

1 Supplementary material

2 Cross-country expert profile

3 **Table 1: Cross-country expert profile**

Country / geographical scope	Research Academia	Private sector	Public sector	Civil society
Spain	36%	48%	6%	10%
Germany	38%	25%	12%	25%
Portugal	33%	33%	11%	22%
Italy	50%	38%	0%	0%
Ireland	29%	29%	14%	29%
Hungary	0%	100%	0%	0%
European Union	25%	50%	25%	0%

4 Deductive coding

5 **Table 2.** Deductive coding framework

Category	Code (label)	Description
Niche level (emerging innovations)	Economic factors	Market dynamics, costs, and financial viability of innovations
	Governance factors	New governance arrangements, coordination mechanisms
	Social factors	Behavioural change, social acceptance, practices
	Technological factors	Emerging technologies and innovation pathways
	Political factors	Policy support and political prioritisation of innovations
Regime level (dominant systems)	Political factors	Existing policies, regulations, and institutional frameworks
	Economic factors	Market structures, cost systems, and financial constraints
	Social factors	Established norms, practices, and societal behaviours
	Technological factors	Dominant infrastructures and technological systems
Landscape level (macro context)	Political factors	Geopolitical dynamics and large-scale policy trends
	Economic factors	Macroeconomic conditions, energy prices, resource scarcity
	Social factors	Societal attitudes, demographic changes
	Environmental factors	Climate change impacts and environmental pressures

Vulnerability dimensions	Financial vulnerability	Limited capacity to afford transition-related costs
	Skills-related vulnerability	Lack of digital or technical skills
	Employment vulnerability	Exposure to job loss or labour market restructuring
Disadvantaged groups	-	Groups disproportionately affected

6 EU-level policy documents

- 7 • European Commission (2021a). European Industrial Strategy
- 8 • European Commission (2021c). Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy
- 9 • European Commission (2022b). European Growth Model
- 10 • European Commission (2022c). Energy and the Green Deal
- 11 • European Commission (2023d, 2024c). Digitalisation of the European Agricultural Sector
- 12 • European Commission (2023a, 2023b). Energy poverty frameworks and indicators
- 13 • European Commission (2023c). Pact for Skills – Renewable ecosystem
- 14 • European Commission (2024a). Access to transport for all
- 15 • European Commission (2024b). Fit for 55 – Delivering the proposals
- 16 • European Commission (2024d). European Green Deal
- 17 • European Commission (2024f). Transport poverty report
- 18 • European Commission: DG MOVE (2024). Transport trends and issues in the EU
- 19 • European Commission: Joint Research Centre (2023). Clean Energy Technology Observatory
- 20 • European Environment Agency (2024a, 2024b, 2024c). Transport, EVs, renewable energy indicators
- 21 • European Parliament (2022). Understanding transport poverty

23 National policy documents (by country)

24 Spain

- 25 • Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2024). Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima (PNIEC 2023–2030)
- 26 • Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2020). Long-term decarbonisation strategy 2050
- 27 • Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2020). Hydrogen Roadmap
- 28 • Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2019). Estrategia Nacional contra la Pobreza Energética
- 29 • Ministerio de Transportes (2021). Estrategia de Movilidad Segura, Sostenible y Conectada 2030
- 30 • Gobierno de España. Plan de Recuperación – Mobility component

32 Germany

- 33 • Federal Ministry for the Environment (2016). Climate Action Plan 2050
- 34 • Federal Ministry of Finance (2020). German Recovery and Resilience Plan
- 35 • BMWK (2023). System Development Strategy (energy systems)
- 36 • Federal Ministry of Labour (2022). Skilled Labour Strategy
- 37 • Bundesministerium der Justiz (2019, 2020). BEHG and GEG regulations (energy and buildings)

38 **Ireland**

- 39 • Government of Ireland (2024b). National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP)
- 40 • Government of Ireland (2023). Long-Term Climate Strategy
- 41 • Government of Ireland (2024a). Renewable Electricity Taskforce
- 42 • Department of Agriculture (2021). Food Vision 2030
- 43 • Teagasc (2022). Climate Action Strategy 2022–2030
- 44 • Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (2023). Just Transition Policy Statement

45 **Italy**

- 46 • Italian Ministry of Environment (2024). National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP)
- 47 • Ministero dell’agricoltura (2024). National Organic Production Plan
- 48 • Ministero delle politiche agricole (2021). CAP Strategic Plan
- 49 • Italian Government (2021). Long-term emissions reduction strategy

50 **Portugal**

- 51 • DGEG (2019). National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP 2030)
- 52 • National housing and urban policy literature (Alves et al., 2023; Chamusca, 2024)
- 53 • Laranja et al. (2020). Smart Specialisation Strategy implementation

54 **Hungary**

- 55 • European Commission (2024e). Final updated NECP (Hungary)
- 56 • Ministry of Innovation and Technology (2021). National Hydrogen Strategy
- 57 • ITM (2024). National Battery Industry Strategy 2030
- 58 • Ministry of Agriculture (2017). Jedlik Ányos Plan (electric mobility)
- 59 • Active Hungary (2023). National Cycling Strategy 2030

60 **Cross-cutting national and sectoral evidence**

- 61 • European Commission CAP Strategic Plans (Ireland, Italy)
- 62 • European Commission (2023g, 2023h). Country factsheets (agriculture)
- 63 • European Commission (2021b, 2022a, 2022d). Construction sector country profiles
- 64 • Energy Poverty Advisory Hub (2023). National indicators

65 **Summary table main drivers, risks, DGs and governance implications by sector**

66 **Table 3.** Summary table. (Source: Armayones Carranza & Viñé, 2025b)

Sector	Main drivers	Key risks	Disadvantaged groups	Governance implications
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerated deployment of renewable energy sources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geopolitical dependencies on critical materials for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-income households • Renters • Older adults 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community energy schemes to extend benefits

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smart grid expansion and advanced storage systems • Digital platforms enabling participatory energy models • EU and national decarbonisation targets (Fit for 55) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • batteries and solar • Grid fragility and exposure to extreme weather events • Rising energy prices excluding low-income households from the transition • Benefits concentrated among property owners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digitally excluded individuals • Fossil-fuel workers • Small energy producers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • beyond ownership • Targeted subsidies accessible without administrative burden • Anticipatory reskilling for fossil-fuel workers • Strategic material diversification to reduce geopolitical exposure
Transport and mobility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrification of vehicle fleets and charging infrastructure rollout • Digital mobility platforms and interoperable transport services • EU sustainable mobility strategy and national EV targets • Business model innovation (mobility-as-a-service) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour displacement in automotive and logistics sectors due to automation • Charging infrastructure gaps in rural and peripheral areas • High upfront cost of EVs limiting access for low-income users • Digital transport services inaccessible to digitally excluded groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-income households • Rural residents • Automotive & logistics workers • Digitally excluded users • People with disabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated rural mobility solutions to prevent transport poverty • Sectoral reskilling programmes tied to EV supply chain demand • Interoperability standards to enable seamless multimodal services • Inclusive design requirements for digital transport interfaces
Agriculture and food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digitalisation of agriculture (precision tools, AI irrigation, traceability) • CAP strategic plans promoting sustainable land management • Cooperative models scaling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital and financial barriers excluding small-scale and older farmers • Automation displacing seasonal and low-skilled agricultural workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small-scale farmers • Older farmers • Seasonal agricultural workers • Producers outside support networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative governance arrangements as entry-point for digital adoption • Proportionate regulatory compliance for small farms • Targeted advisory

	<p>digital tools for smaller producers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Circular economy mechanisms reducing input dependency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unequal access to advisory systems and innovation networks • Regulatory compliance burdens disproportionate for small farms 		<p>services for digitally excluded producers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social protection for seasonal workers facing automation-driven displacement
Housing and built environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate adaptation of housing stock and deep renovation strategies • Digital design and building management systems • EU energy performance of buildings directive and national renovation plans • Universal accessibility standards integration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renovation-driven displacement of low- and middle-income tenants • Uneven municipal capacity to access and deploy renovation funding • Digital-by-default service provision excluding residents without digital skills • Climate exposure concentrated in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-income households • Renters • Residents in climate-exposed areas • Digitally excluded individuals • Low-skilled construction workers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity-building for municipalities with limited institutional resources • Affordability guarantees linked to energy performance improvements • Training pathways for construction workers aligned with new build requirements

67 **Classification of statements >75% delphi survey**

68 **Table 4.** Classification of statements (Source: Armayones Carranza & Viñé, 2025b)

Positive statements (>75% consensus)	Negative statements (>75% consensus)
Housing and built environment	
By 2050, the construction sector will be dominated by assembly and automation roles	Access to climate-adapted housing will be strongly stratified by income, with wealthier households better protected from climate risks by 2050
Public tender processes will increasingly favor construction companies that demonstrate climate adaptive design strategies	By 2050, concrete will remain the dominant construction material

	Energy prices will significantly influence incentives for adopting sustainable housing solutions
Agriculture and food	
Cross-sector alliances (e.g., agriculture, clean energy or pharma) will drive innovation and accelerate digitalization in the agri-food sector	Small farms will be affected by rising compliance costs tied to environmental regulations and certification system
Cloud-based platforms will deliver end-to-end “farm-to-fork” traceability visible to consumers	Automation in farming will significantly reduce the number of manual crop workers by 2050, especially among seasonal and migrant labour
Irrigation networks will use remote sensing and AI to schedule watering autonomously	
By 2050, most family farms will join cooperatively governed data hubs	
By 2050, edge-computing nodes (e.g. 5G base stations) will cover nearly all cultivated land, enabling real-time AI on remote farms	
No farm under 10 ha will be able to adopt precision technologies without joining a formal support network of service providers or cooperatives	
EU and/or national agricultural digitalization schemes will include mandatory regional customization clauses to reflect local climate, soil and crop differences	
Energy	
The transition towards wind and solar energy will continue accelerating	EU energy dependency on third countries for critical materials (e.g., lithium, rare earths) will be a strategic vulnerability
The main factors that will lead the energy transition will be the increase of prices, geopolitical aspects and environmental concerns	Grid resilience will face new challenges as illustrated by the solar-related blackout in Spain
The energy labor market will experience an increase in demand for highly skilled jobs, such as engineers	
The R&D&I on battery recycling will be a decisive factor in EU energy independence by 2050	
New financial models will arise due to the energy market incentives created by private companies and their technification	

Energy systems will be increasingly integrated with digital platforms, demanding strong data governance to protect consumers right	
Mobility and transport	
Battery recycling and domestic production will become critical strategic sectors for EV autonomy by 2050	The automatization of the traditional automotive manufacturing jobs will impact blue-collar workers
New business models such as Mobilit-as-a-Service (MaaS) models will be a reality in 2050	By 2050, the long-haul road freight and aviation sectors will rely primarily on synthetic fuels and bio-derived alternatives, as battery technologies will remain unsuitable for those use cases
Battery reuse and recycling will enable circular business models in the automotive sector	
Pan-European reskilling programs will have retrained the combustion-engine workforce for roles in EV maintenance, smart mobility services, and battery recycling	
By 2050, Europe will have established a circular battery economy in which end-of-life batteries are systematically reclaimed and processed through urban-mining and recycling facilities	

69 **Complete scenarios (detailed). (Source: Armayones Carranza & Viñé, 2025a)**

70 **HOUSING AND BUILT ENVIRONMENT**

71 **Optimistic scenario – Twin transition takes place in the housing and built environment sector by**
 72 **2050**

73 By 2050, Europe’s built environment is a model of climate resilience and health. Cities and towns have
 74 been reshaped through decades of investment in deep renovation and human-centered urban planning
 75 based on sustainable design. The housing stock is unrecognisable from the early 21st century; inefficient
 76 buildings have been replaced or retrofitted into spaces that are comfortable year-round, regardless of
 77 the climate hazards.

78 All homes meet or exceed the highest performance standards for insulation and ventilation, Natural light
 79 is maximised through intelligent design, and passive heating and cooling systems maintain comfort
 80 without mechanical strain. Materials are locally sourced, and chosen for their circular life cycle, so that
 81 components can be reused or recycled without waste. In apartment complexes, green roofs and living
 82 walls are the norm, improving biodiversity and urban air quality while regulating building temperatures.

83 Rainwater harvesting and greywater recycling are integrated into every building, reducing demand on
84 municipal supplies and improving resilience.

85 Urban form has shifted toward mixed-use, walkable districts that integrate housing, services, and leisure
86 spaces. Streets are shaded with trees and permeable pavements, cooling cities and preventing flooding
87 during heavy rains. Public squares double as community gathering places and stormwater retention
88 areas, designed to be both beautiful and functional. Parks and green corridors connect neighbourhoods,
89 creating habitats for wildlife and safe spaces for people to meet and walk (or cycle).

90 Accessibility is universal. Homes and public buildings are barrier free, with wide corridors and adaptable
91 interiors that can be easily modified to suit changing mobility needs. Wayfinding systems use clear
92 signage to assist people with visual or cognitive impairments. For older adults and people with
93 disabilities, assistive technologies are integrated into living spaces, from voice-controlled lighting and
94 ventilation to fall- detection systems and responsive home layouts.

95 Affordability has been protected through long-term housing policy. Renovation subsidies and
96 Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) ensure that low- and middle-income households benefit from transformation,
97 avoiding the displacement that once accompanied urban renewal. In rural areas, buildings that were not
98 used have been repurposed into modern housing clusters that support community life and provide
99 access to essential services without long travel distances. Formerly neglected districts have been
100 revitalised with high-quality, climate-adapted housing alongside cultural and commercial spaces that
101 sustain local economies.

102 **Neutral scenario – Partial achievement of the twin transition, coexistence of the new and the old** 103 **(2050)**

104 By 2050, Europe’s built environment has seen substantial improvements, yet its transformation remains
105 uneven. Many cities have well-renovated housing and climate-resilient public spaces, but the depth and
106 quality of these changes vary widely between regions. In leading areas, older building stock has been
107 retrofitted to high performance standards (insulated façades, airtight windows, advanced ventilation
108 systems...) which create comfortable interiors with reduced environmental impact. In other parts of the
109 continent, however, renovations have been partial or delayed, leaving some homes still vulnerable to
110 extreme weather and high maintenance costs. Material choices have been central to the divergence. In
111 forward-moving regions, procurement policies have favoured local sourcing and recycling content,
112 creating circular supply chains that keep carbon low. In other areas, budget constraints have led to
113 retrofits with mixed-quality materials, some of which have limited life spans or higher environmental
114 impacts, which will be translated into future maintenance costs-

115 Urban areas have embraced a mixed pattern of redevelopment. City centers often feature attractive,
116 walkable districts with integrated green infrastructure. Yet in less well-funded municipalities, urban heat
117 islands persist, and public realm improvements remain modest. Access to high-quality housing is also
118 inconsistent: in thriving regions, affordability policies and inclusive zoning have kept costs stable, but
119 elsewhere, gentrification and limited supply have pushed low- and middle-income residents to
120 peripheral areas with fewer services.

121 Rural settlements have benefitted in pockets from adaptive reuse of old buildings and the creation of
122 compact housing clusters close to essential services. In some areas, underused administrative
123 buildings have been converted into modern community spaces, revitalising small towns. In other rural

124 zones, however, depopulation has left housing stock deteriorating, with insufficient investment to
125 reverse decline.

126 Accessibility has advanced, but progress is uneven. In well-resourced districts, barrier-free design is
127 standard: step-free entrances, adaptable interiors, tactile signage, and smart navigation aids serve
128 people of all ages and abilities. Elsewhere, retrofitting for accessibility has been slow, particularly in
129 older buildings with structural constraints and funding gaps have delayed upgrades. Public spaces show
130 similar disparities. Many metropolitan areas have created shaded pedestrian corridors and
131 neighborhood squares that host markets and events, strengthening social cohesion. But in some towns
132 and city outskirts, public spaces remain fragmented, lacking safe walkways or spaces for community
133 gathering.

134 **Pessimistic scenario – Negative trends and landscape shocks (2050)**

135 By 2050, Europe’s housing and built environment reflect decades of fragmented policy and insufficient
136 investment, accompanied by escalating climate pressures. While some projects stand as symbol of
137 ambition, they are exceptions in a place where much of the building stock remains outdated and
138 inefficient. The renovation wave of the early 21st century stalled midway, leaving millions of homes with
139 poor insulation and obsolete ventilation systems. Extreme heat in summer and cold snaps in winter
140 make these homes uncomfortable and expensive to maintain, putting pressure on household finances
141 and public health systems.

142 Material choices have been driven more by short-term cost-cutting than by sustainability or resilience.
143 In many areas, low-grade imports have replaced durable and low-carbon options, leading to rapid
144 deterioration and a cycle of constant repair. The absence of coherent circular-economy policies means
145 demolition waste continues to pile up, while valuable materials are discarded instead of reused. Some
146 urban districts have become patchworks of crumbling façades and mismatched retrofits, undermining
147 both visual cohesion and community pride.

148 Urban planning has failed to keep pace with climate risks. Many city centers still rely on impermeable
149 pavements and poorly shaded streets, making them hotspots for both flooding and heat stress. In
150 wealthier areas, residents have invested privately in innovations such as cooling technologies and
151 rooftop gardens; elsewhere, the lack of adaptation has left entire neighbourhoods prone to repeated
152 climate-related damage. Public spaces in underfunded municipalities are scarce or degraded, with
153 broken pavements or poorly maintained parks.

154 Accessibility remains inconsistent. While some newer developments include barrier-free entrances and
155 adaptable interiors, many older housing remain inaccessible to people with reduced mobility. Lack of
156 lifts and narrow staircases, as well as absence of visual aids, limit participation in community life for
157 older adults, disabled people and parents with small children. Rural areas face additional challenges,
158 as depopulation has left housing stock to decay, and limited resources mean essential accessibility
159 upgrades are rare.

160 Affordability has worsened in many urban centers. Housing shortages, combined with speculative
161 investment in prime locations, have driven up rents and prices, pushing low- and middle-income
162 residents to peripheral areas with limited infrastructure and poor-quality housing. Informal settlements
163 have emerged in areas around cities in some regions, where residents occupy unfinished or abandoned
164 buildings with minimal services.

165 **AGRICULTURE AND FOOD**

166 **Optimistic scenario – Twin transition takes place in the agriculture and food sector by 2050**

167 By 2050, Europe’s agricultural sector embraced both sustainability and digitalisation, creating a system
168 that is productive, resilient, and fair. Farms of all sizes use advanced tools to manage resources
169 efficiently and meet high environmental standards. Cross-sector alliances between agriculture, clean
170 energy, and technology have become common, pooling expertise and funding to deliver solutions that
171 were once out of reach for smaller producers. These partnerships have driven the spread of innovations
172 such as bioenergy-powered greenhouses, solar-powered irrigation, and digital tools for monitoring soil
173 health.

174 Cloud-based traceability platforms now connect farms directly to consumers, making it possible for
175 shoppers to see where their food comes from, how it was produced, and its environmental footprint. This
176 transparency has built trust and opened new markets for farmers who meet high sustainability criteria,
177 including premium prices for certified products. Smaller farms benefit by differentiating their produce
178 and reaching customers willing to pay for quality and accountability.

179 Water use has become far more efficient thanks to irrigation networks guided by remote sensing and AI.
180 Satellites, IoT sensors, and weather forecasts feed into autonomous systems that deliver water only
181 when and where it is needed. This has cut costs, reduced waste, and helped farming adapt to more
182 frequent droughts. Even in traditionally dry areas, crop yields are stable, and farmers are less dependent
183 on expensive emergency water supplies.

184 Family farms thrive within cooperatively governed data hubs, which act as shared knowledge centers
185 and service providers. These hubs give members access to AI-driven crop models, carbon market
186 participation, and affordable insurance. The cooperative structure ensures that decisions are made
187 locally and benefits are shared fairly. Small farms, once at risk of falling behind, have equal access to
188 the same cutting-edge tools as larger operations.

189 Edge-computing coverage now extends to almost every field, enabling real-time AI for farm
190 management. Autonomous tractors, drones, and robotics operate with precision, reducing input costs
191 and improving productivity. Even the smallest farms can use precision technologies by joining formal
192 support networks or cooperatives, which provide shared access to machinery, training, and
193 maintenance. This arrangement has kept technology adoption high while preventing smaller producers
194 from being left behind.

195 Policies now require agricultural digitalisation schemes to be tailored to local conditions, recognising
196 that a vineyard in southern Spain has different needs from a dairy farm in northern Germany. This regional
197 customisation has made digital tools more relevant, increasing their adoption and impact. Advisory
198 services are staffed with local experts who understand the specific climate, soil, and crop challenges of
199 each region.

200 For disadvantaged subgroups, the changes have been tangible. Low-income rural households have
201 stable incomes through cooperative membership and access to premium markets. Migrants are
202 employed in skilled roles operating and maintaining advanced agricultural systems, supported by
203 training in both technology and language. Older farmers have remained active by working within
204 cooperatives that handle the most complex digital tasks, while providing them with tools they can use
205 confidently. People with disabilities find more accessible employment opportunities in roles involving

206 monitoring, data analysis, and cooperative management. Rural communities once left behind now enjoy
207 better infrastructure, stronger local economies, and improved food security.

208 Agriculture in 2050 is no longer divided between the winners and losers of change. Instead, it is a
209 connected, adaptive system where sustainability and technology work together, and where even those
210 in remote or small-scale settings share in the benefits of the twin transition.

211 **Neutral scenario – Partial achievement of the twin transition, coexistence of the new and the old**
212 **(2050)**

213 By 2050, Europe’s agricultural landscape shows progress toward sustainability and digitalisation, but
214 the picture is uneven. Many farms have adopted advanced tools and more sustainable practices, while
215 others continue with older methods, creating a patchwork of progress. Cross-sector alliances between
216 agriculture, clean energy, and technology exist but are concentrated in certain regions and sectors. In
217 areas with strong investment and political support, these partnerships have brought more efficient
218 production and innovative practices. In other regions, limited funding and fragmented networks have
219 slowed change.

220 Cloud-based traceability systems are widely used by large and export-oriented farms, helping them
221 reach premium markets with detailed information on product origin and sustainability. However, smaller
222 farms without the resources or capacity to meet certification standards often operate outside these
223 platforms, selling into local markets where traceability is less valued. The gap between farmers able to
224 benefit from consumer demand for transparency and those left in traditional supply chains has not been
225 fully closed.

226 Irrigation networks that use AI and remote sensing operate in many regions, especially those prone to
227 drought, but not everywhere. Some farmers still rely on conventional systems, either because of cost
228 barriers or limited access to the infrastructure needed. As a result, water efficiency has improved overall,
229 but unevenly, and some areas still face stress during prolonged dry spells.

230 Family farms participate in cooperatively governed data hubs in several Member States, gaining access
231 to shared tools and services. Yet membership is far from universal, and many small farms remain outside
232 these structures, either due to mistrust, lack of awareness, or reluctance to share data. Where hubs
233 function well, they improve competitiveness and sustainability. Where they do not exist or are poorly
234 managed, farms struggle to keep pace with technological change.

235 Edge-computing coverage enables real-time AI in many agricultural areas, but there are still gaps in
236 remote and mountainous regions. Farmers in well-connected areas use autonomous equipment and
237 data-driven decision-making, while those in poorly served zones rely on less precise methods, creating
238 disparities in productivity and efficiency.

239 Policies for regional customisation of digitalisation schemes are in place, but their implementation
240 varies. In some countries, adaptation to local climate and soil conditions have made tools more relevant
241 and effective. In others, generic approaches have reduced their usefulness, leading to low adoption.

242 The impact on disadvantaged subgroups is mixed. Low-income rural households in regions with strong
243 cooperative structures benefit from stable income and better market access, while those in less
244 connected areas see fewer gains. Migrants continue to work in agriculture, but many remain in seasonal

245 manual roles because training for higher-skilled positions is uneven. Older farmers adapt better in areas
246 where cooperatives provide technical support, but in less organised regions they face challenges in
247 meeting new requirements. People with disabilities have more opportunities on some modernised
248 farms, but accessibility is still inconsistent.

249 In this 2050, agriculture reflects both the achievements and the missed opportunities of the twin
250 transition. Progress is visible, but uneven adoption, infrastructure gaps, and persistent inequalities
251 prevent the sector from fully realising its potential for inclusivity and sustainability.

252 **Pessimistic scenario – Negative trends and landscape shocks (2050)**

253 By 2050, Europe’s agricultural sector is struggling to adapt to the demands of sustainability and
254 digitalisation. Progress has been uneven and, in many places, slow. Small farms face rising compliance
255 costs tied to environmental regulations and certification systems. For many, meeting the requirements
256 for eco- schemes, carbon reporting, and traceability is financially and administratively overwhelming.
257 Larger farms, with dedicated staff and greater resources, absorb the changes with less difficulty,
258 widening the gap between big and small producers. Some smallholdings have closed, while others have
259 been absorbed by bigger operations, leading to reduced diversity in rural systems and the erosion of
260 traditional farming knowledge.

261 Automation in farming has advanced rapidly, replacing a large proportion of manual crop work,
262 especially among seasonal and migrant labour. While this has improved efficiency, it has also displaced
263 many low- skilled workers. In regions that once depended on seasonal agriculture for employment, job
264 losses have driven migration, economic decline, and social strain. Few retraining programs have been
265 implemented, and those that exist are often mismatched to the local labour market.

266 Other positive developments that could have bridged the gap have failed to reach their potential. Cross-
267 sector alliances remain small in scale and are mostly limited to high-tech farms. Cloud-based
268 traceability systems exist but are inaccessible to many smallholders who lack the funds or digital
269 infrastructure to join them. Irrigation systems using AI and remote sensing operate mainly in wealthy
270 regions, leaving others vulnerable to worsening droughts. Cooperatively governed data hubs function in
271 pockets of Europe, but in many areas, they have not been established or have collapsed due to lack of
272 trust and funding.

273 Edge-computing coverage is far from universal. In many rural and mountainous areas, connectivity
274 remains poor, preventing farmers from using autonomous machinery or real-time decision-making tools.
275 This leaves them less productive and less competitive in increasingly globalised markets. Policies
276 requiring regional customisation of digitalisation schemes have been poorly implemented, leading to
277 tools that do not reflect local climate and crop needs, further discouraging adoption.

278 The consequences for disadvantaged subgroups are severe. Low-income rural households face
279 shrinking income opportunities and higher production costs, pushing many out of farming entirely.
280 Migrants, once a significant part of the agricultural workforce, have been displaced by automation
281 without access to new employment pathways. Older farmers are disproportionately affected by
282 digitalisation requirements, with many unable to adapt and therefore excluded from subsidy schemes.
283 People with disabilities and those in remote areas find even fewer opportunities in agriculture, as most
284 accessible roles are concentrated in regions with advanced infrastructure.

285 The sector's vulnerability to climate change has worsened. Without widespread adoption of smart
286 irrigation or precision agriculture, yields fluctuate with extreme weather. Droughts, floods, and
287 heatwaves regularly disrupt production, reducing food security and increasing dependence on imports.
288 Rural depopulation accelerates as young people leave for better prospects elsewhere, leaving behind
289 ageing communities with limited capacity to maintain agricultural output.

290 In this 2050, the twin transition in agriculture has faltered. The promise of technology and sustainability
291 has been realised only in isolated pockets, while large parts of the sector remain trapped in a cycle of
292 high costs, low productivity, and exclusion. Inequalities have deepened, and the gap between the best-
293 equipped farms and those left behind has become a defining feature of the rural landscape.

294 **ENERGY**

295 **Optimistic scenario – Twin transition takes place in the energy sector by 2050**

296 By 2050, Europe's energy system is almost entirely powered by wind and solar. Offshore wind farms
297 stretch along the coasts, producing large amounts of electricity. Solar panels cover rooftops, building
298 walls, parking areas and farmland, often combined with crops in agrivoltaic systems. These renewable
299 sources meet nearly all electricity demand across the continent. The challenges that once came with
300 such high levels of renewables, like unstable voltage, low grid inertia or risk of blackouts, have been
301 solved. Large-scale batteries, green hydrogen storage and smart grid technology keep the system stable.
302 Automatic controls and real-time monitoring mean the grid can adapt before problems appear, even
303 during extreme weather.

304 The shift to this system began decades ago. Rising fossil fuel prices made renewable energy more
305 attractive. Political tensions over energy imports showed how risky dependency could be. People have
306 become more aware of the need to protect the environment, pushing governments to act. Rules that
307 used to delay renewable projects were changed, making it easier and faster to build. Clear plans were
308 set to reduce and then stop the use of fossil fuels. The cost of renewable technology has dropped
309 steadily, helping more people and businesses to invest.

310 Digital platforms are now a normal part of daily life. Every household and business can check where their
311 energy comes from, how much they are using and how much it costs. Many store extra power in batteries
312 and sell it back to the grid at times of high demand, earning extra income. These platforms are easy to
313 use, and strict rules protect people's personal data. Because of this, trust in the system is high.

314 One of the biggest changes has been in battery recycling. Batteries are now made to be repaired, reused
315 or taken apart so that their materials can be recovered. This has reduced Europe's need to import lithium,
316 rare earths and other critical materials. Large recycling centers have opened in towns that once
317 depended on coal mines or heavy industry. These centers provide good jobs for former fossil-fuel
318 workers, newly trained technicians and young graduates in engineering and manufacturing.

319 The benefits are shared widely. Low-income households live in well-insulated and energy-efficient
320 homes. Many have their own solar panels or are part of community-owned energy projects that lower
321 their bills and sometimes pay them a share of the profits. Rural communities run local wind farms and
322 storage systems, using the income to improve services like schools, healthcare and internet access.
323 People who rent their homes, once excluded from most of these benefits, now join through shared
324 ownership programs, virtual net metering or subscription-based clean energy plans.

325 In this future, the system is designed for inclusion. Migrants and people who do not speak the local
326 language well can access training and support to find jobs in the energy sector. Older people and those
327 with disabilities use simple displays, voice controls or other adapted tools to manage their energy use.
328 Energy and digital skills are taught in schools and offered to adults, making it possible for everyone to
329 take part.

330 Europe in 2050 reached its climate goals and built an energy system that is clean, reliable and fair.
331 Electricity is affordable for all, jobs are secure and spread across regions, and communities have more
332 control over their energy future. The twin transition has brought environmental protection and social
333 fairness together, showing that both can be achieved at the same time.

334 **Neutral scenario – Partial achievement of the twin transition, coexistence of the new and the old**
335 **(2050)**

336 In 2050, Europe’s energy landscape shows clear progress, but the transformation is uneven. Renewable
337 energy from wind and solar provides a significant share of electricity, and in some regions it is the
338 dominant source. Offshore wind farms operate efficiently along many coasts, and solar panels cover
339 public buildings, homes, and farmland. Yet, fossil fuels still play an important role in the system. Gas
340 plants are kept as backup for periods of high demand or low renewable generation, and some coal
341 facilities remain active in countries that have struggled to replace them.

342 The advances that have made high renewable penetration possible are present, but not everywhere. In
343 well-connected areas, large-scale batteries, hydrogen storage, and advanced control systems keep the
344 grid stable. Elsewhere, infrastructure is older and less flexible, making it harder to manage fluctuations.
345 Extreme weather events sometimes lead to temporary supply interruptions in these regions, reminding
346 people that reliability is still uneven.

347 Digital tools have changed how many households and businesses interact with the energy system. In
348 urban centers and connected rural areas, people monitor their energy use in real time, store extra power,
349 and sell it back to the grid when prices are high. In these places, dynamic pricing schemes and
350 automated systems help balance supply and demand. However, participation is not universal. Rural
351 residents in areas with weak internet connections, older adults unfamiliar with digital platforms, and
352 migrants facing language barriers often cannot use these services fully.

353 Battery recycling has improved and now provides a steady supply of materials like lithium and rare earth,
354 reducing but not removing Europe’s reliance on imports. Disruptions in supply still occur, and when they
355 do, they can slow down new renewable projects and raise costs. Employment patterns also vary.
356 Regions that embraced renewables early enjoy strong job markets in engineering, maintenance, and
357 manufacturing. Other areas, particularly those that were slower to attract investment, continue to see
358 higher unemployment and limited opportunities for workers from traditional energy sectors.

359 For specific groups, the picture is mixed. Low-income households in proactive municipalities benefit
360 from energy-efficient homes, solar access, and stable bills. In less engaged regions, they face higher
361 costs and fewer support programs. Renters gain access to shared solar projects and virtual net metering
362 in some areas, but elsewhere their landlords have not invested in energy improvements, leaving them
363 with high bills. Rural communities in connected zones run profitable local projects and reinvest in public
364 services, while others without such infrastructure miss out on these gains. Migrants in some regions find
365 training and jobs in the energy sector, while in others they remain excluded by language and recognition

366 barriers. Former fossil-fuel workers have transitioned successfully where retraining programs are linked
367 to local jobs, but many in slower-moving regions work in lower-paid or insecure jobs.

368 This Europe has made important steps toward a clean and modern energy system, but progress is
369 uneven. Renewables and digitalisation have improved efficiency and reduced emissions, yet fossil fuels
370 still fill important gaps. The benefits of the transition are visible, but they do not reach all communities
371 equally, leaving parts of society still waiting for the full promise of the twin transition.

372 **Pessimistic scenario – Negative trends and landscape shocks (2050)**

373 In 2050, Europe’s energy system is under strain. The shift to renewables has slowed, and fossil fuels
374 remain a large part of the mix. Some wind and solar projects have expanded, but their growth has been
375 held back by delays in infrastructure, supply chain disruptions, and political disagreements over funding.
376 Several countries still rely heavily on gas and coal to meet demand, especially during winter peaks. The
377 result is a system that is less clean, less reliable, and more vulnerable to external shocks.

378 Import dependency on critical materials like lithium and rare earths remains high. Global tensions and
379 export restrictions have led to repeated shortages, delaying battery production and renewable
380 deployment. Costs have risen, making new projects harder to finance. Instead of achieving energy
381 independence, Europe faces regular supply disruptions that force governments to restart or extend the
382 life of fossil-fuel plants. These decisions are framed as necessary for stability, but they keep emissions
383 high and slow the move toward climate goals.

384 Digitalisation has advanced unevenly. Some urban areas have smart grids and automated energy
385 management, but much of the system still relies on outdated infrastructure. Large parts of the
386 population cannot participate in dynamic pricing schemes or benefit from grid-connected storage. The
387 lack of strong data governance in some countries has also led to privacy concerns and public mistrust,
388 reducing the uptake of digital energy services.

389 The job market shows deep divides. High-skilled positions in advanced renewable technology are
390 concentrated in a few economic hubs, while many regions have seen job losses from the closure of
391 fossil-fuel industries without equivalent opportunities to replace them. Retraining programs have been
392 patchy and often poorly matched to the needs of local economies. Former fossil fuel workers in these
393 areas face long-term unemployment or accept lower-paid, insecure jobs.

394 The social impact of these failures is significant. Low-income households face higher and more unstable
395 energy bills, as subsidies are inconsistent and fossil fuel prices fluctuate. Rural communities in less
396 developed regions have limited access to renewable projects and remain dependent on expensive
397 imported fuels. Renters are often left behind because landlords have not invested in energy efficiency or
398 clean energy, keeping their bills high. Migrants and people with limited language skills face additional
399 barriers to joining the energy workforce or accessing support programs. Older adults and people with
400 disabilities struggle with poorly designed interfaces and a lack of tailored assistance, leaving them
401 excluded from digital services that could reduce their costs.

402 Frequent extreme weather events have exposed the fragility of the system. Heatwaves, storms, and
403 floods have caused repeated power outages in vulnerable areas. Without adequate investment in grid
404 resilience, recovery from these events is slow, deepening inequalities between well-prepared regions
405 and those left without resources.

406 This is a Europe where the twin transition has not delivered its promise. Renewable deployment has
407 stalled, fossil fuel dependence persists, and the benefits of technology are concentrated in a few places.
408 Many communities are locked in cycles of high costs, limited job opportunities, and vulnerability to
409 climate impacts. The gap between those who can participate in and profit from the energy system and
410 those who cannot has widened, turning the energy transition into a source of division rather than a driver
411 of unity.

412 **MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT**

413 **Optimistic scenario – Twin transition takes place in the mobility and transport sector by 2050**

414 By 2050, Europe’s mobility system is an integrated, low-emission network that is both inclusive and
415 sustainable. Electrification dominates urban and intercity travel, supported by diverse technologies that
416 reflect strategic decisions made decades earlier. Electric vehicles account for nearly all private car
417 sales, but the shift is not limited to ownership: subscription-based “car as a service” models and well-
418 established Mobility-as-a-Service platforms allow access to shared, on-demand fleets in every major
419 city. These platforms integrate booking and payment, as well as routing, across trains, buses, shared
420 EVs, micromobility, and demand-responsive shuttles, replacing much of the friction once found
421 between modes. While private cars still exist, they are fewer and cleaner, and they are integrated in a
422 system optimised for connectivity and efficiency.

423 Urban and rural transport fleets are fully electric, reducing both noise and air pollution. In non-urban
424 areas, integrated rural mobility hubs have transformed access to work and education. These hubs
425 combine shared electric vehicles, regular buses, on-demand mobility, and micromobility options. They
426 are designed with universal accessibility in mind and have reduced transport poverty in areas that were
427 once underserved.

428 Circular economy principles are characteristic of the automotive value chain. Domestic battery
429 production, using diversified chemistries based on locally available materials, has reduced dependency
430 on imported critical minerals. En-of-life batteries are reclaimed and processed through advanced
431 recycling facilities, many located in towns that once depended on combustion-engine manufacturing.
432 This has created stable jobs in battery recycling and second-life applications.

433 These shifts are supported by long-term investment in reskilling. Pan-European programs have retrained
434 former blue-collar workers in EV maintenance, battery diagnostics, and smart-mobility service. Training
435 is linked directly to hiring pipelines, ensuring that former fossil-fuel automotive workers and those from
436 declining logistics subsectors move into stable employment without prolonged unemployment.

437 For low-income households, targeted subsidies and affordable leasing models remove upfront cost
438 barriers. Shared EV schemes, supported by municipal and cooperative ownership, give them access to
439 electric mobility without the cost of ownership. Rural communities benefit from the mobility hubs, with
440 coordinated timetables reducing long travel times to jobs and services. Renters in dense urban areas,
441 once excluded from EV incentives due to lack of private charging, gain from widespread charging in
442 neighborhood-based shared fleets. Migrants and people with limited bureaucratic literacy are supported
443 by one-stop mobility centers that provide multilingual assistance for subsidy applications and account
444 set-up for MaaS platforms, reducing exclusions. Older adults enjoy barrier-free vehicles and priority,
445 easy-to-use booking systems across fleets, while people with disabilities benefit from universal design
446 standards included in every vehicle and hub.

447 **Neutral scenario – Partial achievement of the twin transition, coexistence of the new and the old**
448 **(2050)**

449 In 2050, Europe’s mobility landscape reflects both the successes and limits of the twin transition.
450 Electrification and digitalisation have advanced substantially, but the pace and consistency of change
451 vary widely depending on the market and geographical scope. Electric vehicles dominate new car sales
452 in many urban areas, supported by robust charging networks and subscription-based “car as a service”
453 models, but in smaller cities and rural zones, internal combustion vehicles (often running on hybrid or
454 biofuel blends) remain common, coexisting with EVs. MaaS platforms are well-developed in major
455 metropolitan regions, offering integrated booking for trains, buses, shared EVs, and micromobility. In
456 other areas, fragmented ticketing systems and limited operator participation prevent full integration.

457 Public transport electrification is significant but incomplete. While most urban bus fleets are battery-
458 powered and quiet, some interurban routes and regional lines still rely on diesel or LNG because of
459 infrastructure and cost constraints. Rural mobility hubs exist in certain countries, but their coverage is
460 uneven. In underserved regions, car dependence remains high, reinforcing disparities in access to
461 services and jobs.

462 Battery recycling and domestic production have grown, but dependence on imported materials persists.
463 Circular-economy initiatives recover a portion of lithium, cobalt, and nickel from end-of-life batteries yet
464 processing capacity is concentrated in a few industrial clusters. This creates regional imbalances in job
465 creation, with some former automotive-manufacturing areas thriving while others face prolonged
466 adjustment periods. Reskilling programmes have reached any, but participation rates are uneven, and
467 training does not always match local job demand, leading to some workers accepting lower-paid roles
468 in unrelated sectors.

469 For low-income households, targeted subsidies and affordable leasing exist in some member states, but
470 eligibility criteria and application complexity, as well as budget limits, keep adoption rates modest. Many
471 remain dependent on older, less efficient vehicles, exposing them to higher operating costs. Rural
472 communities benefit when mobility hubs are funded, yet in many places public transport remains
473 infrequent, forcing continued reliance on private cars. Renters without private parking see improved
474 access to chargers in cities with strong policy frameworks, but in less regulated markets, charging
475 availability lags EV growth. Migrants and people with limited bureaucratic literacy gain mobility when
476 local authorities provide support for MaaS apps and subsidy applications, but in many regions such
477 assistance is ad hoc or NGO-led. Older adults experience greater comfort and accessibility on
478 modernised fleets where investment has been made, yet in other areas booking systems remain barriers.
479 People with disabilities are well-served in flagship MaaS networks and urban transport upgrades, but
480 universal design standards are inconsistently enforced outside major cities. They can access mobility
481 systems through physical ticket offices and phone booking in some systems, but in many cases digital-
482 only platforms create silent exclusion.

483 **Pessimistic scenario – Negative trends and landscape shocks (2050)**

484 By 2050, the promise of an inclusive and sustainable mobility transition has not been realised.
485 Electrification has advanced in some wealthy urban sites, but large parts of Europe still rely on older
486 combustion vehicles, often running on imported fossil fuels or low-grade biofuel blends. Fragmented
487 regulation and insufficient investment have stalled the rollout of charging infrastructure, leaving many
488 regions as “charging deserts”. The absence of a coordinated approach has locked in a two-speed

489 transition: metropolitan centers enjoy modern fleets and digital integration, while rural and peri-urban
490 areas remain dependent on outdated, polluting vehicles.

491 MaaS platforms exist in name but fail to deliver integration. Private operators guard data, and public
492 systems lack the capacity to enforce interoperability. As a result, passengers must juggle multiple apps
493 and payment systems. Public transport electrification is incomplete; diesel buses and ageing trains are
494 still in service on many regional and rural routes. The few rural mobility hubs that were launched early in
495 the transition have closed due to underfunding, and worsening transport poverty for low-density
496 communities.

497 Battery production remains heavily dependent on imported critical minerals, making the sector
498 vulnerable to price spikes and supply interruptions. Circular-economy goals for battery reuse and
499 recycling were not met; most end-of-life batteries are processed abroad, losing both materials and job
500 opportunities. Automation in vehicle manufacturing has accelerated without adequate reskilling
501 programmes, leaving large numbers of former automotive and logistics workers unemployed or in
502 precarious, low-paid jobs.

503 For low-income households, the high upfront cost of EVs remains prohibitive. Subsidies either no longer
504 exists or are structured in ways that favour wealthier buyers who can afford initial payments and navigate
505 complex applications. Operating older combustion cars exposes these households to volatile fuel prices
506 and stricter emissions charges, deepening financial strain. Rural communities suffer from the collapse
507 of mobility hubs and long gaps in public transport coverage, forcing continued dependence on expensive
508 private vehicles. Renters without private parking face near-total exclusion from EV ownership, with
509 charging spots limited to wealthier districts. Migrants and those with limited bureaucratic literacy are
510 disproportionately excluded from incentives and subsidies, as assistance services have been cut. Older
511 adults can't use digital booking and payments systems that have replaced physical ticketing, and can't
512 use MaaS services, which have shifted to digital-only formats as well, cutting them off from modern
513 mobility options. People with disabilities face inconsistent or absent accessibility features in vehicles
514 and stations.

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