Robustness checks on “Rebuilding trust in broken systems?”
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A. Main effects

Figure A-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). All models include country dummies (coefficients not displayed).
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-3: Robustness checks: seat gains

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-4: Robustness checks: satisfaction with democracy

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125.
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParliGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties’ success

**Right-wing populist parties’ vote gain**

Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. For right-wing populist parties, \( N = 103 \) (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 88 (trust in parties). For left-wing populist parties, \( N = 33 \) (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 28 (trust in parties)

**Sources**: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure A-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates

**populist electorate**

![Graph showing trust in parliament, parties, and politicians for populist electorate]

**non-populist electorate**

![Graph showing trust in parliament, parties, and politicians for non-populist electorate]

**Notes:** Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

**Sources:** European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
B. Conditional effects

Figure B-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party

democratic quality

[Graphs showing relationships between democratic quality and AMEs of populist party vote gain on trust in parliament, parties, and politicians.]

corruption control

[Graphs showing relationships between corruption control and AMEs of populist party vote gain on trust in parliament, parties, and politicians.]
Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GDP/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies

democratic quality

corruption control
Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; country dummies. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-3: Robustness checks: seat gains

**democratic quality**

![Graphs showing AMEs of populist party seat gain on trust in parliament and parties as a function of democratic quality.]

**corruption control**

![Graphs showing AMEs of populist party seat gain on trust in parliament and parties as a function of corruption.]

Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GDP/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-4: Robustness checks: satisfaction with democracy

Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125.
Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government

*democratic quality*

*corruption control*
economic performance

Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; populists in government. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties’ success

Right-wing populist parties’ vote gain – democratic quality

Right-wing populist parties’ vote gain – corruption control
Right-wing populist parties’ vote gain – economic performance

Left-wing populist parties’ vote gains – democratic quality
Left-wing populist parties’ vote gains – corruption control

Left-wing populist parties’ vote gains – economic performance

Notes: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. For right-wing populist parties, N = 103 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). For left-wing populist parties, N = 33 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 28 (trust in parties).

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.
Figure B-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates

*Populist electorate – democratic quality*

*Non-populist electorate – democratic quality*
Populist electorate – corruption control

Non-populist electorate – corruption control
**Populist electorate – economic performance**

**Non-populist electorate – economic performance**

*Notes*: Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

*Sources*: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.