APPENDIX (to be made available online)

Article: *Routine or Rare Activity? A Quantitative Assessment of Parliamentary Scrutiny in the European Semester Across EU Member States*

Table A1: Scrutiny activity scores for national European Semester programmes: overview

	2014		2015		2016		2017
FI	**0,55**	FRU	**0,56**	FI	**0,57**	FI	**0,61**
ITL	**0,51**	FI	**0,52**	DEL	**0,43**	ITL	**0,50**
ITU	**0,47**	ITL	**0,48**	BEL	**0,41**	ITU	**0,50**
CZL	**0,44**	ITU	**0,47**	ITL	**0,41**	ATL	**0,40**
DEL	**0,37**	CZU	**0,39**	ITU	**0,36**	CZU	**0,35**
FRL	**0,36**	ATL	**0,38**	ESL	**0,35**	IEL	**0,34**
SK	**0,34**	DEL	**0,31**	ESU	**0,35**	ESL	**0,30**
LT	**0,30**	SK	**0,28**	PT	**0,34**	ESU	**0,30**
IEL	**0,28**	DK	**0,27**	ATL	**0,32**	DK	**0,29**
IEU	**0,28**	UKU	**0,27**	CZU	**0,31**	PT	**0,26**
CZU	**0,27**	IEL	**0,23**	FRL	**0,30**	LUX	**0,25**
UKU	**0,26**	LT	**0,20**	DK	**0,28**	DEL	**0,22**
FRU	**0,23**	FRL	**0,18**	UKL	**0,28**	SK	**0,22**
NLU	**0,23**	NLL	**0,18**	UKU	**0,28**	UKL	**0,20**
ATL	**0,22**	PT	**0,18**	SIL	**0,27**	NLL	**0,19**
DK	**0,20**	NLU	**0,16**	LT	**0,26**	IEU	**0,18**
EE	**0,19**	ESL	**0,15**	SK	**0,23**	LT	**0,18**
LV	**0,19**	ESU	**0,15**	LUX	**0,22**	UKU	**0,18**
NLL	**0,19**	PLL	**0,14**	LV	**0,21**	FRL	**0,16**
SE	**0,14**	BEL	**0,12**	NLU	**0,20**	NLU	**0,16**
LUX	**0,13**	LV	**0,12**	FRU	**0,19**	PLL	**0,15**
SIL	**0,12**	SIL	**0,11**	PLL	**0,19**	HR	**0,13**
ROU	**0,07**	IEU	**0,08**	NLL	**0,17**	SIL	**0,13**
BG	**0,05**	SE	**0,08**	HR	**0,12**	BEL	**0,12**
HU	**0,05**	LUX	**0,07**	IEL	**0,12**	EE	**0,09**
BEL	0,00	CZL	**0,06**	CZL	**0,07**	LV	**0,09**
HR	0,00	EE	**0,05**	SE	**0,06**	HU	**0,09**
DEU	0,00	HU	**0,04**	EE	**0,05**	SE	**0,07**
PLL	0,00	BG	0,00	HU	**0,05**	CZL	**0,05**
PLU	0,00	HR	0,00	BG	0,00	BG	**0,04**
ROL	0,00	DEU	0,00	DEU	0,00	FRU	0,00
ESL	0,00	PLU	0,00	IEU	0,00	DEU	0,00
ESU	0,00	ROL	0,00	PLU	0,00	PLU	0,00
UKL	0,00	ROU	0,00	ROL	0,00	ROL	0,00
PT*	0,00	UKL	0,00	ROU	0,00	ROU	0,00

Source: Author´s own calculation

Explanatory note: The scores for parliamentary scrutiny activities of national European Semester programmes (the Stability/Convergence and the National Reform Programme) consist of 5 dimensions (intensity, additional information, outcome of the scrutiny, mainstreaming and timing of the scrutiny) and 10 indicators presented in the Table1 in the section two of the article. The scores include *de facto* parliamentary scrutiny. In this regard, if

a parliament/chamber only received the national European Semester programme(s) and/or a parliament/chamber placed the respective programme on the agenda of the committee meeting or plenary session but only acknowledged/took note of the programme without any follow-up scrutiny, then such cases were not considered. The values for the indicators in each dimension were normalised on a scale from 0 to 1, added up and divided by the number of indicators of the specific dimension. All indicators are, therefore, aggregated with equal weight in their dimension. There are good reasons to consider similar importance of selected indicators for the effective scrutiny since each indicator adds to the specific aspect that enhances the overall parliamentary accountability in the European Semester. All values for each dimension were then added up to an overall score and divided by five i.e. the number of dimensions. The employed method of aggregation of all dimensions constituting the overall score implies their equal weight and certain levels of substitutability between dimensions. For example, extensive hearings with the representative of the government or different experts that a parliament organizes as a part of the scrutiny process might compensate for fewer activities performed, compared to parliaments that scrutinize the national European Semester programmes more actively but rely on their own capacities exclusively. This is because in the former case a parliament is able to actually acquire all necessary information more effectively.

Table A2: Descriptive summary statistics

VARIABLES	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Scrutiny score SCP-NRP	140	.19	.156	0	.61
Strength EU affairs: OPAL	140	.514	.139	.21	.84
Budget amendment powers	140	.557	.334	0	1
Seat share gov. parties	140	54.2	10.55	20.41	79.9
Conflict potential: EU	140	13.29	4.643	4.27	21.05
Conflict potential: economic	140	19.64	5.116	1.59	39.49
Government debt-to-GDP	140	68.74	31.60	9.1	135.4
Elections	140	.0429	.203	0	1
Eurozone membership	140	.65	.479	0	1
No benefits	140	26.65	10.79	7	51
Seat share: Eurosceptics	140	18.95	19.87	0	90.62
Seat share: Economic left	140	40.15	17.58	0	100
Against EMU	140	34.06	19.72	10.5	75
Unemployment	140	9.292	4.371	4	25.1
Credit rating	140	74.95	13.57	49.1	94.7
GDP pc in PPS	140	103.4	41.45	47	272
EU budget contrib.	140	.919	1.544	-.71	5.64
GCI score	140	4.870	.478	4.1	5.7
Intensity score	140	.168	.214	0	1
Mainstreaming score	140	.386	.299	0	1
Timing score	140	.244	.308	0	1

Note: Variables in *italics* are used as alternative operationalisations as follows. Seat share of the Eurosceptic parties as well as parties representing the economic left in the parliament in *italics* are used as alternative operationalisations for the parliamentary Euroscepticism and the parliamentary parties' ideological stances on the economic issues (see Table A3). I rely on the 2014 and 2017 CHES expert survey estimates to calculate these variables. I included all parliamentary parties with the score of 3,5 and below on a seven-point scale of party positions towards the European integration (ranging from 1=Strongly opposed to 7=Strongly in favour) to calculate the seat share of Eurosceptic parties. I re-calculated this variable after each parliamentary election to account for the changes in relative strength of the Eurosceptic parties within the parliament, and to capture the

changes in the parliamentary parties´ position on the EU over time. To calculate the overall size of the economic left in the parliament, I included all parliamentary parties with the score of 4,5 and below on a ten-point scale of parties' ideological left-right stances on economic issues (ranging from 0=Extreme left, 5=Center and 10=Extreme right). I re-calculated this variable after each parliamentary election to account for the changes.
Against EMU in *italics* is used as an alternative operationalisation for the public Euroscepticism (see Table A3). This variable is measured as the percentage of citizens per year that stated they are ´against´ European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro. The variable is operationalised as the average score of the Standard Eurobarometer autumn and spring vintage for each year in the 2014-2017 period. I used several different variables as alternative operationalisations for the economic situation (see Table A3 and A4), relying on different data sources. More specifically, I used the unemployment rate (3-year average) and the GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), relying on the Eurostat data. Furthermore, I used country credit rating and the global competitiveness score, relying on the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Reports as a data source. Finally, I used net national contributions to the EU budget, relying on the European Commission dataset as source. This variable measures national contributions from member states to the EU budget, calculated based on the Gross National Income (GNI). Activity, mainstreaming and timing *in italics* are sub-dimensions of the overall parliamentary SCP-NRP scrutiny score. I conducted additional tests examining the effect of independent variables on these individual aspects of the parliamentary scrutiny (see Table A5).

Table A3: Robustness checks

DV: Scrutiny score S/CP-NRP	**Main model**	**Alternative model 1**	**Alternative model 2**	**Alternative model 3**
EU affairs powers=OPAL	0.613***	0.621***	0.674***	0.483***
	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.136)
Budget amendment powers	-0.0543	-0.0646	-0.0535	-0.0351
	(0.0426)	(0.0435)	(0.0417)	(0.0445)
Seat share gov. parties	-0.00283*	-0.00309*	-0.00289*	-0.00258
	(0.00130)	(0.00123)	(0.00128)	(0.00137)
Conflict potential: EU	0.0000152		0.000954	-0.000168
	(0.00338)		(0.00330)	(0.00370)
Conflict potential: economic	0.000900		0.00197	0.00129
	(0.00290)		(0.00286)	(0.00307)
Govt debt to GDP	0.00236***	0.00248***	0.00248***	
	(0.000676)	(0.000701)	(0.000600)	
Elections=1	-0.0118	-0.0134	-0.0160	-0.0215
	(0.0463)	(0.0456)	(0.0461)	(0.0479)
Eurozone membership=1	0.0461	0.0502	-0.0192	0.0851*
	(0.0400)	(0.0427)	(0.0540)	(0.0413)
No benefits	-0.000395	-0.000325		0.00176
	(0.00154)	(0.00155)		(0.00152)
Seat share: Eurosceptics		-0.000271		
		(0.000903)		
Seat share: economic left		0.000806		
		(0.000846)		
Against EMU			-0.00226	

			(0.00127)	
Unemployment				0.000363
				(0.00470)
Constant	-0.137	-0.143	-0.0981	-0.0281
	(0.126)	(0.106)	(0.125)	(0.142)
lns1_1_1				
Constant	-2.549***	-2.526***	-2.606***	-2.464***
	(0.237)	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.233)
lnsig_e				
Constant	-2.307***	-2.314***	-2.311***	-2.273***
	(0.0698)	(0.0686)	(0.0682)	(0.0699)
Observations	140	140	140	140

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Explanatory note: *Main model* refers to Model 4 of the analysis presented in the paper, which is a full model that includes all three sets of tested factors and control variables**.**

Alternative model 1 uses alternative variables for the parliamentary Euroscepticism and the parliamentary parties' ideological stances on the economic issues. Unlike the variables in the main model, which tested the effect of the inter-party conflict regarding the EU integration as well as economic issues, this model assesses the effects of the Eurosceptic contingent in the parliament, measured as a seat share of all Eurosceptic parties in the parliament/chamber and the effect of the parliamentary ideological stances on economic issues, accounting for the size of the economic left in the parliament. Hence, instead of the effect of the potential for parliamentary party conflict over EU integration on the overall scrutiny activity in the European Semester, the alternative measure assesses whether the greater share of Eurosceptic parliamentary party groups within the parliament triggers greater parliamentary scrutiny in the procedure. Therefore, the alternative model does not only include different variable specification for the parliamentary Euroscepticism but also measures a different although related effect. The same applies for the alternative specification of the variable examining the effect of the parliamentary economic stances on the scrutiny in the European Semester. The expectation here is that the more to the left on the economic issues parliamentary party groups in the parliament are, the greater the parliamentary scrutiny in the European Semester will be. Hence, the alternative model uses different variable specification for the parliamentary stances on the economic issues and also examines a different although related effect.

Alternative model 2 uses the alternative variable for the public Euroscepticism as a control variable. While the main model tested the effect of the negative public perceptions of their country´s benefits of the EU membership in general, this model assesses the effect of the negative public perceptions of the Economic and Monetary Union with single currency euro in particular.

Alternative model 3 uses the unemployment rate as the alternative variable for the economic situation. Unemployment rate, as an important indicator of the economic situation in the respective member states, is monitored within the European Semester via the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and used in annual Alert Mechanism Reports as an important factor for the detection of internal imbalances.

Table A4: Additional robustness checks for the economic factors

DV: Scrutiny score S/CP-NRP	Alternative model 1	Alternative model 2	Alternative model 3	Alternative model 4
EU affairs powers=OPAL	0.483**	0.509***	0.482***	0.466***
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Budget amendment powers	-0.0352	-0.0380	-0.0364	-0.0308
	(0.0449)	(0.0448)	(0.0459)	(0.0444)
Seat share gov. parties	-0.00259	-0.00256	-0.00259	-0.00240
	(0.00136)	(0.00136)	(0.00136)	(0.00137)
Conflict potential: EU	-0.000249	-0.00000645	-0.000107	-0.000632
	(0.00363)	(0.00357)	(0.00381)	(0.00357)
Conflict potential: economic	0.00128	0.00170	0.00126	0.000930
	(0.00317)	(0.00316)	(0.00306)	(0.00306)
Elections=1	-0.0216	-0.0206	-0.0220	-0.0187
	(0.0479)	(0.0479)	(0.0480)	(0.0479)
Eurozone membership=1	0.0856*	0.0913*	0.0876	0.0685
	(0.0427)	(0.0422)	(0.0451)	(0.0445)
No benefits	0.00178	0.00174	0.00175	0.00167
	(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00149)	(0.00147)
Credit rating	-0.0000224			
	(0.00173)			
GCI score		-0.0245		
		(0.0476)		
GDP pc PPS			-0.0000606	
			(0.000525)	
EU budget contrib.				-0.0112
				(0.0118)
Constant	-0.0223	0.0676	-0.0183	0.00946
	(0.145)	(0.219)	(0.135)	(0.133)
lns1_1_1				
Constant	-2.462***	-2.469***	-2.462***	-2.477***
	(0.231)	(0.236)	(0.231)	(0.229)
lnsig_e				
Constant	-2.273***	-2.273***	-2.273***	-2.274***
	(0.0698)	(0.0701)	(0.0698)	(0.0694)
Observations	140	140	140	140

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Explanatory note: *Alternative model 1* uses country credit rating as the alternative variable for the economic situation. *Alternative model 2* uses World Bank global competitiveness score (GCI) as the alternative variable for the economic situation. *Alternative model 3* uses GDP per capita in PPS as the alternative variable for the

economic situation. *Alternative model 4* uses national net contributions to the EU budget as the alternative variable for the economic situation.

Table A5: Multilevel analyses for the selected sub-indicators making up the overall S/CP-NRP scrutiny score

	Model 1 DV: S/CP-NRP Intensity	**Model 2 DV: S/CP-NRP Mainstreaming**	**Model 3 DV: S/CP-NRP Timing**
EU affairs powers: OPAL	0.692***	0.541*	1.076***
	(0.208)	(0.246)	(0.240)
Budget amendment powers	-0.0568	-0.0872	-0.0261
	(0.0611)	(0.0860)	(0.0862)
Seat share gov. parties	-0.00313	-0.00529	-0.00316
	(0.00181)	(0.00274)	(0.00279)
Conflict potential: EU	-0.000466	0.00177	-0.00395
	(0.00484)	(0.00678)	(0.00677)
Conflict potential: economic	0.000235	0.00185	0.00897
	(0.00420)	(0.00577)	(0.00576)
Govt debt to GDP	0.00306**	0.00252*	0.00431***
	(0.00106)	(0.00125)	(0.00122)
Elections=1	-0.0592	0.117	-0.131
	(0.0607)	(0.106)	(0.112)
Eurozone membership=1	0.0452	0.189*	-0.0777
	(0.0627)	(0.0735)	(0.0715)
No benefits	-0.000554	-0.000433	-0.00618*
	(0.00220)	(0.00310)	(0.00309)
Constant	-0.204	0.0959	-0.320
	(0.182)	(0.255)	(0.256)
lns1_1_1			
Constant	-1.999***	-2.109***	-2.222***
	(0.193)	(0.356)	(0.361)
lnsig_e			
Constant	-2.044***	-1.464***	-1.406***
	(0.0681)	(0.0726)	(0.0695)
Observations	140	140	140

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Explanatory note: *Model 1* presents the estimation results of the multi-level analyses for the ´intensity´ as a particular aspect of the parliamentary scrutiny of the S/CP-NRP as the outcome variable. *Model 2* presents the estimation results of the multi-level analyses for the ´mainstreaming´ as a particular aspect of the parliamentary scrutiny of the S/CP-NRP as the outcome variable. Finally, *Model 3* presents the estimation results of the multi-level analyses for the ´timing´ as a particular aspect of the parliamentary scrutiny of the S/CP-NRP as the outcome variable.

Overall, the results of the Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 support the findings of the *Main model* presented in the analysis in the article. The statistical evidence confirms the importance of formal powers in EU affairs and

the levels of governments debt as important factors in explaining greater scrutiny intensity of national European Semester programmes, parliamentary tendency to include sectoral committees in the scrutiny process and start their S/CP-NRP scrutiny ahead of the 30 April deadline for the submission of these programmes to the Commission. In addition, Model 2 and Model 3 reveal further interesting findings. The results of the multi-level analysis in the Model 2 suggest that eurozone parliaments are more likely to rely on the available sectoral expertise in the parliament by including more sectoral committees in processing the European Semester. One possible interpretation could be that because the European Semester is a complex procedure that covers a wide range of policy areas and can be consequential especially for eurozone member states, their parliaments have greater incentives to obtain more comprehensive expert assessments of national European Semester programmes. Within the European Semester, eurozone member states have additional obligations and requirements, and in case of non-compliance there is a possibility of financial fines. This could incentivise a wider expert discussion on the national European Semester programmes in eurozone parliaments in order to enhance the effectiveness of the overall scrutiny. Furthermore, the results of the multi-level analysis in the Model 3 additionally indicate the negative effect of the more sceptical public opinion towards the EU on the timing of parliamentary European Semester scrutiny. One possible interpretation could be that due to the Eurosceptic public, parliamentarians are more reluctant to perform greater scrutiny in the European Semester and try to minimise their activities in the procedure to avoid potential further increases of the negative public perceptions.