

Women's Leadership and the Expansion of Populist Radical Right Party Agendas

Supporting Material for Online Publication

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Appendix A: Study 1, Dataset Description

TABLE A1: COUNTRIES, PARTIES, AND MANIFESTOS INCLUDED IN THE DATASET

Country	Party	Year of Manifestos	Woman Leader(Year)
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	2006, 2008	–
	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)	1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2019	2002*
Belgium	Flemish Bloc (VB)	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003	–
	Flemish Interest (VB)	2007, 2010, 2014, 2019	–
	People’s Party (PP)	2014	–
Denmark	Danish People’s Party (DF)	1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011
	Progress Party (FP)	1988, 1990, 1994, 1998	1988, 1990, 1994, 1998
	The New Right	2019	2019
Finland	True Finns (PS)	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	–
France	National Front (FN; RN)	1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022	2012, 2017, 2022
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	2013, 2017, 2021, 2025	2017, 2021, 2025
Greece	Golden Dawn (XA)	2012, 2015, 2019	–
	Greek Solution (EL)	2019, 2023	–
	Independent Greeks (ANEL)	2012, 2015	–
	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	2007, 2009, 2012	–
Italy	Brothers of Italy (FdI)	2013, 2018	2013, 2018
	League (NL; L)	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018	–
	National Alliance (AN)	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006	–
Netherlands	Centre Democrats	1989, 1994	–
	Forum for Democracy (FvD)	2017, 2021	–
	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	2002, 2003	–
	Party of Freedom (PVV)	2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021	–
	Right Answer 21 (JA21)	2021	2021
Norway	Progress Party (FrP)	1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	2009, 2013, 2017
Portugal	Chega	2019, 2022	–
Spain	Vox	2019, 2023	–
Sweden	New Democracy (NyD)	1991	–
	Sweden Democrats (SD)	2010, 2014, 2018, 2022	–
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union (EDU/UDF)	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2019	–
	Swiss Democrats (SD/DS)	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003	–
	Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC)	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	–

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Country	Party	Year of Manifestos	Woman Leader(Year)
United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	1992, 1997, 2001, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2024	2017, 2019
	Reform UK	2024	—
	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	2001, 2015, 2017	—

Note: * Woman Leader (Year) indicates election years in which the party was coded as being led by a woman. For the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the 2002 election is coded as a woman-led case because Susanne Riess-Passer served as party leader until a month before the election. Although she was no longer the party leader at the time of the election, it is plausible that she influenced the manifesto's content and priorities.

TABLE A2: TOPIC CATEGORIES AND MPD CODES

Category	MPD Codes	Variable Name
Foreign Alliances	101: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	foreignalliances
Militarism	104: Military: Positive 105: Military: Negative	militarism
Internationalism	107: Internationalism: Positive 109: Internationalism: Negative	internationalism
EU	108: European Community/Union: Positive 110: European Community/Union: Negative	eu
Constitutionalism	203: Constitutionalism: Positive 204: Constitutionalism: Negative	constitutionalism
Decentralisation	301: Decentralization 302: Centralisation	decentralisation
Free Market Economy	401: Free Market Economy 402: Incentives: Positive 403: Market Regulation 404: Economic Planning 412: Controlled Economy 413: Nationalisation 415: Marxist Analysis	freemarketeco
Environmental Protection	410: Economic Growth: Positive 416: Anti-Growth Economy: Positive 501: Environmental Protection	environment
Protectionism	406: Protectionism: Positive 407: Protectionism: Negative	protectionism
Keynesian Policy	409: Keynesian Demand Management 414: Economic Orthodoxy	keynesianpolicy
Welfare State	504: Welfare State Expansion 505: Welfare State Limitation	welfarestate
Education Spending	506: Education Expansion 507: Education Limitation	education
Nationalism	601: National Way of Life: Positive 602: National Way of Life: Negative	nationalism
Traditional Morality	603: Traditional Morality: Positive 604: Traditional Morality: Negative	tradmorality
Multiculturalism	607: Multiculturalism: Positive 608: Multiculturalism: Negative	multiculturalism
Labour Policy	701: Labour Groups: Positive 702: Labour Groups: Negative	laborpolicy
Imperialism	103: Anti-Imperialism	anti-imperialism
Peace	106: Peace	peace
Freedom / Human Rights	201: Freedom and Human Rights	freedom_human_rights
Democracy	202: Democracy	democracy

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Table A2 continued from previous page

Category	MPD Codes	Variable Name
Administrative Efficiency	303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	admin_eff
Corruption	304: Political Corruption	corruption
Political Authority	305: Political Authority	political_authority
Corporatism	405: Corporatism/Mixed Economy	corporatism
General Economic Goals	408: Economic Goals	economic_goals
Technology & Infrastructure	411: Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	technology_infrastructure
Cultural Policy	502: Culture: Positive	cultural_policy
Equality	503: Equality: Positive	equality
Law and Order	605: Law and Order: Positive	law_order
Civic mindedness	606: Civic Mindedness: Positive	civic_mind
Agricultural Policy	703: Agriculture and Farmers: Positive	agriculture
Middle Class Policy	704: Middle Class and Professional Groups	middleclass
Minorities	705: Underprivileged Minority Groups	minorities
Other Groups	706: Non economic Demographic Groups	othergroups

Notes: Topic categories are constructed by collapsing Manifesto Project Dataset (MPD) codes. Categories in the upper panel (Foreign Alliances through Labour Policy) are composite; those in the lower panel (Imperialism through Other Groups) correspond to individual MPD codes.

Computation of Issue Salience

Issue salience is computed following Lowe et al. (2011) as $\log\left(\frac{R+L+1}{N}\right)$, where R and L denote the quasi-sentence counts for the positive and negative poles of each issue dimension and N is the total number of coded quasi-sentences in the manifesto. The transformation captures total attention devoted to a policy domain regardless of ideological direction. The offset ensures that the measure remains defined when a manifesto contains no references to a given issue, allowing all observations to be retained.

Appendix B: Study 1, Descriptive and Robustness Checks

TABLE B1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N
ENMI	15.55	3.89	4.86	15.96	23.63	138
Woman leader	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	141
Year	2007.17	10.29	1988.00	2008	2025	141
% Female MPs (t-1)	17.25	12.39	0.00	15.00	50.00	125
Incumbency	0.12	0.33	0.00	0.00	1.00	141
Vote share (t-1)	9.73	7.23	0.31	8.64	29.39	116
Lagged DV	15.51	3.87	4.86	15.95	23.63	137

Note: Unit of observation is party-election year. Differences in N across variables reflect missing values, primarily in vote share and female MPs.

TABLE B2: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS


	(3) <i>FE No Lag DV</i>	(4) <i>Random Effects</i>	(5) <i>Mundlak Hybrid</i>	(6) <i>First Differences</i>
Woman leader	2.275** (0.660)	0.740 (1.086)		3.266* (1.365)
within-party			2.247** (0.663)	
between-party			1.062 (1.273)	
% Female MPs (t-1)	0.010 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.039)		0.035 (0.050)
within-party			0.012 (0.031)	
between-party			-0.040 (0.035)	
Incumbency	0.164 (2.606)	1.125 (1.330)		0.743 (3.943)
within-party			0.228 (2.089)	
between-party			0.866 (0.909)	
Vote share (t-1)	-0.075 (0.060)	-0.014 (0.064)		-0.098 (0.132)
within-party			-0.088 (0.064)	
between-party			0.015 (0.048)	
Lagged DV		0.167 (0.104)		
within-party			-0.155 (0.142)	
between-party			1.048*** (0.139)	
Intercept		13.421*** (1.940)	-0.917 (3.055)	
Observations	94	102	102	71
Parties	20	28	28	19
R ²	0.525	—	0.481	0.084
Party FE	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE clustering	Party	—	Party	Party

Notes: Models (3) and (5) are estimated using OLS with party fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the party level, implemented via `feols` from the `fixest` package. Model (4) is a random-intercept model estimated by REML, implemented via `lmer` from the `lme4` package. Model (6) is a first-differences specification estimated via `feols`. Model (5) decomposes each time-varying covariate into within-party and between-party components (Mundlak, 1978); the within-party coefficients are directly comparable to the fixed-effects estimates in Model (3) and the main text. All models include five-year period fixed effects (1988–1994, ..., 2021–2025); period coefficients are omitted from the table for readability. All models estimated in R version 4.4.1.

⁺p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table B2 presents four alternative specifications supporting the robustness of the main findings. Model 3 excludes the lagged dependent variable to assess sensitivity to potential Nickell bias in the dynamic fixed-effects specification; the coefficient on woman leader increases to 2.275 ($p < 0.001$), close in magnitude to the main specification, suggesting our results are not substantially driven by bias associated with including a lagged dependent variable alongside party fixed effects in a short panel. Model 4 estimates a random-intercept model that exploits both within- and between-party variation. The coefficient remains positive (0.740) and directionally consistent with the main results, though it does not reach conventional significance levels, likely reflecting the inclusion of between-party variation that is limited and heterogeneous across cases. Model 5 presents the Mundlak hybrid decomposition. The within-party component (2.247, $p < 0.01$) closely mirrors the party fixed-effects results. The between-party component is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant (1.062, $p > 0.1$), indicating that the effect of female leadership operates primarily through within-party leadership transitions. Model 6 estimates a first differences specification. The coefficient on Δ Woman leader is positive and statistically significant (3.266, $p < 0.05$), consistent in direction and larger in magnitude than the main results. However, first differencing compounds missing values, reducing the sample to 71 observations across 19 parties. This attrition, driven primarily by missing values in lagged vote share and female MPs, is the key reason we prefer the lagged dependent variable specification in the main analysis, as it retains a larger sample. Across all specifications, the within-party coefficient on female leadership remains positive and substantively stable, consistently supporting the main conclusion.

FIGURE B3: LEAVE-ONE-OUT ROBUSTNESS CHECK



Note: Diamond indicates the full sample estimate (Model 2). Dashed vertical line at zero. Dotted vertical line indicates the full sample coefficient (2.422). Party and Period fixed effects and full c

Figure B3 reports leave-one-country-out robustness checks for the main party fixed-effects specification (Model 2). Each estimate re-estimates the model after excluding one of the six countries that contribute within-party leadership transitions (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom). The dotted vertical line marks the full-sample coefficient (2.422). Across all exclusions, the estimated effect remains positive, statistically significant, and substantively stable. The widest confidence intervals are observed for Norway and Denmark, reflecting the smaller number of remaining observations when these countries are excluded, yet even these intervals remain entirely to the right of zero. The main result is therefore not driven by any single country.

Appendix C: Study 1, Issue Diagnostics

TABLE C1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ISSUE-LEVEL SALIENCE ACROSS POLICY DIMENSIONS

Issue	Mean Importance	Overall SD	Within-Party SD	% Near Floor
Welfare	-2.628	0.688	0.440	5.1
Free Market	-2.696	0.801	0.540	7.1
Law and Order	-2.839	0.847	0.480	10.9
Environment	-3.055	0.685	0.442	9.4
Nationalism	-3.071	1.229	0.669	15.9
Education	-3.413	0.822	0.585	15.9
Technology Infrastructure	-3.476	1.032	0.603	26.8
Admin Efficiency	-3.505	1.047	0.524	23.2
Internationalism	-3.676	0.895	0.581	26.1
EU	-3.676	1.003	0.557	29.7
Militarism	-3.729	0.881	0.643	31.2
Political Authority	-3.733	1.213	0.790	42.0
Traditional Morality	-3.742	1.153	0.605	34.8
Social Justice	-3.757	0.896	0.612	37.0
Freedom and Human Rights	-3.761	0.915	0.660	32.6
Democracy	-3.791	0.903	0.633	33.3
Multiculturalism	-3.806	1.224	0.683	37.0
Agricultural Policy	-3.860	0.937	0.646	37.7
Labor Policy	-4.051	0.896	0.576	46.4
Keynesian Policy	-4.201	1.086	0.898	48.6
Decentralization	-4.204	1.106	0.708	54.3
Cultural Policy	-4.272	0.917	0.619	53.6
Other Groups	-4.338	0.914	0.645	60.1
Corruption	-4.468	0.944	0.587	64.5
Social Harmony	-4.469	0.686	0.490	69.6
Economic Goals	-4.576	0.855	0.592	71.0
Minority	-4.830	0.643	0.412	84.1
Protectionism	-4.842	1.234	0.872	73.9
Middle Class	-4.990	0.514	0.314	92.0
Anti-Imperialism	-5.068	0.723	0.186	94.9
Constitutionalism	-5.073	1.210	0.928	80.4
Peace	-5.144	0.292	0.181	97.8
Corporatism	-5.226	0.192	0.107	100.0
Foreign Alliances	-5.453	1.275	0.873	84.1

Table C1 reports descriptive diagnostics for issue-level salience across the 34 policy dimensions used in the analysis. Mean Importance reports the average value of the log-transformed salience measure. Because individual issues typically account for only a small share of manifesto content, the resulting values are generally negative; less negative values indicate greater average manifesto attention to the issue. Overall SD reports the standard deviation across all party–election observations and captures the overall dispersion in issue emphasis. Within-Party SD measures temporal variation within parties by calculating the standard deviation of issue salience across elections for each party and averaging these values across parties. This statistic therefore captures the extent to which parties adjust the emphasis placed on a given issue over time.

These diagnostics guide the interpretation of the issue-level results reported in Figure 1 in the paper. Issues concentrated near the measurement floor—such as Peace, Corporatism, and Anti-Imperialism—are almost never addressed in the manifestos and therefore provide little scope for meaningful agenda change; we do not substantively interpret estimates for these dimensions. Likewise, issues exhibiting extremely high volatility may reflect broader strategic or contextual shifts rather than leadership-driven agenda change. Our interpretation therefore focuses primarily on issues displaying moderate within-party temporal volatility, where leadership change can plausibly influence agenda priorities. In the main analysis, particular attention is paid to domains such as environmental and labor policy, which exhibit meaningful variation over time and are associated with statistically significant changes in salience under female leadership. Additional shifts in emphasis on traditional morality and law and order are also discussed in light of these volatility diagnostics.


Appendix D: Study 2, Descriptives

TABLE D1. ISSUE FRAMING BY POLICY AREA

Policy Issue	Substantive Position (constant across conditions)	Agentic Framing (Treatment 1)	Communal Framing (Treatment 2)
Immigration	End mass immigration; stop small-boat crossings; deport illegal migrants from safe countries	Identical wording across both treatments and control	Identical wording across both treatments and control
Climate policy	Move away from Net Zero; reduce energy costs	“scrap the costly Net Zero agenda”; “take decisive action”; “harness Britain’s own resources to drive down energy bills”; emphasis on leadership and decisiveness	“shift away from the Net Zero agenda”; “work together”; “use Britain’s shared resources to make energy bills affordable”; emphasis on collective welfare and shared burden
Labour policy	Reduce taxes on work; restrict welfare eligibility; reduce regulation to promote jobs	“I will cut taxes on work”; “strictly limit welfare support to only those who qualify”; “slash red tape”; “break the benefit trap”; emphasis on control, discipline, and assertiveness	“we will cut taxes on work”; “ensure our welfare system protects and supports only those in genuine need”; “carefully reduce unnecessary regulations”; “help people escape the benefit trap”; emphasis on support, fairness, and social protection

Notes: The labour policy proposal combines employment-related measures with elements of administrative efficiency, which frequently co-occur in PRR discourse. Our manifesto analysis also shows that administrative efficiency receives increased attention under female leadership and exhibits moderate within-party volatility (see Figure 1 in the Paper and Table C1 in the Appendix).

FIGURE D1. IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE VIGNETTES



Notes: Points show vignette-level RILE-like scores based on ManifestoBERTa classifications; horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained via bootstrapping semi-clause-level scores.

To assess the ideological positioning of the vignettes, we apply the ManifestoBERTa classifier to semi-clause segments of each text. For each segment, we extract the top predicted policy categories and their associated probabilities, which we map onto a left–right scale using established Manifesto Project coding. We then compute a position score for each segment and aggregate these to obtain a vignette-level RILE-like score. Confidence intervals are estimated by bootstrapping semi-clause-level scores within each vignette. The figure shows that the agentic and communal versions occupy very similar ideological positions (on the right), and the substantial overlap in confidence intervals suggests that the difference between the two framings is not statistically distinguishable.

TABLE D2. SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q	Question
1	How much does this leader focus on the following topics? (1–5, Not at all – Very much): Immigration; Environment; Employment; Education.
2	How would you rate your feelings towards this party leader? (1–5, Very unfavorable – Very favourable).
3	How would you describe the overall message? (1–5, Very mainstream – Very radical).
4	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates far left and 10 indicates far right, where would you place this party?
5	How popular do you think this party leader is going to be in the UK? (1–5, Very unpopular – Very popular).
6	How likely are you to vote for her/his party? (1–5, Very unlikely – Very likely).
7	Based on your answer above, please briefly explain why you would or would not vote for her/his party.
8	What is your age?
9	What is your gender?
10	What is the highest level of education you have completed? (list)
11	Which of the following social classes do you consider yourself to most belong to? (list)
12	Which political party do you feel closest to? (list)
13	Which party did you vote for in the UK general election 2024? (list)

TABLE D3: SAMPLE BALANCE ACROSS TREATMENTS

	Control	Agentic	Communal	Total	p-value	
					Agentic vs Control	Communal vs Control
<i>Age</i>						
Mean (SD)	45.55 (14.35)	46.09 (14.35)	45.53 (14.36)	45.72 (14.35)	0.338	0.962
<i>Gender</i>						
Male (%)	48.87	48.37	49.66	48.96	0.796	0.686
Female (%)	51.13	51.63	50.34	51.04		
<i>Education</i>						
Low (%)	17.08	17.36	16.82	17.09	0.973	0.322
Medium (%)	22.65	21.99	20.23	21.62		
High (%)	60.27	60.65	62.95	61.29		
<i>Social class</i>						
Working class (%)	44.49	41.84	45.48	43.94	0.641	0.792
Middle class (%)	52.74	55.14	51.43	53.10		
Upper class (%)	0.68	0.68	1.13	0.83		
<i>Party affiliation</i>						
Green Party (%)	19.51	19.65	19.60	19.59	0.442	0.357
Labour (%)	19.51	18.18	18.68	18.79		
Liberal Democrats (%)	12.24	13.33	13.76	13.11		
Conservatives (%)	21.96	20.42	17.37	19.92		
Reform UK (%)	20.20	20.18	22.75	21.04		
Other (%)	6.58	8.24	7.84	7.55		
<i>N</i>	1,333	1,324	1,326	3,983		

Notes: Column percentages shown for categorical variables. P-values from two-sided t-tests comparing each treatment group to the control group. Low education = less than secondary to secondary school; Medium = vocational or technical college; High = undergraduate degree or above. Social class “Don’t know” (2.1%) excluded from display. Party affiliation “Rather not say” (1.9%) excluded. SNP, Plaid Cymru, DUP collapsed into “Other”. The total sample consists of 3,985 respondents; gender non-binary ($n = 25$) and “Prefer not to say” ($n = 6$) are excluded from the gender display. $N = 3,983$ due to 2 missing observations on treatments. All p-values > 0.10 , confirming successful randomization across experimental conditions.

TABLE D4: SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS BY PARTY AFFILIATION

	Target Quota (%)	Sample (%)	Difference (pp)
Green Party	17.0	19.6	+2.6
Labour	19.0	18.8	−0.2
Liberal Democrats	13.0	13.1	+0.1
Conservatives	18.0	19.9	+1.9
Reform UK	24.0	21.1	−2.9
Other ^a	4.0	7.6	+3.6
SNP	3.0	0.5	−2.5
Plaid Cymru	1.0	0.4	−0.6
DUP	—	0.2	—
Rather not say	—	1.9	—
Total	100.0	100.0	

Notes: Target quotas based on YouGov polling conducted immediately prior to fieldwork. Sample percentages computed from valid responses ($N = 3,985$). “Other” in the sample includes SNP, Plaid Cymru, DUP, and other parties collapsed for the balance table (Table D3); here shown separately for comparability with quota targets. The middle panel shows parties with small quotas or no quota target that were nonetheless represented in the sample.

Relationship Between Pre-registration and Hypotheses in the Text

The hypotheses presented in the paper closely follow those specified in the pre-registration, with some adjustments to improve clarity, streamline the presentation of results, and incorporate an additional observational analysis. These changes concern the ordering and grouping of hypotheses, the omission of two outcome variables from the main text (popularity and heterogeneous effect of respondent gender), and the addition of one hypothesis not included in the pre-registration (see Table D4).

First, the ordering of hypotheses in the manuscript differs from the pre-registration. In the paper, we group related expectations to provide a clearer theoretical narrative linking agenda expansion, leadership gender, and communication style; for instance, the pre-registered expectation that broadening the agenda benefits women leaders' favourability more than men's (pre-registered H8) is presented earlier in the manuscript (paper H3) to connect more directly with the agenda-expansion hypotheses that precede it.

Second, the main text focuses on the core evaluative outcomes of perceived extremism, leader favourability, and vote likelihood. The pre-registration also included perceived popularity as an outcome variable (appearing in pre-registered H3 and referenced across H5–H7); during analysis, we found that it did not yield substantively distinct conclusions relative to the other outcome variables, and we therefore do not discuss it in the main text, though full results are reported in the Appendix. We report no evidence that leaders with broader agendas are seen as more popular compared to the control. Communal forms of expansion are perceived as more popular than agentic forms of expansion (similar to our finding that communal forms are perceived as less radical than agentic forms of expansion), but the difference between communal and agentic expansion does not reach statistical significance.

Similarly, the pre-registered hypotheses on respondent-gender heterogeneity in framing effects (H6 and H7, on whether communal and agentic framing generate differential favourability by respondent gender) did not yield significant results; we removed these hypotheses from the main text but report the null result explicitly there, with full model results provided in the Appendix.

Third, the manuscript includes one additional hypothesis not specified in the pre-registration. H1 (women leaders of PRR parties are associated with issue expansion) draws on observational data on candidate and party behaviour to complement the experimental hypotheses and is presented as an extension of the pre-registered theoretical framework rather than a planned experimental test.

Importantly, these presentation choices do not alter the specification of the preregistered empirical models. All preregistered hypotheses are evaluated using the planned experimental treatments and outcome measures, and full results, including those involving perceived popularity and respondent-gender heterogeneity, are reported in Appendix E.

Table D5: Preregistered and manuscript hypotheses

Preregistered hypothesis	Manuscript hypothesis	Tested in
Not included. <i>We chose not to preregister our expectation for the descriptive, observational study. The registration concerns the experimental study only. Reviewers and editors encouraged us to formalize it as H1, and we saw the value this adds to the narrative flow of the article. However, we urge caution in interpreting these results given the relatively small N and observational nature of the data.</i>	H1: Women leaders of PRR parties are associated with issue expansion.	Main text (Table 1)
H1: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda are perceived as less extreme than leaders who focus narrowly on immigration.	H2a: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda are perceived as less extreme than leaders who focus narrowly on immigration.	Main text (Figure 3; see also Appendix Table E3)
H2: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda receive higher favourability evaluations than leaders who focus narrowly on immigration, especially from right-wing voters.	H2b: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda receive higher favourability evaluations than leaders who focus narrowly on immigration, especially from right-wing voters.	Main text (Figure 3; see also Appendix Table E3)
H3: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda are perceived as more popular among UK voters than leaders who focus narrowly on immigration.	Not included in main text.	Appendix (Table E3)
H4: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda achieve higher levels of electoral support than those who focus narrowly on immigration, especially among right-wing voters.	H2c: Party leaders who present a broader policy agenda achieve higher levels of electoral support than those who focus narrowly on immigration, especially among right-wing voters.	Main text (Figure 3; see also Appendix Table E3)

Preregistered hypothesis	Manuscript hypothesis	Tested in
H5: Among leaders addressing additional political issues, those adopting communal framing on the additional issues are perceived as more moderate, favourable and popular than those adopting agentic framing.	H4: Among leaders addressing additional political issues, those adopting communal framing on the additional issues are perceived as more moderate and favourable than those adopting agentic framing.	Main text (moderate and favourable; Table 3); Appendix (popular; Table E3)
H6: Communal framing generates higher favourability and perceived popularity among women than among men.	Not included in main text.	Appendix (Table E6)
H7: Agentic framing generates higher favourability and perceived popularity among men than among women.	Not included in main text.	Appendix (Table E6)
H8: Broadening the policy agenda will increase favourability evaluations for women leaders more than for men leaders.	H3: Broadening the policy agenda increases favourability evaluations for women leaders more than for men leaders.	Main text (Figure 4; see also Appendix Table E5). <i>Note that we present the two treatments separately to provide a more nuanced account of the results. This does not change the underlying expectation of H8, and when we pool treatments the result is the same (the interaction is negative but not significant).</i>
H9: Adopting communal rather than agentic framing will increase favourability evaluations for women leaders more than for men leaders.	H5: Adopting communal rather than agentic framing will increase favourability evaluations for women leaders more than for men leaders.	Main text (Figure 4; see also Appendix Table E5)

Appendix E: Study 2, Results

TABLE E1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS — OUTCOME VARIABLES

	Scale	Mean	SD	Min	Max	<i>N</i>
Message extremism	1 = Very mainstream, 5 = Very radical	3.26	1.07	1	5	3,983
Leader favourability	1 = Very unfavourable, 5 = Very favourable	2.86	1.45	1	5	3,983
L-R positioning	0 = Far left, 10 = Far right	7.50	2.03	0	10	3,983
Message popularity	1 = Very unpopular, 5 = Very popular	3.61	0.88	1	5	3,983
Vote likelihood	1 = Very unlikely, 5 = Very likely	2.65	1.56	1	5	3,983

Notes: Descriptive statistics computed across the full sample ($N = 3,983$). Message extremism: 50.7% of respondents rated the message as radical or very radical. Leader favourability: 40.4% rated the leader as favourable or very favourable, while 44.8% rated them as unfavourable or very unfavourable. L-R positioning: the mean of 7.50 reflects the right-wing nature of the vignette party across all conditions. Popularity: 54.1% rated the leader as popular or very popular. Vote likelihood: 38.6% reported being very unlikely to vote for the party, reflecting the cross-party composition of the sample.

FIGURE E1: MANIPULATION CHECK

As a manipulation check, respondents were asked to identify which policy issues were emphasised in the message they read. To verify attentiveness, one decoy topic (education) was included that did not feature in any vignette. The figure confirms that the manipulation was successful: treated respondents correctly identified the issues present in their assigned message and did not select the decoy topic.




TABLE E2. WITHIN-TREATMENT COMPARISON OF COMMUNAL AND AGENTIC LANGUAGE

To validate the framing manipulation, we analyze respondents' open-ended answers using a dictionary-based approach. We construct two dictionaries capturing communal and agentic language as identified by the literature, and count the occurrence of these terms in each response. The communal dictionary includes terms related to cooperation, social support, and collective welfare (e.g., "together," "community," "support," "family"), while the agentic dictionary captures language emphasizing control, decisiveness, and assertiveness (e.g., "control," "strong," "decisive," "cut").

Consistent with the intended manipulation, respondents exposed to the agentic condition use more agentic than communal language, while those in the communal condition use more communal than agentic language. The difference is statistically significant in the communal condition and marginally significant in the agentic condition. These results indicate that respondents perceive and reproduce the intended differences in tone across treatments.

	Communal	Agentic	Difference	p (2-sided)	p (1-sided)
<i>Agentic Treatment</i>	0.212 (0.014)	0.243 (0.017)	-0.032 (0.019)	0.090	0.045
<i>N</i>			1,319		
<i>Communal Treatment</i>	0.246 (0.016)	0.196 (0.013)	0.050 (0.018)	0.007	0.003
<i>N</i>			1,321		

Notes: Entries report means with standard errors in parentheses. Difference is defined as communal minus agentic language use. p-values are from paired t-tests. One-sided tests correspond to directional hypotheses.

TABLE E3: TREATMENT EFFECTS ACROSS ALL OUTCOMES

	Broad Agenda					Agentic & Communal				
	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R pos.	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote lik.	(5) Popularity	(6) Extremism	(7) L-R pos.	(8) Favourability	(9) Vote lik.	(10) Popularity
Broad agenda	0.086** (0.037)	−0.079 (0.071)	0.075 (0.049)	0.075 (0.052)	−0.038 (0.030)					
Agentic broadening						0.180*** (0.042)	0.035 (0.081)	0.030 (0.056)	0.036 (0.060)	−0.069** (0.034)
Communal broadening						−0.006 (0.042)	−0.193** (0.079)	0.119** (0.056)	0.114* (0.061)	−0.008 (0.034)
<i>N</i>	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983
<i>R</i> ²	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001

Notes: OLS regressions with HC robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category: Control condition. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE E3.1: TREATMENT EFFECTS — RESPONDENTS PLACING THE PARTY ON THE RADICAL RIGHT (L-R 8–10)

	Broad Agenda				Agentic & Communal			
	(1) Extremism	(2) Favourability	(3) Vote lik.	(4) Popularity	(5) Extremism	(6) Favourability	(7) Vote lik.	(8) Popularity
Broad agenda	0.098** (0.048)	0.046 (0.062)	0.045 (0.065)	−0.039 (0.037)				
Agentic broadening					0.161*** (0.055)	0.012 (0.071)	0.038 (0.074)	−0.043 (0.042)
Communal broadening					0.029 (0.055)	0.082 (0.074)	0.054 (0.077)	−0.035 (0.044)
<i>N</i>	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408	2,408
<i>R</i> ²	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.000

Notes: Sample restricted to respondents placing the party on the radical right (L-R 8–10). L-R position is excluded as a dependent variable given the sample restriction on party placement. OLS regressions with HC robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category: Control condition. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E4: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY PARTY AFFILIATION

	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R pos.	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote lik.	(5) Popularity
<i>Treatment (ref: Control — Green Party)</i>					
Agentic	0.173 (0.109)	−0.012 (0.179)	−0.078 (0.080)	−0.020 (0.074)	−0.051 (0.071)
Communal	0.094 (0.105)	−0.400** (0.186)	0.012 (0.082)	−0.008 (0.074)	0.000 (0.070)
<i>Party affiliation (ref: Green Party)</i>					
Labour	0.145 (0.105)	−0.420** (0.194)	0.392*** (0.091)	0.357*** (0.086)	0.067 (0.073)
Lib Dems	0.294** (0.115)	−0.447** (0.222)	0.491*** (0.110)	0.437*** (0.107)	0.061 (0.083)
Conservatives	0.002 (0.100)	−1.170*** (0.192)	1.662*** (0.089)	1.723*** (0.092)	0.369*** (0.073)
Reform UK	−0.058 (0.102)	−1.130*** (0.167)	2.724*** (0.072)	3.002*** (0.069)	0.944*** (0.068)
Other	0.060 (0.138)	−1.061*** (0.255)	1.446*** (0.156)	1.472*** (0.170)	0.523*** (0.098)
<i>Interactions: Agentic × Party</i>					
Agentic × Labour	0.032 (0.147)	−0.006 (0.264)	0.167 (0.131)	0.101 (0.125)	−0.029 (0.100)
Agentic × Lib Dems	−0.107 (0.159)	0.160 (0.288)	−0.002 (0.151)	−0.060 (0.145)	−0.058 (0.111)
Agentic × Conservatives	0.013 (0.140)	0.033 (0.258)	0.218* (0.125)	0.168 (0.131)	0.017 (0.102)
Agentic × Reform UK	0.095 (0.141)	0.120 (0.234)	0.058 (0.104)	−0.050 (0.105)	−0.023 (0.099)
Agentic × Other	−0.052 (0.183)	0.069 (0.342)	0.263 (0.216)	0.243 (0.236)	−0.067 (0.139)
<i>Interactions: Communal × Party</i>					
Communal × Labour	−0.023 (0.141)	0.083 (0.268)	0.188 (0.131)	0.160 (0.125)	−0.121 (0.100)
Communal × Lib Dems	−0.179 (0.158)	0.136 (0.303)	0.000 (0.148)	−0.013 (0.144)	−0.096 (0.111)
Communal × Conservatives	−0.158 (0.140)	0.615** (0.258)	0.252* (0.129)	0.268** (0.136)	0.060 (0.105)
Communal × Reform UK	−0.116 (0.136)	0.256 (0.232)	0.052 (0.101)	0.124 (0.096)	0.036 (0.094)
Communal × Other	−0.204 (0.187)	−0.041 (0.336)	−0.038 (0.214)	−0.029 (0.234)	−0.112 (0.139)
Observations	3,906	3,906	3,906	3,906	3,906
R^2	0.016	0.045	0.492	0.521	0.178

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Control condition, Green Party.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE E4.2: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY PARTY — BROAD AGENDA

	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R positioning	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote likelihood	(5) Popularity
Panel A: Green					
Broad agenda	0.133 (0.093)	−0.206 (0.159)	−0.033 (0.069)	−0.014 (0.064)	−0.025 (0.061)
<i>N</i>	765	765	765	765	765
<i>R</i> ²	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panel B: Labour					
Broad agenda	0.137 (0.084)	−0.170 (0.170)	0.145 (0.089)	0.117 (0.086)	−0.101 (0.062)
<i>N</i>	734	734	734	734	734
<i>R</i> ²	0.004	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.004
Panel C: Lib Dems					
Broad agenda	−0.011 (0.103)	−0.061 (0.207)	−0.034 (0.111)	−0.049 (0.110)	−0.102 (0.076)
<i>N</i>	512	512	512	512	512
<i>R</i> ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Panel D: Conservatives					
Broad agenda	0.070 (0.077)	0.111 (0.162)	0.197** (0.085)	0.200** (0.095)	0.010 (0.065)
<i>N</i>	778	778	778	778	778
<i>R</i> ²	0.001	0.001	0.007	0.006	0.000
Panel E: Reform UK					
Broad agenda	0.114 (0.078)	−0.026 (0.125)	0.024 (0.055)	0.029 (0.057)	−0.016 (0.056)
<i>N</i>	822	822	822	822	822
<i>R</i> ²	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panel F: Other					
Broad agenda	0.008 (0.134)	−0.186 (0.255)	0.082 (0.175)	0.096 (0.195)	−0.115 (0.104)
<i>N</i>	295	295	295	295	295
<i>R</i> ²	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004

Note: OLS regressions with HC robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference category: Control condition. Each panel estimated on the party subsample. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE E5: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY LEADER GENDER

	(1) Radicalism b/se	(2) L-R positioning b/se	(3) Favourability b/se	(4) Vote likelihood b/se
<i>Treatment (ref: Control)</i>				
Agentic	0.206*** (0.059)	0.089 (0.115)	0.072 (0.080)	0.060 (0.084)
Communal	-0.013 (0.058)	-0.200* (0.113)	0.120 (0.079)	0.079 (0.085)
<i>Leader gender (ref: Male)</i>				
Female leader	-0.076 (0.061)	-0.146 (0.119)	0.087 (0.079)	0.019 (0.084)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Agentic $\times$ Female	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.108 (0.161)	-0.083 (0.113)	-0.048 (0.120)
Communal $\times$ Female	0.013 (0.084)	0.014 (0.159)	-0.003 (0.112)	0.069 (0.121)
<i>N</i>	3,983	3,983	3,983	3,983
<i>R</i> ²	0.008	0.005	0.002	0.001

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Control condition, Male leader. Agentic $\times$ Female and Communal $\times$ Female.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE E6: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY RESPONDENTS' GENDER

	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R positioning	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote likelihood	(5) Popularity
<i>Treatment (ref: Control)</i>					
Agentic	0.194*** (0.061)	0.036 (0.102)	-0.012 (0.082)	0.020 (0.087)	-0.035 (0.049)
Communal	0.007 (0.061)	-0.128 (0.101)	0.041 (0.081)	0.062 (0.087)	-0.021 (0.049)
<i>Voter gender (ref: Male)</i>					
Female voter	0.051 (0.061)	-0.384*** (0.118)	-0.115 (0.079)	-0.076 (0.084)	-0.018 (0.049)
<i>Interactions</i>					
Agentic $\times$ Female voter	-0.038 (0.084)	0.005 (0.160)	0.086 (0.113)	0.037 (0.121)	-0.068 (0.068)
Communal $\times$ Female voter	-0.054 (0.084)	-0.149 (0.158)	0.165 (0.112)	0.110 (0.122)	0.024 (0.069)
<i>N</i>	3,952	3,952	3,952	3,952	3,952
<i>R</i> ²	0.007	0.014	0.002	0.001	0.002

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Control condition, Male voter. Agentic $\times$ Female voter and Communal $\times$ Female voter. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E7: Treatment Effects by Leader Gender Among Right-Wing Voters

A different pattern emerges when focusing on right-wing voters, for whom gender cues and rhetorical framing may be particularly salient. Table 7 replicates the interaction models restricting the sample to Conservative and Reform UK supporters separately.

Among Conservative voters (Panel A), communal framing increases favourability ($\beta = 0.328$, $p < 0.05$, approximately 0.30 standard deviations), consistent with the broader pattern of communal framing resonating positively with evaluations of the candidate. No significant interactions between treatment and leader gender are detected in this subsample.

A substantively different pattern emerges among Reform UK supporters (Panel B). Without the broadening treatments, female leadership alone increases perceived radicalism ($\beta = 0.277$, $p < 0.05$), and agentic framing further amplifies this effect ($\beta = 0.470$, $p < 0.001$, approximately 0.46 standard deviations). Once the treatments are introduced, however, this pattern reverses. Both broadening treatments interact with female leadership to significantly reduce perceived extremism ($\beta = -0.410$, $p < 0.05$, approximately 0.40 standard deviations, and $\beta = -0.364$, $p < 0.05$, approximately 0.36 standard deviations, respectively). In other words, when a woman leader delivers a broader message, whether framed in agentic or communal terms, Reform UK voters perceive it as less radical than when the same broadened message is delivered by a male leader. This suggests that among the party base, agenda expansion may soften perceptions of radical-right messaging more strongly when articulated by women leaders.

TABLE E7: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY LEADER GENDER: CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM UK VOTERS

Panel A: Conservative Voters				
	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R Positioning	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote Likelihood
<i>Treatment</i>				
Agentic (ref: Control)	0.190 (0.120)	0.305 (0.257)	0.184 (0.131)	0.194 (0.148)
Communal (ref: Control)	-0.078 (0.132)	0.352 (0.259)	0.328** (0.142)	0.212 (0.166)
<i>Leader gender</i>				
Female leader (ref: Male)	-0.009 (0.125)	0.150 (0.276)	0.197 (0.140)	0.127 (0.153)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Agentic × Female	-0.009 (0.175)	-0.596 (0.371)	-0.098 (0.191)	-0.098 (0.217)
Communal × Female	0.027 (0.187)	-0.275 (0.358)	-0.145 (0.199)	0.076 (0.229)
<i>N</i>	778	778	778	778
<i>R</i> ²	0.010	0.007	0.013	0.010

Panel B: Reform UK Voters				
	(1) Extremism	(2) L-R Positioning	(3) Favourability	(4) Vote Likelihood
<i>Treatment</i>				
Agentic (ref: Control)	0.470*** (0.122)	0.276 (0.220)	-0.041 (0.093)	-0.141 (0.100)
Communal (ref: Control)	0.163 (0.120)	-0.190 (0.201)	0.031 (0.085)	0.062 (0.086)
<i>Leader gender</i>				
Female leader (ref: Male)	0.277** (0.131)	0.108 (0.204)	0.020 (0.092)	0.005 (0.091)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Agentic × Female	-0.410** (0.178)	-0.355 (0.300)	0.049 (0.135)	0.157 (0.149)
Communal × Female	-0.364** (0.173)	0.094 (0.277)	0.067 (0.117)	0.110 (0.122)
<i>N</i>	822	822	822	822
<i>R</i> ²	0.025	0.007	0.005	0.015

Notes: OLS regressions with HC robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel A restricted to Conservative supporters; Panel B restricted to Reform UK supporters. Reference categories: Control condition, Male leader. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$