cogitatio

ARTICLE

Muslims' Vote Choice: Exclusion and Group Voting in Europe

Odelia Oshri [1] and Reut Itzkovitch-Malka [2]

[1] Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication, Open University of Israel, Israel

Correspondence: Odelia Oshri (odelia.oshri@mail.huji.ac.il)

Abstract

A well-documented fact is that Muslim citizens tend to vote for the left in greater proportion than non-Muslim citizens. In Western Europe, this difference in the vote for left-wing parties exceeds 30%. Interestingly, the gap endures despite Muslims' integration into the host society, which is expected to militate against group voting. Why, then, do Muslims continue to vote as a group? And what factors account for their leaning towards the left? We argue that exclusion and discrimination, to which Muslims are regularly subjected as a group, work against the effect of integration on their vote choice, as it strengthens the saliency of group interests and "linked fate" in their voting calculus. Using public opinion survey data, we show that the more Muslims feel discriminated against by their host society, the more likely they are to engage in group voting and vote for the left. We also show that political exclusion, proxied by the electoral strength of radical-right parties, has a positive association with Muslims' support for left-wing parties. Finally, we delve into the British case and show that experiences of physical violence are also manifested in stronger group voting by non-Western immigrants. Our article sheds light on a phenomenon that has the potential to reshape the electoral landscape in Europe by rendering ethnic and religious identity a crucial dimension of party competition.

Keywords

exclusion; immigration; left-wing parties; Muslims; radical-right parties; voting behavior

1. Introduction

Immigration is central to European politics (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2008). By 2022, 13.7% of EU residents aged 15–74 were born outside the EU, with an additional 7.2% having at least one foreign-born parent (Eurostat, 2022). Postwar immigration, driven by labor migration, intra-European movement, and conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and sub-Saharan Africa, has significantly altered Europe's

demographics and politics (Dancygier & Margalit, 2020). Integration challenges and the rise of anti-immigration parties remain prominent in the public discourse (Adida et al., 2016; Golder, 2016). In numerous Western European nations, the most substantial segment of naturalized citizens originates from regions where Islam is the dominant religion, a pattern that is expected to be further accentuated by the recent influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Consequently, Muslims are gradually becoming a significant part of domestic European electorates (Dancygier, 2017). Although many Muslims in Europe no longer fit the traditional definitions of having a migration background, they often remain a minority out-group facing inequality, discrimination, and exclusion. Nevertheless, research on their voting behavior remains significantly underexplored. Importantly, the vast majority of the research population of this study (95%) is comprised of Muslims with immigrant backgrounds.

Research on non-Western immigrants, a broader and more heterogeneous group that includes Muslim minorities, shows they consistently vote for left-wing parties more than native populations (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bird et al., 2010; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006). This voting pattern is so consistent that Saggar (2000) calls it an "iron law," and cross-national studies support this finding (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Goerres et al., 2022). While it is evident—also from the data in this study (see Figure 1)—that Muslims tend to favor left-wing parties, there is surprisingly little research investigating the reasons behind this voting tendency.

We propose a framework to explain this phenomenon by considering not only integration but also social exclusion and discrimination as factors. We argue that Muslims facing exclusion are more likely to adhere to their group's voting norms, as these experiences heighten ethnic identity and a sense of "linked fates." Using public opinion data, we show that greater perceived discrimination correlates with increased support for left-wing parties among Muslims. Additionally, the rise of radical-right parties, known for their anti-immigration and anti-Muslim attitudes, also influences Muslims' voting behavior. Regional analysis in the UK, incorporating data on racial hate crimes, further supports that, among Muslims, increased hate crimes correlate with greater group-based voting for left-wing parties.

Our study underscores the importance of examining societal signals—political, social, and physical—in understanding Muslim voting patterns. Negative signals from host societies, such as the rise of radical-right parties or hate crimes, strengthen group-based voting, shaping Europe's electoral landscape and amplifying ethnic and religious identity in party competition.

2. Muslims in Europe and Their Voting Behavior

Many Muslims have immigration backgrounds either personally or within their family. Like other non-Western immigrants, they form a minority out-group distinct from the majority society. Moreover, like other non-Western immigrants, they also tend to vote for left-wing parties to a much greater extent than natives (Just, 2024). Drawing on research about non-Western immigrants and the limited studies on Muslims' electoral behavior, we develop the theoretical foundations for this phenomenon. However, we do not equate the two groups or imply that they are identical.

Despite the persistence of the immigrant-native gap in voting for left-wing parties, this phenomenon has received relatively little scholarly attention (e.g., Goerres et al., 2022). Two primary explanations have been

proposed to account for this pattern. The first explanation attributes immigrants' left-wing voting tendencies to their typical socio-economic characteristics. Immigrants often have lower socio-economic status, which aligns with the profile of traditional left-wing voters. According to this view, as immigrants integrate into their host societies and their socio-economic conditions improve, their political preferences are likely to shift, becoming more similar to those of the native population (Goerres et al., 2022; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2015; Schmidt-Catran & Careja, 2017). This perspective emphasizes individual-level factors and the impact of economic and social integration on voting behavior. The second explanation, grounded in social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), posits that group identity plays a more significant role than individual characteristics in shaping immigrants' political preferences. This approach argues that immigrants often identify strongly with their ethnic or minority group, particularly in contexts where they face discrimination, exclusion, or political hostility. Such group-based identification can lead immigrants to support left-wing parties, which are generally perceived as more inclusive and protective of minority rights. Ethnic identity thus becomes a critical driver of political behavior, reinforcing voting patterns that are distinct from those of the majority population (Dickson & Scheve, 2006).

The latter explanation is validated by studies showing that the policy preferences of immigrants tend to be relatively similar to those of natives but their voting behavior remains distinct (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Heath et al., 2013; Saggar, 2000). Bergh and Bjørklund (2011) confirmed that differences in voting persist even after controlling for social background, with group identity playing a role. Zingher and Thomas (2012) observed similar patterns in Australia, attributing them partly to discrimination.

2.1. In but Out: Political Consequences of Social Exclusion

Exclusion and discrimination can come in different shapes and forms. Concerning Muslim minorities, exclusion can be manifested in hate crimes (Frey, 2020), labor market discrimination (Adida et al., 2016), Islamophobic policies (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020), and the electoral power of radical-right parties that advocate against Islam and support restrictive immigration policies. While anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-Muslim prejudice are closely intertwined, it is anti-Muslim sentiment, rather than anti-immigrant views more broadly, that represents the most pressing and salient threat to Muslims in Europe (Weber et al., 2024). Thus, country of origin and religion are used to categorize—and subsequently problematize—citizens from predominantly Muslim countries.

Individuals can hold multiple identities, but when one becomes more situationally salient—often due to factors like discrimination or exclusion—it activates related preferences, including political ones (Huddy, 2013; Kuo et al., 2017). Situational factors such as discrimination, exclusion, or marginalization can increase one's attachment to a group. These factors render the social categories of minority and majority more visible, thereby increasing the saliency of the minority group and people's attachment to it (Pérez, 2015). Studies show that individuals who experience discrimination, exclusion, xenophobia, or violence due to their group membership are more likely to withdraw into their ethnic group; they come to identify with it more strongly and see the political conflict as essentially ethnic (Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Pérez, 2015; Zingher & Thomas, 2012). Studies on the political participation of religious groups who suffer from exclusion have yielded similar findings (see, for example, Bader, 2007; Just et al., 2014; Wald et al., 2005). The perception of shared grievances is likely to amplify the effect of religious identification on political participation by providing individuals with common interests, specifically addressing injustices against their group and thereby

motivating political engagement (Kranendonk et al., 2018). Nevertheless, a recent study by Just (2024) showed that first-generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to become partisans in strongly anti-immigrant societies.

Only a few studies have specifically addressed the connection between social exclusion and the voting behavior of immigrants, and the results are not uniform. Some found that group-based exclusion increases the probability of immigrants' voting for left-wing parties (Sanders et al., 2014; Zingher & Thomas, 2012). Others reported no direct effect of exclusion either on vote choice (Goerres et al., 2022) or on supporting co-ethnic or non-white candidates (Fisher et al., 2015). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed the connection between discrimination and exclusion and the voting patterns of Muslims in Europe. Notable is the abovementioned research by Just (2024), which examined how an anti-immigrant climate affects party identification among first-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe. However, this study did not directly address actual voting behavior. In a relevant study on minority groups in the US, Chong and Kim (2006) showed that, compared to Latinos and Asian Americans, African Americans' support for the interests of their group is the least responsive to changes in individual economic circumstances. They attributed this pattern to higher levels of racial discrimination.

2.2. Radical-Right Parties as Mobilizers of Exclusion

Radical-right parties are among the most prominent mobilizers of anti-Muslim hostility in contemporary Europe (Mitts, 2019). A common theme in the platforms of such parties is support for exclusionary, "nativist" populism, aimed at ostracizing groups with certain religious or ethnic characteristics (Golder, 2016). These parties portray Muslim immigrants as a threat, whether economic or symbolic; they conjure up a moral divide between the "good" ordinary people and "bad" Muslim immigrants (Schmuck & Matthes, 2017). In their political campaigns, radical-right politicians frequently brandish negative slogans and images that stigmatize minority groups. Not only do radical-right parties target minorities and Muslims in their policies but the viable political force these parties present, in and of itself, may also sway other parties to change their positions, especially as concerns immigration and immigrant integration (Akkerman, 2015).

Several scholars have found a strong link between radical-right voting and anti-Muslim sentiment (Lajevardi, 2020; Rydgren, 2008). While the literature has addressed the effect of immigration on radical-right support, much less is known about the effect of the radical right's popularity on the political behavior of Muslims and immigrants. Mitts (2019) showed that geographical areas in which the radical right is electorally successful are likely to provide fertile ground for Muslim extremism. Sprague-Jones (2011) demonstrated that, in countries where the radical right is electorally successful, ethnic minorities are more likely to support multiculturalism. More to the point, in one of the few existing studies in the field, Martin (2021) established that minority groups in the UK were more likely to vote for the Labour Party in districts where the British National Party received more votes.

Our argument addresses the complex interplay between integration, exclusion, and the vote choices of Muslim minorities in Europe. We posit two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that the more Muslims are integrated into the host society, measured in terms of socio-economic indices, the less likely they are to vote disproportionally for left-wing parties. We base this hypothesis on the assumption that the drivers of Muslims' party preferences are similar to those of non-Muslim individuals and are affected by party

identification, candidate evaluation, and positions on issues (Goerres et al., 2022). Thus, as Muslims become integrated into the host society, they are less likely to vote disproportionally for left-wing parties. The integration of Muslims into European societies is expected to influence their voting preferences by altering their socio-economic status, identity, and political priorities. As integration improves access to education, employment, and upward mobility, Muslims may shift their focus from minority-specific grievances to broader societal issues, aligning with mainstream parties. Integration also fosters dual identities, blending cultural heritage with host-society norms, and encouraging support for centrist platforms. Greater exposure to diverse political discourses broadens their interests and concerns. Reduced marginality dampens the appeal of protest voting, leading to greater participation in mainstream politics. Integration thus transforms political behavior as individuals navigate their evolving roles within society. Indeed, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2015) showed that, with more integration, immigrants' political preferences tend to change. Schmidt-Catran and Careja (2017) arrived at similar conclusions using the German Socio-Economic Panel: The longer the time immigrants spend integrating into the host culture, the greater the change in their political preferences.

We formulated our first hypothesis as follows:

> H1: As Muslims become more integrated into the host society, they are less likely to vote for left-wing parties, thus minimizing the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in voting for left-wing parties.

Next, we address the effect of exclusion on Muslims' vote choice. Given the persistent Muslim–non-Muslim vote gap, we submit that Muslims' vote choice is affected not only by their integration but also by societal exclusion, hostility, and discrimination directed against them. We hypothesize that Muslims' exclusion will lead them to identify more strongly with their ethnic or religious group and therefore increase their likelihood of engaging in group voting. In Western Europe, where the collective identity is rooted in Christian traditions, Muslims are particularly sensitive to hostile social environments. Research shows that members of stigmatized groups are more attuned to social cues, including nonverbal signs from dominant groups (Frable, 1997; Oyserman & Swim, 2001). When faced with hostility, Muslims are less likely to trust institutions, adopt national values, or feel attached to their host country (Adida et al., 2016; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Additionally, anti-Muslim prejudice may foster a "reactive" religious identity. While this result might create further disengagement from society and reduce political participation (Connor, 2010; Just, 2024; Voas & Fleischmann, 2012), it might also politicize group identification, making it more salient and influential on Muslims' vote choice. Thus, the perception of shared grievances might amplify the effect of religious identification on political participation by providing individuals with common interests, specifically addressing injustices against their group and thereby motivating political engagement (Kranendonk et al., 2018).

We divided our second hypothesis into two parts to differentiate between subjective and objective indicators of exclusion:

> H2a: The stronger the country's measurable exclusionary tendencies vis-à-vis Muslims, the more likely they are to engage in group voting for left-wing parties, thus expanding the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in voting for left-wing parties.

H2b: The stronger the perceived discrimination against Muslims as a group, the more likely they are to engage in group voting for left-wing parties, thus expanding the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in voting for left-wing parties.

Subjective discrimination refers to personal perceptions or experiences of being treated unfairly based on one's identity, such as ethnicity, religion, or gender. It reflects an individual's emotional and cognitive response to perceived inequality, often influenced by personal encounters or societal narratives. This form of discrimination is inherently personal and varies based on individuals' awareness, experiences, and interpretations of bias. In contrast, objective measures of discrimination focus on tangible, quantifiable indicators of societal inequality. These measures often include political, legal, and social markers such as the electoral power of radical-right parties or the prevalence of hate crimes. While subjective discrimination captures the lived experiences of discrimination, objective measures provide a broader societal context of exclusion and marginalization. Both dimensions are critical in understanding the multifaceted nature of discrimination, though they differ in their focus—personal experiences versus structural inequalities.

3. Data and Methods

3.1. Data

To analyze the factors influencing Muslim voters, we used multiple data sources. For public opinion data, we utilized all 10 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 2020. Eighteen advanced industrialized democracies from Western Europe are included in the study with a total of 151 country/year samples (see sampling details in Supplementary File A). These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. We followed others by excluding East European countries from our analysis due to distinctive party competition patterns: Left-wing parties are frequently linked to a communist legacy, and the far-right exhibits unique characteristics that differentiate it from its older West European counterparts (Kim & Hall, 2024). The ESS includes items that tap different dimensions of integration, such as the first and second most spoken languages at home as well as items assessing perceived in-group discrimination—and is thus suitable for testing our argument. We supplemented these data with macro-level variables tapping the changing electoral power of the radical right in each country and in the European Parliament, as a proxy of Muslims' political exclusion. Nevertheless, the ESS is not specifically designed to create representative samples of minority populations, such as Muslims, which may lead to potential biases. These samples are often under-representative of groups such as older adults or individuals with lower levels of education that are typically under-sampled in public opinion surveys. This issue is likely amplified when dealing with minority populations. Additionally, individuals from minority out-groups who feel less attachment to the host country or society might be less inclined to participate in such surveys, further contributing to sampling biases.

To deal with this issue we were able to gather information on social exclusion at the level of the region in the UK (NUTS1). Thus, following our cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, we delve into the British case. For our analysis of the British case, we appended a macro-level indicator at the regional level of social exclusion—ethnic hate crimes—to the individual-level data. Due to limitations in the available data, this analysis focuses on non-Western immigrants rather than Muslim citizens specifically. While these two

categories are not interchangeable, and the non-Western immigrant group is more diverse and less homogeneous, we believe this analysis still provides valuable insights and remains worthwhile. Despite the inherent heterogeneity within this group, the findings offer an important perspective on patterns of exclusion and discrimination.

Our analysis unfolds in several stages. First, we descriptively establish the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in voting for left-wing parties and examine the socio-demographic gaps between the two groups that impact voter choice, focusing on integration factors. Next, we estimate vote-choice models that include socio-demographic and integration variables to assess the likelihood of supporting the left. We then test how social and political exclusion affects the voting decisions of Muslims. Based on the results of this analysis, we next conduct a counterfactual analysis to assess the effect of integration on the gap between the two groups. Finally, we present a British case study with a regional and micro-level analysis of social exclusion.

3.2. Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables

We define *Muslim citizens* according to individuals' self-reporting regarding their religion and their eligibility to vote. Our population of interest consists of Muslim citizens, specifically those who are eligible to vote. The analysis excludes those who did not vote for any party. The group of Muslim citizens encompasses Muslim immigrants, who have personally migrated to the host country (69% of our sample); Muslims with immigrant backgrounds, whose parents (at least one) migrated to the host country (26% of our sample); and Muslims with no identifiable immigrant background (5% of our sample). Given this segmentation, Muslims in our sample can be regarded as having an immigration background. Importantly, we do not differentiate between these sub-populations in our analysis because such differentiation is outside the scope of our research. Figure D1 in Supplementary File D presents the proportion of Muslim respondents in each country in our sample.

To evaluate the respondents' *vote choice*, we first grouped the political parties into families. The ESS data include a question asking: "Which party did you vote for in the last national election?" Respondents named specific parties, which we then classified based on party family data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2014). Focusing on the left-wing party family, which includes socialist and social democratic parties (see Supplementary File B for details), we used a dummy variable to code each respondent's vote for the left.

3.2.1. Social Integration Measures

Social integration involves various dimensions: psychological, economic, social, and linguistic (Harder et al., 2018). It measures the degree to which immigrants are effectively integrated into the host society, including language fluency, labor market participation, and access to resources. We assessed social integration using repeated items from the ESS 1–10 survey.

Proficiency in the official language is crucial for interaction with locals. The ESS item asked about the most common languages spoken at home. We measured for *linguistic integration* and coded respondents who spoke a non-official language at home as 1.

The impact of labor market disadvantages varies. Rueda (2005) defined disadvantaged workers as those unemployed or in low-wage jobs, while Häusermann and Schwander (2011) considered those in high-unemployment occupations as disadvantaged. We controlled for *labor market integration* and assessed occupational vulnerability using two measures: unemployment history and reliance on manual labor versus communication skills. Sectors were categorized based on D'Amuri and Peri (2014) and O*NET data, with communication skills linked to greater job stability and manual labor linked to greater vulnerability (see Supplementary File C for elaboration on this variable).

3.2.2. Social Exclusion and Discrimination Measures

Perceived in-group discrimination is a standard measure of discrimination in surveys. Positive scores indicate those who describe themselves as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in their country (Demireva & Kesler, 2011). Respondents were asked to indicate the factors responsible for this discrimination: ethnic origin, language, gender, disability, or religion. Those who named ethnic origin, language, and religion as reasons received a value of 1, and those who did not identify these factors received a value of 0.

We obtained data on the *radical right's vote and seat share* in national parliaments as well as in the European Parliament from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey database, focusing on the last national election before the survey. We added this information to the individual-level surveys.

For the British case study, we collected and operationalized an additional exclusion variable—*hate crimes*.

Following a FOI request, the British Home Office provided us with monthly racial or ethnic hate crime counts in England and Wales as recorded by the police for 2002–2018. A hate crime is defined by the police and the crown prosecution service as any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic (Metropolitan Police, n.d.). This common definition was agreed upon in 2007 by the police and other agencies that make up the criminal justice system. We requested the information by sub-code for racially or religiously aggravated offences. Overall, there were 779,443 hate crimes. We calculated the total number of racial or ethnic crimes for each region in every year preceding the survey and corrected the raw data for the size of each region, dividing the total number of hate crimes per region by population size.

We controlled for a set of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables including age, religiosity, gender, and education. We also controlled for the size and type of community in which the respondents lived (a farm in the countryside to a large city), which is a likely indicator of opportunities for contact with the non-Muslim population as well as cosmopolitanism (Haubert & Fussell, 2006). In addition, we controlled for individuals' ideological self-placement, measured on an 11-point self-placement ideology scale (0 = *left*, 10 = *right*). Finally, we controlled for trust in politicians and political interest. The item gauging trust in politicians was rated on a scale ranging from 0 (*no trust at all*) to 10 (*complete trust*; $M = 4$; $SD = 2.3$). Political interest was measured using the item "how would you assess your interest in politics?" rated on a 4-point scale (reverse-coded so that higher values denoted greater interest in politics; $M = 2.5$; $SD = .9$).

4. Descriptive Analysis

Figure 1 illustrates that Muslims support left-leaning parties 30% more than non-Muslim citizens. This gap persists even as Muslims integrate into host societies (see Figure D2 in Supplementary File D for information on individual countries).

Having established the substantial gap between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in voting for the left, we next examined and compared the characteristics of left-wing voters among Muslims and non-Muslims. Table 1 provides the percentages of Muslims and non-Muslims who voted for the left by social background. As the table indicates, only 25% of the non-Muslim population voted for left-wing parties, while approximately 56% of Muslims did.

In Western democracies, women tend to vote for left-leaning parties more than men, a trend known as the "modern gender gap" (Dassonneville, 2021; Kedar et al., 2024). This trend holds true for non-Muslim voters in our data. However, among Muslims, men are more supportive of the left. Additionally, Muslim voters on average are younger than non-Muslim left voters. While older non-Muslim voters with progressive views lean toward the mainstream left, younger non-Muslim voters with similar views often support environmental or radical-left parties (Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2020). In a way, the Muslim vote keeps the mainstream left more reliant on a younger constituency.


Figure 1. Gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in their vote for left-wing parties. Notes: Trendline is a polynomial regression of the Muslim-non-Muslim gap per year, weighted by country; analysis includes Muslim citizens who are eligible to vote in their respective countries—Muslim immigrants, Muslims with immigrant backgrounds, and Muslim citizens with no apparent immigrant background; parties included in the left-wing party family are social democratic and social parties; the categorization of parties relies on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (see Bakker et al., 2014). Source: ESS (2020).

Table 1 also highlights that Muslims face greater occupational vulnerability than non-Muslims, with higher unemployment rates, more manual jobs, and a more left-tilted income distribution (see Figure 2). They are also more religious. This comparison suggests that Muslims in Western Europe are still not fully integrated into the host society in terms of socio-demographic traits, a fact that might somewhat explain the gap in left-wing voting. We will explore this possibility in the next section.

Table 1. Support for left-wing parties among non-Muslims and Muslim voters, by social background (average).

	Non-Muslim voters	Muslims
All	25%	55.9%
Men	47%	55%
Age	53 (16.8)	40.2 (13.3)
Jobs involving manual labor	46.5 (18.7)	50.8 (19.8)
Unemployment (0–1)	.27 (.44)	.45 (.49)
Religiosity	4.22 (2.9)	7.13 (2.43)
Political interest	2.35 (.87)	2.44 (.93)
Political trust	4.15 (2.26)	4.64 (2.35)
L-R scale	3.93 (1.75)	4.34 (2.38)
Population density	3.12 (1.16)	3.84 (1.07)
Education (yrs.)	12.49 (4.52)	12.69 (4.32)

Source: ESS (2020).

Figure 2. Household income (a) and class (b) distributions for Muslims and non-Muslim voters (2002–2020). Notes: Sectors in Figure 2b are organized in descending order of communication skills; Muslim voters are overrepresented in sectors involving manual labor, whereas non-Muslims are overrepresented in sectors requiring communication skills.

5. Persistent Group Voting: Multivariate Analyses

Following the descriptive comparison presented in Table 1, we tested our integration hypothesis (H1). To do so we estimated a vote-choice model using probit regressions. All models included country- and year-fixed effects. As explained above, our dependent variable was left-wing voting. We examined six models. The first model, a reference only, included only Muslims and non-Muslims on the right-hand side. Model 2 added the economic integration factors and the respondents' demographic background. Model 3 added the measure of linguistic integration.

Not surprisingly, our baseline model confirms the descriptive statistics reported above. Muslims are more likely than non-Muslim voters to support the left. The Muslim coefficient (0.84), converted to predicted probability of voting left, shows a gap of 32% between Muslims and non-Muslims. The economic integration and background variables incorporated into Models 2a and 2b (Table 2) are consistent with previous studies. Manual workers are more likely to vote for the left than those workers who rely less on manual skills. The positive interaction coefficient, plotted in Figure 3, indicates that Muslim manual workers are more likely to translate their labor market vulnerability into support for left-leaning parties. This finding at the micro level, combined with the fact that more Muslims than non-Muslims are employed in sectors that rely heavily on manual labor (Figure 2), results in stronger support for the left among Muslims compared to non-Muslims.

Table 2. Support for left-wing parties, ESS 2002–2020.

	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Empty Model	Economic integration	Economic integration	Linguistic integration	Perceived discrimination	Radical right VS	Radical right SS
Muslims (ref: Non-Muslim voters)	0.84*** (0.03)	0.23** (0.08)	0.72*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.03)	0.77*** (0.04)	0.68*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.04)
Male		−0.02** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.02*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)
Education		−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)
Population density		0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
Age		0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Age squared		−0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)
L-R self-placement		−0.23*** (0.00)	−0.23*** (0.00)	−0.23*** (0.00)	−0.23*** (0.00)	−0.23*** (0.00)	−0.23*** (0.00)
Religiosity		−0.01*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)
Interest in politics		0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Trust in politicians		0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)

Table 2. (Cont.) Support for left-wing parties, ESS 2002–2020.

|	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Empty Model	Economic integration	Economic integration	Linguistic integration	Perceived discrimination	Radical right VS	Radical right SS
Manual skill dexterity		0.29*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)
Manual*Muslims		0.44** (0.15)					
Unemployed >3 months		−0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Unemployed*Muslims			0.16* (0.07)				
Different language spoken at home				0.15*** (0.03)			
Muslim*Different language				0.34*** (0.07)			
Perceived in-group discrimination					−0.28*** (0.05)		
Muslims*Perceived discrimination					0.32** (0.09)		
RR vote share t-1						−0.59*** (0.08)	
Muslims * RR vote share t-1						1.25** (0.44)	
RR seat share t-1							−0.46*** (0.08)
Muslims * RR seat share t-1							1.52*** (0.40)
Country FEx	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEx	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	−0.51*** (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)
Observations	199,575	180,809	180,809	180,809	180,809	180,809	180,809

Model 3 tests the effect of linguistic integration by interacting *different language* spoken at home with the Muslim variable. As Figure 3 indicates, Muslims who speak a different language at home are more likely to support left-wing parties (black line). This effect is weaker among non-Muslims (grey line). As predicted, linguistic integration reduces Muslims' likelihood of voting left. However, while economic and linguistic integration reduce group voting, Muslims still tend to vote left more than non-Muslims, even after controlling for social background.

Figure 3. Predicted probability of supporting the left by economic and linguistic integration indices: across different levels of manual skill dexterity (a); unemployed and seeking work >3 months (b); language most often spoken at home (c). Notes: The more one's job relies on manual skills, the likelier s/he is to vote for the left, with Muslims exhibiting greater vote sensitivity to vulnerability in the labor market; Muslims who experienced unemployment for more than three months are more likely to vote left than those who did not—simply put, for Muslims, economic integration reduces the likelihood of voting for the left; Muslims who speak the host country's official languages at home are less likely to vote left than those who do not.

Models 4–6 in Table 2 show the effects of perceived in-group discrimination and political exclusion on how Muslims vote. Figure 4 displays the predicted probabilities of Muslims and non-Muslims voting for left-wing parties as a function of in-group perceived discrimination (4a) and the electoral power of the radical right (4b). In both panels the trends are similar. The slopes are different and even opposite for non-Muslims and Muslims. Whereas for Muslims the graphs' slopes are positive, for non-Muslims they are negative, indicating that discrimination and exclusion have a unique group-based effect on Muslims' vote choice. As Muslims feel more discriminated against, or as they see the radical right in their country garner more support, they are likelier to engage in group voting and vote for left-wing parties. These findings lend support to H2.

The latter finding regarding the radical right points to a "toxic" symbiosis between the political left and the radical right. Allegedly, the political left should suffer an electoral decline due to the integration of Muslims into the host society. Put differently, the more the left succeeds in integrating Muslims, the more likely they are to shift their support away from it. Ironically, however, our analysis suggests that when it comes to Muslims it is the radical right that keeps the left politically viable. When the radical right garners more support, Muslims are driven back into the arms of the political left.

Figure 4. Predicted probability of supporting the left by perceived discrimination (a) and political exclusion (b). Notes: 4b shows the electoral power (measured as seat share in national parliaments) of radical right parties; we include an auxiliary analysis of radical-right delegation vote share in the European Parliament in Supplementary File D, Table D2.

6. Counterfactual Analysis

In order to gauge the effect of economic and linguistic integration as well as the socio-demographic factors on the vote of Muslims, we conducted a counterfactual analysis (Table 3). First, as a reference, we calculated the predicted probability of supporting left-wing parties for both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, letting each group have its own average position. The predicted gap between the groups is large—35%—but similar to the gap we found in the vote in the raw data (see Table 1). To test the effect of the difference in the factors that are known to affect the vote for left-wing parties, we calculated the predicted probability of supporting the left for both non-Muslim and Muslim citizens, this time letting each group take on the average characteristics of the other group. Table 1 shows that there are considerable differences in the average characteristics of Muslims and non-Muslims. The question is whether the gap in the vote will narrow or even disappear altogether if we cancel out these differences between the groups. In other words, we ask whether differences in the electoral behavior between Muslims and non-Muslim citizens could shrink as a function of the Muslims' integration.

Not surprisingly, for Muslims, the likelihood of supporting the left declines when assigned the average characteristics of non-Muslims, and vice versa: When assigned the characteristics of Muslims, the likelihood of supporting the left among non-Muslims increases. At the same time, the gap between the probability of Muslims and non-Muslims supporting the left narrows by only 5–7%. It seems, therefore, that integration alone does not account entirely for the gap in voting, providing only partial support for H1.

Table 3. Counterfactual analysis of integration effects.

|	Non-Muslims' Pr(vote = left-wing parties)	Muslims' Pr(vote = left-wing parties)	Gap
Observed	20	49	29
Predicted based on each group's true characteristics	23	58	35
Given non-Muslims' characteristics	23	51	28
Given Muslims' characteristics	28	58	30

Notes: The gap between Muslims and non-Muslims is the difference between the proportion of non-Muslims and the proportion of Muslims voting for left-wing parties, based on survey responses; the predicted gap is based on each group's mean characteristics; results are based on Model 2 in Table 2.

7. The British Case Study

We used the British case study for a more detailed regional analysis, matching ESS data on respondents' locations with regional racial or ethnic hate crime statistics. Due to data limitations, we shifted our unit of analysis from Muslim citizens to non-Western immigrants. Specifically, we focused on first-generation immigrants, meaning individuals who were born in non-Western countries. While this adjustment broadened the scope of cases we could analyze, it also introduced a more heterogeneous group. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the available UK hate crime data does not differentiate between crimes targeting Muslims and those against other racial, ethnic, or religious groups, making it unsuitable for an analysis involving only Muslims. While we acknowledge its limitations, adopting this approach provided an important additional layer of analysis. Nevertheless, we conducted the analysis using Muslim respondents as well. The results were similar in direction, although not statistically significant (see Supplementary File D, Table D3).

Our probit model examined how regional hate crimes impact non-Western immigrants' voting behavior, including year fixed effects. Our analysis shows a significant positive effect of regional hate crimes on the likelihood of first-generation non-Western immigrants voting for left-leaning parties. Figure 5 illustrates this interaction. It shows that, in regions with a lower rate of hate crimes, immigrants' likelihood of voting for the left is similar to that of natives. However, as hate crime rates increase, immigrants are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties. Specifically, in regions with few hate crimes, the probability of an immigrant supporting the left is around 0.3, while in high-crime areas, it exceeds 0.75. These results support H2, suggesting that experiences of exclusion lead immigrants to favor left-wing parties.

Figure 5. Predicted probability of supporting the left by immigrant/native and societal exclusion. Notes: Controls and year-fixed effects are included; the NUTS1 regions are: North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, South West, East of England, London, South East, and Wales.

8. Conclusion

This study joins a group of studies demonstrating that Muslims engage in group voting; they vote for parties that they regard as promoting the interests of their group, even if an individual's beliefs and interests are not typical of that group. Nonetheless, research pertaining to Muslim and immigrants' voting behavior is still in its infancy and mostly descriptive. Studies suggesting the existence of group voting are even more limited and usually focus on a single case study. Using the ESS, we present a cross-sectional analysis of Muslims' voting patterns as a function of the well-known predictors of vote choice and indicators of their integration and societal exclusion. We show that socio-demographic factors have a limited impact on Muslims' vote choice, providing only partial support for H1.

What is clear from our analysis is that discrimination and exclusion—whether societal, political, economic, or even physical—matter for Muslims' vote choice. The less welcome they feel in their host society, the more likely they are to engage in group voting. The results of both our cross-sectional analysis using indicators of perceived discrimination or the electoral success of the radical right and our British case study using indicators of violent ethnic-based hate crimes support this contention. For Muslims, exclusionary acts boost feelings of shared identity, linked fates, brotherhood, or connectedness and make their minority identity more politically

salient. As a result, they tend to vote for left-wing parties that they regard as better representing their minority group interests.

Despite the saliency of these findings and their contribution to the field, some caveats are in order. This article explores an understudied issue using available data, which, while valuable, often have limitations and potential biases due to their lack of focus on minority populations. As such, the sample size may be insufficient, and the data do not allow for direct testing of the mechanisms at play. We argue that the activation and salience of group identity serve as the explanatory mechanism connecting exclusion to vote choice among Muslims. However, to test this mechanism directly, future studies should employ more robust methodologies, such as experimental designs, to better capture the causal processes involved. Thus, we still need additional systematic datasets that target Muslim populations. Such information would allow us to conduct quantitative empirical research to identify the role of their social and political experiences, their integration into the host country, and their inclusion or exclusionary acts in their vote choices and political engagement.

Acknowledgments

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

Data Availability

Replication files are available in the Harvard Dataverse: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/F7UBXX

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the authors (unedited).

References

Abdelgadir, A., & Fouka, V. (2020). Political secularism and Muslim integration in the West: Assessing the effects of the French headscarf ban. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(3), 707–723. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000106

Abou-Chadi, T., & Wagner, M. (2020). Electoral fortunes of social democratic parties: Do second dimension positions matter? *Journal of European Public Policy*, *27*(2), 246–272.

Adida, C. L., Laitin, D. D., & Valfort, M. A. (2016). *Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies*. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674088962-prf

Akkerman, T. (2015). Immigration policy and electoral competition in Western Europe: A fine-grained analysis of party positions over the past two decades. *Party Politics*, *21*(1), 54–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462928

Bader, V. (2007). *Secularism or democracy? Associational governance of religious diversity*. Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.5117/9789053569993

Bakker, R., De Vries, C., Edwards, E. E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., Steenbergen, M., &

Vachudova, M. A. (2014). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. *Party Politics*, *21*(1), 143–152. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462931

Bergh, J., & Bjørklund, T. (2011). The revival of group voting: Explaining the voting preferences of immigrants in Norway. *Political Studies*, *59*(2), 308–327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00863.x

Bird, K., Saalfeld, T., & Wüst, A. M. (2010). Party choices among immigrants and visible minorities in comparative perspective. In K. Bird, T. Saalfeld, & A. M. Wüst (Eds.), *The political representation of immigrants and minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies* (pp. 66–106). Routledge.

Chong, D., & Kim, D. (2006). The experiences and effects of economic status among racial and ethnic minorities. *American Political Science Review*, *100*(3), 335–351. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062228

Connor, P. (2010). Contexts of immigrant receptivity and immigrant religious outcomes: The case of Muslims in Western Europe. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *33*(3), 376–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870902935963

D'Amuri, F., & Peri, G. (2014). Immigration, jobs, and employment protection: Evidence from Europe before and during the great recession. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *12*(2), 432–464. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12040

Dancygier, R. (2017). *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400888108

Dancygier, R., & Margalit, Y. (2020). The evolution of the immigration debate: Evidence from a new dataset of party positions over the last half-century. *Comparative Political Studies*, *53*(5), 734–774. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858936

Dancygier, R., & Saunders, E. N. (2006). A new electorate? Comparing preferences and partisanship between immigrants and natives. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*(4), 962–981. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x

Dassonneville, R. (2021). Change and continuity in the ideological gender gap a longitudinal analysis of left-right self-placement in OECD countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, *60*(1), 225–238.

Demireva, N., & Kesler, C. (2011). The curse of inopportune transitions: The labour market behaviour of immigrants and natives in the UK. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *52*(4), 306–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715211412116

Dickson, E. S., & Scheve, K. (2006). Social identity, political speech, and electoral competition. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *18*(1), 5–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629806059594

ESS. (2020). *European social survey round cumulative file* [Data set]. Norwegian Social Science Data Services.

Eurostat. (2022). *Foreign-born people and their descendants—Main characteristics*. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Foreign-born_people_and_their_descendants_-_main_characteristics#Overview_by_migration_status

Fisher, S. D., Heath, A. F., Sanders, D., & Sobolewska, M. (2015). Candidate ethnicity and vote choice in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, *45*(4), 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000562

Frable, D. E. (1997). Gender, racial, ethnic, sexual, and class identities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *48*(1), 139–162. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.48.1.139

Frey, A. (2020). 'Cologne changed everything': The effect of threatening events on the frequency and distribution of intergroup conflict in Germany. *European Sociological Review*, *36*(5), 684–699. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa007

Goerres, A., Mayer, S. J., & Spies, D. C. (2022). A new electorate? Explaining the party preferences of immigrant-origin voters at the 2017 Bundestag election. *British Journal of Political Science*, *52*(3), 1032–1054. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123421000302

Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *19*, 477–497. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441

Harder, N., Figueroa, L., Gillum, R. M., Hangartner, D., Laitin, D. D., & Hainmueller, J. (2018). Multidimensional measure of immigrant integration. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *115*(45), 11483–11488. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1808793115

Haubert, J., & Fussell, E. (2006). Explaining pro-immigrant sentiment in the US: Social class, cosmopolitanism, and perceptions of immigrants. *International Migration Review*, *40*(3), 489–507.

Häusermann, S., & Schwander, H. (2011). Varieties of dualization: Identifying insiders and outsiders across regimes. In P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier, & M. Seeleib-Kaiser (Eds.), *The age of dualization. The changing face of inequality in deindustrializing societies* (pp. 27–51). Oxford University Press.

Heath, A. F., Fisher, S. D., Rosenblatt, G., Sanders, D., & Sobolewska, M. (2013). *The political integration of ethnic minorities in Britain*. Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018). Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *25*, 109–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279

Huddy, L. (2013). From group identity to political cohesion and commitment. In L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of political psychology* (2nd ed., pp. 737–773). Oxford University Press.

Just, A. (2024). Islam, opinion climates, and immigrant party loyalties in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, *47*(6), 1304–1332. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2194788

Just, A., Sandovici, M. E., & Listhaug, O. (2014). Islam, religiosity, and immigrant political action in Western Europe. *Social Science Research*, *43*, 127–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.09.005

Kedar, O., Oshri, O., & Halevy, L. (2024). Party positions and the changing gender gap(s) in voting. *European Union Politics*, *25*(3), 504–526. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165241257785

Kim, S., & Hall, P. A. (2024). Fairness and support for populist parties. *Comparative Political Studies*, *57*(7), 1071–1106. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231193013

Kranendonk, M., Vermeulen, F., & Van Heelsum, A. (2018). "Unpacking" the identity-to-politics link: The effects of social identification on voting among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. *Political Psychology*, *39*(1), 43–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12397

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezat, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). *West European politics in the age of globalization*. Cambridge University Press.

Kuo, A., Malhotra, N., & Mo, C. H. (2017). Social exclusion and political identity: The case of Asian American partisanship. *The Journal of Politics*, *79*(1), 17–32. https://doi.org/10.1086/687570

Lajevardi, N. (2020). *Outsiders at home: The politics of American Islamophobia*. Cambridge University Press.

Martin, N. S. (2021). How does the strength of the far right affect ethnic minority political behaviour? *Parliamentary Affairs*, *76*(2), 320–340. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab060

Metropolitan Police. (n.d.). *What is hate crime?* https://www.met.police.uk/ro/report/hate-crime/information/v1/hate-crime/what-is-hate-crime

Michon, L., Tillie, J., & van Heelsum, A. (2007, May 7-12). Political participation of migrants in the Netherlands since 1986 [Paper presentation]. ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, #21: Migration and Representation in Parliamentary Democracies, Helsinki, Finland.

Mitts, T. (2019). From isolation to radicalization: Anti-Muslim hostility and support for ISIS in the West. *American Political Science Review*, *113*(1), 173–194. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000618

Oyserman, D., & Swim, J. K. (2001). Stigma: An insider's view. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00198

Pantoja, A. D., & Segura, G. M. (2003). Fear and loathing in California: Contextual threat and political sophistication among Latino voters. *Political Behavior*, *25*(3), 265–286. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025119724207

Pérez, E. O. (2015). Xenophobic rhetoric and its political effects on immigrants and their co-ethnics. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(3), 549–564.

Reeskens, T., & van Oorschot, W. (2015). Immigrants' attitudes towards welfare redistribution. An exploration of role of government preferences among immigrants and natives across 18 European welfare states. *European Sociological Review*, *31*(4), 433–445. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcv003

Rueda, D. (2005). Insider–outsider politics in industrialized democracies: The challenge to social democratic parties. *American Political Science Review*, *99*(1), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540505149X

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, *47*(6), 737–765. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x

Saggar, S. (2000). *Race and representation: Electoral politics and ethnic pluralism in Britain*. Manchester University Press.

Sanders, D., Heath, A., Fisher, S., & Sobolewska, M. (2014). The calculus of ethnic minority voting in Britain. *Political Studies*, *62*(2), 230–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12040

Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Careja, R. (2017). Institutions, culture and migrants' preference for state-provided welfare. Longitudinal evidence from Germany. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *27*(2), 197–212. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928716681463

Schmuck, D., & Matthes, J. (2017). Effects of economic and symbolic threat appeals in right-wing populist advertising on anti-immigrant attitudes: The impact of textual and visual appeals. *Political Communication*, *34*(4), 607–626. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1316807

Sprague-Jones, J. (2011). Extreme right-wing vote and support for multiculturalism in Europe. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *34*(4), 535–555. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1316807

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge University Press.

Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis)identification and ethnic and religious identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*(10), 1448–1462.

Voas, D., & Fleischmann, F. (2012). Islam moves west: Religious change in the first and second generations. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *38*(1), 525–545. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145455

Wald, K. D., Silverman, A. L., & Fridy, K. S. (2005). Making sense of religion in political life. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *8*, .143–121 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.083104.163853

Weber, S., Stoop, N., Van der Windt, P., & Zhai, H. (2024). A meta-analysis of attitudes towards migrants and displaced persons (Working Paper No. 24-03). IPL. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/u8ks6

Zingher, J. N., & Thomas, M. S. (2012). Patterns of immigrant political behaviour in Australia: An analysis of immigrant voting in ethnic context. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, *47*(3), 377—397. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2012.704000

About the Authors

Odelia Oshri is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she holds the Gillon Lectureship in political science. Her main research focuses on democratic politics and failures of representation in advanced democracies. She also studies radical right populism, party competition in Europe, online hate speech, the representation of minorities and Muslims in Europe, and how political elites effect violence toward women.

Reut Itzkovitch-Malka is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at the Open University of Israel. Her research interests include political representation, gender and politics, legislative studies, and electoral politics. Her work has appeared in journals such as the *American Journal of Political Studies*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, *The European Journal of Political Research*, and more.