Supplementary Material

1. Regression Tables

Table A1. Regression Table for Figure 4. Interaction between illiberalism and economic left-right

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regimes of the World	0.016**	
	(0.006)	
Economic Left-Right	-0.004*	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Liberalism-Illiberalism	-0.003**	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Economic Left-Right × Liberalism-Illiberalism	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Electoral Democracy Index		0.110**
		(0.046)
Num.Obs.	1818	1818
R2	0.983	0.983
R2 Adj.	0.982	0.982
R2 Within	0.094	0.108
R2 Within Adj.	0.091	0.105
AIC	-7186.0	-7214.0
BIC	-6519.8	-6547.8
RMSE	0.03	0.03
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X

- * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country.

Table A2. Regression table for Figure 5. Subdimensions of illiberalism and economic left-right interaction

	Inclusive-Exclusive Values	Inclusive-Exclusive Values	Power Concentration	Power Concentration
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regimes of the World	0.016**		0.018***	
	(0.006)		(0.006)	
Economic Left-Right	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Inclusive-Exclusive	-0.003*	-0.002*		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Economic Left-Right x Inclusive Exclusive	-0.001**	-0.001**		
	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Electoral Democracy Index		0.114**		0.119**
		(0.047)		(0.046)
Power Concentration			-0.002	-0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Economic Left-Right × Power Concentration			-0.001**	-0.001*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	1803	1803	1817	1817
R2	0.983	0.983	0.983	0.983
R2 Adj.	0.982	0.982	0.982	0.982
R2 Within	0.085	0.100	0.087	0.101
R2 Within Adj.	0.082	0.097	0.084	0.098
AIC	-7103.5	-7132.4	-7166.8	-7194.8
BIC	-6443.8	-6472.8	-6500.7	-6528.7
RMSE	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X

- $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country

Table A3. Regression table for Figure 6. Subcomponents of V-Dem inequality as separate DVs, Model 1.

	v2dlencmps	v2dlunivl	v2peedueq	v2pehealth
GDP per capita	0.000**	0.000	0.000*	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	-0.001	0.003	0.002	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Regimes of the World	0.288***	0.034	0.012	0.095**
	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Economic Left-Right	-0.016	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.027*
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Liberalism-Illiberalism	-0.028**	0.004	-0.014	-0.025**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Economic Left-Right x	-0.009**	-0.007**	-0.006	-0.004
Liberalism-Illiberalism	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	1818	1818	1818	1818
R2	0.909	0.919	0.975	0.969
R2 Adj.	0.903	0.913	0.974	0.967
R2 Within	0.121	0.017	0.039	0.086
R2 Within Adj.	0.117	0.013	0.036	0.083
AIC	1018.2	2.4	-275.0	214.4
BIC	1684.4	668.6	391.1	880.6
RMSE	0.30	0.23	0.21	0.24
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X

- $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country

Table A4. Regression table for Figure 6. Subcomponents of V-Dem inequality as separate DVs, Model 2.

	v2dlencmps	v2dlunivl	v2peedueq	v2pehealth
GDP per capita	0.000*	0.000	0.000*	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	-0.001	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Electoral Democracy Index	2.400***	0.187	0.011	0.550**
	(0.344)	(0.252)	(0.303)	(0.277)
Economic Left-Right	-0.016	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.028*
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Liberalism-Illiberalism	-0.017	0.004	-0.014	-0.024**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Economic Left-Right x	-0.006	-0.007**	-0.006	-0.003
Liberalism-Illiberalism	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	1818	1818	1818	1818
R2	0.919	0.919	0.975	0.969
R2 Adj.	0.914	0.913	0.974	0.967
R2 Within	0.220	0.017	0.039	0.088
R2 Within Adj.	0.217	0.013	0.035	0.085
AIC	800.3	2.1	-274.5	210.3
BIC	1466.4	668.3	391.6	876.5
RMSE	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.24
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X

- $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country

Table A5. Predicted effect of each subdimension of illiberalism on executive constraints.

	Judicial Constraints	Judicial Constraints	Legislative Constraints	Legislative Constraints
GDP per capita	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	0.000	0.000	-0.001**	-0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Economic left-right	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Inclusive-Exclusive Values	-0.007**		-0.011***	
	(0.003)		(0.004)	
Inclusive-Exclusive x	0.000		0.000	
Economic left-right	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Power concentration		-0.009**		-0.015***
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Economic left-right x		-0.001		0.000
Power concentration		(0.001)		(0.002)
Num.Obs.	1803	1817	1802	1816
R2	0.958	0.959	0.930	0.931
R2 Adj.	0.955	0.956	0.925	0.926
R2 Within	0.027	0.044	0.045	0.068
R2 Within Adj.	0.024	0.041	0.042	0.066
AIC	-4711.7	-4787.4	-3882.0	-3932.9
BIC	-4057.5	-4126.8	-3233.4	-3277.8
RMSE	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X

- $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country. Models test whether different dimensions of illiberalism affect institutional constraints.

2. Descriptive Statistics of Left-Right and Liberal-Illiberal Observations

**Figure A1. Observations in Panel Data by Economic Left-Right and Liberal-Illiberal**

Figure A2. Correlation of Inclusive-Exclusive Values and Power Concentration-Dispersion for leaders on Left and Right.

3. Robustness Checks. Gini Inequality as Dependent Variable

To test the robustness of our findings regarding the relationship between illiberal leadership and economic inequality, we conducted additional analyses using alternative measures of inequality from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2021). While our main analysis uses V-Dem's equal distribution of resources index, these robustness checks employ two Solt inequality indicators: Gini Disposable Income and Gini Market Income.

The Gini coefficients measure income inequality before government intervention (Market Income) and after taxes and transfers (Disposable Income), with higher values indicating greater inequality. It is worth noting that Gini provides less coverage than the V-Dem inequality index and typically exhibits less temporal sensitivity, therefore providing less year-to-year variation. The results, presented in Table A6, show patterns that are not conclusive, but do not contradict our main findings. The only finding that approaches traditional levels of significance is that there is less pre-distribution inequality under leftist liberal leaders. This could potentially reflect the increased bargaining power of workers and unions in the conditions where such leaders prevail.

Beyond that, the marginal effects plotted in Figure A1 do not lend themselves to strong conclusions. The estimated effects of the interaction of left-right and liberal-illiberal positions broadly do not appear to be significant. These differences in statistical significance may stem from several methodological considerations. First, the V-Dem equal distribution index and Gini coefficients capture fundamentally different aspects of inequality. While V-Dem measures focus on distribution outcomes across multiple dimensions (education, health, and public goods provision), Gini coefficients more narrowly focus on income distribution. Second, the different data collection methods and varying country-year coverage between datasets may contribute to the discrepancy. Finally, the Gini coefficients often exhibit "stickiness"--slower responsiveness to policy changes compared to expert-based V-Dem measures. While these alternative specifications suggest the need for caution in interpreting the robustness of our findings, they do not invalidate our primary conclusions. We acknowledge that further work analyzing the relationship between leadership style and different dimensions of inequality is necessary.

Figure A3. Marginal effects of interaction between economic left-right and liberal-illiberal on gini measures.


Effect of Economic and Institutional Position on Inequality Measures

Table A6. Regression results of robustness test using Gini equality as dependent variable.

	Gini Disposable Income Model 1	Gini Market Income Model 1	Gini Disposable Income Model 2	Gini Market Income Model 2
GDP per capita	0.000**	0.000	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth	0.022**	0.005	0.022*	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Regimes of the World	0.407	0.441		
	(0.282)	(0.272)		
Economic Left-Right	0.070	0.150	0.069	0.149
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.104)
Liberalism-Illiberalism	-0.045	0.052	-0.034	0.060
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Economic Left-Right x	-0.027	-0.035	-0.024	-0.032
Liberalism-Illiberalism	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Electoral Democracy Index			2.961	2.839
			(1.998)	(1.887)
Num.Obs.	1625	1625	1625	1625
R2	0.971	0.946	0.971	0.947
R2 Adj.	0.969	0.943	0.969	0.943
R2 Within	0.052	0.041	0.057	0.044
R2 Within Adj.	0.048	0.037	0.054	0.041
AIC	6496.3	6445.9	6485.4	6439.0
BIC	7115.2	7064.8	7104.4	7057.9
RMSE	1.43	1.41	1.42	1.40
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X

- $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country