#### The Role of Gender in Parliamentary Attacks and Incivility

#### APPENDICES

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Appendix A. Coder training

- Appendix B. Examples of non-attacks and attacks with and without incivility
- Appendix C. Descriptive statistics for female (descriptive) representation and variables
- Appendix D. Descriptive analysis
- Appendix E. Odds ratios from the main models
- Appendix F. Country differences
- Appendix G. Election proximity
- **Appendix H.** Robustness checks Count DVs
- Appendix I. Robustness checks Seniority / Backbenchers vs. Frontbenchers in the UK

#### Appendix A. Coder training

Coder training in the first five weeks was conducted on 15% of the UK data given the fluency of all coders in English. Every week, 3 PMQs from different periods were coded. Students received individual feedback on their coding after each week and attended a join meeting where coding issues were discussed. The codebook was updated every week based on the previous week's coding. In the last week, coders were tested for coding Belgian and Croatian data. Krippendorff's alpha scores for *attacks* in speech units reached satisfactory levels ( $\geq$ .67) across all weeks and coders (Table A.1). Scores for *incivility* saw improvements through the coding process with all coders reaching satisfactory scores in the final week (Table A.2). Coding across all variables was satisfactory for all coders in the last three weeks (Table A.3).

	Coder A	Coder B	Coder C	Coder D	Average
Week 1	0,956759	0,985354	0,8924272	0,9855864	0,9550318
Week 2	0,946835	0,960117	0,9867105	0,9468444	0,9601268
Week 3	0,959027	0,979513	0,9795263	0,9692968	0,9718408
Week 4	0,986921	0,986921	0,9869206	0,9607619	0,9803809
Week 5	1	1	0,9861051	0,9721845	0,9895724
Week 6	0,916365	1	1	1	0,9790912
Average	0,960984	0,985318	0,9719483	0,9724457	0,972674

**Table A.1** Krippendorff's alpha scores per coder for spotting attacks

 Table A.2 Krippendorff's alpha scores per coder for spotting incivility in attacks

	Coder A	Coder B	Coder C	Coder D	Average
Week 1	0,188718	0,261438	0,388937	0,639362	0,369614
Week 2	0,443441	0,783232	0,678759	0,809672	0,678776
Week 3	0,485256	0,700893	0,55497	0,604348	0,586367
Week 4	0,630542	0,60771	0,674899	0,793348	0,676625
Week 5	0,626781	0,490421	0,745211	0,744639	0,651763
Week 6	0,929263	0,800964	0,779221	0,790607	0,825013
Average	0,550667	0,607443	0,636999	0,730329	0,631359

	Coder A	Coder B	Coder C	Coder D	Average
Week 1	0,65007332	0,643619	0,646304	0,56962	0,627404
Week 2	0,597234094	0,68818	0,685905	0,692417	0,665934
Week 3	0,594976804	0,684221	0,672337	0,752718	0,676063
Week 4	0,663424565	0,669457	0,701644	0,724657	0,689796
Week 5	0,746810338	0,765724	0,836624	0,803619	0,788194
Week 6	0,80209381	0,808271	0,848942	0,843965	0,825818
Average	0,675768822	0,709912	0,731959	0,731166	0,712202

 Table A.3 Krippendorff's alpha scores per coder for coding all variables

# Appendix B. Examples of speeches

Table B.1 Examples of attack speeches (with no incivility)

	Dries Van Langenhove 23.1.2020	You and your predecessor failed to give the Immigration Department the necessary clout. Even worse, you and your predecessor have failed to take the necessary steps to limit the influx of foreigners.
	Gwenaëlle Grovonius 18.1.2018	You talk about efficiency, about results. The least you could do is apply this concept to yourself and respect your own commitments,
Belgium	Monica De Coninck 26.4.2018	I'm glad you discovered that reality is sometimes very complex. However, I do not accept that so many children disappear in this country. I think there should be a priority action plan, not just from you, but from the entire government.
	Denis Ducarme 26.9.2018	This is an important subject! Mr. President, you will take responsibility for not seeing answers given to all of the nine questions that were put to me and which normally give me the opportunity to answer with an extended speaking time!
	Peter Luykx 11.3.2010	You cite a number of reasons to justify the King's visit, including the historical links, for what they are still worth today. But, Prime Minister, there are not one, not a thousand, but hundreds of thousands of reasons not to go to Congo.
	Biljana Borzan 19.5.2010	The fact is that what was hidden and what you personally signed came to light. I would just like to tell you that in normal countries, for far less damage, resignations are given for moral reasons.
	Tulio Demetlika 16.1.2019	As you said, I am not at all happy with your answer because I asked very clear questions so I expected clear answers accordingly and you have entered a certain history.
Croatia	Darko Milinović 27.1.2010	Of course, I have another 15 minutes to speak, but I have a chance to once again refute the misinformation from the ranks of the SDP.
ۍ ۲	Marta Luc-Polanc 14.11.2018	() you have stated that you are increasing timber quotas. You are completely in contradiction with your statement that more is planted and less is cut, if you have foreseen 20 years in advance on forest management grounds.
	Đuro Popijač 21.1.2015	So you didn't do what you were supposed to do. You are the designated minister. Of course, with other colleagues primarily the Minister of Labor, Foreign Affairs, to protect and prevent this discriminatory law.
	Feryal Clark 19.12.2020	Is the Prime Minister aware that his Government risk failing a generation of children in my constituency of Enfield North and across the country ()
	Nadine Dorries 14.7.2010	Thanks to the massive deficit left by Labour, all but two departmental budgets are to be cut by between 25% and 40%.
ž	Michael Connarty 20.10.2010	() it is clear that this Government intend to breach the spirit and the letter of the Good Friday and the St Andrews agreements by refusing to bring in a Human Rights Act
_	Andy Slaughter 7.5.2014	Will the Prime Minister stop his Health Secretary putting my constituents' lives at risk?
	Leo Docherty 28.6.2017	I was deeply alarmed to hear of the Leader of the Opposition's reported announcement at the Glastonbury festival that, if in power, he would abandon Trident and utterly undermine the security and safety of our country.

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# Table B.2 Examples of attack speeches (with incivility)

	Marco Van Hees 2.7.2015	Minister, I note that in addition to playing the role of the Smurf with glasses, you also play the role of the happy Smurf – "it will be better tomorrow".					
_	Véronique Caprasse 1.6.2017	You are in a real quagmire, Madam Minister. () This situation is very disturbing, you are playing a dangerous game, both for public health in the south of the country and for democracy.					
Belgium	Jan Jambon 8.11.2012.	Mr Di Rupo, I must confess that I have a certain admiration for you. After a pleiade of MPs here ask you questions, you manage to say nothing () You proclaim blah blah blah and don't answer any specific question except the one about 0.7%.					
	Karin Temmerman 26.9.2018	Minister, did you also fall out of the sky, like your colleague Marghem? Was it a bolt from the blue for you too?					
	Tanguy Veys 6.2.2014	You wash your hands in innocence, then no longer like a Walloon Houdini, but like Pontius Pilate.					
	Gordan Jandroković 14.11.2012	Mr. Prime Minister does not know that. He is the Goliath of words and the Lilliputian of deeds.					
	Nenad Stazić 17.1.2017	() by resigning from the position of former Minister of Culture, Mr. Zlatko Hasanbegović, all the people in the media, especially the non-profit ones, but also all the other people who truly love democracy, breathed a sigh of relief as if from a nightmare.					
Croatia	Tatjana Šimac Bonačić 22.9.2010	It is very interesting to hear, Mr. Minister, what a magician you are that you managed to save 50% of your income () people in the current helplessness and anger they feel, because of your court, gave you a nickname " Dr. House. "					
	Andrej Plenković 24.11.2021	Mrs. Peović, keep it to yourself, you are disgusting. And not just you but everyone along with it.					
	Goran Marić 14.5.2014	But you are offering a prophecy instead of resigning. Every day you explain to the public and the Croatian people why what you announced the day before yesterday did not happen yesterday, you are actually a prophet who prophesies backwards.					
	Boris Johnson 22.7.2020	The Leader of the Opposition has more flip-flops than Bournemouth beach.					
	Harriet Harman 14.3.2012	That is absolute rubbish. () What has happened to that fine Liberal tradition? They must be turning in their graves: the party of William Gladstone; the party of David Lloyd George: now the party of Nick Clegg.					
ň	David Cameron 18.12.2013	I would have thought that after today's briefing in the papers the hand gesture for the shadow Chancellor should be bye-bye. You don't need it to be Christmas to know when you are sitting next to a turkey.					
	Theresa May 28.11.2018	What does Labour have to offer? Six bullet points. My weekend shopping list is longer than that.					
	Jeremy Corbyn 19.12.2018	She is holding Parliament and the country to ransom. () Is this not just a deeply cynical manoe from a failing and utterly reckless Prime Minister?					

### Table B.3 Examples of neutral speeches

	David Clarinval 25.6.2016	Minister, thank you for your response. 98% coverage is great, but let's aim for indoors. For the rest, I share your opinion. It is important that the Walloon Region understands that if it want to develop rural areas, it must stop taxing pylons at all costs!
-	Georges Gilkinet 24.5.2012	Mr. Chairman, I understand that various groups have tabled proposals on this very important subject That said, I agree with the comments made by Mr. Moriau. As Chairman of the Finance Committee I can propose, possibly with the External Relations Committee, to organize hearings before th holidays in order to make concrete progress in this matter.
Belgium	Annemie Turtelboom 7.1.2010	Dear colleague, at the moment the black boxes are already being used by certain units of the federa police for certain interventions; you yourself referred to the Intervention Corps. They are also alread being used in certain local police zones, for example Schaerbeek.
	Sophie Rohonyi 12.12.2019	Madam Minister, do you consider that the law against sexism, which is the basis of this legal action must be adapted to make it possible to sanction remarks made not against a particular person bu against a group of people, in this case all women?
	Sammy Mahdi 9.4.2020	Minister, how will you deal with the warnings of many Flemish scientists? When can we expect th app? Time is running out on that front. Do you have any idea of the cost of developing an maintaining such an application?
	Branka Juričev- Martinčev 10.4.2013	Therefore, all of them are fearfully wondering what will happen and whether this new real estate ta will be introduced. Your question, given that you have now passed and presented a new bill in part of our country, do you still insist on the introduction of a real estate tax, yes or no?
	Domagoj Hajduković 15.9.2017	My question and I would ask you for a direct answer, will the Government of the Republic of Croat buy INA from MOL and if we are going to buy INA from MOL does that mean that we are going t privatize 25% of HEP shares, ie 25% of HEP and of these 25% of HEP included 7 veterans percent Thank you.
Croatia	Milanka Opačić 15.4.2015	Mr. MP, so yes, we initially divided the debt write-off into two categories. In the first category we the beneficiaries of social benefits, in the second category are our citizens who meet a certain incom threshold. So 2.5 thousand per single person or 1250 kuna per household member in the last months.
	Karmela Caparin 17.3.2011	I am satisfied with the answer and I am pleased with the positive business of the Croatian Healt Insurance Institute and I believe that you will continue the health care reform and insurance reforr because really this money we provide is needed by our citizens and patients for whom we are here
	Zvonko Milas 23.1.2013	Mr. President, yesterday, if I remember correctly at Maslenica, you said that freedom had n alternative. I totally agree with you. Some decisions and some values simply do not have, but I thir that this decision could have an alternative and so I ask you if the Government of Croatia and yo personally consider postponing this law ()
	Boris Johnson 25.11.2020	Yes, indeed; I can make that guarantee. Our position on fish has not changed. We will only be ab to make progress if the EU accepts the reality that we must be able to control access to our water It is very important at this stage to emphasise that.
	Jo Stevens 2.5.2018	The Prime Minister's new Home Secretary says that her "hostile environment""does not represer our values as a country".—[Official Report, 30 April 2018; Vol. 640, c. 41.]Does she agree with him
	David Linden 9.12.2020	Why does the Prime Minister think we have now seen 15 consecutive polls showing majority suppo for Scottish independence?
Х	Annette Brooke 10.2.2010	Recent research has shown that more than 70 per cent. of blind and partially sighted people as unable to access vital personal health information. Will the Prime Minister agree to meet me and delegation from the Royal National Institute of Blind People, so that we can discuss provisions the could address that shameful inadequacy?
	Jeremy Corbyn 15.6.2016	Last week, the Prime Minister gave a welcome commitment to the closing of the loophole in the posting of workers directive. We will hold him to that, but we are concerned about the exploitation of migrant workers and the undercutting of wages in this country as a result. On that issue, will hold y commit to outlawing the practice of agencies that only advertise abroad for jobs that are, reality, jobs in this country?

6

Appendix C. Descriptive statistics for female (descriptive) representation and variables

Country	Term	N (sampled QTs)	Average	SD	Minimum	Maximum
	2007-2010	4	37.2	7.5	27.6	45.2
	2010-2014	34	30.4	9.3	14.8	50
Belgium	2014-2018	50	30.5	10.0	13.3	57.7
	2018-2023	15	41.4	8.3	27.6	53.9
	2007-2011	7	29.5	2.0	26.9	32
	2011-2015	15	23.4	6.1	9.7	31.7
Croatia	2015-2016	1	16.7	-	-	-
	2016-2020	14	20.4	4.3	13.6	29.1
	2020-2024	6	30.4	3.2	25.5	34.5
	2005–2010	4	18.1	13.1	9.5	37.5
	2010–2015	53	23.3	6.7	7.7	43.3
UK	2015–2017	21	28.9	8.2	13.3	41.7
	2017–2019	26	34.8	8.1	19.4	50
	2019-2024	11	28.5	7.4	16	38.1

Table C.1 Descriptive representation of female politicians during QTs

#### Table C.2 Descriptive statistics for dependent variables

Variable		Ν
DV(1. Free lawing attack (NL 7724)	No	4,584 (59.3%)
DV1: Employing attack (N=7,724)	Yes	3,140 (40.7%)
$\mathbf{D}$ (2). Cotting torrected (N=7.724)	No	6,129 (79.3%)
DV2: Getting targeted (N=7,724)	Yes	1,595 (20.7%)
<b>DV2.</b> Attacking with inciviliate $(N=2.140)$	No	2,228 (71%)
DV3: Attacking with incivility (N=3,140)	Yes	912 (29%)
DVA: Catting towards d with installing (NL 1 EQE)	No	1,076 (67.5%)
DV4: Getting targeted with incivility (N=1,595)	Yes	519 (32.5%)

Note: Speakers and independent politicians/politicians from parties not in the CHES excluded


#### Table C.3 Descriptive statistics for independent variables

	Ν	Average	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Male	5,452 (70.6%)	-	-	-	-
Female	2,272 (29.4%)	-	-	-	-
ions	7,724	23.4	15.1	0	59
	7,724	.18	.08	.00	.47
Opposition	3,163 (41%)	-	-         -         -           -         -         -         -           23.4         15.1         0           .18         .08         .00	-	
Majority	3,183 (41.2%)	-	-	-	-
Cabinet	1,378 (17.8%)	-	-	-	-
	Female ons Opposition Majority	Male         5,452 (70.6%)           Female         2,272 (29.4%)           ons         7,724           7,724         7,724           Opposition         3,163 (41%)           Majority         3,183 (41.2%)	Male         5,452 (70.6%)         -           Female         2,272 (29.4%)         -           ons         7,724         23.4           7,724         .18           Opposition         3,163 (41%)         -           Majority         3,183 (41.2%)         -	Male         5,452 (70.6%)         -         -           Female         2,272 (29.4%)         -         -           ons         7,724         23.4         15.1           7,724         .18         .08           Opposition         3,163 (41%)         -         -           Majority         3,183 (41.2%)         -         -	Male         5,452 (70.6%)         -         -         -           Female         2,272 (29.4%)         -         -         -           ons         7,724         23.4         15.1         0           7,724         .18         .08         .00           Opposition         3,163 (41%)         -         -         -           Majority         3,183 (41.2%)         -         -         -

Note: Speakers and independent politicians/politicians from parties not in the CHES excluded

#### Appendix D. Descriptive analysis


In this appendix, I will briefly explore whether hypotheses hold on a descriptive level. As such, on the farleft side of Figure D.1, I show the share of politicians that employed attacks and got targeted in attacks during QTs based on gender. As can be seen, men attacked more compared to women. Out of all men who spoke during all QTs, almost 41.8% of them attacked someone during QTs, compared to women where 38.6% of them engaged in attacks. The difference between men and women is wider if we look at targets. We can see that 22.5% of men got attacked which is 6 percentage points less compared to women who accumulated 16.2% of attacks in their direction. As such, we can conclude that there is some merit in H1a and H2a. Moving to the right side of Figure D.1, we focus on instances where politicians attacked or got targeted, looking at the share of used or received incivility in these attacks. There is a strong indication that corroborates H3a with 22.7% of women relying on incivility in attacks compared to 31.6% of men. H4a, that is, that women are less attacked compared to men with incivility, also shows support as there is 2 percentage points difference in incivility usage with men receiving more uncivil attacks in their direction.




**Figure D.1** Share of female and male politicians that attacked/got targeted/attacked with incivility/got targeted with incivility (y-axis) in the pool of all politicians nested in QTs

To explore sub-hypotheses regarding the impact of proximity to parliamentary elections, I plot shares from Figure D.1 per year since the last election (Figure D.2). We can observe that there is some merit for H1b, H3b, and H4b. On the far-left side of Figure 2, we see that women employ slightly fewer attacks compared to men early in the electoral cycles but these shares become equal the closer we get to elections and even surpass men in the election year thereby confirming H1b. Regarding targets, female politicians tend to be less attacked compared to men throughout the term which is not in line with H2b.

Looking at the incivility usage on the right side of Figure D.2, we can observe that men increase their usage of incivility and receive more uncivil attacks closer to elections, unlike women who experience a decrease. This is in line with H3b and H4b.






Note: x-axis represents years since the last parliamentary elections


Furthermore, to get a deeper take on the results, on the left side of Figure D.3, I show the share of politicians that engaged in attack behaviour during QTs based on gender and their status. As can be seen, whether we observe opposing or cabinet politicians, in both groups, men attacked more compared to women. Out of all men in the opposition who spoke during all QTs, almost 69.5% of them attacked someone during QTs, compared to women where 62% of them engaged in attacks. In the cabinet, almost 28% of men attacked, compared to 21.5% of women. The difference between men and women in the majority is non-existent. Overall there is an indication that H1a holds both for the opposition and the cabinet.

On the right side of Figure D.3, I show the share of politicians that got targeted in attacks during all QTs based on gender. We can see that in the opposition, 24.5% of men got attacked which is 9 percentage points less compared to women who accumulated 15% of attacks in their direction. There is only a small gender difference between attacks on male and female majority politicians who rarely got targeted. However, with regards to the cabinet, we can see that women receive an equal share of attacks as men. It does appear that having women in the cabinet increases the likelihood that they will be attacked similar to men when compared to women and men in the opposition. This is in line with the theory that there is pressure to attack women if they are in the cabinet.



**Figure D.3** Share of female and male politicians that attacked/targeted (y-axis) in the pool of all politicians nested in QTs

Moving to incivility in attacks, on the right side of Figure D.4, I present the share of politicians that used incivility in their attacks during QTs. There is a strong indication that corroborates H3a, as across all three groups (opposition, majority, and cabinet) men used more incivility in attacks compared to women. Changes range from 4.5 percentage points difference in the cabinet to 9 percentage points difference in the opposition in favour of men using incivility. In turn, there is also support on a descriptive level for H4a. Considering all attacks directed towards opposition, majority, and cabinet members, there is less incivility in attacks that are targeting women. There is 4 and 8 percentage points difference between male and female politicians receiving uncivil attacks in the opposition and majority respectively. In turn, for the cabinet, this difference is only slightly above 2 percentage points. As such, the difference is visibly greater for opposition and majority politicians when compared to cabinet politicians.



**Figure D.4** Share of female and male politicians that attacked/targeted with incivility (y-axis) in the pool of all politicians nested in QTs that were engaged in attacks

### Appendix E. Odds ratios from the main models

	DV1: Employing attack (1=Yes)	DV2: Getting targeted (1=Yes)	DV3: Attacking with incivility (1=Yes)	DV4: Getting targeted with incivility (1=Yes)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	O.R. (S.E.)	O.R. (S.E.)	O.R. (S.E.)	O.R. (S.E.)
Male politicians (ref.)		. ,	. ,	. ,
Female politicians	.810 (.051) **	.666 (.053) ***	.623 (.062) ***	.731 (.105) *
Proximity to Elections	1.013 (.002) ***	1.007 (.002) **	1.008 (.003) **	1.008 (.005) †
Ideology	4.452 (3.808) †	1.431 (1.535)	21.593 (19.172) **	1.057 (1.134)
Opposition MPs (ref.)				
Majority MPs	.056 (.005) ***	.045 (.007) ***	.323 (.050) ***	.657 (.214)
Cabinet politicians	.082 (.008) ***	3.041 (.313) ***	1.150 (.170)	2.495 (.389) ***
Belgium (ref.)				
Croatia	1.466 (.325) †	1.765 (.493) *	.478 (.124) **	.717 (.177)
UK	.357 (.090) ***	1.225 (.415)	1.134 (.314)	1.441 (.403)
Constant	2.480 (.721) **	.215 (.074) ***	.249 (.081) ***	.224 (.090) ***
Variance (QT)	.364 (.041)	.083 (.146)	.222 (.093)	.260 (.136)
Variance (Parties)	.429 (.096)	.617 (.106)	.430 (.097)	.307 (.129)
N (total)	7,724	7,724	3.140	1.595
N (QTs)	261	261	261	261
N (min. politicians per QT)	13	13	3	1
N (max. politicians per QT)	56	56	37	23
AIC (empty model)	8.140 (0=9.509)	5.785 (0=7.707)	3.584 (0=3.810)	1.938 (0=1.984)

**Note:** †p<0.1,\*p<0.05;\*\*p<0.01;\*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included / Due to the large O.R. and S.E. for the ideology variable in certain models, tests were re-run omitting this variable, but the effect of the gender variable remained consistent.

### Appendix F. Country differences

**Table F.1.** Multi-level regressions testing probabilities of engaging in attacks during QTs by interacting gender and country

	DV1: Employing attack	DV2: Getting targeted	DV3: Attacking with	DV4: Getting targete
	(1=Yes)	(1=Yes)	incivility (1=Yes)	with incivility
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Male politicians (ref.)				
Female politicians	.008 (.104)	193 (.125)	189 (.143)	158 (.210)
Male (ref.) X Belgium (ref.)				
Croatia	216 (.165)	220 (.194)	114 (.249)	237 (.351)
UK	423 (.144) **	480 (.193) *	975 (.255) ***	347 (.359)
Proximity to Elections	.013 (.002) ***	.007 (.002) **	.008 (.003) *	.008 (.004) †
Ideology	1.556 (.852) †	.436 (1.071)	3.207 (.881) ***	.143 (1.085)
Opposition MPs (ref.)				
Majority MPs	-2.874 (.102) ***	-3.088 (.158) ***	-1.152 (.157) ***	417 (.326)
Cabinet politicians	-2.492 (.106) ***	1.117 (.103) ***	.167 (.148)	.913 (.156) ***
Belgium (ref.)				
Croatia	.455 (.224) *	.630 (.282) *	671 (.261) *	281 (.257)
UK	898 (.256) ***	.333 (.342)	.342 (.280)	.446 (.293)
Constant	.814 (.292) **	-1.621 (.348) ***	-1.507 (.328) ***	-1.557 (.408) ***
Variance (QT)	.368 (.041)	.101 (.123)	.229 (.091)	()
Variance (Parties)	.426 (.096)	.615 (.106)	.424 (.097)	()
N (total)	7,724	7,724	3.140	1.595
N (QTs)	261	261	261	261
N (min. politicians per QT)	13	13	3	1
N (max. politicians per QT)	56	56	37	23
AIC (empty model)	8.135 (0=9.509)	5.783 (0=7.707)	3.572 (0=3.810)	1.941 (0=1.984)

**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included

#### Table F.2 Multi-level regressions testing probabilities of engaging in attacks during QTs per each country

		BELG	NUM			CRO	ATIA		UK			
	DV1:	DV2:	DV3:	DV4:	DV1:	DV2:	DV3:	DV4:	DV1:	DV2:	DV3:	DV4:
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Male (ref.)	060 (.100)	139 (.126)	193 (.144)	228 (.203)	212 (.147)	440 (.146) **	376 (.208) †	448 (.282)	454 (.104) ***	870 (.169) ***	-1.381 (.233) ***	667 (.330) *
Female												
Proximity to Elections	.012 (.006) †	.007 (.006)	.015 (.007) *	.003 (.009)	.047 (.014) **	.027 (.009) **	.030 (.014) *	.017 (.015)	.004 (.004)	.005 (.006)	.008 (.007)	.027 (.012) *
Ideology	2.305 (.748) **	1.716 (.722) *	3.023 (.685) ***	1.769 (1.173)	-2.466 (2.475)	1.146 (1.602)	2.448 (2.385)	191 (2.871)	.800 (1.235)	2.765 (1.783)	023 (2.341)	-7.994 (7.989)
Opposition (ref.)												
Majority	-2.089 (.140) ***	950 (.216) ***	-1.034 (.212) ***	.525 (.438)	-4.264 (.217) ***	-3.497 (.249) ***	-1.108 (.272) ***	-1.119 (.791)	-2.104 (.145) ***	-3.410 (.315) ***	480 (.304)	.567 (1.180)
Cabinet	-2.854 (.163) ***	2.606 (.178) ***	846 (.295) **	1.685 (.308) ***	-3.813 (.215) ***	.127 (.130)	250 (.215)	.234 (.203)	3.715 (.598) ***	5.417 (.735) ***	2.351 (.319) ***	3.061 (.894) **
Constant	.174 (.421)	-3.041 (.458) ***	-1.868 (.483) ***	-2.158 (.676) **	1.940 (.718) **	-1.216 (.494) *	-2.765 (.774) ***	-1.569 (1.071)	.025 (.239)	-1.626 (.361) ***	947 (.424) *	-1.418 (1.330)
Variance (QT)	.386 (.071)	.351 (.086)	.301 (.117)	.198 (.328)	.366 (.087)	.000 (.086)	.000 (.167)	.000 (.438)	.000 (.051)	.000 (.086)	.000 (.228)	.000 (.326)
Variance (Parties)	.233 (.103)	.195 (.107)	.182 (.138)	.000 (.587)	.855 (.216)	.435 (.173)	.707 (.275)	.164 (.415)	.000 (.051)	.000 (.118)	.000 (.084)	.799 (.497)
N (total)	2.833	2.833	1.284	635	2.059	2.059	954	595	2.832	2.832	902	365
N (QTs)	103	103	103	103	43	43	43	43	115	115	115	115
N (min. politicians)	13	13	5	2	28	28	10	9	14	14	3	1
N (max. politicians)	37	37	22	13	56	56	37	23	37	37	17	6
AIC (empty model)	2.947 (0=3.295)	2.217 (0=2.949)	1.513 (0=1.539)	795 (0=818)	1.811 (0=2.663)	1.897 (0=2.448)	1.082 (0=1.089)	704 (0=694)	2.824 (0=3.313)	1.417 (0=2.142)	935 (0=1.056)	446 (0=476)


**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included / Due to the large Coef. and S.E. for the ideology variable in certain models, tests were rerun omitting this variable, but the effect of the gender variable remained consistent.

#### Appendix G. Election proximity

**Table G.1.** Multi-level regressions testing probabilities of engaging in attacks during QTs by interacting gender and election proximity in the UK


	DV1: Employing attack (1=Yes)	DV2: Getting targeted (1=Yes)	DV3: Attacking with incivility (1=Yes)	DV4: Getting targeted with incivility
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Male politicians (ref.)				
Female politicians	512 (.172) **	-1.078 (.278) ***	852 (.404) *	.136 (.564)
Male (ref.) X Elections				
Female politicians	.003 (.006)	.009 (.010)	027 (.018)	038 (.023)
Proximity to Elections	.003 (.005)	.003 (.006)	.010 (.007)	.034 (.013) *
Ideology	.791 (1.23)	2.782 (1.782)	.056 (2.343)	-8.188 (8.387)
Opposition MPs (ref.)				
Majority MPs	-2.103 (.146) ***	-3.411 (.315) ***	495 (.304)	.716 (1.240)
Cabinet politicians	3.721 (.599) ***	5.442 (.736) ***	2.306 (.320) ***	3.131 (.965) **
Constant	.046 (.244)	-1.567 (.365) ***	-1.052 (.428) *	-1.632 (1.390)
Variance (QT)	.000 (.051)	.000 (.119)	.000 (.232)	.000 (.341)
Variance (Parties)	.000 (.262)	.000 (.086)	.000 (.084)	.837 (.529)
N (total)	2.832	2.832	902	365
N (QTs)	115	115	115	115
N (min. politicians per QT)	14	14	3	1
N (max. politicians per QT)	37	37	17	6
AIC (empty model)	2.826 (0=3.313)	1.418 (0=2.142)	934 (0=1.056)	445 (0=476)

**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included / Due to the large Coef. and S.E. for the ideology variable in certain models, tests were re-run omitting this variable, but the effect of the gender variable remained consistent.



**Figure G.2. BELGIUM** Predicted probabilities for employing attack (top-left), getting targeted (top-right), employing attack with incivility (bottom-left) and getting targeted with incivility (bottom-right) during QTs in Belgium

Note: Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals (90%) / Generated from the individual models run only on the Belgian sample



**Figure G.2. CROATIA** Predicted probabilities for employing attack (top-left), getting targeted (top-right), employing attack with incivility (bottom-left) and getting targeted with incivility (bottom-right) during QTs in Croatia

**Note:** Vertical lines indicate confidence intervals (90%) / Croatia has a 4-year electoral cycle / Generated from the individuals models run only on the Croatian sample

# Appendix H. Robustness checks - count DVs

	DV1: N of attacks	DV2: N of received attacks	DV3: N of employed uncivil attacks	DV4: N of received uncivil attacks	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	
Male politicians (ref.)					
Female politicians	110 (.064) †	330 (.099) **	370 (.113) **	207 (.170)	
Proximity to Elections	.008 (.001) ***	.007 (.001) ***	.009 (.002) ***	.009 (.003) **	
Ideology	1.611 (.352) ***	.695 (.577)	2.905 (.550) ***	379 (.973)	
Opposition MPs (ref.)					
Majority MPs	-1.591 (.054) ***	-2.234 (.125) ***	665 (.121) ***	067 (.294)	
Cabinet politicians	-1.169 (.075) ***	1.091 (.083) ***	.382 (.127) **	.845 (.138) ***	
Belgium (ref.)					
Croatia	.326 (.077) ***	.844 (.116) ***	167 (.126)	157 (.166)	
UK	499 (.077) ***	.261 (.119) *	008 (.136)	.116 (.207)	
Constant	.926 (.133) ***	399 (.195) *	3.419 (3.463)	.318 (.380)	
N (total)	7.724	7.724	3.140	1.595	
N (politicians)	1.581	1.581	881	409	
AIC (empty model)	17.253 (19.761)	10.083 (11.532)	4.733 (5.158)	2.942 (3.140)	

**Table H.1** Negative binomial regressions testing the count of engagement in attacks during QTs

**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included

 Table H.2 Negative binomial regressions testing the count of engagement in attacks during QTs per each country

	BELGIUM				CROATIA			UK				
	N of attacks	N of received attacks	N of employed uncivil attacks	N of received uncivil attacks	N of attacks	N of received attacks	N of employed uncivil attacks	N of received uncivil attacks	N of attacks	N of received attacks	N of employed uncivil attacks	N of received uncivil attacks
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Male (ref.)												
Female	143 (.073) †	168 (.124)	122 (.102)	172 (.214)	.075 (.120)	238 (.171)	273 (.248)	085 (.349)	274 (.107) *	578 (.232) *	817 (.252) **	431 (.390)
Proximity to Elections	.010 (.002) ***	.004 (.003)	.009 (.004)	.004 (.006)	.019 (.004) ***	.014 (.005) *	.027 (.010) *	.027 (.010) *	.011 (.002) ***	.010 (.003) **	.020 (.005) ***	.019 (.007) **
Ideology	1.129 (.311) ***	1.293 (.603) *	2.130 (.362) ***	1.381 (1.202)	1.035 (.781)	572 (1.099)	1.675 (1.649)	005 (2.356)	.595 (1.230)	5.551 (2.701) *	1.146 (2.311)	-8.448 (4.299) *
Opposition (ref.)												
Majority	-1.356 (.078) ***	837 (.183) ***	813 (.164) ***	.535 (.399)	-1.932 (.094) ***	-3.015 (.240) ***	833 (.241) **	647 (.695)	-1.669 (.143) ***	-3.351 (.386) ***	327 (.307)	.128 (.858)
Cabinet	-2.132 (.119) ***	1.949 (.148) ***	616 (.230) **	1.487 (.288) ***	-1.499 (.106) ***	.552 (.110) ***	.026 (.229)	.411 (.215) †	1.967 (.178) ***	1.785 (.270) ***	1.716 (.292) ***	2.172 (.467) ***
Constant	.810 (.202) ***	-2.114 (.320) ***	-1.728 (.304)	836 (.599)	.950 (.238) ***	.725 (.341) *	1.569 (1.333)	.901 (.915)	1.852 (.283) ***	1.640 (.638) **	3.032 (4.239)	1.191 (.884)
N (total)	2.833	2.833	1.284	635	2.059	2.059	954	595	2.832	2.832	902	365
N (politicians)	368	368	269	130	403	403	245	169	810	810	367	110
AIC (empty model)	6.676 (7.244)	4.203 (4.452)	1.982 (2.038)	1.262 (1.283)	5.146 (5.789)	3.379 (3.749)	1.371 (1.376)	929 (917)	4.878 (5.261)	2.226 (2.446)	1.338 (1.380)	751 (769)

**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included / Due to the large Coef. and S.E. for the ideology variable in certain models, tests were rerun omitting this variable, but the effect of the gender variable remained consistent.

### Appendix I. Robustness checks - Seniority / Backbenchers vs. Frontbenchers in the UK

**Table I.1.** Multi-level regressions testing probabilities of engaging in attacks during QTs by including variables on seniority and backbenchers vs. frontbenchers

	DV1: Employing attack	DV2: Getting targeted	DV3: Attacking with	DV4: Getting targeted	
	(1=Yes)	(1=Yes)	incivility (1=Yes)	with incivility	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	
Male politicians (ref.)					
Female politicians	221 (.110) *	212 (.200)	-1.042 (.246) ***	162 (.360)	
Backbenchers (ref.)					
Frontbenchers	2.893 (.302) ***	3.400 (.238) ***	1.765 (.227) ***	1.898 (.397) ***	
Seniority	003 (.005)	.014 (.008) †	.009 (.008)	006 (.016)	
Proximity to Elections	.004 (.004)	.006 (.007)	.006 (.007)	.031 (.013) *	
Ideology	.859 (1.277)	8.389 (3.782) *	.376 (2.547)	-6.719 (9.664)	
Opposition MPs (ref.)					
Majority MPs	-1.825 (.150) **	-2.422 (.520) ***	.117 (.329)	2.206 (1.435)	
Cabinet politicians	1.121 (.664) †	3.050 (.844) ***	1.097 (.357) **	2.634 (1.131)	
Constant	266 (.255)	-3.664 (.788) ***	-1.688 (.470) ***	-2.924 (1.596) †	
Variance (QT)	.076 (.232)	.000 (.290)	.000 (.648)	.000 (.323)	
Variance (Parties)	.000 (.071)	.613 (.295)	.000 (.087)	.987 (.620)	
N (total)	2.832	2.832	902	365	
N (QTs)	115	115	115	115	
N (min. politicians per QT)	14	14	3	1	
N (max. politicians per QT)	37	37	17	6	
AIC (empty model)	2.663 (0=3.313)	1.133 (0=2.142)	869 (0=1.056)	422 (0=476)	

**Note:** †p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 / Control for yearly differences included/ Due to the large Coef. and S.E. for the ideology variable in certain models, tests were re-run omitting this variable, but the effect of the gender variable remained consistent.