Robustness checks on "Rebuilding trust in broken systems?"

Marlene Mauk

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A. Main effects




Figure A-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).





Figure A-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies


Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). All models include country dummies (coefficients not displayed). Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

Figure A-3: Robustness checks: seat gains



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Figure A-4: Robustness checks: satisfaction with democracy



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125.





Figure A-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government


Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Figure A-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties' success



Right-wing populist parties' vote gain


Left-wing populist parties' vote gains



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. For right-wing populist parties, N = 103 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 88 (trust in parties). For left-wing populist parties, N = 33 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 28 (trust in parties)

Figure A-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates

populist electorate





Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

B. Conditional effects


Figure B-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party


democratic quality







corruption control








economic performance




Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).


Figure B-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies


democratic quality







corruption control





economic performance







Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; country dummies. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).


Figure B-3: Robustness checks: seat gains


democratic quality







corruption control







economic performance





Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). *Sources*: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.







Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125.

Figure B-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government


democratic quality



corruption control




economic performance




Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; populists in government. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).


Figure B-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties' success




Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – democratic quality




Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – corruption control





Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – economic performance



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Left-wing populist parties' vote gains – democratic quality

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
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
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
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






Left-wing populist parties' vote gains - corruption control

Left-wing populist parties' vote gains – economic performance




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
Figure B-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates




Populist electorate – democratic quality


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





Non-populist electorate – democratic quality




Populist electorate – corruption control



Non-populist electorate – corruption control



Populist electorate – economic performance




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.75 .8 .85 .9

Non-populist electorate – economic performance



Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.