

The Impact of Socio-Political Cleavages on Constitutional Referendums: The Case of Chile 2022

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Abstract

A constitutional referendum was held in Chile in 2022. The competing options were to “approve” or “reject” the proposed new constitution written by a Constitutional Convention, as the “reject” option triumphed, the 1980 constitution remained in force. This study identifies the basis of support for the winning option. To do so, we draw on the theory of sociopolitical cleavages. Specifically, we measure the effect of the religious division in force since the mid-19th century, the urban social class division of the early 20th century, the urban/rural division of the mid-20th century, and the authoritarianism/democracy division resulting from the dictatorship of General Pinochet (1973–1990). Based on an analysis of electoral data in Chile’s 345 municipalities and a survey of 2,117 people taken before the referendum, we conclude the following: First, “reject” was the strongest among evangelical voters. Second, while “reject” performed better in the country’s poorest municipalities, in the Metropolitan Region, which accounts for 40% of the population, the result was the opposite. Third, “reject” performed better in municipalities with a higher percentage of rural population. Fourth, “reject” was the preferred option for voters who were more inclined toward authoritarian rule. Consequently, while constitutional referendums can be explained by support for incumbents—in this case, for the president of the republic, who supported the Convention’s constitutional proposal—this does not imply that sociopolitical cleavages are irrelevant. This study shows that even though a referendum may respond to short-term variables, such as low presidential approval, sociopolitical cleavages still robustly explain electoral outcomes.

Keywords

Chile; cleavages; constitution; political party system; referendum

1. Introduction

Typically, the outcomes of a constitutional referendum are examined through heuristic and systematic political reasoning approaches. The heuristic approach suggests that voters rely on “informational shortcuts” when faced with a decision that involves significant information costs, such as understanding the constitutional proposal (Borges & Clarke, 2008; Garry et al., 2005). For example, voting patterns may be influenced by the approval ratings of the president or prime minister or the prevailing economic conditions at the time of the referendum (Leininger, 2019). By contrast, the systematic political reasoning approach posits that voters are rational and willing to bear these information costs by voting in line with the contents of the constitutional proposal (De Angelis et al., 2020). Our research, however, takes a more comprehensive approach, delving into the socio-political cleavages that have persisted in Chile over the years and their impact on the electoral outcome of the 2022 constitutional referendum.

We analysed the case of Chile, a country that developed a constitutional process between 2020 and 2022 after extensive days of protests that began in October 2019. To escape the crisis, the political class opened a process of constitutional change, replacing the constitution inherited from the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). In 2020, the first referendum was held and 78% agreed to write a new constitution. In 2021, a Constitutional Convention was chosen and its function was to draft a new constitution. Finally, in 2022, a second referendum was held in which 62% rejected this constitutional proposal. How much did the historical socio-political cleavages affect Chileans’ voting intention, to what extent did religious identification, social class, area of residence (urban or rural), and attitudes towards the democratic regime explain the outcome of the constitutional referendum and to what extent did cleavage theory help to explain voters’ electoral preferences when, instead of candidates, programmatic options are confronted?

We relied on two sources to answer these questions: First, a database of the country’s 345 municipalities, including electoral information and socioeconomic and sociodemographic data. Among them are the percentage of the religious population, the percentage of people with low incomes, and the percentage of the rural population. Second, the results of an online survey applied to 2,117 people between 25 August and 3 September 2022 (the referendum was on 4 September 2022), conducted by the Millennium Nucleus Centre for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile. This article is divided into four sections: First, we describe the theory of sociopolitical cleavage and its application to Chile. Second, we present our hypotheses. Third, we analyse the data. Finally, we present our conclusions.

2. The Theory of Cleavages

The theory of socio-political cleavages assumes that societies face conflicts and that these conflicts are processed by voters around critical issues, such as the relationship between the Catholic Church and state, capital and labour, and town and country, to name a few. These conflicts explain the formation of political parties and the structure of party systems (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). In most Latin American countries, following Colomer and Escatel (2005), these cleavages are summarised along the left–right axis, which helps to understand the characteristics of party systems.

There is not much literature on sociopolitical cleavages and constitutional referendums. Of note, however, are the works by Baum and Freire (2001) on the regionalisation referendum in Portugal (1998) and Sinnott (2002)

on some referendums in Ireland. Meanwhile, in Latin America, referendums on constitutional change have been held by Peru (1993), Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009). In all cases, the process was driven by a political leader. Generally, their outcomes have been analysed regarding economic and institutional variables rather than sociopolitical cleavages (Altman, 2010; Durán-Martínez, 2012; Morales, 2021). However, there are some exceptions. Recently, in the case of Chile, Castillo et al. (2023) analysed the effect of religion on political preferences in the 2020 referendum. Alemán and Navia (2023) and González-Ocantos and Meléndez (2023) did so for the 2022 referendum. They concluded that socio-political cleavages had a limited impact on voting intention, with presidential approval being the most relevant variable. The work of Osorio-Rauld et al. (2024) and Pelfini and Osorio-Rauld (2024) on the conservative positions of the economic elite in the face of the 2022 constitutional referendum stands out, identifying the homogeneity of this elite as a political actor that broadly supports the “reject” option. Finally, Paredes et al. (2025) suggest that the failure of the constitutional process in Chile can be explained by the polarisation of elites in the Constitutional Convention, with the right obstructing the process and the left trying to impose its constitutional proposal.

2.1. The Theory of Cleavages in Chile

According to Dix (1989), Chile was an exception in Latin America in the 20th century because of its high levels of party institutionalisation and programmatic structuring of electoral preferences around societal cleavages. Scully (1992) explains this ordering based on three generative cleavages: the clerical/anticlerical axis of the mid-nineteenth century; the urban social class axis of the early nineteenth century; and the rural/urban axis of the mid-20th century. Each cleavage created a new party system generally distributed in thirds (Table 1).

However, this approach has generated debate. For some, although parties were ordered along the left–right axis, the same was not true for voters (Montes et al., 2000; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003), which explains the significant variations in electoral volatility between 1932 and 1973. The argument is that parties not only attracted voters partially through ideological-programmatic proposals but also through clientelistic strategies (A. Valenzuela, 1977). However, party competition was structured in three-thirds of the 20th century. In fact, after General Pinochet (1973–1990), the party system was relaunched with more continuity than change (Huneus, 2001; J. S. Valenzuela & Scully, 1997).

Does this mean General Pinochet’s dictatorship does not affect the party system? According to Torcal and Mainwaring (2003), the Pinochet dictatorship became the fourth societal cleavage in Chilean history—i.e., authoritarianism/democracy. Unlike previous cleavages generated by social conflicts, the political party elite promoted authoritarianism-democracy cleavage without cancelling the effect of historical socio-structural cleavages (Bargsted & Somma, 2016). J. S. Valenzuela et al. (2007) and Raymond and Barros (2012), for example, show the validity of religious cleavages in characterising the bases of support for Chile’s two main political coalitions.

Consequently, as shown in Table 1, historical cleavages gave rise to different party systems that remained in force for several decades. Meanwhile, the authoritarianism/democracy political cleavage ordered—and continues to order—the Chilean electoral competition at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

Table 1. Cleavages and party systems in Chile.

	Origin	The party system is arranged on a left-right ideological axis
<i>Socio-cultural cleavage</i>		
Religious	Mid-19th century	PR, PL, PCo
<i>Socio-structural cleavages</i>		
Urban social classes	Early 20th century	PC, PS, PR, PL, PCo
Urban/rural	Mid-20th century	PC, PS, PR, PDC, PL, PCo
<i>Political cleavage</i>		
Authoritarianism/democracy	Late 20th century	PC, PS, PR, PPD, PDC, RN, UDI

Notes: PR = Radical Party; PL = Liberal Party; PCo = Conservative Party; PC = Communist Party; PS = Socialist Party; PDC = Christian Democratic Party; PPD = Party for Democracy; RN = National Renewal; UDI = Independent Democratic Union.

2.2. The Constitutional Process

In October 2019, a violent and widespread “social explosion” occurred in Chile, triggered by an increase in the price of public transport (Morales, 2020). Social protests continued for several months. Citizens’ unrest was mainly due to the inequalities created by the development model. One of the central criticisms was of the pension system—unlike the current “individually funded” one, it was being demanded a fairer and more solidarity-based pension system. There was also criticism regarding the political class and business people, given successive cases of public and private corruption. Greater state intervention was demanded in matters related to pensions and the provision of basic goods and services. Consequently, what began as a protest against the increase in the price of public transport, quickly became a redistributive movement against the neoliberal model (Garretón & Morales-Olivares, 2023; Morales, 2020; Somma et al., 2020). This social mobilisation was preceded by protests by high school students in 2006 and university students in 2011, demanding free and quality education. For some authors, the situation in Chile before the “social explosion” was characterised by a high level of discontent with democracy (Cantillana et al., 2017; Huneus, 2003; Joignant et al., 2017). This malaise was characterised by distrust in the representative institutions of democracy, dissatisfaction with politics, and disapproval of the governments in power. Therefore, the October 2019 protests should be interpreted in the context of the intense questioning of the functioning of democracy, including public and private actors.

Faced with the country’s social and political instability, the parties initiated a process to change the 1980 constitution. The process was designed in four stages (Figure 1). First, an “entrance” referendum. In this referendum, citizens were asked whether they wanted a new constitution or not. The options were “approve” and “reject,” with the former winning 78.3%. In the same referendum, but on a second ballot, it was questioned what would be the body in charge of writing the new constitution. The alternatives were two: “Constitutional Convention”—made up of 155 representatives directly elected by the citizens—and “Mixed Constitutional Convention,” made up of 172 representatives (half would be elected directly by the citizens and the Congress would choose the other 86). The first option—Constitutional Convention—won by 79.2%. As with all elections since 2021, a system of automatic enrolment in electoral registers and voluntary voting was implemented.

The second stage was the election of representatives to the Constitutional Convention. Through an electoral proportional representation system, 155 people were elected in districts distributed between three and eight seats. These results were favourable for left-wing parties and movements (Tagle et al., 2023). Of the 155 seats, the right won only 37, representing 23.8% (Belmar et al., 2023). As decisions in the Constitutional Convention were made with an agreement of two-thirds, the right was left without veto power.

The third stage was the drafting of the new constitution, which was a year-long process. The central axes of the constitutional proposal were as follows: The first was plurinationality, which implied recognising the 11 original peoples of Chile, including autonomous territories for these peoples and justice systems according to their traditions and customs; the second was the elimination of the Senate of the Republic, which would be replaced by the Chamber of the Regions, but political power would be more concentrated in the Chamber of Deputies, establishing asymmetrical bicameralism; the third was the regional state, which implied greater autonomy for the regions and communes, which could then create public enterprises; the fourth was the voluntary interruption of pregnancy (abortion); the fifth was the expansion of social rights, which would extend to health, education, pensions, and housing; and the sixth is gender parity in the composition of all bodies of democratic representation.

The fourth stage was the ratification referendum. Chileans were asked whether they approved or rejected the Convention's constitutional proposal. Unlike the 2020 referendum, a system of automatic registration was implemented in the 2022 referendum, but with compulsory voting. As a result, voter turnout reached almost 86%, far higher than the 51% recorded in the 2020 referendum. In terms of results, in the 2020 referendum, as we said, more than 78% voted to "approve," which meant continuing to draft a new constitution by electing a representative body. In the 2022 referendum, which aimed to ratify the proposed new Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention, the "reject" option reached almost 62% of the vote. Moreover, almost 5.5 million more people voted in this referendum than in the 2020 one (See Contreras & Morales, 2024). Therefore, an increased turnout may have had an impact on the outcome. Indeed, when analysing data from 345 municipalities in Chile, the correlation between support for the "reject" option and the percentage change in turnout between 2020 and 2022 yields a correlation coefficient of 0.64 ($p < 0.01$).




Figure 1. Milestones of the Chilean constitutional process, 2019–2022.

2.3. The Election Campaign

The “approve” and “reject” election campaigns reflected high levels of political polarisation in the country. The dispute was not only over the contents of the constitutional proposal but also over the performance of the Constitutional Convention, including a series of scandals that were widely covered by the press. For example, some members of the Convention arrived at the working sessions in all sorts of disguises, undermining the seriousness of the process, and one of the members of the Convention admitted that he

had lied about having cancer, even though his electoral campaign had revolved around this health problem. According to the CADEM (2022) survey, in January of that year, the Constitutional Convention had almost 60% of citizens' confidence, while in April, it had only 44%, and in May, it was only 40%. Therefore, the performance of the Constitutional Convention may have impacted voters' choices, especially among new voters who were added to the electorate as a result of the reinstatement of compulsory voting.

Polarisation was also reflected in the composition of the coalitions backing "approve" and "reject." On the "approve" side were the left-wing parties that were part of President Gabriel Boric's government. Meanwhile, right-wing parties supported "reject." In the case of the Christian Democracy, a centrist party that was not part of the ruling coalition, it supported "approve," but some of its leaders supported "reject," which led to a major crisis that ended with the expulsion of some militants. In general, the "approve" campaign focused on the advantages of the constitutional proposal, especially in terms of economic equality, recognition of indigenous peoples, and plurinationality. Among other things, the campaign underlined that the constitutional proposal addressed the historic demands of Chileans expressed in the social outburst of 2019. Specifically, a new national health system with strong state participation, the regulation of water rights, especially in agricultural areas, and greater autonomy for municipalities and regions. The "reject" campaign, meanwhile, criticised the constitutional proposal for its "refoundational" spirit. The main objections were related to the new political system, among other things, the elimination of the senate. In addition, more conservative leaders expressed their disagreement with an article of the constitutional proposal that regulated the voluntary interruption of pregnancy (abortion). Finally, they opposed changes to the pension system. Chile has a system of individual capitalisation, in which workers own pension funds. The constitutional proposal moved towards a more solidarity-based pension system, which was interpreted by the opposition as an attempt to nationalise pension funds, taking them away from the workers.

In this programmatic discussion, it is possible to identify the validity of societal cleavages. First, a religious cleavage emerged along with a discussion on abortion (Morales, 2024). Both Catholic and Evangelical organisations quickly expressed their opposition to this proposal (Mayorga & Carvajal, 2022). The Episcopal Conference pointed out that this article of the Constitution was an "attack on human dignity," and that it placed an "insurmountable obstacle for many citizens to give their approval to the constitutional text that is being drafted" (Román, 2022). As Tec-López (2022) argues, in the case of evangelicals, and despite their heterogeneity, there seems to be a greater consensus than Catholics regarding the rejection of abortion and other legislation linked to equal marriage and gender identity. For this reason, as Morales and Pérez (2024) point out, it is understandable that in 2021, Evangelicals supported José Antonio Kast's presidential candidacy, a radical right-wing leader who defended a conservative agenda on issues related to the right to life, equal marriage, and sexual diversity, among others. In Chile, the link between evangelicals and right-wing parties dates back to the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). As Boas (2016) argued, in 1975, Pinochet was backed by the Council of Pastors, which brought together leaders from different evangelical churches: "Starting that year, the Council sponsored an annual inter-denominational service, the Evangelical Te Deum, which was regularly attended by Pinochet and other government officials" (Boas, 2016, p. 199).

The second part of the discussion revolved around social rights. The constitutional proposal included the rights to health, education, housing, and social security. The latter generated the most controversy. Chile has an individually funded pension system in which the worker owns pension funds. The constitutional proposal

stated that social security policy is defined by the state based on contributions from workers and employers. Therefore, the discussion was whether the money collected by each worker for their future pension would remain their property or whether it would be part of a large fund managed by the state. In this context, a movement called “Not with my money” emerged, which emphasised the danger of nationalisation of workers’ pension funds. This movement also warned that the poorest workers who had contributed regularly to a private institution (Association of Pension Funds) would be the most affected, because if these workers’ resources went to a “solidarity fund,” they would be used to finance those who had not contributed regularly. Therefore, this movement argued that there would be a big problem, as it would increase the incentive to not contribute, given the existence of a solidarity pension fund. This discussion partially activated a social class cleavage, especially because there was tension between granting more and better social rights to citizens while tolerating a stronger state that would be under more pressure to collect resources to finance these social rights.

The third discussion, which could activate other cleavages, following González-Ocantos and Meléndez (2023) and Morales (2024), corresponded to plurinationality. This implied not only constitutionally recognising all the country’s native peoples but also giving them territories and moving towards political autonomy. The discussion revolved around whether Chile would remain one state and one nation or whether it would become a state with several nations. In addition, these native peoples would have certain advantages in the acquisition of water rights, a basic commodity, especially in the context of drought and climate crises. All of this may have influenced the greater support for the “reject” campaign, especially in rural areas, for two reasons: First, there is a greater attachment to the more traditional patriotic values of national unity (Collier & Sater, 1996), which is in line with more significant support for right-wing parties (Herrera et al., 2019; Scully, 1992). Second, rural voters could perceive certain disadvantages concerning indigenous peoples in the acquisition of water rights, which is a fundamental element of farming. On Friday, 19 August 2022, several peasant organisations called for a march to protest the contents of the new Constitution (Cooperativa, 2022). According to some authors, plurinationality was the content most rejected by Chileans, which distanced the constitutional proposal from the median voter (Bargsted & González, 2022), bringing it closer to more conservative voters (Disi, 2023).

Finally, the authoritarianism/democracy cleavage was activated. The reason for this is simple: The constitutional referendum of 2022 was about repealing the 1980 constitution, written under the dictatorship of General Pinochet, and enacting a new one. Although in the 2020 referendum, the “reject” supporters reached only 22%, the scandals of the Constitutional Convention and the criticisms concerning the contents of the proposal attracted more moderate voters. This does not imply that “reject” voters in 2022 were in favour of the Pinochet regime. What we are saying is that the authoritarianism/democracy divide re-emerged in the constitutional debate, with some voters openly defending the 1980 constitution.

3. Hypotheses

We propose four hypotheses to measure the impact of socio-political divisions on the outcome of the 2022 constitutional referendum in Chile. The first hypothesis concerns the effects of religion on voting intention. The constitutional proposal included an article on voluntary termination of pregnancy (abortion). Therefore, we expect more significant support for “reject” from religious voters, especially evangelicals. According to Scully (1992), the religious divide in Chile originated in the political dispute between liberals and

conservatives in the mid-19th century. Part of this dispute was resolved with the 1925 constitution, which separated the church and state. However, the religious cleavage remained in force at the party and voter levels in the 20th and 21st centuries (Bargsted & De la Cerda, 2019; J. S. Valenzuela et al., 2007). Moreover, although intermittent, religious identification explained voting intentions in presidential elections between 1999 and 2017 (Raymond, 2021) with a much stronger effect in the 2021 presidential election. As Morales and Pérez (2024) show, evangelicals strongly supported the candidacy of the radical right in those elections and, in the 2022 constitutional referendum, according to recent research, evangelicals more strongly supported the “reject” option (Morales, 2024).

Accordingly, we have drafted one hypothesis for the aggregated data at the municipal level (Hypothesis 1A) and another hypothesis for the individual data based on the opinion survey (Hypothesis 1B). The first hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1A: The higher the percentage of people who identify with a religion—especially evangelicals—the greater the support for “reject.”

Hypothesis 1B: Religious voters—especially evangelicals—were more supportive of “reject” than non-religious or other religious voters.

Our second hypothesis is related to social class cleavage. With the emergence of left-wing parties in the early 20th century and the rise of the working class, the Chilean political party system was reorganised around a new axis. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party sought to represent workers, while the right-wing parties continued to represent higher-income classes, especially oligarchy (Scully, 1992; S. Valenzuela, 1995). This created a new party system structured along a left–right axis that dominated the electoral competition until the 1973 coup d’état (López, 2004). With the advent of democracy following the dictatorship of General Pinochet (1973–1990), and as Huneus (2001) shows, the poor and popular sectors changed their electoral behaviour, especially at the end of the 1990s. This occurred because of the consolidation of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), a right-wing party officially founded in 1983 but forged amid General Pinochet’s dictatorship (Klein, 2004). The popular sectors were no longer captive segments for left-wing parties, as the UDI began to gain support, so much so that it came close to winning the 1999 presidential election. Historically, as a conservative party with close ties to Opus Dei (Huneus, 2000; Morales & Bugueño, 2001), the UDI has been the strongest right-wing party since its return to democracy in 1990. However, it suffered an electoral setback in the last elections because of the emergence of a radical right-wing party, the Republican Party. Given that the popular segments have gradually been won over by right-wing parties that were in favour of the “reject” option, we expect that the poorest municipalities and the poorest people will have been overwhelmingly in favour of this option. As with Hypothesis 1, we present one hypothesis for aggregated data at the municipal level (Hypothesis 2A) and another for individual data with opinion survey information (Hypothesis 2B):

Hypothesis 2A: The higher the percentage of poor people per commune, the greater the support for “reject.”

Hypothesis 2B: Poorer voters were more supportive of “reject” than the rest.

Our third hypothesis concerns the urban/rural divide. According to Scully (1992), this cleavage emerged in the mid-20th century because peasants struggled with better living conditions. In 1957, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was formed, in part, to represent the rural areas of the country, which until then had been a captive electorate for right-wing parties mainly because of their links to the landowning elite (Loveman, 1976). The PDC won the 1964 presidential election and, during the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva, implemented agrarian reform and opened the way to peasant unionisation, which severely strained its relationship with right-wing parties (Fleet, 1985). As Herrera et al. (2019) show, since 1990, the PDC has maintained its roots in rural areas but is in constant competition with right-wing parties. Thus, in the 2021 presidential elections, rurality strongly predicted support for radical right candidates (Morales & Pérez, 2024). This occurred one year before the 2022 constitutional referendum; therefore, we expect rurality in predicting the ‘reject’ option. In this case, given that we only have aggregate data at the communal level, our hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 3: The higher the percentage of rural population per commune, the greater the support for “reject.”

Our fourth hypothesis concerns the authoritarian/democratic divide that emerged from General Pinochet’s violent dictatorship (1973–1990). The centre-left parties fought fiercely against the authoritarian regime, while the right-wing parties were part of a civilian coalition that supported Pinochet (Huneus, 2001). This axis of competition has defined Chilean politics since 1990 (Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003), albeit in the company of other historical cleavages that explain the configuration of different party systems (S. Valenzuela, 1995). A key milestone was the 1980 constitution, written under dictatorship, but successively reformed under democracy. This was the central point of discussion in the 2020 referendum, in which citizens were asked whether they wanted to continue with the current constitution or change it accordingly. While the right-wing parties were in favour of the 2020 referendum, they were not in favour of the 2022 referendum. There were calls to dismantle the “Pinochet Constitution” from the left, intensifying the conflict between authoritarianism and democracy. For these reasons, we expect that voters who are more likely to support authoritarian rule are more likely to support rejection. Our hypothesis, for which we only have individual data from the opinion poll, is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Voters more likely to support authoritarian rule were more likely to support “reject.”

Table 2 presents the hypotheses, including the cleavages and units of analysis, which consist of two elements: First, electoral data at the municipal level; and second, opinion poll data. Religious cleavage and social class cleavage can be analysed using both sources of information. We propose a hypothesis for each cleavage and the respective unit of analysis. The urban/rural cleavage, however, cannot be analysed using opinion surveys, as they only include the urban population. Therefore, we resorted to municipal data. In the case of the authoritarianism/democracy cleavage, we only have data from the opinion poll. We are aware of the limitations of municipal electoral analysis, mainly because they are not homogeneous geographical units, which could lead to problems of “ecological fallacy” in interpreting the data. However, this municipality analysis is essentially a measure of the robustness of the conclusions drawn from the individual analysis of public opinion data. The only cleavage that we analysed exclusively with municipal data was urban/rural cleavage. In this case, as observed in an important part of the Chilean electoral literature (Altman, 2004; López, 2004; Morales & Belmar, 2022), rural municipalities tend to be more homogeneous than urban ones, mainly because they are

territorial units with a small number of inhabitants compared to the national average. Incidentally, this reduces problems of ecological fallacy and makes statistical inferences more reliable.

Table 2. Units of analysis and hypotheses.

Unit of analysis and measurement		Hypothesis		
Socio-structural cleavages				
	Municipality	Individual	Municipality	Individual
Religion	Percentage of people identifying with a religion	Religious identification	Hypothesis 1A: The higher the percentage of people who identify with a religion—especially evangelicals—the greater the support for “reject”	Hypothesis 1 B: Religious voters—especially evangelicals—were more supportive of “reject” than non-religious or other religious voters
Social class	Percentage of poor	Social class identification	Hypothesis 2A: The higher the percentage of poor people per commune, the greater the support for “reject”	Hypothesis 2B: Poorer voters were more supportive of “reject” than the rest
Rurality	Percentage of rural population		Hypothesis 3: The higher the percentage of rural population per commune, the greater the support for “reject”	
Political cleavage				
Democracy		Preference for democratic rule		Hypothesis 4: Voters more likely to support authoritarian rule were more likely to support “reject”

4. Data and Method

We constructed a series of multivariate linear least squares (OLS) regression models to test the hypotheses using official electoral data at the municipality level. In this case, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes for the “reject” option. We used multinomial logit (*mlogit*) models to test the hypotheses using opinion polling data. The dependent variable, in this case, is voting intention.

Table 3 shows the correlation matrix with municipal data between our dependent variable—the percentage of “reject” votes—and the independent variables. In the case of religion, we split it into three indicators: percentage of Catholics (70.8%), percentage of Evangelicals (14.9%), and percentage of inhabitants with no religion (8.9%). “Reject” vote share correlated significantly with all the independent variables, showing a positive relationship with the percentage of the evangelical population, the percentage of poor (*mean* = 10.8%) and the percentage of the rural population (*mean* = 11.9%).

Table 3. Correlation matrix.

Variables	Reject (%)	Catholics (%)	Evangelicals (%)	No Religion (%)	Poverty (%)	Rurality (%)
Reject (%)	1.000					
Catholics (%)	-0.186*** (0.001)	1.000				
Evangelicals (%)	0.421*** (0.000)	-0.929*** (0.000)	1.000			
No Religion (%)	-0.393*** (0.000)	-0.640*** (0.000)	0.321*** (0.000)	1.000		
Poverty (%)	0.499*** (0.000)	-0.316*** (0.000)	0.488*** (0.000)	-0.247*** (0.000)	1.000	
Rurality (%)	0.452*** (0.000)	0.188*** (0.000)	0.008 (0.876)	-0.486*** (0.000)	0.335*** (0.000)	1.000

Note: * Shows significance at $p < 0.001$. Source: Authors' elaboration with data from the Chilean Electoral System (SERVEL, 2024) and National Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey (CASEN, 2024).

We built an OLS regression model to test the hypotheses. The specifications are as follows:

$$R(\text{Reject})_j = \alpha + \beta_{1j}(\text{religion}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{poverty}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{rurality}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{MR}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{MR} \times \text{poverty}) + \varepsilon_j$$

Where R represents the percentage of votes for the “reject” option; *religion* is the percentage of Catholics, Evangelicals, or people with no religion—used interchangeably in the respective model; *poverty* indicates the percentage of the population living in poverty; *rurality* refers to the percentage of the rural population; and MR is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the commune is MR and 0 otherwise. $MR \times \text{poverty}$ is an interaction term. We have included this interaction term for three reasons: first, MR is a remarkably diverse region and its composition is based on income levels and inequality (Corvalán & Cox, 2013); second, it accumulates close to 40% of the electoral rolls; third, left-wing candidates obtained better results in the constitutional convention and 2021 presidential elections in the first and second rounds, respectively.

The results are presented in Table 4. First, we note that the higher the percentage of Catholics per commune, *ceteris paribus*, the lower the percentage of rejection votes. Something similar happens with the variable *no religion* but with a more robust coefficient. In contrast, in the case of the percentage of Evangelicals, the coefficient is positive. That is to say that—*ceteris paribus*—an increase in the percentage of evangelicals was associated with an increase in the “reject” vote. However, both poverty and rurality showed positive signs. That is, “reject” performed better electorally in poor communes with a high concentration of the rural population.

Regarding the interaction term, the results are in line with expectations. As we have said, in MR , since at least 2020, the left has had better electoral results. The models indicate that while, on average, “reject” performed better in the MR , its support decreased in the poorest municipalities. To demonstrate this result more clearly, we constructed a graph of the predicted “reject” values based on Model 4 (Figure 2). In addition, we have constructed two appendices to show the results of the previous referendum. That is, the 2020 referendum was organised under the system of automatic registration for voters aged 18 and over and voluntary voting. Appendix 1 in the Supplementary File shows the referendum results, indicating the number of votes for each option, and the voter turnout. In a universe of almost 15 million voters, voter turnout was just under 50%. Meanwhile, in Appendix 2 of the Supplementary File, we replicate the same multiple linear regression model

Table 4. OLS models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Catholics (%), H1A	−0.172*** (0.0400)			−0.160*** (0.0382)		
Evangelicals (%), H1A		0.323*** (0.0472)			0.311*** (0.0449)	
No Religion, H1A			−0.312* (0.173)			−0.358** (0.164)
Poverty (%), H2A	0.505*** (0.111)	0.327*** (0.112)	0.712*** (0.103)	0.691*** (0.111)	0.510*** (0.111)	0.892*** (0.102)
Rurality (%), H3	0.102*** (0.0154)	0.100*** (0.0144)	0.0714*** (0.0163)	0.0969*** (0.0147)	0.0961*** (0.0137)	0.0660*** (0.0155)
MR	−7.979*** (1.194)	−7.307*** (1.137)	−6.342*** (1.298)	11.77*** (3.519)	12.16*** (3.366)	14.55*** (3.620)
MR*Poverty				−2.005*** (0.338)	−1.980*** (0.324)	−2.113*** (0.344)
Constant	71.30*** (3.710)	55.79*** (1.359)	58.83*** (1.925)	68.10*** (3.578)	53.66*** (1.338)	56.86*** (1.856)
Observations	345	345	345	345	345	345
R-squared	0.433	0.474	0.408	0.486	0.526	0.467
Log Lik	−1,164	−1,151	−1,172	−1,147	−1,133	−1,154

Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of “reject” votes; standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Chilean Electoral System (SERVEL, 2024) and National Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey (CASEN, 2024)

of Table 4. We find that socio-political cleavages influenced the outcome of the 2020 referendum, albeit with less intensity compared to the 2022 referendum. Additionally, the percentage of evangelicals had a positive effect on the “reject” option, as did the percentage of the rural population. Meanwhile, poverty had an inverse effect in 2020 compared to 2022. All of this demonstrates two things: First, Chile’s historical socio-political cleavages continue to contribute to explaining electoral outcomes; and second, while some variables maintain some continuity in their effects, others significantly change their impact on electoral outcomes. Finally, we have constructed a third Appendix (see Supplementary File), which aims to show the effect of socio-political cleavages on the percentage of votes received by the two most popular presidential candidates in the first round of 2021. The results go in the same direction and illustrate how socio-political cleavages are important predictors of electoral outcomes.

We conclude that: First, socio-structural cleavages explain the outcomes of the 2022 constitutional referendum; second, “reject” obtained better results in municipalities with more evangelicals, supporting Hypothesis 1. This is not surprising if we analyse the contents of the constitutional proposal, which included an article on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy. Although, as Castillo et al. (2023) point out, there is a minority group of progressive evangelicals, in general, evangelicals are opposed to abortions. The opposite was true for municipalities with more non-religious inhabitants, who are often more liberal on such issues. In the case of municipalities with a higher percentage of Catholics, meanwhile, “reject” obtained less support, although with a weaker regression coefficient than the other two groups. Religious cleavage, then, not only




Figure 2. Predicted values of “reject” as a function of the percentage of poor people and the geographical area of the municipality (MR/Rest of Chile). Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Chilean Electoral System (SERVEL, 2024) and National Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey (CASEN, 2024).

explains the outcome of the referendum but also helps to understand in more detail the specific impact of certain religions, especially Evangelicals.

Concerning social class cleavage, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. “Reject” gained more support in the poorest municipalities, but in the MR, the opposite was true. The three highest-income municipalities in the country are located in this region. There, “reject” obtained an average vote of over 80%, while in the poorest municipalities of the MR, “approve” outperformed “Reject” by a narrow margin. Gabriel Boric extended his lead over José Antonio Kast in the 2021 presidential run-off in these municipalities. Moreover, in these municipalities, left-wing parties and movements achieved their best electoral results in the election of the Constituent Convention members (Belmar et al., 2023).

Finally, the data confirm Hypothesis 3 regarding the urban/rural cleavage. There is abundant evidence that in rural communes, conservative votes are inclined towards Christian Democracy and right-wing parties (Herrera et al., 2019). Given that the constitutional proposal implied a drastic change in the rules of the democratic game, this conservative vote probably did not feel represented. Furthermore, the constitutional proposal implied the cession of autonomous territories to the indigenous peoples. Most of the indigenous people live in rural areas. Therefore, voters in these municipalities may have seen the constitutional proposal as a threat to their private property and interests.

What do the results of opinion polls tell us? Table 5 presents the results of this study. “Reject” obtained 41.47%, the “approve” option 31.32%, while 27.21% opted for *do not vote, no answer, or do not know/no answer* options. When discounting the latter option and recalculating the percentages of each alternative, “reject” reached 57% and “approve” 43%, similar to the referendum result.

Table 5. Voting intention for the constitutional referendum.

	Cases	%	% (Without NV/NADA/DK)	Referendum results
Approve	663	31.32	43.0	38.11
Reject	878	41.47	57.0	61.89
NV/NA/DK	576	27.21		
Total	2,117	100	100	100

Notes: The question is: “In the election on 4 September, will you vote to Approve or Reject the Constitutional Convention’s proposal for a new constitution?”; NV = No vote; NA = No answer; DK = Do not know. Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the survey carried out by the Millennium Nucleus for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile (MEPOP), which is not yet publicly available.

Figure 3 shows voting intentions according to religion, socioeconomic status (SES), and democratic support. Regarding religion, evangelicals, representing 10.9%, voted “reject” by 58.9% and “approve” by 13%. Among voters with no religion, who represent 31.4%, “I approve” outnumbered “I reject” by almost 8 points (38.2% versus 30.4%), a gap that increased very significantly among agnostics, who represent 8.6% of the sample. Among Catholics representing 39.6%, “reject” was the majority choice with 49.3%, while “approve” only




Figure 3. Voting intention by (a) religion, (b) SES, and (c) democracy support. Notes: For religion, the question is: Which religion or religious group do you feel closest or most identified with? For democracy, the question asked is: In your opinion, (a) democracy is preferable to any other form of government, (b) in some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one, (c) for people like you, a democratic regime is the same as a non-democratic one; the chi-square tests were significant for all three variables.

garnered 26.3%. These results are in line with Hypothesis 1. Indeed, Evangelicals rejected the constitutional proposal more broadly.

Regarding social class cleavage, the results at the individual level contradict those at the municipal level. Voters were classified into seven groups ordered from highest to lowest income: AB (richer people, 1.3%), C1a (wealthy people, 6.9%), C1b (people with medium/high incomes, 5.6%), C2 (people with medium incomes, 13.7%), C3 (people with medium/low incomes, 24.1%), D (poor people, 35.0%), E (poorer people, 13.4%). “Reject” prevailed in all groups except the lowest income group, where the NV/NA/DK options predominated at 42.6%. Therefore, caution must be exercised when interpreting the results. Higher-income groups had stronger preferences than lower-income groups, which could partially distort the overall interpretation of the data.

Finally, we present voting intentions according to adherence to democracy as a form of government. Voters with the highest adherence to democracy (66.%) preferred “approve” over “reject,” but the distance was only five points. In the group of voters who preferred an authoritarian regime (20.1%), “reject” reached 61.7%, while “approve” achieved 10.6%. In the group of voters “indifferent” (13.9%) to the political regime, the majority favoured the NV/NA/DK options, with 47.8%. Therefore, given that the new constitution was supposed to repeal the 1980 constitution, it is unsurprising that people prone to an authoritarian regime supported “reject” to a greater extent. This result supports Hypothesis 4 regarding the prevalence of the authoritarianism-democracy cleavage.

We built three multinomial logistic regression models to test the hypotheses. The dependent variable was *voting intention*: “I approve,” “I reject,” and “NA/NV/DK.” The independent variables were divided into three groups. First, the control variables were *gender*, *age*, and *area of residence (MR vs. the rest of Chile)*. Second, variables linked to sociopolitical cleavages are *religion*, *SES*, and *adherence to democracy*. Third, the political variables were self-placement on the left–right ideological axis and presidential approval. Additionally, we constructed an interaction term between *MR* and *SES* to be congruent with the municipal-level data analysis. The following equations summarise the characteristics of the model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Logit}(p_{\text{reject}}) : \\ &= \ln \left(\frac{p(\text{referendum} = \text{Reject})}{p(\text{referendum} = \text{Approve})} \right) \\ &= b_1 + b_2 \text{ gender} + b_3 \text{ age} + b_4 \text{ religion} + b_5 \text{ ses} + b_6 \text{ democracy} + b_7 \text{ MR} + b_8 \text{ ideology} + b_9 \text{ popularity} + b_{10} \text{ MR} \times \text{ses} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Logit}(p_{\text{NVNADK}}) : \\ &= \ln \left(\frac{p(\text{referendum} = \text{NVNADK})}{p(\text{referendum} = \text{Approve})} \right) \\ &= b_{11} + b_{12} \text{ gender} + b_{13} \text{ age} + b_{14} \text{ religion} + b_{15} \text{ ses} + b_{16} \text{ democracy} + b_{17} \text{ MR} + b_{18} \text{ ideology} + b_{19} \text{ popularity} \\ &\quad + b_{20} \text{ MR} \times \text{ses} \end{aligned}$$

Table 6 presents the results. Concerning the first hypothesis and in line with the analysis of municipal data, Evangelicals differ significantly from Catholics, registering more significant support for the “reject” option and the “NA/NV/DK” options, with the opposite happening in the group of agnostics. This evidence confirms the validity of religious cleavage. Literature that analyses the effect of religion on political preferences in Chile tends to compare religious and non-religious voters without going much deeper into the specific religion

they profess. More recently, Castillo et al. (2023) refined the contemporary effect of religious cleavage by emphasising the particular characteristics of evangelicals.

The second hypothesis is related to class cleavage. These results indicate that SES has a partially significant effect on voting intention. Only in model 1 are some differences in segments C3, D and E, suggesting that these groups were less likely to vote “reject.” However, these differences disappeared when more variables were included in subsequent models. The coefficient of the interaction variable between *MR* and SES (Model 3) was also non-significant. These results present a challenge, as there is a contradiction between the municipal and individual data. This could be due to the high number of respondents who ticked the “NA/NV/DK” options, which makes a robust comparison between the two referendum options “approve” and “reject” difficult. We presume that many respondents who opted for the “NA/NV/DK” option ultimately voted “reject.” This is because “not voting” implies that economic sanctions and invalid votes barely reached 2.1%.

The third hypothesis concerns authoritarianism/democracy cleavage. The results indicate that “democratic” voters were less willing to vote “reject” compared to the “indifferent” group, which is the reference category. Meanwhile, authoritarian voters do not differ significantly from “indifferent” voters except in the first model, where they are more likely to vote “reject.” These results were consistent with those of the descriptive analysis. Moreover, the effect of this cleavage holds, even in models that theoretically add robust political variables, such as the ideological axis and presidential approval. Indeed, left-wing voters were less likely to vote “reject” than right-wing voters. As for presidential approval, those who supported Boric were less likely to vote “reject.”

Table 6. Multinomial logit.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Reject	NA/NV/DK	Reject	NA/NV/DK	Reject	NA/NV/DK
Women	-0.275** (0.114)	0.269** (0.125)	-0.220 (0.167)	0.249 (0.165)	-0.296* (0.174)	0.176 (0.171)
Age	0.00130 (0.00405)	-0.00977** (0.00446)	0.0127** (0.00611)	0.00128 (0.00597)	0.0135** (0.00613)	0.00211 (0.00599)
<i>Religion (H1B) R.C. = Catholics</i>						
Evangelicals	1.002*** (0.226)	0.826*** (0.249)	0.814** (0.324)	0.664** (0.326)	0.811** (0.324)	0.661** (0.326)
Others	-0.0908 (0.214)	0.432* (0.222)	0.0480 (0.304)	0.520* (0.292)	0.0306 (0.303)	0.503* (0.291)
Agnostics	-1.556*** (0.208)	-1.415*** (0.262)	-1.132*** (0.314)	-0.945*** (0.323)	-1.127*** (0.314)	-0.938*** (0.324)
No religion	-0.876*** (0.134)	-0.223 (0.143)	-0.550*** (0.195)	-0.107 (0.189)	-0.542*** (0.195)	-0.100 (0.189)
<i>SES (H2B) R.C. = AB</i>						
C1a	-0.443 (0.502)	-0.0894 (0.743)	-0.119 (1.023)	0.113 (1.102)	-0.000344 (1.058)	0.199 (1.141)
C1b	-0.444 (0.511)	-0.121 (0.757)	-0.356 (1.038)	-0.0294 (1.120)	-0.00719 (1.092)	0.290 (1.177)
C2	-0.591 (0.485)	-0.0153 (0.717)	-0.450 (1.001)	-0.128 (1.078)	-0.0727 (1.060)	0.220 (1.140)

Table 6. (Cont.) Multinomial logit.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Reject	NA/NV/DK	Reject	NA/NV/DK	Reject	NA/NV/DK
C3	-0.799* (0.477)	0.241 (0.705)	-0.882 (0.989)	-0.120 (1.066)	-0.428 (1.060)	0.306 (1.140)
D	-0.805* (0.476)	0.406 (0.703)	-0.837 (0.987)	-0.0787 (1.063)	-0.285 (1.076)	0.442 (1.155)
E	-1.008** (0.499)	0.679 (0.715)	-1.161 (1.005)	0.0159 (1.077)	-0.521 (1.110)	0.621 (1.185)
<i>Democracy (H4) R.C. = Indifferent</i>						
Democratic	-1.170*** (0.198)	-1.609*** (0.194)	-0.642** (0.257)	-0.930*** (0.244)	-0.660** (0.258)	-0.948*** (0.245)
Authoritarian	0.786*** (0.248)	-0.146 (0.252)	0.409 (0.322)	-0.124 (0.313)	0.393 (0.323)	-0.139 (0.314)
MR	-0.345*** (0.114)	-0.0768 (0.124)	-0.258 (0.167)	0.00700 (0.163)	0.818 (0.689)	1.046 (0.699)
Presidential approval			-4.416*** (0.306)	-2.908*** (0.202)	-4.423*** (0.306)	-2.915*** (0.202)
Left			-1.577*** (0.247)	-2.085*** (0.227)	-1.567*** (0.247)	-2.077*** (0.227)
Centre			-0.0768 (0.216)	-0.885*** (0.206)	-0.0718 (0.216)	-0.880*** (0.206)
Right			2.227*** (0.336)	0.256 (0.340)	2.245*** (0.337)	0.274 (0.341)
SES*MR					-0.205 (0.128)	-0.197 (0.128)
Constant	2.593*** (0.589)	0.889 (0.793)	2.629** (1.123)	2.070* (1.184)	2.240* (1.175)	1.701 (1.242)
Observations	2,117	2,117	2,117	2,117	2,117	2,117
Pseudo-R:	0.114	0.114	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388
Log-Likelihood:	-2,030	-2,030	-1,404	-1,404	-1,402	-1,402
Chi-squared	524	524	1,777	1,777	1,780	1,780
Prob Wald:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: The dependent variable was *voting intention for the constitutional referendum*; standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$; R.C. = Reference Category; in the case of ideology—left, centre, right—the reference category is “none.”

5. Conclusion

Although constitutional referendums are usually analysed using heuristic and systematic political reasoning approaches, cleavage theory contributes to a better understanding of their outcomes. In the case of Chile, we have shown that the four socio-structural and socio-political cleavages significantly impacted the success of the rejection of the 2022 referendum. While the results are more precise and robust when analysing municipal data, opinion poll data allowed us to delve deeper into the specific characteristics of voters according to religion, social class, and attitudes towards the democratic regime.

Concerning religious cleavage, we found that Evangelicals rejected the constitutional proposal more strongly than the others. Traditional literature that has examined the prevalence of religious cleavages in Chile usually compares religious and non-religious voters. It is unusual to make a precise distinction between each religion. In this case, Evangelicals' rejection of the constitutional proposal could be explained by the incorporation of an article on abortion and the modification of the political, economic, social, and cultural structure of the country.

Social class cleavages have provided contradictory evidence. Municipal analysis shows an apparent positive correlation between the percentage of poor people and the "reject" vote. The exception, however, was *MR*. In this region, "reject" was more robust in higher-income municipalities. What is relevant here is that variations in poverty levels help to understand variations in support for "reject." However, the individual analysis points in different directions. Our statistical model does not indicate a robust effect of social class on voting intention. We suggest that this result may be due to the uneven distribution of "NA/NV/DK" responses, which is much more pronounced in lower-income segments, preventing an accurate comparison between "approve" and "reject" voters.

Meanwhile, the authoritarianism-democracy cleavage yields no significant surprises, and its effect is theoretically expected. Democratic voters were less likely to vote "reject" compared to the "indifferent" and "authoritarian" groups. The "authoritarian" voters were evidently against repealing the 1980 constitution and also against replacing it with a constitutional proposal drafted mainly by left-wing parties and movements.

The results of this research contrast with the most recent approaches to the reasons behind the "reject" triumph, which attributes it to an incumbent vote reflected in presidential approval (Alemán & Navia, 2023; González-Ocantos & Meléndez, 2023). While it is true that the most robust variable explaining support for "reject" corresponded to presidential approval, historical socio-political cleavages were very relevant for understanding Chileans' voting intentions. These cleavages were, in part, activated by the coalitions that backed "approve" and "reject." As noted, some religious organisations opposed the constitutional proposal for including an article on abortion. This was taken up by the "reject" parties, expressing their defence of the "right to life" as an elementary issue. Rural organisations also emerged, expressing their rejection of plurinationality, emphasising that it put Chile's historical traditions at risk and native peoples at a clear advantage over the rest. The "reject" campaign used these arguments, indicating that, among other things, the new constitution sought to establish different justice systems for Indigenous peoples and the rest of the country, which violated the principle of equality before the law. Finally, as discussed in the electoral campaign section, there was also a debate on the ownership of pension funds. The leaders of the 'reject' campaign argued that with the new constitution, there was a possibility of nationalisation of the funds. In practice, this opened the debate on whether the state or the market should be involved in pension policies.

Another relevant issue, from our perspective, is that in the 2022 referendum, voting was compulsory. Therefore, unlike the 2020 referendum, the parties expected massive voter turnout. While the "approve" option was strongly linked to President Boric, the campaigns revolved around the contents of the constitutional proposal. The parties had to convey their messages to a much wider audience, synthesising the constitutional proposal as much as possible. This led, on certain occasions, to some "reject" leaders spreading "fake news" about the contents of the new constitution. This may have had a marginal impact on the final result, especially in groups of voters who were less informed and less interested in the constitutional process. Consequently, Chile also serves as a case study to analyse the impact of different

electoral rules on political outcomes. As we pointed out, the 2020 referendum consulted on constitutional change and the representative body in charge of writing the new constitution. These were two general questions that did not involve programming content. However, the 2022 referendum with compulsory voting opened up public debate on relevant issues, such as social rights, the right to life, private property, the political system, and plurinationality, among others.

In sum, this study highlights the validity of historical socio-political cleavages in explaining the outcomes of constitutional referendums. Although some studies have found that certain cleavages were extinguished or suspended, our results differ from this hypothesis. Without ignoring the effect of contingent variables, such as presidential approval, or more powerful political variables in explaining electoral behaviour, such as self-positioning on the left-right ideological scale, our research confirms the presence of historical cleavages that continue to explain political outcomes. Moreover, we suggest that these socio-political cleavages, which also serve to explain the results of the presidential elections, were activated much more clearly in the context of constitutional change. This is because the public debate covered all kinds of issues and the proposed constitution aimed to change the political system, the economic system, and even the values on which the republic was built.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

Data Availability

The database and syntax can be found at the following URL: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WUHNBH>

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the authors (unedited).

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