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Civil Society Elites

Editors
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Editorial

Civil Society Elites: A Research Agenda

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Abstract
This editorial introduces the thematic issue on 'civil society elites,' a topic that has been neglected in elite research as well as civil society studies. It elaborates on the concept of 'civil society elites' and explains why this is an important emerging research field. By highlighting different methodological approaches and key findings in the contributions to the thematic issue, this article aims at formulating an agenda for future research in this field.

Keywords
capital; civil society; civil society elite; elites

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Civil Society Elites" edited by Håkan Johansson (Lund University, Sweden) and Anders Uhlin (Lund University, Sweden).

The phenomenon of 'civil society elites' has not received much scholarly interest either in elite or civil society studies. Social science has a long interest in elites, as a means to describe and understand resource distribution, systems of social stratification and mechanisms that lead to concentration of power in societies (Hartmann, 2007; Savage & Williams, 2008; Scott, 1996). Scholars often define elites as the small group(s) of individuals who "have vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource" (Khan, 2012, p. 361). Elites are in that respect groups of individuals who 'possess' substantial amounts of resources valuable to others. One can also define elites as linked to positions that allow some individuals authority to exercise influence over others (Scott, 2008). Elites are in this respect defined by the position they occupy, for instance in political, administrative or business institutions. These two definitions of elites are in practice often mutually reinforcing as substantial resources allow access to key positions, and vice versa (Hartmann, 2007).

Whereas we find substantial literature on various elite groups (e.g., 'political elites,' 'business elites,' 'administrative elites' or 'religious elites'), few studies have focused on those at the top of civil society and hence in positions to exercise substantial influence over other civil society actors, the issue areas they are engaged in or even over societal developments. This is an increasingly relevant topic to address considering current developments within civil societies. Although civil society is a vast and diverse field embodying actors with different interests, small groups of civil society organizations (CSOs) have come to occupy central positions that allow them to dominate others. They tend to hold status positions that allow them to control valuable resources, such as money, information, expertise and knowledge or ability to mobilize extensive numbers of people to push for policy change. They also enjoy prestige and status within, but also beyond civil society and their particular area of concern. They furthermore often have a 'seat at the table' to discuss pressing issues (e.g., climate change, inequality, health, migration and human rights). Well-known organizations like Greenpeace, Amnesty, Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Foundation and Caritas are examples and can be seen as having significant influence within their issue areas as well as beyond. Such concentration of valuable resources has not remained unchallenged. Civil society is a field where actors compete over

valuable resources and central positions, and today social movement and grassroots mobilizations do not only target political and business leaders, but also civil society leaders, for having traded their democratic function as watchdogs against states and markets for prestige and status in new contexts. There is also a growing debate on the lack of diversity at the top level of major CSOs.

There is however a lack of systematic analyses of individuals who hold top positions in civil society, leaders who control vast resources and are part of networks of power and influence inside and also outside civil society sectors. Despite that civil society studies is a mature field of research, we have limited knowledge on issues like: Who are those in leading positions, what avenues lead into positions of power and how are their positions challenged? The notion of 'civil society elites' thus opens up a new strand of research, with regard to both civil society and elite studies. Much current civil society research addresses how states tame, manufacture or co-opt CSOs, how political influence are potentially traded in exchange for legitimacy or alternatively how CSOs mobilize and organize against governments. While some research has paid attention to conflicts and power inequalities within civil society, this has seldom been analysed in terms of status and elites. In parallel, much elite research neglects civil society as a sphere sufficiently institutionalized to embody elite positions and elite groups, and generally considers civil society as a societal sphere lacking the resources and capacities associated with traditional elites or being the sphere where the 'real' elites interact as they take on positions to improve their public legitimacy as doing good and contributing to society.

The contributions to this thematic issue challenge such conventional academic understandings. The thematic issue contains studies from Northern and East-Central Europe to Southeast Asia, and also in the supranational context of the EU. In their combined effort, the contributors show that civil society elites can be found across the world. The different contributions also apply various methods to study civil society elites, ranging from statistical analysis of survey data (Gulbrandsen, 2020) via qualitative analysis of biographical data on individual civil society leaders (Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020) to qualitative interviews (the other contributions).

Based on the different contributions we find that processes of civil society elitisation occur across regime types—in consolidated democracies such as Norway and Sweden as well as in newer and more contested democracies such as Poland and Indonesia, and in increasingly authoritarian states such as Cambodia. This is a striking finding suggesting that a civil society elite phenomenon is not only linked to particular political, social and geographical contexts.

Processes of elitisation take place in formal CSOs, such as NGOs, and more informal networks and platforms, as demonstrated in the Cambodian case (Norén-Nilsson & Eng, 2020). A particular type of civil society elites can be found among think tanks, although they do not necessarily self-identify as belonging to the civil society field, as shown in articles by Åberg, Einarsson, and Reuter (2020) and by Jezierska (2020).

Four of the contributions (Haryanto, 2020; Lay & Eng, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Norén-Nilsson & Eng, 2020) draw explicitly on Bourdieu's field theory and the related concept of capital. This approach is useful because it sheds light on relations of conflict and cooperation within civil society and how different power resources are valued, gained and used by civil society actors, thus indicating how and why certain actors emerge as elites.

In their study of career trajectories of 17 leaders of EU-based peak CSOs, Lindellee and Scaramuzzino (2020) derive a set of skills, types of capital, and forms of recognition and status that characterize the EU civil society field. They find that specific EU career trajectories are prominent among directors of Brussels-based umbrella organizations whereas the presidents of these organizations tend to have a more mixed—often national—background. Expert knowledge plays an important role in the environmental sector, whereas an activist background is more salient in the social policy area.

The field approach also allows for analyses of how the civil society field relates to state and economic fields. As demonstrated by Lay and Eng (2020), state regulation of civil society may have different implications for the formation of civil society elites. In post-authoritarian Indonesia, state regulations have led to civil society elitisation through the formalisation and bureaucratisation of CSOs. Competition for formal positions has intensified, resulting in a plural civil society elite. Similar processes in increasingly authoritarian Cambodia have reduced the space for elite competition and created a monolithic 'hyper-elite' within civil society who are loyal to the regime.

A field approach also opens up for analyses of elite mobility between spheres and several articles in this thematic issue (Gulbrandsen, 2020; Haryanto, 2020; Norén-Nilsson & Eng, 2020) examine how 'boundary crossers' move between civil society and other fields. Norén-Nilsson and Eng (2020) explore pathways to leadership within and beyond Cambodian civil society. They identify different forms of capital required to reach elite status in civil society and explore pathways of boundary crossing from civil society to the state, electoral politics and economic fields. In doing so, they also shed light on the particular types of power or capital that pertain to each field. They observe that social capital, including networks in civil society and other fields, is especially important for coming into an elite position in Cambodian civil society.

Haryanto (2020), in his study of civil society elites in post-authoritarian Indonesia, also focuses on boundary crossers. The process of democratisation has stimulated movement from civil society to the state field. Haryanto (2020) identifies direct and indirect strategies that CSO leaders use to enter the state field. The direct

strategy is one of running in legislative or executive elections, whereas the indirect strategy implies zig-zagging between civil society sub-fields before entering the state field, while sometimes also remaining active within civil society. When civil society leaders are transformed into politicians and state officials, they get new ways of shaping public policy. At the same time, they may also lose some capital through the boundary crossing.

Whereas Haryanto (2020) and Norén-Nilsson and Eng (2020) explore boundary crossing from civil society to electoral politics and the state field, Gulbrandsen (2020) provides an analysis of how business elites take up positions within civil society. Based on a survey of Norwegian elites he finds that it is not uncommon for business leaders to become elected representatives in CSOs. This indicates that CSOs to some extent are integrated into the general network of the Norwegian business elite. Business leaders with a working-class background are more frequently engaged in civil society than business leaders with a more privileged background.

Two of the articles in this thematic issue focus on think tanks, a type of civil society actor that is often perceived as more elitist. Think tanks are typically small, professional and expert-based, without any larger membership base. They tend to have more financial and knowledge resources and more political influence than other civil society actors. Åberg et al. (2020) examine Swedish think tanks, and more specifically their executives and top-level staff. Many of these 'think tankers' have a background in business, politics, media or the academia, indicating that boundary crossing is a common phenomenon. The organizational identity of think tanks is strikingly similar, despite differences in age, size and political affiliation. Jezierska (2020) describes Polish think tanks as a "reluctant civil society elite" (p. 152). Interviews with think tank leaders reveal not only a denial of being elitist, but some also deny that they are part of civil society and some even reject the think tank label.

While these contributions indicate common patterns across highly different social, political and cultural contexts, research on civil society elites is still in an early phase. With this thematic issue we invite more scholarly conceptual debates on the forms of capital that can be seen as constitutive of a civil society field and hence offering some actors domination over others. We also encourage more comparative efforts across country contexts to be able to identify similarities as well as differences and more profoundly identify the mechanisms and factors that institutionalise power in civil society and allow some actors to occupy leading positions. This also indicates the need for more substantial academic investigations into how civil society elites emerge and to what extent the pathways that lead into positions of power within civil society are the same as in politics or business. Are the structural advantages similar, or is civil society a different field or sector, marked by its own logic that has so often been argued by civil society scholars?

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Can EU Civil Society Elites Burst the Brussels Bubble? Civil Society Leaders' Career Trajectories

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Abstract
The Brussels-based civil society organizations (CSOs) have been conceived by the EU to act as a bridge between the bureaucratic elites and the citizens of Europe. The institutionalized presence of the major EU-based CSOs has, however, called their legitimacy into question, as exemplified by notions such as 'revolving doors' implying homogeneous social, educational, and professional backgrounds shared by both EU officials and CSO leaders. This article therefore asks the following questions: To what extent do the leaders of EU-based CSOs merely reproduce the types of capital that mirror those of the political elites in the so-called 'Brussels bubble'? To what extent do the CSO leaders bring in other sets of capital and forms of recognition that are independent of the Brussels game? How can we explain differences in the salience of EU capital found across policy areas, types of leadership positions, and types of organizations? Empirically, this article qualitatively analyzes the career trajectories of 17 leaders of EU-based peak CSOs that are active in social and environmental policy areas. Despite the highly integrated and institutionalized characteristics shared by all organizations, we find diversity in the composition of the leaders in terms of the extent to which their career trajectories are embedded in the EU arena.

Keywords
capital; career trajectory; civil society organizations; EU institutions; EU Policies; political elites

Issue
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1. Introduction

The project of European integration has entailed not only the creation of new institutional actors such as the European Commission, European Court of Justice, and European Parliament, but also a new constellation of collective actors such as interest groups and civil society organizations (CSOs) established at the EU level. This new socio-political space has attracted the interest of social scientists seeking to analyze these new interactions and power relations (Coen & Richardson, 2009; Fligstein, 2008; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013; Johansson & Kalm, 2015; Magone, Laffan, & Schweiger, 2016). Departing from an understanding of the EU arena as a Bourdieusian bureaucratic field in the making (Bourdieu, 1994; Georgakakis, 2017; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013), this article sets out to explore the career trajectories of EU-based CSOs' leaders in relation to wider field dynamics that structure the relative positions of different actors.

The aim of this article is to analyze to what extent previous knowledge about the main oppositional dynamics in the field of Eurocracy between the 'insiders' and 'outsiders' also applies to EU-based civil society. The insiders in the EU's socio-political field have been conceptualized as the high-level civil servants dominant in the EU institutions with their bureaucratic backgrounds, as well as a range of political actors who work closely with the EU institutions in consensual and depoliticized ways, seizing the access to the EU's highly specialized and complex

policy processes. The outsiders, on the other hand, have been conceptualized as the actors who employ more contentious strategies and who are more likely to mobilize grassroots constituencies in national contexts (Dür & Mateo, 2016; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013; Greenwood, 2007). As intermediary actors, EU-based CSOs have been conceived by the EU to act as a bridge between the bureaucratic elites in the EU and the citizens of Europe (European Commission, 2001; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007; Smismans, 2003; Trenz, 2009). They have, in fact, been acting as agents of policy integration and dissemination of EU policy ideas, especially in areas such as human rights, anti-discrimination, environmental protection, and gender equality (Ruzza, 2007, 2014, 2019). By studying the (broadly-defined) career trajectories of the leaders, we can derive a set of skills, types of capital, and forms of recognition and status that are relevant in the field of EU civil society and discuss the extent to which the fault line between the insiders and outsiders is observed at the level of individual leaders' career trajectories.

We will answer the following research questions:

- To what extent do we find specific EU capital in the career trajectories of the major CSO leaders in the social and environmental policy areas?
- What other sets of capital and forms of recognition do we find in the career trajectories of the CSO leaders that are rather independent of the Brussels game?
- How can we explain different forms of capital in different leaders' trajectories?

Empirically, this article is based on a study of the career trajectories of 17 leaders of peak EU-based CSOs active in the two policy areas of social policy and environmental policy. By 'peak organizations' we refer to organizations that have access to a disproportionate amount of resources and/or enjoy high status and recognition within civil society and/or by EU-institutions. The data are based on short biographies of the presidents and directors of the identified CSOs, which provide information regarding their career trajectories.

2. Previous Research

2.1. Democratic Representation, Power Structures and Capital in the Field of EU Civil Society

Civil society refers to a societal sphere separate from the state, the market and the family that is populated by a variety of collective actors, including organizations, networks and movements. This article focuses on CSOs in terms of formal organizations that belong to the sphere of civil society. Among these organizations, we find interest groups, social movement organizations and other forms of non-governmental and non-profit actors (Meeuwisse & Scaramuzzino, 2019).

The EU-based CSOs have emerged as a set of actors that gained access to EU institutions as the EU expanded its regulatory competences in different areas. The important role that the Brussels-based CSOs have played in the evolution of the EU's competence and institutionalized presence in many policy areas naturally calls for a debate about democratic representation. Although EU-based CSOs existed earlier, it was the EU's 'participatory turn' during the 1990s that gave them a clear role in the deliberative policy processes envisioned by the EU institutions (European Commission, 2001). The general expectation concerning advocacy strategies is that CSOs would be more likely to employ outsider strategies (e.g., demonstrations) as opposed to business actors, who would be more inclined to use insider strategies (e.g., lobbying; Dür & Mateo, 2016; Maloney, Jordan, & McLaughlin, 1994). Instead, the major expansion of the EU-based CSOs was aided by the financial and ideational support of the European Commission. This meant that many organizations acquired rather institutionalized positions vis-à-vis the EU institutions and have taken on the role of consultative bodies, rather than the role of political agents taking matters to the streets (Cullen, 2003; Greenwood, 2007; Michel, 2013; Ruzza, 2007). Scholars have thus raised the issue of the representativeness of the CSO leaders, and there has been a great deal of empirical research looking into the actual mechanisms and practices of representation and the representational claims of non-elected representatives (Johansson & Lee, 2014; Kröger & Friedrich, 2012).

Despite the salience of these debates, few previous studies have looked into the actual profiles of the EU-based CSO leaders. Notions such as 'revolving doors' and 'Brussels' bubble' have been used to illustrate the homogeneous social, educational, and professional backgrounds among EU officials and the CSO leaders active at the EU level (Dialer & Richter, 2019). It has also been argued that the system of representation exemplified by the European Transparency Initiative (European Commission, 2006) is in fact a result of co-production between the EU institutions and interest groups whose leaders share not only the same backgrounds, but also a common vision of European integration (Michel, 2013). However, these sweeping statements might obscure the diversity that might be found among the leaders of EU-based CSOs. This article thus attempts to empirically scrutinize the career trajectories of the leaders of peak EU-based CSOs.

The debate on the representativeness of EU-based CSOs and their leaders can be connected to the previously mentioned notion that the incumbents in the field of EU civil society—the actors who have close access to the EU institutions—prioritize consensual and coordinative strategies in a bureaucratic and depoliticized manner, rather than confrontational and politicized strategies that rely on grassroots mobilization. This preference for insider strategies implies that being able to provide expertise on specific policy issues for the demands and

political frameworks of the EU's institutional actors in a tailored manner is considered important capital (Oleart & Bouza, 2018, p. 884). It could be expected that the importance of such capital could be directly translated to the profiles of the leaders of EU-based CSOs. Yet, previous empirical studies have shown that among the incumbents in the field of EU civil society we can also observe organizations that are more nationally or internationally anchored, profiling themselves as true grassroots organizations, rather than professionalized participants in policy-centered dialogues with EU institutions (Johansson & Lee, 2015).

Thus, the question of which types of capital are valued in the field of EU civil society cannot be easily answered. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Oleart and Bouza's (2018) study on the involvement of EU-based CSOs in the European Citizens' Initiative, the insider-outsider divide alone does not fully explain the repertoire of advocacy strategies employed by some of the incumbent CSOs, as instruments such as the ECI invite the CSOs to engage in novel constellations of collaborations and campaign activities. In order to understand the constantly changing patterns of cooperation and competition among CSOs in the field of EU civil society, studying the profiles of individual leaders could provide a novel insight into the types of capital that are valued and the kinds of social institutions, skills and experiences that lead to top positions in EU-based CSOs.

2.2. Studying Career Trajectories in Order to Understand Positions within the EU Field

The contribution of this study is twofold. First, while previous studies have looked extensively into the career trajectories and professional backgrounds of formal representatives of EU institutions as well as a various groups of adjacent players interacting with these EU institutions such as experts and representatives of interest groups and lobbying organizations (Beauvallet & Michon, 2013; Georgakakis & Lebaron, 2018; Robert, 2013), few studies have explored the careers of EU-based CSO leaders.

Second, traditional approaches in studies of elites tend to explore the link between a given elite position and individuals' social origins such as family backgrounds. The present study of career trajectories of EU-based CSO leaders instead draws on the tradition of prosopographical studies of elites developed by C. Wright Mills and Pierre Bourdieu (Ellersgaard & Larsen, 2020). Common to these empirical studies is that beyond the formal positions that individual leaders occupy as of today, one pays attention to their career trajectories. This provides a glimpse into the social processes lying behind their elite positions. The career trajectories might thus reveal the ways in which the individuals build their own authority and pursue their organizational as well as professional interests (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). Studying the prosopography of individual leaders of selected CSOs can thus help us understand the field of civil society at the EU level by identifying the patterns of career paths from which we can infer what types of social institutions, skills, and recognition play important roles in the reproduction of elites (Khan, 2012, p. 371).

3. Theoretical Departing Point

3.1. The EU as a Bureaucratic Field in the Making

The development of the EU resembles a bureaucratic field in the making in multiple respects (Bourdieu, 1994). The institutionalization of European integrationist practices has increased the complexity in the thick web of actors interacting at the EU level and has led to the concentration in Brussels of different types of actors with diverse types of capital. The development of the EU's external border policy can be aptly compared to the domination of physical force that Bourdieu explained as one of the core elements of the state-building process ("Capital of physical force"). The EU's expanding internal market, the adoption of the European Monetary Union, and the adoption of the euro as the common currency all strengthen the symbolic value of the EU as a unitary territory ("Economic capital"). The vision and identity of a globalized, Europeanized, cosmopolitan Europe is advocated as a "universal" interest for Europeans and unifies the EU institutions and civil society actors within the EU arena ("Information/cultural capital"; Bourdieu, 1994)

Bourdieu-inspired field-theory approaches have been frequently applied in sociological studies of the EU arena focusing on interactions between various collective actors (Coen & Richardson, 2009; Fligstein, 2008; Michel, 2013; Vauchez & de Witte, 2013). As a novel political environment, the studies of particular power dynamics and network structures within the EU arena identified the inner core of this field, epitomized in notions such as 'permanent Eurocrats' who are equipped with specific sets of knowledge, expertise, and social skills (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). The importance of informal rules and processes governing the EU's policy and legislative processes (Héritier, 2012; Stacey, 2010) can give the so-called 'insiders' in the EU arena strategic advantages over those who only intermittently visit Brussels. This field-specific dynamic has been understood to give rise to the core, bureaucratic elites in Brussels who actively seek to consolidate the EU as a bureaucratic field, embodying the active agents striving to establish and represent a common 'European' interest (Bourdieu, 1994; Georgakakis, 2017; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013).

In this context, the specific 'EU capital' can be understood as comprising a range of different types of capital that can be effectively translated into "symbolic capital" in the EU arena (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 8–9). For a given skill, status, recognition, or experience to gain this symbolic power in the field of Eurocracy, it is the acknowledgement, recognition, and even accreditation by the EU institutions that matters. This is because it is the EU

institutions that have a clear "authority of nomination" (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 10–11). The EU institutions are, in other words, the primary supplier of the EU capital, and one of the concrete manifestations of such capital with regards to the EU-based CSOs is when they gain official status as a consultative body. By being invited to the EU's policy discussions and formal processes as official representatives of CSOs, they are officially recognized as a responsible and competent agent for the project of European integration.

3.2. Analytical Focus

Investigating individual leaders' career trajectories is a way of understanding a given field in a dynamic way because we consider the importance of individual leaders' own career trajectories for understanding the different positions they occupy in relation to each other, which might reveal fault lines that are not obvious from merely looking at the positions of the organizations (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013, p. 5). This article, hence, explores to what extent the EU-based CSO leaders possess the types of capital that are EU-specific and what their career trajectories tell us about the status, forms of recognition, and experiences outside of the EU arena that can be translated into valuable capital in the field of Eurocracy.

The article aims to explore the following hypotheses informed by our theoretical understanding of the field of Eurocracy: First, we expect that the positions of the CSO leaders will mirror the broader fault line between the permanent, Brussels-based insiders and the intermittent participants in the EU arena whose reputations and capital are derived mainly from the national/international arenas. Second, related to the first point, we expect to observe what can be called 'EU capital' and its particular repertoire relevant for the CSO leaders in their career trajectories. This could be in the form of educational degrees in certain subjects and/or universities, formal employment positions in EU institutions, or other types of accreditation from EU institution with symbolic value. Third, despite the nested character of the field of CSOs at the EU level reflecting the broader oppositional dynamics in the field of Eurocracy, we expect to find other types of skills, status, and forms of recognition that are specifically important to the CSOs. This aspect sheds light on to what extent CSO leaders are embedded in the EU field and to what extent their status and authority are determined by their embeddedness in other fields (for example, national/international or academic fields). This question is motivated by previous understanding of the EU arena as a "porous" field that is easily affected by external determinants with uneven processes of integration across different policy fields (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013, p. 239).

The two policy areas the leaders are engaged in share some important features in their development at the EU level. In environmental protection, CSOs have been integral to the presence of the EU in policy discussions. The European Commission and the European Parliament have been important institutional actors that facilitated the establishment and empowerment of the transnational, Brussels-based environmental CSOs since the 1980s, and the environmental CSOs have continuously intensified their coordinated and collective actions at the EU level, as exemplified by the European Environmental Bureau working with joint campaigns such as "Greening the Treaty" in the 1990s. The institutionalized and formalized position of the key environmental CSOs by means of being included in structured dialogues and on working committees with the European Commission and the European Parliament was utilized in turn to strengthen and reinforce the legal basis of the EU's mandate in environmental protection as a policy area through the adoption of EU directives (Cichowski, 2007, pp. 210–220).

A similar development has taken place in the establishment of the so-called 'social dimension' of the EU and the CSOs working with a diverse range of social issues. During the 1980s, the EU took a step towards institutionalizing its mandate in the social policy area, and this led to the establishment of Brussels-based CSOs seeking influence in the development of the EU's social dimension (Cullen, 2003; Greenwood, 2007; Kendall, 2009). Despite exhibiting a great diversity in the types of policy issues, causes, and groups represented by the social CSOs, we have witnessed the emergence and expansion of Brussels-based umbrella organizations and networks such as Social Platform and Civil Society Contact Group that have attempted to act as a concerted voice. Previous research looking into this particular population of organized civil society in Brussels showed that there are competing and contradictory capital-logics at play and that both interconnectedness with the EU institutions as well as autonomy from them are valued by the CSOs (Johansson & Lee, 2015).

While both policy areas have seen the establishment of EU-based CSOs already in the 1980s, they differ when it comes to the EU mandate, which is stronger when it comes to environmental issues than in social policy. The types of CSOs in each policy area also tend to differ as the area of social policy is dominated by organizations that aim to represent specific societal groups vis-à-vis the EU institutions (e.g., women, pensioners, people with disabilities), which does not apply to the area of environmental policy. Based on these differences, we expect expert knowledge as a type of capital to be more salient in the area of environmental policy than in the area of social policy, while an activist background to be more salient in the area of social policy than in the area of environmental policy.

4. Sampling Method and Data

The leaders who are studied in this article are those who have gained significant symbolic capital in the field of Eurocracy by being granted privileged positions within

EU-based CSOs and vis-à-vis the EU. This article is based on an analysis of these leaders' career trajectories.

To be able to identify the peak organizations, we have mostly made use of the Transparency Register of the EU and the database Lobbyfacts. Using a set of five indicators that allowed us a broad and complex interpretation of status and recognition in civil society at the EU-level, we sampled 308 EU-based CSOs active in different policy areas among which we identified the CSOs in the social and environmental policy fields.

The first set of two indicators measured different forms of internal status and recognition: 1) Internal resources for organizations that have at least 4 staff members (as full-time equivalents) or that have at least 910,000 euro as their budget; and 2) Internal status and recognition for organizations that are members of one of the following umbrella organizations representing the civil society sector—Civil Society Europe and Civil Society Contact Group. When it comes to external status and recognition, we used the following three indicators: 3) EU funding of at least 600,000 euro; 4) External status and recognition within specific policy areas for organizations that are included in Intergroups and EU Commission groups or that according to Lobbyfacts had had at least seven meetings with the European Commission; and 5) External status and recognition for organizations that are members of the Liaison group of the European Economic and Social Committee.

Among the 308 CSOs sampled, we chose eight CSOs for this study based on the following criteria: 1) Being active in the areas of social or environmental policy; 2) Fulfilling at least three of our five indicators; and 3) Availability of biographical information on both the president the director of the CSO.

Table 1 shows the four organizations chosen for the social policy area and the four chosen for the environmental policy area. In total we considered 17 leaders because we included two directors for the Red Cross—the director of the European Region and the director of the EU office.

While presidential positions uphold tasks of external representation, directors work on the managerial aspects of the everyday routines in the organization. A reason for choosing a small sample of presidents and directors belonging pairwise to the same organizations is that this allows us a more in-depth analysis of the CSOs they represent. This includes looking at the characteristics of the organization, e.g., if it has a strong organizational identity across different levels of governance (hereafter referred to identity-based organizations) or if it is a network or umbrella organization that has a diverse set of member organizations (hereafter referred to as umbrella organizations). We included organizations with strong identities, such as Caritas, Red Cross, Friends of the Earth (FoE), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), as well as umbrella organizations with various types of member organizations such as Solidar and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which are active also at the international level, and Social Platform and Green 10 that are exclusively operating at the EU level. We expected that these organizational characteristics might partly explain the different career trajectories of the leaders.

For each individual leader we collected biographical data based on the following sources: organizational websites, personal websites, Wikipedia, and LinkedIn. Combining different sources gives us a broader insight into the leaders' career trajectories. These sources differ in terms of their aim and target audience. Organizational websites might be keen to present the leaders in ways that fit their organizational profile, while the leader's personal website and LinkedIn profile would reflect how they want to promote themselves. We would assume that the Wikipedia article would be more neutral. The fact that certain experiences are more or less pronounced in the presentations of the leaders' profiles allows us to draw conclusions regarding the types of capital that are valued in the field, which is an important part of our aim. By combining different sources of data as much as possible, we argue that we are able to overcome certain biases in the sources and have quite accurate (although not exhaustive) information on the leaders' career trajectories.

The following analysis explores different sets of capital that are traceable in the leaders' career trajectories and disentangle those that can be related to the field of Eurocracy and those that seem to be more independent from it. By comparing these sets of capital when it comes to policy areas (social vs. environmental policy), leaders' positions (presidents vs. directors), and types of organizations (umbrella vs. identity-based), we aim at explaining the variation of the career trajectories among the leaders.

5. Analysis

The analysis of the biographic information of the selected individual CSO leaders was initially guided by

Table 1. CSOs whose leaders were included in the analysis by policy area.

Social policy	Environmental policy
Solidar	International Union for Conservation of Nature
Social Platform	Green 10
Caritas	Friends of the Earth
Red Cross	World Wildlife Fund

the theoretical interest in discerning EU capital from other types of capital. After several rounds of careful reading of the leaders' biographies, we developed a coding scheme consisting of the following six categories: Brussels or EU-specific, international experience, long-term engagement with the national branch, expert orientation, managerial competence, and activist backgrounds/charismatic leader. These codes were used explicitly in new rounds of analysis and Table 2 lists examples of items in the leaders' biographical information that were coded into the above-mentioned categories.

Based on the coding of the biographical information of the 17 leaders, Figure 1 offers a visualization of the different characteristics of the leaders' career trajectories. The figure is not based on any quantification, but rather on a qualitative interpretation of the career trajectories of the 17 leaders in relation to each other. The three labels presented along each axis should be considered as ideal-typical categories that characterize the leaders' professional experience and engagement. These categories should not be seen as being placed on a continuum in the strict sense. The end poles of the axes represent tensions between theoretically motivated 'oppositions' (expert vs. activist; national vs. EU-specific) while the categories placed in the middle (managerial competence and international) should be seen as third categories on the same axes and not as an exact middle ground between the two opposites. The horizontal axis is primarily inspired by the distinction made in previous research that examine the field of Eurocracy, in which the insider and outsider divide is known to be salient (Dür & Mateo, 2016; Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). The vertical axis is partly inspired by the same body of literature in which the importance of expert knowledge of European political processes is emphasized. While it is possible to argue that the knowledge claims that could be made by a long-term activist about a specific issue is also a highly legitimate form of expertise, in this figure we consider a rather narrow definition of what we call 'expert knowledge' in the sense that the leaders have formal educational backgrounds in the subject matters within which they work.

It is evident that the self-representation of leaders, whether mediated via organizations or not, emphasizes different types of competing and complementary forms of knowledge that are pivotal to leading these EU-based CSOs in different ways. Thus, the distribution of individual leaders in the figure is partly a result of the ways in which their career backgrounds are portrayed, in many cases, in narrative forms that emphasize certain aspects of their backgrounds over others. Individuals are placed in the figure with their position and organization, followed by "P" for president/chair positions and "D" for directorships. The organizations written in green font are the ones active in the environment policy areas, and the ones in light blue are the social policy areas. The organizations that have underlined names are umbrella organizations, while the ones without are identity-based CSOs.

5.1. The Horizontal Axis: EU Capital vs. Skills, Experiences, and Recognition Accumulated Outside of the EU Arena

The horizontal axis in the figure describes the opposition between career trajectories with highly Brussels and EU-specific orientations on the right and those with more national orientations on the left. The mid-point captures international orientations.

Examples of the Brussels and EU-specific career trajectories include long-term experience in EU-level advo-

Table 2. Coding scheme.

Categories used in coding	Examples
Brussels—or EU-specific experience	President/directorship and other executive positions of EU-based CSOs; Expert role in EU policy processes; Chair of EESC; Directorship at Brussels office of international organizations; Long-term residency in Brussels; Lawyer by training
International experience	President/directorship and other executive positions of international CSOs and other types of international organizations such as OECD, UN; Extended period of working overseas; Engagement in projects in multiple national contexts
Engagement at national level	Long-term career in national branches of European/international CSOs, including volunteer engagement; Expert role in national policy processes
Expert orientation	Academic degree related to specific policy areas; expert advisor role
Managerial competence	Mid-level management positions in multiple organizations; Academic degree in business, management, leadership and communication related subjects
Activist backgrounds/charismatic leadership figure	Self-presentation as activist; Recognized political/religious figure



Figure 1. Types of capital in the career trajectories of EU-based CSO leaders. Note: The figure is not based on any quantification, but rather on a qualitative interpretation of the career trajectories of the 17 leaders in relation to each other.

cacy and lobbying, being invited as experts as part of the EU's common policy processes, chairing specific EU institutions such as the European Economic and Social Committee, having been either executive or representative leaders of EU-based CSOs or networks of CSOs, previously having held positions in Brussels-based offices of international organizations, having majored in the typical academic disciplines among the EU representatives, i.e., law or international relations/politics, and lastly having resided in Brussels for an extended period of time.

The other side of the horizontal axis represents the career trajectories that are concentrated in specific national contexts, and the mid-point represents professional experiences in various non-EU countries and in international arenas. Examples of national experiences include long-term engagement (often starting as volunteers) in the national branch of the CSO and having worked extensively in relation to governments and other public authorities in specific national contexts. Examples of international experiences include executive or representative positions in international CSOs and having worked in specific policy programs as experts in international organizations such as the OECD and UN institutions.

What we can see along the horizontal axis is that while the directors are dominant in the right half of the space (directors of Green 10, WWF, Social Platform, Caritas, Solidar, and Red Cross EU), the presidents are dominant in the left half of the space (presidents of the IUCN, WWF, Red Cross, Caritas, FoE, and Solidar). There are of course some 'strange birds,' such as the director of the IUCN who has been extremely active at the EU level having been closely involved in the EU's climate and energy policy, yet at the same time has been closely collaborating with the public authorities in Belgium as an expert advisor. Similarly, the president of Social Platform has been extensively engaged in advocacy and lobbying at the EU level as an executive leader of an EU-based CSO. However, he is not based in Brussels and has previously worked in other national contexts and in the private sector—which makes this president stand out from the others who are placed on the right side of the axis with more clearly Brussels-based careers.

Another interesting observation is that we find mostly umbrella organizations on the right-hand side of the axis (both president and director of Green 10 and directors of Social Platform and Solidar), whereas the identity-based CSOs are found on the left-hand side of the axis (presidents of the WWF, Red Cross, FoE, and Caritas). Experience of working in direct contact with the EU seems to be the most prominent characteristic of many directors of the umbrella CSOs, especially for the specifically EU-level organizations Green 10 and Social Platform whose leaders are placed in the upper right corner of the figure. The leaders of the international um-

brella organizations IUCN and Solidar are more spread out, with the directors being close to the right side of the horizontal axis and the presidents being placed on the other end of the axis representing national and international orientations in their career trajectories. When it comes to the identity-based CSOs (WWF, FoE, Caritas, and Red Cross), their presidents have all developed careers outside of the EU arena. In the case of FoE Europe, its director had never even lived in Brussels or worked for any other CSO at the EU level previously.

Following a similar logic, the different profiles of the two directors of the Red Cross is a telling case. While the EU office director has previously worked in the Brussels office of a UN institutions and even within the European Commission, the biographic information about the director of the European Region of the Red Cross exhibits a much more nationally and internationally oriented career trajectory, as exemplified by long-term engagement in the organization at the national level and also having participated in projects in other non-EU countries.

5.2. The Vertical Axis: Expert Knowledge—Managerial Competence—Activist/Charismatic Leader Identity

The vertical axis in Figure 1 captures the different types of knowledge and experiences manifested in the selected CSO leaders' career trajectories. The placement of leaders along this axis is to be interpreted with care because some of the indicators used are arguably rather rough, such as the subject matter that the leaders had majored in as an indicator of expert knowledge. The leaders were placed on the upper half of the vertical axis if they majored in the subjects that are clearly relevant for the policy areas that the organizations work with. On the other end of the vertical axis we placed the leaders whose career trajectories are characterized by their activist backgrounds and are described as well-known figures, often with nearly heroic narratives about their lifetime commitment to issues as leaders and activists. In the middle of the vertical axis we find what is termed managerial competences, meaning that the leaders' career trajectories demonstrate high managerial competences with previously held executive roles. The leaders who have educational backgrounds in business and management, leadership, and communication subjects are positioned near this mid-point.

One salient observation is that the majority of the directors of the selected organizations can be closely placed to the mid-point of the vertical axis, indicating conspicuous managerial competence (WWF, Social Platform, Caritas, Solidar, and Red Cross). Almost all the leaders in the lower half of the vertical axis are instead presidents (FoE, Caritas, Red Cross, and Solidar). They seem to share an activist profile in the sense that they entered the civil society field as grassroots' activists and made their way up to the point where their activism became a professional career. What characterizes these leaders is that their involvement in civil society is performed within the same organization by moving up through the organization's structure over time.

Another difference is found between the organizational types along the vertical axis. The majority of the umbrella CSO leaders (Green 10, IUCN, Social Platform, and Solidar) are found in the upper-half of the vertical axis, meaning that expert knowledge on the issues they work with in their organizations and/or managerial competences are most pronounced in their educational backgrounds and professional trajectories (the only exception is the president of Solidar). On the other hand, the identity-based CSOs are more dispersed along the vertical axis, with the above-mentioned tendency where presidents are placed closer to the lower end with activist backgrounds and charismatic leader figures (presidents of Red Cross, FoE, and Caritas) and directors rather closer to the mid-point of the vertical axis with pronounced managerial competences (directors of Caritas, FoE Europe, and Red Cross EU & European region). One illustrative example is the case of Caritas. As a religious organization, it follows the internal rules of the Catholic Church. While the organization has a president who is a well-recognized religious figure (a bishop), when it comes to the director, they have appointed a leader who is Brussels-based and who has had a career trajectory in several welfare-oriented CSOs at the EU level.

What is also evident is that the environmental organizations are all placed in the upper-half of the space along the vertical axis, except for the president of FoE. The most common subject of study of the environmental CSO leaders seems to be environmental science and some other adjacent subjects such as biology, agriculture, food systems, and biodiversity. This is the case for both directors and presidents, with the exception of the director of the WWF who has previously worked in other EU-based CSOs with other issues. When it comes to the leaders of the CSOs working with social policy issues, we find more diverse subjects such as law, economics, business and management, and languages. The case of the director of the WWF is indeed worth noting because this is the only director of the environmental CSOs without a specific policy-relevant educational background. Her managerial competence and experience accumulated in the Brussels sphere seem to be the rationale for her recruitment.

It is worth noting that we find no individual leader placed in the lower-right corner of the space formed by the two axes in Figure 1. This might be interpreted as an incompatibility between having an activist background and being a charismatic leader figure and having Brussels-based and EU-specific types of capital.

6. Conclusions and Discussion

Despite the fact that our sample includes EU-level CSOs who are characterized by a high level of integration into EU institutions' formal and institutionalized ways of involving civil society, we observe diversity in the composition of the leaders in terms of the extent to which their

career trajectories are embedded in the EU arena. At the same time, however, we do find systematic patterns regarding the distribution of different types of career trajectories along several comparative dimensions.

As shown in the previous section, the policy areas (social policy vs. environmental policy), types of leadership positions (presidents vs. directors), and types of organizations (umbrella organizations vs. identity-based organizations) provide us with some explanations as to the differences in the types of capital required to reach leadership positions in EU-based CSOs. We observe that the Brussels and specifically EU-based career trajectories are particularly prominent in the biographies of the leaders of the EU-based umbrella CSOs, and in particular among the directors rather than presidents.

Along the other important analytical dimension, the axis representing different career trajectories characterized by expert knowledge, managerial competence, and activist background, we see the clearest fault line between the CSOs working with environmental issues and those working with social policy issues, and to some extent between the umbrella CSOs and the identity-based CSOs. These results are in line with our expectation that expert knowledge would be more salient in the environmental policy area while activist background would be more salient in the social policy area. These differences might be linked to the expectation that CSOs within the social policy area not only have knowledge and expertise in the specific issues with which they work (as with the environmental organizations) but also are able to act as representatives of the societal groups they mobilize and support. For these organizations the activist background and the experiences at national and sub-national level of their leaders might provide the capital needed to be able to (at least claim) to be able to over bridge the gap between the EU-institutions and the communities of EU citizens.

The career trajectories of many directors can be understood as a personified version of the roles that the EU-based CSOs working closely with the EU-institutions are expected to play, namely providing information and expertise and mediating communication between the public and the EU, and thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the EU project (Saurugger, 2010). The skills and resources these CSO leaders have accumulated with their long-term career development in Brussels can be described as what Georgakakis and Rowell (2013) call "specifically European capital" that is valued by the EU institutional actors. The complex negotiation processes involving multi-level governance and complex webs of institutions require insiders with a "feel-for-the-game" (Savage & Silva, 2013, p. 113) in Brussels. It is plausible that the leaders of the peak EU-based CSOs have also developed a shared, common political vision and culture of European integration as a result of their long socialization process (Georgakakis, 2017).

In contrast, for many of the presidents of the CSOs studied here their careers have been built up at the grass roots, national, or international level. These leaders deliver on aspects such as representativeness, embeddedness in national contexts, and experience in specific policy issues at different governance levels. Their activist backgrounds seem to carry a certain symbolic capital among the identity-based CSOs because some of the individuals reached their leadership positions (mostly presidents) at the EU level exclusively based on their engagement outside of the EU arena. The fact that skills, experiences, and reputation accumulated outside of the EU arena carry important symbolic value in becoming the leader of EU-based CSOs (although concentrated to presidents) also means that the autonomy of the field of EU civil society is not complete.

A possible functionalistic explanation for the observed differences between the leadership positions could be that these presidents counterbalance the image of the EU-based CSOs being a part of an elitist project as has been presented by some national CSOs and some EU member states (Ruzza, 2019, p. 136). Alternatively, the leadership positions of the individuals with types of capital derived from other contexts beyond the EU arena might be interpreted as part of an on-going power struggle between the permanent and temporary agents among the CSO leaders who are active at the EU level, the latter constantly challenging this EU capital through capital accumulated and recognized outside of the field of Eurocracy.

Finally, we would like to return to our original question of whether EU civil society elites can burst the Brussels' bubble. Based on our results, if we consider both presidents and directors to be part of the EU civil society elites, we would argue that they can burst it. By allowing separate roles and career trajectories for presidents and directors, the CSOs can keep one foot in the Brussels bubble and one outside. However, the fact that we have found no CSO leader who clearly combines an activist background and EU-specific capital makes us wonder about whether these types of capital might be mutually exclusive and are therefore a sign that the Brussels bubble is hard to burst, at least at the level of individual career trajectory.

This article extends previous studies on the career trajectories of political actors in the field of Eurocracy by testing the theoretically and empirically motivated field dynamic in the EU arena in a novel organizational population. The distinction between EU capital and non-EU capital turned out to be fruitful in studying CSO leaders. A similar approach could be applied in future research where a larger number of leaders and organizations are included, preferably combining a quantitative variant of relational analysis method such as Multiple Correspondence Analysis in order to systematically address the broader map of the EU field of CSOs.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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

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Article

State Regulations and Elitisation: A Study of Civil Society Elites in Indonesia and Cambodia

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Abstract
This article analyses how and to what extent state regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) have resulted in elitisation, i.e., the process of obtaining elite status within and beyond civil society. This is studied in the context of emerging democracy in Indonesia and shrinking civic space in Cambodia. Combining Bourdieu's concepts of field and elite with strategic action fields, the article uses data from interviews with civil society leaders. It finds different patterns. In Indonesia, elitisation occurs through a process of CSO formalisation and bureaucratisation, with elites gaining legitimacy owing to their formal offices. As a result, competition for formal positions intensifies: This is particularly notable among national CSO leaders, who may shift their activities to the grassroots level to seek further empowerment and other capitals to legitimise their elite status, facilitate the rise of leaders in existing fields, and create pluralistic forms of elites. Regulations have also resulted in the marginalisation of non-formal elites and shifted the locus of legitimacy from activism to formalism. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, regulatory formalisation and bureaucratisation has not only reduced the space for elite competition and level of competitiveness, but also created 'most dominant actors' or 'hyper-elites' who are loyal to and support the regime and its priorities while punishing those who do not. This has resulted in a monolithic form of elites.

Keywords
Cambodia; civil society organisations; elitisation; Indonesia; state regulations

Issue
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1. Introduction

This article investigates the implications of state regulations regarding civil society organisations (CSOs) for the process of elitisation, i.e., the process through which CSO leaders use their capital to attain status within and beyond civil society. This article aims to answer the question of how and to what extent CSO regulations have resulted in elitisation, taking Indonesia and Cambodia as its case studies. Indonesia represents a regime that regulates the mechanisms through which CSOs access state resources and participate in policy processes. Cambodia, meanwhile, represents a case where state regulations have only been implemented recently in an attempt to increase oversight over CSOs, which first emerged (with strong international backing) in 1993.

This article focuses on civil society elites, namely CSO leaders who receive recognition within the civil society field. This is important because elite studies have focused primarily on non-CSO actors—especially society (Migdal, 1988; Sidel, 2005), religious (Buehler, 2014), state (Robison & Hadis, 2004) and party elites (Case, 1996)—while CSO studies have emphasised organisations (Weller, 2004), movement (Aspinall, 2005; Uhlin,

1997) and values (Appe, Barragán, & Telch, 2017) rather than activists or leaders themselves. Activists and organisations are often treated interchangeably, and some studies even view activists as representing organisations (Afiff & Rachman, 2019).

This article is built upon the findings of a collaborative research project during which several studies were conducted in Indonesia and Cambodia. Three techniques have been exercised to collect primary data: formal interviews, informal conversations and participant observation in formal meetings, events and daily activities. We adopted a semi-structured interview technique, using guided conversations rather than a structured inquiry to allow ample opportunities for respondents to provide their perspectives and convey their understandings of their organisational roles as well as their extra-organisational relations. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with CSOs leaders and activists. For the Cambodian case, we have decided to pseudonymise the names of all interviewees, CSO leaders and organisations (CSOs, NGOs, and political parties) in order to guarantee their safety.

In Indonesia, field studies were conducted between October 2018 and June 2019, with data also being collected through focus group discussions involving nine elites representing five important subfields: agrarian law, human rights, religion, anti-corruption and youth. Data were honed through in-depth interviews with seven leaders in the agrarian subfield, as well as a review of internal and public documents.

In Cambodia, research was conducted between May and December 2019 with six organisations, one of which—Farmer Center, an organisation made up of farmers' networks that has both policy influence and grassroots engagement—is discussed in this article. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with organisations' leaders, board members and management teams, as representatives of local organisations. In total, the fieldwork comprised of in-depth interviews in Khmer with 14 people in Phnom Penh and 12 people in Kampot Province and 12 people in Preah Vihear Province.

In Indonesia, the phenomenon of elitisation was explored within the agrarian subfield using the experiences of CSO leaders involved with the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (*Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria*), a consortium of more than 150 CSOs at the national and local levels. Aside from its national scope, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform was also chosen because of its deep roots in Indonesia, having been established by elites from various CSOs.

In Cambodia, the Farmer Center was chosen as a case study, representing agriculture as a subfield that has been prioritised by the government. Established by a French CSO, the Farmer Center was chosen because it was the only CSO that was capable of transforming itself from a foreign-sponsored organisation into a national one. By 2014, it had provided direct assistance to about 160,000 families in 22 provinces. The Farmer Center focuses on sharing knowledge about agricultural innovations with local farmers, farmer associations and young entrepreneurs.

This article argues that state regulations have transformed the process through which CSO leaders achieve elite status. It no longer is based on performance and individual activism; it is derived from legal status. Understanding the experiences of Indonesia and Cambodia is crucial, as regulations produce a dual process of elitisation, simultaneously expanding and contracting the spaces available for inter-elite competition. The former produces elite pluralism, while the latter produces a monopoly of elites.

The article is organised into five parts: introduction, analytical framework, state regulations and elitisation in civil society in Indonesia and Cambodia and conclusion.

2. Field as Analytical Framework

This article draws on Bourdieu's concept of field, which is "a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capitals…among the holders of different forms of powers" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 264). As they involve diverse forms of capital and competition between actors, fields represent structured arenas of conflict (Swartz, 1997).

In this article, the field is understood as consisting of multiple levels. To ease discussion, this article identifies these levels as follows. First, the field refers to state society, civil society, economic society and political society. Second, the subfield refers to the civil society sectors in which actors accumulate capital and work individually or collectively. Finally, the sub-subfield refers to the CSOs in which different actors compete. Referring to Bourdieu, links between these fields are complex, and intersection is common (Wacquant, 1996, p. xi). Hence, as a theory of power, Bourdieu offers a flexible means of understanding how elites—leaders who have accumulated more capital than others—are produced and reproduced, as well as how they compete to accumulate capital and gain recognition (Bourdieu, 1990).

Furthermore, through the lens of Strategic Action Fields (SAF)—a concept derived from Bourdieu's work—the conscious activities of actors within the fields are prioritised over the unconsciousness of binary perspectives and structures. SAF looks more at actors' subjective standing than objectivity in the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). The term 'strategic action' highlights the dynamicity of the field, while still recognising its structural aspects. As such, SAF offers a meso-level social order. An order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why) and the field's rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 2). As SAF emphasises the need to consider collective actors—organisations, social movements or even government

systems—in addition to individual ones, it argues that collective actions work in conjunction with individual strategic actions to shape contestation and competition (Laamanen & Skålén, 2015). As arenas of competition, fields have relatively flexible boundaries. They may be singular, or may be nested, and are characterised by actors' (1) diffused understandings regarding the rules of the field; and (2) ability to accumulate capital (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, pp. 3–6). Actors' competitiveness is determined by their ability to utilise their political capital.

SAF's view of contestation is actually parallel with Bourdieu's classical explanation of dominant dominators and dominated dominators (Wacquant, 1996); i.e., hyper-elites, as identified by Maclean and Harvey (2019). The terms refer to inter-actors' competition, where the most dominant actor (dominant dominators) may be present within a certain field, and consequently more dominated actors (dominated dominators) may exist in this field. According to Bourdieu, there are two types of political capital: that acquired by individuals and that acquired through delegation (Bourdieu & Robinson, 1985; Kauppi, 2003). Individual political capital is produced through either "slow accumulation…or action in a situation of institutional void and crisis," reflecting the Weberian idea of charismatic legitimacy. Meanwhile, the political capital acquired through delegation is accumulated through institutions (Kauppi, 2003, pp. 779–780).

Competition with these fields, subfields and subsubfields will be understood through a competition of (1) the basis of elitisation, including formalisation, bureaucratisation and reputation; (2) the character of competition (i.e., the degree of openness); (3) level of competitiveness (i.e., high or low); (4) elitisation (i.e., production or stagnation of elites); and (5) elite formation (i.e., plural or monolithic).

3. State Regulation of Civil Society

This article aims to understand the situation through which one field influences the dynamics of another. In this case, we are focusing on the implications of state regulations on elitisation process.

The state is a stronger field than civil society, political society and economic society. It is "a kind of grand social organiser that constantly exercises a formative action of durable dispositions…it imposes fundamental principles of classification on everybody" (Kauppi, 2003, p. 781). As such, the State has the capacity to influences the rules of the game used by CSOs and other organisations.

Studies on the State, regulations and CSOs are not new to social science. However, we have been unable to find any articles that discuss the implications of state regulations on CSOs' elitisation processes. A study by Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash (2014), for example, focused on how the nature of regime affects the way states regulate CSOs. They argued that macro-institutional arrangements of representation crucially affect national styles of CSO regulation (2014, p. 716). State corporatists, who understand CSOs as obstacles to their regime, tend to limit their freedoms. Eldridge (1996), meanwhile, argued that the identification of Pancasila as a singular ideology through State regulation was an instrument used by the Soeharto regime to control CSOs in Indonesia. Conversely, pluralistic states that see CSOs as 'substitutes for formal communication channels' emphasise collaborative governance networks, prioritising policy priorities over organisational structures (Bassarab, Clark, Santo, & Palmer, 2019, p. 32). A study by Lay (2017), for instance, showed how Indonesia's political reform has created more democratic space for CSOs to engage in policymaking.

A study by Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl (2006) emphasised the negative impacts of state regulations on CSOs, where structural differentiation and functional specialisation provides space for power abuse. Several studies have emphasised the motivation of state regulations. The State's inclination to control CSOs through tight administration is aimed to limit these organisations' latitude, as in the case of Cambodia (McCarthy & Un, 2017). The same logic applies to Jordan, where state regulation has been used to preserve the depoliticisation of women CSOs (Ferguson, 2017). Meanwhile, in Ethiopia, control has been exercised through the implementation of good governance principles, especially transparency and accountability (Yeshanew, 2012). Another study demonstrated how, in the UK, regulations have provided local NGOs with the political space to become involved in policy implementation (Lewis, 2008).

Plakhotnikova and Kurbanova (2008) use Kyrgyzstan to examine civil society transformation, state-building, and its implications for CSO leaders. Initially, leaders emerged spontaneously, impulsively and situationally but became organised as civil society became increasingly institutionalised actors. Since then, CSO activities have been "primarily linked to a high level of professionalism, succession procedures, and institutional sustainability" (p. 27), with educated individuals and women becoming leaders and activists. Leadership is no longer charismatic, but rather rational and legal.

Moving beyond existing studies on state regulation of civil society, this article argues that state regulations have led to the formalisation and bureaucratisation of CSOs. Formalisation and bureaucratisation have two different implications. For emerging democracies such as Indonesia, formalisation and bureaucratisation create new spaces for inter-elite competition, thereby promoting elite pluralism. This occurs when CSO elites orient themselves towards creating new subfields and entering said fields to maintain their elite status. Meanwhile, for states with shrinking civic space such as Cambodia, formalisation and bureaucratisation can narrow and even close spaces for inter-elite competition. Referring to the arguments of Knoke (1993) and Hoffman-Lange (2018), that elites may be identified through their position and reputation, this article argues that the formalisation and bureaucratisation of CSOs through state regulations can

create new spaces for CSOs while simultaneously limiting the availability of spaces in non-prioritised sectors (see Figure 1).

3.1. The Indonesian Case

In Indonesia, the main instrument used to regulate CSOs and mitigate foreign influences is the Civil Society Organisation Law (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1985), which was passed by the authoritarian Soeharto regime (Detik, 2007; Eldridge, 1996). Since political reform in 1998, CSO activists have sought to transform State control. These demands have been positively received by post-reform regimes, and both CSOs and government agents have used legal instruments to ensure access to state resources, guarantee freedom of association and improve public participation.

This has been realised, for example, through the ratification of Law No. 12 of 2011 (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011a), which requires the general public to be involved in the drafting of all laws. This has provided a legal means for civil society elites to become involved in the policymaking process. Since the passage of this law, CSO regulations have become increasingly diverse and detailed. For example, since its 2013 and 2017 revisions, the Civil Society Organisation Law (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013, 2017) has allowed CSOs to exist as associations, foundations or without any legal status whatsoever. All CSOs, however, are required to have their own institutional structures and mechanisms.

Several further laws have regulated CSOs in more detail. The Foundation Law (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2001), for example, contained multiple articles that deal specifically with the institutional structure of foundations and mechanisms for filling them. Its replacement, Law No. 28 of 2004 (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2004) created new standards for CSOs, and thus affected their ability to access state resources and participate in policymaking activities. Today, Indonesia has many similar sectoral regulations; take, for example, Law No. 16 of 2011 (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011b) regarding Legal Aid and the Presidential Regulation regarding the Procurement of Public Goods and Services, both of which regulate CSOs' access to funding. Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration No. 4 of 2015 (Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, 2015) regarding the Administration of Village-Owned Enterprises was drafted in the same spirit, enabling CSOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and donors to work in conjunction with village-owned enterprises were approved by the village government and formalised through a memorandum of understanding. Under these regulations, which are intended to guarantee accountability and transparency, actors' formal positions within CSOs have become important.



Figure 1. State regulations and elitisation.

The internal rules of the game that regulate elite circulation in response to state regulations, which have always emphasised formal processes, have similar implications, insofar as actors' formal position is a central component of their legitimacy.

3.2. The Cambodian Case

The Cambodian government started to regulate the civil society sector after it passed the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) in 2010 and implemented it in August 2015 (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2015). The most frequently quoted justification for LANGO relates to the government's need to prevent foreign terrorist organisations (Karen & Peter, 2015; Palatino, 2015) and to govern CSOs. According to officials at the Ministry of Interior, while there are thousands of NGOs operating in Cambodia, they are not being overseen by state regulations—which is particularly necessary as many organisations receive international funding.

Civil society actors have feared three aspects of LANGO's implementation: (1) Stringent requirements for registration as a legal entity to operate and receive funding, (2) regular reporting of activities and financial status (including amount and sources of funds) and (3) a vague provision that requires CSOs to be politically neutral (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015; USAID, 2016). Registration is only a small part of LANGO. Interviews with officials of the Ministry of Interior who oversee the law's implementation suggested that its main aim is to create more transparency (particularly financial transparency) and accountability amongst CSOs who receive funding from international organisations and foreign governments. Not only does the ministry require activity and financial reports, but also bank account numbers, which enable the government to trace the source and amount of funding CSOs receive. Using such information, the government can potentially monitor and selectively target specific activities based on their leaders' political orientation as well as their funders. An additional concern from CSOs is the use of LANGO to close down NGOs that are critical of the government.

LANGO has been adopted together with broader political changes. Some observers note that the law's adoption suggests a change in the government's strategy to deal with civil society; it no longer relies on harassment and intimidation, but instead uses more complex measures to threaten the sector (Un, 2019). One important aspect of this attempt to increase the regulation of CSOs is directly related to the government's claim that some civil society leaders and activists worked with the opposition party (the Cambodia National Rescue Party) to topple the government during and after the 2013 national election (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2018).

Cambodia's civil society has entered a new era of uncertainty, with civic space being increasingly dictated by the State. This has affected elite production and circulation in a number of significant ways, as will be illustrated through a case study of Cambodia's agriculture sector.

4. Elitisation in Civil Society

Civil society, as well as the subfields and sub-subfields it contains, represents an arena for inter-elite competition as a part of elitisation. This will be demonstrated herein through the experiences of Indonesia and Cambodia (see Table 1).

4.1. The Indonesian Case

In the 1970s, agrarian reform became a central discourse in some notable universities in Indonesia. However, it transformed into a more organised movement following the establishment of the Consortium for Agrarian Reform in 1994. Over the years, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform has significantly influenced the establishment of CSOs and the production of civil society elites.

Agrarian reform was postponed by the Soeharto regime for 32 years because it was identified with communism. Nonetheless, activists revived discourses on agrarian reform in the early 1970s using the Agro-Economic Survey, a government research institution under the Department of Agriculture (Saluang, 2019). G. Wiradi, a researcher-cum-activist who had been involved in the drafting of the Basic Agrarian Law (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1960) under President Sukarno, and Sajogyo, an academic who concealed his activism with agricultural research and programmes, were central in transforming agrarian reform from mere discourse into a subfield of civil society (Saluang, 2019). As agrarian issues became more complicated in the 1980s owing to the regime's repressive regulations, ideological activism (through student movements and CSOs' organisational engagement) became

Table 1. Comparison of the Indonesian and Cambodian cases.

Manner	Indonesia	Cambodia
Formalisation and Bureaucratisation	High	High
Space for elite competition	Widening	Shrinking
Level of competitiveness	High	Low
Elitisation	Reproduction of elite	Stagnation of elite production
Elite formation	Pluralistic	Monolithic

more common, creating a triangle of intellectual-cum-activists, CSO leaders and student activists.

This alliance was marked by the establishment of the Consortium for Agrarian Reform—at the time an underground movement—in 1994 during a meeting of dozens of activists and intellectual elites from various CSOs (interview, D. Bachriadi, June 24, 2019). Consortium for Agrarian Reform represented the convergence of two specific interests, i.e., the interest of intellectual cum-activists to have agency and an outlet to materialise their ideas and the interest of CSO leaders and student activists to gain academic support for their movement.

In order to be recognised by the state as an organisation, since the very beginning, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform adapted its internal rules of the game to government regulations that required clear structures and forums for decision making as well as elite circulation mechanisms. Owing to internal regulations, this subfield promoted competition between formal civil society elites.

The dynamics of inter-elite competition within the Consortium for Agrarian Reform can be traced through the positioning and circulation of elites within its formal structure—its executive and legislative bodies, as well as its Expert Assembly. Internal Consortium for Agrarian Reform guidelines position the National Congress as a forum and mechanism for circulating elites and making decisions. Decision-making in the National Congress follows the principle of 'one man, one vote.' This does not hold true for the Expert Assembly, which is used by intellectuals and senior activists as a means of guiding discourse. Positions in the Expert Assembly are filled through appointment, while other bodies are populated through competitive mechanisms.

In Consortium for Agrarian Reform's early years, elite competition was not particularly prominent. This can be attributed to two main factors: (1) a relative lack of elites at a time when the number of CSOs was mushrooming and (2) a clear basis for elitisation, with individuals' elite status being derived from their activism, individual reputation, capacity to produce discourse and experience. It is not surprising that, between the First and Sixth National Congress, the leaders who occupied formal structural positions were campus activists who had been intensely involved in civil society movements and who had consistently produced and disseminated information on agrarian reform. Consortium for Agrarian Reform's lack of leadership in its early years, at a time when CSOs were mushrooming in number, meant that not all of its founding activists were involved in its internal competitions. Nonetheless, Consortium for Agrarian Reform has been treated as a collective property of CSO leaders from various sub-subfields.

Later developments resulted in the transformation of Consortium for Agrarian Reform's elitisation process. In the mid-2000s, as donor institutions increasingly emphasised managerial capacity, accountability and transparency, technocratic capacity became an important capital (Oxfam, 2020). At the same time, the State became an alternative source of funding and allowed CSOs to become involved in policymaking processes; in return, it expected certain technical standards to be met. This shift can be seen in the experiences of D. Kartika, the Secretary-General of Consortium for Agrarian Reform (2016–2021). After the Sixth National Congress (2013), when Kartika failed in her bid to become secretary-general, she descended to the grassroots and established legitimacy as an activist. Her appointment was also reinforced by the affirmative and inclusive policies imposed by international donor institutions. Ultimately, having accumulated resources outside the organisation itself as an activist, Kartika was made Secretary-General at the Seventh National Congress, receiving the majority vote (interview, D. Kartika, June 26, 2019). Her appointment as secretary-general, thus, cannot be separated from her ability to combine the diverse resources at her disposal.

Consortium for Agrarian Reform's first two National Congresses produced an organisational structure consisting of a chairman, an implementation body and a secretary-general. This structure was later simplified, consisting solely of the secretary-general and the supporting structure. Consequently, inter-elite competi-



Figure 2. Connections among field, subfield, and sub-subfield of Indonesia case.

tion became fiercer and elites were required to combine diverse resources to gain the support of National Congress participants.

This staunch internal competition drove Consortium for Agrarian Reform's leaders to seek new ways to persevere and be recognised as elites. They did this, first, by establishing new sub-subfields. This could occur through anticipatory measures, such as those used by Faryadi, who established the Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movements (*Aliansi Gerakan Reforma Agraria*) while still serving as the Consortium for Agrarian Reform's first secretary-general. Although the Consortium for Agrarian Reform intended this alliance to facilitate its creation of its own CBOs (Faryadi, 2016; Tanisa, 2003), over time it provided Faryadi with a sub-subfield in which he could exert power even after leaving the Consortium for Agrarian Reform. New sub-subfields could also be created in reaction to particular phenomena. For example, Zakaria, an intellectual-cum-activist who helped establish the Consortium for Agrarian Reform, was active outside the sub-subfield of the Consortium for Agrarian Reform; today, he chairs the Association for Village Renewal (*Lingkar Pembaharuan Pedesaan dan Agraria*), a CSO he established in 2002 that focuses on village and agrarian issues. He had also been involved in the drafting of the 2016 Village Law, which enabled CSOs and CBOs to become involved in village-level activities. The Consortium for Agrarian Reform's leaders used this law to establish Villages for Agrarian Reform (*Desa Reforma Agraria*), a grassroots project (interview, D. Kartika, June 26, 2019). Bachriadi established the Agrarian Resources Center in 2005, six years after finishing his term on the Implementation Body and shortly after leaving the Expert Assembly, while Rachman and other activists established the Sajogyo Institute for similar purposes in 2005.

The above phenomenon indicates the emergence and spread of elites, as reflected in the mushrooming of CSOs in recent decades. In 2001, Indonesia had only 429 active CSOs (PLOD, 2005); one decade later, it had at least 2,293 (Scanlon & Alawiyah, 2015). This implies that organisational elites have become increasingly common and diverse. It means that inter-elite discrimination has promoted the diversification of CSO elites. This, in turns, has promoted checks and balances and has thus become a crucial part of democracy.

Since Indonesia began its political reform in 1998, Consortium for Agrarian Reform activists have been divided into two blocs, signifying a collective contestation. The first bloc views the State as enabling the realisation of agrarian reform, being the arena in which political decisions are made. The State is also important because of its significant symbolic power (interview, D. Kartika, June 26, 2019). The second bloc, meanwhile, argues that seizing such "political opportunities" would violate their principles as activists, who are expected to exist outside the State in order to provide checks and balances. For example, Bachriadi stated, "activists always talk about opportunities…but movements are characterised by their ability to challenge [others]. Whether or not they have an open structure, opportunities, they will still challenge [others], as that is their driving principle" (interview, D. Bachriadi, June 24, 2019). In the context of emerging democracies such as Indonesia, this reflects Etzioni-Halevy's (1993) argument that elite pluralism promotes checks and balances.

Second, elites have migrated to other fields, particularly the State. For example, Setiawan became involved in the State field while still serving as Consortium for Agrarian Reform's Secretary-General (2005–2009), having been asked to join the National Land Agency (*Badan Pertanahan Nasional*; interview, U. Setiawan, June 26, 2019). He chaired the Food Security Council at the Ministry of Agriculture before being asked to handle agrarian reform at the Presidential Staff Office. Other former Consortium for Agrarian Reform leaders who migrated to the State field included Rachman—better known as Oji—and Nurdin. A senior activist who was greatly respected by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform, Rachman, became part of President Jokowi's inner circle through his organisational network before ultimately working with the Jakarta Governor (interview, U. Setiawan, June 26, 2019).

Rahman was the first former Consortium for Agrarian Reform leader to join with Masduki (interview, D. Bahriadi, June 24, 2019), a civil society leader who helped found Indonesia Corruption Watch. Masduki had served on the National Ombudsman Commission. In 2014, after a stint on Jokowi's presidential campaign team, he became the Director of the Presidential Staff Office; today, he is Minister for Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises. Nurdin, who is currently Chair of Consortium for Agrarian Reform's National Council, was also a member of the Presidential Staff Office. Similar trajectories were followed by other Consortium for Agrarian Reform leaders, including Wijayanto, who is now part of a special commission of the Jakarta Governor's Office. CSO activists' involvement in the State and civil society fields does not only necessitate complex networks amongst civil society elites, but also highlights the strong overlap between these fields. These fields, thus, are not sharply distinguished.

Third, elites established CBOs or remained active at the local (grassroots) level. Zakaria (interview, July 6, 2019) explained, "They don't disappear…their roles…become more diverse. Boy Fidro lived in a village, built schools, became a teacher…a principal…in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis." This practice is also illustrated by Agustiana, who represented the Pasundan Farmers' Association (*Serikat Petani Pasundan*) during Consortium for Agrarian Reform's establishment but remained active at the grassroots level (interview, D. Bachriadi, June 24, 2019; U. Setiawan, June 26, 2019). As such, local spaces have been maintained by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform elites, as these have provided them with a space for retaining their elite status.

4.2. The Cambodian Case

Unlike the Consortium for Agrarian Reform, which is strongly characterised as a social movement, the agrarian subfield in Cambodia has involved agriculture and rural development—both key government priorities since the United Nations organised Cambodia's first national election in 1993 and the country became reintegrated into the region and the world. The establishment of the Farmer Center in 1997 followed international NGOs' successful implementation of agriculture and capacity development during the 1990s. The formal establishment of the Farmer Center also enabled the transfer of leadership from foreigners to Cambodians, as well as the transformation of international NGOs into Cambodian CSOs. As a national player in the agriculture and rural development field, the Farmer Center has become well-respected, particularly for its ability to effectively provide training and extension services and mobilise capacity building for rural farmers and communities. The Farmer Center has been led by formal elites, representing a diverse group of high-profile individuals working in the civil society field and in large international organisations. One of the most recognised leaders today, Mr. Som, is known as a foreign-educated agriculture expert who introduced new approaches to agriculture as he increasingly accumulated social and cultural capital. His leadership of one foreign CSO's projects was followed by his appointment as the Farmer Center's first director in 2015. His success in obtaining donors' financial support and, through his personal networks within the Ministry of Agriculture, government political support resulted in the Farmer Center establishing close relations with rural farmers and formalising farmer associations in the country. The Farmer Center has grown from seven employees working in two villages in one commune in a province to a staggering 277 employees serving 7,200 villages in 1,050 (out of 1,640) communes in 22 of Cambodia's 24 provinces. In 2012, Mr. Som received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for his contribution to agriculture and poverty reduction.

Increased regulations, in conjunction with rural popular support for the work of the Farmer Center, prompted Mr. Som and his trusted network of NGO leaders to enter the political field. He played an important role in creating new sub-subfields by establishing the New Party in 2015, which provided Mr. Som, other CSO leaders, and farmer organisations an arena to explore opportunities in the political field. Despite Som's failed prime ministerial candidacy in 2018, the New Party received five commune council seats in four provinces. Given the number of seats contested (11,500) and area covered, these results were insignificant; nonetheless, the New Party's showing is important within the context of Cambodia and its elections (Morgenbesser, 2019). The election of grassroots activists and organisational leaders such as Mr. Oun to commune government further strengthened his profile within farmer associations and Farmer Center. Oun had become known as the president of the Farmer Association and as a member of the Farmer Center Board, having worked with donor agencies and gained popularity among grassroots members. Oun's ascendance from ordinary farmer to local political and agricultural elite reflect Mr. Som's and Farmer Center's ambition when it initiated the grassroots mobilisation and capacity building of rural farmers and their associations.

However, Som's focus on politics since 2016 has resulted in setbacks in Farmer Center's agricultural activities. As he focused on developing his party and political agenda, he left the CSO to new management. Mr. Som, as the leader of Farmer Center, became the 'most dominant actor' or 'hyper-elite' within the organisation's hierarchy owing to his loyalty to the regime and support for state priorities; this resulted in the stagnation of the elitisation process. Farmer Center's director since 2017, Malis, has thus experienced significant problems gaining formal recognition, including difficulty in registering the organisation's new management with the Ministry of the Interior and problems with human resources. Many senior staff have left Farmer Center, while international donor support has diminished (interview, Malis, May 2019).

Reflecting on Farmer Center's case, CSO regulation has had three major effects on elites in Cambodia. First, it has pushed CSO elites to forge a closer relationship with State elites, and this has taken place through investment in personal contacts. It has long been noted that one positive development during the 2000s was the localisation of leadership, with Cambodian nationals replacing foreigners in leadership positions (Öjendal & Ou, 2015). This trend initially created opportunities to strengthen trust between CSO and State elites, and—as shown in the case study—enabled both to work closely. In the case of the Farmer Center, the personal relationship between Som and the Minister of Agriculture was important to the Farmer Center's success and enabled it to effectively provide input. CSO elites have had to move away from criticising the government to adopting a more engaging approach and assisting the government in carrying out its mission (see Henke, 2011). Such a phenomenon has also been seen in contemporary China, where CSOs have sought to create a 'win-win' situation (Fulda & Song, 2012).

Second, CSO regulation has significantly constrained CSOs' ability and institutional capacity to carry out their mission, which has resulted in CSO elites moving to other fields. In the case of Farmer Center, the leadership team's engagement in politics by establishing a new political party that mobilised public support on the premise that CSOs are powerless and that drastic and large-scale change requires political power. Farmer Center, meanwhile, has faced significant institutional challenges in its relations with the government. This problem remained unsolved when interviews were conducted in May 2019. The organisation's change of leadership had yet to be recognised by the government, as its documentation



Figure 3. Links between field, subfield, and sub-subfield, Cambodia case.

was not accepted. Farmer Center has thus informally hired government officials to process this paperwork. This situation threatened its contract with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide training to farmers as well as its contract with the Ministry of Commerce to provide a special market for Farmer Center's farmers.

Third, pressure on CSO elites does not only come from the State, but also from international donors. Development partners have pressured CSOs to work within the narrow framework dictated by the government. From an international donor perspective, the law's implementation makes it difficult to provide funds to leaders who are not favoured by the government for fear of limited effectiveness. Donor funding for civil society has steadily declined in recent years; in 2016, for example, there was a 15% decrease in Official Development Assistance (USAID, 2016). Donors have responded to LANGO's implementation by selecting civil society and individual leaders that can work effectively on issues in which the government is interested. This shift in strategy is reflected in the political empowerment championed by the Farmer Center, whose funding has been significantly reduced due to its leadership's involvement in party politics. This has further limited the Farmer Center's ability to mobilise grassroot support and implement its activities with rural farmers. Furthermore, the provincial department of agriculture has discriminated against farmer organisations whose leaders are active in party politics; such farmers have been directly excluded from capacity building activities and faced distrust among community members.

This case study suggests that the impact of government regulations and dependence on foreign funding is likely to reinforce State-preferred civil society elites rather than local constituents, and to favour national elites over local elites as well as leaders with formal and technocratic knowledge over informal and political activism. Furthermore, it is highly likely that CSO elite must manage and combine different subfields in order to maintain their influence and elite status (see Figure 3).

5. Conclusion

The experiences of Indonesia and Cambodia show similarities as well as distinctions in the effects of CSO regulations. Both cases reveal the centrality of regulations, where states impose their fundamental principles of classification by drafting and implementing regulations to transform the character of civil society—including its fields, subfields, sub-subfields and elitisation processes. These cases also demonstrate that state regulations can fundamentally transform the process of elitisation through formalisation and bureaucratisation. Nonetheless, these two cases show a very different path. In Indonesia, State regulations have directly shifted the basis of legitimation, with formal institutional positions being used to legitimise elites' status. Formalisation and bureaucratisation have occurred as CSOs' collective capital have been converted to activists' individual capital, thereby intensifying contestation between elites. Elitisation occurs through formal mechanisms and is driven by bureaucratic logic, which has also promoted inter-elite discrimination as an integral part of the elitisation process. As a result, remaining elites have sought to find spaces wherein they can maintain their elite status. However, this has not resulted in stagnation. Rather, it has led to elite pluralism, providing a new basis for further democratic consolidation.

Meanwhile, in Cambodia regulation has limited the space available for contestation and created a monopoly that has stagnated the elitisation process. The case of Cambodia also shows that CSO regulation has significantly constrained CSOs' ability and institutional capacity to carry out their mission. CSO elites have thus moved to other fields, resulting in CSOs experiencing significant difficulty reproducing elites. Likewise, the effects of CSO regulations in Cambodian have not been direct. Instead, these regulations have been influenced by the political judgment of the regime and by CSO elites' ability to demonstrate support or even become part of the regime. Elites who have proven to be the most loyal to the regime have enjoyed privileges, being given a red-carpet

to attain elite status. The case of Cambodia also confirms that personal relationships, such as that between Som and the Minister of Agriculture, were not only important to Farmer Center's success and ability to effectively provide input, but also explained the hyper-elite status achieved by certain actors. Regulations, therefore, have been used both as coercive and persuasive instruments—-as stick and carrot—-to uphold CSOs' loyalty to the regime. This model echoes Indonesia's authoritarian past under Soeharto when regulations were used to push CSO elites to establish closer relationships with State elites by investing in personal contacts.

Both cases also show that regulations have further implications. In Indonesia, on the one hand, they minimise activism's ability to mobilise civil society. On the other hand, they transform organisational processes from arenas for elite contestation into arenas for contesting resources qua resources. Administration and organisation are thus important material and symbolic capital for elitisation. This differs from the Cambodian case, where administration and organisation have functioned as arenas for State control. These case studies highlight the need to consider political contexts and regime characteristics when discussing the elitisation processes within CSOs.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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

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Article

Pathways to Leadership within and beyond Cambodian Civil Society: Elite Status and Boundary-Crossing

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Abstract
Elitisation in Cambodian civil society and how such processes relate to holding elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic fields, is poorly understood. This article seeks to identify different pathways to becoming an elite within and beyond Cambodian civil society. We focus on four case studies, representing different forms of organisations within the sectors of agriculture and youth. Three main questions are explored. Firstly, we identify different forms of capital needed to reach elite status in civil society. Secondly, we explore how elite status within civil society is related to elite status within other fields, by identifying three pathways of boundary-crossing (Lewis, 2008a) from civil society into the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Thirdly, we map the perceived possibilities and limitations of each field. In exploring these questions, this article argues for a reappraisal of Cambodian civil society, shifting attention to the networks and platforms that fall outside of the dominant focus on professional NGOs. By empirically tracing how elites move between fields, it aspires to provide a better understanding of the contours of, and relations between, civil society and other fields (including government, electoral politics, and business), including in terms of what particular forms of power pertain to each.

Keywords
boundary-crossing; Cambodia; civil society; elites; leadership

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Civil Society Elites" edited by Håkan Johansson (Lund University, Sweden) and Anders Uhlin (Lund University, Sweden).

1. Introduction

In academic accounts, Cambodian civil society is often treated as a relatively self-contained field, locked in an uneasy relationship with an authoritarian state. Though civil society is understood to be diverse, less formal groups are poorly understood and under-researched (Coventry, 2016). Elitisation within civil society has consequently been studied in terms of NGOs' accountability (Dosch, 2012) and their difficulty in establishing grassroots links (Khlok, Phoumim, & Vanna, 2003; Malena & Chhim, 2009). This leaves out important patterns of elite formation within and beyond Cambodian civil society today. Whilst it is well-recognised that civil society is marked by power dynamics (Mosse, 2005), the development of civil society elites remains relatively unexplored in academic literature. Processes of elite formation in civil society display interconnections and sometimes interdependence with other fields, as well as instances of boundary-crossing between them. In this article, we set out to identify different pathways to leadership within and beyond Cambodian civil society. What are some of the different pathways to elite status in Cambodian civil society? How is elite status within civil society related to elite status within other fields? What range of possibilities are afforded through civil society activity, which sets it apart from activity in other fields?

There is a growing realisation in the literature on Southeast Asia that civil society activists may choose between different arenas for engagement. Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007) hold that in Southeast Asian hybrid regimes, state-sponsored modes of participation (in which participants exert political influence over public policy, through e.g., community consultation over policy-making or nominated members of parliament) form a continuum with civil society expression (collective actions in spaces not created by state actors). In Weiss's (2017) reworking, three principal spaces are available for activists: autonomous civil society, extra-electoral state-sponsored or institutional spaces, and electoral politics. In this article, we trace processes of elite boundary-crossing towards becoming formally incorporated into the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Our interest in elite movement between these fields reflects our observation that it is substantial. It also reflects our different approach to elites' aims and ambitions. We do not, like Weiss (2017), assume that activists primarily respond to political opportunity structures in choosing different pathways of engagement, "weighing not only relative risks and the relative degrees of access that various routes afford but also the nature of the claims that they seek to press and ongoing feedback from intended targets" (Weiss, 2017, p. 383). We keep the motivations for elite boundary-crossing open, acknowledging that this may be a goal in itself, and that other fields may be prioritised over civil society.

Our departure point is an understanding of civil society which focuses on the nature and aims of activities rather than organisational characteristics. Civil society is here understood in broad terms as a space at the nexus of formal politics, family structures, and business; as a realm of voluntaristic, generally collective and self-supporting activity, however structured, which seeks to provide or secure public and collective good, and is separate from, and in its ideal form autonomous from, the state (Weiss, 2017, p. 377). Our approach is in line with an emerging realisation that the concept of civil society needs to be "operationalised" in Cambodia (Henke, 2011; Waibel, 2014; Wells-Dang, 2014), where a great deal of activity fitting the above description takes place outside of formal NGOs. Waibel (2014, pp. 8–9) quoting Hannah (2007, p. 94) argues that research needs a shift to "looking at who within a society/state constellation is undertaking which civil society activities and who is accomplishing which civil society objectives," and that Cambodian social actors themselves should define which state-society relationships and activities are important. Shifting our object of study to organisations, networks, and platforms which have a significant influence through civil society activities, we take actors' accounts of their relationships and activities as a starting-point, agreeing with Waibel (2014, p. 1) that "'tracking', as opposed to 'pinning down', civil society should be the long-term goal of academic inquiry.''

Contemporary scholarship of Cambodian civil society has pointed to a relatively weak social force which counterbalances the state to promote democracy and a pro-poor reform agenda (Hughes, 2003; Un, 2004). The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has in different incarnations dominated the Cambodian state apparatus since 1979, using the profits from land and natural resources on the periphery to fund service provision and rural development projects across Cambodia. Studies during the 2000s concluded that Cambodian NGOs were polarised into two groups: a strident and confrontational 'advocacy' wing ineffectually protesting hot political issues such as land conflict, human rights, and natural resource governance; and quiescent service-delivery NGOs working closely with the government to fill gaps in service provision (Malena & Chhim, 2009; Ou & Kim, 2013).

Significant recent changes to Cambodian civil society have resulted in new dividing lines in terms of relations with the state, which bear on patterns of elite formation and boundary-crossing. During the 2000s, NGOs gradually expanded activities into rural areas, and international NGOs with expatriate staff were replaced by local NGOs with Cambodian leaders (Öjendal, 2014). Community-based organisations (CBOs) were established in rural villages, often funded by and working closely with NGOs. The expansion of CBOs and increased interactions between NGOs and CBOs initially started with saving groups and self-help associations in the agriculture sector among subsistence farmers. Local saving and self-help groups are welcomed by authorities, but only as long as they are not engaged in rural mobilisation on contentious issues or party politics. Emerging grassroots mobilisations in these areas are unequivocally treated with suspicion. The escalation of land conflicts and common resource enclosure has given rise to a new strategy of network-based activism (Henke, 2011; Young, 2019). This new strategy also reflects the frustration of affected communities with professional NGOs whose support for local grievances has so far been limited and tentative (Thon, Ou, Eng, & Ly, 2009).

Demographic change has also significantly impacted the civil society landscape. The children of a post-war baby boom became eligible to vote in large numbers by the time of the 2013 national elections, in which youth were a majority of the electorate. Seeing its support significantly weakened in the election, the CPP reasoned that preserving its dominance required urgent action to reformulate the political strategy in a manner that could co-opt significant sections of young voters (Eng & Hughes, 2017). The government has ramped up efforts to engage youth in a range of primarily social and cultural activities through state-sponsored platforms and mass organisations. Yet, there are also independent youth initiatives to create platforms to address social and political issues.

New Cambodian civil society elites are consequently emerging who are more politically engaged and enmeshed than the previous generation of expatriate NGOs, and who navigate a variety of organisational forms, including networks, mass organisations, and plat-

forms. To understand these novel civil society dynamics, including the contours of and relations between civil society and other fields, it is necessary to investigate who emerges as civil society elites and the dynamics driving boundary-crossing between fields.

2. Conceptualising Elites, Fields, and Capital

Bourdieu's theory of elites continues to provide a fruitful theoretical starting point for elite studies (e.g., Korsnes, Heilbron, Hjellbrekke, Bühlmann, & Savage, 2017). Following Bourdieu, we understand elites not in terms of formal leadership positions, but as groups and individuals who control disproportionately large amounts of different forms of capital. Positions in social space are based on the overall amount of capital agents possess, the composition of capital, and their social trajectory (Heilbron, Bühlmann, Hjellbrekke, Korsnes, & Savage, 2017, p. 6). Bourdieu (1986, p. 243) distinguished between economic, cultural, and social capital. Economic capital refers to money and ownership, whereas cultural capital can refer to an embodied state (such as tastes and lifestyle), an objectified state (cultural goods), or an institutionalised state (e.g. educational qualifications). Social capital is "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). Each member of the network is backed by its joint volume of capital (economic, cultural, or symbolic), which functions as a "credential" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 249). Following Khan (2012, p. 365), we include two further forms of capital: political and knowledge capital. Political capital focuses on the management of "political transitions," whilst knowledge capital refers to "ideas, knowledge, and ideology" (Khan, 2012, pp. 366, 370).

Capital is mobilised by agents to stake claims and access specific positions within particular social domains, fields (Bourdieu, 1986). For Bourdieu, the concept of field reflects a historical process whereby fields of activity have been differentiated into specialised professions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), for example, political, economic, bureaucratic, religious, medical, scientific, and artistic. They, therefore, correspond to "familiar divisions of action into self-contained realms of endeavour" (Martin, 2003). In line with this rationale, we conceptualise civil society, the state, the realm of electoral politics, and the economic field as different fields.

The fields that have crystallised are relatively autonomous spaces each with their own specific structures, which determine the specific effects of capital (Bourdieu, 1989). Each field has its own internal logic as to the "nature of the game" and is therefore analytically distinct (Martin, 2003). Yet fields are permeable, in the sense that hierarchical positions of power are replicated between fields through the conversion of capital. For Bourdieu (1986, p. 242), this refers to "forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most material types of capital—those which are economic in the restricted sense—can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa." Actors seek to reproduce capital and their positions "by means of the conversions least costly in terms of conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 253).

We understand elites not only in terms of the resources they control or have access to but also in terms of how these can be converted into different forms of capital and transferred across fields, and what the exchange rates for such transfers are (Khan, 2012, p. 362) The value and transferability of resources are defined through social processes (Khan, 2012, p. 362). The state plays a part in these and may advance or hold back civil society groups by gatekeeping the pathways to become an elite in civil society and beyond.

3. Methodology and Introduction to the Cases

This research builds on a qualitative case study approach, in which patterns within our framework of field theory were identified from a set of heuristic case studies (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 75). For each case study, we studied elite formation by examining recruitment and appointment procedures, including the value and conversion rates of different forms of capital in such processes. A second analytical focus was on elite interaction and elite integration between civil society elites and elites from other fields. This included the processes through which civil society leaders cross over to take up leadership in other fields, spending and gaining what capital, and at what conversion rates. Different forms of capital, as well as pathways to leadership within and beyond civil society, were identified inductively.

Fieldwork was carried out in Cambodia between September 2018 and December 2019. In-depth case studies were carried out of six organisations, four of which are discussed here. Data was collected through interviews, observations, and document analyses. About 40 semi-structured interviews were carried out with both leaders and ordinary members of the four organisations. Questions focused on the themes of elite formation and elite interaction. A number of comprehensive 'life-work history' interviews were carried out with boundary-crossers who had crossed from civil society to other fields. Following Lewis (2008b, p. 565), this is an adaptation of the life-history method by which "in order to investigate the sector boundary-crossing phenomenon, experiences of work (whether in terms of formal career, activism, volunteering) were placed at the centre of the life-history data to be collected." As argued by Lewis (2008b, p. 564), the life-history method can illuminate instances of boundary-crossing in and out of civil society, shedding light on "the types of relationships and forms of power that link structures and processes across the sectors" by documenting "the motivations and experiences

of those who have crossed over," and seeking "to explore the broader meanings and implications of these movements." Life histories also illustrate how capital becomes contingent on the fields in which they are situated (Park, Rinke, & Mawhinney, 2016). With the permission of the interviewees, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Writing up our study, we faced the dilemma of balancing a precise presentation of findings with exposing respondents' identities (Baez, 2002). As pointed out by Lancaster (2017, pp. 95, 99), notions of authority, sensitivity, and vulnerability are fluid and relational between the researcher and participant in elite interviewing, and the small sampling frames of key individuals means that they are "vulnerable" in the sense that they could be identifiable even when anonymised. Recognising that elites may in interviews be "vulnerable elites" (Smith, 2006), we have anonymised them and the four organisations, although none of the boundary-crossers interviewed requested anonymity.

An inherent problem of the life-history method is that subjective accounts are necessarily co-produced by the informant, who particularly as an elite may seek to exert control over the research process (Smith, 2006), and the researcher-author, who decides what is included or omitted in an account and how it is framed. We have sought to redeem this by constantly reflecting on such power issues throughout the research process (Lewis, 2008b, pp. 562–563). Finally, life-history data also sets limits on generalisation. We agree with Bron and West (2000, p. 159, as cited in Lewis, 2008b, p. 560) that individual narratives "reflect and constitute the dialectics of power relations and competing truths within the wider society," and can link personal experience with patterns of institutional change if taking into account the plausibility of the evidence, triangulation with other evidence, and an understanding of the historical content (Lewis, 2008b, p. 561).

Engaging in case research, we have not sought to select cases that are directly representative of diverse populations (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 30), but offer instead a set of in-depth case studies reflecting different types of elitisation processes. A set of interviews during an initial pilot study made it possible to draw a broad picture of the main forms of boundary-crossing in Cambodia, and then to identify specific individuals who corresponded to these (cp. Lewis, 2012, p. 161). Our case studies are drawn from the youth and agriculture sectors, which illustrate the emerging civil society dynamics outlined in the introduction. They represent different types of organisation, ranging from network-based types to discussion platforms; they also have different relations with the state; and in terms of boundary-crossing, offer intersections with the state, electoral politics, and economic fields.

Youth Discussion (YD) identifies as an informal weekly political discussion forum for young people that seeks to cultivate a democratic political culture in Cambodia. Established in 2011 by a group of four friends, the forum had had over 2500 participants by 2020, including over 400 regular attendees. YD has attracted much media attention, which has propelled key members into civil society elite status and made them interlocutors for their generation among international media, international organisations, and the diplomatic community. Whilst it is independent, it is treated with some suspicion by the government and it suspended its activities for several months when authoritarianism hardened in September 2017.

Cambodian Ideas (CI) describes itself as a new social platform, presently centred around a debate and public speaking contest for Grade 12 and university students. It was founded in 2017 by six young elites in different sectors. Whilst CI claims to be an independent initiative, the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia (UYFC), which describes itself as an NGO but which functions as an unofficial youth branch of the dominant CPP, has acknowledged the CI as one of its initiatives (UYFC, 2019). CI is run in partnership with the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MoEYS).

Farmer Center (FC) is an organisation made up of farmers' networks, founded in 1997. By 2014, it provided direct assistance to about 160,000 families in 22 Cambodian provinces. FC focuses on agricultural innovation knowledge sharing with local farmers, farmer associations, and young entrepreneurs. Founders and grassroots have formed the backbone of a political party, founded in 2015.

Cambodian Rice (CR) is one of Cambodia's largest rice exporting companies, founded in 2011 by a former NGO leader. Operating as a successful social enterprise with 10 000 farmers registered under a contract farming scheme, the entrepreneur works extensively with farmer associations.

4. Pathways to Elite Status in Cambodian Civil Society

In this section, we identify the different forms of capital needed to reach elite status, as well as the role that interactions with and engagement in other fields has in acquiring such status.

4.1. Youth Discussion

Centred on a weekly discussion forum, YD counts as its members those who are involved on a weekly basis. Membership is open to anyone. The leadership structure is made up of four generations of core members, but this arrangement is not well known, even among members. The core membership has expanded only gradually and slowly. The first generation counts the four cofounders, who started YD in 2011; the second generation 16 core members, recruited around 2014; a third-generation four core members, recruited in 2018; and a fourth-generation also four core members, announced in 2020. Recruitment to core membership is informal, and generally by consensus rather than election.

Core members identified three main selection criteria, corresponding to different forms of capital, for ap-

pointment. First among these is social capital in the form of trust. Whilst YD is non-partisan, and its core members and participants represent different political lines, the government has viewed YD with suspicion. The consequent fear of recruiting a core member who might seek to break up YD from inside has led to some hesitation to take on new core members. This dilemma also precludes there being a formal core member recruitment process. Three out of four first-generation core members have attended the Royal University of Phnom Penh's Department of Media and Communication (DMC), and they recruited like-minded people whom they were acquainted with having shared the same social networks. Consequently, the second generation leadership included several journalists and a blogger, and in the third generation, three out of four core members have a DMC connection. Personal acquaintance prior to joining the YD forum is not a criterion: several second and third-generation core members benefitted from trust due to belonging to similar social circles only. The second form of capital is knowledge capital, in the form of political interest. According to co-founder Sophal, he verifies that potential core members take an interest in politics and political issues, stating that "any background is fine as long as you are interested in politics." Similarly, other core members charged that core members must share an interest in political engagement as this is necessary for organising and participating in the forum. A third criterion identified by core members is activity/engagement, which can be understood as a form of knowledge capital. For example, one core member, who was not acquainted with any other core member before attending the forum, was asked to become a core member, which she believes was because she had been vocal in forums with high profile commentators.

One co-founder, Sophal, has emerged as a key civil society actor, drawing primarily on knowledge capital which then allowed him to accumulate social capital within the field. Growing up in rural Pursat, Sophal secured several scholarships which enabled him to study at three different Cambodian universities. Winning a scholarship from the Indian embassy, Sophal went on to study political science in India where he gathered students for small group discussions about Indian local politics which triggered the idea of YD. Returning to Cambodia, Sophal made appointments at coffee shops with friends to debate politics, attracting NGO sponsorship in the form of a space for discussion. Core members attribute his leading role to his activity, in the forum and on Twitter; his social capital, in terms of being well known and having many connections; his knowledge capital, in terms of skills in political analysis; his transparency; and his commitment in guiding youth on personal, academic, and forum issues.

4.2. Cambodian Ideas

CI was founded in 2017 by six young elites in different sectors including education, economics, health, and culture. The six founding members are known as the "founders" and make up the board of CI. The board has delegated executive powers to an executive team, headed by the managing director and co-founder, Dara.

For the leadership level of CI, as with YD, social capital in the form of trust is paramount, but in contrast to YD, the social networks it is drawn from penetrate the state. These networks are built through youth volunteering activities sponsored by the ruling CPP and the MoEYS. The six founders had been friends since their participation in the elite Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth programme, a youth exchange programme organised by the Cabinet Office of Japan and Southeast Asian governments, including the Cambodian government. One of the founders, Kanitha, then Director of the Administrative Department at Pannasastra University of Cambodia (PUC), invited fellow UYFC-member and former President of the Pannasastra Student Senate Dara to join in organising CI because of his extensive experience in debate and public speaking. Further recruitment went through Dara, who relied on his personal networks. For the selection of the executive team, Dara selected several positions and advertised the remaining positions among his networks through groups on WhatsApp and Telegram. A technical team of nine mentors in debate and public speaking were then handpicked by him (interview with Dara). The connections that these recruitments built on were mainly forged through youth volunteering in three associations: the Cambodian Red Cross, Cambodia Scouts, and UYFC. All of these are patronised by the ruling CPP and have close links to state structures, primarily through the MoEYS. The joint capital of these networks functions as a 'credential' which constitute social capital for each member.

For the first two CI seasons, 80 candidates were selected out of 180 and 989 applicants respectively. The forms of capital required for selection mirrored those of YD. Possessing social capital, in the form of the trust granted by in-group membership, was the most fundamental criterion. The program was advertised through the personal networks of the founders on Facebook, with the result that applicants were largely drawn from these. The second was knowledge capital. Applicants were examined through an exam, which counted for 80% of the assessment and focused on general knowledge of social science subjects including politics, economics, history, and culture. The third part of the assessment was an interview, focusing on commitment, confidence, manner, alongside content and analysis.

Being selected as a CI contestant arguably means joining an elite which although formed within civil society is inherently looking to forge connections across fields. Contestants gain in social capital through networking opportunities with representatives from other fields: ministries, companies, and NGOs are regularly consulted during preparation for the contests. Two experts, one from the government, one from the NGO sector, alongside two technical experts act as judges; for the final, the Minister

of Education, Youth, and Sport himself served as a judge. Many contestants interviewed see the main benefit of CI as internal networking, forming a community which describes itself as a "family" in which the founders are referred to as "father" and "mother." From the perspective of the founders, the main outcome they wish to see is a close-knit community of capable youth bound by friendship to take on leading positions across the economic, civil society, and state fields. In the words of one co-founder: "Almost all my children are now spread out. They work in good companies, NGOs, and Ministries, which I am so happy about" (interview with Kanitha). The co-founders intend to create leadership across fields, tying together future political, civil society, and economic elites.

4.3. Farmer Center

The leadership group of FC was a product of donor projects established in the 1990s. FC was set up by a well-educated French Cambodian working for a French NGO. He came from a family with strong links to the political elite, who returned to Cambodia after the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. Since FC was founded with support from the French NGO in 1997, he served as chair of its board. A team leader for the French NGO, Som, was appointed as the first-generation leader of FC.

FC is governed by a board of directors with representation from the development sector. The leadership group of the organisation consists of core staff members who manage key divisions within the organisation. These are individuals who are tied to and were inspired to join FC by Som, a charismatic and visionary leader. Som draws on social capital in various ways to hold this status. He has a long-term vision for the agricultural sector and rural farmers in Cambodia. One is "Making the changes for the farmers to be successful in their enterprise that could make them a tycoon farmer (*Sethy Srok Srae*)." He has planned to set up a system to connect the urban and rural populations in Cambodia through capital investment of urban people into rural farmers' enterprises. In his own words, "the goal is to attract the rich to invest in *FC* projects and in agriculture so that Cambodia can improve the food production system" (interview with Som).

Som draws extensively on his knowledge capital, as one of very few Cambodians with PhD training abroad as an agronomist during the 1990s. He has therefore been highly sought after by NGOs and donors as well as government officials for advice and expertise in rural development. His personal character also contributes to his elite status. He is a highly trustworthy individual who commands respect. Senior staff at FC described him as a caring and down to earth personality, who is passionate about changes at the community level, where he spent most of his time sharing his knowledge with local farmers. This long-term presence and direct interaction with farmers and communities provide important social capital, not only to mobilise support from farmers but also to influence state actors who needed FC's manpower and rural community resources. The trust of a large number of rural farmers awards Som and FC with political capital that Som and his team used to mobilise voters for their newly established political party (see below) in local and national elections in 2017 and 2018. Som thus successfully converted knowledge capital and social capital into political capital.

4.4. Cambodian Rice

Deth is the co-founder and president of CR. Founded in 2008, CR has grown from a struggling family-owned milling business to Cambodia's leading producer and exporter of organic rice. Deth's business strategy depends on collaboration with local farmers and the farmer associations through civil society organisations. In order to meet rice export requirements, CR works with 10,000 farmers through contract farming, ensuring that farmers are committed to the company in exchange for guaranteed purchase, price, and technical assistance. Contract farming is not new in Cambodia: it was introduced by NGOs, international donors, and the government as a top priority. Nonetheless, the partnership rarely works due to high levels of distrust between farmers and companies and the lack of farmers' capacity to meet the contractual requirements.

Deth attributes his company's success to bringing his network of civil society organisations and international donors into play when working with government policymakers and smallholder farmers (interview with Deth). His previous work was exclusively in the civil society sector, including as secretary general of Cambodia Against Child Trafficking; Save the Children Cambodia; and project officer of the NGO Terre des Hommes. Previous civil society roles and engagement provided social capital in the form of relations to a wide range of key development actors in Cambodia. High-profile donor projects, including a United Nations Youth Millennium Development Goals project, enabled his public involvement interacting with high ranking government officials, development partners, and civil society organisations. His reputation in the civil society field also helped him build trust with rural actors, including rice farmers.

Deth's accumulation of economic capital has further improved access to government officials, reliant on private sector partnership and financial resources for policy implementation. Through this exchange, he has become quite influential in the policy circle which has, in turn, helped to garner support from his business peers, as demonstrated by his election to lead the Cambodia Rice Federation in 2019. His social, economic, and political capital have thus reinforced one another during interactions with the business and state fields.

5. Boundary-Crossing

There are three main pathways of boundary-crossing within our case studies. The first pathway is that of elite

civil society actors, crossing over to the field of electoral politics by converting capital accrued in the civil society field. In the case of FC, long-time director Som crossed over to electoral politics. In 2014, during a time of political impasse and search for alternatives to Cambodia's political polarisation, he co-founded a network which united civil society leaders around the goal of promoting more democratic party politics. The New Party emerged out of the network the following year. Its top positions were occupied by civil society elites: Whilst Som became the New Party's Program Director, former NGO directors became its President and Secretary General. Ahead of the next national election in 2018, a party congress elected Som almost unanimously as the Prime Ministerial Candidate. Since the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), had been dissolved the previous year, the New Party expected to mobilise votes from CNRP supporters.

In building his career in electoral politics, Som drew on the connections and trust established with FC grassroots. The very rationale of the New Party was to channel grassroots leadership from the civil society sector into political leadership positions. Consequently, also grass-roots level activists tended to be veteran civil society activists, with a very high proportion coming from FC. Field visits in 2018 showed that some local headquarters were used as de facto party headquarters, and interviews also suggested that New Party members were recruited through FC structures. In around 14 communes out of 27 where the party was active in May 2017, local leaders had previously been involved with FC. The connections formed with the grassroots thus formed the bulwark of support, which enabled Som's boundary-crossing to electoral politics.

A second pathway is for civil society elites' status to cross over to the state field. Here, actors converted social capital as the 'credential' bestowed by in-group membership in networks spanning the state, to political capital pertaining to policy-making positions. This pathway is exemplified by CI co-founder Kanitha. A self-made civil society elite, from the age of 12 Kanitha had volunteered for the three main organisations patronised by the ruling CPP and to different extents sponsored by the MoEYS: the Cambodian Red Cross, the Cambodia Scouts, and the Youth Association of Cambodia, which in 2012 became the UYFC. In 2012, Kanitha was promoted from a province-level activist to the UYFC central committee. In co-founding the CI, Kanitha's crowning achievement in the civil society field, Kanitha mobilised the established networks she had built through state-sponsored youth volunteerism.

Another crucial resource Kanitha mobilised was her control over access to youth. Kanitha held the key position of Director of Administration for the well-known PUC in Phnom Penh, acting as a gatekeeper to the University by liaising between the PUC, the MoEYS, and the UYFC. The UYFC has been able to spread at the university level by recruiting key individuals in student representative bodies, who then initiate a UYFC presence at the university in question. Kanitha connected with Dara, former President of student association Pannasastra Student Senate (PASS), who also happened to be the brother of the head of the UYFC volunteers at the MoEYS. As the two took leading roles in creating CI, most PASS members, particularly the debate club, joined. Through Kanitha and Dara, the UYFC had thus established a significant presence at PUC. Kanitha was rewarded with an appointment as a full-time staff member in the UYFC.

Equally impressed by her work for CI, the Minister of Education, Youth, and Sport then appointed Kanitha as Director General of Youth, specifically requesting her to develop a similar program through the Ministry. According to Kanitha, many people have criticised her appointment to the highest technical-level position there is in the Ministry, which ordinarily requires decades of public sector experience. The Minister of Education, Youth, and Sport however routinely dismisses such criticism, by pointing to her experience in the civil society field. In this case, access to youth constituted a form of social capital that enabled boundary-crossing to the state and the conversion to political capital.

A third pathway is that of a civil society elite crossing the boundary into the economic field. This route is exemplified by Deth, president of CR. In 2012, Deth left the civil society field, turning his wife's family business to CR. The company grew very fast from 2013 to 2020, going from four family members with five staff to 200 staff, and increasing its profits from $6 million to $40 million. The success of the company was facilitated by Deth's former elite status in civil society. His social capital, in terms of connections with donors and NGOs, enabled cooperation with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Agence Française de Développement, and other donors which made the initiative successful. From 2013 onwards, the Ministry of Commerce supported the company, with the World Bank and International Finance Corporation following suit in 2014. CR received a 100% grant to implement its capacity-building projects with rice farmers. Other factors also contributed to CR's success, most importantly the government's 2010 policy for exporting rice as well as the fact that Cambodia received preferential trade status from the EU under the Everything But Arms scheme from 2001 onwards.

Establishing himself as a leading figure in Cambodia's private sector, Deth mobilised his economic capital to become an *oknha* (tycoon), a title bestowed by royal decree to economic elites who invest specified amounts in government development schemes. The *oknha* title institutionalises an elite pact between the Cambodian economic elite and the CPP leadership, by which the *oknha* receive privileges and opportunities in their business ventures in return for financial contributions to the CPP state (Verver & Dahles, 2015). Economic capital is thus converted into social capital in terms of mutual trust with state elites, which boosts further economic capital accumulation and bestows a certain political cap-

ital in terms of influence on economic policy-making. Deth is regularly invited by the government to negotiation meetings with international investors, and much of his work focuses on building connections with the latter. He enjoys close relations with high ranking government officials in various powerful ministries: Commerce, Economy and Finance, and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Members of his board of directors include government advisers and high-ranking officials from these ministries and the Supreme National Economic Council, the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, and the Ministry of Environment. He is also President of the Cambodia Rice Federation, which created in 2014 serves as a club of main elites in the rice export sector, and is chaired by a son of former deputy Prime Minister Sok An.

A second pattern is when civil society elites refrain from boundary-crossing. Among our case studies, this pattern was exemplified by YD, for which relations with the state and overall social relations played a role in shaping this outcome. No core member interviewed reported having established relations in government through YD; interactions with government officials were confined to when the latter were invited to speak at the forum. The state field is thus relatively impermeable to YD leaders (although one core member had become a civil servant). Even remaining as a civil society elite, co-founder Sophal has accrued significant political capital as a self-defined "political entrepreneur." Sought after by the media for political commentary, Sophal is cherished by the diplomatic community and a frequent guest at several embassies.

Whilst the YD leadership does not aspire to cross to the state or electoral politics fields, its larger agenda is to prepare members to become future elites in electoral politics and the state. According to co-founder Sophal, the mission of the forum is to build the critical thinking, public speaking, and analytical skills of youth, so as to cultivate a democratic culture to replace an alleged political culture of infighting. That task necessarily remains within civil society confines for him, but has boundary-crossing ambitions into the electoral politics and state fields for YD participants. According to Sophal, YD is a "kind of investment" to turn politically ambitious young people into "political entrepreneurs." Although these are not yet members of political parties or government officials, "because they know they are not ready yet," it is "up to them when they think they are ready to go." In Sophal's words, "I keep telling them: 'If you want to be a politician, you need to be capable, have the financial resources, enough network, good knowledge and skills.'" *Sauf* financial capital, YD is designed to provide social and knowledge capital, to later be converted into political capital.

6. The Perceived Possibilities and Limitations of Different Fields

There was a perception among boundary-crossers that the state field offers unparalleled possibilities to effectuate social change. Boundary-crossing to the state field was motivated by a perception of it having a higher level of impact than the civil society field. For Kanitha, crossing to the state was prompted by a sense that policy-making was more impactful than UYFC work. This is perhaps surprising, given the increasingly prominent role of the UYFC, and indicates the continued primacy of holding government positions. Kanitha perceived that work in the state field offered the opportunity to engage in similar initiatives to those in civil society writ large. Her work as Director General of Youth has thus focused on upscaling and mainstreaming youth volunteering initiatives, including a planned national debate-contest, modelled on CI, to involve all Cambodian high schools. Comparing work at the MoEYS with work at PUC and for the UYFC, Kanitha stressed the greater responsibility that came with occupying a policy-making position (interview with Kanitha).

Boundary-crossing to the electoral politics field was similarly motivated by a perception that it offers greater potential to effectuate change than the civil society field, although only if crossing into the state field is the final destination of the individual. In the case of Som, his move to electoral politics was prompted by his desire to work at a national policy-making level. Working with FC, he stated, he could help only a small number of farmers, whereas winning an election to lead the government, he would be able to help farmers nationwide. Another strong reason that compelled him to cross to electoral politics was his conviction that "politics should not just be about elite competition" (interview with Som). The New Party was established to provide a platform for ordinary Cambodians such as farmers and grass-roots civil society leaders to become involved in politics, which should lead to them holding public office. He also cited the vulnerable position of his organisation as the government is suspicious of its grassroots organising, and its poor finances, as comparing unfavourably to work in government. However, his boundary-crossing experience to oppositional politics has yielded only negative results so far. New Party performed poorly in local elections 2017 and national elections 2018, winning 0.07% and 1.11%, respectively. FC has also suffered from the move of its founder to electoral politics, as it is treated with increasing suspicion by the government which closely monitors its activities, to the point that the network is now in a process of disintegration. This suggests that in the absence of cordial relations with the state, boundary-crossing to electoral politics is a high-risk endeavour.

Cambodia's rapidly expanding economic field has attracted both new and established civil society elites. According to Deth of CR, his decision to leave civil society was prompted by a realisation that there were more opportunities to help poor farmers in the private sector through contract farming. Deth described his effort in the private sector as "a new world which is starkly different from CSOs in that CSOs always wait for sponsors, while the private sector carries out their work independently,

using their own capital" (interview with Deth). He now enjoys greater flexibility to implement his own vision and initiative without having to ask for permission and support from sponsors. Operating within the economic field is however not without limitations, particularly in relations with the government. He has been able to overcome initial suspicion and build trust with the state by investing in forming a long-term partnership with government institutions, both through formal project collaborations as well as through financial contributions to support government projects. The *oknha* system has thereby allowed him to become a state "insider."

Also the accounts of those who remain within the confines of civil society give important insights into the perceived possibilities and limitations of the civil society field. The commitment of Sophal of YD to stay within civil society is founded in a conviction that there he is best positioned to create a training ground for future boundary-crossers to move into the fields of the state and electoral politics. This orientation again points to the primacy of electoral politics and the holding of public office. It also suggests that absent the embedment in social relations which span the state, civil society is navigated as a field where different forms of capital can be accrued that can later be mobilised and converted to cross over into the state and electoral politics fields. In 2018, YD applied to the Ministry of Interior to register as an NGO, intending to produce future "political entrepreneurs." The request for registration was rejected, with the unofficial reason given that the inclusion of the word "political" in the NGO's name was inappropriate—signalling the state's rejection of the boundary-crossing ambition. Core members then jointly came up with the idea of opening their own coffee shop as a venue for forums. This preference for a form of social enterprise strategy again highlights civil society's reliance on funding as a perceived limitation. YD's current meeting space is offered by a foreign foundation on its premises, though core members unanimously reported that the foundation has never affected the running of the forum or discussions to date. Still, core members considered a coffee shop to present both an economic opportunity for members to become shareholders and a means of becoming completely independent of external funding demands.

7. Conclusion

Our key aim in this article is to illuminate pathways to leadership in Cambodian civil society and beyond. The patterns of elite formation and boundary-crossing that have been identified likely reflect durable trends, pointing towards the future architecture of Cambodian civil society. As foreign funding gradually declines, domestic, politically enmeshed elites will have to navigate diverse organisational forms and social relations with versatility. Yet whilst the article seeks to shine new light on contemporary civil society dynamics in Cambodia, its implications are extensive. The framework we propose for tracing and making sense of elitisation within and beyond civil societies can be broadly applied.

To become a Cambodian civil society elite, our study suggests the key importance of social capital. Arguably, this points to the role of networks characterised by mutual trust in a "controlled civil society," where there is a range of "authoritarian control mechanisms and restrictions on oppositional politics and associational life" (Uhlin, 2016, p. 43). Social capital is accrued not only within civil society but also through networks spanning the state, electoral politics, and economic fields.

Cambodia offers an interesting comparison from the perspective of what enables and motivates boundary-crossing in an authoritarian regime with a "controlled" civil society. In the wider region, patterns of boundary-crossing from civil society to the state have been identified in the Philippines (Lewis, 2008a) and Indonesia (Haryanto, 2020; Mietzner, 2013), in both cases following democratic openings which enabled a new role for civil society figures. Our four case studies revealed patterns of boundary-crossing from elite status in civil society to elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Primarily social capital proved to be convertible so that the presence or absence of credentials bestowed by in-group membership in networks spanning the authoritarian state shaped patterns of boundary-crossing.

Attention to boundary-crossing gives a picture of an outward-oriented, rather than inward-looking, Cambodian civil society field. Lewis (2008b, pp. 570–574) distinguishes between two archetypes of boundary-crossers: "'the role-based identity," in which a person's priority is simply to follow the job, with no long-term concept of the preferred sector, and the "sector-based identity," in which individuals are "guided primarily by a sense of belonging to, or identifying with, the third sector," but make an exploratory sojourn in the public sector. All three boundary-crossers here discussed defy this conceptualisation. Two of the boundary-crossers displayed strong preferences for the state field and one for the economic field, considering them more efficient fields of action to bring about change. Even the platform without high-level boundary-crossing was motivated by an aspiration for its members to take up roles in electoral politics and/or the state. The picture that emerges is the primacy, in some quarters of Cambodian civil society at least, of electoral politics and winning government office. Throughout these processes of elite formation and elite interaction, the state plays a key role in advancing and alternatively holding back civil society groups. It does so by gatekeeping pathways to becoming elites in civil society and beyond, by defining the value and transferability of resources.

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Article

Boundary Crossers: The Transformation of Civil Society Elites in Indonesia's Post-Authoritarian Era

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Abstract
This article discusses the strategies used by the leaders of civil society organisations (CSOs) to cross the boundary between the field of civil society and the field of the state. Moreover, it examines the implications of this boundary crossing for post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia. In doing so, it tries to answer two questions: First, what are the strategies used by CSO leaders in boundary crossing? Second, what are the political implications of this boundary crossing for Indonesia's post-authoritarian politics? Using Bourdieu's field theory as its conceptual framework and drawing on qualitative interviews with CSO leaders, this article scrutinises the mobility of CSO leaders in different sectors: agrarian, anti-corruption, law, and human rights. It identifies two main strategies used in boundary crossing: direct and indirect strategies. Such strategies tend to be individual rather than organisational. Neither strategy is exclusive; CSO leaders do not limit themselves to particular strategies but may combine them and use them simultaneously. Another finding is that, when crossing to the state field, CSO leaders may increase or reduce their capital, or even lose it. Furthermore, boundary crossing has several significant implications for post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia: it generates sectoral policies; it creates political linkages; and finally, it leads CSO leaders to exert political control within the state field.

Keywords
boundary crosser; boundary strategies; Bourdieu; civil society elites; civil society organisations; Indonesia; political implications

Issue
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1. Introduction

Interactions between state, economic, and civil society actors are common in countries around the world (Lewis, 2008; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, & Beaulieu, 2002). These interactions occur dynamically, with diverse forms that are influenced by the political structure of the state. Authoritarian regimes tend to have antagonistic relationships with pro-democracy civil society elements (Uhlin, 1997), while democratic governments generally have more open and plural relationships with civil society elements.

The political changes that have fundamentally transformed Indonesia since 1998 have also informed state–civil society relations. There has been an awareness of the need to "use democratic institutions to ensure popular control over public affairs" (Savirani & Törnquist, 2016; Stokke & Törnquist, 2013). At the same time, however, the continued predominance of the predatory elite in Indonesia's democracy has resulted in "civil society actors seeking to influence the government not only from the margins of civil society but from within the power centres of political institutions" (Mietzner, 2013). This clearly shows that civil society actors in post-authoritarian use political endeavours to enter the state and play a political role within it.

To understand this phenomenon, this article examines the strategies through which civil society elites cross

the boundary between the 'civil society field' and the 'state field' in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Civil society elites may be identified based on their dominant position in the civil society field or in broader social relations, which they gain by accumulating social, economic, cultural, and symbolic capital. Following the positional approach (Hoffmann-Lange, 2017), formal leadership positions may indicate elite status. However, this study is not concerned with the identification of individual civil society leaders as belonging to an elite group; rather, it focuses on the power dynamics of their boundary-crossing activities.

This theme is interesting to explore, not only because it expands the discussion of civil society–state relations, but also because it offers a detailed understanding of the civil society organisations (CSOs) leaders' boundary-crossing activities. Civil society is predominantly perceived as an autonomous field, and CSOs are often seen as opposed to the state. Nielsen (2012), for example, showed that "politics is perceived as dirty, unprincipled, dishonest, and corrupt, and thus incapable of accommodating activists' moral struggle." Such a perception is not entirely correct; as Alagappa notes, "the relations between civil society and the state are dynamic, occurring over a broad spectrum, rather than entirely confrontational" (Alagappa, 2004). Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) have also shown that civil society–state partnerships may be established during the development process; James Ryker, in his categorisation, elaborates that state–civil–society relations can take place in many forms such as autonomous, facilitation, collaboration/cooperation, co-optation, and containment (Ryker, 1995, pp. 208–211).

In Indonesia, some scholars have explored the dynamics of civil society-state relations. Lay (2017a, 2017b) has mapped CSOs political linkages within the policy-making process; Aspinall (2014) has examined their relations within the context of political transformation; and Mundayat, Narendra, and Irawanto (2009) have found that their relations depend heavily on the strength of civil society and the effectiveness of governance. In general, Philip Eldridge emphasises that relations between CSOs and the government in Indonesia are generally pragmatic, characterised by both co-operation and conflict (Eldridge, 1996, p. 30). From these studies, it can be seen that the relations between the state and civil society are complex.

Nonetheless, few studies of civil society–state relations in Indonesia have examined how actors cross the boundary from the civil society field to the state field. This practice, known as 'boundary crossing' (Lewis, 2008), is relatively widespread around the globe. As political systems transform from authoritarian to democratic, civil society actors are driven to cross boundaries (Abers & Tatagiba, 2015; Lewis, 2008; Mietzner, 2013; Perdana, 2015). Studies that have considered this phenomenon are limited to efforts to explain CSO actors' motivations for boundary crossing (Mietzner, 2013) and the characteristics of the practice itself (Lewis, 2008). The current article seeks to fill this gap by elaborating upon the strategies used by the CSO leader when crossing boundaries.

In describing boundary–crossing practices, the article answers two main questions: First, what are the strategies used by CSO leaders in boundary crossing? Second, what are the political implications of boundary crossing for post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia? I find that, in post-authoritarian Indonesia, two main strategies are used by civil society elites in boundary crossing: first, 'direct strategies,' wherein civil society leaders become politically engaged as candidates in election processes; second, 'indirect strategies,' wherein civil society elites follow a zig–zag route into the state. In this second strategy, civil society leaders do not follow a singular route into the state. They may move from subfield to subfield, strengthen their relationships with other CSOs, or become involved in political processes as volunteers. Boundary crossing has several implications for post-authoritarian politics: It generates sectoral policies, creates political linkages, and leads CSO leaders to exert political control within the state field.

This article's examination of leaders' boundary-crossing strategies focuses on those involved in the agrarian, anti-corruption, law, and human rights sectors at the national and local level. These sectors were chosen based on a review of the literature and discussions with experts. These processes also become a point of departure to identify in each sector how civil society leaders cross over to the state field. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with CSO leaders, political party actors, and local officials, as well as two focus group discussions. Complementary data were collected by reviewing related documents. In data collection, multiple aspects were considered, including the personal background of CSO leaders, career, experience in civil society field, motivation to enter the state field, aspects that facilitated the process, evaluation of boundary-crossing experience, etc. The research was conducted in Yogyakarta, Makassar, Kupang, and Jakarta between October 2018 and July 2019 as part of a collaboration between Lund University, Sweden, and Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. The research was conducted at both the national and regional level, as both are important to consider in the decentralised political environment of post-authoritarian Indonesia.

In describing the boundary-crossing strategies of civil society elites, the article presents both a general overview and illustrative cases. After assessing extant studies of boundary crossing as a general practice, this article offers a specific elaboration on the Indonesian case. It presents the history and political context of border crossing, two main strategies, and the implications of the practice. The article also offers a brief comparative analysis in its last section, showing the similarities and differences between boundary-crossing practices in Indonesia and other countries.

2. Boundary Crossing: An Overview

Civil society is often understood as distinct from the state, and this implies that a boundary exists between them (Rosenblum & Lesch, 2011). In essence, this distinction is rooted in particular assumptions, norms, ideologies, and epistemologies about civil society and the state. The liberal tradition, for example, has viewed civil society as independent from the state; this view is rooted in liberal regulative principles that position civil society as an independent, self-regulating, and autonomous associational space. In such a view, the state only serves to promote a pluralist associational life.

However, this boundary is not impermeable; civil society and the state are dynamically related. In this context, Chandhoke (2001) argues that "civil society cannot be defined as entirely separate from the state, as these fields are intertwined and mutually related." Alagappa (2004), examining civil society in Asia, finds that civil society–State relations occur on a broad spectrum and are incredibly diverse.

In this dynamic state–civil society setting, boundary-crossing practice has a political significance to elaborate. Mietzner (2013), in a study of a CSO activist, identifies several types of boundary crossers: (1) those who deliberately use CSOs as stepping stones to enter the state field, (2) those who remain with their CSOs when political opportunities are lacking, but immediately enter the state field when it is possible, and (3) those who cross for ideological reasons and seek to improve the political system from within. Mietzner notes that CSO actors may also be active in an intersectional space, not joining political parties or becoming part of the bureaucracy, but still advising government ministries and legislative bodies. Actors in such intersectional spaces may be identified as employing indirect strategies, not contesting elections but still using their capital to shape policy as expert staff or advisors. In such situations, activists touch upon the state field, even as they remain active within civil society.

Within post-authoritarian states, boundary crossing can also be seen as a consequence of the permeability of the state–civil society boundary. While authoritarian states reject criticism and repress civil society, post-authoritarian ones are open and accommodative. In such situations, the state is not situated solely as an object of monitoring and criticism, but also as a strategic partner that may facilitate the realisation of goals and enactment of change (Abers & Tatagiba, 2015). Seizing this momentum, CSO leaders may decide to take part in the formal power structure rather than continue to struggle outside it (Abers & Tatagiba, 2015).

The above-discussed studies contribute to a clear understanding of the structural setting of civil society–state relations as well as their dynamics. However, they have yet to reveal an important dimension of these relations: CSO leaders' ability to cross boundaries and enter the state field. As such, this article seeks to examine the practice of boundary crossing, with particular focus on its strategies.

3. Field Theory and Boundary Crossing

This article's exploration of leaders' crossing to the state field refers to Bourdieu (1986, 1989, 1996), particularly his concepts of 'field,' 'capital,' and 'habitus.' Field refers to the gaming space within which power relations occur. In the field, agents mobilise or organise their available capital and utilise it strategically to access specific positions (Bourdieu, 1986, 1989, 1996; Swartz, 1997). This article uses the field to refer specifically to civil society (including the networks between civil society actors) and the state (including the networks between political actors). The state field refers to the political spaces in which social agents can make political decisions (such as policy); as such, the basic logic of the state field is its authoritative ability to make a political decision. In this article, the state field encompasses the legislative and executive branches. Conversely, the civil society field refers to the social space that is mobilised by the logics of association, self-organisation, advocacy, and social empowerment, which is ultimately distinguished from the state field by its lack of authoritative force to make policies and political decisions.

The concept of field cannot be separated from the concept of capital, as capital is the main resource that enables actors to act and compete within the field (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu identifies four types of capital: social, economic, cultural, and symbolic. Following Bourdieu's concept, the capital used by CSO leaders to cross boundaries to the state field may be identified as networking (social capital), funding (economic capital), knowledge accumulation (cultural capital), and symbolic capital.

As a practice, boundary-crossing is not only determined by agents' ability to mobilise capital within the field but also by their habitus. As stated by Bourdieu, "practice is produced through the interaction of disposition (habitus) and position within the field, as determined by capital possession" (Bourdieu as cited in Maton, 2008, p. 50). Using this framework, it can be recognised that boundary-crossing practices reflect the habitus of CSO leaders and are made possible by their ability to mobilise capital.

Drawing from Bourdieu's field theory, this article analyses the strategies employed by CSO leaders to cross into the state field. Leaders' strategies are influenced by the habitus and the capital available to them, their ability to utilise it, and their environment—i.e., the dominant political system.

In this article, 'boundary crossing' is understood as CSOs leaders' movement from the civil society field to the state field. Such crossing may occur directly, through the contestation of legislative and executive elections, or indirectly, through zig–zagging from subfield to subfield (i.e., from human rights to anti-corruption) within the

civil society field before entering the state field. Referring to the model offered by Lewis (2008), the former is a 'consecutive model' through which CSO elites directly cross boundaries by moving from civil society to the state, while the latter is an 'extensive model' wherein CSO elites do not fully cross boundaries, but only 'span' them, being simultaneously involved in civil society and state activities.

4. Boundary Crossing in Indonesia

4.1. History and Political Context

State–civil society relations in Indonesia have dynamic historical roots. In the early years of independence, considerable antagonism existed within the state field—the main field of power. This condition affected the dynamics of civil society. As Aspinall remarked, "civil society became a mechanism, not for generating civility and social capital, but rather for magnifying socio-political conflict and transmitting it to the very bases of society" (Aspinall, 2004, p. 62).

Political intrigue and bloodshed soon brought Indonesia into a dark period, one in which political space was strictly controlled and a logic of authoritarianism permeated every aspect of Indonesian society. This regime identified itself as the New Order and employed a range of depoliticisation strategies. First, it used an 'archepolitics' strategy in a communitarian attempt to define and organically structure homogeneous social space. President Soeharto was constructed as a father figure, as a source of order and harmony. Second, the regime used a 'para-politics' strategy, seeking to mitigate political conflict by way of formulating clear rules. This was reflected in the New Order's fusion of political parties, allowing only two parties and one functional group to exist. Third, it used an 'ultra-politics' strategy, using militarisation to promote depoliticisation (Duile & Bens, 2017).

The authoritarian regime's consolidation of power had a direct effect on civil society actors' relationship with the state and their ability to enter the state field. In the early years of the New Order (1966–1974), several civil society activists were able to cross into the state. These activists, known collectively as the "Generation of '66," had been staunch opponents of the Sukarno government's authoritarian regime (Noor, 2010, p. 22; Uhlin, 1997, p. 102). However, as the New Order regime became increasingly authoritarian, civil society became subordinated. State–civil society relations became increasingly antagonistic in the 1980s and 1990s, and civil society leaders could no longer penetrate the state field.

Reformasi (Indonesia's political reform), which began in 1998, resulted in the opening of political spaces through democratisation. It created and multiplied democratic spaces in both the national and local arenas (Lay, 2017b), enabling CSO actors to become more heavily involved in politics. In the early years of *Reformasi*, several civil society leaders became key drivers of reform; however, most civil society actors were floating, being vulnerable and lacking capacity to enter the state arena. They were what political scientists termed 'floating democrats' (Priyono, Prasetyo, & Törnquist, 2003).

In the post-authoritarian era, which remains plagued by fundamental problems such as weak political representation and limited ability to penetrate the state, efforts have been made to repoliticise civil society actors through a process known as 'go politics.' Five major strategies have been employed: (1) forming pressure groups, (2) entering parliament, (3) utilising political parties, (4) establishing alternative political parties, and (5) entering government networks (Samadhi & Törnquist, 2016, p. 116; Törnquist, 2009).

Entering parliament and participating in elections has been a favoured strategy for go politics in civil society, as noted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Ichwanuddin, 2010) in its study of civil society actors' use of the 2009 national and local elections to enter the state. According to Mietzner (2013), 37 (7%) of the legislators elected in 2009 had a background in activism. In 2013, the Power, Welfare, and Democracy Project recorded that such strategies had created linkages between CSO actors, political parties, and populist politicians (Törnquist & Samadhi, 2016).

However, CSO actors have not only crossed into the political field through elections; they have also used indirect routes as a means for exerting political power. This involves a 'zig-zagging' process through which CSO leaders move from one subfield to another before entering the state field. This indirect strategy creates an extensive model of boundary crossing, meaning that CSO leaders not only fill new positions within the state field but also retain a certain position in the civil society field.

To obtain a specific understanding of the two strategies mentioned above, we must examine their use in boundary crossing in more detail.

4.2. Direct and Indirect Strategies

CSO leaders who enter the state field come from various subfields but share similar views of civil society's position in post-authoritarian Indonesia. To advance reform, they must involve themselves in the state. As stated by Teten Masduki, a CSO leader active in the anti-corruption subfield:

> Good people should be pushed to enter government, to become directors general, to become regents, mayors, or even members of parliament. Civil society actors must enter the government so they can become champions, pioneers, and promote reform. That must be a priority. (Teten Masduki, interview, June 27, 2019)

A similar attitude was expressed by CSO leaders who were active in the agrarian subfield, who argued that agrarian reform is a political agenda that must be priori-

tised by the state. For example, Usep Setiawan, a CSO leader active in this subfield, stated: "I would say that agrarian reform must be promoted by the state. The government, as the administrator of the state, must handle such reform" (Usep Setiawan, interview, June 27, 2019).

A similar view was expressed by Iwan Nurdin, another CSO leader, who stated: "Agrarian reform must necessarily involve political processes. We must recognise that agrarian reform is not a non-political issue. It has been political from the beginning" (Iwan Nurdin, interview, June 27, 2019).

These shared motives have driven the CSO leader to cross boundaries. They have sought to reach beyond civil society and have broader effects on society. If referring to Bourdieu, "the boundaries of a field can be recognised based on its influences" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), then the practice of boundary crossing can be seen as an effort to expand their influence to another field.

As explained previously, two strategies are commonly used by civil society leaders for boundary crossing, reflecting the different channels and mechanisms used by civil society leaders. 'Direct strategies' are marked by a reliance on electoral mechanisms to enter the state field, while 'indirect strategies'—though more varied—share the common feature of zig-zagging from subfield to subfield.

4.2.1. Direct Strategy

One common strategy used by civil society leaders to cross over to the state field is the direct strategy, so named as civil society leaders rely on elections to cross boundaries. In the direct strategy, civil society leaders actively engage as candidates in electoral contestation.

Civil society leaders' use of direct strategies to enter the state field must be positioned within the context of post-authoritarian politics, particularly the transformation of the national, provincial, and district parliaments through the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. Under the New Order government, parliament merely served as a rubber stamp for the executive branch. However, since *Reformasi*, parliament has become a new space for national politics and policymaking (Lay, 2017b, p. 7); as such, political parties have taken a strategic role in policymaking and political processes. At the same time, the mechanisms through which parliament functions have changed and the political climate has become more open, allowing civil society actors to take a more active role in parliament (Lay, 2017b).

To obtain a detailed understanding of how civil society leaders use elections to enter the state, it is necessary to understand how their 'habitus' and 'capital,' as well as their ability to organise and mobilise capital, influence their ability to cross boundaries. Civil society leaders' habitus reflects the way they think and act, providing a basis for their boundary-crossing practices.

The habitus of civil society leaders is strongly linked to their experiences, as well as the knowledge that guides their practices. Two key habitus provide a foundation for civil society leaders' use of elections for boundary crossing: the empowerment experiences that inform their society-orientated practices, and the experiences that underpin their advocacy logics. Both provide a foundation for enabling civil society leaders to enter the state. As mentioned by Sofia de Haan, a civil society leader in Kupang (Yayasan Alfa Omega), East Nusa Tenggara:

> I think that, if we stay outside of the system and not within it, it will be difficult for us. Even though we've already established a basis for empowerment. They (the people) can be involved in policymaking processes at the village level. However, they lack influence. As such, the decision to become a member of the local parliament was made to advocate their rights. (Sofia de Haan, interview, April 25, 2019)

A similar logic provided the foundation for the boundary crossing undertaken by Tomy Yulianto, a civil society leader from Bulukumba Regency. As he said:

> I spent nine years in East Kalimantan, did my best to create change in society and improve the system. I spent too long away from home. All of my experiences, all of the knowledge I obtained over the course of my journey. I should use my competencies to help my hometown. That's what made me decide to enter parliament. (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019)

If advocacy and empowerment are the logics that underpin boundary-crossing practices, what enables civil society leaders to enter the state through elections (which require political parties)? As often noted, political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia lack public trust, and as such, they are frequently criticised by civil society activists. It is thus difficult to imagine how the habitus of civil society leaders can be in-line with the habitus of political parties.

To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the logic used by political parties when recruiting civil society actors. A study of civil society actors conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2010) found that they are not recruited through a 'transactional logic'; in other words, economic exchange is not the central logic through which candidates from civil society backgrounds are recruited. Rather, parties require a symbolic means of showing their concern for voters. Manor (2013) calls this 'post-clientelist' politics, that is, a politics made up of political connections in which politicians and parties opt to cooperate with well-reputed leaders and civil society organisations. There is thus no logical contradiction involved in boundary-crossing practices. As emphasised by Sofia de Haan:

> The party's main consideration is quality. CSO actors know the roots of the problems, are capable of revealing needs. Now more CSO actors are involved in political parties, and many of them succeed. Several

> have become council members. Parties recognise that CSO actors have constituents and are involved in their communities. Furthermore, certain leadership qualities are recognised by parties. (Sofia de Haan, interview, April 25, 2019)

As with habitus, capital plays a central role in civil society leaders' choice of direct strategies. The knowledge and networks that they accumulate provide them with capital that they can utilise to penetrate the state. Cultural capital (i.e., knowledge) and social capital (i.e., networks amongst the grassroots) determine two things in boundary-crossing processes: first, these leaders' positions within political parties and their electability in the election process.

Sofia's experience provides an interesting example. An activist and leader with the Alfa Omega Foundation, an NGO actively promoting economic empowerment and rights fulfilment for farmers, fishermen, and the poor, Sofia had significant bargaining power when dealing with political parties. Owing to her background as an activist, as well as her recognition as an activist, she could not only empower others but also influence politics. Sofia's capabilities were buttressed by the knowledge that she had accumulated through organisational, training, and educational activities at the national and international levels. At the same time, she enjoyed significant social capital. The daughter of a priest, she had been active in church activities throughout East Nusa Tenggara; this provided her with significant capital in Christian-majority Kupang, and granted her recognition at the grassroots level and in the government.

These types of capital provided a foundation for Sofia's bargaining with political parties, as a result of which she became elected to the Kupang Regency Parliament. Becoming the chairwoman of the Nasdem Party's Kupang branch, she was ultimately re-elected in 2014 and 2019. In this case, we can consider that cultural capital, together with other capitals, can help agents gain positions in multiple fields.

Other civil society actors chose a different route when entering the state through electoral processes. For example, Tomy Yulianto employed a double track approach when penetrating the state, first being elected to parliament before gaining a central position within the executive branch.

In the first track, Tomy Yulianto used his cultural and social capital to become a member of the local parliament, becoming the Deputy Speaker of the Bulukumba Regency Parliament. In the second track, he used his civil society networks and the symbolic capital that he had accumulated as Deputy Speaker to become vice-regent. After crossing over into the state (within the legislative branch), he used his position to reinforce his social capital and gain greater recognition:

> Many community activists and media groups used me as a reference, and so people said that I was a media darling. For instance, when disagreements emerged between the local government and parliament, I'd be asked to comment. As I often interacted with the media, and with my civil society allies in Bulukumba, I became more widely known. (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019)

This broad recognition provided Tomy Yulianto with significant capital, and other CSO activists ultimately urged him to run for executive election: "I had never thought of becoming deputy regent and contesting the elections. However, many youths and media actors—who had never known me before—shared the same vision. There thus emerged discourse that I should contest the election" (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019).

Several conclusions may be drawn regarding the use of elections as a direct strategy for boundary crossing. First, actors' habitus, advocacy orientation, and empowerment activities provide a logical foundation for their boundary crossing practices. This foundation is necessary not only because it shapes civil society leaders' actions, but also because it provides a basis for establishing links with political parties and entering the state field. Second, CSO leaders' cultural and social capital, including their networks, provide a basis for their participation in political parties and electoral processes. Such actors do not necessarily limit themselves to parliament; they may also employ a double track, using the legislative branch as a stepping stone for entering the executive branch.

4.2.2. Indirect Strategy

CSO leaders have not only relied on direct strategies to enter the state field; indirect strategies have also been used. Such strategies enable CSO leaders to improve their knowledge while expanding their networks with civil society actors and politicians. They are involved in political processes to a certain extent, such as serving as candidates' campaign staff.

Indirect approaches involve a lengthy process through which CSO leaders move from one subfield to another, zig-zagging closer to the state field while remaining within the civil society field. Although they are all motivated to become part of the post-authoritarian state, CSO leaders vary in their use of capital and approaches.

Generally, indirect strategies are used by CSO leaders who cross the boundary to the state while remaining active within civil society. Such strategies may involve movement between subfields, or the expansion of networks between them. Such mobility does not necessarily guarantee that CSO leaders can accumulate more capital; they may also lose existing capital. Mobility is made possible by leaders' knowledge accumulation and networking activities. The experiences of CSO leaders such as Teten Masduki can illustrate this process. Teten Masduki began his CSO career as a human rights activist under the authoritarian New Order government, an experience that enabled him to accumulate significant knowledge regard-

ing authoritarian regimes and understand Indonesia's future political trajectory. As he stated in an interview with CNN, he chose to migrate from the human rights subfield to the anti-corruption subfield because he recognised that the authoritarian regime would soon collapse. In its wake, it would leave a legacy of corruption. As he stated: "The authoritarian New Order regime was built on violence and corruption. I saw that, even if the regime was replaced, these two problems would remain in the government. That is why I established Indonesia Corruption Watch" (Teten Masduki as cited in Fauzie, 2020).

By becoming an anti-corruption activist, Teten Masduki lost the symbolic capital of public recognition as a human rights activist. At the same time, however, he accumulated new capital: knowledge of corruption and broad media networks (made possible owing to the issue's high profile). He was thus often interviewed by the media, and over time this enabled him to gain public recognition as an anti-corruption activist.

With this recognition, Teten was able to establish networks with politicians and anti-corruption activists. His conversion of symbolic capital to social capital significantly influenced his boundary-crossing activities. He used his capital to become a member of Joko Widodo's campaign staff during the 2014 presidential election, where he was able to link politicians with anti-corruption activists to advance their shared interests. Several activists became part of the new government after Joko Widodo was elected.

An indirect strategy was also employed by Kanti, a CSO leader who migrated from the human rights subfield to the anti-corruption subfield. Drawing on this experience, she became a member of the legal staff at the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry. When she migrated, she lost her social capital (i.e., her networks with marginalised peoples). As she stated:

> The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) is a subfield that worked closely with the poor and the marginalised, while Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) is an elitist subfield, as it deals with issues that directly affect political elites. Where LBH deals directly with those who are truly powerless, both in terms of their finances and in terms of their bargaining power, ICW deals with cases that are very elitist. (Kanti, interview, May 7, 2019)

Although Kanti lost her social capital, her experiences with anti-corruption activism enabled her to accumulate new knowledge and become broadly known as dealing directly with corruption. In 2018, recognising her capacity as a lawyer, the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry recruited her to its legal staff. According to Kanti, "this institution required someone who could deal with corruption issues" (Kanti, interview, May 7, 2019).

Boundary crossers may also expand their networks with those in power, thereby enabling them to reinforce their social capital and penetrate the state field. Such an approach has been used by the CSO leaders in the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA, a CSO that promotes agrarian reform). Usep Setiawan, one of KPA's leaders, was made the chairman of the Land Committee at the National Land Office (BPN) in 2006 owing to his close relationship with the Brighten Institute, led by Joyo Winoto. This organisation worked closely with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and when Joyo Winoto was appointed director of BPN he involved several of his allies.

With the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, leaders such as Usep Setiawan used a different strategy to enter the state field, establishing close ties with Joko Widodo's campaign staff. By doing so, they were able to ensure that their political networks were maintained; at the same time, they guaranteed that they could continue to exert political influence. This can be seen by the inclusion of several KPA leaders in Joko Widodo's government through the Presidential Staff Office (KSP).

In their boundary crossing activities, KPA leaders used a unique approach. Even after entering the state field, they remained active in civil society. Indeed, they used their boundary crossing activities to expand their influence in civil society. In other words, this approach has involved 'boundary spanning.'

Based on these cases, it may be concluded that CSO leaders do not enter the state field through a singular channel, but rather a lengthy process. Three important processes are used in the indirect strategy: first, moving to another subfield within the civil society field before entering the state field, through which civil society leaders accumulate more social and cultural capital. Second, moving to another subfield while broadening their political networks by establishing political links by being actively engaged in electoral processes as campaign staff; third, establishing networks with civil society organisations that have political links with the ruler and are actively engaged in political processes.

5. Political Implications of Boundary Crossing

The involvement of civil society in policymaking is the main characteristic of post-authoritarian politics, with the implication that such involvement can promote the creation of political linkages and democratic spaces (Lay, 2017a, 2017b). This strategic role in ensuring popular control over public affairs enables CSOs to become political entities with a representational function in a democratic state (Törnquist, 2009).

CSOs have continued to debate the question of CSO actors' involvement in the state. Many civil society actors have doubted their ability to play a representative role in formulating domestic policies and agendas. However, this study has shown that CSO leaders can—to a certain degree—drive sectoral change when they have a position within the state field. Furthermore, they can create political linkages with CSO actors outside the state field. In several cases, these leaders' habitus within the state re-

mains strongly influenced by the habitus created through their civil society experiences, and this enables them to play a control function in policymaking processes.

Such sectoral changes are inexorably linked with CSO leaders' backgrounds before entering the state field. For example, CSO leaders with a background in agrarian issues tend to focus on agrarian policy. One such group has continued to influence agrarian policy since first gaining influence under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, as one activist admitted, their ideas of agrarian reform sometimes lose their spirit in translation (Usep Setiawan, interview, June 27, 2019). Another CSO leader who has promoted sectoral change is Tomy Yulianto, whose background as an environmental activist focused on issues of empowerment and agrarian law has influenced his activities in the legislative and executive branches. He has, for example, passed local bylaws recognising customary societies, promoting corporate social responsibility, and regulating agricultural land. Such an emphasis on sectoral issues, however, has one fundamental shortcoming: Sectoral agendas are built upon a logic of difference, and as such CSO leaders often fail to develop broader political alliances.

Aside from promoting change through public policy, CSO leaders also seek to control policymaking processes. This indicates that their habitus does not change significantly when entering the state field. This can be illustrated through the case of Tomy Yulianto, who was capable of rejecting the annual Accountability Report of the Regional Executive; as he said, "Such an event had never happened in the history of Bulukumba Regency" (Tomy Yulianto, interview, April 20, 2019).

Finally, CSO leaders who enter the state have an important role in developing political linkages with groups or organisations outside the state field. Such linkages are often established as part of sectoral policymaking and advocacy.

6. A Comparative Sketch of Boundary Crossing: Experiences in Indonesia and Other Countries

It is important to note that boundary crossing does not happen exclusively in Indonesia, and as such a comparative sketch is necessary to understand the similarities and differences in boundary-crossing strategies around the world. In Brazil, for example, Abers and Tatagiba (2015) found that CSO activists have used the state arena to conduct 'institutional activism.' David Lewis (2008), an important figure in boundary-crossing studies, provided a detailed examination of boundary crossing in three countries: the Philippines, Bangladesh, and the United Kingdom. These countries have fundamental differences. In the Philippines, boundary crossing has occurred as a result of the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As such, its boundary-crossing processes have been more political. In Bangladesh, conversely, boundary crossing has been driven primarily by the state's own inability to provide public services and by CSOs' strategic influence (resulting in part from their foreign funding). Consequently, boundary crossing has taken a different direction, with actors moving from the state to civil society. In the UK, boundary crossing has occurred as a result of transformations in domestic institutions and stronger international development programmes. At the domestic level, the state has created collaborative schemes and partnerships with other sectors, particularly CSOs in the social services. To strengthen its role as an international donor, the Department for International Development has created space for CSOs to become involved in the fund management.

Boundary-crossing practices in Indonesia are similar to those in the Philippines, both in their context and in their nature. CSO actors have been driven to enter the state field; similarly, boundary-crossing activities are political, with CSO actors being driven to enter politics by democratisation. However, there are significant ideological differences between the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines, boundary crossing is facilitated by strong ideological links and roots between CSO and political parties. Such a phenomenon is not present in Indonesian CSO activists' boundary-crossing practices.

Boundary-crossing practices in Indonesia also differ significantly from those in Bangladesh. In Indonesia, the state has a strong position. The state becomes a space into which CSO actors eagerly move. Although Indonesian CSO activists receive significant assistance from foreign donors, the State is still irreplaceable. As such, in Indonesia, actors leave CSOs to enter the state, while in Bangladesh they abandon the state to enter civil society. Boundary crossing in Indonesia also differs from the practice in the United Kingdom, as it has not resulted from the rearrangement of social service programmes and because Indonesia is not a donor country (i.e., its CSOs cannot be involved in international agendas). The lack of international dimensions significantly distinguishes Indonesian CSOs from their brethren in the United Kingdom.

7. Conclusions

CSO elites may cross boundaries and enter the state field by using 'direct and indirect strategies.' In the former, leaders use elections to gain the access and authority necessary to directly influence policymaking. In the latter, meanwhile, elites make a 'zig-zag' movement before entering the state field. In the direct strategy, actors' habitus, advocacy orientation, and empowerment activities provide a logical foundation for their boundary-crossing practices. This logic is necessary not only because they shape civil society leaders' actions, but also because it provides a basis for establishing links with political parties and entering the state field. Moreover, a direct strategy is also made possible by CSO leaders' cultural and social capital, such as their knowledge and networks. These provide a basis for CSOs' participation in political parties and electoral processes. Finally, in this

strategy, such actors do not necessarily limit themselves to parliament; they may also employ a double track, using the legislative branch as a stepping stone for entering the executive branch.

When using indirect strategies, CSO leaders do not enter the state field through a singular channel, but rather a lengthy process. These leaders' approaches to entering the state field vary, but inexorably involve processes of capital gain and loss. The indirect strategy may take one of three forms: first, by moving between subfields within civil society before entering the state field; second, by moving to another subfield within civil society and then expanding political networks by actively engaging in political processes such as elections (i.e., by providing loyal support to politicians as campaign staff or volunteers); third, by broadening networks with civil society organisations that have strong political links with the ruler.

Although CSO leaders may use direct and indirect strategies to cross boundaries, election processes remain crucial. We can see that several CSO leaders, even when not engaged as candidates in elections, actively serve as campaign volunteers. These activities provide them with important momentum for creating political contracts with politicians and entering and influencing the state.

Boundary-crossing processes also transform civil society leaders. Direct strategies transform them into politicians or state officials, while indirect processes offer them the ability to expand their influence, becoming not only civil society leaders but also special staff with a strategic role in state institutions. These new roles enable them to influence post-authoritarian political processes, and although they cannot entirely transform political structures, they can still promote some significant changes. Boundary crossers generally promote sectoral policy agendas, based on their backgrounds and experiences. Boundary crossers from the agrarian subfield, for example, continue to promote agrarian reform. At the same time, they establish political linkages and shape public policy.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Business Elite as Elected Representatives in Voluntary Organizations in Norway

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Abstract
Little is known about the links between the business sector and civil society in Norway. To address the lack of knowledge, this study focused on members of the business elite who are elected representatives in voluntary organizations. Information about these representatives was obtained from a national survey of Norwegian elites and used to examine to what extent voluntary organizations are integrated into the business community's network of institutions and organizations outside the corporate world. The analyses demonstrate that voluntary organizations are well placed within this network. Moreover, business leaders who are elected representatives are well-connected. Several of them serve on state boards and have frequent contact with politicians and state administrators. Business leaders who have experienced pronounced social mobility seem to be more attracted to being involved in the governance of voluntary organizations than their colleagues with a more privileged background.

Keywords
business elite; civil society; elected representatives; Norway; voluntary organizations

Issue
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1. Introduction

In Norway, as in the other Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Sweden, the links between the state and voluntary organizations are many and dense (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018; Selle, 1993). Organizations turn to the state for cooperation, funding and legitimacy. The bonds between voluntary organizations and the business sector have, however, traditionally been weaker. One reason for this situation is that, historically, philanthropy has not been held in high regard in Norwegian society. Although the business sector has been involved in voluntary organizations through philanthropy and charity in Great Britain and the US, charity has been considered somewhat patronizing and something to be avoided in Norway (Sivesind, 2015). Nonetheless, the Norwegian business community is connected to voluntary organizations in various ways. Corporations contribute financially, and some business leaders hold positions in these organizations' governing bodies. There is, however, little systematic knowledge about the connections between the two sectors. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to learn more about the relationship between the business community and civil society.

In previous international research, the relationships between voluntary organizations and the business sector have been studied in various ways. Scholars have examined how business-like practices have been incorporated into civil society organizations (CSOs), which has led to the hybridization of these organizations (Billis, 2010; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Moore, Sobieraj, White, Mayorova, & Beaulieu, 2002; Suykens, De Rynck, & Verschuere, 2020). Others have described how the governing bodies of CSOs function as meeting places where members of the economic elite and the upper class socialize and bolster their status (Domhoff, 1967; Ostrower, 1998; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983). Several researchers have focused on the network linkages between busi-

ness corporations and CSOs (MacLean, Harvey, & Kling, 2014; MacLean, Harvey, & Kling, 2017; Moore et al., 2002; Moore & White, 2000; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983; Vidovich & Currie, 2012). They have used network techniques to survey, for example, interlocking directorships between business corporations and charities and voluntary organizations. In some projects, public bodies and industry associations are also included. Moreover, several scholars have discussed why voluntary organizations invite business leaders to participate in their governing bodies and have studied the motivations of leaders who accept these invitations (e.g., Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Middleton, 1987; Moore & White, 2000; Ostrower, 1998; Ostrower & Stone, 2006).

In this article, close attention is given to examining linkages between the business sector and civil society. This will be achieved by charting members of the Norwegian business elite who participate in what MacLean et al. (2017) call "extra-corporate networking." MacLean et al.'s (2017) definition of extra-corporate positions includes board positions in institutions and organizations outside of individual corporations. This category encompasses positions held not only in voluntary organizations but also in business associations and state boards and committees. This information will be used to investigate to what extent voluntary organizations are integrated into the overall external network of the Norwegian business elite. In their study of the interlocking network between businesses, non-profits and federal advisory committees, Moore et al. (2002) found that non-profit organizations were relative outsiders in the interlocking network. These findings prompted two questions: Does the same pattern exist in Norway? And are voluntary organizations sparsely represented in the business elite's overall extra-corporate network?

Business leaders who are elected representatives in voluntary organizations can be viewed as "bridging actors" (Burt, 1992; MacLean et al., 2017) or "boundary spanners" (Lewis, 2010) between the business community and civil society. Boundary spanners can perform tasks that benefit the sectors, organizations or groups they are spanning (Lewis, 2010). They can transmit important knowledge from one sector to the other, and they can stimulate learning and innovation across sectors. Bridging actors are in a position to form coalitions that can determine institutional settlements and control societal resource flows (MacLean et al., 2017). Bridging actors also build social and organizational capital that can favour their personal careers (MacLean et al., 2017). Accordingly, it would be interesting to learn more about people who occupy boundary spanning and bridging roles. This article, therefore, will also describe in greater detail people who are or have served as elected representatives in national voluntary organizations and address the following questions: What characteristics do they have? And do they distinguish themselves from business elite individuals having other forms of extra-corporate bonds/linkages?

To answer the four aforementioned questions, data from the 2015 Leadership Study, a national elite survey, conducted in collaboration between the Institute for Social Research and Statistics Norway will be used (Gulbrandsen, 2019; Torsteinsen, 2017). The analyses presented in this article are primarily descriptive and exploratory in nature. The intention is to provide plausible interpretations of the findings rather than test specific theories.

2. Definitions

In general, the term "elite" is defined as a select group of people who have superior abilities or qualities when compared to other members of a group or society. In sociology, the term is employed to describe powerful and influential individuals and groups and to analyse the power structure in a specific country. In previous research, several definitions or meanings of the term have been suggested (Gulbrandsen, 2019). In contemporary research, there are two prevailing definitions: Elites are defined as either (1) individuals who hold command positions in significant institutions and organizations (Mills, 1956) or (2) groups and individuals who control disproportionately large amounts of vital resources, particularly money (Bourdieu, 1986; Kahn, 2012). In the 2015 Leadership Study, we followed Mills (1956) and defined elites as holders of top leadership positions in significant institutions and organizations.

In the 2015 Leadership Study, the term "business elite" was defined as people who hold leadership positions at the apex of the largest corporations in the economy. We focused on two types of positions: CEOs and chairmen of the boards of the corporations. According to Kahn (2012) and Bourdieu (1986), wealthy or super-rich individuals should also be included in the "business elite" category. However, unless wealthy persons also held positions as CEO or chairman of the board in a large corporation, super-rich people were not considered to be members of the business elite in the 2015 Leadership Study.

3. The Norwegian Case: Capitalism with Strong State Involvement

Similar to how voluntary organizations are integrated with the state, business corporations also have many ties to the state. Firstly, a unique feature of the Norwegian economy is that the state has traditionally been an active participant in the economy and remains a large business owner. Currently, the state owns about 30 percent of the stock listed on the Oslo stock exchange. Secondly, the business community is highly dependent on the state for delivering various services and outcomes, such as a stable macroeconomic environment, effective infrastructure, a well-functioning educational and legal system and necessary market regulations. Moreover, the ongoing restructuring and innovations in the economy would not be possible without close collaboration be-

tween business companies and scientists and technologists at state-financed universities and research institutes. Thirdly, the state is heavily involved in containing and regulating conflicts of interest between capital and labour. The state has initiated extensive labour legislation. Moreover, the state has participated actively in tripartite agreements and cooperation between organizations representing capital and labour. The many ties between the business sector, other sectors, such as civil society, and the state have generated a national elite network. This network provides favourable structural conditions and meeting places for interaction between members of various elite groups in Norwegian society.

4. Description of the Norwegian Civil Society

The civil society in Norway, as well as in Denmark and Sweden, constitutes a distinct Scandinavian model, different from civil society regimes found in other countries (Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018). The civil society in Norway is characterized by a high level of citizen participation in voluntary organizations, measured in terms of memberships and volunteers (Sivesind, Arnesen, Gulbrandsen, Nordø, & Enjolras, 2018). Individuals in what the authors describe as elite occupations are overrepresented as volunteers (Eimhjellen & Fladmoe, 2020). Secondly, these organizations have traditionally been hierarchically organized, with local, regional, and national chapters. The model for this organizational structure was originally the political party and the broad popular movements that historically played a pivotal role in these countries (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002). Thirdly, as mentioned above, the relationship between the state and civil society is characterized by close collaboration and integration.

However, significant changes took place in the Norwegian civil society during the second half of the 20th century. The composition of CSOs has changed. As a result of the emergence of the "leisure society" during the second half of the 20th century, the organizational society has become more dominated by organizations within the cultural and leisure fields, while the welfare field has become comparably smaller (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002).

At the organizational level, new organizations are often formed around more narrow issues than the traditional broad society-oriented organizations. However, the number of organizations at the local level is decreasing, but it is increasing at the national level. Currently, there are close to 4,000 national voluntary organizations (Arnesen & Sivesind, 2020). National organizations are increasingly more likely to not have local chapters, and local organizations are, to a lesser extent, connected to national organizations. A dual organizational structure is developing, where different organizations exist at the local and national levels (Sivesind et al., 2018).

In Norway, voluntary organizations and non-profits are regulated under the law of associations (Woxholth, 1998). The governing bodies of a normal democratic association in Norway are the general assembly, executive committee and auditors. The general assembly is the supreme body of the association and consists of the members. In national associations with local chapters, the members are representatives elected by local chapters. The general assembly elects representatives to the executive committee. It is responsible for the day-to-day management of the association. In large, national, voluntary organizations, this responsibility is usually delegated to a hired manager. Business leaders can be elected to the executive committee, to the general assembly from a local chapter or to the audit committee.

5. Theory and Analytic Design

In earlier research on the relationship between the business community and voluntary organizations, the connections were often analysed in terms of elite integration (Moore et al., 2002; Ratcliff, Gallagher, & Ratcliff, 1979; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983). Scholars have discussed how the bonds and networking arenas between the two sectors contribute to promoting integration between or within involved elite groups. For instance, Salzman and Domhoff (1983) claimed that non-profit boards provide a place where business elites can exchange information and develop common viewpoints. In their opinion, these functions are instrumental in promoting class cohesion.

Studies of elite integration raise the question of to what extent different elite groups or segments within a specific elite group are united, divided and opposed or fragmented and not related to each other. For analytic purposes, it is necessary to distinguish between *manifestations* of elite integration and *structural circumstances* fostering integration (Engelstad, 2018; Gulbrandsen, 2019). Integration is manifested in various ways: (1) as consensus on significant values or desired properties of the society, (2) subjective feelings or perceptions of belonging to the same community, (3) mutual trust between different elite groups, (4) perceptions of complementarity (i.e., that they are mutually dependent upon each other), and (5) instances of collective action, compromises and cooperation.

We can discern between at least two forms of structural conditions that are favourable for the development of elite integration. The first condition is social similarity between elite individuals and groups. Examples of social similarity are: (1) having grown up in families of the same social class or status, (2) having attended the same elite high schools and universities, and (3) having shared career experiences. The second condition is social relations and social arenas that bring elite individuals into contact with each other. Mills (1956), Domhoff (1967) and Farkas (2012) focused on social clubs as meeting places for building relationships between elite individuals and for promoting elite unity. According to Higley, Hoffmann-Lange, Kadushin, and Moore (1991), elite unity is facilitated by the incorporation of members of different elite groups into a national elite network where the top leaders meet

each other, deliberate and forge compromises. Wiesel (2018) showed how connections bridging diverse elite circles in elite neighbourhoods could be understood as a mechanism of elite integration. In this article, the analytic approach is primarily to study the structural conditions for integration between the business community and voluntary organizations.

As shown above, earlier studies of relationships between business corporations and voluntary organizations have focused on interlocking directorships between corporations and these organizations. In studies of interlocking directorships, researchers have concentrated on describing the properties of the network structure created by interlocks. Moreover, they have often been particularly interested in identifying the most central corporations or organizations and persons in the network.

In contrast, in the current study, the frequency of members of the business elite holding extra-corporate positions will be determined. The focus is on the prevalence of holding such positions, as well as the structure of overlapping positions. Moreover, a broader set of positions and contacts than the ones in the aforementioned studies will be examined. First, a survey of the extent to which business leaders have been elected representatives in national voluntary organizations will be conducted. Positions held in national employer and industry associations, political parties, state committees and boards, and the extent of contact with politicians and senior civil servants will also be surveyed. These data will help determine the overall external network of the Norwegian business elite and the place voluntary organizations have within this network. Comparing the prevalence of the different external network positions will enable the consideration of whether voluntary organizations are centrally located in the external business network or are rather isolated.

The number of positions the elected representatives have in other sectors will also be surveyed to address the following questions: How many of them are also members of boards of employer and industry organizations or members of state boards and committees? And how frequently do they have contact with politicians and senior public servants? This information gives another indication of the centrality of voluntary organizations in the business elite extra-corporate network.

As mentioned above, the business elite elected representatives in voluntary organizations are boundary spanners between business and civil society. Given the importance of the role of boundary spanner, more should be known about their distinguishing features. Ostrower (1998) and Moore et al. (2002) demonstrated that business leaders who are members of boards of CSOs are characterized by upper-class origin, distinguished education and family wealth. For these prominent leaders, participating in the governance of CSOs fosters feelings of belonging to the same elite community, as well as nurtures a shared outlook and consensus on significant values. In other words, CSOs constitute a significant mechanism for manifested elite integration.

In their study of access to the "power field" in French society, MacLean et al. (2017) discovered that the size of business leaders' extra-corporate networks was significantly related to the leaders' class background. Leaders who grew up in upper and upper-middle-class families had more board positions in voluntary organizations than their colleagues who had moved up from the lower classes. Elite education also appeared to be a significant predictor of occupying bridging positions. In line with these scholars, the business leaders' social background, the parents' and respondents' education and wealth will be charted to address the following question: Do the elected representatives in voluntary organizations stand out in terms of wealth and an upper-class origin compared to business leaders without such positions?

6. Data and Method

The purpose of the 2015 Leadership Study was to examine the characteristics of Norwegian elite individuals, including their social background and careers, relationships to each other, attitudes on a large number of key policy issues, and lobbying activities. As in earlier national elite studies (Gulbrandsen et al., 2002; Higley et al., 1991; Hoffmann-Lange, 1992; Ruostetsaari, 2015), in the 2015 Leadership Study, we aimed to chart the whole population of elite individuals in the Norwegian society. The population was established by the so-called position method, which means that within selected sectors, we identified the most important formal top leadership positions. We then selected the persons holding these positions. The positions and persons holding these positions were identified in a collaboration between the Institute for Social Research and Statistics Norway. We included command positions from ten sectors, including the business sector (Gulbrandsen, 2019; Torsteinsen, 2017).

For the purpose of this article, members of the business elite—CEOs and chairmen of the board of the largest companies—were selected. The identification of members of the business elite was performed by Statistics Norway. Statistics Norway selected CEOs and chairmen of the board of all enterprises with more than 1,000 employees and those of all enterprises with more than five billion Norwegian kroner in turnover (and less than 1,000 employees). Sixty-three percent of the selected CEOs and chairmen of the board chose to participate in the survey, a total of 242 individuals. Thirty-one percent of these individuals were chairmen of the board of an enterprise, and 69 percent were CEOs or presidents.

The business leaders' extra-corporate network was measured by asking them whether, in 2015 or the preceding five years, they had held any of the following four positions: (1) member of the board of a national employer or industry association, (2) elected representative in a national voluntary or non-profit organization,

(3) member of one of the governing bodies of a political party, (4) position in a state board or committee. Then, the business leaders' contacts with representatives of the political system were charted by enquiring how frequently in the previous year they had been in contact with (1) members of parliament, (2) members of the cabinet, and (3) top administrative leaders of ministries, public agencies and regulators. The question had four answer choices: (1) "weekly or more often," (2) "monthly," (3) "rarely," and (4) "never."

In the 2015 Leadership Study, the construction of the class variable was based on the father's occupation. Operational definitions of the various classes were derived from a model developed at the Institute for Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, referred to as the Oslo register data class scheme (ORDC; Hansen, Flemmen, & Andersen, 2009). For the purposes of analysis in this article, four classes are used: upper-class, upper-middle-class, lower-middle-class, and working-class/primary sector. The respondents' education level, as well as that of their fathers and mothers, is a variable with five values: (1) primary school, (2) secondary school, (3) university education at the bachelor's level, (4) university education at the master's level, and (5) university education at the doctoral level or similar. In the statistical analyses, education is a continuous variable.

The business leaders' wealth was quantified as the taxable gross assets of their households. This information was retrieved from public registers. This measure is a standard measure used in public statistics in many countries. In the statistical analyses, the logarithmic form of this variable is used. Measuring household wealth is particularly useful when studying elites since their lifestyle and welfare are influenced by both spouses' contributions to the family economy.

Age and gender are included as control variables. The older the business leaders are, the more years they have been visible as members of the elite. Visibility probably increases the number of invitations to join a voluntary organization as an elected representative. Ostrower and Stone (2006) have shown that women are increasingly involved in the governing of CSOs. It is possible that women's values make them more motivated to join the boards of CSOs; however, only 13 percent of the business leaders were women.

7. Descriptive Statistics

The CEOs and chairmen of the boards of the largest enterprises in Norway have busy work schedules. Table 1 reveals that many of them nevertheless emphasize participating in extra-corporate networks. Fifty percent of them were or had been members of the board of an employer or industry association. Fifteen percent (36 individuals) had been elected representatives in a national voluntary organization. Only 2 percent had participated in the governance of a political party, while 15 percent had been members of state boards or committees. Nineteen percent had at least monthly contact with members of parliament, while 12 percent had contact with members of the cabinet, and 24 percent had monthly contact with the administrative leaders of ministries and directorates.

Nineteen percent of the CEOs and chairmen of the board of the largest corporations in Norway were from upper-class families, while 46 percent were from the upper-middle-class, and 10 percent were from the lower-middle-class. Twenty-five percent of the CEOs and chairmen of the board of the largest companies in Norway grew up in working-class families, indicating that there has been a significant degree of upward mobility into business-elite positions.

The business elite in this study are well educated. Only 6 percent of them have a secondary school education or less, while 16 percent have a bachelor's degree, 67 percent have a master's degree, and 10 percent have a PhD. As expected, the business leaders' fathers did not have the same level of education, on average, as their sons (and a few daughters). Even so, they were probably better educated than males in the same generation. Fifty-three percent of the fathers have a bachelor's or master's degree. Typically, the educational level of the fathers varied with their occupational status. As much as 48 percent of the fathers who, by occupation, belong to the working-class only have a primary school level of education. Only 4 percent of fathers belonging to the upper-class have this level of education. As much as 63 percent of the upper-class fathers have a master's or PhD degree, compared to 2 percent of the working-class fathers.

Thirty percent of the business leaders' mothers have completed only primary school, while 36 percent completed secondary school, 26 percent have a bachelor's degree, and 8 percent have a master's degree or higher. There is a strong correlation between the fathers' and mothers' educational levels (Pearson's $r = 0.51$). However, there is some variation in the fathers' occupational status. Fifty-nine percent of the mothers whose husbands belong to the upper-class by virtue of their occupation have only a primary or secondary school level of education, and 48 percent of mothers whose husbands have lower-middle-class occupations have a bachelor's or master's degree.

Average taxable gross assets among the members of the business elite were 90 million Norwegian kroner, close to ten million Euros. However, the business elite exhibited an unequal distribution of assets (SD = 795 million Norwegian kroner). Six of the business leaders had more than 600 million kroner. Three of these were billionaires.

8. Results

Table 1 demonstrates that the business elites' extra-corporate network primarily includes positions on the boards of national employer and business associations, which is unsurprising. The boards of these associa-

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Wealth	90 million kroner (average)
Age	54 (average)
Member of the board of employer and industry associations (percent)	50
Elected representative in a voluntary organization on the national level (percent)	15
Member of the governing body of a political party on the national level (percent)	2
Member of state boards and committees (percent)	15
Monthly or more frequent contact with members of parliament	19
Monthly or more frequent contact with members of the cabinet	12
Monthly or more frequent contact with administrative heads of ministries and directorates	24
Class origin based on father's occupation (percent)	
Upper-class	19
Upper-middle-class	46
Lower-middle-class	10
Working-class	25
Business leader's educational level (percent)	
Primary school	
Secondary school	6
University education at the bachelor's level	16
University education at the master's level or higher	77
Father's educational level (percent)	
Primary education	15
Secondary education	32
University education at the bachelor's level	24
University education at the master's level	29
Mother's educational level (percent)	
Primary school	30
Secondary school	36
University education at the bachelor's level	26
University education at the master's level	8
Gender (percent)	
Men	87
Women	13
N	242

tions are salient as arenas where the business community's policies are discussed and determined. In contrast, Table 1 also shows that business leaders are not much interested in being members of the governing bodies of a political party; they seem to stay clear of party politics.

Outside the realm of corporations and employer and business associations, however, the number of connections that elite individuals have to voluntary organizations is on par with their connections to the political system. While (as mentioned above) 15 percent of the business leaders had been elected representatives in voluntary organizations, the same percentage had been members of state boards and committees. Only a slightly higher percentage of the business leaders have had monthly contact with members of parliament and senior civil servants.

Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables representing various extra-corporate positions. The variable "positions in a political party" is not included since so few of the business leaders had held such positions. Moreover, correlations between the three variables measuring the frequency of contact with representatives of the political system are also excluded.

The correlational analysis presented in Table 2 indicates combinations of positions that are (significantly) prevalent among the business leaders. In terms of the number of individuals, the members of boards of employer and industry associations have the most links to institutions and organizations outside the business community. Their wide network of connections is a result of their functions in business associations. They contribute to shaping the stance of the business community in various policy issues, and they are expected to actively represent business interests, vis-à-vis politicians and senior civil servants.

Table 2 demonstrates, however, that elected representatives in voluntary organizations are significantly more active in the extra-corporate network than business leaders unconnected to voluntary organizations. They are more often members of state boards and committees. They also have significantly more frequent contact with representatives of parliament and administra-

Table 2. Combinations of extra-corporate positions.

	Elected representative in voluntary organizations	Member of the boards of employer or industry associations	Member of state boards and committees
Elected representatives in voluntary organizations	1.00		
Member of boards of employer and industry associations	0.08 (22)	1.00	
Member of state boards and committees	0.21*** (12)	0.12* (23)	1.00
Frequency of contact with members of parliament	0.12* (12)	0.13** (32)	0.27*** (17)
Frequency of contact with members of the cabinet	0.08 (7)	0.11* (20)	0.26*** (12)
Frequency of contact with administrative heads of ministries and directorates	0.12* (16)	0.19** (44)	0.20*** (18)

Notes: Pearson's *r* results are depicted; the number of individuals having each of the combinations is in parentheses; levels of significance are ***1 percent, **5 percent and *10 percent.

tive heads of ministries and directorates. Accordingly, these business leaders are bridges between the business world, voluntary organizations, and the political-bureaucratic system. They are, however, neither more nor less represented in the boards of employer and business associations.

As mentioned above, in earlier studies of the boundary-spanning network of members of the elite, the focus has been upon identifying the most central persons in the network (MacLean et al., 2014, 2017; Moore et al., 2002; Moore & White, 2000; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983; Useem, 1984; Vidovich & Currie, 2012). Useem (1984) labelled these persons as members of "the inner circle." MacLean et al. (2014, 2017) have similarly described such elite individuals as "hyper-agents" or as the "elite of the elite." As measures of centrality, the scholars have counted the number of overlapping board positions or the number of positions in extra-corporate organizations and institutions (MacLean et al., 2017).

The number of extra-corporate positions held by members of the Norwegian business elite was also counted. In this count, positions in (1) employer and business associations, (2) voluntary organizations, (3) political parties, and (4) state boards and committees are included. This simple operation showed that holding several positions is uncommon. Forty percent of the business leaders had held only one position, while 43 percent had held two positions, 14 percent had held three positions, and 2 percent had held four positions. Moreover, in a separate multivariate analysis not presented here, it appeared that, contrary to what MacLean et al. (2017) found, holding several extra-corporate positions is unrelated to the business leaders' class background.

More importantly, the number of such positions varies between different groups within the business community. Elected representatives in voluntary organizations have held, on average, 2.8 positions. Business leaders who are not involved in such organizations have held only 1.6 extra-corporate positions. Business leaders who are members of the boards of employer and industry associations (excluding the elected representatives in voluntary organizations) have held 2.1 positions on average.

Next, the characteristics of business leaders who have been elected representatives in voluntary organizations were analysed more closely. As shown above, they function as bridges not only between the business community and voluntary organizations but also, to some extent, between these institutions and the political system. This finding prompted a further examination of these individuals. A statistical analysis of all the members of the business elite was then performed to determine the extent to which being an elected representative in voluntary organizations is statistically related to various personal characteristics (cf. Model 1 in Table 3). In the model, the business leaders' education and class background, wealth, age, gender and mothers' educational level were included. Logistic regression was used in the analysis, and being elected representative or not was a dependent variable. The fathers' education was not included since this variable correlates strongly with both the fathers' occupational status and the mothers' educational level.

Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results of a similar statistical analysis where the dependent variable is whether the business leaders are or have been members of the boards of employer and industry associations. Leaders

Table 3. Personal characteristics of elected representatives in voluntary organizations and members of the boards of employer and industry associations.

	Model 1. Elected representatives in voluntary organizations	Model 2. Members of boards of employer and industry associations
Parameter	Estimates	Estimates
Intercept	−8.271*** (.2.631)	−5.741*** (2.157)
Class origin (compared with working-class)		
Upper-class	−1.567** (0.681)	0.212 (0.476)
Upper-middle-class	−0.999** (0.483)	−0.053 (0.398)
Lower-middle-class	−1.076 (0.744)	−0.169 (0.576)
Log wealth	0.286** (0.128)	0.229* (0.122)
Leaders' education	−0.085 (0.287)	0.492** (0.228)
Mothers' education	0.691*** (0.233)	0.231 (0.180)
Age	0.027 (0.027)	0.004 (0.021)
Gender. Male = 1	0.034 (0.593)	−0.686 (0.467)
−2 Log L	183.770	263.499
N	237	201

Notes: Logistic regression; standard errors in parentheses; levels of significance are ***1 percent, **5 percent and *10 percent.

who also were elected representatives in voluntary organizations were not included in this analysis. (Including these persons does not, however, alter the results of the analysis).

Notably, in Table 3, the two groups of business leaders are socially different, particularly as it relates to social origin. Model 2 in Table 3 demonstrates that being a board member in employer and industry associations is unrelated to the occupational status of the business leaders' fathers. Business leaders from upper-class families are neither more nor less inclined to join the governing bodies of associations in which individual corporations are members. In contrast, Model 1 in Table 3 reveals that leaders who have been elected representatives in voluntary organizations are significantly more likely to have been raised in working-class families.

Additionally, membership on the boards of employer and industry association is related to the educational level of the elite individuals. It seems that the best-educated leaders are chosen to represent the business interests of these associations. A surprising difference is that holding positions in voluntary organizations is significantly associated with the educational level of the business leaders' mothers. The higher the level of education the mothers have, the more likely that the leaders were or had been elected to the governing body in a voluntary organization. However, the two groups of business leaders have one characteristic in common: Table 3 reveals that wealthy business leaders, independent of their class background, have a higher probability of being represented in each of the two groups.

9. Discussion

In international research, there are different opinions about the network relationships between the business sector and civil society. In a survey of the network involving a selection of large corporations, charities, foundations, and state advisory boards, Moore et al. (2002) found that voluntary organizations were relatively isolated within the network. In a study of the French elite, MacLean et al. (2017) discovered that centrality in an extra-corporate network was a significant factor behind access to the "elite of the elite."

In contrast to what Moore et al. (2002) found in the US, voluntary organizations in Norway do not have a peripheral position within the business network with the outside world. Instead, the connections of the business elite to voluntary organizations are as common as links to various parts of the political-bureaucratic system. Moreover, as demonstrated above, the participants in the governance of voluntary organizations are among the most well-connected members of the business elite. Accordingly, they act as bridging actors between the business community, civil society and public sector and can, as such, facilitate elite integration across sectors.

There are probably various reasons why business leaders are invited to join the governing bodies of voluntary organizations. Similarly, the business leaders likely have had various motives for accepting the invitations. In the Norwegian context, well-connected business leaders are probably valuable to many national voluntary organizations. Norway is characterized by a large welfare state that is an important source of funding for many of these organizations. Many of them actively lobby politicians and senior civil servants (Sivesind et al., 2018). Business leaders with knowledge of the bureaucratic-political system are well equipped to give useful advice about how to manoeuvre in this complex environment to obtain funding and influence political decisions.

Another indication of the integration of voluntary organizations into the business elite network is the position of wealthy business leaders. These super-rich elite individuals (some of them are billionaires) are over-

represented among participants in the governance of both voluntary organizations and employer and industry associations. Given the definition of business elite followed in this article, these super-rich persons are probably CEOs or chairmen of the board of large corporations in which they are also large shareholders. They have acquired their positions as dominant owners through inheritance or by having built up the corporations themselves through entrepreneurship. It is well known that many of these "owner-managers" have considerable power and influence in the Norwegian economy.

Their attendance at governing bodies of voluntary organizations is possibly a result of an exchange of favours between the rich business owner and the voluntary organizations. The organizations have probably received a substantial donation, and in return, the donator is invited to join the organization's governing body. Previous scholarship on board composition in CSOs indicates that this interpretation is valid. However, regardless of their reasons for having accepted positions in voluntary organizations, the participation of wealthy business leaders is a testimony to the integration of voluntary organizations in the business elite network.

However, business leaders who participate in the governance of Norwegian voluntary organizations differ from their colleagues on the boards of employer associations. As shown in Table 3, elected representatives in voluntary organizations are notably more likely to have grown up in working-class families. In other words, business leaders who have experienced pronounced social mobility seem to be more attracted to being involved in the governance of CSOs than colleagues from a privileged background. Seemingly, this finding goes against ideas in previous research that privileged elites seek positions in CSOs to engage in elite socializing and attain prestige and status (Moore & White, 2000; Ostrower, 1998; Ratcliff et al., 1979; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983).

In the theory section above (Section 5), social similarity was described as a structural precondition for elite integration. In some of the literature on elites, social similarity in the form of a shared upper-class origin is even portrayed as a manifestation of elite integration (Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1956). One might ask whether their working-class background indicates that some of the elected representatives are less integrated into the business elite. However, the data provided by the 2015 Leadership Study do not support an unambiguous answer to this question.

The literature on elites and CSOs suggests that "outsiders" in the elite community are often eager to acquire positions in such organizations. Middleton (1987) mentioned that becoming a member of the board of a CSO is an important means to further one's career in the business world. She also discussed board membership as a way to develop new friendships and become more fully integrated into the community. Similarly, Ostrower (1998) showed that membership on an arts board opened opportunities for making social connections and gaining social entrée. MacLean et al. (2017) emphasized that positions in CSOs enable elite individuals to accumulate social and organizational capital, which is beneficial for entering into the power field of the "hyperagents." Norwegian business leaders who grew up in working-class families could be particularly preoccupied with these benefits. In line with the ideas and findings of Middleton (1987), Ostrower (1998) and MacLean et al. (2017), it is likely that they have perceived that their careers and standing in the community would both be helped by accepting invitations to become elected representatives in voluntary organizations.

As MacLean, Harvey, and Chia (2012) pointed out, class-bounded career constraints can be overcome if the individual becomes conscious of the unspoken claims and adapts to them strategically. Socially-mobile leadership candidates can identify and embrace behaviours that express the dominant repertoire of cultural capital, and they can build a social network and cultivate personal relationships that could advance their careers. Business leaders from a working-class background participating in the governing bodies of voluntary organizations—significantly more often than their peers who do not have such a background—are a testimony to the importance of such reflexivity.

An alternative interpretation is that socially-mobile members of the business elite want to give back to society. The persons who have moved into peak positions in the business world from an ordinary social origin have obtained a privileged life. They are well aware of the contrast between their new lifestyle and their lifestyle during childhood. If they are conscious of this contrast, they could feel a genuine desire to share the fruits of their success. One way to do this is by lending their competence to voluntary organizations. The wish to give back can also be paired with a need to legitimize their own success. Socially-mobile business leaders could, perhaps, feel that they must assure themselves and significant others that their good fortune is well deserved.

The previous explanations focus on socially-mobile business leaders and their motivations. It is, however, likely that an explanation of their overrepresentation in voluntary organizations might just as well be sought in the absence of business leaders from the upper-class. This prompts the question of why leaders from the upper-class are not more engaged in the governing of voluntary organizations. Being hesitant to take up positions in voluntary organizations could be rooted in a preference for avoiding public attention. Norway is characterized by relatively small income differences and an egalitarian culture (Aalberg, 1998; Myhre, 2017). Sometimes, this egalitarian culture stimulates a negative public focus on privileged families. Traditional upper-class families may feel that this public focus questions the legitimacy of their position in society. Some may counter the threat to their legitimacy by becoming large donators or participating in other types of prosocial activities. Others may prefer to keep their heads low. As the French scholar Daloz

(2007) observed some years ago, Norwegian elites are characterized by considerable "conspicuous modesty." They prefer to downplay their power and status. Their inclination to avoid public attention could motivate them to abstain from accepting invitations to join the governing bodies of voluntary organizations.

Surprisingly, the analyses presented above revealed that joining the governing bodies of voluntary organizations is significantly related to the educational level of the business leaders' mothers. This result might reflect that in many families, highly educated mothers are stewards of social and occupational ambitions. As Harding, Morris, and Hughes (2015) noted, they teach their children how to behave in both school and work life, as well as how to relate to authority figures so that it favours their careers. These mothers may also stimulate their sons' and daughters' ambitions. The mothers' teaching and encouragement could have made the business leaders aware of the possible career advantages of participating in the governance of voluntary organization as elected representatives. This interpretation also suggests that voluntary organizations can be useful pathways to elite career and prestige. The various explanations discussed in the preceding paragraphs are attempts at plausible interpretations of the findings presented above. Further research focusing on business leaders' motives for becoming elected representatives in voluntary organizations is needed to establish the validity of these interpretations.

10. Conclusion

Previous studies have demonstrated that voluntary organizations in Norway have many links to the public sector. The analyses presented in this article indicate they are also integrated into the extra-corporate network of the business elite through business leaders who are elected representatives in these organizations. Admittedly, the elected representatives constitute a minority of all members of the Norwegian business elite. However, they are well-connected. Several of them act as bridges between the business world, civil society and the state.

The relationship between the business community and voluntary organizations reflects the basic features of the Norwegian welfare-state model. This model is characterized by comprehensive responsibility for the well-being of citizens, a large public sector and generous welfare benefits, and is distinguished by a unique collaboration between strong trade unions, centralized employers' associations and the state. A civil society with a high level of citizen participation is also an important element of this model. The Norwegian welfare-state model has given rise to a close-knit national elite network gravitating around the state at the centre. The business elite and the top leaders of national voluntary organizations are both firmly interwoven in this national network.

Individual business leaders have different motives for becoming elected representatives in voluntary organizations. From an overall perspective, their participation supports the business elite in their endeavours to promote the interests of the business community. The elected representatives can help build the legitimacy of the business community and form useful political alliances. Among the elite individuals who participate in the governance of voluntary organizations, there is an overrepresentation of leaders who grew up in the working-class. In this sense, being an elected representative in these organizations seems to be nearly a "prerogative" for socially-mobile business leaders. This pattern of recruitment could be due to conscious determination on the part of these leaders to use trusted positions as a pathway to elite status and prestige. Alternatively, it could be the result of a genuine desire to give something back to society and use their talents for the common good.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares that there are no conflicts of interests.

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Article

Organizational Identity of Think Tank(er)s: A Growing Elite Group in Swedish Civil Society

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Abstract
Think tanks, defined as organizations that produce policy research for political purposes (McGann, 2007; Medvetz, 2008), are an increasingly ubiquitous type of policy actor world-wide. In Sweden, the last 20 years' sharp increase in think tank numbers (Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter, 2019) has coincided with the decline of the traditional Swedish corporatist model based on the intimate involvement of the so-called 'popular movements' in policy-making (Lundberg, 2014; Micheletti, 1995). Contrary to the large, mass-membership based and democratically organized movement organizations, think tanks are small, professionalized, expert-based, and seldom represent any larger membership base. Their increasingly important role as the ideological greenhouses in Swedish civil society might, therefore, be interpreted as an indication of an increasingly elitist and professionalized character of the latter. But what is a think tank? The article explores how a shared understanding of what constitutes a think tank is constructed by think-tankers themselves. In the study, interviewed think tank executives and top-level staff reflect upon their own organizations' missions and place in the Swedish policy system.

Keywords
civil society; elites; social movements; Sweden; think tanks

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1. Introduction

In the last two decades, the increasing proliferation of independent organizations trading in policy advice has attracted growing attention in the social sciences. Being originally an Anglo-Saxon (and particularly U.S. American) phenomenon, policy institutes or 'think tanks' are today ubiquitous in most countries, as well as at the global level, across the whole spectrum of policy fields (Rich, 2004; Stone, 1997). While they are often analysed primarily as actors in policy systems, these organizations are also part of civil society. This is due not only to their legal form which often is that of associations or foundations, but above all to the fact that think tanks work by diffusing ideas, and their operations usually aim at influencing societal development in some form. As such, think tanks fit well into a neo-Gramscian view of civil society which highlights this sphere's normative, ideational, and discursive dimensions (e.g., Reuter, Wijkström, & Meyer, 2015; Wijkström & Reuter, 2015). Generation and dissemination of, as well as mobilization around, ideas and ideologies, which is at the centre of what think tanks do, is, according to this perspective, a trademark of civil society actors.

Think tanks are, however, a particular type of civil society organization: They lack individual membership, are often established and funded by other actors in civil society, and their raison d'être and legitimacy as policy actors are based on expertise rather than on being anchored in particular segments of the broader society. In contrast to many types of grassroots oriented organizations traditionally associated with civil society, think tanks build their claim to influence not on interest representation or community but on a carefully negotiated balance between expertise and opinion, or between knowledge and ideology. As highly professionalized organizations, often run and staffed by individuals with high academic credentials, think tanks are therefore often conceptualized in the extant literature as a distinctly elitist type of political and policy actor (e.g., Fischer, 1991; Savage, 2016; Smith, 1991; Stone, 2001).

What is a think tank, though? The literature notes frequently that defining these organizations is a notoriously difficult task, the think tank concept being slippery, distinctly empirical, and hard to pinpoint analytically. Moreover, the term 'think tank' is often used by organizations to strategically position themselves at the crossroads of different institutional fields (Hauck, 2017; Medvetz, 2012), but also to put into question the legitimacy of rival organizations. What a think tank is, is in many cases a matter of what suits the actors involved. It is therefore relevant to examine how these organizations themselves discursively construct the 'think tank' as a type of civil society and policy actor. And, as the institutional context in which think tanks operate is crucial for the character of the niche they occupy in civil society and in the policy system (Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter, 2019; Kelstrup, 2016), it is also relevant to highlight the importance of such context for the way in which these organizations define themselves.

This article aims to explore how think tanks, or rather 'think-tankers' (the people involved in the organizations in different capacities) themselves construct an idea of what a think tank is and how its purpose(s) should be understood in relation to the wider institutional environment. While this question has been previously addressed with a focus on the U.S. American setting (Medvetz, 2010), our interest lies in the self-understanding of think tanks in contexts where this type of civil society and policy actor is relatively new, and where think tank(er)s thus cannot count on their organizations' purpose and place in society being immediately obvious to the outside observer. What components does the narrative about being a think tank consist of in such a setting? how do these components relate to the cultural and historical traits of the institutional environment? and how do they reflect the think tank as an institutional 'newcomer' in this particular setting?

Our discussion is based on a qualitative, interview-based study of four Swedish think tanks and of the ways in which their directors, staff and board members understand and portray the nature and roles of their organizations. Swedish civil society has during the 20th century been dominated by broad, membership-based and democratically structured organizations with strong grassroots orientation, and with a strong position in the corporatist Swedish policy system—i.e., so-called popular movements (*folkrörelser*). Think tanks are a relatively new phenomenon in this context, and it is a type of actor still very much in search of its proper place in Swedish civil society and the Swedish policy arena (Åberg et al., 2019). This provides us with a unique opportunity to explore think tanks' self-image 'in the making,' while it is still being negotiated. As these organizations in many respects clearly diverge from traditional forms of Swedish civil society organizing, we are also interested in the extent to which their differentiation from other, more traditional grassroots oriented types of actor, is a part of their self-understanding.

Inspired by Medvetz (2012), we focus less on what a 'real' think tank is, and more on how these organizations, by labelling themselves think tanks and ascribing to themselves certain characteristics, collectively contribute to constructing the ideal-typical think tank. The collective dimension is important here, as we want to explore the extent to which think tanks in a particular national institutional setting develop a shared understanding (cf. Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) of their own nature and purpose.

2. Think Tanks in Civil Society and in the Policy System

While the sphere of civil society is often associated with grassroots empowerment and conceptualized as a space for ordinary citizens to collectively strive to transform society, the emergence of the think tank as an increasingly visible actor in this space has often been interpreted as a sign of an elitist turn in civil society and policy-making (e.g., Fischer, 1991; Savage, 2016; Smith, 1991; Stone, 2001). One of the few things that the extant think tank literature appears to agree on is the elite-oriented character of these organizations. There are, at the same time, different interpretations of how this elitism should be understood. In the classical debate between elitist and pluralist perspectives on U.S. American politics, think tanks have often been portrayed by elite theorists as tools for advancing the interests of an increasingly global corporate-political elite (e.g., Domhoff, 2009, 2010; Dye, 2001; Peschek, 1987) and as vehicles for the neo-liberal ideas that are seen as supporting those interests.

Most think tank scholars, however, conceptualize the exclusive—or exclusionary—character of these organizations in wider, more general terms. Rather than the representation of particular class's interests, think tank elitism is linked here to their technocratic outlook, the exclusivity of their 'products,' and their claims to expertise and intimate knowledge of public policy processes. In this understanding, think tank professionals are seen as part of a new rising political class consisting of managerial and policy experts or the 'technically trained knowl-

edge elites' (Fischer, 1991). Stone (2001) notes, for example, that think tanks cater to those 'politically and economically literate,' are populated by highly educated individuals from privileged backgrounds, and that their frequent interactions with political and administrative decision-makers allow them to acquire considerable influence (Stone, 2001). She draws attention to access and participation in think tanks not normally being open to the general public and sees their expert status as a form of exclusiveness.

In his seminal work on think tanks from 2012, Medvetz divides society into 1) the political and bureaucratic field, which includes actors such as state agencies, social movements, and political parties; 2) the field of cultural production, which includes universities but also for instance policy journals; 3) the media field, including for instance newspapers and magazines; and 4) the economic field, which in Medvetz's model contains corporations as well as labour unions and trade associations (Medvetz, 2012). It should be noted that the four fields mentioned overlap each other and the space of think tanks is chiselled out in the middle of all this. Savage (2016) argues that the interstitial position of think tanks noted by Medvetz in itself contributes to their elite character. Savage sees the intersections of the four spheres where think tanks reside as containing society's core institutions, which themselves are dominated by highly influential, 'elite' actors. Think tanks' links to these spheres give them, in his view, a unique ability to influence the formation of public opinion, the construction of politics, and the development of policy.

The question of the extent to which the think tank should be regarded as being, in some sense, an elite type of actor, depends of course to a considerable extent on how we define this organization in the first place. As indicated in the introduction, the simple question of 'what is a think tank' generates multiple, often vague, and even contradictory answers. Since the term itself is empirical rather than analytical, its more precise meaning appears to be very context-bound (Åberg et al., 2019; Kelstrup, 2016). What is understood as a think tank in a certain institutional context; which organizations call themselves (or are referred to as) think tanks in that context; and which of these organizations perform the tasks and roles usually ascribed to think tanks, may, therefore, be three very different things.

The issue of defining think tanks is further complicated by the fact that, as Medvetz (2012) notes, the think tank label has over time become a rhetorical tool of its own, used for strategic purposes by actors wishing to position themselves in the relevant social structure. As the term 'think tank' invokes images of scientific objectivity and rigour (Pautz, 2007), to be awarded this label is, for some organizations and in some contexts, "to rise above mere interest-group struggles and claim membership in the ranks of experts" (Medvetz, 2012, p. 34). For others, and in other contexts, it may, on the other hand, mean being degraded from a 'respectable' academic research institute to a mere ideological hothouse. Medvetz proposes, therefore, a relational, rather than essentialist, approach to defining think tanks. Pointing to the ways in which the think tank concept and the use of the term have developed historically he argues that 'the think tank' should be understood and treated as a discursive creation rather than an objectively existing type or category of organizations with an objectively defined set of characteristics. This is also the approach adopted in this article.

Inspired by Bourdieu, Medvetz analyses the push-and-pull processes through which think tanks, in the U.S. American context, on the one hand, draw different forms of capital from the institutional spheres that they span, and on the other hand, how they strive to play down their links to these spheres and their actors in order to retain the image of autonomy and distinctiveness. Think tanks perform thus continuous balancing acts where they need to project both proximity to, and distance from, academia, the media, politics, and the economic field (Medvetz, 2012). Policy experts involved in think tanks build their professional identity on the idioms associated with each of the spheres—those of the academic scholar, the policy aid, the media specialist, and the entrepreneur—and attempt to reconcile them into a coherent whole (Medvetz, 2010).

Medvetz posits that the reason behind the need for this balancing act is the relative novelty of the think tank as an organizational actor, and of the think tank policy expert as a professional role, entailing a lack of ready-made templates or idioms of their own that these organizations and their staff are able to draw on when constructing narratives about who they are and what they do. This assumption is, presumably, based on a comparison with the four much more established institutional spheres and the professional roles associated with them, that Medvetz sees think tanks as drawing on. 'Novelty' is, however, also relative. In comparison with countries where such organizations have only started to appear in the recent few decades, the U.S. American think tank (which is the object of Medvetz's analysis) is a well-established type of actor, well integrated into American civil society and the American policy system. The question is thus, to what extent the narratives of think-tank(er)s in countries where think tanks are institutional newcomers reflect a similar balancing act.

3. Think Tanks in Sweden: A Background

As noted above, think tanks are a relatively new phenomenon in Swedish civil society and policy system; while the first of this kind of organization has been around since the 1930s in Sweden, it is only since the turn of the Millennium that think tanks have become a more visible type of actor in the Swedish public arena (Åberg et al., 2019). During much of the 20th century, most organizing in Swedish civil society followed the 'popular movements' model, inspired by the

powerful temperance, free-church, agricultural, labour, women's, sports, and environmental movements (Götz, 2003; Micheletti, 1995; Wijkström, 2011). This dominant model encouraged grassroots oriented organizing based on mass membership, internal democracy, and a focus on advocacy and interest representation. As part of the Swedish corporatist system, movement organizations were for a long time treated as a partner to the government (Götz, 2003), with the state lending them political legitimacy as well as financial and structural support. The involvement of movement organizations, but also other similarly organized interests such as trade associations, in the development and implementation of public policy was central to the so-called 'Swedish model' (Rothstein, 1992). The fact that several of the established political parties had close links to one or the other of the movements (Micheletti, 1995), combined with the corporatist public policy system, meant that the movements were able to provide the policy processes with ideational and ideological content through many different channels.

Today this no longer holds entirely true. Since the 1990s, the institutional civil society-state nexus has begun to evolve towards a more pluralist policy system (Blom-Hansen, 2000; Öberg et al., 2011). In the same period, Sweden has experienced almost exponential growth in the numbers of think tanks—from just a handful to around 40 in roughly two decades (Åberg et al., 2019). Elsewhere we have shown that Swedish think tank executives point to the decline of the corporatist interest representation system, as well as to the relative stagnation of the popular movements, as having helped create an institutional niche for the think tank as a new type of policy-oriented actor in civil society (Åberg et al., 2019). In particular, the slow decline of the popular movement as the dominant organizing model in Swedish civil society, and trends such as professionalization, the rise of managerialism, as well as growing public acceptance of new, alternative forms of organizing which are less dependent on individual membership and democratic structures (see Papakostas, 2012; Wijkström, 2011, 2016) appear to have opened up a window of opportunity for think tanks—or, perhaps, what Medvetz (2012) would call a space of think tanks.

Not only Sweden's civil society but also its political and policy system has undergone important transformations during the same period as the number of think tanks has risen. Svallfors (2016) points for example to the diminishing importance of traditional policy actors such as political parties, blue-collar trade unions, and similar organizations; the decreasing visibility and intelligibility of public policy processes; and the altered power balance between labour and capital (to the latter's advantage). These institutional transformations have, he argues, coincided with a decline in political participation among the wider population, as well as with the rise of so-called 'policy professionals'—a social category of people who are interested in working with and influencing public policy, but not through the traditional, relatively transparent means such as publicly accountable electoral politics or the hierarchical civil service. Rather, policy professionals exercise influence from behind the scenes, in more informal (but no less influential) roles as political advisers, political secretaries, public relations consultants, lobbyists, or think tank policy experts (see also Garsten, Rothstein, & Svallfors, 2015). The increasing importance of policy professionals and their organizations (such as think tanks) is, Svallfors contends, significative of a new kind of elite-driven politics and policymaking, very unlike the traditional corporatist structures of the 20th century.

At the same time, the traditional Swedish political and policy system of the past was not necessarily very egalitarian or grassroots oriented. While Sweden's movement-based civil society was largely organized according to principles of mass participation, democratic access, and grassroots engagement, the political system itself has been described as top-down, centralized, and expert-driven (Steinmo, 2003, 2010). Svallfors (2016) suggests therefore that we should understand the recent decades' transformations less as a change from an egalitarian or populist system towards an elitist one, and more as a turn towards a new type of elite politics, with less transparency and accountability, and with new roles for new kinds of experts.

Today think tanks are on their way to becoming an established part of the Swedish public policy landscape (see, e.g., Sörbom, 2018). While many of them are fairly un-political and/or founded to work on one particular issue only, the most prominent and visible of them belong (with a few exceptions) rather clearly in one of two ideological-political spheres: the progressive sphere which includes among others the labour movement and the Social-Democratic Party, and the liberal pro-market sphere which includes the right-of-centre parties as well as the umbrella organizations of business and industry, such as trade associations. Within these spheres, think tanks are today among the more active and visible policy actors. At the same time, they still to a certain extent constitute an exotic feature in the policy landscape. Thus, we argue that just as in other countries that have scarce previous experience of think-tanking (Boucher & Royo, 2009; Desmoulins, 2009), think tanks in Sweden should be understood as still searching for their collective identity as policy and civil society actors.

4. The Case Study: Design, Methods, and Cases

As mentioned above, previous research points out that the Swedish think tank population consists of around 40, with the first currently operational think tank having been founded at the end of the 1930s, and the majority being founded since the year 2000 (Åberg et al., 2019). Furthermore, most of these think tanks are rather small, with the majority of them having between 1 and 10 employees, and diverse when it comes to the ideologies and interests that they represent.

The empirical research discussed here is based on a qualitative case study of four of the most influential Swedish think tanks. The researchers used a purposive sampling technique to capture the most influential Swedish think tanks as well as cases from different parts of the Swedish political spectrum. Three of the think tanks represent different parts of the labour movement, and one has a liberal/conservative orientation representing more liberal market values and is connected to the trade associations. The selected organizations vary when it comes to such organizational characteristics as size, age, turnover, staff numbers etc., giving us a rather heterogeneous sample which resembles, but cannot be seen as fully representative of, the Swedish think tank population (see Åberg et al., 2019).

In the study, the self-understanding of the four organizations is explored through the eyes of the staff, since these are the actors who are actively involved in the construction, de- and re-construction of organizational identity. As organizations operate through their employees, the opinions, beliefs, and conduct of the latter mirror and become set into the organizational framework. In each of the four organizations, we have conducted semi-structured interviews with the CEO (or equivalent) and additional staff holding titles such as head of communications, head of publishing, chief economist, and research officer. Since the size of the organization, including the number of employees, varies between the organizations not all positions exist in every organization but in total, we conducted 16 interviews. The interviews lasted between one and two hours. They were all recorded and transcribed *in verbatim*, and subsequently analysed using NVivo and thematic analysis (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013; Saldana, 2013). In order to keep the respondents confidential, we anonymized the quotes but named the respondents TxRx (Think tank x, Respondent x) in the text to help the reader see how much analytical variation there is within think tanks and between think tanks in the empirical material.

Data analysis proceeded in two steps. First, we went through the interview transcripts using descriptive coding in order to create a rough inductive account of the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2013). This descriptive coding was done in several iterations as some codes where merged and others were split apart and new codes also emerged from the data. The second step of the data analysis used focused coding (Charmaz, 2006) in order to create themes and subthemes from the first order codes, related to the overarching identity-related question of 'who are we?' These themes and subthemes are presented below.

5. Analysis

Under the overarching headline of 'who are we?' our interview data reveals four themes that consistently appear in the interviews across the studied think tanks. They concern: the organization's founding story, the relationship between the think tank and the movement or sphere it belongs to, the centrality of independence, and the role of research in the identity of think tanks.

5.1. The Founding Story

All the four think tanks studied have an internally strong and coherent founding story that describes them as formed in response to an ideological development in society that their founders wanted to counteract. This appears to be an important and distinctive component of the narrative about what it entails to be a think tank for the organizations studied. The ideological development to be counteracted differs between think tanks, from the Social Democratic hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s to the neo-liberalism of the 1990s and 2000s, depending on the time of the think tank's establishment. As one of the respondents remarks in this context: "Think tanks are in some sense politically anti-cyclical" (Interview, T1R1).

The respondents at the more recently founded think tanks place their stories on a timeline containing other, already existing policy institutes, and describe the reasons for their own creation as related to the need to counteract the influence of those older think tanks. For example, interviewees from the liberal market think tank T4 refer to the near-total social democratic and labour movement ideological and political hegemony in Sweden of the previous decades. By establishing T4, the liberal market sphere hoped to create more concentrated ideological resistance and respond to the large resources that the labour movement dedicated to ideology and the production of policy advice. Conversely, the three younger, left-of-centre think tanks (T1, T2 and T3) were established during the more recent period of the relative ideological hegemony of market liberalism in Sweden, and their accounts highlight the need within the progressive sphere for policy-relevant research and they advise from a different, more 'leftist' ideological angle. In this, the stories told by the think tanks from the two opposing ideological camps mirror each other almost perfectly.

The appearance of think tanks in the political and social landscape and when, how, and by whom they are created, is related to political and social transformations and relations, as noted in Medvetz's studies of think tanks in the U.S. (Medvetz, 2012). Previous research also notes that the advance of think tanks on the political arena and in the public eye seems to coincide with reorientations in the organizational and governance models in the U.S. civil society (e.g., McGann & Weaver, 2000; Rich, 2004). Such reorientations can also be spotted in Sweden. As noted previously in this article, the popular movements, and the popular movement organizations, have been the dominant normative model for how collective mobilization is expected to be organized in Sweden since the early 1900s. Recent decades have, however, unveiled a development towards a civil society that also includes less member-based and more professionalized organizations (Papakostas, 2012; Wijkström & Einarsson, 2006).

5.2. The Relationship to the Wider Sphere

In the interviews, the above-described role of counteracting an undesirable ideological development in society is very consistently framed in terms of the organizations' embeddedness in broader movements or societal spheres: the left-of-centre 'progressive' sphere that includes the labour movement, the trade unions, the Social Democratic party etc. (T1, T2 and T3), and the right-of-centre sphere made up of ideological and/or interest groups which in different ways promote a liberal market agenda in Sweden (T4). The respondents all talk about the missions of their think tanks as being geared towards filling particular niches or functions in 'their' movements and serving the need for professionalized expert advice relating to the spheres that they belong to. Several of them stress this as the core part of the work of their organizations: "The Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Social Democratic Party, i.e., the labour movement—these are the ones we should influence" (Interview, T2R5).

An important part of the think tank's mission is thus to shape the ideological development of their own political camp. In this context, a long-term and more expert oriented perspective becomes particularly important: "I have difficulties seeing that a trade association could do what a think tank does, because a trade association has, by definition, a shorter time horizon, and they are also very clearly lobby organizations" (Interview, T4R13).

Several of the respondents mention that many of the other types of actors in civil society and in the policy arena, especially the more grassroots oriented membership-based organizations, have become more reactive, and governed by the current political agenda. Think tanks as small professionalized organizations, on the other hand, can according to the respondents, play a more long-term role in their movements; they do not have to cater to the whims of members, voters or principals, but are able to address and safeguard the more long-term general interests of their constituents: "[The trade unions] seem to have much shorter time horizons, so all that they do is more connected to day-to-day politics. That's why we can do things that you cannot do in a central organization" (Interview, T1R1).

The interviewees' view of the added value of their organizations appears also to include a strong element of think tanks operating 'outside of the box' in a more general sense, the 'box' being in this context the ways in which policy advice work has traditionally unfolded in Sweden, and something that other, more established policy actors in their movements or spheres are perceived as still being caught up in. Several of the respondents expressed the view that think tanks, to a greater extent than the more traditional policy actors such as politicians, parties, unions, or interest groups through being small elite organizations are free to pursue their policy agendas. This puts think tanks, according to the interviews, in a unique position to be able to notice and pursue important societal issues and needs that might pass under the radar or be impossible to pursue for other policy actors:

> I think they see a value in that there is an organization that can think freely from the interests that govern the unions….An organization that can think a little freer and in the slightly longer term also, which is not constrained by the next collective bargaining process or by what political parties will do or say in the near future. (Interview, T1R2)

By being essentially different from other actors in their own spheres, the think tanks can thus, according to these accounts, provide an added value and take on tasks that other, more traditional policy actors are less well equipped to carry out. This distinctiveness, and more of an elite profile, seems to be an important part of the self-understanding of the ideal-typical Swedish think tank.

5.3. Independence

The third theme that consistently emerges from the interviews as a particular trademark of think tanks is their independence from other policy actors with more pronounced political agendas. Such independence lends, in the eyes of the respondents, a particular legitimacy to the policy advice provided by their organizations:

> This is not a trade union saying something….This is not the Social Democrats. The good thing is that here we have gathered…a few people who can think for themselves, who dare to think for themselves, who have the mandate to think for themselves. What comes from us, it comes from us, it does not come from anyone else. (Interview, T2R5)

It seems utterly important that a think tank has its own independent voice and that it is not perceived as being controlled by the movement it belongs to, or by anyone else. The argument thus seems to be that the think tank gains legitimacy by being an insulated elite professionalized organization rather than by being a membership-based grassroots organization. Importantly, however, this is not only about appearing legitimate in the eyes of the external environment. It is also, and crucially, a matter of the formal independence allowing think tanks to speak uncomfortable truths, and express unpopular views which may in the short run go against the interests of potentially powerful actors in the sphere to which the think tank itself belongs:

> [Our principals] have outsourced some difficult debates to us….They need to have an independent organization that can run a consistent market liberal agenda since there are issues that are good for the market economy at large, but that can be bad for an individual company. (Interview, T4R13)

5.4. The Relationship to Research

Finally, the relationship to (academic) research appears as a central theme in the respondents' understanding of the essence of their organizations. Here we discern a clear need for distinction from other types of actors in the academia:

> I would not say that we are an academic research institution. We are so small, and we do not have the ambition to claim to be [an academic research institution] either, but much of what we do here is research-based. Over the years, we have done a lot of things that one might categorize as research. Many of the report and book authors that we work with are academicians and scholars. And of course, we have the ambition to increase this in the long term. (Interview, T1R3)

None of the four think tanks studied, which are some of the largest and most active in Sweden, say that they produce original research. Rather, they see their contribution in terms of 'repackaging' research that has been conducted elsewhere:

> What we do differently from a lot of universities is that we have an organization that is extremely well-equipped to package and communicate research. We have an infrastructure for it in place, we have strong credibility as well, and many stakeholders that give us the opportunity to reach out with the material. (Interview, T4R13)

In the eyes of the interviewees, the added value—the 'unique selling point'—of a think tanks lies, not only in pure communication and re-packaging skills, neither is it strictly about 'research' in terms of providing pure facts, as these are often already accessible from public sources. Instead, it is to a large extent about adding an ideological dimension to the way in which facts are presented or 'spun': "The facts are there. They are [available from] Statistics Sweden, they are already in the reports from governmental investigations….But when we introduce ideology to it, it becomes dynamite, so to speak" (Interview, T2R6).

Several of our interviewees dwell on the ideological steering of which kind of data is presented and how it is presented:

> If we make a report on the free school choice, for example, and we know that the starting point is that we do not believe that free school choice is a good idea, then it is clear that we formulate the question in that way, and bring in people who can scientifically show that it is problematic. [The free-market think tank] Timbro might think that the free school choice is good, and then they bring in researchers who show that it is good, but both researchers can still be independent people anyway. (Interview, T2R5)

While the relationship to research emerges strongly in the interviews, it is framed in terms of what 'think tanking' is not; it is not about pure academic knowledge but rather about arriving at a research-based product with an ideological angle—thus it differs from both scholarship and from propaganda. At the same time, the respondents were very careful in explaining that their policy advice is soundly anchored in academic research and quality assurance processes.

6. Discussion

The interview data discussed above shows a somewhat unexpected coherence in the way the interviewed heads and staff of the four think tanks studied appear to perceive the essence of 'think tanking.' The organizations included in the study differ from each other in several dimensions such as age, size, and political affiliation. Yet, the respondents' accounts of why their organizations were established, of the ways in which they differ from other types of policy actors, and of the niche(s) that they fill in the policy arena, are very consistent and similar to each other. In many cases, the respondents speak of their own organizations, but just as often they speak about think tanks in general, thus positioning themselves in an organizational category that in their eyes clearly has specific and unique characteristics. This may be interpreted as pointing towards a shared understanding of think tank identity in Sweden, with particular traits that everyone agrees on as central to such an identity. At least it indicates a collective work among think-tankers to conceptualize think tanks as a distinct type of organizational actor in Swedish civil society, which is differentiated both from the classic American think tank discussed in the literature (cf. Medvetz, 2012) but also from the traditional Swedish popular movement organizations. Thus, those active in Swedish think tanks carve out their own space, the Swedish space of think tanks (cf. Medvetz, 2012), in between being connected to and being independent of Swedish popular movements.

The literature on think tanks has previously highlighted their position in between different institutional fields, particularly those of academia, politics, media and economics, as well as their need to distinguish themselves from the organizational actor types prominent in these fields (Hauck, 2017; Medvetz, 2012). The respondents in our study do mention universities and research institutes as two types of academic actors that they see their own organizations as being different from. There is, however, no mention of media actors in the themes we have identified in the interviews. Instead, we find that the organizations studied to a large extent construct their identities in opposition to, or through distinction from, actors in what Medvetz (2012) would call the political and bureaucratic field as well as the economic field—particularly towards actors in the movements or ideological spheres to which they belong as discussed above. They appear to perceive a need to highlight both their

strong embeddedness in their own ideological spheres and the added value, the 'unique selling point,' that they bring to those spheres. An interesting find in the Swedish context is that most of the think tanks studied, which are among the most prominent Swedish think tanks, have strong ties to either labour unions or to trade associations even though their (at least professed) ideology and the issues they focus on are more akin to what is usually connected to social movements and political parties, which can be reflected upon in the light of the model constructed by Medvetz (2012) which has been discussed previously in this article.

It seems that the most central and distinctive organizational characteristic is centred around a founding story in which the think tank is created to counteract an unfolding and undesirable (ideological) development in society. This is further reinforced in those of the younger think tanks which clearly place the older think tanks from the 'other side' as their main adversaries and the reason for their creation. This may both be seen as an attempt to give their own think tank a distinct identity but also as an attempt to collectively place themselves within the Swedish discourse of popular movements and thus create legitimacy for the organizational type by being attached to a social movement or societal sphere. At the same time, another very important organizational trait is being independent of other actors, including those within their own ideological sphere or movement. This independence is often seen as a prerequisite for think tanks to be able to fulfil their role as long term and proactive ideology producers, two other important building blocks of the ideal-typical think tank identity. A balancing act akin to which that Medvetz (2012) describes in his seminal work on think tanks.

In the eyes of think tankers, by being free from many of the constraints that the more traditional policy actors face (such as large organizational bureaucracies, party political considerations, member or voter demands, etc.) as well as by adding a distinctly ideological twist to the research results that they re-package and disseminate, think tanks can provide the public debate with something that no one else can: ideologically grounded, realistic, and far-sighted policy advice. In this context, the studied think tanks' apparent need for differentiation from more traditional Swedish civil society actors has a clear elite–grassroots dimension.

In the interviews, the ability of the think tanks to survive and act in a politically anti-cyclical climate is frequently linked to those of their traits that—in our conceptualization—place them at the elite end of the elite–grassroots continuum: expertise, professionalism, flexibility, and independence. Think tanks connected to, or working in opposition to, different movements and grassroots organizations can, according to our respondents, take advantage of these traits as insulated elite professional organizations to approach issues and apply perspectives that are more difficult for larger grassroots-oriented organizations to address. In the eyes of our interviewees, think tanks can thus be the actor and the voice that the more traditional organizations in their movements or spheres cannot be, especially in times of an adverse political climate. The ease with which our interviewees point to the advantages that their more elite-profiled character provides for their movements or spheres might be interpreted as a sign of a changing norm regarding organizing in civil society in Sweden (cf. Wijkström, 2011).

An interesting next step in research on the Swedish think tank landscape would be to look more closely at the individuals inhabiting and working inside the think tanks to further our understanding of how they build up their own professional identities. As noted above, Medvetz (2010) argues that think tank staff, i.e., what he calls policy experts, create their identity using building blocks from the four different spheres of academia, politics, economics, and media. Would the same patterns be evident in a Swedish context given that the interviewees in this study did not emphasize all of these areas?

Previous research on think tanks highlights the difficulty of defining these organizations, with the think tank concept being seen as empirical, slippery, and hard to tie to a number of clear characteristics. A takeaway from the study is that research on think tanks needs to take contextual factors that may affect the identity of this type of organization more into account.

Swedish think tanks operate in a policy environment which for the last century has been centred around two distinct ideological spheres, but which has also in the last three decades seen a significant ideological shift in society. These two institutional factors appear to be central to the self-understanding of the organizations studied. While the importance of the national institutional architecture for the role and function of think tanks in society has already been approached in the literature (Åberg et al., 2019), the results of the present study point to such architecture being central also to the way in which think tanks collectively work on constructing their and others' shared understanding of what think tanks are.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Three Types of Denial: Think Tanks as a Reluctant Civil Society Elite

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Abstract
Think tanks, or policy advice institutions, are civil society organizations producing and delivering social analysis to policymakers and the wider public. Their aim is to influence policy in a given direction. Compared to most other civil society organizations, they hold relatively privileged positions, both in terms of wealth (on average bigger budgets and staffs), political influence (their very raison d'être), knowledge (educational level of the staff), and social networks. Thus, it seems beyond dispute that think tanks adhere to the elite of civil society. This article focuses on think tanks' negative self-identification, on their reluctance to accept labels. Not only are think tanks unwilling to take on the elite designation, some of them also deny being part of civil society, and some go one step further in denying identification with the think tank community. These multiple denials are expected if we recall Pierre Bourdieu's observation that "all aristocracies define themselves as being beyond all definition" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 316). The analysis focuses on how this definitional ambiguity is discursively constructed. Think-tankers are often described as situated in an interstitial space between such fields as politics, civil society, media, market, and academia. While this intermediary position is the source of their unique role as converters of various forms of capital, it also complicates the identity formation of think tanks. The argument is illustrated by Polish think tanks and the data consists of original interviews with think tank leaders. The article provides a novel perspective on think tanks and on civil society elites.

Keywords
Bourdieu; civil society; elite; Poland; think tanks

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Civil Society Elites" edited by Håkan Johansson (Lund University, Sweden) and Anders Uhlin (Lund University, Sweden).

1. Introduction

This article analyzes think tanks as a civil society elite. Think tanks, or policy advice institutions, are civil society organizations producing and delivering social analysis to policymakers and the wider public. Their aim is to influence policy in a given direction but one that, allegedly, is not defined by any vested interests. The claim to independence and orientation at influencing policymaking is central for think tanks (Jezierska & Sörbom, 2020). The distinctive traits of think tanks are drawn from their interstitial position between other fields (Medvetz, 2012a, 2012b), such as academia, politics, media, market, and civil society. This in-between position leads to a combination of various qualifications, functions, and professional models in these organizations. Operating on the verge of other fields, think tanks perform boundary work converting capital from the other fields. Compared to most other civil society organizations, think tanks are relatively privileged, both in terms of wealth (on average bigger budgets), political influence (their very raison d'être), knowledge (educational level of the staff), and social networks. As such, it seems beyond dispute that think tanks belong to the elite of civil society.

This article focuses on the self-identification of think tanks. How do they identify with respect to the think tank community, the broader surrounding civil society, and their elite position in it? The argument is that think tanks, qua civil society elite, define themselves in negative terms. Their identity is built on three types of denial: of their place in civil society; of being a think tank; and of constituting an elite. While most think-tankers

agree that, at least formally, they belong to civil society, they clearly mark their difference with respect to other civil society organizations. They also negate belonging to a civil society elite. Even more puzzling is that some think tanks decline the definition of their organization as a think tank. I argue that these denials are rather indicative of elites if we recall Pierre Bourdieu's observation that "all aristocracies define themselves as being beyond all definition" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 316). This negative identification is interpreted as a logical consequence of think tanks' interstitial positioning between different fields, a source of their elevated status. Definitional ambiguity, even though frustrating for scholars of this phenomenon, actually suits these organizations well in the performance of their functions. To substantiate these claims, the article builds on interviews with Polish think-tankers. While studies of Polish civil society abound, it is still a rather understudied context for think tank scholarship.

The remaining text is structured as follows. First, I present a short reflection on the relation between civil society, think tanks, and elites, positioning this article in the Thematic Issue. Second comes a background section on the development of think tanks and civil society in Poland, followed by a brief clarification of which organizations were selected for this study and how they are analyzed. The analysis section is divided thematically in three types of denial. In the conclusion I try to make sense of the triple negative identification of think tanks.

2. Does Civil Society Have Elites?

Elites (from French *élite*, etymologically derived from Latin 'chosen, elected person') can be defined as those members of a society who hold socially privileged positions, whether in terms of wealth, political influence, cultural prestige, social networks, knowledge, or some other relevant assets, and who are recognized by others as legitimately occupying such a position (Bourdieu, 1996; Jezierski, 2020). In other words, elites constitute the hegemonic groups in a society. The notion of elite captures the relative position of various individuals and groups in a field. Any larger group will produce stratification, a hierarchical order with the privileged at the top (cf. iron law of oligarchy, Michels, 1915; Nodia, 2020). Thus, when we zoom in on the civil society field, we will necessarily discover differentiation between its members, with some cherishing a more elevated status.

Contrary to the usual approach of studying elites at the individual or group levels, the contribution of this article to the Thematic Issue is to interpret the theme of civil society elites as a distinction between various organizations of civil society. Instead of focusing on the elevated individuals within civil society, the article studies civil society organizations that, as organizations, have a higher standing. Seen this way, we necessarily bring the perspective of internal conflict and struggle to the analysis of civil society (cf. Gramsci, 1971/2005). The organizations and individuals constituting civil society do not form a unified entity if there is social distinction and power at stake. Moreover, we should not expect any homogeneity or coherence among the elites. Those belonging to the elite (whether analyzed at the organizational or individual level) may well be dispersed and in conflict with each other. This is, in fact, what is more probable, as they compete for the same type of capital.

The argument in this article departs from the observation that think tanks are among the organizations that form the civil society elite. It is a common approach to analyze think tanks as part of civil society, as a specific type of NGO (e.g., Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter, 2019; Jezierska, 2018; McGann & Weaver, 2000; Ohemeng, 2015; Stone, 2007). Civil society literature, on its part, often includes think tanks as an object of study (e.g., Diamond, 1994; Jobert & Kohler-Koch, 2008; Scholte, 2002). However, an explicit discussion of what position think tanks occupy with respect to the broader civil society is rather rare (but see some comments about it in Jezierska, 2018; Klásková & Císař, 2020; Stone, 2007). As Diane Stone (2007, p. 269) explains:

> [T]hink tanks cater primarily to the economically and politically literate and are at some distance from the rest of society. The people who found these institutes and the people who work in them are usually highly educated, male, middle-class, Westernized professionals, often from privileged backgrounds. The organizational mandates—to inform and/or influence public policy—drives them to engage with other usually more powerful elites in society.

Hence, the contribution of this article is to bring this argument to the fore and analyze discursive means by which think tanks elevate themselves.

3. Civil Society and Think Tanks in Poland

For any study of civil society in Poland or other Central and Eastern European countries, the year 1989, which officially ended the state-socialist period (1945–1989), forms a critical juncture that cannot be ignored. It was a clear rupture in terms of political and economic organization of these societies, but also a spark for the construction of a new pluralistic public sphere. Obviously, 1989 was not a magical reset button (Iłowiecka-Tańska, 2011, p. 40), which forced all social life to organize anew. There is enough evidence of an "incomplete," "dissident," or "one-sided" civil society prior to 1989 (Buchowski, 1996; Ekiert & Kubik, 2014), the Solidarity movement being just one prominent example. Nevertheless, the post-1989 period undoubtedly offered substantially changed conditions and opportunities for civic action. Alongside the plethora of informal civic initiatives, a new organizational model materialized—the professionalized NGO. The mushrooming of these organizations added up to an "associational revolution" (Ekiert & Kubik, 2014). Thus,

the third sector, i.e., a legally recognized, institutionalized, and professionalized set of NGOs was a new phenomenon, while the wider civil society and civic engagement obviously had a longer tradition, stretching back to not only pre-1989 but also to before World War II (Frączak, 2013).

The formation of this new third sector in post-state-socialist Poland coincided with the emergence of think tanks. Most Polish think tanks were founded in the early years of transformation to liberal democracy and capitalism, i.e., in the 1990s and early 2000s. Just as in the case of civic engagement, one might identify proto-think tanks among organizations from the state-socialist period. However, given the conditions of policymaking under communist rule, these institutions were heavily controlled by the party and did not even aspire to make an appearance of independence. Since 1989, the pluralist model has been adopted in Poland (Czaputowicz & Stasiak, 2012), allowing for non-governmental actors' engagement in policymaking. Just as Struyk (1999) reports in his study of Bulgaria, Armenia, Russia, and Hungary, in Poland too the support from Western governments and foundations for think tanks and NGOs more broadly was apparent from the first months of the transition. After the first wave of think tanks were launched in the early to mid-1990s their number oscillated at around 40, which was in the top tier in the region. Among the more visible think tanks during that time were CASE—Center for Social and Economic Research (*Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych*), founded in Warsaw in 1991, and Institute for Market Economy Research (*Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową*), founded in Gdańsk in 1989. Both specialize in economic analysis and have been rather active in promoting the neoliberal orientation of reforms in Poland as well as in other Central European countries (cf. Krastev, 2000). Their successes were clearly shown by the hegemonic discourse of "no alternative" to the shock therapy style of transition (e.g., Ost, 2000; Woś, 2014). Another important institution from that early period is Batory Foundation (*Fundacja Batorego*) launched in Warsaw in 1988. Batory quickly became the go-to foundation supporting a variety of newly created NGOs in Poland and beyond. It also developed its own in-house social analysis unit, assisting transition to an open, liberal society, in line with the will of its founder, George Soros.

A second stage in the development of the Polish think tank landscape came around 2015, when the nationalist right-wing party Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) came to power, initiating a so-called second transition to 'illiberal democracy.' As of 2020, there are approximately 60 think tanks in the country. Many of the new organizations share the ruling party's ideological orientation and push it to promote conservative and Catholic policy solutions. The Institute for Legal Culture Ordo Iuris (*Instytut na Rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris*) is the prime example here. It was founded in 2013 and has been very active both in Poland and internationally (e.g., at the UN fora), proclaiming for instance anti-abortion and anti-LGBT regulations.

In effect, the Polish think tank landscape is composed of quite varied institutions. Polish think tanks cover a broad ideological spectrum from the left to the right and they showcase diversity with respect to funding sources and size (Jezierska, in press). Compared to the more known cases from the Anglophone world, the actual involvement of Polish think tanks in policymaking is rather limited however (Biskup & Schöll-Mazurek, 2018; Cadier & Sus, 2017). There are surely some spectacular cases of successes in promoting given policy solutions, also by the above-mentioned think tanks, but on the whole, Polish think tanks lack systematic access channels to policymakers. Those who succeed need to be resourceful and find non-given paths to the ears of powerholders. Think-tankers usually blame their relatively meagre impact on the "immaturity" of the Polish political class (Jezierska, 2020), which results in policymakers only sporadically resorting to external policy advice. Nevertheless, think tanks have become given players on the Polish political scene and some of them manage to gain quite a lot of public attention.

In contrast to the vast literature on think tanks in the Anglophone world, especially in the US, the focus on think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe has so far attracted much less scholarly consideration. There is, however, a growing number of studies ranging from inventorial reports to more analytical approaches (on Central and Eastern Europe see e.g., Bigday, 2020; Jezierska & Giusti, 2020; Keudel & Carbou, 2020; Kimball, 2000; Klásková & Císař, 2020; Krastev, 2000; Sandle, 2004; Schneider, 2002; Struyk, 1999; and specifically on Poland see Bąkowski & Szlachetko, 2012; Biskup & Schöll-Mazurek, 2018; Cadier & Sus, 2017; Czaputowicz & Stasiak, 2012; Hess, 2013; Jezierska, 2015, 2018, 2020a, 2020b; Zbieranek, 2011; Ziętara, 2010). This article builds on findings from this research and contributes the perspective on Polish think tanks as a civil society elite.

4. Data and Methods

There is no unequivocal definition of a think tank in the literature. The characteristics of think tanks most commonly pointed out are engagement in policy advice, independence from governments, and social interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties as well as a non-profit character (e.g., Abelson, 2009; Rich, 2004; Stone, 2000; Weaver, 1989; Weaver & McGann, 2000). All these attributes can be questioned in any given study of think tanks. Some think tanks are government institutions, some are party affiliated, other are sponsored by business organizations. Many institutions do conduct for-profit activities to diversify their funding and secure resources for the costly policy analysis. This makes think tanks a loosely defined organizational type. Following common praxis, this article departs from a working definition where think tanks are understood as civil soci-

ety organizations that claim independence (but do not actually have to be independent) and attempt to influence policymaking (succeeding to varying degrees in this endeavor) based on the social analysis they produce. This definition is deliberately kept open to capture different declinations of the think tank model. Thus, the crucial aspects that helped identify the objects of this study are the research/analysis component in the organization, activities aiming at policy influence and claims to independence.

The selected sample of think tanks includes nine organizations (Batory Foundation, Civic Institute, Civil Development Forum, Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought, Green Institute, Political Critique, Sobieski Institute, The Institute of Public Affairs, and The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard) out of 40 existing at the time (2013). Hence, the data addresses the Polish think tank landscape at the end of its first stage of development (1989–2015), i.e., before the coming to power of the Law and Justice party. While the conditions for think tanks in Poland have changed after 2015, it is mostly visible in power shifts within the think tank community, with organizations previously marginalized now gaining traction because they support the ideological line of the ruling party and major organizations pre-2015 having problems with obtaining state-funded grants. It means that the analysis presented here, focusing on identification of think tanks as a specific type of organization, applies to the currently reconfigured space of think tanks as well.

All organizations selected for this study fulfill the working definition criteria and figure in previous literature as think tanks, even though, as we will see in the analysis, some deny identification with the think tank community. The sample was constructed to represent the Polish think tank population at the time. This means, for instance, that all but one of the studied organizations are located in the capital. To capture the diversity of the Polish think tanks, the sampled organizations vary in terms of ideological leaning (from the leftist Political Critique, the neoliberal Civil Development Forum, to the conservative Sobieski Institute), organizational age (e.g., Batory Foundation founded in 1988, Institute of Public Affairs founded in 1995, and Civil Institute founded in 2010), size of the budget and staff (e.g., Sobieski Institute with four employees and a budget below EUR 500,000, Institute of Public Affairs with 25 employees and a budget of almost EUR 2 million), as well as different areas of specialization (e.g., cultural policy for Political Critique, environmental policy for Green Institute, economic policy for Civil Development Forum, and a broad spectrum of policies for the Institute of Public Affairs).

It can be debated what constitutes the identity of an organization, whether it should be identified through how the leader defines the organization, or through the aggregated sense of identity of the staff. For the purpose of this article, I approach organizational identity through an interrogation of key figures in these organizations. Hence, the data consist of interviews with think tank leaders, i.e., those who have the power to strategically position the organization closer or further away from various surrounding actors (cf. van Knippenberg, 2016). In the case of bigger organizations, additional interviews were conducted with project leaders to capture a more comprehensive picture and make sure the individual identity narrative of the leader did not take over the organizational perspective. In total, 16 qualitative semi-structured interviews with Polish think tank leaders were conducted. Each interview lasted about an hour. In line with the informed consent, each conversation was recorded, transcribed, and translated to English by the author. It was made clear to the interviewees that they were expected to reflect upon their organization's position with regard to other fields, not their individual positioning.

The analysis of the data followed the standard procedure of qualitative content analysis (e.g., Mayring, 2004), with thematic coding of the interview material. The qualitative approach to data gathering and analysis has implications for the generalizability of the findings. While simple extrapolation to other contexts is not advised, it does not mean that the results presented here are purely idiosyncratic. Generalizability in qualitative research comes from the "fit of the topic or the comparability of the problem that is of concern" (Morse, 1999, p. 6). While the purposeful composition of the sample is obviously not representative in the statistical sense, it nevertheless captures the variety of positions that brings forth a comprehensive and credible identity narrative of Polish think tanks. Moreover, the issues related to the positioning of think tanks with regard to other civil society organizations and the specific intermediary role think tanks play is shared by this type of organization beyond Poland. Previous scholarship has convincingly argued that think tanks are best understood as boundary organizations (Medvetz, 2012b). This article analyzes what implications this intermediary position has for think tank identity and in this sense the results apply beyond the immediate case analyzed here. There are scattered comments in the literature indicating that this claim is substantiated. For instance, a study of Canadian think tanks (Lindquist, 1989) notes that think-tankers at times object to being classified as such. A recent article on Swedish and Polish think tanks (Jezierska & Sörbom, 2020) singles out distancing from various actors, including civil society, as one fundamental mechanism by which these organizations wish to secure the perception of independence. The analysis in this article concentrates on one discursive strategy, i.e., denial, that I argue springs from the intermediary position of think tanks and helps them affirm their elevated position through distancing from other actors. The Polish case should be seen as an illustration of the specific arguments think-tankers use to maneuver their identity, putting forth specific denials of identification with civil society, with think tanks and with the elite.

5. Three Types of Denial

5.1. Denial 1: Not Civil Society

In Poland, think tanks fall into the same legal category as other NGOs, thus being part of the third sector. Just like other NGOs, they register as either associations or foundations. However, the interviewed organizations display ambiguity with respect to a civil society identity. To mark their adherence to civil society, some of the interviewed think tanks use the label of 'think-and-do tank.' This is a way of stressing the activist component of what they do, combining advocacy and expert functions with direct community engagement (Jezierska, 2020). One think-tanker even argued that her organization is akin to a social movement: "Our aim was basically to combine the intellectual dimension with a social movement" (Political Critique). While this is a rather unusual claim, a recurring theme in the interviews was the desire to make a tangible impact on social life, by engaging in testing or implementing their proposed policy solutions. This positions the studied organisations in proximity to other NGOs:

> [We] engage in social campaigning, realized in partnership with other organizations, which are NGOs but not think tanks. We subscribe to and feel like we are a part of this community. We don't want to be the know-it-alls who sit on the sidelines and say [what to do]. (Institute of Public Affairs)

Contrary to the perception of think tanks as distanced experts who deliver recommendations for action, here the drive to be active and connected to other NGOs was stressed. At the same time, think tanks' position with respect to the broader civil society is ambiguous. The interviewees recognize the formal categorization of their organizations as part of the third sector, even though their identity is often detached from it. The CEO of a leftist think tank clarifies:

> The natural legal form of a think tank is an association, so in this way, I am part of the third sector. But I never had a need to work in the sector; what I wanted to do happened to be formally situated in the third sector. (Lassalle Centre for Social Thought)

The CEO from the conservative Sobieski Institute argues even more forcefully: "I don't see myself as a worker in the third sector. The third sector has connotations that I don't identify with." The distance to the third sector is emphasized and the distinctiveness of think tanks as professionalized knowledge producers and experts is highlighted. As the CEO from a major center-liberal think tank explains:

> My dilemma was to choose an academic career or something else, so, frankly, I rather chose to work in a think tank than in the third sector.
>
> *So do you define it as something separate?*
> It wasn't obvious to me that I would work in the third sector. Think tanks were actually things that were slightly off to the side. (Institute of Public Affairs)

While the above quotes can be read as reflections about personal career trajectories, expressing the habitus of think tank leaders, they also reveal organizational identify. As the rich organizational literature has it, when it comes to identity the individual and organizational levels are closely intertwined (e.g., Dejordy & Creed, 2016) and especially in the case of leaders, their perceptions of what a think tank is has huge impact on how they position the organization, its distance, or closeness to other actors.

Think tanks apparently have mixed identities and ambitions. Being "slightly off to the side," they both are and are not part of civil society. Denying a civil society identity is a way to carve their distinctive space in the sociopolitical landscape. What the interviewed organizations claim distinguishes think tanks from other NGOs are the intellectual ambition and research component of their activity, as well as the drive to engage in policymaking.

5.2. Denial 2: Not Think Tanks

As discussed above, the interviewed organizations ambiguously relate to the civil society field by stressing that their identity as think tanks takes priority. It might then seem slightly paradoxical that they, at times, also deny being think tanks. In the analyzed data, this second type of denial comes from two opposing positions. The interviewed organizations either pointed out their organizational deficiencies, which allegedly prevent them from living up to the think tank label, or conversely, they elevated themselves and dismissively talked about think tanks as organizations they do not want to be conflated with.

Not displaying a clear-cut think tank identity is explained by the necessity to engage in multiple tasks and not being able to keep the focus on what is perceived as the main think tank activity. This impurity of focus is mostly blamed on problems with securing stable funding over time:

> As a pure think tank, it [the Institute of Public Affairs] would never survive, it wouldn't have enough financial means for the activities, so unfortunately, we need to reach out for different projects. We are careful to always have a research component, but it's often simply concrete engagement [*konkretne działania*]. (Institute of Public Affairs)

Here, again, the distinction between civil society and think tank functions is underscored and the very fact of mixing them is used to argue for an insufficiently pure think tank identity. The interviewees seem to believe that these problems are unique for the Polish context:

> Here [in Poland] it's very difficult to keep the [think tank] structure, and most of these organizations simply vegetate, taking on whatever they want or, rather, whatever they can. The Institute [of Public Affairs] also ended up there—"We do some training and some grant-giving because there was money for organizations dealing with legal help." The institutions become hybrids, not like in the West. (Batory Foundation)

While in other contexts funding might indeed be more readily available for think tanks (e.g., due to more developed philanthropy), hybridity is discussed in the academic literature as a typical feature of think tanks (e.g., Medvetz, 2012b; Stone, 2007). In the eyes of the interviewees, however, the impurity of focus on policy analysis and advice sets the Polish institutions apart, making them not fully think tanks. The dispute over what constitutes a think tank and how to identify one is apparently something the interviewees struggle with as well:

> The hybrids emerge, like Shipyard and Political Critique [both interviewed for this study], with all their dissociating from being a think tank, they actually do, from time to time, put on the think tank hat. They also deal with policy issues; they aren't non-think tanks. It's apparent that this clear-cut distinction is being erased. (Institute of Public Affairs)

As noted, impurity is partly blamed on financial instability. Most Polish think tanks rely on short-term public and private grants (Jezierska, in press), forcing them to take on varied tasks. Yet another factor that the interviewees list as seemingly disqualifying their organization as a think tank is insufficient academic credentials: "In fact, we couldn't compete with formal think tanks because we don't have this whole establishment with all the degrees" (Shipyard). Interestingly, we know from empirical findings from other contexts that even though conducting policy research is a necessary component of a think tank, it is present to a varying degree. To capture this variance in think tanks' dedication to research, only some organizations that have a significant number of academically accredited staffers and primarily produce academic-like book-length publications are dubbed "universities without students" (Weaver, 1989). For most think tanks, impurity of focus is a defining characteristic coming from their specific boundary position.

Some other interviewees stressed alterity with regard to the think tank identification aiming at positive distinction. Independence and the ambition of the interviewed organizations to initiate new debates were listed as elements that seemingly distance them from a think tank identity. Again, these qualities are usually included as core characteristics (or aspirations) of a think tank but were presented by these interviewees as something distinguishing their organization from, in this account, a negatively viewed 'real think tank':

> That is, we for sure cherish more agency [*podmiotowość*] and feel more sovereign because think tanks are often linked to someone else, usually someone stands behind them. We have nobody behind us, and we're not anybody's instrument; this is how I'd put it. This is one thing, and another is the level of operating. Think tanks are more at the instrumental level, not truly creating completely new ideas but rather ascribing a certain ideology to given interests. (Political Critique)

Here, the perspective discussed above, in which a lack of identification with think tanks is explained by Polish institutions being insufficient in terms of their purity of focus, is reversed. What we see, in contrast, is a pejorative view of think tanks, while the interviewed organization conveys a more ambitious and independent image, looking down on think tanks and distancing itself from these institutions. In both cases, the denial is clear.

In a study of Canadian think tanks, Lindquist (1989) observes their reluctance to take on the think tank label noting several cases where respondents claim that they do more than 'think.' Apparently, particular motivations for denying a think tank identity might differ, but this type of denial seems to transcend the Polish case.

5.3. Denial 3: Not Elite

With regard to measures such as budget size (economic capital) and formal qualifications of the staff (educational capital), think tanks clearly place themselves in the upper tier of the civil society field. Despite some variation in budget sizes between Polish think tanks, the available assets of even the 'poorest' think tanks place them among the 'richest' NGOs in the country (cf. Jezierska, in press). According to a recent report (Klon/Jawor, 2019), in 2018 only 6% of all Polish NGOs operated with budgets bigger than EUR 230,000 (PLN 1 million), while all but two think tanks in this study exceed a EUR 500,000 budget. This is not surprising, given the fact that policy analysis and advice are expensive activities. They both require highly qualified staff and often long-term commitment to analysis on which policy recommendations are based. Higher education is generally correlated with engagement in civil society (Czapiński & Panek, 2015), but even here think tanks stand out with respect to other NGOs, showcasing a higher level of academic credentials, which is the source of their expert image.

Apart from their main activities, i.e., attempts at directly or indirectly influencing policymakers based on the social analysis they produce, think tanks sometimes take an explicit leadership role with regard to the civil society in Poland. They often have "promotion of civil society" or "development of the public sphere" in their mission statements (Jezierska, 2018), thus positioning themselves as initiators or moderators of these entities. Think tanks also provide training, distribute funding, and offer other types of support for smaller NGOs. These functions

might be read as an embracement of the civil society elite role.

However, rather than self-identifying as a civil society elite, think-tankers repeatedly stress their intermediary position between different elites. Having access to academia, civil society, media, and politics, they see themselves as enablers, mediators, or "vehicles of the articulation of elites…a machine to build social contact" (Sobieski Institute). They point to their function of connecting elites. Being partly associated with various fields, they accumulate and convert economic, academic and media capital into political capital using advocacy and networking as conversion tools (cf. Keudel & Carbou, 2020). Thus, they become translators, brokers, or converters of the different forms of capital at stake in the surrounding fields. Their unique interstitial position allows think tanks to play the role of "mapping and gathering elites—people with knowledge, engagement, and contacts" (Sobieski Institute).

Asked about their target audience, the interviewees point to political, business, and media elites, the ones who decide the shape of a society. The role of think tanks, according to a leftist think tank, is to "put pressure on the political and economic elites to change their way of thinking" (Political Critique), which is the only way (progressive) social change can happen. Think tanks present themselves as crucial agents of change having enough organizational capacity and access to "people on important positions" (Sobieski Institute). They stress their interactions with elites, who are identified elsewhere.

With regard to budget size, formal qualifications of their staff and type of activity they perform (functions towards smaller organizations), Polish think tanks occupy a leading position with respect to Polish civil society. At the same time, they are also detached from civil society in the sense that they do not claim to represent a broader constituency, or any specific group in civil society. Their "assertion of a voice in the policy-making process is based on their claim to expertise rather than as a vox populi" (Weaver & McGann, 2000, p. 17). Think tanks claim to serve ideas, not members or followers (or funders), which creates distance between them and other NGOs. "NGOs may therefore view the 'research community' negatively: elite, exclusive and with insubstantial connections to the general public" (Stone, 2007, p. 270). Think tanks are closely tied with other elites and are viewed by others as an elite, but they do not themselves identify as constituting an elite. Instead, they see their role as putting pressure on elites, mediating between different elite types and converting various forms of capital. It should be noted that the usually pejorative descriptions of elitism and elitist (Williams, 2015) obviously influence any groups' propensity to self-identify as an elite.

6. Conclusion

This article focused on the self-identification of Polish think tanks. A comprehensive study of elites should include both the self-perceptions and means adopted to gain the privileged status as well as legitimation procedures, i.e., processes through which other groups and individuals in the field legitimize and counter the elevated position of the elite (Jezierski, 2020). The latter, however, is left for future studies to explore. The argument in this article, investigating self-identification only, is not that all Polish think tanks express all three types of denial. Some of them do, while others stress one of the types and perceive the other identifications as less problematic. Nevertheless, seen collectively, as the space of think tanks, the ambiguous positioning with respect to other fields emerges as an important characteristic of think tanks. This ambiguity is also reflected in the lack of definitional clarity in the academic literature on think tanks. There is no widely accepted definition of think tanks and scholars often resort to working definitions to make empirical studies feasible.

What unites all think tanks is their interstitial position. They occupy the space in-between the fields of politics, media, academia, and civil society. Such a position grants them the role of intermediaries—being the ones who understand and to some extent incorporate the logics of all those fields, they are not engaged in one field only. As intermediaries, think tanks convert different types of capital, becoming translators or brokers. Their elevated position is not based on the number of members or followers, but rather on the capacity to formulate policy recommendations or discourse around a policy issue in such a way that it gets traction among decision makers and/or the broader public. This is facilitated through a think tank's academic credentials—which give them the image of experts—through their fluency in the media language which allows them to formulate their recommendations as soundbites, through their links to civil society which makes these recommendations appear as disinterested and non-for-profit, and through their contacts in policy circles—which grant them access to those who make political decisions. The interstitial position, however, is both the very key to think tanks' unique role and what complicates their (self-)identification. To grasp who they are and to carve out a sufficiently distinctive identity multiple points of reference are needed. The Polish example provides an illustration of what the intermediary role of think tanks entails for their identity with denial of identification with various fields as a discursive strategy to deal with the interstitial position. Based on sporadic comments from previous literature, we can infer that this is not a unique trait and strategy for Polish think tanks. However, more studies on other contexts are needed, also to verify whether the specific arguments used by Polish think tanks are unique.

This article analyzed three types of denial, which I contend are central to a think tank identity. The studied Polish think tanks deny their identification with civil society, with the think tank community and with being a (civil society) elite. If we follow Bourdieu (1996), claims to being "beyond all definition" are indicative of elites.

Although some recognition and visibility are needed to attract funders, to some extent think tanks also need to stay obscure, which helps them exert policy influence without attracting too much attention and calls for accountability. The rhetorical moves of denial can also be seen as an expression of what Cynthia Weber (2016) calls a "plural figure" that defies categorization as either/or. Weber (2016) sought to describe a pluralized masculine and/or feminine identification. In the case of think tanks, plurality refers to identifications with roles, functions, and logics of the multiple fields in which think tanks are immersed, while defying any simple ascription to a single field.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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