

Annex IV – Empirical evidence: frequencies

Table I – Empirical evidence: nº of quotes and nº of interviews in which they appear by claim in the paper

Claim	Nº of quotes	Nº of interviews
Positive evaluation of governance outcome (MEPs)	11	4
Positive evaluation of governance outcome (Commission Officials)	4	2
Negative evaluation of governance outcome	12	4
Both positive and negative evaluations of governance outcomes	14	4
Unrealistic EP governance demands (1)	6	3
The real discussion on the role of the EP in the governance of the RRF is yet to come	15	7
Consent to the whole package only if creation of own resources	6	3
Preference for increasing the size of the available funds	13	6
EP success in increasing the size of the available funds	9	5
EP managed (for the first time) to re-open the allocation of MFF funds and acquired a larger role in the negotiation over the distribution of the funds	4	1
The consent to the MFF would only be granted if they were satisfied with the overall package	12	5
Importance of the fact that the negotiations of the four issues were connected	14	9
Coordination among the negotiation teams was strong	8	6
Issue linkage permitted extending the effects of procedures to different areas or gain leverage in other negotiations	26	11
MFF veto extended to other acts of the package	9	6
Time factor against the EP: money was urgently needed to respond to the effects of COVID-19	6	3

Time factor against the EP: public opinion costs of delaying the money due to the emergency situation	7	2
In case of no agreement, the previous MFF (2014-2020) with a superior expending ceiling would be automatically extended, reducing the cost of no-cooperation for the Parliament	5	3
The EP warned that it would walk out of the negotiations over the lack of advances regarding the MFF and the funding for 15 flagship programmes if the Council did not move	3	2
The early agreement on the MFF meant that the EP could not use the leverage deriving from the MFF over the other pending issue (i.e. the RRF)	6	2
Timing became a factor against the EP	9	7
Council puts time pressure on the EP arguing that a swift approval of the RRF was necessary and that the EP should not block it	1	2
Hungarian veto cancelled the timing advantage of the Council	10	4
MFF veto was part of its negotiating repertoire	9	6
The EP was more prepared to veto the MFF and rule of law conditionality regulations and less so the RRF	15	4
Veto in the MFF was used to acquire a larger role in the allocation of the funds in the MFF, going beyond the formally accorded role	4	1
Sense of urgency for the arrival of the money, decreased the willingness of the EP to effectively veto the RRF	13	5
GUE/NGL was finally not part of the big consensus	3	3
Unprecedented majority obtained in ECON and BUDG	1	1
Broad consensus as a strong negotiation element	40	12
Existence of a broad consensus as a necessary tool to negotiate with the Council	18	8
Intergroup consensus was reinforced with the inclusion of the Greens	14	6

In the early stages of negotiations (i.e. March 2020), the Greens/EFA group was not aligned with the three main groups	2	2
The appointment of a new rapporteur played a major role in the inclusion of the Greens to the united front	1	1
The Greens perceived that intra-group differences in the EPP and Renew could prevent a sufficient majority	4	2
Bringing the Greens to the table increased the green credentials of the whole package	2	2
ECR tried to adhere but did not find compromise points	2	2
ID reports exclusion from the negotiations and a lack of access to information	4	1
Consensus was forged by incorporating in package topics relevant to the different groups	14	7
Consensus was forged by excluding those topics that could be too divisive	12	5
Intra-group tensions	12	5
Differences in policy priorities	2	1
Consensus at the committee stage was crucial because it preserved the substantive interests of the different groups	1	1
Personal relations among rapporteurs played a very important role, and were facilitated by maintaining the previous negotiating team from the Reform and Support Program in the previous legislature	7	4
Having rapporteurs from member states set to profit more of the facility helped consensus	4	3
Governance of the new RRF was one of the points of consensus among groups	6	4
National needs played a significant part in the calculation of the agreement among parties	13	6
Being in an opposition party at national level played a significant part in the calculation of the agreement among parties	3	2
Limits to the intergroup consensus applied also to governance mechanisms, in particular, the scrutiny of national recovery plans	6	2
MEPs perceived the Commission as following the Council's interest during the negotiations	20	9
The Commission was supportive of the EP's position on certain policy issues (e.g. Climate)	5	4

The relationship EP-Commission also depended on who was the Commission's negotiator	1	1
Lack of support on governance mechanisms happened because the Commission wanted to preserve its autonomy in implementing measures within the RRF	6	5
The facility itself was an old EP's aspiration and, hence, having it and participating in its design meant already a success	5	3
The MFF and Rule of Law Regulation emerged as priority, specially increasing the size of available funds	22	7
Voting on national recovery plans via voting on delegated acts was unachievable	7	5
Voting on national recovery plans via voting on delegated acts was overambitious	5	3
The Council's position on this issue as unmovable and that this marked the limit to what the EP could achieve	12	6
Council's inflexibility can be attributed to the sensitiveness of the Council's July agreement	10	6
Asymmetry of powers between the Council and the EP	3	1
Important role of the German presidency in keeping an inflexible position	5	4
S&D MEP not totally convinced on the wisdom of fully involving the EP in the main instrument of RRF governance	3	1
MEPs second-preferred solutions still gave the EP a preeminent role in governance term	13	3
Strategies limits: the political, reputational and economic costs of such move were perceived as too high for the MEPs	13	5
Strategies limits: could endanger the implementation or the success of the facility, an old aspiration of the EP	5	3
MEPs believe that the real battle for governance is yet to come and that they will be able to expand the role of the EP	15	7
EP negotiators looked for alternative concessions within the design of the RRF	9	3
The heterogeneity of preferences among governments gave MEPs the opportunity to exploit divisions in the Council	2	2
Interviewees believe that the outcome of the negotiations includes significant policy gains for the EP	9	5

Table II – Empirical evidence: nº of quotes and nº of interviews in which they appear by code (created with Atlas.ti)

Code	Nº of quotes	Nº of interviews	Group
1.1 Appeal to democracy used yes	4	2	1 Rhetoric appeal to democracy
1.1.2 Appeal to democracy used yes and ineffective	5	3	1 Rhetoric appeal to democracy
2.1 Veto threat yes	9	6	2 Veto threat
2.1.1 EP red lines	10	3	2 Veto threat
2.1.2 EP to extend MFF 14-20	5	3	2 Veto threat
2.2 Co-legislation MFF as veto	4	1	2 Veto threat
2.3 Limits to the veto threat	15	4	2 Veto threat
3.1 Issue linkage yes	14	8	3 Issue linkage
3.1.1 MFF used to get concessions in other elements	12	5	3 Issue linkage
3.1.2 Coordination among the negotiation teams of the different elements	8	6	3 Issue linkage
3.3 Limits to the issue linkage	1	1	3 Issue linkage
4.1. Time pressure on EP	9	7	4 Timing
4.1.1 Emergency situation time pressures the EP	6	3	4 Timing
4.1.2 Council puts time pressure against the EP	2	2	4 Timing
4.1.3 Public opinion pressures the EP	7	2	4 Timing
4.1.4 Time pressure consequence: indefiniton of some aspects of the RRF	4	1	4 Timing
4.2 Time plays in favour of the EP: Council suffers time pressure	10	4	4 Timing

5.1 Intergroup consensus yes	22	8	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1 Intergroup consensus based on equal participation	14	7	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.1 Non-mainstream groups participating in the consensus	4	4	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.1.1 Inclusion of the Greens	14	6	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.1.2 Greens early exclusion corrected afterwards	2	2	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.2 Non mainstream groups missing in the consensus	11	6	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.2.1 Reasons for the exclusion/non-participation	1	1	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.1.3 Intergroup negotiations trade-offs	0	0	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.2 Intergroup consensus based on precursory team	7	4	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.3 Intergroup consensus based on geography	6	5	5 Intergroup consensus
5.1.4 Intergroup consensus based on large convergence	7	5	5 Intergroup consensus
5.2 Cohesion reinforces Parliament negotiating position	18	8	5 Intergroup consensus
5.3 Cohesion for institutional self-reinforcement	3	2	5 Intergroup consensus
5.4 Limits of the intergroup consensus	12	4	5 Intergroup consensus
5.4.1 MEPs dependence on national governments: same party	13	6	5 Intergroup consensus
5.4.2 MEPs dependence on national governments: opposition party	3	2	5 Intergroup consensus
5.5 Indefinition of some aspects of the RRF in order to get consensus	1	1	5 Intergroup consensus
5.6.1 Intragroup interest in avoiding plenary	1	1	5 Intergroup consensus
5.6.2 Intergroup interest in avoiding plenary	1	1	5 Intergroup consensus

5.7.1 Intragroup consensus: clear	1	1	5 Intergroup consensus
5.7.2 Intragroup difficulties to reach consensus	13	6	5 Intergroup consensus
6.1 Commission played as an honest broker: end of the negotiations	7	5	6 Commission
6.2 Commission did not play as an honest broker: beginning of the negotiation	20	9	6 Commission
6.3 Commission's preeminent control of the RRF	6	5	6 Commission
6.4 Commission's alignment with EP in policy issues	4	4	6 Commission
6.5 Illegality of EP governance demands	10	5	6 Commission
7.1 EP preferences: large scope	7	6	7 EP preferences
7.2 Governance demands	16	8	7 EP preferences
7.2.1 Priority of governance issues	1	1	7 EP preferences
7.2.2 Governance on equal footing with policy issues	1	1	7 EP preferences
7.2.3 Maximum governance preference	6	3	7 EP preferences
7.2.3.1 Maximum governance preference unachievable	7	5	7 EP preferences
7.2.3.2 Maximum governance preference undesirable	6	2	7 EP preferences
7.2.3.3 Maximum governance preference unrealistic	5	3	7 EP preferences
7.2.4 Alternatives to the maximum governance outcome	12	3	7 EP preferences
7.2.5 Expansive aim of the EP	1	1	7 EP preferences
7.3 EP policy preferences	8	3	7 EP preferences
7.3.1 Priority of policy preferences over governance	1	1	7 EP preferences
7.3.2 Preference for increasing the size of the available funds	13	6	7 EP preferences
7.4 Preferences trade-off	8	5	7 EP preferences

7.5 Geography of the MEPs: impact on the outcome	5	2	7 EP preferences
8.1 Satisfaction in general terms with the package	4	2	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.2 Satisfaction with policy and monetary outcomes	14	7	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.2.1 Facility as an old EP aspiration	5	3	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.2.2 Satisfaction: +16 billion euros	5	5	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.3 Satisfaction with governance outcomes	20	8	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.4 Disatisfaction with governance outcomes	16	5	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
8.5 Both positive and negative evaluation of governance outcomes	2	2	8 Satisfaction with the final outcome
9. Future governance	15	7	9 Future governance
9.1 Limits to future governance	4	1	9 Future governance
9.2 Long-term scope of the RFF	1	1	9 Future governance
9.2.1 Long-term scope of the RFF: no	2	1	9 Future governance
9.3 Art.122 in the future: EP participation	2	1	9 Future governance
10.1 Council non EP aligned attitude	15	8	10 Council
10.2 Council's preeminent control of the RRF	14	9	10 Council
10.2.1 Council's preeminent control of the RRF: achieved	2	1	10 Council
10.3 German Council's Presidency relevance	13	7	10 Council

10.3.1 German Council's presidency tactics	5	4	10 Council
10.4 Council stronger than EP	3	1	10 Council
10.5 Council's sensitive agreement	10	6	10 Council
11.1 EP negotiations with the Commission	7	5	11 EP
11.2 EP negotiations with the Council	17	8	11 EP
11.3 EP position not tough enough	1	1	11 EP
11.4 EP negotiation position from less to more	3	2	11 EP
11.5 Governance most difficult aspect of the negotiation	1	1	11 EP