canada, 2019, p. 6) that will get people safe, secure, and well-defended. Canadian Armed Forces will have a permanent presence in Northwest territories to act within human and environmental matters, if and when needed, and to protect their ocean waters.

The goals can be condensed as follows, separated into a total of eight sections, which are all intertwined and have climate change as the common connection:

1. Canadian Arctic and Northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy: In this first goal, there are 12 objectives defined to eradicate poverty among Indigenous populations by providing opportunities for education and healthcare, with strategies that can assist in adapting to the rapid climate variations taking place in those communities, enabling them to maintain their resilience and fortitude. Adequate access to food is also a crucial element that impacts the welfare of these communities;
2. Strengthened infrastructure that closes gaps between the regions of Canada: A pledge to provide this region (Arctic and North) with the chance to reach the same economic standing as other regions of the country. To achieve this, the infrastructures must be proficient and successful in communication (depending on satellites), transportation, and sustainable energy, adjusting to the new conditions of climate change;
3. Strong, sustainable, diversified, and inclusive local and regional economies: The outcomes of a flourishing economy with diverse prospects for commerce and capitalisation and full participation of Indigenous communities are expected to happen;
4. Knowledge and understanding guide decision-making: Research and knowledge are essential to share data and acknowledge traditional knowledge on an equal footing and with equal significance as academic research. Both types of knowledge can affect positively the decision-making process by engaging younger generations to narrow the recognised disparities and excel internationally in Indigenous knowledge;
5. The Canadian Arctic and Northern ecosystems are healthy and resilient: This goal hopes to put into practice strategies that can help the adaptation and mitigation of climate change, through data that will enable better preparation and resilience to its challenges;
6. The rules-based international order in the Arctic responds effectively to new challenges and opportunities: To enhance the safeguarding of its borders, specifically in the maritime domain, Canada will establish more precise demarcations of the marine regions and boundaries in the Arctic. The changes affecting the region in many ways are leading to growing international attention, that consequently modifies the international order;
7. The Canadian Arctic and North, including the Indigenous peoples are safe, secure, and well-defended: Awareness of the impacts of climate change on communities' lives is a huge achievement for the federal government. A military presence that works with Arctic and Northern communities as well as monitoring and controlling the area as prevention in an increasingly accessible region;
8. Reconciliation supports self-determination and nurtures mutually respectful relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples: The federal government commits to honour and implement the rights of Arctic and Northern Indigenous peoples so the move forward can be done upon a solid and healthy relationship, that seeks to partner in issues that can lead other Arctic countries adhering to global standards that may eventually be recognised as an established practice regarding native peoples and governing matters.

In the chapter titled "Conclusion," which outlines the following steps, the new way of working is highlighted and will take place in various phases, including implementation, with financial investment to ensure the success of this framework.

Annexed to Canada's *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (2019) is a list of principles and an Introduction to the partner's chapters where it is clarified that "they [framework chapters] do not necessarily reflect the views of either federal government, or of the other partners" (Government of Canada, 2019, p. 73). Kikkert and

Lackenbauer (2019) consider this statement confusing, having an “absence of coherence” due to the assumed “inability to reach unanimous agreement” (Kikkert & Lackenbauer, 2019, pp. 7–8) pointed out in the Arctic policy. That is not an obstacle in the view of Goodin (1992, p. 128), since participation is an approach to endorse “better decisions” and allow different inputs, introducing or modifying concepts and language in a new way of doing policy, assuming this new form of co-development (Government of Canada, 2019).

4. Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy (2021)

Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy (2021) acknowledges the national and international vision of a country that aims to have a relevant role in the Northern region of the EU (Heininen, 2014). Finland’s four strategical priorities are identified in a very simple way: (a) climate change, mitigation, and adaptation; (b) inhabitants, promotion of well-being, and the rights of the Sámi as Indigenous people; (c) expertise, livelihoods, and leading-edge research; (d) infrastructure and logistics (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 11). The strategy document is composed of nine chapters that include background, an introduction, a chapter for each priority, one that maps the impact of the strategy, and another that monitors the objectives and measures.

According to the strategy’s first chapter, Finland is classified as an “Arctic country” with “Arctic interests and Arctic expertise” and its “Arctic character supports and enhances Finland’s international image as an Arctic country in international contexts” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 12). The section “Background” states that this work was developed by a “working group of public servants responsible for Arctic issues based on the steering group’s directions” (Finnish Government, 2021), indicating that the Saami Council was not consulted during the preparation of this document. The mentioned section also highlights, first, security issues in the Arctic region of relevance and a “significant priority for Finland’s foreign policy” (Finnish Government, 2021). The international cooperation in the area is challenged by the growing interest in the region and also by changes in international geopolitics. The international situation is further developed in the next chapter “Strategy.” Second, it highlights the priorities defined in the document are following the UN Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are expected to be achieved. A thought-provoking observation is that, at the end of each chapter priority, the corresponding SDGs are indicated. Third, it emphasises the principle of “doing no harm to environmental, social and cultural objectives, including impacts on Indigenous peoples’ rights to practice their own culture” (Finnish Government, 2021), which is safeguarded through the application of the European Green Deal (and Covid-19) measures, with the need to be ready for other pandemics in the future that can affect the region. Pandemics are a new factor to be well-thought-out and understood in health and environmental security.

At the end of the section “Background”, it is assumed that everything is related to “climate change, the importance of sustainable development, Arctic biodiversity, the status of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic and the importance of international cooperation in the Arctic region” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 13). These priorities are guided by: (a) the Paris Agreement; (b) the UN Agenda 2030; (c) the UN Convention on Biological Diversity; (d) the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; (e) negotiations on the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction; (f) the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007); (g) the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

In the “Introduction” chapter, Finland assumes that there is a “sum of many actors” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 16) which includes public administration and policy-making, universities, research institutes, and

NGOs. In the mentioned section, it is affirmed that the objectives are outlined for a period that goes until 2030, with the will to mitigate the impacts of climate change, develop a circular economy with other new economic activities that can create new business opportunities (considered a Finland's expertise), and to reinforce investment in education and research as well as infrastructures and logistics in the region. The issue of security is a significant concern for Finland as it is explained in three distinct subsections, where Russia and China are mentioned as two significant actors. The cognisance of this fact keeps Finland alert and more focused on working through dialogue (bilateral and multilateral) to keep promoting a stable, peaceful, cooperative, and secure environment in the region, by mentioning that the "welfare of the region's population must remain among the key priorities of Arctic cooperation" (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 20). Being an EU member, Finland reinforces the need (and support) to have the EU as an observer member in the Arctic Council, assuming the goal to sustain its leadership along with Sweden and Denmark, as Arctic EU member states that can also fortify EU's Arctic policy. Throughout the document, Finland assumes itself as a "global polar actor" (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 24) due to its active role in the Antarctic since the 1980s.

The priorities can be summed up in order to better understand their meaning, from the Finnish Government's perspective: The first priority is called climate change, mitigation, and adaptation. The impact of climate change on populations and communities, particularly Indigenous Sámi peoples, is developed and explained rather than being presented as an isolated problem. In that regard, it is confirmed that traditional Sámi knowledge will be incorporated into the knowledge base of the work being done on Arctic development and climate change. The idea of establishing a Sámi Climate Council is another one that might enhance this recognition.

The second priority (inhabitants, promotion of well-being, and the rights of the Sámi as an Indigenous people) is divided into two subsections: (a) focuses on the promotion of well-being and promotes education with equal access to basic and secondary levels and allows the Sámi people to keep their language and technology to develop distance learning digital services for health care in Indigenous communities affected by rapid social changes that affect their mental health; and (b) focuses on the rights of the Sámi, as an Indigenous people, "to maintain and develop their own language and culture" (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 43). Finland's Arctic Strategy also recognises that the Sámi languages are endangered and measures need to be taken to allow the children to learn their mother tongue even for those who are not living in the Sámi homeland.

The third priority (expertise, livelihoods, and leading-edge research) is also divided into two subsections. The first one (expertise and livelihoods) focuses on the Finnish expertise in areas such as "maritime industry, tourism, circular economy and bioeconomy, forestry, health technology, construction, sustainable mining, environmental and energy efficiency and the fish industry" (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 48). There is an intention to support the development of businesses in the Arctic region that are considered "particularly vulnerable" (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 48). Digitalisation is, once more, mentioned as a key tool that will enable the diversification of sustainable businesses, the creation of jobs, and the circular economy at a time when interest in the region's economy is rising. New networks and clusters may therefore be important in the area.

The second section of the third priority (expertise and leading-edge research) has its main focus on research and knowledge because both need to be used correctly in various sectors and industries. This high-quality expertise exists due to "Finland's position as an Arctic country" and to the "research infrastructure that is unique by international standards for observing climate and environmental change in the Arctic region"

(Finnish Government, 2021, p. 58). Research is of importance in the decision-making process because it is focused on Arctic issues, however, the high volume of research “is not readily available” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 58). It is thought that by effectively utilising this information, research, and expertise in partnership with businesses, the promotion of infrastructure investments, a good life, networks, and communications development will improve. Additionally, it can strengthen the work of the EU with the European Space Agency, the Copernicus program, and the Horizon programs, while being helpful in areas like security and national defence. It is also expected that the Arctic Council be a “key agent” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 31) in the implementation of international instruments such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction to maintain the protection of the Central Arctic Ocean. The Finnish Government also assumes that the EU will participate in the Arctic Council’s efforts to create a just transition, which uses the EU Green Deal as a tool for guidance. This second section of the third priority ends with a description of the necessary tactical actions.

The fourth priority (infrastructure and logistics) hopes to develop a transportation system that can fulfil the requirements of every area in Finland and the needs of businesses in a simple and efficient way. The sustainable movement is to occur in a more environmentally friendly way, reducing carbon emissions, and following the rules set by the International Maritime Organization so that “the use and carriage for use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic waters will be banned from July 2024” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 66). The development of alternative fuels like electricity, gas, hydrogen, renewable fuels, and electric fuels can help to advance infrastructure, mobility, and businesses. The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, also known as the Polar Code, is mentioned as a measure that Finland believes will improve the security and sustainability of Arctic shipping. This further solidifies Finland’s role as an expert in Arctic matters within the International Maritime Organization. The digitalisation process can guarantee good communication networks for businesses and citizens in difficult-to-access regions in Northern Finland, the development of various transport sectors, such as air traffic, maritime transport, and rail transport, and establish the necessary electrification that could link Northern Finland and Northern Sweden, promoting cross-border connections and addressing the region’s growing tourism. In Sodankylä, the Arctic Space Centre of the Finnish Meteorological Institute contributes significantly to Finland’s expertise in preparing for and adapting to climate change.

It shall be observed that the Arctic Railway project, from Rovaniemi (Finland) via Inari (Finland) to Kirkenes (Norway), is not mentioned in *Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy*, mainly due to the Sámi opposition that considers this project a “catastrophe for reindeer husbandry” in the locations as it would reduce the area for pasture (Saami Council, 2021). A controversy already explored by Cepinskyte (2018) in “The Arctic Railway and the Sámi Reconciling National Interests with Indigenous Rights.”

The last section of the *Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy*, titled “Steering Impact of the Strategy and Monitoring of its Objectives and Measures,” pledges to provide an annual analysis to the group of the Arctic Advisory Board and the Strategy for Arctic Policy, chosen by the prime minister’s office (between 3 February 2020 and 31 October 2023), for the discussion of the “implementation of the Strategy’s objective and measures by the Government’s decision-making bodies as necessary” (Finnish Government, 2021, p. 71). This chapter also states that before measures are put into action, their costs and timing will be evaluated in light of the funding and spending constraints set by the central government.

The Strategy refers to the SDGs, defined by the United Nations Agenda 2030, as connected to the priorities; nonetheless, it shall be noted that SDGs 1, 2, 6, 7, and 17 are missing in Finland's Strategy. I would like to emphasise the importance of SDG 17, which alludes to the partnership but is not explicitly mentioned in the text. As a result, the country does not fulfil its own Arctic Council priorities (2017–2019), which include working with organisations representing Indigenous peoples, in this case, the Saami Council. This transnational organisation was not invited to be part of the elaboration of the Finnish document, nor is its Arctic Policy considered or mentioned.

5. Comparative Analysis and Conclusion

The conclusions that can be drawn from this section, will allow me to respond to the question and create a comparison between Canada and Finland (see Table 2 in the Supplementary File).

It can be mentioned that both countries acknowledge that there are disparities in the Northern and Arctic communities, thus it shall be underlined that both have not looked at a particular area of their country in a consistent or coherent way until the early 2000s, an observation confirmed by Exner-Pirot (2021) in the case of Canada and by Heininen (2014) in the case of Finland.

If Canada can maintain coherence moving forward on human rights issues, it can become a successful “model or case” (Exner-Pirot, 2021, p. 454) and be emulated not only by Finland or other Arctic countries but also globally. The Arctic is a complement to the Canadian and Finnish North becoming “a subject of collective identity.” (Exner-Pirot, 2021, p. 454).

When examining both countries in this context, it is important to keep in mind that Canada, along with Norway and Japan, took the initiative to advance the discussion of human security by establishing the Human Security Network in 1998, also known as the Lysoen Agreement (Bajpai, 2003; Hoogensen et al., 2009; Waisová, 2003). The Human Security Network currently consists of 12 countries: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Panama, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand. South Africa participates as an observer. Canada took this issue seriously and established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, in 2000, by the hand of Lloyd Axworthy. Due to this fact, Canada takes the lead in this comparison study.

This analysis makes it possible to say that while Canada has adopted the human security approach, Finland still seems to be very far from it, continuing to use the economic sector as the primary determinant and point of departure for the goals of the Arctic Strategy (Finnish Government, 2021). In some ways, Finland's treatment of the Sámi population is a symptom of the UN's alerts about the violation of human rights in the country in 2022. One could argue that the human security of the Sámi population in Finland will, regrettably, only experience a very minor impact. The native Sámi peoples' human rights have not been upheld by the European Arctic member state. This might be attributed to the distance that exists between governments and the Sámi community and their representatives. A distance created by the lack of actively listening to and spending time with the community to understand and acknowledge its complex and changing needs. In this context, the truth-and-reconciliation process is a key element in this distant relationship, which subsequently breeds mistrust, a distant relationship that is a barrier to the possibility of developing a participatory democracy that involves those communities in issues of their concern. The Sámi population is

significantly more influenced by their collective memory than are non-Indigenous peoples. To protect the community and jointly determine what needs to be done to positively impact Indigenous lives, while respecting their identity, traditions, beliefs, values, languages, control, and management, the Finnish state must be willing to assist in the healing process and, more specifically, be available to listen to them. This means that Finland will need to address the International Labour Organization Convention—the major binding international convention concerning Indigenous peoples and tribal peoples, and a forerunner of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—and the Nordic Saami Convention—new international instrument/human rights convention with the goal “to confirm and strengthen the rights for the Sámi people as to allow the Sámi people to safeguard and develop their language, culture, livelihoods and way of life with the least possible interference by national borders” (Article 1) approvals as they also signal the beginning of a close relationship. These are crucial elements that are related to the ability to forge fruitful connections, much like Canada has done. This will make it possible to work together without feeling the need to exert control over a region that has been neglected for a while or be influenced by potential economic opportunities that might develop nearby in the future. Finland has not been able to treat Indigenous issues with the same priority it accords to climate change. It can be said that the polar nation has fallen short of its goal of enhancing and promoting human security, which the Barcelona Group Report states is “the most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2003, p. 29). In 2021, Prime Minister Sanna Marin issued an apology for the delays in enacting human rights legislation for the Sámi people. Given that some issues remain unclear for some commission members who resigned in the fall of 2021, the tasks that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should have completed have been challenging. These concerns pertain to accurately defining who qualifies as Sámi.

In a discussion about Canada’s *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (2019), held online in 2020, Krista Henriksen, Acting Director General of Northern Strategic Policy Branch within Crown–Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, offered a constructive critique in which she stated that the focus on people was what made this policy unique. When there is a desire to make opportunities for Indigenous peoples’ voices to be authentically heard, cooperation is achievable. In Canada, under Justin Trudeau’s government, the understanding of the connections between human rights and climate change and how those Indigenous communities are affected has been revealed through work done in a short period. At the moment this article is being written, no reports are available to confirm the results of the implementation of the goals and objectives. Fukuda-Parr and Messineo (2011, p. 1) argue that “human security is a concept that identifies the security of human lives as the central objective of national and international security policy.” This seems to apply to Canada. There is some expectation regarding future reports/surveys, to see if the results confirm the positive impact of the Arctic and Northern policy on the Inuit community. It is also relevant to understand this huge difference in applying human security in the Arctic policy between both Canada and Finland. Canada has defined its own view on human security by placing people at the centre of security policy (Waisová, 2003). From Bajpai’s perspective, the awareness of a growing world interdependence, a consequence of globalisation, is relevant in Canada’s perception of human security acknowledging the transnational aspect of threats by addressing “the safety of the individual that is, human security, has become a new measure of global security” (Bajpai, 2003, p. 205).

One notable distinction between Canada and Finland is that the former has been able to significantly improve its relationship with Indigenous communities by inviting them to participate in discussions that affect them and their security. This contrasts with Finland’s unwillingness to cooperate within its borders

and to prioritise Indigenous people, despite its position on two regional communities (Arctic Council and the EU). This continuity of a top-down plan that disregards local knowledge and fails to map and/or identify the gaps with the Saami Council makes it difficult to execute the Sámi population's human security in Finland as well as the principles outlined in official documents such as the UN Charter (1948), the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), and the EU Charter (2000). Note that *Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy* (Finnish Government, 2021) does not make any reference to the Sámi Arctic Strategy (Saami Council, 2019).

According to the Handbooks reports (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009, 2016), the human security approach combines top-down norms (including the establishment of the rule of law) with bottom-up democratic processes, which support the important role of individuals and communities as actors in “defining and implementing their essential freedoms” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009, p. 10; see also United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016, p. 10). An idea defended by the green political theories as mentioned in Section 1 of this article. In the case of Canada, it was clear that:

A secure and stable world order is built both from the top down, and from the bottom up. The security of states, and the maintenance of international peace and security, are ultimately constructed on the foundation of people who are secure. (United Nations, 1999, p. 3)

This bottom-up strategy involves numerous actors who can positively impact mitigation and adaptation (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009, p. 6), empowerment and protection (Commission on Human Security, 2003), and solidarity (United Nations Development Programme, 2022). The United Nations Development Programme's (2022) *Special Report on Human Security* strengthens the Stockholm Declaration's call for cooperation among various actors that depends on “the mutual trust between the two” (United Nations, 1972, p. 28). Mutual trust is necessary for the protection of Indigenous peoples and their environment. Inclusion takes place through dialogue and listening to the voices of Indigenous peoples (Kirchner et al., 2022). The changes brought on by climate change require both parties to acquire new knowledge. It can be concluded that Finland failed to implement protection and empowerment (Commission on Human Security, 2003; World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) and solidarity (United Nations Development Programme, 2022) in its Arctic Strategy, and, as a result, did not empower the Sámi people because it denied them the opportunity to express and present their needs and gaps, already identified in the Sámi Arctic Strategy (Saami Council, 2019). In some ways, it is disappointing to make those claims about Finland when it is the same country that promotes the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. This European Arctic nation has struggled along the way to address the two intertwined issues at the domestic level. Table 2 of the Supplementary File demonstrates that Canada has been successful in empowering the Indigenous Inuit people, by prioritising the duty to consult.

The only way vulnerability can be eliminated is through prevention. Indigenous peoples have always had the capacity and resilience to adapt to nature, so they do not view themselves as particularly vulnerable. It took some time to realise that Arctic Indigenous peoples were already in danger, what Hossain (2016, p. 7) refers to as an “ecocide of people who did not contribute to climate change.” If the litmus test for determining whether it is useful to frame an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk (United Nations, 1999), then it takes some time to understand the risk those communities were and are facing. Perchance, Finland's policies will change because everyone now has the right to a healthy environment (United Nations, 2022), allowing the Saami Council to properly represent the Sámi population in Arctic strategies and

define the strategies, measures, and goals necessary to keep them safe and secure. For Canada, it will be an additional tool for enhancing the previous work.

In addition to climate change, their relationship with Indigenous peoples, as relevant non-state actors, is a key factor in how they approach the same issues, acknowledging the additional diversity that the Inuit and Sámi people can bring into a society that values inclusivity. Through the holistic approach to human security, it must be taken into consideration what kind of influence states' policies and agendas can have in protecting Indigenous communities within their borders. Both countries can take the lead regionally and internationally by combining their efforts in climate and cultural diplomacy.

Hopefully, this article will inspire further analysis and research about the transnational Indigenous organisations' role as important and relevant non-state actors at the different levels of governance (international, regional, national and local, in democratic and autocratic countries).

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the author (unedited).

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