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Climate Governance and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times

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Editorial

European Union Climate Governance and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times

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Abstract
In December 2019, the European Commission published the European Green Deal (EGD), an overarching policy framework to achieve climate neutrality in Europe by 2050. This thematic issue aims to understand the origins, form, development, and scope of the EGD and its policy areas. It uses the concept of turbulence to explore and assess the emergence of the EGD and the policy and governance choices associated with it. Focusing on different levels of governance, different policy domains, and different stages of policymaking, each contribution raises pertinent questions about the necessity of identifying sources of turbulence and of understanding how to govern with such turbulence, rather than against it. Overall, the articles in this issue demonstrate that, while specifying contextual factors, researching the sources of and responses to turbulence provides useful insights into the development, direction, and potential durability or advancement of EU climate governance.

Keywords
climate change; European Green Deal; European Union; turbulent governance

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Climate Governance and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times" edited by Claire Dupont (Ghent University, Belgium) and Diarmuid Torney (Dublin City University, Ireland).

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In December 2019, the European Commission, led by newly appointed President Ursula von der Leyen, published the European Green Deal (EGD): an overarching policy framework to achieve climate neutrality in Europe by 2050. The EGD can be regarded as a new venture in EU climate governance (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; Dupont et al., 2020). As the EGD moves into its implementation phase from 2021 onwards, the emergence and development of the EGD deserve further scrutiny and research. Does the EGD represent a true shift in EU climate governance? How has the EGD emerged, given the broader turbulent governance context? Is the EGD itself a source of turbulence in the wider EU governance system? What can we learn from previous EU climate governance approaches for the implementation of the EGD?

This thematic issue aims to understand the origins, form, development, and scope of the EGD and its policy areas, especially given the general context for climate governance that can be described as turbulent. The articles contribute both empirical and conceptual insights on the development of the EGD. Although analysis of the EGD is in its early stages (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; Dupont et al., 2020; Skjærseth, 2021), and necessarily preliminary as we await the agreement and implementation of the policies and legislation associated with the EGD at the time of writing, the thematic issue contributes to knowledge by building on past developments in EU climate governance across several areas of focus, and analysing these developments in light of the conceptual lens of turbulence.

While much research on the EU has focused on governance in times of crisis, and indeed during a conglomerate of crises (Falkner, 2016; von Homeyer et al., 2021), we consider whether "turbulence" proves a (more) useful

lens for analysing EU climate governance. Turbulence and crisis are not identical. While crisis occurs suddenly or unexpectedly, turbulence refers rather to the shifting ground upon which usual governance actions occur, leading to choices between governing with or against turbulence. The very puzzle inherent in the EGD is that it has emerged and developed in turbulent times: It was published during one major crisis for the EU (Brexit) and advanced towards implementation during another severe crisis (the Covid-19 pandemic), meaning that the prevailing context was turbulent.

Further, these crises added to the general lack of unity among member states on climate policy more broadly, with a persistent division between Poland and its allies and the rest of the EU member states on the degree and scope of climate policy ambition (Skovgaard, 2014), meaning that the internal, organisational context around climate governance was also turbulent. Crisis can certainly provide opportunity, but the EGD seems—at least on paper—to move far beyond what would have been considered a feasible governance option, even in 2018 (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020; Skjærseth, 2021). It may itself be a source of turbulence for other governance domains. Turbulence has not previously been applied to the EU governance context. The contributors to this thematic issue use the concept of turbulence to explore and assess the emergence of the EGD and the policy and governance choices associated with it.

In the first article, Mary Dobbs, Viviane Gravey, and Ludivine Petetin provide a detailed conceptual discussion of turbulence and its potential application in analysing EU climate and environmental governance (Dobbs et al., 2021). Building on the conceptualisation by Ansell et al. (2016), they discuss various types of turbulence, including horizontal, scalar, environmental, organisational, and policy turbulence. They ask whether the EGD is an effort to govern with or against turbulence, and whether the sources of turbulence are understood by EU policy actors. The authors lay out important questions about the role of turbulence in understanding governance choices, and how the EU deals with turbulence in climate governance. The rest of the articles in the thematic issue provide initial insights into these questions.

Marco Siddi's contribution analyses negotiations on the European Climate Law and on the 2030 target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the EU (Siddi, 2021). He examines the interactions of three types of turbulence: environmental, organisational, and scalar. The negotiations took place in a context of broader environmental turbulence that, Siddi argues, was intensified by the Covid-19 pandemic. Organisational turbulence manifested itself in diverging positions among EU institutions and inside those institutions, while turbulence of scale was present in several conflicts with some member states. Siddi finds that such interactions of turbulence did not prevent governance choices being made, but led to certain (types of) compromises in the negotiations. His article highlights that turbulence remains a challenge to EU climate governance in general.

Continuing the analysis of turbulence in EU climate governance, Jana Gheuens and Sebastian Oberthür ask how much the EU has integrated a long-term view into its climate and energy policy and ambition (Gheuens & Oberthür, 2021). Overall, they find that the degree of myopia (or short-sightedness) in EU climate and energy policy has fluctuated in the past, and they lay out questions for future research on the temporal dimensions of governance strategies. Their article warns of future inconsistencies in governance approaches to climate change if myopic policy choices are pursued.

The contribution by Jeffrey Rosamond and Claire Dupont explores how the European Council and the Council of the EU responded to the emergence and development of the EGD (Rosamond & Dupont, 2021). Division among member states is recognised as a source of organisational turbulence in EU climate governance (Biedenkopf, 2021; Siddi, 2021; Skovgaard, 2014) and the EGD developed during a time of environmental turbulence. The authors analysed 424 Council and European Council conclusions between 2018 and 2020 and found that—on paper—these intergovernmental EU institutions managed to govern with the environmental and organisational turbulence towards the EGD.

Odysseas Christou investigates the evolution of the conceptualisation of energy security in EU policy between 1995 and 2020 (Christou, 2021). He focuses on the policy formulation phase and traces the evolution through an analysis of policy documents. He finds that the conceptualisation of energy security changed from a narrow definition based on energy supply characteristics to an expanded conception integrating other elements, in line with the convergence of energy and climate policy objectives. Christou argues that the EGD represents a culmination of this evolution, which sees the EU governing through turbulence as both a response to crisis and a source of long-term policy adaptation.

Jonas Schoenefeld's contribution focusses on policy monitoring, emphasising the political nature of monitoring choices, and underlining the need to understand better the effects of policy monitoring, especially in the context of the EGD (Schoenefeld, 2021). If the EGD is or becomes a source of policy turbulence, the manifestation of this may appear in monitoring effects. Schoenefeld notes that monitoring regimes for policy instruments within EU climate governance vary, and that the subjects of monitoring may not always be clearly defined. A better understanding of who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s), Schoenefeld argues, can be key for the implementation of the EGD.

Diarmuid Torney's contribution studies the use of innovative forms of deliberative democracy in governing the response to climate change, which are a prominent feature of the EGD (Torney, 2021). He explores when and how such democratic innovations are likely to generate turbulence in the governance of climate transitions.

Using the cases of two recent and high-profile citizens' assemblies in Ireland and France on climate change, he finds that the institutional design of these processes but also the broader governance context shape how and in what ways such innovations contribute to turbulent climate governance.

Katja Biedenkopf considers the position of Poland on EU climate policy questions, which stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU's level of ambition (Biedenkopf, 2021). Her analysis identifies three distinct policy narratives in Polish climate policy: Poland is in a unique situation, Poland pursues an alternative pathway, and climate policy endangers competitiveness. Biedenkopf's findings confirm the dominance of the governing party's narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

Joseph Earsom and Tom Delreux focus on the international dimension of EU climate policy (Earsom & Delreux, 2021). They analyse the EU's role in the agreement of the Initial Strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). While this agreement formed part of the goals of the EU, the authors question the extent to which the EU was itself responsible for its goal achievement. Employing process-tracing, they reveal the interactions with other events and actors earlier in the negotiations that the EU could build on towards goal achievement. Their insights speak to research on the role of the EU as an international (climate) actor, underline points of attention for the external role of the EU in the EGD, and highlight the organisational and scalar turbulence playing out within this international negotiation forum.

Taken together, the articles in this thematic issue provide a broad view of the usefulness of examining EU policy and governance through the lens of turbulence. Although the articles touch upon different levels of governance, different policy domains, and different stages of policymaking, each raise pertinent questions about the necessity of identifying sources of turbulence and of understanding how to govern with such turbulence, rather than against it. Overall, the issue demonstrates that, while specifying contextual factors, researching the sources of and responses to turbulence provides useful insights into the development, direction, and potential durability or advancement of EU climate governance.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Driving the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times

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Abstract
The European Green Deal (EGD) is an ambitious strategy. However, significant events, incidents, and demands, from democratic backsliding in the EU to the Covid-19 pandemic, are causing the ground to shift underfoot. These events go beyond ordinary changes or even individual crises, cumulatively fuelling a "new normal" of turbulence for the EU, encompassing rapid, unpredictable changes. This turbulence can help and hinder policy design and implementation, requiring policy actors to think outside the box and beyond the status quo. This article investigates how the European Commission and other key actors can engage effectively *with* turbulence to ensure the successful delivery and implementation of the EGD. The first half of the article strengthens and adapts turbulent governance literature (Ansell & Trondal, 2018). It delineates how turbulence differs from crisis; expands the forms of turbulence to include horizontal scalar and policy turbulence, as well as its transversal attribute; and shifts the focus to governing *with* turbulence rather than against turbulence. The second half undertakes an initial analysis of the EGD in light of turbulence and provides a springboard for further investigations within this thematic issue and beyond. It is apparent that the EGD is both responding and contributing to a varied landscape of turbulence. Policy actors must identify and understand the sources of turbulence—including their transversal nature and the potential for responses to increase turbulence—if they are to effectively govern *with* turbulence.

Keywords
crisis; environmental governance; environmental turbulence; European Green Deal; organisational turbulence; policy turbulence; scalar turbulence

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1. Introduction

The European Green Deal (EGD) has become the central tenet of the von der Leyen Commission, setting out a holistic approach towards the climate and biodiversity crises with policies ranging from agriculture and food to a circular economy. It is both an overarching set of priorities of the new European Commission (hereafter Commission)—a communication published in December 2019 as it took office (European Commission, 2019b)—and the ensuing legislative and administrative agenda of 47 key actions. These span seven substantive themes: climate ambition; clean, affordable, and secure energy; industrial strategy for a clean and circular economy; sustainable and smart mobility; greening the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)/"Farm to Fork"; preserving and protecting biodiversity; and moving towards a zero-pollution ambition for a toxic free environment. To achieve this, the EGD promotes three procedural themes: mainstreaming sustainability in all EU policies, pushing for the EU to be a global leader and working together across levels, and policy areas for a European Climate Pact (European Commission, 2019a). Alongside its environmental ambition, it has a clear focus

on "just transition," e.g., to avoid massive unemployment in carbon-intensive industries overnight (European Commission, 2019b). The EGD therefore appears to promote an inclusive vision of sustainability with emphasis on a "just transition" that would leave "no one behind" (European Commission, 2019b, p.16). It pushes boundaries and proposes major changes beyond what the EU has attempted previously, including the key ambition of making Europe the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050. However, the EU is seeking to achieve this not merely in the face of crises but in the context of significant turbulence (Oberthür et al., 2016).

This article draws upon Ansell and co-authors' understanding of turbulence, which they define as "interactions of events or demands that are highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected or unpredictable" (Ansell et al., 2016, p. 3). They distinguish turbulence from crisis by drawing on notions of "shifting parameters," "intercurrence," and "temporal complexity" (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 45). Shifting parameters—the idea that "the ground is in motion" (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 45)—means turbulence aims not to capture the crisis response of stable political systems, but instead the "increasingly volatile context for complex problem-solving" (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 3). Intercurrence concerns "unexpected institutional entanglement" (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 45) which grows between normally independent levels and organisations when decision-makers try to respond to turbulence. These entanglements can be understood as "interplays" between institutions, "situations in which one institution affects the development or performance of another institution" (from the local to the global levels), ranging from "disruptive" to "synergetic" (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011, p. 4). While interplays are common and often managed, the growing number of institutions and their fluctuating mandates can lead to unexpected entanglements. Finally, temporal complexity captures the way decision-makers are put under strain by different and competing time horizons (Ansell & Trondal, 2018). When the three facets of shifting parameters, intercurrence, and temporal complexity combine, turbulence flourishes. The turbulence imbues the system, weaving its way through until it becomes the "new normal" or new landscape for political systems—to a similar extent that "rapid change and unpredictability in both the market and technology standards" is part of the business environment of many firms (Yun et al., 2019, p. 218). It is the point the UK has reached when delivering Brexit—a radical departure which destabilises policy, politics, and polity (Burns et al., 2019). It is also where the EU, which has faced repeated crises (Falkner, 2016; Rhinard, 2019), has now arrived—bringing both challenges and opportunities for the EGD and its ambitions.

This article addresses the question of how the Commission and other key actors can engage effectively *with* turbulence to ensure the successful delivery and implementation of the EGD, as an ambitious policy that arises in a turbulent landscape. It seeks to make both theoretical and practical contributions. The article (1) teases out the features that distinguish turbulence from crisis. It then (2) develops an enhanced conceptual framework focused on turbulence, building on Ansell and co-authors' work. It outlines the need to govern *with* rather than against turbulence; categorises the different forms of turbulence; and discusses the need to foster transformative actions towards durable policies. This provides an analytical foundation for the remainder of this article and also for this thematic issue. The article then applies this framework to undertake a preliminary analysis of the EGD. It (3) maps the four categories of turbulence on to the EGD, before (4) highlighting potential pathways and key challenges in developing and implementing the EGD in the face of turbulence, with a focus on Covid-19 and greening the CAP. As highlighted throughout this thematic issue, the EGD and the steps to implement it have the potential to be transformative, but with numerous challenges and pitfalls to be addressed. Not only is the EGD arising in the context of turbulence, it can be understood as both a response to, and a contributor to, turbulence at the EU level. If policy actors are effectively to govern *with* turbulence and thereby ensure the successful delivery and implementation of the EGD, they must identify and understand the sources of turbulence—including their transversal nature and the potential for responses to increase turbulence.

2. Differentiating Between Turbulence and Crisis

The EU has lived through many crises—indeed, Monnet famously argued that "Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises" (Monnet, 1976, as cited in Guiso et al., 2014, p. 1). This affinity between the EU and crisis—and between EU scholarship and crisis—may lead to concept overstretching and thus the need to clearly define what is and is not a crisis. At the heart of the concept of crisis is the existence of ordinary, non-crisis time—a crisis is an acute, extreme event which may ultimately be resolved leading to another period of calm (Saurugger, 2014). However, in recent years the EU has been beset by a multitude of crises, what Falkner termed "a conglomerate of specific but interconnected crises" (2016, p. 220). This begs the question of when, if ever, the EU can return to normal—if even "normal" makes sense for an ever-changing polity (Laffan et al., 2000). A recent questioning of what normal in the EU context means is Rhinard's work on crisification (2019). He found a growing number of dedicated crisis-scanning and crisis-managing institutions leading to a new mode of crisis policymaking operating alongside normal policymaking. Rhinard's crisification outlines how at least part of the EU's apparatus always operates in "crisis mode," even though normal policymaking continues in other areas.

Conceptualising the EU as experiencing turbulence goes a step further. Ansell et al. (2020) differentiate between turbulence and routine—turbulence has

long been considered the exception, not the norm, yet recently "the balance between the routine and the turbulent has shifted and we have been slow to catch up" (p. 3). This, we argue, is particularly true for the EU. We start from the premise that there is no returning to "normal" time in between times of "crisis." The balance has shifted so that the ever-changing turbulent context is the "new normal" (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 53), the new routine—turbulence is pervasive throughout the whole EU system (no policy area is isolated from its effects). While Rhinard (2019) focuses on the impact on EU decision-making with crisification, turbulence adopts a broader scope, considering the interplay with other policy areas and levels of governance. Furthermore, the conceptual shift to turbulence is also a normative shift, as crisis has negative connotations—"threaten[ing] the high-priority goals" (Saurugger, 2014, p. 181)—whereas turbulence may also be positive.

Crises may contribute to turbulence but the two concepts are distinct. A practical example may provide some clarity here. A once-off magnitude 8 earthquake, Pompeii-scale of volcanic eruption or resulting tsunami is a crisis for the affected populations and leads to emergency responses to survive that singular incident. However, a location that is subjected to repeated mid-level earthquakes or volcanic ash clouds, with occasional ones of greater intensity (including crisis-level ones), is subject to turbulence and requires a response that enables those affected to live with the turbulence, whether this be to change the structural design of buildings, what crops are grown (e.g., those with short lifecycles or benefiting from ash), or otherwise. Consequently, being able to identify sources of turbulence—and not only crises—and tailor appropriate responses is an essential part of the governance toolkit.

3. A Framework for Turbulent Times

As noted, turbulence entails a new normal that encompasses shifting parameters, intercurrence, and temporal complexity. Whilst traditional approaches to governance or decision-making may be effective in the doldrums or even for individual crises, a tailored framework is needed in the context of turbulence. To respond effectively to turbulence, policy actors need to be able to identify and understand (1) the over-arching goal of governance in the context of turbulence; (2) specific instances and sources of turbulence; and (3) suitable responses to the turbulence. Consequently, this section outlines a conceptual framework to achieve this analysis, building on and adapting the work of Ansell and co-authors to the EU context.

3.1. Steering Through Turbulence: Governing With and not Against Turbulence?

Turbulence generally does not prevent the functioning of decision-making or governance, but it does pose considerable challenges for policy actors. It raises questions such as how to achieve existing goals or ambitions in a new context, or indeed whether those goals themselves need to be adapted. Does one try to patch the existing systems and regimes, throw in the towel, or undertake a substantial overhaul? Is it a matter of addressing a single, temporary instance of turbulence or attempting to insulate and prepare for future occurrences? What mechanisms could be of help?

Ansell and Trondal (2018) outline four potential dilemmas that policy actors may be faced with in the context of turbulence: stability vs. change; anticipation vs. resilience; tight(er) coupling vs. decoupling; and integration vs. differentiation. Whilst the dilemmas are useful considerations for policy actors, they highlight a more fundamental issue for actors: whether to govern against or *with* turbulence.

Governing against turbulence is focused on fixing the symptoms of turbulence and bypassing it as much as possible, in order to focus on the original aims and objectives. The purpose is to identify and address specific issues as a sort of patch job in the short-term. It also hopefully creates some general stability and consistency initially, providing space and time to focus on the long-term. In contrast, governing *with* turbulence entails acknowledging we may not be able to fully understand or prepare for turbulence—that it will reoccur in a new formulation or form.

Overall, governing against turbulence may work in the short term (and may even be desirable to ensure some stability and achieve specific goals). But as turbulence is an ongoing, developing condition where indeed more unpredictable turbulent events may occur, the system becomes increasingly stressed and subject to pressures, breakdown, and ruptures. As such, a shift to governing *with* turbulence is essential. The purpose of governing *with* turbulence is to build in flexibility, dynamism, resilience, and enable policy actors to respond more effectively to changes and overall turbulence in the future. Consequently, even if initially policy actors seek to govern against turbulence, in the long-term only governance *with* turbulence can be viable. Building such capacity brings considerable challenges as highlighted in Section 3.3, but first the policy actors must be able to identify sources of turbulence.

3.2. Sources of Turbulence

Building on earlier work in administration studies (e.g., Cameron et al., 1987), Ansell et al. (2016) conceptualise three different forms of turbulence which matter from a governance perspective, each impacting on, and impacted by, public organisations and institutions: organisational, environmental, and scalar. Organisational turbulence deals with turbulence within organisations and institutions, such as major administrative reform, staff conflict, or turnover. At EU level, this would cover, for example, tensions within the Commission ranks

following repeated administrative reforms over the last 20 years (Kassim et al., 2013), and for climate action especially, the creation of DG CLIMA in 2010 and further reorganisation under President Juncker (Bürgin, 2020). Environmental turbulence concerns contextual, external forms of turbulence, from the Covid-19 pandemic to the ongoing climate and biodiversity emergencies. Scalar turbulence is of particular importance to multi-level polities such as the EU. It concerns the impact that decisions at one level can have on another level. As Ansell and Trondal (2018) argue, "a 'good' solution at one level might be considered a 'bad' solution at another level" (p. 46). This turbulence covers both intended and unintended consequences of multi-level decision-making, exposing the interdependence and interplay of the different decision centres (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011). Ansell and Trondal (2018) limit themselves to the above three forms of turbulence, yet these are arguably insufficient. In our study of the impact of Brexit on UK agricultural policies, we expand further the conceptual framework they set in four ways (Dobbs et al., 2021).

First, although Ansell and Trondal (2018) focus on vertical examples of scalar turbulence, the impacts can also be felt horizontally (Dobbs et al., 2021). This reflects broader notions of multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) and institutional interplay (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011). Here, early responses to Covid-19 in Europe where national governments each went their separate ways, undermining both an EU-wide response but also their neighbours' own responses, created a particularly acute example of both horizontal and vertical scalar turbulence (Dobbs, 2020). The different levels of EU competences across policy areas (or lack thereof) and the policy-cycle, alongside the sometimes-fraught relationships between "Brussels" and some member states, make scalar turbulence particularly likely.

Second, we identified the possibility of a new, fourth form of "policy turbulence." This entails where there is substantial policy conflict or incoherence, e.g., due to multiple related policies in conflict, a substantive policy gap, or potentially a new policy that is exceptionally innovative or overhauls the regime. In the case of Brexit and agriculture, this was primarily through the loss of the CAP.

Third, categorisation of turbulence is not fixed and depends on the focus of study. Thus, depending on what part of the system is studied, a different categorisation or mapping of turbulence may be done: A study on policy divergence at regional level may consider vertical scalar turbulence—how their decision-making is constrained by policy choices made at higher levels of governance without considering their needs—more important, while an analysis of state responses may be more concerned with horizontal turbulence and the impact of decisions made by their neighbours. Furthermore, in our Brexit and agriculture example, losing the CAP may be policy turbulence for agriculture stakeholders but considered as contributing more to a generic environmental turbulence for green groups.

Finally, while it is useful to identify different forms of turbulence, they are not independent from each other. Instead, turbulence can be *transversal* in nature (building on the interdependence between levels posited by Ansell & Trondal, 2018). Thus, at the very least, resources spent responding to one form of turbulence are not available for responding to others, stretching administrative and political capacity. But more fundamentally, responding to one form of turbulence can worsen another, for example the UK hastening to "get Brexit done" and address environmental turbulence has come at the cost of higher organisational turbulence for businesses exporting to the EU and scalar turbulence, evidenced by growing distrust between Westminster and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Dobbs et al., 2021).

3.3. Transforming to Govern With Turbulence

Upon identifying sources of turbulence, policy actors must then determine how to respond. In order to govern *with* turbulence, something truly transformative is necessary (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 2)—but what does transformative look like?

From a governance perspective, Ansell et al. (2020) put forward "robust governance" conceptualised as:

> The ability of one or more decision-makers to uphold or realise a public agenda, function, or value in the face of the challenge and stress from turbulent events and processes *through the flexible adaptation, agile modification, and pragmatic redirection of governance solutions*. (p. 5; emphasis added)

The focus is on change, resilience, and dynamism. It also fundamentally centres on effectiveness, reflected in the idea that it is the "ability… to uphold or realize a public agenda, function or value," i.e., to deliver concrete change.

Alternatively, from a policy perspective this means developing policy that is "durable by design" (Jordan & Moore, 2020), "that endures and is influential over a particularly long period of time" and that has "the capacity to ride out the inevitable political bumps in the road that lies ahead without diminishing their effectiveness" (Jordan & Moore, 2020, p. 5). Thus, the aim is to develop policies able to "ride out" future sources of turbulence, as yet of indeterminate nature. Both "durable by design" policies and "robust governance" offer an ideal of nimble policies and governance arrangements that can weather turbulence while not losing sight of their original goal. In practice, this may be delivered with entirely innovative tools or simply repurposing existing tools from one regime to another. To this end, lessons can be learnt, for instance, from literature on managing "gridlock" (e.g., Klyza & Sousa, 2013) and on "new environmental policy instruments" (Moore et al., 2021). But nimble policy and governance ideals may be hard to

deliver in practice. While Ansell et al.'s (2020) concept of robust governance is underpinned by flexible adaptation, great care is needed as actors governing *with* turbulence also risk losing sight of the original goals, objectives, and values, with potential knock-on effects on the long-term governance structures and regimes.

Turbulence literature stresses the need to consider turbulence holistically (taking into account its pervasive, long-term nature, the multitude of sources of turbulence and their transversality), and develop responses to turbulence accordingly in order to avoid displacing the problem. But this is extremely difficult for policymakers to do in practice—as evidenced by Ansell et al.'s different dilemmas and the potential dealignment between values, policy agendas, and governance functions (Ansell et al., 2020; Ansell & Trondal, 2018). This parallels with Rhinard's (2019) crisification, where he describes politicians being faced with "real choices with consequences" or even facing "tragic choices" in a time-pressured context of crises (p. 11)—turbulence does not necessarily necessitate the same rushed responses, but this does not mean they do not occur or that difficult choices do not arise. In practice, governments tend to prioritise responding to one form of turbulence over another, or prioritising, for example, agenda or functions over value. This may be due to downplaying certain forms of turbulence, a lack of tools to target different forms of turbulence simultaneously, or consciously choosing what is, at least in the short term, the lesser evil: to live and fight (another form of turbulence) another day.

4. Mapping Green Deal Turbulence

The EGD—both the communication and the overarching legislative and administrative agenda for the von der Leyen Commission—can be analysed as the Commission's attempt at responding to turbulence and developing a nimble policy, durable by design which would allow the EU to become the first carbon-neutral "continent" by 2050. But, as expected, the ground keeps shifting under EU decision-makers. In the process of delivering the EGD legislative commitments, the EU faces four interconnected forms of turbulence, with some pre-existing sources and some more recent like the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the EGD itself becomes a source of turbulence for other policy areas. How the EU, and the Commission in particular, navigates each of these will determine whether the EGD is successful or whether, like many EU long-term strategies from the Lisbon Strategy to the Sustainable Development Strategies, it fails to deliver and loses sight of its objectives (Steurer, 2021).

4.1. Organisational Turbulence

Organisational turbulence is exemplified by the appointment of the entire von der Leyen Commission in 2019, which faced multiple obstacles and was central to the EGD's creation. The election of the president of the Commission was not an easy task. The European Parliament (hereafter Parliament) shortlisted its preferred candidates but the European Council (hereafter Council) ignored its selection and the heads of government proposed their own nominee (Hennessy, 2019). Von der Leyen secured her current position by a narrow margin of nine votes in front of the Parliament (383 votes, where 374 were required). This weakened her position from the outset and could lead to difficulties in successfully passing legislation through the Parliament—including legislation central to furthering the EGD. Beyond the Commission, the decision by Viktor Orban to preventively take his party Fidesz out of the European People's Party within the Parliament (after the European People's Party finally changed its internal rules to make it easier to exclude Fidesz) is shifting the balance of power within the Parliament in uncertain directions (Votewatch Europe, 2021).

However, von der Leyen also contributed to organisational turbulence—at least temporarily—through two key election promises: first, to provide the Parliament with the right of initiative of legislation that would end the monopoly of the Commission and shift the balance of powers between the institutions; second, to proceed to full co-decision for the Parliament (and thus move away from unanimity and consensus) in the areas of climate, energy, social, and taxation policies. Such changes could enable Members of the Parliament to put forward proposals that push for an even greener EU agenda, reflecting the 2019 "green turn" or wave in the Parliament and the growing recognition by EU citizens of the importance of environmental matters. Although attitudes vary considerably across issues—e.g., with the greatest consensus on the significance of climate change, in contrast for instance with noise pollution—the majority of those surveyed by the Commission in 2017 considered that environmental protection was very important and 94% considered it important (European Commission, 2017). As well as impacting upon the institutions' relationships, this could either support the EGD by providing it with greater democratic underpinnings or indicate that it is not ambitious enough.

4.2. Environmental Turbulence

Environmental turbulence has been central in both driving and delaying the EGD. As noted, the green wave across Europe and especially in the Parliament had considerable effects and von der Leyen made different promises to multiple EU political parties reflected in ambitious political guidelines and the EGD (von der Leyen, 2019). Whilst the manifold, eclectic promises may create further challenges (see "Policy Turbulence" in Sub-Section 4.3), the existing turbulence was the impetus for an innovative, highly ambitious (at times) policy. Beyond the Parliament, growing pressure from activists—Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for Future

climate marches—and their willingness to both engage and publicly criticise the EU for inaction, has the potential to take key policy debates about the EGD beyond the Brussels bubble and spur ambition.

But environmental turbulence has also hampered EGD development. Repeated delays on the Brexit negotiations pushed back Commission approval and delayed the launch of the EGD, before Covid-19 temporarily derailed all political plans—impacting on lives, economies, political relationships, and political priorities. Although public health, the environment, and the economy are clearly interlinked and dependent on each other in the long-term, they have been portrayed as a dichotomy (Georgieva & Adhanom Ghebreyesus, 2020). Adopting yet again such a dichotomic approach regarding Covid-19 vis-à-vis other focuses, including the EGD, forces black and white choices upon the public and decision-makers rather than finding positive, beneficial solutions towards a green recovery such as developing green jobs or nature-based solutions to environmental problems and pollution (WWF, 2020). The nature of this false dichotomy was eventually recognised by the EU (Dupont et al., 2020), which arguably utilised this specific ongoing turbulence to help further the EGD by shifting the focus to a green recovery.

Euroscepticism within and beyond the EU is undermining the chances of the EGD to attain its full potential. Externally, Brexit is dampening the moods on both sides of the Channel, where the issue around a level playing field in environmental, food, and animal welfare standards proved one of the pinch points for the EU/UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Internally, Eurosceptic member of the Parliament tend to reject climate and energy policies, and the Visegrád group (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia) frequently calls for less ambition to avoid carbon leakage (businesses moving away from the EU to countries with laxer climate policies) and impacts on competitiveness (Zapletalová & Komínková, 2020). While this is not new, it is becoming more consequential. After years of environment and climate action being side-lined at the EU level (Čavoški, 2015), and thus this sharp East/West divide happening in an area of relatively low political salience, it is now the flagship policy issue for a Commission whose (as of yet limited) efforts on rule of law put it in direct confrontation with Poland and Hungary.

4.3. Policy Turbulence

Mainstreaming is one of three procedural themes of the EGD—both an old debate at the EU level (treaty commitments to environmental policy integration date back to the 1980s) and still very much a live issue. The last 20 years saw a narrowing down of environmental policy integration into *climate* policy integration—for example the EU's previous long-term strategy's (Europe 2020, adopted in 2010) environmental objective of sustainable growth largely had a climate and energy focus, omitting most environmental issues (Steurer, 2021). The EGD adopts a much wider scope on environmental policy integration and brings back to the top of the EU agenda both broad environmental issues (including biodiversity) and other policy areas (agriculture), which had been peripheral to EU long-term strategies (Lisbon and Europe 2020 Strategies) and either forgotten or inured from the type of changes required of other policy areas. The EGD gives teeth to mainstreaming—both through its "fit for 55" agenda of evaluating existing legislation (whether they are fit to support the EU in reaching its 2030 target) and in one other of the EGD seven substantive themes, explicitly focused on greening the CAP. But the 2021 CAP reform demonstrates that these teeth are not sharp enough. The von der Leyen Commission introduced the EGD without removing and rewriting the CAP reform proposal produced under the Juncker Commission, arguing that it *could* be coherent with the EGD if the legislators not only maintained, but *raised* its ambition. However, environmental ambition in CAP reforms tends to be reduced, not increased by both the Parliament and the Council (Gravey & Buzogány, 2021), and 2021's trilogue confirms this trend. Thus, while in December 2019 it appeared that the EGD could potentially disrupt (at least from an environmental/sustainability perspective) the CAP reform process, the opposite has unfolded with the Council weakening CAP greening ambitions and widening the gap between the CAP and the EGD (Fortuna & Foote, 2021).

4.4. Scalar Turbulence

Scalar turbulence, beyond those sources that overlap with environmental turbulence, remains largely in waiting to-date and will most likely manifest when it comes to the gradual implementation of the EGD and related policies, due to the roles of the EU and the member states. Many of the areas integral to the EGD, including the environment and agriculture, are shared competences between the EU and the member states. Interestingly, in the next CAP increased responsibility will be placed on the member states to deliver the goals of the EGD. The partial repatriation of the CAP could lead to greater intra-EU divergence, fuelling both horizontal and vertical turbulence as less ambitious member states undermine their more ambitious neighbours (Matthews, 2021). Such repatriation may nevertheless provide an opportunity for the Commission to green the CAP a posteriori: All new National Strategic Plans for disbursing CAP funding will need to be graded against EGD commitments as part of approval process by the Commission.

4.5. Confirming the Transversal Character of Turbulence

These four forms of turbulence interact demonstrating the transversal nature of turbulence: e.g., CAP funding is used to support friends and leaders of member states experiencing democratic backsliding—from Czech

President Babis being one of Czechia's biggest CAP recipients creating a conflict of interest (Wanat, 2020), to the links between CAP funding and regime allies in Hungary uncovered by New York Times journalists (Gebrekidan et al., 2019). This reflects what Kelemen calls the EU's "autocracy trap," whereby EU funding with few strings attached is used to strengthen its opponents (Kelemen, 2020, p. 481). In challenging the CAP, the EGD therefore not only creates policy turbulence, it challenges this autocracy trap and contributes to organisational and environmental turbulence.

5. Governing the EGD Through Turbulence: An Assessment of Difficult Choices

Identification of turbulence is only half the battle. The EU must now seek to respond to turbulence to avoid the obstacles it poses and take advantage of the opportunities it provides. Returning to the framework, this begs two questions: first, whether there are appropriate tools and pathways open to the EU; and second, whether the European Commission is availing of these in a robust and holistic manner to deliver transformative change.

On the first, a multitude of pathways exists in the EU, whether at the EU level or internally within the member states. For instance, soft law (e.g., guidance documents and policy papers) may be availed of in lieu of hard law (Eliantonio et al., 2021); funding with conditions may be offered as an incentive, rather than creating prohibitions with associated penalties; public-private agreements may be developed; networks may be cultivated; corporate social responsibility may be supported; and policies may be either centralised or de-centralised. A wide range of "new environmental policy instruments" exists within the EU (Moore et al., 2021). However, the availability of measures does not guarantee their suitability or uptake in a manner to achieve governance *with* turbulence.

On the second, the EGD is a good first step, as it takes innovative approaches and could be truly transformative. However, its development and implementation must continue to be transformative to address ongoing turbulence and it must do so in a more holistic manner. Unfortunately, the EU appears to have fallen into the pitfall of siloed approaches; while the EGD has a very wide scope, it will be delivered through a number of strategies, some of which are narrow in scope (e.g., greening the CAP, the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the Biodiversity Strategy) and may drift further apart through the legislative process (as the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy are currently doing). Further, and linked at times to siloed approaches, the EU has made policy decisions that have entailed various forms of prioritisation with significant consequences as demonstrated in Sub-Section 5.1.

5.1. Prioritisation in Practice

Prioritisation rests on a gamble that the problem created or left by the chosen solution is smaller and easier to tackle than the original problem. Examples include (1) the prioritisation of one area over another and addressing policy turbulence over scalar turbulence in the context of the CAP; (2) the prioritisation of functions over agenda in responding to Covid-19; and (3) the prioritisation of functions and agenda over values in agreeing the Next Generation EU and 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework plans in the Council.

The first example highlights the potential consequences of both prioritising one area (the CAP) over another (Farm to Fork, and the EGD more generally) and addressing one form of turbulence (policy) over another (scalar). Greening the CAP has until now yielded few environmental gains, with soil degradation, habitats loss, and water pollution continuing (Alons, 2017; European Environment Agency, 2020). The proposed use of National Strategic Plans in the new CAP, with a repatriation of policy development, can be seen as the use of an alternative pathway (repatriation) to allow at least some member states to further green their farming sector. In pursuing such an approach, the EU (and in particular the Commission) is trying to avoid being (yet again) scapegoated for policy failure. However, it is effectively shifting responsibility (Fouilleux & Gravey, in press), and delegating the task of ensuring that the new CAP strengthens the Farm to Fork initiative and overall EGD to national governments—thereby also risking its failure.

Thus, that the Council is pushing for lowering the threshold of CAP payments ring-fenced for environment and climate action is not encouraging on its own (Fortuna & Foote, 2021) but also due to what it means for the likely success of two other EGD strategies, the Farm to Fork and Biodiversity Strategies. The Farm to Fork strategy focuses on a holistic approach towards the sustainability of food systems with an emphasis on sustainable food production, sustainable food consumption, food loss and waste prevention, as well as sustainable food processing and distribution. A key aspect of the Strategy includes the reduction by 2030 of the use of more hazardous pesticides by 50% (European Commission, 2021). However, this ambitious target will be difficult to meet, as the French experience of Ecophyto illustrates. Created in 2008, the Ecophyto plans set high ambitious regulatory targets for pesticides reduction. However, they were running alongside a CAP whose payments were pushing farmers in another direction and France repeatedly failed to meet its targets, with pesticide use increasing instead (Petetin et al., 2019). Ecophyto failures illustrate the central role of the CAP in changing farming practices and how the future CAP could undermine the whole land-use and biodiversity sections of the EGD. Whether the Commission, when negotiating one-on-one with each member state on their plans, manages to deliver better EGD complementarity remains to be seen. Critically, the new CAP therefore risks fuelling scalar turbulence, both vertically between the member states and the EU, if the Commission strictly polices the content of these national plans, and horizontally between member states

opting for very different levels of ambition leading to a more uneven level playing field across the EU. It also risks increasing policy turbulence for the EGD, through creating internal conflicts.

The second example of prioritisation—relating to potential conflicts between policy agendas and functions—is exemplified by the EU response to Covid-19. The EU has limited competence in health policy—it remains with the member states. Initially, the EU was very hesitant to act regarding Covid-19, despite its impacts on the EU's policies directly and indirectly (through for instance member states' actions), including on the free movement of goods and persons—respecting the functions over the public agenda (Purnhagen et al., 2020). It limited itself to actions such as the public procurement of personal protection and other medical equipment. However, over time, the continuing turbulence and knock-on impacts motivated the EU to further action, through proposing EU-wide approaches to exiting lockdowns, travel restrictions, funding, and vaccines. Nonetheless, in doing so, the EU has attempted to restrict itself to either unanimous decisions or soft measures, thereby still respecting its overall functions. A concern would be that the EU would overly restrict itself in developing and implementing the EGD, e.g., due to it being an area of shared competence and not exclusive EU competence, or through seeking to appease member states or other EU institutions.

A third example of prioritisation—this time delivering a policy agenda and functions over values—is the budget compromise negotiated by the German presidency of the Council in December 2020. Hungary and Poland accepted to withdraw their veto to the new budgetary package (Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 and Next Generation EU) as long as the new rule of law mechanisms, which would enable the suspension of disbursement of EU funds in case of corruption or other failures to meet rule of law criteria, would not be used until Hungary and Poland have had the opportunity to challenge the rule in front of the Court of Justice of the EU and get a verdict (Bayer, 2020). This pushes back the actual application of the rule of law mechanism, perhaps for years—as the Hungarian and Polish governments can first take their time to start the annulment procedure and second because the Court of Justice is not renowned for its swiftness. This compromise prioritised getting the budget through and financing the EU's post-Covid recovery over standing up for the rule of law—echoing earlier choices of the EU to de-prioritise the rule of law and human rights (Kelemen, 2020).

Whether these gambles will pay off remains unclear. Prioritisation is a normal component of policymaking, but turbulence exacerbates the situation—uncertainty pervades, numerous issues need to be addressed simultaneously, and responses may create further turbulence or not bring the expected outcomes. Irrespective of results, for the EGD to be truly transformative, a more holistic, robust response should be taken where possible and these choices should be open for political debate and require clear justification.

6. Conclusions

The world is becoming increasingly turbulent, exemplified within the EU today by the accumulation of events such as Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, the Green Wave, conflicts over the rule of law, and significant policy overhauls including the ongoing reform of the CAP and the EGD itself. The EGD is simultaneously a source of and response to turbulence but crucially, for the purposes of this article and thematic issue, also operates within a context of turbulence.

This article built upon the work of Ansell and co-authors (2016, 2018, 2020) to develop an enhanced conceptual framework. Ansell et al. initially identified three central forms of turbulence: organisational, environmental, and scalar. This article broadened scalar turbulence to encompass also horizontal turbulence (alongside vertical turbulence). It also demonstrated the existence of a fourth form of turbulence—policy turbulence—reflected in the introduction of fundamentally new policies such as the EGD, or the inherent conflict between policies or prongs of an individual policy such as with the CAP. It further expanded Ansell and Trondal's (2018) reflection on the connections between turbulence at different levels, showing how turbulence can be transversal—different forms of turbulence, and responses to these, fuel new forms of turbulence.

This article developed a conceptual framework for this thematic issue by operationalizing what turbulence means for delivering and implementing the EGD and the challenges policy actors, notably the Commission, face in governing *with* and not against turbulence. Turbulence brings new challenges and opportunities, as it forces actors to look beyond the status quo and think outside the box. If the Commission and other actors seeking to implement the EGD simply continue as normal, then the deal risks stalling and being undermined, for example through being derailed by Covid-19, blocked by Hungary and Poland, weakened by the failing legitimacy of the EU or the Commission, or pushed down the priority list by future incidents. Responses to turbulence, including prioritization, may increase turbulence and lead to undesirable outcomes. On the other hand, the EGD itself demonstrates the potential for turbulence to help instigate, develop, and implement innovative and future-facing policies. To achieve this, policy actors must acknowledge and address the turbulence they face; they must learn to govern *with* turbulence and, to this end, undertake transformative actions in a holistic manner.

Overall, the article highlighted the significance of governing *with* turbulence, the need for durability and robustness, and key concerns in operationalizing this. Great care is needed by policy actors in identifying the sources of turbulence, their impacts, and what mechanisms or pathways might enable them to steer a way to

a robust response. This does not necessitate the eradication of all turbulence—turbulence is not an "evil" in and of itself—but simply reflective thinking to see how best to respond. Ansell and co-authors (2016, 2018) discussed how a "good" decision for a level could be "bad" for another. Our exploration of turbulence and the EGD revealed a murkier picture, where EU decision-makers struggle to identify any universally "good" decisions. Eschewing the arguably high bar of transformative, holistic responses to turbulence, EU leaders make problematic gambles—for instance hard decisions are passed to lower levels of governance, or, as with the rule of law mechanism, further delayed.

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Article

Coping With Turbulence: EU Negotiations on the 2030 and 2050 Climate Targets

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Abstract
This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal's (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU's climate agenda.

Keywords
2030 climate and energy framework; climate; European Climate Law; European Green Deal; European Union; turbulence

Issue
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1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has long pursued a climate agenda in international and domestic contexts characterised by turbulence. Turbulence can be defined as "interactions of events or demands that are highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected or unpredictable" (Ansell et al., 2016, p. 3). As Dobbs et al. (2021) have argued, although there is potential for overlap in their occurrence, the concept of turbulence is distinct from crisis or from a single unexpected development. While a crisis is an individual, profoundly disruptive event, such as Brexit or the Covid-19 pandemic, turbulence encompasses the resulting, accumulated and on-going effects of significant events, including crises. In other words, it is the cumulative concatenation of significant incidents and crises that produces turbulence. Such incidents and crises can thus be "sources of turbulence," but they do not constitute turbulence in themselves. Being the result of such complex interactions, turbulence usually complicates decision and policy making by altering substantially and continuously the broader context and by fostering uncertainty.

For instance, the EU acted in a turbulent context for climate policy in the early 2000s, when it endeavoured to secure enough signatories for the Kyoto protocol to enter into force despite the withdrawal of the United States (Parker et al., 2017). In the 2000s, notwithstanding

domestic and external challenges—most notably, internal reorganisation after two rounds of treaty amendments and the failure of other main polluters to set emission reduction targets—the EU launched the Emissions Trading Scheme, the world's most significant greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) trading scheme (Lindberg, 2019). It also adopted a comprehensive climate legislative package that included targets for emission reductions, renewable energy and energy efficiency, to be achieved by 2020. Despite the 2008–2009 economic and financial crisis, as well as the failure to secure a global agreement on limiting GHG emissions at the 2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen, the EU continued to pursue its domestic climate targets and drafted new ones for 2030 (Siddi, 2016, p. 135). Moreover, European diplomacy played an important role in the negotiations leading to the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. The negotiations were conducted against a volatile background of increasing geopolitical competition between major powers and serious domestic crises (i.e., regarding migration, the eurozone) that exacerbated relations between member states and European institutions (von Homeyer et al., 2021).

While complex domestic and international circumstances have long shaped the broader context in which EU climate policy was formulated, recent developments point to an increase in the number and gravity of sources of turbulence. During Donald Trump's presidency, the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement. Trump's outright denial of climate change also provided a template for like-minded leaders of other countries, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Various types of climate change sceptics acquired popularity in Europe too (Vihma et al., 2020). Most significantly, Brexit and Poland's and Hungary's breaches of the rule of law were unprecedented sources of intra-EU turbulence, with negative repercussions also for EU climate policy. The Covid-19 pandemic posed a further, extraordinary challenge to the Union's climate agenda, threatening to derail the recently announced European Green Deal (Siddi, 2020).

The occurrence of such serious, concomitant sources of turbulence calls for an analysis of its impact on EU climate policy. Climate governance is a highly relevant field to explore the effects of turbulence because, due to its multilateral framework and links to numerous other policy areas (i.e., agriculture, industry, financial policy), it is particularly susceptible to being affected by the complex ramifications of turbulence. Recent analyses (such as those in Ansell et al., 2016) have deepened the conceptualisation of turbulence and applied it to the investigation of several domestic and international case studies (i.e., public administration, family policy, private military corporations), but not to climate policy. Together with the other contributions to the thematic issue, the article attempts to address this gap. At the same time, the main goal of the article is empirical. Rather than advancing a new conceptualisation of turbulence, it relies on an existing typology in order to investigate current developments in EU climate policy and their links with the broader political context. By doing so, the article also contributes to the growing body of scholarly literature on EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis (see for instance the special issue edited by von Homeyer et al., 2021), most notably through the systematic investigation and process tracing of key components of the European Green Deal and the 2030 and 2050 agendas.

Specifically, the article draws on Ansell and Trondal's (2018) typology of turbulence and applies it to the investigation of three recent and important developments in EU climate policy: the announcement of the European Green Deal, the drafting of the European Climate Law, and the negotiations on the 2030 Climate Target Plan. Arguably, climate policy and the energy transition took centre stage in EU debates in December 2019, when the newly appointed European Commission presided by Ursula von der Leyen presented its plans for a European Green Deal—a comprehensive, long-term roadmap of policies to advance the energy transition in Europe. Despite the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, the Commission declared that the European Green Deal remained a priority (Simon, 2020). Moreover, it drafted a European Climate Law that codifies the 2050 climate neutrality target and proposed a 2030 Climate Target Plan, namely a framework to achieve a more ambitious EU GHG reduction target for 2030. The three climate policy developments under analysis are closely interrelated but of different nature. While the Green Deal encompasses a broad set of policies and strategies, the Climate Law is a specific legislative initiative and the 2030 Climate Target Plan is a framework that needs to be implemented through the adaptation of policy and legislation. In order to be agreed upon, all of them have required sustained negotiations involving EU institutions and member states. Turbulence produced by international and domestic developments influenced significantly these negotiations.

The article begins with a conceptual discussion of turbulence and of how it relates to EU climate policy. It identifies three main types of turbulence that have influenced EU climate policy. In the subsequent empirical analysis, the article traces the impact of turbulence on the political process that led to the formulation of the European Green Deal (in December 2019) and on the negotiations concerning the European Climate Law and the 2030 target until May 2021, when the European Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the Climate Law and the 2030 target. This was a crucial period for EU climate policy, particularly thanks to progress on framing an agenda to pursue the energy transition and achieve major emission reductions. While negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan are still ongoing at the time of writing, their development in 2020 and early 2021, in a highly turbulent context, allows for an assessment of how turbulence can influence EU deliberations on climate governance.

2. Conceptualising and Tracing Turbulence

2.1. Sources of Turbulence and EU Climate Governance

The term "turbulence" has been used in several disciplines with different meanings. In social sciences, it usually refers to a series of disruptive, highly variable and sometimes unpredictable events. While turbulence and crises can be interrelated, the concept of turbulence is distinct from crisis. A crisis is a single, disruptive event or development, such as Brexit, Covid-19 or the breach of the rule of law in some EU member states. Turbulence is the resulting, cumulative effect of significant crises and incidents (Dobbs et al., 2021), which creates an "increasingly volatile context for complex problem-solving" (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 951) and can pose a challenge to decision making and governance. Hence, crises or individual incidents can be sources of turbulence, but do not constitute turbulence in themselves. Furthermore, not all crises or incidents are sources of turbulence. Some are just aspects of ordinary politics and policy making—for instance, disagreements in parliamentary debates or in negotiations between European institutions—and can be solved in due course, without cumulative effects that pose a challenge to governance.

As argued, turbulence is the effect of several disruptive events and crises. However, as the concept is used to describe their long-term interaction, it also expresses a cumulative state of affairs that can in turn contribute to aggravating individual crises. In other words, turbulence is the effect of crises, but it can also be a cause of their entrenchment and further radicalisation. Moreover, turbulence has an impact on governance. While the impact can vary from case to case and depend on the policy area, turbulence usually poses a sustained, long-term challenge to existing governance mechanisms and calls for a complex response by policy makers. For instance, policy makers need to decide whether they want to govern against turbulence, fixing its symptoms and bypassing it as much as possible, or with turbulence, by acknowledging that it is part of a "new normal" and building flexibility and resilience to respond to it more effectively in the future (Dobbs et al., 2021).

Following Ansell and Trondal (2018), this article focuses on three interrelated dimensions of turbulence that are particularly relevant from a governance perspective: environmental turbulence, organisational turbulence, and turbulence of scale. While this typology of turbulence can have an impact on any aspect of EU governance, the focus here is on examples that are more closely related to EU climate policy. Due to the paramount challenge posed by climate change and the pressure stemming from current European public debates, climate policy has been a central issue of EU governance in recent years. Moreover, because of its multilateral nature and links to numerous other policy areas, climate policy is particularly susceptible to being affected by the complex ramifications of turbulence.

Environmental turbulence has been a defining feature of this period. It concerns contextual, external forms of turbulence, such as Covid-19, Brexit, as well as broad and disruptive policy shifts or upheavals in the European polity. Since March 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has been a major source of environmental turbulence for European (and global) politics and society. The cumulative effects of Covid-19 in different policy areas (i.e., healthcare, the economy, citizen mobility), in combination with other highly disruptive crises such as Brexit, have posed serious governance challenges to the EU. Most notably, the high human and economic cost of the pandemic has called for prompt and radical policy responses by EU leaders. During the autumn of 2020, the conflict regarding rule of law violations in Poland and Hungary between these two member states, on the one hand, and the European Commission and other member states, on the other, became another important source of environmental turbulence. While the dispute had been going on for years (Gora & de Wilde, 2020), it reached a climax when the Commission and a majority of member states expressed their wish to tie the disbursement of European recovery funds to the respect of the rule of law. The Polish and Hungarian reaction led to an impasse that delayed the adoption of the entire EU budget, including funds essential for the EU to demonstrate a credible commitment to its 2030 Climate Target Plan.

Throughout 2020, fraught negotiations over Brexit and occasional tensions between the EU and the United States were further sources of environmental turbulence. Following Brexit, the EU lost a member state that supported its climate action domestically and internationally (Bocse, 2020). Within the EU, the United Kingdom was a key proponent of policy solutions in the field of climate policy and supported higher than average emissions reduction targets (despite not being very ambitious with regard to the renewable energy target, see Bocse, 2020, pp. 270–271). In December 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that the country will reduce its emissions by 68 percent by 2030 compared to the year 1990, a higher target than that pursued by the EU (Harvey, 2020). The UK also played an important role in EU climate finance, both through its contribution to the EU budget and through the provision of international green finance by UK-based institutions. Moreover, following Brexit, the EU is no longer able to rely on the large resources and networks of the British diplomatic service to support its climate action internationally. While the effects of Brexit for EU climate policy will become clearer in the longer term, and largely depend on the extent of EU–UK cooperation in this policy area (cf. Dupont & Moore, 2019), the considerations made here highlight that Brexit can be a source of significant turbulence. In the period 2016–2020, the main impact of Brexit on EU climate policy was that Brexit-related negotiations distracted some European resources and attention from the climate agenda (Bocse, 2020). As for relations between the EU and the United States, uncertainty

concerning the outcome of the US presidential election of November 2020 implied that the EU had to decide upon its climate targets for 2030 and 2050 without knowing whether its main ally and the world's second largest polluter would re-join multilateral efforts to tackle climate change or (in case of Trump's re-election) continue to undermine them.

Organisational turbulence concerns turbulence within organisations, stemming for instance from administrative reform or internal disagreements that disrupt the ordinary policy or administrative processes. Within the EU, profound disagreements between the European Parliament and the European Council concerning the appointment of a new Commission in 2019, institutional reorganisation following Brexit and inter-institutional conflicts of competence were sources of environmental turbulence. In 2019, the European Council rejected the candidates proposed by the European Parliament for the post of Commission President, which marked an abrupt departure from the *Spitzenkandidaten* system adopted in 2014 (cf. Heidbreder & Schade, 2020). Thereafter, the Parliament approved Ursula von der Leyen's nomination with a scant majority of nine votes. Von der Leyen's subsequent focus on the European Green Deal possibly aimed also at broadening her support in the Parliament through a more ambitious agenda that could draw the support of Greens/EFA group members. Despite this, the Parliament maintained a critical stance on some key Commission proposals in the field of climate policy. Thus, significant inter-institutional disagreements continued on central questions such as the targets and governance mechanisms for the 2030 and 2050 climate goals.

Turbulence of scale can occur in multi-level governance structures such as the EU when a decision taken at one level—for example in a member state—has significant consequences at another level—for instance, at the EU level. The rule of law dispute concerning Poland and Hungary and their decision to veto the EU budget had disruptive consequences also for EU-wide climate policy, as it prevented the adoption of the 2030 Climate Target Plan due to the lack of agreement on the funding necessary to pursue it. This also had an impact at the international level. As the EU's 2030 emission reduction target was also its nationally determined contribution in the framework of the Paris climate agreement, the Union had to withhold from announcing it in multilateral contexts until an intra-EU compromise was reached. Hence, the rule of law dispute had a disruptive scalar effect, producing turbulence both inside the EU and at the international level.

It is important to note that different types of turbulence are often interconnected and that a crisis or disruptive incident can be a source of different types of turbulence. For instance, Brexit is primarily a source of environmental turbulence. At the same time, the departure of British representatives also led to an unprecedented reorganisation of EU institutions and thus contributed to organisational turbulence. The rule of law dispute concerning Poland and Hungary was a source of environmental turbulence, as the ensuing confrontation at the EU level had an impact on numerous policy areas (highlighted by the Polish and Hungarian veto on the entire EU budget). However, it also had a scalar effect when the Polish and Hungarian veto on the EU budget prevented EU diplomacy in multilateral arenas where funding is an essential component of EU external action.

2.2. Process Tracing and Sources

Process tracing offers an apt methodology to investigate the interaction between turbulence and EU negotiations on the Climate Law and the Climate Target Plan. Collier (2011, p. 824) defines process tracing as "an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena"; it "can contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena and to evaluating causal claims" (p. 823). Transposing this reasoning to the subject of this study, process tracing allows drawing descriptive and causal inferences about the relationship between turbulence and EU climate negotiations as they unfolded over time. In order to trace developments and facilitate the identification of causal mechanisms, the empirical analysis follows a chronological approach. This approach also allows zooming into specific instances of policy output (the launch of the Green Deal, the publication of the draft Climate Law and of the 2030 Climate Target Plan) as they occur. While process tracing addresses trajectories of change and causation, describing key events and situations at one point in time is also essential. Hence, it is important to focus on "good snapshots at a series of specific moments" (Collier, 2011, p. 824). For the topic under analysis here, this means focusing on the main instances of policy making and negotiations—such as the Commission's release of key documents, European Council summits, trilogues—by gathering and analysing trustworthy evidence.

Accordingly, official EU policy and legal documents are the main primary sources for this study—most notably, the Commission Communication on the European Green Deal, the European Climate Law, the main Commission communications concerning the 2030 Climate Target Plan, and the EU Recovery Plan. In addition, the daily *Bulletin Quotidien Europe* (Europe Daily Bulletin) issued by Agence Europe provides the main source repository for tracing the developments and causal relationships in the negotiations on the EU climate agenda during the autumn and winter 2020–2021. Agence Europe is a trustworthy, independent press agency that collects, publishes, and distributes news and in-depth analyses concerning the European Union. The *Bulletin Quotidien Europe* is its main publication. It is typically based on insider knowledge of ongoing negotiations and policy making in the European institutions. Information drawn from this source repository is critically assessed against and complemented by reference

to scholarly work and contemporary analyses published in reputable dailies reporting on European politics, such as the *Financial Times*, and news websites specialised in EU politics, most notably *Euractiv*.

3. Turbulence and Negotiations on Climate Targets in the EU

3.1. The European Green Deal: A Response to Environmental and Organisational Turbulence?

EU climate and energy governance is structured around three main headline targets concerning GHG emission reduction from 1990 levels, the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption and improvement in energy efficiency. For the year 2020, the EU-level goal for each of the three headline targets was 20 percent. In 2014, the European Council adopted new goals for 2030: a GHG emissions reduction target of at least 40 percent, and a target of at least 27 percent for both renewable energy and energy efficiency. The targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency were revised following the adoption of new legislation in 2018. The target for renewable energy was increased to at least 32 percent (Directive 2018/2001) and that on energy efficiency to at least 32.5 percent (Directive 2018/2002; for detailed discussion, see Oberthür, 2019). On the other hand, despite some discussions about raising the GHG reduction target in 2015–2018, it remained set at "at least 40 percent" compared to 1990 levels (Directive 2018/410 and Regulation 2018/842).

The appointment of the von der Leyen Commission and its proposal of a European Green Deal in December 2019 provided a framework for a new upward revision of EU climate targets. The Commission Communication on the European Green Deal proposed to "transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050" (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). Among its most significant measures, the Communication announced that the Commission would draft a European Climate Law by March 2020, which would "enshrine the 2050 climate neutrality objective in legislation" (European Commission, 2019, p. 4). Furthermore, the Commission stated that it would present "an impact assessed plan to increase the EU's greenhouse gas emission reductions target for 2030 to at least 50 percent and towards 55 percent compared with 1990 levels" by the summer of 2020 (European Commission, 2019, p. 4).

The Green Deal Communication was the first important policy announcement of the newly appointed Commission. This raises the question of why von der Leyen decided to prioritise climate policy and focus on revising climate targets that had been codified in EU legislation only a year earlier. Based on her public statements, environmental turbulence was an important driver of her agenda. In her Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019–2024, published in July 2019 (while she was still a candidate for the post of Commission President), von der Leyen listed a European Green Deal as the first "headline ambition" and declared that:

> The message from Europe's voters—and those too young to vote—is loud and clear: They want real action on climate change and they want Europe to lead the way. I have been inspired by the passion, conviction and energy of the millions of our young people making their voice heard on our streets and in our hearts. They are standing up for their future and it is our generational duty to deliver for them. (Von der Leyen, 2019, p. 5)

Hence, the Green Deal was at least partly a response to one of the main political messages of the European parliamentary elections of April 2019, in which Green parties in large Western member states significantly increased their support by campaigning on a platform that focused on climate action (Mudde, 2019). Most significantly, the Green Deal was inspired by the emergence and surging popularity of youth grassroots movements such as Fridays for Future and Youth Strike for Climate (Knops, 2021). The rise of Fridays for Future and Youth Strike for Climate was an important source of environmental turbulence because they constituted unprecedented, transboundary civil society movements that called for radical governance responses to climate change across numerous policy areas. Moreover, it took place in a context of growing evidence and mediatisation of the climate crisis, which was highlighted by repeated record high summer and winter temperatures, the melting of polar ice and glaciers and catastrophic forest fires in Sweden, Siberia and Australia in 2018–2019.

Arguably, organisational turbulence within the EU also played a role in von der Leyen's prioritisation of the Green Deal. Before the 2019 European election, party groups in the European Parliament proposed their candidates (*Spitzenkandidaten*) for the post of Commission President, following a practice introduced at the previous European election in 2014 (Heidbreder & Schade, 2020). However, the European Council refused to endorse the *Spitzenkandidaten* proposed by the Parliament and backed the candidacy of Ursula von der Leyen. This new inter-institutional conflict left von der Leyen in the difficult position of having to secure the endorsement of a displeased European Parliament. Due to these circumstances and to election results, her backing in the main party groups—the European People's Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and Renew Europe—seemed hardly sufficient to guarantee her a majority. Hence, foregrounding the Green Deal in her agenda was functional to her quest of support among members of the Greens/EFA, the fourth largest group. Nonetheless, members the Greens/EFA group voted against her appointment because they considered her commitments insufficient (Greens/EFA, 2019). Their

opposing vote left von der Leyen with a very small majority in the Parliament. The need to broaden her support base (particularly to the Greens/EFA group) was possibly one of the factors that led her to foreground and further prioritise the Green Deal in the following period.

3.2. The European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan

In early March 2020, the Commission duly presented a draft European Climate Law, including the climate neutrality objective for the year 2050 (for an analysis of the March draft, see Siddi, 2020, pp. 7, 10). The draft also called upon the Commission to review the Union's GHG emission reduction target for 2030 (set at 40 percent compared to 1990, as of March 2020) and "explore options for a new 2030 target of 50 to 55 percent" (European Commission, 2020a, p. 14). The draft law proposed a governance mechanism to regularly adjust the trajectory toward the 2050 target following the timeline set by the global stocktakes of the Paris Agreement. Most notably, Article 3 would empower the Commission to review the GHG target by delegated acts, namely without having to go through full negotiations with the European Parliament and the member states. This proposal became a source of inter-institutional contention. The Parliament voiced its opposition to the use of delegated acts to review the target already in late March. A non-paper prepared by the Parliament's legal service stated that delegating the power to the Commission to set out the trajectory for achieving climate neutrality by 2050 was not in line with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to the non-paper, emission reduction targets are "indisputably elements which are "essential" to the Union policy on fighting climate change" and entail "fundamental political choices" that cannot be delegated to the Commission (European Parliament, 2020, p. 4; cf. Agence Europe, 2020a).

Before the issue of the use of delegated acts reached the European Council—arguably the institution that had the most important say on the matter—the Covid-19 pandemic arrived in Europe. This major source of environmental turbulence led to an immediate refocus of debates and policy initiatives. EU institutions had to cope with criticism for failing to coordinate a prompt, joint response and to procure protective equipment. They also faced self-interested member state policies, such as national export bans on protective equipment, which prevented or hampered joint EU action (Brooks & Geyer, 2020). As a result, for most of the spring, climate governance debates receded into the background of EU politics. Some government representatives of Eastern European member states argued that the EU should delay or revise its climate agenda in order to focus on the economic consequences of the pandemic (Khan & Brunsden, 2020). In mid-April 2020, the Commission announced that some of the less urgent policies of the Green Deal were delayed until 2021, but the schedule for key priorities (such as the assessment of new emission reduction targets for 2030) remained unchanged (Simon, 2020).

The Commission's Communication *Europe's Moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation*, published on 27 May 2020, clarified that the Green Deal and the climate targets took priority in the EU's plans for the post-pandemic recovery. The Commission announced its intention to borrow 750 billion Euros on the financial markets, thereby supplementing a revamped EU budget of approximately 1,100 billion Euros for the years 2021–2027. It also declared that 25 percent of the EU budget was to be spent on climate investments, a target that was later raised to 30 percent (Dupont et al., 2020, p. 1102). The Communication defined the Green Deal as an essential part of the economic recovery and as "Europe's growth strategy" (European Commission, 2020b, p. 4). In this context, it described the climate neutrality goal by 2050 and ambitious climate targets for 2030 as a crucial framework to provide long-term certainty and predictability for private investments (European Commission, 2020b, p. 6). The Communication was a response to the unprecedented environmental turbulence caused by Covid-19. Therefore, while the pandemic caused a partial delay of the Green Deal agenda, it also elicited a governance response that reiterated and foregrounded climate targets. This was highlighted further in the Communication on the 2030 Climate Target Plan and in the amended proposal for a European Climate Law, both published on 17 September 2020, which raised the 2030 GHG reduction target to "at least 55 percent" compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 2020c, p. 19; 2020d).

3.3. The EU Climate Agenda in the Autumn and Winter 2020–2021: Coping With Multiple Sources of Turbulence

In the autumn of 2020, the Commission was to seek approval of the European Council for the Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan. However, multiple sources of turbulence accompanied and influenced negotiations on the climate agenda. By early fall, it had become clear that a second wave of Covid-19 infections was in full swing throughout Europe. While EU institutions and member states were now better prepared to cope with Covid-19, the new wave of infections and the uncertainty about the timeline for producing and distributing vaccines aggravated the negative economic and societal effects caused by the pandemic in spring 2020. Nonetheless, while the second wave of the pandemic generated further environmental turbulence, it did not appear to have a direct impact on negotiations on the Climate Law and the 2030 targets in the autumn. The argument that the EU's climate agenda should be delayed or revised due to Covid-19, which had been made by prominent Eastern European politicians the previous spring, no longer held sway. This can be explained

by the fact that, by the autumn of 2020, the European Commission had formulated a policy response to the pandemic (epitomised by the Communication *Europe's Moment*) within which climate action remained a priority and was seen as a driver of the economic recovery.

However, new sources of disagreement emerged. In October, member states formally rejected the Commission's proposal to use delegated acts to set the trajectory toward climate neutrality (Agence Europe, 2020b). Moreover, member states disagreed on several issues pertaining to the Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan. A group of countries including Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Latvia, and Spain would have liked the climate neutrality target to apply to each member state, rather than just at the EU level. Neither this nor their proposal to state that the EU should aim for negative emissions after 2050 was included in the text of the Climate Law. Most Eastern members consistently opposed such ambitious language (Agence Europe, 2020b). Arguably, the relative influence of Eastern members on EU climate policy—a field where they tend to be less ambitious than most other members—increased following Brexit. For EU climate action, Brexit entailed the departure of a large member state with traditionally ambitious emissions reduction targets (Bocse, 2020; Loss, 2020). Thus, besides being a source of environmental turbulence and a distraction from the climate agenda, Brexit tilted the balance in negotiations on emissions reduction in favour of reluctant member states.

Moreover, a group including Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania (unsuccessfully) argued that the text of the Climate Law should include a reference to the principle of "technological neutrality," allowing member states to determine their energy mix. They also maintained that reference to the "enabling framework"—the set of tools, incentives, and investments to assist member states in the energy transition taking into account their different starting points—should be included in the main body of the law, rather than only in recital 11 (cf. European Commission, 2020a, p. 11). This amendment was not accepted due to firm opposition of a group of Nordic and Western countries, but a sentence requiring the Commission to assess "adequate instruments and incentives for mobilising the investments needed" was included in Article 3(2) of the consolidated draft (Agence Europe, 2020b).

This compromise, together with the postponement of a decision on the 2030 targets (Agence Europe, 2020c), aimed to pave the way for a swifter adoption of the Climate Law and the long-term zero net emission target. Like the EGD's Just Transition Fund—an EU funding mechanism that aims to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the energy transition in regions that rely heavily on the fossil fuel value chain—these measures aimed to assuage the economic concerns of Eastern members (Siddi, 2020, p. 6). This approach seemed to be vindicated when, in mid-November 2020, the ambassadors of member states to the EU approved the proposal to start inter-institutional negotiations ("trilogues," including the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission) on the text of the Climate Law as redrafted in October (Agence Europe, 2020d).

However, while member states and EU institutions worked to overcome their disagreements, climate negotiations were affected by two major interrelated sources of environmental turbulence: the dispute on Polish and Hungarian violations of the rule of law and the difficult negotiations on the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021–2027. For over two years, Poland and Hungary had been facing a procedure under article 7 of the Treaty on European Union for serious violations of the rule law (Gora & de Wilde, 2020). Although EU institutions and other member states repeatedly called on Poland and Hungary to redress rule of law violations, the issue remained unsolved (European Parliament, 2020) and became intertwined with the complex negotiations on the MFF. In early November 2020, trilogue negotiations on the MFF reached a political agreement on a mechanism that tied both the Just Transition and the MFF funds to the respect of the rule of law (Makszimov, 2020).

The prospect of losing access to part of their EU funds led Poland and Hungary to veto the EU's 2021–2027 budget and the post-pandemic recovery programme, both of which included the funding necessary to pursue the Green Deal and the EU's climate objectives (Gera, 2020). The Polish and Hungarian veto was also a source of turbulence of scale, as it prevented the adoption of the EU's nationally determined contribution to the Paris climate agreement for 2030. A decision taken at member state level had consequences for climate policy at both the European level (by stalling intra-EU negotiations) and at the international level (by delaying the announcement of a crucial EU target within the multilateral framework of the Paris Agreement). Eventually, a compromise between Poland and Hungary and other EU member states was reached at the European Council summit of 10–11 December 2020. The mechanism allowing the suspension of EU funds in case of rule of law violations remained in place, but the Commission agreed not to launch a sanction procedure against any member states until the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decides on the legality of the mechanism (Valero, 2020).

While the conflict may resurface following the ECJ's decision, potentially generating further turbulence, the compromise reached in December 2020 allowed the EU to adopt a 1.8 trillion budget including climate finance (European Council, 2020, pp. 1–4). This paved the way for the European Council's adoption of the Climate Target Plan with a revised GHG reduction target of "at least 55 percent" compared to 1990 (European Council, 2020, p. 5). Subsequently, on 18 December, the Commission forwarded the new target to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as

required by the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, details on how to achieve the target remained to be agreed. A group of Eastern European member states consider future financial support essential to pursue the target (Agence Europe, 2020e, pp. 1–2). Furthermore, inter-institutional disagreements returned to the fore due to the more ambitious stance of the European Parliament on the 2030 target. This emerged with particular clarity at the third round of trilogue negotiations in early February 2021. The Parliament proposed to raise the 2030 target to 60 percent and to make the 2050 climate neutrality goal applicable to all member states, rather than just to the EU as a whole. However, the Council declined both proposals and the negotiations were reportedly stalled (Agence Europe, 2021). The Council and the Parliament reached a provisional agreement only after several months of intense negotiations, in early May 2021. The main terms of the agreement—a reduction target of at least 55 percent for 2030, climate neutrality "within the Union" by 2050—reflected the Council's position (European Council, 2021, p. 28).

4. Conclusion

This article made an empirical contribution to the incipient corpus of scholarly literature on recent, crucial developments in the EU's climate agenda, most notably the European Green Deal and the 2030 and 2050 climate frameworks. While its main contribution was empirical, the article also engaged with the scholarly debate on the concept of turbulence. It relied on Ansell and Trondal's (2018) typology of turbulence to investigate EU climate action. Previously, this typology had not been applied specifically to a case study on climate policy. However, as the article attempted to demonstrate, climate action is a highly relevant field for this investigation because it is particularly exposed to the complex ramifications of turbulence. The analysis revealed that environmental turbulence was an essential feature of the period under consideration and had an important impact on the EU climate agenda. The announcement of the European Green Deal in December 2019 was partly a response to the outcome of the 2019 European elections and, most notably, to the environmental turbulence generated by an unprecedented wave of transnational youth protest movements demanding climate action. The drafting of the European Climate Law in March 2020, including the 2050 climate neutrality goal, can also be seen as a governance response to young demonstrators' demands of a long-term strategy to tackle climate change.

During 2020, new sources of environmental turbulence played a disruptive role in the EU's climate agenda. In the spring, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic led to a shift of attention away from climate issues and threatened to delay the implementation of the Green Deal. In the autumn, the dispute on rule of law violations in Poland and Hungary became intertwined with EU budget negotiations and caused a dangerous deadlock with consequences for many aspects of EU governance, including climate policy. Poland's and Hungary's veto on the EU's budget was also a source of turbulence of scale, as it had an effect at the multilateral level too (both at and beyond the EU level). It delayed the adoption of the 2030 Climate Target Plan and hence the announcement of the EU's nationally determined contribution to the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, the different positions of EU institutions on the 2030 target and several aspects of the 2050 climate framework led to a protracted stall in intra-EU negotiations that was only overcome in May 2021.

On the whole, however, EU governance responses to various types of turbulence have highlighted that climate action remains a priority for the Union. The post-pandemic recovery packages have increased the availability of EU climate finance (see also Dupont et al., 2020, p. 1102). The Commission has reframed the Green Deal as the EU's growth strategy and as an essential part of the economic recovery. At the same time, prospects for the EU's global climate action and for international cooperation improved following the election of Joe Biden to President of the United States in November 2020. The beginning of Biden's presidency, with the return of the US to the Paris climate agreement and the announcement of new US emissions reduction targets, marked a clear departure from the unilateralism and hostility to climate negotiations of his predecessor (Hook & Politi, 2021). While major challenges to the EU's global climate action persist (cf. Grimm et al., 2021), Biden's election removed an important source of environmental turbulence that had particularly nefarious effects for climate policy. Therefore, while turbulence remains a formidable challenge to EU and global climate action, EU institutions now appear to view the post-pandemic economic restructuring and the changed stance of the US on the climate agenda as opportunities to accelerate the energy transition.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

EU Climate and Energy Policy: How Myopic Is It?

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Abstract
This article investigates the shortsightedness or myopia of recent climate and energy policy (CEP) in the EU. To this end, it develops and applies a measurement tool of short-termism composed of four key criteria: (1) the reflection of science-based long-term thinking in the policy process and its output; (2) the degree to which mid-term greenhouse gas emission targets and accompanying policies align with science-based long-term objectives; (3) the stringency of the legislation; and (4) its adaptability. We use these criteria to assess the levels of short-termism of the EU's 2020 and 2030 CEP frameworks and the (still evolving) European Green Deal (EGD). Overall, we find that the level of myopia of EU CEP has fluctuated and has advanced far less than the development of the nominal mid-term emission targets might suggest. The EGD's 55% emission reduction target for 2030 only constitutes a return to the levels of alignment with science-based long-term objectives existing in the 2020 Package (making good on the regression of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due to the maturing of long-term thinking and a ratcheting mechanism, that EU climate policy under the EGD can be considered less myopic than the 2020 Package (although the assessment remains preliminary pending the adoption of further implementing legislation). These findings lay the ground for future research that not only investigates reasons for the general myopia of (EU) climate policy, but also the drivers of the fluctuations over time.

Keywords
2020 Package; 2030 Framework; ambition; effort sharing; emissions trading; European Climate Law; European Green Deal; myopia

Issue
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1. Introduction

In the twenty-first century, the EU has significantly developed its climate and energy policy (CEP), most notably through several policy packages. The 2020 Climate and Energy Package (2020 Package), adopted in 2009, established and implemented a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 20% by 2020. In 2018, the 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework (2030 Framework) revised this target to 40% by 2030. In the last step so far, the European Climate Law adopted under the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2021, upgraded the 2030 mitigation target to 55% (while further implementing legislation is forthcoming) to better align the EU's commitments with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, namely, to limit the increase of global average temperature to 2 °C or even 1.5 °C compared with pre-industrial times. Over the same timeframe, the EU's long-term target has also evolved from a political commitment to reducing GHG emissions by 80–95% by 2050 made in 2009 to a binding target of climate neutrality or net-zero emissions by 2050 enshrined in the Climate Law. In parallel with advancing its emission targets, the EU has also developed the surrounding legislative framework,

including the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) covering the power and industry sectors, an Effort Sharing among member states regarding the non-ETS sectors, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive and more (on EU CEP and its evolution, see e.g., Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Delbeke & Vis, 2019; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).

A rich literature has explored various aspects of EU CEP. Amongst several themes, scholars have analysed: the development of EU climate policy, its implementation and effectiveness, its ambition, its innovation, the EU's role as an international climate leader, and individual climate policy instruments and packages (e.g., Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Burns, 2019; Dupont, 2016; Rayner & Jordan, 2016). This is not the place for a comprehensive review of the achievements and shortcomings of this literature and its many branches. Rather, we note that hardly any contributions to this literature have, as of yet, diachronically assessed to what extent EU CEP, and its mid-term targets and related policy frameworks in particular, has been in line with scientifically-derived long-term objectives.

Beyond the literature on EU CEP, scholars have investigated the role of time in climate politics. Short-term time horizons and the focus on immediate interests form a key component of the conceptualization of climate change as a "superwicked problem," having so far led to largely inadequate climate policies (Levin et al., 2012). Similarly, Hovi et al. (2009) have argued that the time inconsistency between short-term costs of climate policies and long-term benefits resulting from them, impedes effective climate protection. Hence, temporal asymmetries between short-term policy action ("political time," e.g., electoral cycles or dynamics of international institutions) and long-term impacts ("deep time," geological timescales) hamper climate decision-making (Galaz, 2019). Furthermore, literature on "democratic myopia" has explored the shortsightedness of politics more generally (and only partially with respect to climate policy; see Cseh, 2019) as resulting from the institutional structures of contemporary democratic political systems (see Finnegan, 2019) and associated behavioral mechanisms and short-term interests (e.g., Jacobs, 2016; Mackenzie, 2016). In line with the problem analysis, these diverse contributions explore similar potential solutions, namely adapting the design of (climate) policies (to strengthen their path dependency; see Levin et al., 2012) and the institutional structures of political systems (e.g., reinforcing the agonistic aspects of democracy, as in Machin, 2019; turning to deliberative forms of democracy, as in Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2019; or even potentially constraining democracies, as in Beckman, 2008). Surprisingly, however, few contributions to the mentioned literatures have empirically examined the degree of shortsightedness or "myopia" of climate policy as a key foundation for investigating the reasons for such myopia and possible remedies. Additionally, myopia literature has, so far, remained focused on the national level. As a result, any changes of the level of myopia over time or the presence of myopia at the EU level have hardly been explored.

Against this backdrop, this article examines the level of myopia/shortsightedness (or farsightedness) of EU CEP from the 2020 Package to the EGD. How myopic has EU CEP been, and has its level of short- or farsightedness changed over time? Investigating these questions promises to make a twofold contribution to the aforementioned scholarship. First, it offers a fresh systematic assessment of EU CEP which advances on the established focus on ambition by taking a long-term perspective that pays particular attention to intertemporal trade-offs. Second, our analysis proposes an approach to the systematic investigation/determination of the *level* of myopia of (climate) policy as an essential basis for research on temporal asymmetries, time inconsistencies and "democratic" myopia. This provides the ground for systematic comparisons across countries and time as an important basis for advancing explanatory analyses, which we have to leave for future research.

We argue that EU CEP has, overall, remained shortsighted, but with significant variation over time and across different criteria. Our assessment indicates that the myopia of EU CEP has declined far less than the development of the nominal mid-term emission reduction targets—from 20% to 40% to 55%—might suggest. The 55% target under the EGD only returned to the levels of the 2020 Package (making good on the regression of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due to the maturing of long-term thinking and a ratcheting mechanism, that EU CEP under the EGD can be considered less myopic than the 2020 Package (although the assessment remains preliminary pending the adoption of further implementing legislation).

In the following, we develop our argument in three steps. The next section first lays out our framework for assessing the level of myopia of EU CEP featuring four key criteria. Subsequently, we apply these criteria to appraise the level of myopia of EU CEP from the 2020 Package over the 2030 Framework to the evolving EGD. Lastly, we discuss the main findings, draw conclusions and look ahead to follow-up research.

2. Myopia of EU Climate Policy: Assessment Framework

Building on the relevant literature, we suggest four key criteria for assessing the level of myopia of EU CEP over time. We propose to investigate to what extent: (1) a long-term perspective in line with science was explicitly reflected in the legislative process and its output; (2) the mid-term emission reduction targets and accompanying policies have been in line with long-term objectives in accordance with science; (3) the governance framework has been "stringent" in demanding actors to adapt their behavior; and (4) ratcheting mechanisms for further developing mitigation targets and the governance

framework in line with science (adaptability) have been included. Overall, we consider myopia a property of a policy (both process and output), hence our focus on the EU's legislative documents. While this may connect to the myopia of actors, investigating the latter would move towards explanation, which is beyond the scope of this article and may be part of future research (see also below).

First, we analyze to what extent a long-term perspective was reflected in the decision-making process and its output. This criterion serves to provide a first insight into the importance and understanding of the long term in the legislative process and the resulting legislation. Three aspects appear to be particularly relevant in this respect, namely: (1) whether any long-term objective is mentioned; (2) whether the mid-term emission reduction target is related to the long-term target and trajectory; and (3) whether the long-term target is derived from science. This third sub-criterion is meant to capture the quality of the long-term perspective that is likely to be deficient without a firm basis in science. To assess these three aspects, we examine the adopted legislative texts related to the emission reductions and their implementation, as well as the legislative proposal by the European Commission and the positions expressed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (and any related pronouncements of the European Council).

Second, we appraise the degree to which the mid-term target pursued closes the gap between a baseline scenario and an ideal, farsighted mitigation trajectory. While the identification of the existing emission target is straightforward, assessing the other two reference values—the baseline and the ideal ambition—raises important issues (Grant et al., 2020).

The *baseline scenario* denotes the emission trajectory toward the relevant target year that was expected under *existing* policies prior to the political decision on the target. The calculation of such a hypothetical emission trajectory is not an exact science, not least because it is based on assumptions about uncertain future developments of relevant framework conditions, such as economic growth. Nevertheless, the European Environment Agency has, since 2003, published the most authoritative baseline scenarios for the EU (projections with existing measures) in its "Trends and Projections" reports. We thus use these as our baseline scenarios.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the *ideal, farsighted ambition* of EU mitigation targets. What target should the EU, according to the latest science at the time of decision-making, have aimed at? While science can advise on which global emission scenarios have a higher or lower likelihood of ensuring global temperature increase stays below 2 °C (or even 1.5 °C), varying equity or fairness criteria lead to different results as to the share of individual actors depending on historical and current responsibility, economic and technological capabilities, etc. (Hayward, 2012; Williston, 2019). In this respect, we base our discussion on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement (Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). Accordingly, both responsibility and capability need to be considered. Since, in practice, actors with high historical responsibility (e.g., the US and the EU) generally also possess high capacity to mitigate climate change, we take into account studies that include both responsibilities and capabilities or only capabilities, in order to identify scenarios of farsighted ambition.

In assessing the mid-term target, we additionally examine relevant accompanying provisions of the policy instruments adopted to implement it. Two types of flexibilities may be considered. First, some provisions may allow EU member states to balance over-and underachievements between them or across time (borrowing emission allowances from the future, banking past emission reductions). These flexibilities do not affect the overall target, but may reduce the likelihood that it is overachieved. Of greater concern, flexibilities that allow member states to offset their emissions by domestic or international carbon removals/credits (e.g., from forests) de facto reduce and water down the emission reduction target (see McLaren, 2020). By contrast, accompanying provisions on renewable energy or energy efficiency have the potential to provide additional impetus for emission reductions, potentially leading to overachievement of the emission target (despite concerns that they might interfere with the proper functioning of other policy instruments such as the ETS; Rayner & Jordan, 2016).

Beyond the ambition of the target, we examine other aspects of the policy design of the legislative measures particularly relevant for myopia. As covering all aspects of policy design from the policy instrument choice and policy mixes to design processes and the actors involved in the policy design (see Howlett & Mukherjee, 2018) is beyond the scope of this article, we focus on two components that are particularly pertinent for our purposes: the stringency and adaptability of the legislation. A certain degree of stringency or bindingness is required for the targets to be achieved across different policy cycles (i.e., electoral cycles or terms of office). Low stringency would then indicate shortsightedness as the targets will be less likely achieved or more likely overturned or watered down in a following policy cycle. To examine stringency, we base our assessment on the framework developed by Oberthür (2019) on the basis of literature on hard versus soft law as well as the bindingness and legalization of international governance. He introduces four criteria: (1) the formal status of the legislation (i.e., whether it is formally binding); (2) the nature of the obligations (i.e., substantive or procedural); (3) the prescriptiveness and precision of the rules and obligations; and (4) the means available to promote accountability and effective implementation (e.g., monitoring and reporting, response to non-compliance).

Furthermore, adaptability is required to avoid a lock-in of shortsighted policies. The need for mechanisms for ratcheting and further developing CEP over time arises because most emission targets and accompanying climate governance frameworks have historically remained deficient (e.g., Climate Action Tracker, 2019). In addition, new scientific knowledge may emerge, and other developments may affect mitigation trajectories. Thus, the policy framework needs to include mechanisms to regularly review and strengthen existing targets, as appropriate, in line with science. As a prime example, the Paris Agreement includes various provisions that are jointly referred to as a "ratcheting" or "ambition mechanism" (Brun, 2016; Torney & O'Gorman, 2020). Key features of such an ambition mechanism include: (1) the scheduled regular review and further development of existing targets and measures; (2) the orientation towards strengthening (rather than a weakening); and (3) the establishment of science as a benchmark (Torney & O'Gorman, 2020). Taken together, these elements may, beyond the emission targets themselves, serve to indicate the extent to which the governance framework is oriented towards the long term and farsighted.

Overall, the two criteria of the ambition of mid-term targets and the stringency of the related legislative measures constitute the substantive core of our assessment of the myopia of EU CEP over time. They determine the compatibility of EU CEP with long-term science-based requirements. Whether deliberate or not, lack of compatibility can be interpreted as myopia/shortsightedness, unless an appropriate reasoning is provided (e.g., lack of feasibility of science-based long-term requirements). The existence and design of a ratcheting mechanism forms a complement as a third criterion to be taken into account in addition to the two aforementioned ones. Furthermore, examining whether and how long-term considerations have been explicitly reflected in the political process and its output allows us to determine whether any shortcomings on the other criteria may be due to the neglect of the long term, result from deficiencies in the long-term perspective (e.g., a disregard of science), or are in fact acknowledged (e.g., as mentioned above, by providing appropriate reasons). Taken together, the four criteria hence enable us to assess the myopia of EU CEP over time, including both the substance of the policy and the framing of its time horizon.

3. Assessing the EU's Level of Myopia Over Time

We apply our analytical framework to the main milestones in the development of EU CEP legislation: the 2020 Package, the 2030 Framework and the EGD. These overarching legislative frameworks set out the EU's mid-term GHG emission reduction targets, which have been divided into a target for the sectors covered by the ETS Directive (principally industry and power) and a target for the non-ETS sectors (including transport, buildings, and agriculture) covered by the Effort Sharing Decision/Regulation. While the overall targets relate to 1990 as the baseline, the ETS and non-ETS targets are calibrated against 2005, for which verified data are available (Delbeke & Vis, 2019). Other key elements of the aforementioned legislative frameworks include the Renewable Energy (RE) Directive, the Energy Efficiency (EE) Directive and, newly introduced in the 2030 Framework, the Regulations on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (hereafter Governance Regulation; Delreux & Happaerts, 2016; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). As the legislation of the EGD is still under development at the time of writing, the assessment focuses on the European Climate Law that (among other things) enshrines both a strengthened 2030 emission target and climate neutrality by 2050 in law.

3.1. 2020 Package

Adopted in 2008/2009, the 2020 Package established the EU's target of a 20% GHG emission reduction by 2020 compared to 1990. To implement this target, the ETS Directive and the Effort Sharing Decision aimed to reduce GHG emissions in their respective sectors by 21% and 10% (compared to 2005; EU, 2009a, 2009c). Additionally, the RE Directive established binding member state targets towards increasing the share of RE in the EU's final energy consumption to 20%, and the EE Directive (adopted in 2012) pursued an indicative target of a 20% EE improvement (EU, 2009b, 2012; Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010; Rayner & Jordan, 2016). The emission reduction target was to be upgraded to 30% if other developed countries and more economically advanced developing countries took comparable and adequate action according to their responsibilities and capabilities (an upgrade that did not materialize).

Neither the legislation nor the legislative process provide evidence for adequate long-term thinking. As a result of the proposal by the Commission and suggestions by the European Parliament and the European Council, the legislation referred to long-term objectives of a global GHG emission reduction of 50% and a reduction of 60–80% for developed countries by 2050 (EU, 2009a, 2009c; European Commission, 2008a, 2008b; European Council, 2007; European Parliament, 2008a, 2008b). However, the scientific basis of these targets was—beyond mentioning "the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)"—not clearly argued. Perhaps even more importantly, it was unclear how the EU's 2020 target of 20/30% would fit in the long-term trajectory. Overall, it would appear that the long-term emission targets referred to were based on the IPCC's report from 2001 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2001) rather than its then most recent report (IPCC, 2007); in other words, the scientific basis was outdated.

Regarding ambition, the 20% emission reduction target, on the one hand, significantly advances the baseline scenario of a 5% emission increase as estimated by the

European Environment Agency (with existing measures; see European Environment Agency, 2007). On the other hand, this target falls short of what—according to the IPCC—developed countries would have had to reduce (25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020; see IPCC, 2007) and the EU's fair share: Available studies taking into account responsibility and capability suggested that the EU's fair share would fall into the upper part of the indicated range (30–40%; see den Elzen & Höhne, 2008; Rogelj et al., 2010; Winkler et al., 2009). As a result, the 20% target closed the 35–45 percentage point gap between the baseline (+5%) and the required emission reductions (30–40%) by close to two-thirds (25 of 35–45 percentage points = 55%–71% advancement; see Figure 1). An upgrade of the target to 30% would have aligned it with the lower end of the required range: It would have closed the gap by 78–100% (35 of 35–45 percentage points). Additionally, the target was somewhat reduced because ETS installations were allowed to use international emission credits to some extent. Several other flexibilities included in the package reduced the pressure to reduce emissions, most importantly the possibility for member states to bank past and borrow future emission allowances (5%) under the Effort Sharing Decision and to trade such allowances between them (EU, 2009a, 2009c; Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010). Furthermore, free allocation of ETS emission allowances to industries in international competition has been subject to criticism for slowing down emission reductions (Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010). Counterbalancing these effects, action on RE and EE has served to bolster emission reduction efforts. As a result, an overachievement of the 20% target was soon projected (European Environment Agency, 2010).

Following Oberthür (2019), the 2020 Package possesses a relatively high degree of stringency. It is firmly rooted in instruments of EU law (regulations, directives, decisions). Member states have binding national targets for both emissions (under the Effort Sharing Decision) and RE (under the RE Directive), and emissions of industry and the power sector are directly controlled under the ETS Directive. The package combines these precise substantive obligations with procedural obligations, including for member states to elaborate plans and report on implementation and progress. The key obligations are, with some circumscribed limitations, precise and prescriptive with few flexibilities. Finally, the package can in large part rely on the general accountability and implementation mechanisms under EU law, in particular infringement proceedings. In addition, it possesses several specific means, such as evaluation of progress by the Commission, penalties for non-compliance under the ETS and specific consequences for any member state exceeding its emission allocation under the Effort Sharing Decision: a deduction of 1.08 tonnes of CO_2 for every excess tonne, the requirement to develop a corrective action plan, and a temporary suspension to transfer emission allocations to another member state (Lacasta et al., 2010; Oberthür, 2019).

Lastly, the package included few measures towards adaptability. Most importantly, the 2020 emission reduction target could be raised to 30% if other developed countries and economically more advanced developing countries committed to taking strong action (see above). This would happen through the ordinary legislative procedure. Furthermore, several provisions for revising the different elements of the package were included; for example, the Commission could make additional legislative proposals to help the member states achieve their commitments under the Effort Sharing Decision after assessing its overall implementation (EU, 2009c, Art. 6). However, there was no clear schedule for the review and further strengthening of existing targets and measures and no clear link with science as a benchmark in this respect.

Overall, the 2020 Package displayed a relative farsightedness. The 2020 emission target closed the gap between the baseline scenario and the ideal scenario by about two-thirds, while a relatively high degree of stringency supported its effective implementation. To the limited extent that the Package reflected a long-term perspective, it was based on outdated science. At the same time, it lacked a dedicated ratcheting mechanism (so that no upgrading of the target was considered even though the 20% reduction was already realized in 2014).

3.2. 2030 Framework

Initiated in 2013/2014 and concluded in 2018/2019, the 2030 Framework aimed at a GHG emission reduction of at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The framework contained the amended ETS Directive (43% reduction compared to 2005) and the Effort Sharing Regulation (30% reduction compared to 2005), complemented by the amended RE Directive with a target of 32% for the share of RE in final energy consumption and the EE Directive with a target of a 32.5% improvement in EE (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Other new key instruments included the LULUCF Regulation and the Governance Regulation, alongside a set of revisions of instruments governing the electricity market (EU, 2018b, 2018d; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).

A certain degree of long-term thinking is reflected in the legislation (especially in the Effort Sharing Regulation, the ETS Directive, and the Governance Regulation). Referring to the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 °C (preferably 1.5 °C), the EU set out to reach an 80–95% emission reduction by 2050, net-zero as early as possible and negative emissions thereafter (EU, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). Having said that, the pathway towards the 2050 goal, how the 40% target fits in it, and the scientific basis for it (beyond stating "in the context of the IPCC") remain unspecified. While the 80–95% emission reduction in effect stems from the IPCC's 2007 report (and hence was again quite dated; see IPCC, 2007), the long-term targets included had been proposed by the Commission and

the European Parliament (European Commission, 2016; European Parliament, 2017, 2018). The Parliament even argued for net-zero emissions by 2050 and negative emissions thereafter, and it proposed to task the European Commission with calculating a global carbon budget, and the EU's fair share in it, to guide the long-term trajectory (European Parliament, 2018).

We consider that the 2030 emission target closed the gap to what would ideally be required by less than half. As the IPCC did not formulate any benchmark mitigation ranges for 2030, we have derived them from scenarios that take either both responsibility and capability or at least capability into account (see Section 2). We have identified five scenarios that have applied these equity principles to calculate the EU's fair share, out of a wider range of scenarios using varying or no equity principles. They encompassed a range from 52.4% to 90% GHG emission reduction compared to 1990 levels (Averchenkova et al., 2014; Meinshausen et al., 2015; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). Since the three middle scenarios fell within a range of 64% to 67.9% emission reduction, we consider 60–70% an ideal range for the EU. According to the European Environment Agency, measures existing prior to the first pronouncement of the 40% reduction target in 2014 would have resulted in a baseline emission reduction of 22% by 2030 (European Environment Agency, 2014). Consequently, the adopted 40% target closed 37.5–47.4% of the gap between the baseline (22%) and the required target range (60–70%; see Figure 1).

Furthermore, the strengthened RE and EE targets (and accompanying rules) have been balanced by enhanced flexibilities. The 2030 Framework introduced several additional flexibilities, while largely keeping existing flexibilities or even expanding them (e.g., an increased borrowing limit of 10% between 2021–2025). In particular, member states were allowed to offset a certain amount of their emissions under the effort sharing with ETS allowances (up to 100 million allowances) and LULUCF credits (up to 280 million net removals; EU, 2018c; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). If fully exploited, the LULUCF credits could reduce the 40% target by close to three percentage points. In contrast, the Commission calculated that the full implementation of the RE and EE targets should lead to a significant overachievement of the 40% emission target toward 45–46% (European Commission, 2018; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).

At the same time, the stringency of the 2030 Framework is at a similar level as that of the 2020 Package (EU, 2018e, 2018f; Oberthür, 2019). On the one side, the bindingness suffered a set-back with the replacement of binding national targets for RE with a collectively binding target at the EU level. On the other side, the Governance Regulation strengthened member states' procedural obligations to prepare integrated National Energy and Climate Plans (including details on policies and measures) and long-term strategies as well as to report on progress in implementation (EU, 2018d; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Also, it upgraded the powers of the European Commission to monitor and promote implementation, and introduced a formula for the calculation of indicative national RE targets. Overall, these opposing trends can be considered to have cancelled each other out so that the stringency remained largely at the same level (Oberthür, 2019).

Furthermore, advancing beyond the 2020 Package, the 2030 Framework introduced a schedule for review and potential upward revision of the package (EU, 2018d; Torney & O'Gorman, 2020). Strongly linked to the five-year global stocktake under the Paris Agreement in which countries collectively assess their progress towards the agreement's goals, the various legislative instruments foresee a review and potential upgrade around 2023 (and every five years thereafter). In addition, the Governance Regulation establishes that National Energy and Climate Plans are regularly updated and further developed every five years and requires the Commission to prepare a long-term strategy for the EU. This constitutes an opening for more long-term planning and the embedding of periodic reviews into a long-term decarbonization trajectory—without yet providing for such a trajectory and a related process that would clearly establish science as a benchmark (EU, 2018d; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020; Torney & O'Gorman, 2020).

Overall, the myopia of the 2030 Framework can, despite some opposing trends, be considered to have increased compared with the 2020 Package. The mitigation ambition pursued closes the gap towards effective climate protection in a long-term perspective less than half (down from about two-thirds) and was further softened by newly introduced flexibilities and offsets. While its stringency remained roughly at the same level, the 2030 Framework did progress on adaptability by establishing a ratcheting mechanism, which can be linked to a stronger explicit reflection on a longer-term perspective in the policy process and its output. This positive development remains, however, insufficient for balancing the significant regress on mitigation ambition.

3.3. European Green Deal

Launched by the von der Leyen Commission in 2019 as the EU's growth strategy to make its economy sustainable, the EGD aims at reaching climate neutrality (net-zero emissions) by 2050. As a central piece of the EGD, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on a European Climate Law in April 2021 (EU, 2021). This Climate Law enshrines an enhanced GHG emission reduction target for 2030 of 55% and the 2050 climate-neutrality target. A fuller legislative package implementing the 2030 target (known as the "Fit for 55" package), including revisions of the ETS Directive, the Effort Sharing Regulation, the RE and EE Directives, was proposed in July 2021 and remains to be adopted at the time of writing. Thus, the analysis in this section focuses on the ambition, the long-term perspective and the ratcheting

mechanism addressed in the Climate Law, while the stringency of the governance framework will largely depend on the Fit for 55 package still to be enacted.

The Climate Law more strongly reflects long-term thinking than the 2030 Framework, but still leaves room for significant further improvement. First, the Law binds the mid-term 2030 emission reduction target of net 55% together with the long-term 2050 climate-neutrality target, along with a prospect of achieving negative emissions thereafter (EU, 2021). However, the pathway towards net-zero emissions in 2050 and the logic for the 2030 target on the trajectory to 2050 remains to be specified. Also, beyond general references to the IPCC 1.5 °C Report (IPCC, 2018), it is not clear how the new targets align with science. This outcome resulted from the slightly diverging positions of the European institutions involved in the legislative process (Council of the European Union, 2020; European Commission, 2020; European Parliament, 2020). Especially the European Parliament argued for further strengthening the long-term perspective by requesting each member state to achieve negative emissions from 2051, and determining a Union carbon budget of 48 Gt CO_2 equivalent for the period 2018–2050 (based on prior Commission calculations). Nevertheless, similar to the other institutions, the exact scientific basis for its long-term objectives was not further specified.

Concerning ambition, the heightened 2030 emission reduction target enhances farsightedness compared to the 2030 Framework, even though the baseline has increased in the meantime. Since the EGD emerged shortly after the finalization of the 2030 Framework, the same studies remain relevant. Hence, the EU's 2030 emission reduction target should have ideally amounted to 60–70%. At the same time, the baseline scenario increased to 36% by 2030 because of the progress in implementing the 2030 Framework (European Environment Agency, 2019). Therefore, the 55% target closes 55.9–79.2% of the gap between the baseline (36%) and the required target range (60–70%; see Figure 1). However, the gap closure is somewhat reduced because the 55% constitute a "net" target: The Climate Law allows the crediting of LULUCF removals of up to 225 Mt CO_2 so that the 55% target translates into an actual emission cut of 52.8% (EU, 2021). At the same time, the magnitude of the allowed LULUCF credits is somewhat lower than in the 2030 Framework. Furthermore, the Climate Law includes the requirement for the Commission to assess the consistency of each draft measure or legislative proposal with the climate-neutrality objective. Other flexibilities cannot be assessed yet since they will only be discussed as part of the further implementing legislation.

Concerning stringency, the Climate Law makes the 2030 and 2050 emission targets legally binding. While discussions so far would not point to a significant deviation from the existing stringency of the governance framework, relevant other aspects cannot be assessed yet as the implementing legislation is still under development.

Finally, the Climate Law further strengthens the existing ratcheting mechanism and thus the adaptability of the legislation. The schedule for review and potential upward revision of the legislation in line with the quintennial global stocktakes of the Paris Agreement is maintained. In addition, the Climate Law requires the Commission to formulate an emission reduction target for 2040 within six months after the first global stocktake in 2023, accompanied by an indicative Union GHG emission budget for 2030–2050 (EU, 2021). This 2040 target can be revised within six months of the second global stocktake in 2028. Lastly, a European Scientific Advisory Board will be established to provide scientific advice on the EU's existing and proposed measures, targets and GHG emission budget. Additionally, member states are invited to establish their own national climate advisory bodies.

Overall, the EGD thus seems to increase the farsightedness of EU CEP somewhat beyond the level of the 2020 Package. To be sure, the 2030 emission reduction target of 55% only achieves about the same level of alignment with the ideal ambition as the 2020 target of 20% (assuming stringency will remain roughly stable in the upcoming further implementing legislation). It is the process-related elements—the maturing of the long-term perspective and the strengthening of the ratcheting mechanism—that elevate the EGD above the 2020 Package. This assessment hinges on retaining the prior ideal ambition (of the 2030 Framework), which may be questioned given the increasing focus on limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 °C after the Paris Agreement and the IPCC 1.5 °C report (IPCC, 2018). When we calibrate the emission target toward a 1.5 °C warming scenario, the EGD would appear to be even more myopic. In this case, the EU's ideal targets for 2030 and 2050 may have to be increased to 77–87% and to more than 140% (i.e., negative emissions) respectively (Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). As a result, the 55% target would only close the gap to the ideal emission reduction by some 37–46% (19 of 41–51 percentage points).

3.4. Results

The alignment of the EU's mid-term GHG emission targets with long-term requirements has fluctuated significantly from the 2020 Package to the EGD (see Figure 1). Despite the doubling of the nominal mid-term emission target from 20% by 2020 to at least 40% by 2030, the 2030 target was less aligned with long-term requirements (see Figure 1). Additionally, whereas the design of the 2020 Package ensured a significant overachievement of the 20% emission target, the 2030 Framework enhanced the flexibilities (in particular by including LULUCF offsets) so that a full realization or even an overachievement of the 40% emission reduction remained uncertain. Accordingly, the shortsight-



Figure 1. EU mid-term GHG emission targets: closure of gap between baseline scenario and ideal target (100% = complete closure).

edness of the mid-term emission target of the 2030 Framework may be considered to have been close to double that of the 2020 Package (60% gap versus 30% gap). The significant upgrade of the 2030 target to 55% under the EGD may only re-establish the level of far-sightedness of the 2020 target, especially considering the reinforced inclusion of LULUCF removals. Admittedly, complementary elements required for a more complete assessment of the revised 2030 target under the EGD (including amendments to the rules governing the ETS, the effort sharing, RE and EE) are still to emerge from the further implementing legislation to be elaborated from mid-2021.

According to our assessment, the stringency of EU CEP has, so far, neither reinforced nor balanced the ups and downs in shortsightedness of ambition (see Table 1). Changes from the 2020 Package to the 2030 Framework have entailed both a weakening (e.g., Union target RE) and a strengthening of stringency (e.g., more procedural obligations), which seem to largely balance each other. We need to caution, though, that the assessment of the EGD necessarily remains incomplete on this aspect

Table 1. Evolution of the shortsightedness of the EU's climate and energy policy.

	2020 Package	2030 Framework	Climate Law
Closure of gap between baseline and ideal scenario	55–71%	37.5–47.4%	55.9–79.2%
Stringency	Relatively high (formal legal status, precise substantive and procedural obligations, implementation mechanisms)	Equal (abandonment of national RE targets balanced by increase in procedural obligations)	Not available yet
Adaptability	Limited (potential increase of target through ordinary legislative procedure—no schedule)	Strengthened (five-year reviews tied to global stocktakes of Paris Agreement)	Further strengthened (additional provisions for 2040 target and increased role of science)
Long-term thinking	Limited (vague long-term objectives, no clear scientific basis or mitigation pathway)	Strengthened (more specific long-term objectives tied to Paris Agreement)	Further strengthened (specific long-term objective central to legislation)

as well, as it depends on the forthcoming implementing legislation.

At the same time, a long-term perspective and adaptability have seen steady growth over time (see Table 1). Long-term thinking has become more prominent in the legislation and the underlying positions of the European institutions from the 2020 Package, culminating in the inclusion of the 2050 climate-neutrality target in the European Climate Law. Furthermore, the 2030 Framework introduced scheduled reviews and upward revisions, which has been further strengthened in the EGD's Climate Law that frames a process for the establishment of a 2040 target as well as a GHG emission budget. It also promises to strengthen the link with science—a significant gap so far—through the creation of a European Scientific Advisory Body.

Overall, our assessment indicates that while the shortsightedness of EU CEP has evolved significantly, it has decreased far less than the development of the nominal mid-term emission targets might suggest. The substantive farsightedness of the EGD only re-established the levels of the 2020 Package (making good on the regression of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due to the maturing of long-term thinking and the strengthening of the ratcheting mechanism, that EU CEP under the EGD can be considered less myopic than the 2020 Package (although the assessment remains preliminary pending the adoption of further implementing legislation). Additionally, using a 1.5°C warming scenario as the ideal scenario significantly increases the level of myopia of the EGD (and potentially also of the 2030 Framework). This raises the question whether such ideal levels of emission reduction are feasible domestically or whether they would require international action.

4. Conclusion

Our analysis reveals that the level of myopia of EU CEP displays significant variation over time. "Substantive myopia" (including the emission target and the stringency of accompanying policies) has decreased from the 2020 Package to the 2030 Framework before increasing under the EGD to levels comparable to the 2020 Package. In contrast, process-related elements (long-term perspective and adaptability) have advanced more linearly over time, while still leaving significant room for improvement. It remains to be seen whether the progress on adaptability will be able to overcome the enduring myopia of EU CEP. As time is running out to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, it may be questionable whether any future ratcheting can still catch up.

These findings make a significant contribution to both the literature on EU climate policy and research on temporal asymmetries, time inconsistencies and (democratic) myopia. It provides a novel perspective on EU climate policy that enables a diachronic assessment of policy development over time, properly integrating a long-term perspective that pays attention to time (in)consistency, which is central in climate policy. It also advances a systematic investigation of the *level* of myopia of (climate) policy as an essential basis for research on temporal asymmetries/inconsistencies and "democratic" myopia, thereby enabling comparisons across countries and across time as an important basis for advancing explanatory analyses.

A logical next step in advancing the research presented in this article may be the investigation of the driving forces of short- and farsightedness in general and with respect to EU CEP in particular. The aforementioned literatures on time asymmetries and democratic myopia might suggest a focus on institutional factors, whereas underlying interests and politics may also come into focus. For example, we might investigate in further detail the positions of the European institutions involved and the underlying politics as drivers of myopia. We may also scrutinize to what extent the applicable institutional procedures and structures have furthered or permitted a more science-based long-term perspective as opposed to more short-term political considerations. We are hopeful that our analysis creates a solid foundation for advancing such research to gain a deeper understanding of myopia in EU (climate) policymaking and how to overcome it.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

The European Council, the Council, and the European Green Deal

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Abstract
We assess the response of the European Council and the Council of the European Union (hereafter the Council) to the emergence and development of the European Green Deal (EGD). First, we conduct a literature review of the historical role of the two intergovernmental institutions in EU climate policy development, drawing inspiration from new intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism. Next, we provide an overview of the EGD itself and three of its core elements: (1) the ambition to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; (2) its systemic and integrative nature; and (3) the just transition approach. We then present the results of a qualitative content analysis of all Council and European Council Conclusions from 2018 to 2020. Our findings show that the European Council and the Council have declared support for the EGD and its underlying principles. The European Council engaged with all three elements but mentioned the objective of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 most frequently and with growing intensity over the years studied. The Council similarly discussed the three elements of the EGD and gave increasing focus to the integrated/systemic transition over the course of the years 2018–2020. Our empirical analysis suggests that, on paper, the Council and the European Council may manage to govern through the organisational turbulence of member state divisions on climate governance. Furthermore, environmental turbulence arising from external contexts (e.g., economic and health crises) did not dampen their declared support towards the goals of the EGD.

Keywords
climate policy; Council of the European Union; European Council; European Green Deal; turbulence

Issue
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1. Introduction

The European Green Deal (EGD) was published by the European Commission (hereafter the Commission) in December 2019, fulfilling Ursula von der Leyen's promise to the European Parliament (hereafter the Parliament) before her confirmation as Commission President to place a Green Deal at the heart of her mandate. The EGD is an overarching policy framework designed to set the EU on the path towards climate neutrality by 2050. It lays out the need for policies and strategies in overlapping systems, including food, industry, energy, buildings, mobility, and finance. The policy framework further sets out principles that guide the pursuit of the climate neutrality objective, including integrated action and a just transition in which no-one is left behind, coupled with diplomatic engagement to accelerate sustainability transitions globally (European Commission, 2019). On paper, the EGD seems to provide the sort of transformational response that the climate challenge requires (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; Dupont et al., 2020).

That Commission President von der Leyen pushed such an agenda, and that the Commission delivered the EGD early in her mandate, underlines previous scholarship emphasising the importance of both high-level political commitment to climate action and the Commission's

entrepreneurial role (Dupont et al., 2020; Rietig & Dupont, 2021). But policymaking in the EU is a complex endeavour involving multiple actors, including the Parliament and the Council of the European Union (hereafter the Council). Furthermore, outside of the legislative processes, the European Council provides strategic, political direction. We are interested in examining the official positions of the European Council and the Council concerning the emergence and development of the EGD to assess how the two intergovernmental actors responded to the policy framework. We analyse the institutions' responses as reported in their Conclusions, thereby providing indications of their approaches towards the EGD. The European Council and Council Conclusions are the product of intense, deliberative negotiations that occur within the intergovernmental bodies (Puetter, 2012, 2014). They therefore represent the collective positions of the member state governments following discussions and compromises made at various levels, including in working groups, in the committees of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and in the meetings of the Council and European Council. Furthermore, since the European Council does not provide minutes or recordings of its meetings, and the non-legislative functions of the Council are also held behind closed doors, the Conclusions are the only public source of negotiated member state positions (Hillebrandt & Novak, 2016). While there are limits to focusing on the Conclusions as a source of data, our interest lies in understanding official stances and positions, making the documents a key data source. In this article, we build further on literature that draws (even partly) on the Conclusions to understand the Council's and European Council's approaches to the climate challenge (Dupont & Oberthür, 2017; Skovgaard, 2014).

Research shows that the Council and European Council have previously weakened EU proposals for climate action, particularly owing to persistent internal disunity, which can be described as organisational turbulence (Dobbs et al., 2021; Dupont, 2016). This organisational turbulence has resulted in either incremental climate governance improvements (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020), or else delayed climate action (Dobbs et al., 2021; Dupont & Oberthür, 2017; Skovgaard, 2014). Divergences among the preferences of EU member states have previously blocked or delayed policy action during times of environmental turbulence, or turbulence in the external context, for example, after the financial and economic crises in the late 2000s (Burns et al., 2018; Dobbs et al., 2021; Skovgaard, 2014). At the onset of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020, expectations based on previous research that the EU, and particularly the Council and European Council, would lower ambition or stall climate policy development in response to a turbulent context have not (yet) been met (Burns & Tobin, 2020; Dupont et al., 2020). Instead, the European Council adopted a recovery plan in 2020 that placed the EGD at its centre, perhaps indicating that the institution has adapted to governing with or through environmental and organisational turbulence towards the EGD (Dobbs et al., 2021). Our analysis sheds light on whether this is reflected in European Council and Council official positions.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we review literature on the contribution of the two intergovernmental institutions to EU climate policy development historically. We complement this review with insights from theoretical literature aiming to understand the functioning of the Council and European Council in EU integration in general, drawing on new intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al., 2015; Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016; Puetter, 2014) and institutionalist perspectives (Schmidt, 2008, 2010; Stark, 2018; Verdun, 2015). Second, we highlight three aspects of the EGD that could be seen as innovations in climate policy development, and that guide our empirical analysis. These are (1) the ambition to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; (2) the need for a systemic and integrative transition across sectors; and (3) the just transition approach (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; European Commission, 2019). Third, we present the results of our content analysis of 424 Council and European Council Conclusions from 2018 to 2020. Our results reveal how often, in what context, and in what way the Council and European Council respond to the EGD and related climate governance issues. Fourth, we discuss our results with reference to previous literature on the Council and European Council in climate policy development in the EU, and to two types of turbulence as discussed by Dobbs, Gravey and Petetin (2021): organisational turbulence (internal divisions) and environmental turbulence (external contexts, like crisis events). We argue that official responses in both the European Council and Council have generally supported the ambition and multifaceted approach of the EGD. We conclude by outlining future research avenues and by highlighting the importance of further analysis as the EGD is implemented.

2. The Council and the European Council in EU Climate Policy Development

The European Council and the Council both bring representatives of member state governments together, but they serve different purposes. The Council is comprised of the ministers of the EU's member states. It acts as co-legislator (with the Parliament) on proposals initiated by the Commission under the EU's Ordinary Legislative Procedure. The European Council brings together the heads of state or government of the member states. It has no legislative role, but serves a political, agenda-setting purpose, outlining the general priorities of the EU. These distinct roles are set out in the Treaty on European Union in Articles 15 and 16.

Broader scholarly research on the European Council and Council in European integration processes provides insights that may help in understanding intergovernmental responses to the EGD. First, new intergovernmentalist literature asserts that the European Council and

Council tend to act beyond their roles and purposes as assigned under the Treaties (Bickerton et al., 2015; Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016; Puetter, 2014). New intergovernmentalist scholars argue that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty led to an integration paradox in the EU: that the EU continues to deepen its integration and increase the domains over which it has competence without increasing degrees of supranationalism (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hodson & Puetter, 2019; Puetter, 2014). These scholars therefore assert that member states recognise the importance of extending EU-level governance over contemporary policy challenges but are reluctant to surrender more power to the EU's supranationalist institutions, most notably, to the Commission (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hodson & Puetter, 2019; Puetter, 2014). The European Council and the Council are understood as having become the "main catalysts" in driving integration and policymaking in new areas of EU competence, particularly in finance, justice and home affairs, and common foreign security and defence policy (CFSP/CSDP; Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016, pp. 481–482), and that they have adopted a consensus-driven decision-making approach (Bickerton et al., 2015).

Second, different institutionalist perspectives of the European Council and the Council pay attention to the internal (sometimes turbulent) dynamics of the EU's intergovernmental institutions. Historical institutionalism suggests that institutions are largely stable, and that change occurs only incrementally following a logic of path dependency, unless swept off the path as the result of a critical juncture (Dupont et al., 2020; Stark, 2018; Verdun, 2015). Discursive institutionalism, however, underlines the role of ideas and discourse in explaining institutional change (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). Foreground discursive abilities of agents allow them to communicate critically about institutions, which may result in persistence or change (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Discourse can be both coordinative and communicative, with coordinative discourse involving the exchange of ideas among political actors, and communicative discourse referring to communication and projection of ideas to external audiences (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Coordinative discourse is more likely to occur inside a complex political entity like the EU.

For our analysis of the Council's and the European Council's responses to the emergence and development of the EGD, new intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism all provide helpful insights. From a new intergovernmentalist perspective, we would expect that the EGD progresses only with support from the intergovernmental institutions. Employing a historical institutionalist lens, we could expect the European Council and Council to continue along established institutional paths, thereby following previous trends of downgrading or deprioritising environmental and climate policy during times of crisis or environmental turbulence (Burns et al., 2018; Dobbs et al., 2021; Skovgaard, 2014). Finally, considering a discursive institutionalist perspective, explanations for European Council and Council responses to the EGD could stem from ideas communicated through discourses shared inside the EU institutions and to external audiences.

Previous research on the role of the European Council and Council in climate policy development shows underlying patterns of organisational turbulence (Dobbs et al., 2021). Organisational turbulence refers to turbulence within institutions, including conflict (Dobbs et al., 2021). In the context of the European Council and Council in climate policy governance, this internal, organisational turbulence can be most clearly identified in divergences among member states (Dupont et al., 2018; Skovgaard, 2014). Such organisational turbulence does not mean that governance is impossible, but it does require efforts to broker compromise and make decisions (Dobbs et al., 2021). Literature has shown that both the European Council and Council have been important players in the EU's climate policy development, but that at times, the internal, organisational turbulence delayed action or reduced ambition (Dupont, 2019; Wurzel, Liefferink, & Di Lullo, 2019). Research has also shown that while certain external events, or environmental turbulence—like the financial crisis of the late 2000s—similarly led to delays and reduced ambition, other events have pushed the European Council and Council to advance on climate policy development (Dobbs et al., 2021). For example, annual negotiations on global climate governance under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provide regular pressure points for the EU to demonstrate global climate leadership, in line with its professed aims (Oberthür & Dupont, 2021; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008; Wurzel, Liefferink, & Di Lullo, 2019). Youth climate movements and Fridays for Future protests from 2018 also generated an environmental turbulent context that facilitated EU action (Dupont et al., 2020).

The heads of state and government in the European Council engaged with the climate challenge with increasing intensity over the years and pushed the EU to take a leading role globally in responding to climate change (Dupont, 2019; Oberthür & Dupont, 2021; Wurzel, Liefferink, & Torney, 2019). The European Council has, in the past, adopted the EU's climate policy targets in a consensus decision-making form (see, for example, European Council, 2007, 2014). But it has not limited itself to political steering and has also provided clear policy instructions, setting the scope for policy action in internal EU negotiations. In 2014, for example, it adopted the EU's goal to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 40% by 2030, accompanied with detailed Conclusions on the shape of the policy instruments to achieve that goal (European Council, 2014). Ideas and discourses, such as the necessity of global leadership, the potential for ecological modernisation, and the security implications of climate impacts, have framed the European Council's historical political direction on climate governance (Dupont, 2019; Dupont & Oberthür, 2017).

The Council has a predominantly legislative function, but it also serves as a venue for political discussions to seek compromise among diverging political and policy preferences (Dupont & Oberthür, 2017; Skovgaard, 2014). Finding compromise among coalitions of member states with incoherent priorities (e.g., promoting energy security through the use of fossil fuel sources versus promoting climate action through accelerated renewable energy roll-out) has at times been challenging, as demonstrated by Poland's refusal to align with the EU 2050 Energy Roadmap, published by the Commission in 2011 (European Commission, 2011; Skovgaard, 2014; Wurzel, Liefferink, & Di Lullo, 2019). Coordination inside the multiple layers of the Council helps to achieve consensus that is more than the lowest-common denominator (Dupont, 2016). Although the 2008/2009 economic and financial crises showed that it was challenging to maintain political interest in climate policy ambition during turbulent contexts (Burns et al., 2018; Skovgaard, 2014), "the interest in pursuing European strategies in response to common policy challenges has not declined. There is even further appetite for more intergovernmental policy coordination" (Puetter, 2012, p. 162). Ideas and discourses, such as securitisation and ecological modernisation, are also found in the Council's positions on climate policy development (Dupont, 2019; Dupont & Oberthür, 2017).

3. The Emergence and Development of the European Green Deal

In many ways, the EGD may represent a break from previous incremental steps forward in EU climate governance (Dupont et al., 2020; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). It sets up a transformational framework that is novel for the EU via at least three main elements.

First, the overarching objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 is a step beyond previously envisioned policy ambition in the EU (i.e., a political goal of reducing emissions by 80–95% by 2050, adopted by the European Council in 2009). The net-zero objective is a response to the aim of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius, and to strive to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. More importantly, the EU's climate neutrality goal is embedded in the European Climate Law, making it legally-binding (Siddi, 2021).

Second, the transformational nature of the EGD is acknowledged through its systemic and integrative approach across sectors. The EGD states that "all EU actions and policies will have to contribute to the European Green Deal objectives" (European Commission, 2019, p. 3), and calls for legislative development across numerous domains, including headline topics: "mobilising industry for a clean and circular economy," "building and renovating in an energy and resource efficient way," "accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility," and "From Farm to Fork: designing a fair, healthy, and environmentally-friendly food system." Scientific evidence underpinning such a systemic approach was growing in the years prior to the EGD's publication, for example, with the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report on the impacts of 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018). The Commission also presented a communication in 2018 calling for a climate neutrality goal by 2050, which laid the initial groundwork for the systemic and integrated approach advanced by the EGD (European Commission, 2018).

Third, the approach of the EGD moves the EU towards an economic strategy that emphasises a just transition in which no-one is left behind. According to the Commission, the EGD "aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of green-house gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use" (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). The text highlights that "the transition must be just and inclusive. It must put people first, and pay attention to the regions, industries and workers who will face the greatest challenges" (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). The transition to climate neutrality should therefore be beneficial to all Europeans.

These three innovative aspects of the EGD—(legally-binding) ambition, its systemic and integrative nature, and a just transition approach—are of core interest in our analysis of the responses of the European Council and Council to the EGD in their Conclusions. We expect that the European Council and Council would approach the EGD in different ways, using different language, given their overarching roles and functions (see above).

4. Analysing European Council and Council Responses to the European Green Deal

We analysed all 424 Council and European Council Conclusions published between January 2018 and December 2020. We chose this time frame of analysis because we are interested in understanding the official positions of the two member state bodies immediately prior to and following the publication of the EGD. We analysed the Conclusions to highlight the institutions' positions on climate governance in general, and their stances on the emergence and development of the EGD. As the only public documentary evidence of discussions and deliberative consensus in the intergovernmental bodies, assessing the Conclusions is necessary to understand their agreed positions (Puetter, 2012, 2014). Therefore, the Conclusions are key sources of data for our approach. However, such an approach comes with limitations: The Conclusions are not legally binding, do not give us insight into the negotiating dynamics among the member states, and provide no evidence of individual member state interventions (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016; Hillebrandt & Novak, 2016). We therefore discuss our results with these limitations in mind.

In conducting our analysis, we first developed a codebook of key words or phrases, inspired by our review of literature on the European Council and Council in climate policy development. The codebook includes references that represent the variety of ways in which the intergovernmental bodies approached climate governance and (1) the goal of climate neutrality by 2050, (2) a systemic and integrative transformation or transition, and (3) a just transition. In Table 1 we provide an overview and categorisation of key terms in the codebook. The codebook was developed in an iterative manner: Terms were added as we noticed new ways in which the institutions commented on relevant issues, resulting in a compilation of 96 terms. The categorisation of the terms was similarly iterative. A first categorisation was developed and altered by both researchers separately. A combined categorisation was then checked via a close reading of the Conclusions, leading to further changes. For example, the key phrase "climate action" was categorised under the climate neutrality ambition category because coding here occurred when the institutions cited a general or specific call to action to meet the EU's climate neutrality goals. Similarly, the term "United Nations 2030 Agenda" was placed under the just transition category as coding occurred when the institutions placed the required transition prescribed by the EGD to tackle climate change within the broader context of sustainable development worldwide. We also included a list of "other" coded terms to catch references to policy instruments or related terms that did not readily fall under the other categories.

Second, we carried out a close reading of all the Conclusions analysed (see Table 2), to remove false hits and to achieve a deeper understanding of the results. For example, a statement like "Member states' ambition in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement" was recorded under "climate ambition," whereas a sentence such as "employment opportunities resulting from the green transition" was coded under "green jobs." Furthermore, some terms like the "United Nations SDGs,"

Table 1. Categorisation of terms in the codebook.

	Coded terms
Overarching terms	European Green Deal; climate change; climate challenge; climate emergency; climate threat; climate security; climate protection; climate agenda; climate resiliency; climate risk; (global/earth) warming; UNFCCC; Paris Agreement; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); IPCC Special Report; Kyoto Protocol; greenhouse gas; GHG
Climate neutrality ambition	Climate action; climate targets; climate objectives; green objectives; climate ambition; climate neutrality; decarbonisation; net zero; temperature/climate goal; climate neutral economy; carbon neutrality; carbon neutral growth; low carbon; climate target plan; 2030 Climate Targets
Systemic and integrative nature of the EGD	Green recovery; (green/climate) transition; (green/climate) transformation; green architecture/infrastructure; climate neutral economy; carbon neutral growth; green/greening/greener sector/policy; green economy; sustainable economy; green jobs; climate/green investments; green/climate/low emissions technologies; green/sustainable growth; climate mainstreaming
Just transition	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); United Nations 2030 Agenda; One Planet Summit; just/fair (transition/transformation); Just Transition Fund; Just Transition Scheme; Just Transition Mechanism
Other coded terms	Climate interventions; climate practices; climate strategy; (natural) disaster; alternative fuel; carbon leakage; carbon market; carbon border adjustment mechanism; carbon storage; carbon accounting; carbon removal; fossil fuel; resource efficient; energy efficient; non-renewable; renewable; carbon/environmental footprint; carbon pricing; energy-intensive industries; clean energy/clean solutions; energy costs; climate policy; climate/green finance; climate requirements; climate sector; climate development; climate measures; climate co-benefits; adaptation; mitigation; Effort Sharing Regulation; Emissions Trading System (ETS); emissions; temperature increase; National Energy and Climate Plans; Low Emissions Development Strategy; Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); climate/green investments; green/climate/low emissions technologies; European Climate Law; climate and energy policy framework; climate and energy programmes; Low Emissions Development Strategy; green/climate innovation; circular economy/circularity; circular plastics economy; carbon-intensive sectors

Table 2. Number of documents analysed per institution, per year.

Year	European Council Conclusions	Council Conclusions
2018	8	127
2019	9	154
2020	4	122
Total	21	403

which are mentioned in dozens of Conclusions, did not always pertain to climate policy or the EGD and were therefore not universally coded. Key words appearing in the title of a piece of legislation, policy, or proposal were not coded for further analysis.

4.1. The European Council

In the European Council, first, we observed that climate governance was a recurring issue in the Conclusions between 2018 and 2020. We analysed 21 European Council Conclusions, of which 11 (52.38%) contained key words or phrases included in the codebook. Nine of the total number of European Council Conclusions focused solely on Brexit and one pertained only to the appointment of new senior EU officials. The remaining 12 European Council Conclusions mentioned multiple issues, with climate included in 11 of these (91.67%). The Conclusions from the European Council meeting held on 28 June 2018 was the only multi-issue document that did not include any coded key term.

Second, we found that climate was the second most prominent issue mentioned in the European Council Conclusions. Of the 11 Conclusions that referenced climate or a coded term, eight (72.73%) had an entire section devoted to climate issues. Only external relations/EU foreign policy concerns garnered greater attention (with a dedicated section in 10 Conclusions). Other prominent issues included security and defence (in six Conclusions), the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (five Conclusions), migration, social issues/European values, Covid-19, the Single Market, and Europe's Digital Strategy (each included in four Conclusions; see Table 3).

Third, we analysed the amount of space dedicated to climate governance and to the EGD in the Conclusions. We counted the number of paragraphs that included a coded term and measured that against the total number of paragraphs. Besides the official numbered paragraphs of the Conclusions, we also analysed paragraphs in the preamble and annex sections, if they were officially agreed by the institution. Bulleted lists were counted as one paragraph and preambles/annexes composed of several single or double lines of text were grouped together and counted as one paragraph. The 11 European Council Conclusions that referred to climate policy or a main element of the EGD had a total of 426 paragraphs, and 80 (18.8%) included a coded term. But there are variations across the three years under examination. In 2018, coded terms appeared in 11.1% of paragraphs of three Conclusions of the European Council. Coded terms featured in one out of 16 (6.3%) paragraphs in March 2018, in two out of 14 paragraphs (14.3%) in October 2018 and in two out of 15 paragraphs (13.3%) in December 2018. In 2019, 24.2% of paragraphs of the four European Council Conclusions that mentioned climate governance contained a coded term. Coded terms featured in one out of nine paragraphs (11.1%) in March 2019, 11 out of 58 paragraphs (19%) in June 2019, and one out of 12 paragraphs (8.3%) in October 2019. The December 2019 European Council Conclusions—published on 12 December, the day after the Commission's publication of the EGD—featured coded terms in 11 out of 20 paragraphs (55%). In 2020, 18% of all paragraphs in the European Council Conclusions contained a coded term. Coded terms appeared in 26 out of 186 paragraphs (14%) of the July

Table 3. Dedicated single-issue section headings in European Council Conclusions, 2018–2020.

Topic of Section	Total Number of Conclusions with the Section
External Affairs/EU Foreign Policy Concern	10
Climate Change	8
Security and Defence	6
Multi-Annual Financial Framework	5
Single Market	4
Social Issues/European Values	4
Europe's Digital Transition	4
Covid-19	4
Migration	4
Disinformation/Free Elections	3
Jobs, Competitiveness and Growth	2

2020 European Council Conclusions. These Conclusions laid out the Covid-19 recovery strategy. Coded terms were found in seven out of 30 paragraphs (23.3%) and in five out of 24 (20.8%) paragraphs of the two European Council Conclusions published in October 2020, and in 13 out of 24 paragraphs (40%) in December 2020 (see Figure 1).

Fourth, we break the results down by category, to check if the European Council engaged with the three elements of the EGD as defined above. Of the 10 most frequently found coded terms, five are categorised under the climate neutrality goal group, one under the systemic and integrated nature of the EGD category, and one under the just transition category. Further, two of the most frequently found coded terms fall under the overarching terms category, and one was categorised under "other" climate governance terms. The most prominent terms found under the climate neutrality ambition category were: "climate objectives" (found 25 times in seven Conclusions), "climate action" (mentioned 22 times in eight different Conclusions), "climate neutrality" (cited 20 times in six different Conclusions), "climate target" (cited 20 times in three Conclusions), and "climate ambition" (coded 19 times in seven Conclusions). The terms "net zero," "carbon neutral growth," "climate neutral economy," and "climate target plan" were not found. Turning to the EGD's prescription for a systemic and integrated transition, the most frequently found term was "transition," which was cited 18 times in seven Conclusions. The other most frequent terms coded in this category included: "green/climate/low emissions technologies" (found six times in three Conclusions), "transformation" (cited five times in five Conclusions), "climate mainstreaming" (found four times in four Conclusions), and "green jobs" (cited three times in three different Conclusions). The terms "green architecture," "climate neutral economy," and "carbon neutral growth" were not found. Finally, under the just transition category, the term "just/fair (transition/transformation)" was found 12 times in six different Conclusions beginning in March 2019. Other terms coded under this category included: "Just Transition Mechanism" (found six times in three different Conclusions beginning in December 2019), "Just Transition Fund" (cited six times, only in the July 2020 Conclusions), and the "Just Transition Scheme" (referenced once in the July 2020 Conclusions). The European Council referred to the "United Nations Sustainable Development Goals" and its "2030 Agenda," as they pertain to integrating climate governance within a larger frame of inclusive and just global development goals, once each. The institution also mentioned overarching terms, including "climate change" (coded 22 times in nine Conclusions) and the "Paris Agreement" (coded 22 times in 11 Conclusions), and other general climate governance terms, such as "emissions," which was coded 10 times in five Conclusions. The term "European Green Deal" was found three times, in the December 2019 and July 2020 Conclusions.

4.2. The Council

We analysed 403 publicly available Council Conclusions, of which 127 were published in 2018, 154 in 2019, and 122 in 2020 (see Table 2). First, we found that 33 of the 127 Council Conclusions in 2018 (26%), 54 of the 154 Council Conclusions in 2019 (35.1%) and 64 of the 122 Council Conclusions in 2020 (52.5%) contained a coded term (see Figure 2). Climate was the fifth most prominent issue mentioned in these Council Conclusions. Since most Council Conclusions deal with a single issue, we divided each of the Conclusions by policy field. If the Conclusions dealt with more than one topic equally, then all topics were recorded. We found external relations was most frequently discussed in the Council (118 Conclusions), followed by economics/finance (73 Conclusions), security/defence (56 Conclusions), the environment (30 Conclusions), and climate (25 Conclusions).



Figure 1. Percentage of total paragraphs in European Council Conclusions that contain a coded term.



Figure 2. Conclusions including a coded term versus the total number of Council Conclusions published.

Second, we found coded terms in Conclusions with a central focus other than climate or the EGD. Results showed that 127 Conclusions that did not focus specifically on the EGD or climate issues contained a coded term. We coded terms in Conclusions focusing on external relations (55 Conclusions), economics/finance (24 Conclusions), and the environment (23 Conclusions), amongst other topics (see Table 4).

Third, the ratio of paragraphs including coded terms to total paragraphs in the Council Conclusions varied greatly over the three years. As noted above, while some Conclusions were devoted exclusively to EGD or climate policy matters, others mentioned coded terms embedded within another policy focus. In 2018 for example, paragraphs containing coded terms ranged from 1% to 100% of total paragraphs in a document. In total, 21.4% of all paragraphs contained a coded term in 2018. In 2019, we found that 24% of the total paragraphs in the Council Conclusions contained a coded term. In 2020, 20.3% of paragraphs contained a coded term.

Fourth, of the most frequently found coded terms in the Council Conclusions, four fall under the "other" climate governance terms category, three fall under the climate neutrality ambition category, two were classified under the overarching terms category and one belonged to the systemic/integrated transition category. Fewer coded terms were found under the just transition category. The most frequently cited coded terms classified within the ambition category included: "climate neutrality" (mentioned 137 times), "climate action" (found 90 times), and "climate ambition" (referenced 80 times). Other terms found in this category included "temperature/climate goal" (mentioned 44 times), "decarbonisation" (found 39 times), and "climate targets"

Table 4. Prominent topics of Conclusions and those that include coded terms.

Topic Focus of the Conclusions	Total Number of Conclusions	Conclusions Containing a Coded Term
External Relations	118	55
Economics/Finance	73	24
Security/Defence	56	5
Environment	30	23
Climate	25	N/A
Justice	22	0
Human Rights/European Values	21	5
Employment/Jobs	19	10
Women/Youth	19	11
Sport/Culture	18	4
Agriculture	14	6
Energy	13	10
Transportation	12	6

(cited 25 times). The Council made reference to each coded term within the ambition category at least once. Under the integrated/systemic transition category, the term "transition" was found 196 times. Other terms coded frequently from this category included: "green/climate/low- emissions technologies" (mentioned 54 times), "transformation" (cited 33 times), and "green/greening/greener sector" (found 28 times). All other coded terms pertaining to the systemic transition prescribed by the EGD were also mentioned by the Council, but less frequently. Under the just transition category, the most cited terms included the "United Nations 2030 Agenda" (mentioned 65 times) and its "sustainable development goals" (found 73 times). The term "just/fair (transition/transformation)" was found 55 times (twice in 2018, 21 times in 2019, and 32 times in 2020). However, the terms "Just Transition Fund" and "Just Transition Scheme" were not found and the "Just Transition Mechanism" was mentioned twice in 2020. The Council also engaged with a wide variety of overarching terms, including "climate change" (coded 289 times), the "Paris Agreement" (found 197 times), and the "EGD" (coded 86 times), as well as "other" climate governance terms, including the "circular economy" (coded 246 times), and "renewable energy/sources" (cited 168 times). To see the full tally of coded terms per category, see Table 5.

4.3. Summary of Results

In summary, we find that both the Council and the European Council responded to the emergence and development of the EGD in their Conclusions. In the European Council Conclusions, climate governance received its own heading more times than any other issue except for external relations and the issue was discussed in 11 out of 12 Conclusions focusing on multiple issues. In the case of the Council, Ministers referenced climate and EGD-related issues with increasing frequency across each year studied, including in negotiated positions on a wide range of policy topics ranging from agriculture to human rights. When it comes to the coded terms categorised under the three examined elements of the EGD, there are some trends and variations (see Table 5). Results from our analysis of the European Council Conclusions show that terms across all categories were cited more frequently with each successive year. For example, there were no key words or phrases coded under the just transition category in 2018, however we found 12 references in 2019 and 15 mentions in 2020. The greatest change was observed in the climate neutrality ambition category in which coded terms increased from six mentions in 2018 to 26 in 2019 to 84 in 2020. The institution referenced terms pertaining to the climate neutrality objective more than terms associated with the overarching aspects of the EGD and the "other" climate governance terms category combined. In the Council, we similarly observed an increase across all categories of terms between 2018 and 2019. From 2019 to 2020, however, there was a decrease in mentions of coded terms in each category, except for the systemic/integrated transformation and "other" climate governance terms. The Council provided greater focus to the systemic/integrated transition with references increasing from 48 to 164 to 191 across successive years. However, as to be expected given its legislative role, the institution most frequently mentioned various policy instruments categorised within the "other" climate governance terms; here we see the number of coded references increase from 234 to 387 to 452 from 2018 to 2020.

5. Discussion

Previous scholarship on EU climate policy development, and the role of the Council and the European Council in this process, has highlighted several evolutions in the response of the member state institutions of the EU to the climate challenge (Dupont & Oberthür, 2017; Skovgaard, 2014; Wurzel, Liefferink & Di Lullo, 2019). First, the European Council and Council increasingly engaged with climate governance as the issue's political importance grew over time. Second, this engagement was characterised by organisational turbulence, stemming from internal policy divergences among member states and by environmental turbulence, arising from external contexts, such as economic crises. Our analysis of the European Council and Council Conclusions draws out their responses to the emergence and development of the EGD and provides some further nuance to the insights of previous literature.

Reflecting on the results of our empirical analysis, we first observe that it seems that not all periods of

Table 5. Coded terms found in the Conclusions, per year and per category.

	European Council			Council		
	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020
Overarching Term	11	26	28	280	404	255
Climate Neutrality Ambition	6	36	84	72	220	213
Systemic/Integrated Transformation	2	21	25	48	164	191
Just Transition	0	12	15	44	79	78
Other Climate Governance Term	5	18	41	234	387	452
Total	24	113	193	678	1254	1189

environmental turbulence necessarily lead to member state reticence on EU climate governance. Given the history of climate and environmental policy development in the EU after the 2008/2009 crises, we could have expected a decline in engagement in the Council and European Council at the onset of the Covid-19 crisis from 2020 (Burns et al., 2018; Burns & Tobin, 2020; Dobbs et al., 2021; Dupont et al., 2020). But our analysis shows that climate change and the EGD were mentioned in each of the European Council Conclusions published in 2020. Further, the July 2020 European Council Conclusions laid out the plan for the EU's recovery from the Covid-19 crisis and placed the EGD at the centre (European Council, 2020). Similarly, in the Council, the percentage of Council Conclusions mentioning a coded term related to climate or the EGD increased from 26% in 2018 to 35.1% in 2019 to 52.5% in 2020. This finding provides evidence of increasing political focus given to the climate issue on paper by the Council and European Council over time. However, in this case, we see this increasing engagement also during an acute crisis, or turbulent environment.

Our results further indicate that the European Council and Council may manage to govern through or with organisational turbulence (Dobbs et al., 2021), with options pursued to ensure reticent member states find their place in a push for climate neutrality. Historically, organisational turbulence in the EU around climate policy development stemmed from internal member state divisions, particularly around the level and scope of climate policy ambition (Skovgaard, 2014). The just transition approach is part of a response to such divisions. Our analysis shows references in both the European Council and Council to climate neutrality throughout the years under analysis (2018–2020). In 2018, while the Council emphasised the importance of climate governance as a component of inclusive global development as per the UN SDGs, it refers to a just or fair transition only twice and this language is absent altogether in the 2018 European Council Conclusions. In 2019, we begin to see references to a just transition and its policy mechanisms in the Conclusions. The June 2019 European Council Conclusions, for example, state that the transformation of the EU's society and economy to achieve climate neutrality must be undertaken "in a way that takes account of national circumstances and is socially just" (European Council, 2019, p. 9). The just transition became embedded in the EGD when published in December 2019, allowing the more reticent member states (e.g., Poland) to agree to the overall ambition. In this case, the historical, organisational turbulence did not prevent member states from moving forward on the EGD and climate governance, which demonstrates some capacity to govern despite institutional divisions.

Finally, our exploratory analysis also links to some insights from new intergovernmentalism and historical and discursive institutionalism. We have demonstrated that climate governance and the EGD are mentioned regularly in the Council and the European Council Conclusions. This provides some initial backing to the new intergovernmentalist idea that the intergovernmental institutions of the EU (and especially the European Council) extend their functioning beyond their Treaty roles in areas of shared competence (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016; Skovgaard, 2014). However, further research conducted during subsequent phases of policy development is needed to explore this phenomenon. Through a historical institutionalist lens, we could lend some initial support to scholarship exploring the notion that the EGD itself represents a critical juncture in EU climate policymaking (Dupont et al., 2020). Prior to the emergence of the EGD, the Council and European Council supported incremental increases in climate policy ambition (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). But our analysis shows that both institutions discussed the climate neutrality goal in the lead up to the publication of the EGD and found a way to govern despite member state divisions. The declared level of ambition was not diluted or derailed as a result of the Covid-19 crisis (Dupont et al., 2020). Finally, drawing on insights from discursive institutionalism, we could identify and analyse responses to three main elements of the EGD in the European Council and the Council Conclusions. Discursive institutionalism highlights the importance of the role of ideas in facilitating institutional change and our analysis may indicate that by focusing on the ideas of climate neutrality in the European Council, of an integrated/systemic transformation in the Council, and of the just transition approach in both institutions, organisational turbulence or resistance to climate ambition could be overcome.

6. Conclusions

Through its Conclusions, the intergovernmental arm of the EU has responded to the EGD and its three underlying principles: the ambition to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, an integrated and systemic transformation, and a just and inclusive transition. While the Commission proposed raising the level of EU climate ambition and set out these elements with the EGD, the European Council and Council provided negotiated member state positions supporting these moves.

Over the course of the three years studied, we found increasing recognition of the need for society-wide transition and/or transformation in the realm of climate governance in the institutions' Conclusions, even during the height of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020. While studying the Conclusions is important to understand the common, negotiated positions of the Council and the European Council, an important limitation to such an approach is that it does not provide insights into individual member state stances. Research revealing these member state positions would be welcome for further nuance and would require other approaches. Although the environmental and organisational turbulence seem to have been overcome, or at least did not prevent agreement on the

climate ambition in the European Council and Council during the emergence and development of the EGD, these sources of turbulence may disrupt the legislative process as the member states negotiate concrete policy options alongside the Parliament. Further research on strategies for maintaining political focus during periods and situations when organisational turbulence comes to the fore is also necessary, both for understanding the functioning of the European Council and Council in climate governance, and for mitigating and preparing for future challenges to achieving the goal of a climate neutral Europe.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Energy Security in Turbulent Times Towards the European Green Deal

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Abstract
This article presents a theoretical approach to energy security. It incorporates the concept of governing through turbulence as both a response to crisis onset and a source of long-term policy adaptation. The article applies this framework to an empirical analysis of the energy and climate policy of the EU through a review of policy documents in the period between 1995 and 2020. The article presents the evolution in the conceptualization of energy security in EU policy from a narrow definition restricted to characteristics of energy supply to an expanded conception that integrates additional elements from associated policy areas. The article argues that the European Green Deal represents the culmination of this process and concludes that the convergence of energy and climate policy objectives reinforces the trend towards the widened conceptual scope of energy security.

Keywords
energy; Energy Union; European Green Deal; governance; policy; security; turbulence

Issue
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1. Introduction

International relations approaches overemphasize issues of geopolitical concern in energy relations with a distinct focus on security of supply. Goldthau and Witte (2010, p. 2) stress that this erroneously assumes a zero-sum game between states' energy security. They identify two key determinants of energy policy missing from the debate: the impact of energy markets on demand and supply patterns, and the impact of the national and international rules that govern them. This article emphasizes the second of these factors, albeit with a narrower focus. In the case of EU member states, the boundary of available policy options is ultimately determined by collective policy objectives and priorities that are centrally mandated at the EU level. Long-term policy enactments shift priorities that reorder policy options through the agenda-setting power of supranational institutions. When policy pronouncements become legislative enactments, then these policy objectives are transformed into legally binding targets for states and advance the role of the EU as an independent actor in the international energy market (Goldthau & Witte, 2015, p. 941). On the other hand, legal approaches to the topic tend to underemphasize the geopolitical aspects of the debate and the pressure that they exert on states, thereby shaping their policy options.

This article adopts a theoretical approach to address the research question of how the concept of energy security has been implemented in the evolution of EU energy and climate policy. It presents the issues that arise out of the multiplicity of approaches in defining energy security. Furthermore, the article integrates the concept of turbulence to investigate whether EU policymaking can be characterized as crisis response or long-term adaptation. The article applies this framework to a review of EU energy and climate policy documents. It traces the evolving conceptual framing of energy security through a longitudinal review from 1995 to 2020 and places the four successive Energy Packages within the context of this evolution.

2. Defining Energy Security

Traditional conceptions of energy security have delimited its scope to the ability of states to maintain

uninterrupted energy supply relative to demand at affordable and relatively stable prices. The International Energy Agency (2021), for example, defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. Energy insecurity, therefore, can arise out of either the interruption of energy supply or sudden price fluctuations that could render supply unaffordable. Chester (2010) identifies two dominant characteristics: (1) a narrow focus on security of supply of oil and gas as the two primary sources of energy, and (2) an application of this conceptualization of energy security in terms of geopolitical and foreign policy decision-making considerations. These are perhaps most compatible with the influential formulation of the four As of energy security (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2007): Availability of energy resources, Accessibility, Acceptability of associated environmental effects, and Affordability of investment. Cherp and Jewell (2014) problematize the four As approach by applying the logic of fundamental security questions: security for whom, for which values, and from what threats? They conclude that energy security conceptualizations that provide answers to these questions help to explain and inform policy options. Of the three, the first is of primary importance to this account, as it deals with the issue of specifying the object of energy security relations as discussed further below.

Other approaches have expanded the security of supply debate to the electricity sector as well (Hawker et al., 2017; Moore, 2017). More recent attempts, especially from outside international relations theories, have yielded various multi-faceted perspectives on defining energy security, revealing a consensus on the difficulties inherent in such definition-building. Ang et al.'s (2015) extensive meta-study of energy security approaches ultimately concludes that no widely accepted definition of energy security as a narrowly defined construct exists. They conclude that seven dominant themes have emerged: securing energy availability, securing energy infrastructure, securing the affordability of energy supplies (Bielecki, 2002), societal aims such as the eradication of energy poverty (Lesbirel, 2004), environmental security and sustainability (Pasqualetti & Sovacool, 2012), energy security governance (Goldthau & Sovacool, 2012), and the improvement of energy efficiency (Hughes, 2009; Kemmler & Spreng, 2007). von Hippel et al. (2011) called for the establishment of a much more comprehensive conceptualization of energy security, where security of supply is one of many pillars that also includes economic, technological, environmental, social-cultural, and military-security dimensions. Vivoda (2010) further widens this conceptualization by including the three additional challenges of human security, international implications, and state capacity to implement specific energy security policies, while more recent approaches have made the explicit linkage between energy security and sustainability (Narula, 2019; Radovanović et al., 2017).

In the theoretical literature of security studies, energy security remains a largely underexplored area with some notable exceptions (Kirchner & Berk, 2010; McGowan, 2011). According to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 116), the relative abundance of energy as a tradable commodity means that energy insecurity that may arise as an economic threat to stability does not pose a threat extending beyond the economic sector. Contrary to this position, this article argues that the extent to which energy can present risks depends on its conceptual framing as energy security could be subsumed in political, societal, and military discursive practices. It is also highly technical, particularly regarding environmental effects. As a result, energy can be theoretically examined as part of a widened security agenda (Natorski & Herranz-Surralles, 2008). The inherent characteristics of energy security—namely that the impact of energy insecurity could be both imminent and immediate—are important factors for security (Christou & Adamides, 2013). Imminence refers to the fact that energy insecurity can occur at any time and easily escalate from minor to existential threat. This escalation is likely to result from factors beyond economic considerations; indeed, political, and military factors only tangentially relevant to energy frequently lead to energy insecurity. Energy insecurity is also unique because of the immediate and severe impact it can have on the functioning of a state. As Ciuta (2010) asserts, the ubiquity of energy in distinct security logics drives the necessity for conceptual variation in a contextual perspective. Winzer (2012) proposed a set of conceptual boundaries to differentiate between security, sustainability, and economic efficiency by reformulating energy security to energy supply continuity. I integrate this reformulation to the narrow definition of energy security used in this article. This conceptual move helps clarify the definitional vagueness of energy security identified above and is applied to the operationalization described further below.

3. Energy Security in the Context of Turbulence

My conceptualization of turbulence uses Ansell et al.'s (2016, p. 2) definition of "interactions of events or demands that are highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected or unpredictable." Applying this concept to the narrow definition of energy security presented above with its emphasis on uninterrupted supply and affordability, this formulation suggests that turbulence may be equated with energy insecurity and, by extension, the possibility of crisis onset. Yet, Dobbs et al. (2021) differentiate turbulence from both uncertainty and crisis, even though they share clear conceptual linkages. Instead, they propose that both uncertainty and crises can be the outcomes of turbulent interactions. That is especially the case from an ontological perspective on energy security, whereby the emergence of *in*security is typically characterized by the defining attributes of a crisis (Boin et al., 2005, pp. 3–4): threat, urgency, and

uncertainty. Conversely, it is unlikely that energy insecurity would be the result of deliberate policy shifts.

However, turbulence can also be conceptualized as a transformative process that results in fundamental shifts to the policy framework leading to long-term adaptation and change rather than the short-term abruptness that characterizes crises that arise in times of uncertainty (Ansell, 2016, p. 77). In other words, while instances of energy insecurity can be understood as crises, turbulence in energy policy need not produce crisis. In fact, quite to the contrary, turbulence framed as long-term adaptation towards specific policy objectives can foster the facilitating conditions towards the neutralization of crises. According to Dobbs et al. (2021), governing *against* turbulence takes the form of crisis response and management in the short run. But governing *with* turbulence requires long-term governance adjustments towards flexible, dynamic, and resilient policy outputs. Perhaps the best example to illustrate the distinction in terms of the direction of EU energy policy has been the centrality of EU-Russian energy relations. Each instance in the series of gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine since 2005 can be characterized as a crisis. Each entailed specific consequences for EU policymaking and each elicited specific crisis management responses. But the shifts in EU policy to anticipate and obviate crisis recurrence cannot be characterized in the same way. Instead, they represent the identification of persistent patterns of crisis onset and their counteraction through long-term adaptation.

Ansell and Trondal (2018) have introduced a typology of turbulence by distinguishing between turbulent environments, turbulent organizations, and turbulence of scale. They conclude that policymakers can confront turbulence by attempting to stabilize it, by adapting to it or by attempting a combination of the two strategies. They suggest that stabilization leads to path dependence and a *static resilience* that reinforces the status quo, while adaptation favors institutional change leading to a strategy of *dynamic resilience* that aims at continuous adaptation in the face of turbulence. Path dependence refers to cycles of reinforcing pressures and patterns of interaction whereby governance systems revert to preexisting organizational arrangements. This may result either because these arrangements are well-known and entrenched (Olsen, 2010, p. 96), because they present the potential for increasing returns (Pierson, 2000), or more generally because they favor specific reproduction mechanisms that define the scope for institutional evolution (Thelen, 1999).

4. Operationalizing the Framework

The main contribution of this article to the theoretical literature is an understanding of the conditions under which energy is embedded in security processes. In other words, an understating of how energy threats may escalate or—perhaps more importantly—de-escalate. This understanding depends largely on the definition of energy security that is employed. As described above, the traditional usage of the concept restricted the scope to elements of access, affordability, infrastructure, and economic cost. As a result, similarly to Winzer's (2012, p. 37) reconceptualization of energy security to energy supply continuity, one may conclude that the actual object in these approaches is not energy as a general term but energy supply. I apply the conceptual framework to a textual discursive analysis that examines the usage of energy security in EU policy statements. I survey all official policy documents that include explicit definitions of energy security from 1995 to 2020 covering developments starting from the formulation of an EU energy policy in 1995 and the First Energy Package in 1996 through the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD). I survey all formulations of energy security in the intervening years, including the succession of energy packages. While I focus on energy policy formulation, I include the introduction and development of climate policy objectives for the milestones of 2020, 2030, and 2050, as the energy-climate policy nexus becomes increasingly interdependent, and their policy objectives directly interlinked.

In so doing, I aim to examine two fundamental research questions with respect to the concepts of energy security and turbulence described above. The first question is: Does the definition of energy security in EU policy adhere to a traditional formulation that is narrowly restricted to supply characteristics, or does it integrate elements of the conceptual expansion of energy security? And if so, which elements are incorporated in this conceptual evolution? Additionally, I examine whether the definition of energy security conforms to stated policy objectives of energy policy imperatives, such as the nature of external relations, and dependency on energy resource types and actors. The second question is: Can we characterize the evolution of EU energy policy as governing against or with turbulence? Additionally, are we witnessing policy options being implemented to stabilize turbulence (path dependence) or to adapt to it (institutional change)? A corollary to this question concerns the EGD more specifically: Is the EGD another step in a path-dependent process or does it represent a shift in institutional configuration?

5. The Evolving Conceptualization of Energy Security in EU Energy and Climate Policy

This section traces the evolving conceptual framing of energy security through a longitudinal review of EU energy and climate policy pronouncements. It places the four successive Energy Packages within the context of this evolution. The analysis covers the period starting from the White Paper on EU Energy Policy of 1995 immediately preceding the First Energy Package through the Third Report on the State of the Energy Union of 2017 that followed the Fourth and latest Energy Package of

2016. It ends with a discussion of the EGD and associated developments up to 2020.

5.1. Energy Security in the First and Second Energy Packages

The policy trajectory of the Energy Packages begins with the White Paper (European Commission, 1995) establishing common aims for an EU energy policy. These are established in the context of a broader framework of global trends such as increasing market globalization, environmental and technological concerns, and institutional responsibilities. Economic competitiveness and security of supply are set as the main policy aims, while considering social and regional dimensions, as well as environmental protection policy priorities. The usage of energy security reveals an interesting dualism in terms of its adherence to traditional characteristics on the one hand, and conceptual expansion on the other. While the term is never explicitly defined, its major element is clearly the emphasis on security of supply. This is also exemplified in the Work Programme, which sets out crisis measures, diversification, and international relations' development as indicative actions for supply security management. However, even at this early stage in the development of EU energy policy, the contribution of additional policy priorities to energy security is acknowledged, such as the use of renewables and the prioritization of efficiency in energy use. The First Energy Package of 1996 focused on the integration of national energy markets into a unified, comprehensive market that is both harmonized and liberalized with primary application to the two major internal sub-components of electricity and gas. Conceptions of energy security—while significant determinants of the specificities of the measures adopted—were not expressed as central policy objectives. Instead, the measures focused on the removal of trade barriers, the harmonization of tax and pricing policies and measures, the integration of energy regulations with environmental and safety regulations, and ultimately the creation of free and fair access to a functioning market with adequate levels of consumer protection, interconnection, and generation capacity.

The approach of the 1995 White Paper remained unaltered in the European Commission's (1997) review of energy policy and actions, while the emphasis on availability was strengthened in the communication (European Commission, 2000a) on the EU's oil supply that looked forward to the Green Paper on a comprehensive energy security strategy. The Green Paper (European Commission, 2000b) represented a turning point by adopting a wider framing of energy security. It painted a stark picture of existing policy options and market conditions; for example, it characterized the EU's energy supply as "Gulliver in chains" and the external dependence on oil supply as being held hostage. It also identified the potential of renewables not only as an alternative but as a political priority. It concluded that the dearth of supply-side options necessitated shifting priorities towards managing demand. The necessity for this demand-driven approach was reinforced in the Final Report on the Green Paper (European Commission, 2002) and was carried over in the European Commission's (2003) communication on energy infrastructure and security of supply in the lead-up to the Second Energy Package. The communication established key policy objectives and necessary measures for the electricity and gas markets. The fundamental logic of the package was evolutionary from the first one and did not alter the principles and actions described above. The main regulatory innovation of the second package was the emphasis on the liberalization of competition, giving the ability to industrial and domestic consumers to choose among gas and electricity suppliers. All references to security in both the communication and the energy package concern supply, infrastructure, technical characteristics, and system reliability capacity.

5.2. Energy Security in the Third and Fourth Energy Packages

2007 represented the most significant turning point juncture in the evolution of EU energy policy, including in terms of the specification of energy security, in two fundamental ways (McGowan, 2011, p. 503). The first was the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2005 culminating in the disruption of supply to EU member states in early 2006. The crisis illustrated many of the risks identified in EU energy security priorities to that point: an imminent danger creating immediate and widespread disruption, a lingering volatile geopolitical environment that could lead to further incidents—as indeed evidenced on numerous occasions in the years since—and a lack of viable short-term alternatives. The conceptualization of energy security now placed at the center of the EU's approach was further established through the Strategic Energy Review on an energy policy for Europe (European Commission, 2007). It identified the following four pillars of insecurity: vulnerability concerning imports, shortfalls in supply, possible energy crises, and uncertainty with respect to future supply. The second major development was the expression of the energy-climate policy nexus as a vital strategic component for the first time. The review incorporated the specific objective of a 20% reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 in comparison to 1990 reference levels. This formed the basis of the 2020 Climate and Energy Package in combination with the targets of a 20% share of renewable energies and a saving of 20% through energy efficiency in EU energy consumption by 2020 (European Commission, 2008a). The Second Strategic Energy Review (European Commission, 2008b) made the conceptual expansion of energy security explicit. Previous specifications of energy security priorities never explicitly defined its parameters, but rather analyzed individual characteristics as presented above. The new EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan specified these parameters as: infrastructure

needs and the diversification of energy supplies, external energy relations, oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms, energy efficiency, and making the best use of the EU's indigenous energy resources. Thereafter, energy efficiency and its associated measures would not be considered merely ancillary or compatible with energy security priorities but an integral component of its conceptual scope.

The convergence would be inherent in the upcoming Third Energy Package of September 2009 that accelerated the integration processes of the first two packages without being restricted to the primary goal of market liberalization. Instead, it expanded the scope of application to create additional synergies between the regulatory implementation of energy and adjacent areas with environmental regulation and competition being foremost among them. In addition to new Directives on the common rules for the internal electricity and gas markets, the Package introduced new Regulations on the conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and to the natural gas transmission networks. The Regulation for the establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators established new procedural arrangements with far-reaching consequences for the decision-making power of all stakeholders (Labelle, 2017). Effectively, the measures of the new package shifted the emphasis of this amended regulatory framework towards the options of ownership unbundling, the separation of energy supply and generation from the operation of transmission networks, and the establishment of Independent Transmission Operators and Independent System Operators, all under the regulatory supervision of independent National Energy Regulatory Authorities (De Somer, 2012). The Package led to subsequent measures more specific to the issue of energy security, such as the obligation on member states to maintain minimum stocks of oil products and measures to safeguard the security of gas supply, largely in response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis during the winter of 2008–2009 (de Jong et al., 2012).

The update to the EU's energy strategy (European Commission, 2010) was largely a response to the concern that the 2020 targets would not be achieved. It aimed at consolidating the different policy objectives of the past decade into a comprehensive policy agenda and outlined five priorities: energy efficiency, energy market integration, consumer empowerment, technological innovation, and strengthening external dimensions. All pillars of this cohesive approach were reformulations of existing objectives except for the focus on consumer behavior. This was largely driven by the measures introduced in the Third Energy Package, since more open, competitive, and integrated energy markets must be accompanied by initiatives on consumer awareness and access. References to energy security adhere to established principles of infrastructure, supply, as well as the interrelation to efficiency targets. The strategy does not alter that conceptual scope since the strategy comes immediately after the Lisbon Treaty. Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union established the major objectives of EU energy policy as market functionality, energy supply security, efficiency, and network interconnection. With these priorities enshrined in primary EU law, they form the legal basis for all subsequent legislative developments in this area.

In the years between the Third and Fourth Energy Packages, there was no major shift in the conceptualization of energy security. The major determinant of policy trajectory was the steady prioritization of climate policy objectives on the basis of the already expanded conceptual scope. Thus, two approaches can be observed. In policy pronouncements regarding energy security in the context of external relations, the traditional emphasis is maintained. For example, the EU energy policy on international cooperation (European Commission, 2011b) and the report on the progress towards completing the Internal Energy Market (European Commission, 2014d) both maintain focus on security of supply. In new policy initiatives—that typically centered on the increasing ambition of climate objectives—the widened scope was brought to the fore. With the establishment of the milestones to the 2050 targets (European Commission, 2011a), another communication (European Commission, 2011c) surveyed the different scenarios on achieving decarbonization, implicitly prioritizing the efficiency dimension of energy security. The same observation holds in the lead-up to the Fourth Energy Package with the presentation of the 2030 targets (European Commission, 2014b) and the specification of the contribution of energy efficiency to energy security and towards the achievement of the targets (European Commission, 2014c).

5.3. Energy Security in the European Green Deal

The broader Energy Union Package (European Commission, 2015) represents security of supply as one of its five major pillars alongside emissions reduction, internal market integration, energy efficiency, and research and innovation on low-carbon technologies (Ringel & Knodt, 2018). The European Energy Security Strategy (European Commission, 2014a) and the Energy Union Package present solidarity in the pursuit and implementation of the Energy Union as a pathway towards energy security. They eventually framed the bulk of the additional elements of the Fourth Energy Package, known as the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package (European Commission, 2016). For the first time, the scope of the package expanded to incorporate practically all adjacent areas to energy policy and regulation. It incorporated measures on energy efficiency and renewable energy, the previous iterations of which were left outside the scope of the packages. Their integration speaks to the far more ambitious scope of the package and the prioritization of the binding climate policy objectives for 2030 under the new legislation. In addition, the approach

previously reserved for risk-preparedness in the gas sector was extended to the electricity market by implementing measures for crisis identification and management. The latest expansion in the scope of energy security came in the Third Report on the State of the Energy Union (European Commission, 2017), which set the priorities of mitigating energy poverty and a socially fair energy transition as prerequisites to the enhancement of energy security. Energy poverty had already been introduced as an energy policy priority with the Fourth Energy Package but was now linked more explicitly with mitigating supply security risks through improvements in energy efficiency. The call for a socially fair transition was not elaborated in the Report but would receive much more attention in the EGD. Thus, while the main characteristic of security of supply remains at the core of the EU's approach to energy security, it has yet again been supplemented by additional elements.

The EGD (European Commission, 2019) represents a significant step in the historical trajectory of the convergence between climate and energy policy of the EU. Its overarching aim of creating a climate-neutral continent by 2050 is set as the main priority of the Commission for the period 2019–2024. There is neither a separate policy area dedicated to energy security nor a significant differentiation to the concept in relation to previous policy formulations. Nevertheless, various aspects of the broadened definition described above are included. The most overt specification of energy security as a policy priority is within the policy area of clean energy where the primary goal of the digitalization of the EU's energy systems is established in accordance with the three principles of: 1) energy efficiency with a growing basis on the use of renewable sources of energy, 2) the full integration, interconnection, and digitalization of the energy market, and 3) the security and affordability of energy supply. Therefore, the primary approach towards energy security—at least at the level of policy pronouncements—does not deviate from the traditional focus on supply. Yet, an examination of the key roadmap actions for the achievement of these policy objectives reveals a much more extensive characterization of the fundamental attributes of security and affordability that is interconnected with most of the other policy areas of the EGD. The "clean energy" priority area calls for the assessment of the final National Energy and Climate Plans, as well as the development of strategies for: 1) smart sector integration including a "renovation wave" initiative for the building sector, 2) increased offshore wind production, and 3) a clean and circular economy. Lastly, it calls for the evaluation and review of Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, known as the "TEN-E Regulation," with a new legislative proposal published in December of 2020 (European Commission, 2020). Overhauling the TEN-E Regulation may rectify an inherent contradiction between the existing policy objectives of the regulatory framework and the far-reaching goals of the EGD. While the Regulation includes elements such as the call for an increase in the use of renewable sources of energy, its approach to energy security remains firmly entrenched in its traditional formulation as any risk to energy supply. The emphasis on the interconnection of energy networks and infrastructure represents a direct mitigation of those risks (Schittekatte et al., 2020). However, projected future trends of relative stagnation in oil and gas demand (International Energy Agency, 2020, p. 30) are seemingly at odds with the prioritization of the gas and oil corridor categories. Even more importantly, they appear to be directly at odds with the goals of the EGD.

6. Discussion

Based on the above empirical analysis, the conceptual usage of energy security in the context of the elaboration of EU energy and climate policy is characterized by two tendencies. The first is a persistent emphasis on the traditional conception of energy security as security of energy supply, the maintenance of affordability, and the mitigation of associated risks. This is especially true where energy and climate policy objectives are considered in combination with external relations and the broader geopolitical and economic environment of the international system. Elements of this conceptualization are applied relatively narrowly to the regulation of the oil and gas markets prior to 2007 and to the electricity market thereafter. The second tendency establishes a widened conception of energy security that integrates additional pillars of energy and climate policy to bring the pursuit of energy security in line with the increasingly ambitious climate targets.

These two tendencies do not represent a mutually exclusive dichotomy; in other words, there is no clear and decisive chronological point where policy choices move starkly from one tendency to the other. The usage of energy security prior to the First Energy Package of 1996 remains firmly in the traditional approach. The supply continuity element has never been discarded and it remains a central tenet of EU energy policy. Its salience, however, has diminished over time in relation to additional characteristics such as efficiency and the use of renewable sources, as these elements increasingly tip the balance of priorities towards climate policy objectives with the EGD putting climate firmly at the center. These characteristics were integrated into the conceptual space of energy security as early as 2000 and there has been a constant widening ever since. Once a legislative framework was adopted that binds the EU to measurable climate policy targets, it could be argued that there can be no backtracking towards a reverse trend. Given the increasingly ambitious progression of the targets on greenhouse emissions reduction, share of renewables, and energy efficiency, it is difficult to conceive of an approach to energy security that divests itself of these characteristics.

With respect to the second research question that concerns the evaluation of the EU's approach to turbulence, I note the following. In response to the first formulation of the questions—whether the EU is governing against or with turbulence through its energy security approach—it is evidently doing both. The reason is that the temporal characteristics of the two perspectives are different: Their incidence, the policy responses available, and the consequences of each occur in accordance with different time horizons. Therefore, when the EU prioritizes the traditional characteristics of energy security, it tends to be in response to crises, thus governing against turbulence in the short-term. On the other hand, the EU prioritizes the characteristics of the widened scope when it establishes long-term adaptations, whether that refers to long-term policy objectives such as the climate targets for 2050 or to long-term institutional change such as the transformation of decision-making structures towards the institutionalization of the Energy Union. As a result, we may conclude that in the conceptual evolution presented above, the long-term aspects inherent in governing with turbulence rather than against it, are becoming increasingly more significant. As discussed above, the example of the ongoing dilemma in EU-Russia relations (Goldthau & Sitter, 2020) illustrates this conclusion. At various instances of crisis onset, we have witnessed a response through EU policy that seemed to reprioritize the traditional element of security of energy supply. But, at the same, the long-term strategic planning on achieving energy security veered in the direction of obviating the potential of future crisis onset through alternative means. Responses to external crises did not simply take the form of immediate crisis management but also forward-looking aims.

Lastly, is the EGD the logical continuation of a path-dependent process or does it aspire to fundamental change? Purely from the perspective of its contribution to the energy security conceptualization debate, we can observe elements of both. As described in the analysis above, characteristics of energy security such as energy poverty and a just transition have moved the usage of the term towards the social sphere of interaction. This is very much evident in the outlook for the EGD as well. It is clear—at least in terms of intent—that the EGD aspires towards fundamental change both in terms of institutional parameters in decision-making and in terms of adherence to social justice principles that have been absent up to this point. In that sense, the EGD can be characterized as a source of turbulence, the outcome of which will be determined by the multitude of actions in its projected roadmap. These include the implementation of a circular economy that significantly reduces demand for critical raw materials and accelerates the use of recycled materials and resources (Smol et al., 2020). In the industrial sector, general targets include minimizing the 20% share of EU emissions that come from industrial production, especially from sectors such as steel production and construction (Pianta & Lucchese, 2020). This is combined with the overarching goals of the promotion of energy efficiency more broadly and the enhanced energy performance of buildings more specifically (Ringel et al., 2021). The same trend is observed in the inclusion of the transport policy area in the broader scope of the EGD, which has been traditionally considered adjacent to but effectively outside the boundaries of the EU climate and energy regulatory framework. While many of the details regarding the implementation of socially just priorities will be implemented in subsequent measures, the "Fit for 55" (European Commission, 2021) introduces the Social Climate Fund that represents the first practical measure towards the mitigation of energy poverty.

7. Concluding Remarks and Avenues for Further Research

Energy security remains a multifaceted concept that has grown in scope from a restricted perspective of supply security and affordability to a multiplicity of characteristics that integrate principles of the broader sustainability framework. This trajectory has been reflected in the energy and climate law and policy of the EU both in terms of overarching policy objectives and in terms of the utilization of energy security. At the core of the EGD is a multi-sectoral policy convergence, not only between the areas of energy and climate but also with associated areas such as transportation, industry, and construction. The comprehensiveness of this approach necessitates a widened conception of energy security, since its attainment must extend beyond the sufficiency of its supply to economic, technological, environmental, and sociocultural dimensions. In this sense, the extended conceptual scope of energy security illustrates that the pursuit of objectives in these other policy areas of the EGD contributes to the alleviation of risks associated with energy insecurity. It establishes alternative means of energy security, while it reduces the likelihood of crisis onset associated with exposure to the pressures of external geopolitical and economic relations in the international system.

Lastly, I introduce two avenues for further research emphasizing additional theoretical aspects of the framework. The first is the issue of energy governance. The empirical analysis illustrates that the pathway towards the policy integration of the Energy Union runs parallel to the conceptual evolution of energy security. The establishment of a supranational legal framework by EU member states, as envisioned by the Energy Union, illustrates the inability of traditional conceptions of energy security to capture the various challenges to state actors' unilateral action in the international system. As the legal framework matures, it will restrict the range of available policy options through the imposition of increasingly ambitious mandatory targets. For instance, it is impossible to analyze the evolution of policy objectives associated with energy efficiency without

a simultaneous assessment of the evolution of measures on industrial emissions, air pollution, and the EU's emissions trading scheme, which Dupont (2020, p. 95) describes as "an example of EU policymaking advancing even under contestation." The concept of turbulence can inform our understanding of energy governance integration. This article describes the evolution of energy security in EU policy as both a response to crises and, more significantly, a policy adaptation towards long-term objectives. The evolution of institutional structures to govern this adaptation can be examined through the application of this framework.

The second avenue is the application of the framework to the examination of collective securitization in energy and climate policy. This approach characterizes the EU as a governance agent of collective securitization. According to Sperling and Webber (2019, p. 236), "the actor in question acts on behalf of other empowered actors who themselves may have individual securitizing imperatives." There have been multiple studies on the securitization of EU energy policy (Judge & Maltby, 2017; Szulecki, 2020) and increasing interest in the securitization of climate policy. Dupont (2019) argues that convergence towards a unified position on climate change has enabled the collective securitization of climate policy and concludes that the potential of the EU as an agent of collective desecuritization is worth investigating. Hansen (2012, p. 541) suggests that desecuritization may involve "the combination of one issue moving out of security while another is simultaneously securitized." The coevolution of EU energy and climate policy priorities may constitute such a replacement.

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Article

The European Green Deal: What Prospects for Governing Climate Change With Policy Monitoring?

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Abstract
The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing *who* monitors, *what*, *why*, *when*, *and with what effect(s)*. The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

Keywords
climate policy; energy efficiency; energy policy; Energy Union; European Green Deal; Monitoring Mechanism; Paris Agreement; policy monitoring; renewable energy; soft governance

Issue
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1. Introduction

Policy monitoring (hereafter "monitoring") may be understood as "a continuous process of collecting and analysing data to compare how well a project, program, or policy is being implemented against expected results" (OECD-DAC, 2002, p. 30). Monitoring has long been considered a suitable governance tool to enable progress in turbulent times; that is, in "situations where events and demands interact in a highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected, and/or unpredictable manner" (Ansell et al., 2017, p. 7; Dobbs et al., 2021). In these volatile policy environments, monitoring has often been assumed to generate a steady stream of insights about the direction of travel and be a basis for policy adjustment (see Rist & Stame, 2011). Continuous feedback, so the thinking goes, may enable a more flexible and dynamic form of governance commensurate with the demands of turbulence and its difficult politics. Implicitly, policy monitoring has thus been viewed as an important ingredient in governing "with turbulence" (Dobbs et al., 2021). Existing evidence suggests that doing so is a long-standing strategy:

Nearly 30 years ago, the EU pursued monitoring at the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, because agreeing on substantial climate policy (such as a carbon tax) proved impossible (Haigh, 1996). Yamin and Depledge have consequently identified monitoring and review as "the backbone of the climate regime" (2004, p. 327).

More than two decades later, the EU found that negotiating binding emissions targets or even concrete policies still proved too contentious for agreement at the international level, so it once again focused on monitoring and review processes in the negotiation of the 2015 Paris Agreement (Held & Roger, 2018). Article 13 of the Paris Agreement prescribes that all parties to the agreement must monitor and report on their greenhouse gas emissions and their corresponding climate policy efforts to curb emissions. Summing up the key features of the current, Paris-based governance approach, Held and Roger argue that "the review process… must provide accurate information about what states are and are not doing" (2018, p. 535).

Responding to these international developments, the EU's new strategy for governing climate change and the environment, the European Green Deal (EGD) communication (European Commission, 2019), also relies significantly on policy review and monitoring provisions. For example, on page 3, the document reads that "the Commission will refocus the European Semester process of macroeconomic coordination (a monitoring and review system, see Bocquillon et al., 2020) to integrate the United Nations' sustainable development goals" (European Commission, 2019, p. 3). Re-thinking the European Semester and particularly its indicators has been highlighted as one of the key issues in implementing the EGD, especially with a view to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, but also the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (Laurent, 2020). Furthermore, the EGD highlights the member state National Energy and Climate Plans on page 6, which also contain monitoring provisions (Knodt et al., 2020). Furthermore, the Green Deal communication emphasises the need for non-financial company reporting (European Commission, 2019, p. 17) and refers to the better regulation initiative by the Commission (European Commission, 2019, p. 19), which stresses the crucial role of policy monitoring and evaluation (Radaelli, 2018). In the context of a new Environmental Action Programme, there will be "a new monitoring mechanism to ensure that Europe remains on track to meet its environmental objectives. The Commission will also launch a dashboard to monitor progress against all of the European Green Deal objectives" (European Commission, 2019, p. 23). As there is a headline target of reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century (if not before) and an evident prominence of monitoring in the EGD provisions, what are their prospects for contributing to successful environment and climate governance?

Given the decades-long history of monitoring and its prominence in the EGD, it is striking how little attention has been paid to it. Scholars have at best scratched the surface while exploring the characteristics of monitoring schemes and factors that may foster or hinder successful monitoring. Some have highlighted the political nature of related policy evaluation (e.g., Bovens et al., 2006), but more systematic approaches to investigate monitoring schemes and the data they produce have only been undertaken more recently (Bürgin, 2021; De Francesco et al., 2020; Schoenefeld et al., 2021; Tosun, 2012). While some publications have centred on the plausibility and quality of climate monitoring data (Hildén et al., 2014; Schoenefeld et al., 2018) or aspects of implementing policy monitoring (Jones, 2010; Schoenefeld et al., 2019), a more general framework for analysing the politics of policy monitoring is currently missing (see also Schoenefeld & Rayner, 2019)—even though the theoretical and practical importance of monitoring has repeatedly been highlighted (Aldy, 2014, 2018; Cumming & Forbes, 2012; Peeters & Athanasiadou, 2020).

This article seeks to fill this gap by offering a novel framework to analyse and understand the politics of policy monitoring in Section 2. Doing so responds to a long-standing misconceptualisation of policy monitoring as an apolitical means of governing, which has been admonished time and again but remains a strangely persistent assumption among many academics and practitioners (for a discussion of this phenomenon, see Hildén et al., 2014). Such a limited understanding severely hampers the conceptualisation and comprehension of the potential of policy monitoring to governing (with) turbulence. To propose a better framework for analysing and understanding monitoring, this article draws on Lasswell's (1965) famous definition to unpack the politics of policy monitoring by analysing *who* monitors, *what*, *why*, *when*, *and with what effect(s)*. In introducing the framework, this article relates each constituting element to extant monitoring schemes, focusing on energy efficiency and renewable energy policies, the broader Monitoring Mechanism in the EU, and other processes. The Energy Efficiency Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive are of high relevance to curbing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, while the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation aims to generate an overview across climate policies in the EU member states (the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation has now been incorporated in the Energy Union Governance Regulation [2018/1999], but the underlying monitoring regime remains intact). Section 3 brings together the emerging insights and discusses them in the context of the EGD, which relies in part on monitoring. Doing so opens numerous avenues for future research and offers monitoring design choices to practitioners.

2. Analysing Policy Monitoring: Towards a New Framework

Back in 1965, Lasswell famously wrote that "politics is the study of who gets what, when and how" (1965, p.

3). This article draws on Lasswell's early thinking to propose a new framework for analysing the politics of policy monitoring schemes. It centres on *who* monitors, *what*, *why*, *when*, *and with what effect(s)*. Existing literature (e.g., Aldy, 2014; Tosun, 2012) has already begun to analyse policy monitoring actors and their relationships (*who*), monitoring content (*what*), rationales for policy monitoring (*why*), the timing of policy monitoring (*when*), and the policy outputs and outcomes of monitoring schemes (*effects*). However, these elements have typically been discussed in isolation, generating fragmentation and a paucity of cumulative insight. The remainder of this section unpacks the proposed framework and relates each element to existing literature and the EGD to illustrate their plausibility. Table 1 summarises the main points of the framework in the context of past experiences with monitoring energy efficiency and renewable energy policy in the EU, as well as the Monitoring Mechanism/Energy Union Governance Regulation.

2.1. Who Monitors?

The *who* question addresses the actors and institutions that partake in monitoring schemes (Waterman & Wood, 1993). To better understand monitoring actors, the distinction between the role of public (i.e., government-driven) and private (i.e., society-driven) policy monitoring actors has proven useful (Gupta & Mason, 2016). Many of the advantages and disadvantages of private and public actors that have been identified in the context of policy evaluation (see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017; Weiss, 1993) also apply to monitoring. For example, public actors may have more resources to finance monitoring processes (see Mayne & Zapico-Goñi, 1997). Public actors may furthermore have better access to relevant data in monitoring efforts or may be able to steer governments towards generating such data. By contrast, non-governmental actors may also command considerable resources and may be more independent than governmental actors, but they may also potentially be interest driven.

The relationship between those who monitor and those subjected to monitoring has consequences: If actors come to understand monitoring processes as learning opportunities (see Sabel, 1993), they may happily provide the relevant data and derive lessons from them to improve their own policy-making endeavours. If policy monitoring becomes a control mechanism to check compliance against targets or potentially decide on the (dis)continuation of certain policies, then the motivation to provide data may be much lower. Tensions between actors may also emerge because policy monitoring is not free—on the contrary, it requires monetary and personnel resources (Leeuw, 2010; Mayne & Zapico-Goñi, 1997). Conflicts may thus emerge over monitoring and reporting's cost and administrative burden, as well as the perceived usefulness of the outputs a policy monitoring mechanism generates. While monitoring refers to the processes of regular data collection and collation, reporting refers to the transfer of data from one actor to another, often across governance levels. Data availability also has the potential to shift the power relations among different agents in governance systems, potentially impinging on interests (Hughes et al., 2019).

In the cases of energy efficiency and renewable energy, the EU directives prescribe that the member states report on their policies to the European Commission. The relationship is hierarchical, with non-implementation of monitoring potentially leading to infringement procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Monitoring Mechanism also includes the European Environment Agency as an implementing actor between the member states and the Commission. The EEA quality checks the monitoring data, publicises, and forwards them to the European Commission, which in turn uses them in its own reporting to the UNFCCC (Schoenefeld et al., 2019). The relationship between the actors is similar to the previous two directives; Luxembourg has already faced the CJEU twice for untimely reporting (Schoenefeld et al., 2018). The inclusion of these monitoring streams in the National Energy and Climate Plans in the Energy Union has shifted the relationship between the Commission and the member states. In cases of ambition or delivery gaps, the Commission can act and has therefore strengthened its hand through monitoring (Knodt & Ringel, 2018).

Non-state actors also engage in policy monitoring. A notable example is the Climate Action Tracker (https://climateactiontracker.org/about), a consortium that provides a range of data on renewable energy deployment, efficiency in the building sector and, above all, greenhouse gas emissions. Doing so yields country reports and worldwide assessment of climate action progress. The Climate Action Tracker prides itself in being independent of governments, whose activities it monitors, especially with a view to the pledges that countries submitted under the Paris Agreement. However, it should also be noted that the Climate Action Tracker has received support grants from the German Federal Government. Taken together, both governments and private initiatives regularly monitor climate policies. This framework suggests that there is value in exploring monitoring actors as well as how their interests may shape the monitoring. This is especially true for the emerging design of the EGD, which appears to mainly rely on government-driven monitoring, potentially neglecting the growing ability and role of non-state actors in policy monitoring. However, the EGD monitoring does aim to link with international efforts through the UN SDGs.

2.2. What Do They Monitor?

The second element of the framework concerns what is being monitored, typically expressed through the data that monitoring processes generate. From a conceptual perspective, Dunn (2018) distinguishes between

monitoring policy inputs (e.g., resources invested), policy outputs (e.g., laws on the statute books), and policy outcomes/impacts (i.e., what is actually being achieved). There are numerous ways in which monitoring may be conducted, ranging from "social systems accounting" (i.e., broad, headline indicators such as the unemployment rate), "policy experimentation" (i.e., the more or less controlled application of policy approaches to a sub-section of the population), "social auditing" (i.e., capturing the connection between inputs, outputs and outcomes of policies), "research and practice synthesis" (e.g., compiling knowledge from case studies and research reports), as well as "systematic reviews and meta-analyses" (i.e., more systematised analysis of a particular research question based on existing studies) that could all be a basis for monitoring (Dunn, 2018). In other words, the *what* question also incorporates important methodological questions and choices.

Each broad area translates into a plethora of potential individual indicators (Kenney & Gerst, 2021; Lehtonen, 2015) that may be used, such as dollars/euros invested, the numbers of laws on the statute books, or the level of pollutants in the air. However, not every monitoring approach is equal; it often tends to be easier to monitor policy outputs than outcomes. For example, while taxation, installation, and electricity production data generally allow for good estimates of the amounts of solar panels installed in a country, estimating policy impact on greenhouse gas emissions is more challenging, given that doing so involves life cycle analysis of solar panels, energy substitution behaviour, and so on. In the area of energy policy, there have, for example, been endeavours to track the amount of money being invested in subsidies for nuclear or renewable energy over time (Küchler & Meyer, 2012). Scholars have furthermore counted the climate laws that countries have put

Table 1. Analysing policy monitoring in energy efficiency, renewables, and general monitoring of climate policies.

Case	Energy Efficiency	Renewable Energy	Monitoring Mechanism (now incorporated in the Energy Union Governance Regulation)
Who	Member states collect data and report them to Commission; Commission conducts analyses. Article 7 of the directive requires that independent authorities conduct the monitoring (varies by member state).	Member states collect data and report them to the Commission.	Member states collect data and report them to the European Commission. The European Environment Agency assists in the implementation.
What	Energy savings. Mainly projected and/or achieved (soft language in the directive).	Commission must monitor origins of biofuels, as well as their greenhouse gas savings, based on reports from the member states. Article 24: Transparency platform that publishes national plans, statistical transfers, and projections.	Greenhouse gas reduction per policy. Cost per policy. Ex-ante data mandatory; ex-post data voluntary.
Why	To track policy developments in the member states and improve them.	Unclear.	To track policy development and fulfil reporting duties to the UNFCCC.
When	Report every year on the achievement of the targets (from 2013). National Energy Efficiency Action Plans every 3 years (from 2014).	Every other year (starting in 2011).	Every other year (first data available from 2009). Greenhouse gases every year.
Effects	No assessments available.	No assessments available.	No assessments available.
Sources	Iatridis et al. (2015, 2016); Kanellakis et al. (2013); Pereira and da Silva (2017); Ringel (2017); Rosenow et al. (2015).	Howes (2010); Kanellakis et al. (2013).	Hildén et al. (2014); Schoenefeld and Jordan (2020); Schoenefeld et al. (2018); Schoenefeld et al. (2019); Schoenefeld et al. (2021).

into place worldwide (Averchenkova et al., 2017), while others have tracked private initiatives that address climate change (Hsu et al., 2019). Then there have equally been the considerable efforts under the UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to account for the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (Calvo Buendia et al., 2019; Eggleston et al., 2006), as well as other efforts to track energy flows, such as coal, oil, or gas (Eurostat, 2016). Conceptually, Mayne and Zapico-Goñi (1997) explain that performance measures should be purpose- (rather than data- or practicality-) driven.

In the area of energy efficiency policy, the EU's focus is on energy savings—i.e., policy outcomes. Indicators here include the cumulative reduction in annual energy sales in absolute numbers and percentage reductions as well as, for example, renovation rates for public and private buildings (expressed in %). Article 24 of the Energy Efficiency Directive allocates progress monitoring tasks to the Commission, and details that it must report to the European Parliament and the Council, and include the findings in other reporting exercises, such as the Energy Union reports (Schoenefeld & Knodt, 2021). The reporting requirements include both retrospective and prospective elements. Earlier papers have, however, admonished that "[a]t present, Member States are free to decide themselves on the appropriate measuring and have no obligation to use any harmonised M&V scheme" (Ringel, 2017, p. 761). For example, in Germany, the National Statistical Office plays an important role in collating energy efficiency data, which is mainly generated by a public-private partnership that in turn uses data from the regional and local administrations (Ringel, 2017). At the European level, this mode of policy monitoring has led to varying levels of data quality, a lack of transparency of energy-saving calculation methods, and incomplete reporting (Rosenow et al., 2015).

The Renewable Energy Directive is equally detailed in its legal provisions, where for example, Article 7 includes clear prescriptions on how to calculate the national renewable energy share (a form of standardisation). However, the reporting requirements are more general and mainly focus on the share of renewables in the member states and lists existing and planned policies and measures to achieve this. Finally, the Monitoring Mechanism contains per-policy quantification of projected greenhouse gas reductions but minimal ex-post data. Over time, the number of indicators has also been expanded to include information on the costs of policies. However, much of the additional monitoring remains voluntary, drawing limited member state interest. The monitoring of state progress through the nationally determined contributions (Paris Agreement), as well as monitoring the steps towards achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, which has recently been enshrined in the EU's new climate law, has also further increased the relevance of monitoring. In the EGD, especially the focus on a "just transition" will be a key question for monitoring (and also evaluation). In its current form, the EGD mainly relies on the European Semester to assess national policymaking. But monitoring a just transition may require a broader range of evidence, including potentially qualitative aspects, which reach beyond the limited frameworks that have, for example, featured in EU cohesion policy (Batterbury, 2006). Whether the dashboard as part of the new environmental action programme will contain such considerations remains to be seen.

2.3. Why Do They Monitor?

Both practitioners and academics usually understand policy monitoring as a means to an end. But to what end(s)? One reason is to make public policy efforts more transparent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the adjective "transparent" as "easily seen through, recognised, understood, or detected; manifest, evident, obvious, clear" and transparency in turn as "the quality or condition of being transparent." The core idea behind the concept of transparency is that knowledge about the behaviour of others, in turn, changes behaviour (or policies) or reinforces desirable actions (but there are also cautionary voices, see Hillebrandt, 2020; Weikmans et al., 2020). Relatedly, Elinor Ostrom (1990, p. 45) stresses that "[w]ithout monitoring, there can be no credible commitment; without credible commitment, there is no reason to propose new rules." In the context of the EU Energy Union and the Monitoring Mechanism, efforts to increase the public availability and visibility of the monitoring data have become apparent: Whereas the Energy Union reports have become a prominent platform to showcase energy efficiency and renewable energy data (Schoenefeld & Knodt, 2021), the European Environment Agency has made concerted efforts to generate online platforms and a data viewer to increase the visibility of the data (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2020).

Actors may also engage in policy monitoring because they face international pressure, or are actively being monitored by international institutions, such as the European Commission or the OECD. For example, in the case of the EU member states, pressure comes from the Paris Agreement, the Governance Regulation, and of course the EGD, which demand regular monitoring. Those who monitor may be interested in actively steering or coordinating policy action at lower governance levels through policy monitoring (Schoenefeld & Rayner, 2019). This ultimately signifies some level of control being exerted by those who monitor public policies. However, actors may also monitor because they wish to learn, perhaps even peer-to-peer (see Aldy, 2018; Sabel, 1993). Acquiring new information about one's own activities and those of others can be a source of learning (see Gerlak et al., 2017).

Just as scholars have stressed regarding policy evaluation (e.g., Bovens et al., 2006), policy monitoring may also be conducted for political or tactical reasons that have less to do with the learning and steering functions

detailed above. Policy monitoring may be used as a signalling tool to set the agenda or hide insufficient policy action (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2019). In its first attempt to make a mark on international climate politics, the EU arguably chose this route and pursued monitoring, given its own inability to agree on a domestic carbon tax (Haigh, 1996; Yamin & Depledge, 2004). As Gupta and Mason (2016, p. 88) therefore highlight, "disclosure is itself a site of contestation, rather than a (neutral) means to help transcend political conflicts." These political aspects of monitoring demand attention. So far, the EU has often sought to depoliticise monitoring and avoid, for example, ranking countries to enable naming and shaming, a general approach that the EGD has picked up once again.

2.4. When Do They Monitor?

Mayne and Zapico-Goñi (1997, p. 18) highlight that useful performance measures have to be timely. For example, are there dedicated reporting cycles? How often does policy monitoring happen? And what role does policy monitoring play in "closing the policy cycle" (see Mastenbroek et al., 2016)? The timing of policy monitoring is thus another key factor, especially in relation to other policy developments. As Puaschunder (2021) highlights with a view to the EGD, policy outcomes will need to be observed over extended periods to capture their full effects. Then there is the temporal orientation of policy monitoring itself: Monitoring data may be either forward-looking or prospective (ex-ante), that is, assessing future policy impacts, or they may be retrospective (ex-post), that is, monitoring past policy impacts. These distinctions are by no means purely technical. Politically, ex-ante predictions may be less "threatening" to certain actors than ex-post assessments of what they have actually (not) achieved (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2019).

In the cases reviewed in this article, there are recurrent monitoring cycles, creating predictable monitoring outputs. An innovation in the Energy Union governance is that there are concrete prescriptions on Commission assessments with a view to revising targets and instruments. Furthermore, the Monitoring Mechanism has been closely aligned with effort sharing processes at the EU level, another attempt to increase the consequentiality of monitoring (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2020). This has been done, in turn, as the EU has adjusted its own policy cycles to the rhythm of the Paris Agreement. Putting monitoring in sync with policymaking may increase the effectiveness of the former. Taken together, there is a clear trend towards better alignment of monitoring processes with policymaking in various substantial policy areas.

One challenge of the EGD and the associated legislation is that they contain long-term targets (e.g., carbon neutrality) and concepts (such as justice and fairness), which require profound change, including far-reaching social change. Aspects such as social justice or resilience are difficult to capture with single indicators to assess progress against targets. A broad range of indicators, combined with qualitative evidence, will likely be necessary for a more comprehensive and continuous assessment over time. The link with the SDGs and their indicators in the EGD is one promising aspect in terms of monitoring progress (see Schoenefeld et al., in press).

2.5. To What Effect Do People Monitor?

While previous research has typically viewed monitoring as a tool to assess the effects of policies, emerging work suggests that the existence and operation of monitoring systems may have a range of potential political and substantial effects. For example, if monitoring helps strengthen policy implementation or provides a basis for revising governance targets, then substantial effects may flow from it. Given that there are multiple reasons why actors engage in policy monitoring, there is no straightforward answer to what the potential political and/or substantial effects may be, creating an important need to investigate real-world instances of policy monitoring empirically. Relevant questions include: Does policymaking become more transparent, do steering effects emerge, and can we observe the more political elements of policy monitoring? Importantly (and challengingly), can we trace the (often implicitly assumed) causal mechanisms running from the existence of monitoring to observed impacts? There are in principle multiple ways in which policy monitoring may be conceptualised in empirical investigations: as an independent variable in order to explain certain outcomes (essentially the rationale above); as an explanatory tool in order to assess the existence of other causal mechanisms running from policy inputs to impacts (see Dunn, 2018, p. 255); as an intervening variable as part of another policy input-impact mechanism; or finally as a dependent variable that can be explained with other, independent variables.

Considering the growing emphasis on monitoring and review in the context of the EGD, Paris Agreement, the EU Energy Union, and specific pieces of legislation on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and the Monitoring Mechanism (now incorporated in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), there is certainly an underlying assumption that these processes are or will become important elements of effective climate governance in turbulent environments. However, the extent to which this assumption is true is an open empirical question ripe for detailed exploration; some scholars, such as Puaschunder (2021), have raised doubts about whether the existing monitoring regimes are sufficient for the EGD's bold aims because they, for example, omit consumption-based emissions. Laurent (2020) has pointed to the limitations of the existing indicators contained in the EGD and the need to thoroughly re-think the European Semester and key indicators contained therein.

So far, there are no structured empirical investigations that assess the effects of monitoring systems. Some authors have warned that "[g]ood performance

information on its own is not going to reform the public sector" (Mayne & Zapico-Goñi, 1997, p. 12). One could, by extension, argue that good policy monitoring alone is unlikely to put the world or the EU on track to achieve its aims under the Paris Agreement. Waterman and Wood (1993) have likewise cautioned that policy monitoring should not be viewed as a panacea. Putting monitoring in place could also generate desired or undesired side effects, such as the empowerment of executive agencies involved with monitoring activities in the EU (Jevnaker & Saerbeck, 2019; Trondal, 2016). There is, in sum, no reason to assume that policy monitoring will necessarily produce the desired effects, and thus a need for careful empirical analysis to trace the factors that may drive impactful monitoring and what impacts it generates.

3. Conclusions and Future Directions

Practices of policy monitoring—which include policy monitoring, reporting, and data evaluation—have become ever more central in EU policy-making, including in the EGD. They have been presented as suitable tools to address turbulent policymaking around and within EU institutions, especially in the conflict-prone area of climate change and energy policy. Despite the growing prominence of monitoring, so far scholars have by and large neglected it—a gap that this article addressed by proposing a new analysis framework (based on Lasswell's early insights on politics) and by conducting a first plausibility probe. The novel framework is chiefly a tool for analysing existing monitoring schemes, but it may equally serve as a resource for practitioners seeking to set up monitoring schemes as it makes monitoring design choices explicit (see also Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017). The framework demonstrates that there are many different potential variations of policy monitoring, which emerge as unique combinations of design characteristics that include *who* monitors, *what* they monitor, *why* they monitor, *when* they monitor, and with *what effects*. The plausibility probe has demonstrated that the framework's elements can be identified in the context of climate policy in the EU and the emerging EGD.

The biggest unexplored issue relates to the effectiveness of monitoring. As a key element of the framework, the effects of policy monitoring in terms of enabling steering, learning, and ultimately advancing climate action under conditions of turbulence are a key area for future research. Turbulence in EU climate and energy governance has emerged as one of the drivers of monitoring schemes, as other policy options have often remained beyond reach. The extent to which monitoring is, in turn, a suitable tool to govern turbulence remains a key future research priority. Given the multiple design options for monitoring schemes, particularly the connection between different monitoring design options and effective governance requires attention.

What implications emerge from these findings for the EGD? The EGD builds on several existing monitoring provisions, thus representing a key empirical example where monitoring is being used to govern in turbulent times. It relies on the EU's monitoring within existing frameworks that have long been in existence, but which have been enhanced in various ways, for example, in the context of the Energy Union. Whether doing so is sufficient remains an open question—with a view to monitoring the EGD, Puaschunder (2021, p. 5) argues that:

> Difficulties include the observability of results over time, a lack of bodies to measure grand-scale worldwide projects as well as the lack of systemic and objective examination criteria for not occurred risks as well as multiple stakeholder channels to discuss.

For example, Laurent (2020) explains how a focus on territorial emissions (i.e., the approach of the Monitoring Mechanism) ignores imported consumption-based emissions, for which the existing monitoring regimes and the EGD do not account, and whose omission paints a skewed picture of the EU's emissions reductions and the impact of its climate policies. Governing with turbulence, in particular, requires a broad knowledge of the impacts of the EGD, given the potential for the emergence of unexpected outcomes. Crucially, the efficacy of these monitoring schemes is yet to be assessed, a key gap that the proposed framework has highlighted. There appears to be a tendency to integrate different monitoring streams to generate overall assessment, as is the case in the Energy Union reporting. The new Governance Regulation has also placed a stronger emphasis on ex-ante reporting, whose effect on "policy shaping," especially by the European Commission, remains a key subject for future research (see Knodt & Ringel, 2018). The new EGD monitoring efforts and the dashboard could potentially generate new effects, especially when monitoring happens across policy sectors rather than on a sectoral basis, but it is too soon to tell while the exact institutional design and monitoring provisions remain unknown.

An additional effect of policy monitoring may be its use in other policy evaluation exercises, that is, "careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth and value of administration, output and outcome of government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future, practical action situations" (Vedung, 1997, p. 3). In contrast to policy monitoring, policy evaluation is a broader exercise, which often aims to assess the causal effect of a policy, frequently drawing on programme theory. In doing so, monitoring data may be a helpful ingredient, but only to the extent that it is relevant to and usable in policy evaluation. In the implementation of the EGD, the question will ultimately be whether policy monitoring ends up as a "paper tiger" (Niederberger & Kimble, 2011) or whether it becomes one of the crucial institutional conditions that help accelerate and steer the much-needed low-carbon transition (Roberts et al., 2018). As Patton (2021) argues, "the greatest danger for

evaluators in times of turbulence is not the turbulence—it is to act with yesterday's criteria." Without a better understanding of policy monitoring practices and their effects, scholars and practitioners may well discover that the devil of governing in turbulent governance environments emerges through the details of monitoring.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Article

Deliberative Mini-Publics and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times: The Irish and French Climate Assemblies

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Abstract
Innovative forms of deliberative democracy are gaining traction in governing responses to climate change in Europe and beyond. Proponents of deliberative democracy have drawn attention to its particular suitability for shaping responses to environmental challenges. Citizen engagement and participation is also a prominent feature of the European Green Deal. This article considers the relationship between turbulence and deliberative democracy in the context of climate transitions, exploring when and how such democratic innovations are likely to generate turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. A framework is developed that focuses on three important sets of characteristics of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs): (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the ways in which climate change is framed as a policy problem; (b) the nature of participation and the degree to which the participants are empowered to shape the deliberative processes in which they participate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant policymaking processes. This framework is used to explore two recent and high-profile cases of a particular type of DMP: citizens' assemblies in Ireland and France. The article contributes to the literatures on turbulent governance and deliberative democracy by reflecting on key dimensions of DMPs from the analytical perspective of turbulent governance.

Keywords
climate change; deliberative democracy; democratic mini-public; European Green Deal; turbulence

Issue
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1. Introduction

Citizen engagement, participation, and deliberation are prominent features of the European Green Deal (EGD). The Commission's 2019 EGD communication articulates its aim as being "to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use" (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). A European Climate Pact—a central element of the EGD proposal—aims to "build on the Commission's on-going series of citizens' dialogues and citizens' assemblies across the EU, and the role of social dialogue committees" (European Commission, 2019, p. 23).

The importance of citizen participation in the EGD and, more broadly, in the transition to a climate neutral and resilient future, is driven at least in part by the need to ensure that justice and fairness are placed at the centre of the transition. The costs and benefits of transition are distributed in deeply unequal ways across space and time, as are existing opportunities to participate in shaping climate transitions. The European Commission's EGD communication notes prominently that the envisaged transition must be:

> Just and inclusive. It must put people first, and pay attention to the regions, industries and workers who will face the greatest challenges. Since it will bring substantial change, active public participation and confidence in the transition is paramount if policies

> are to work and be accepted. (European Commission, 2019, p. 1)

Against this backdrop, innovative forms of deliberative democracy are gaining traction in governing responses to climate change. This phenomenon forms part of a broader "deliberative wave" (OECD, 2020) in which the use of deliberative processes is growing in prevalence and prominence across countries and policy areas. Building on a longer line of scholarship advocating deliberative democracy (e.g., Dryzek, 1990; Fishkin, 1991), proponents of deliberative democracy have drawn attention to its particular suitability for shaping responses to environmental challenges, which are characterised by conflicting interests, values and worldviews, complexity, trade-offs, and long-time horizons that stretch beyond one electoral cycle (e.g., Blue, 2015; Niemeyer, 2013; Smith, 2003; Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014). Rather than simply aggregating atomized preferences of the population through elections or opinion polling, the process of deliberation can serve to transform the preferences of participants by exposing them to a wide variety of views and engaging them in conversation with those whose views they may not share. Niemeyer (2013) argues that deliberative forums enable participating citizens to consider the interest of non-human agents, and that deliberation has the potential to attune participants to complexity as well as to take a long-term view on global environmental issues.

Within the broader field of deliberative democracy, a significant literature has developed around the use of so-called "deliberative mini-publics" (DMPs), defined by Goodin and Dryzek (2006, p. 220) as democratic innovations involving ordinary citizens in "groups small enough to be genuinely deliberative, and representative enough to be genuinely democratic." According to Farrell et al. (2019), DMPs are characterised by two core design features: (a) they are deliberative in the sense that participants reach conclusions having received relevant information and engaged in a careful and open discussion; and (b) they are representative in that participants are selected to be representative, as far as possible, of the wider population.

The broader political and social landscape presents challenges for climate transitions. Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and in a climate context resistance from central and eastern member states to ambitious policy agendas, as well as a widespread perception that democracy is in crisis (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) all complicate the pathway for implementation of the EGD. Populist backlash has been increasingly evident in a range of western democracies, with action on climate change drawing particularly strong critique for being an elitist or unjust project. The concept of turbulent governance has been used to capture the accumulation of challenges (Ansell & Trondal, 2018; see also Dobbs et al., 2021). Turbulence is distinguished from crisis in the sense that it is a normal and enduring feature of the contemporary governance landscape—a condition or a dysfunction—and as something to be managed or withstood.

The aim of this article is to situate the growth in DMPs for framing climate transitions within the context of turbulent governance. Such democratic innovations can be seen as either a response to turbulent governance or as a cause of turbulence in the broader climate governance landscape. In this context, this article focuses more narrowly on DMPs as a cause of turbulence in climate change governance. It connects the concept of turbulent governance to the literature on DMPs and seeks to answer the question: To what extent and under what conditions can DMPs lead to turbulence in the governance of climate transitions?

The article distinguishes three key characteristics of DMPs: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the ways in which climate change is framed as a policy problem; (b) the nature of participation and the degree to which the participants are empowered to shape the deliberative processes in which they participate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant policymaking processes. These characteristics are then used as a framework to explore two recent and high-profile cases of a particular type of DMP: citizens' assemblies focused on climate change conducted in EU member states, namely the Irish Citizens' Assembly, which deliberated on climate change along with four other topics, and the French Citizens Convention for Climate (*Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat*).

The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the article's case selection and approach. Section 3 introduces the concept of turbulent governance and relates it to the literature on DMPs. Section 4 undertakes an empirical analysis of the two selected cases mentioned above to provide an analytical mapping of emerging practices. Section 5 discusses the findings and reflects on the extent to which the two DMPs have led to turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. Section 6 concludes and identifies broader lessons for climate transitions and the EGD.

2. Case selection and Approach

DMPs range in size from small processes such as citizens' juries (typically 15–30 participants), citizens' councils (typically 15 participants), and consensus conferences (typically 16 participants), to larger processes such as citizens' assemblies (typically 90–150 participants), citizens' dialogues (typically 150 participants), and deliberative surveys (typically more than 200 participants). DMPs share certain features that distinguish them from other forms of citizen participation (Brown, 2006; Farrell et al., 2019): (a) They provide participants with access to a range of relevant information on the topic in question and, importantly, provide adequate time and space for participants to deliberate with their fellow citizens; (b) they limit interest group representatives to participation as expert group members and possible steering

group members; (c) they feed into policy processes, but they have no authority to make legally binding decisions; and (d) they address both public officials and the general public. Mini-publics are usually representative of the "maxi-public," that is, the wider population from which the participants are drawn.

The empirical focus in this article is more narrowly on citizens' assemblies, considered to be the most robust and elaborate form of DMP (Escobar & Elstub, 2017). A range of European countries have implemented national citizens' assemblies focused, in part or in full, on climate change, including Ireland, France, the UK, Scotland, Denmark, Finland, and Germany. A range of smaller scale deliberative processes have been implemented at city or local level, such as in the UK, Hungary, and Poland. These processes exhibit significant national variation in terms of their establishment, design, scope, operation, outcomes, and impact.

The empirical analysis in Section 4 focuses on the Irish Citizens' Assembly, which deliberated on climate change along with four other topics, and the French Citizens Convention for Climate. Both fulfil the core criteria of DMPs set out in the introduction, namely that they were deliberative and representative, involved extended deliberation on the topic of climate change, and consisted of representative random samples of the national population. The French and Irish cases were selected for analysis furthermore on the basis that, at the time of writing, enough time has elapsed to be able to begin to analyse their relationship with the broader policy system and the extent to which they can be considered a cause of turbulence in climate transitions. The empirical analysis draws on publicly available sources and existing research—including that conducted by the author on the Irish case—regarding the design, implementation, and outcomes of these two national citizens' assemblies. Rather than conducting new empirical research, the aim of the analysis is to explore the plausibility of the analytical framework and open new avenues for research.

3. Turbulent Governance and Deliberative Mini-Publics in the Context of Climate Transitions

Turbulence provides a useful conceptual entry point to analysing the role of DMPs in the context of the EGD. Ansell and Trondal (2018, p. 53) define turbulence as "situations where events, demands, and support interact in highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected and unpredictable ways." Elsewhere they characterise turbulence as the "increasingly volatile context for complex problem-solving" (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 3). Ansell and Trondal (2018, p. 46) distinguish between three types of turbulence: (a) organisational turbulence, which covers turbulence within organisations themselves; (b) environmental turbulence, which includes sources of turbulence from the broader environment; and (c) scalar turbulence, which includes the turbulence caused by activities at one governance level that spill over to another level such as when policy solutions at one level create problems at another. In another contribution to this thematic issue, Dobbs et al. (2021) suggest the need to expand the conceptualisation of turbulence developed by Ansell and colleagues to include policy turbulence, which they define as "where there is substantial policy conflict or incoherence, e.g., due to multiple related policies in conflict, a substantive policy gap, or potentially a new policy that is exceptionally innovative or overhauls the regime" (Dobbs et al., 2021, p. 319)

How does turbulence manifest itself in the governance of climate transitions? Elsewhere in this thematic issue, Dobbs et al. (2021) develop the concept of turbulence in the context of the EGD. Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, Euroscepticism, political upheaval in member states, and the broader international landscape can all be identified as sources of environmental turbulence for the EGD. Moreover, the EGD itself is a potential source of turbulence, since it entails significant and potentially disruptive changes across a wide range of policy arenas. In terms of organisational turbulence, examples include reforms within the European Commission such as the creation of DG Clima as well as the challenges faced in the appointment of a new Commission president in 2019. For scalar turbulence, the multilevel character of the EU governance system and particularly the fact that many of the areas of relevance to the EGD are shared competences between the Union and member state levels increase the prospects of scalar turbulence.

How can we situate the relationship between DMPs and turbulent governance in the context of climate transitions? As a form of institutional innovation, DMPs can be conceptualised as both a *response* to turbulence and themselves a *cause* of turbulence. By opening up channels for citizen participation, DMPs can potentially serve as a response to environmental turbulence such as pervasive distrust of political institutions, disinformation and rising Euroscepticism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In the case of the scale of transformative change envisaged in the EGD, DMPs can serve as institutional mechanisms to engage diverse publics—including marginalised and hard-to-reach sections of society. DMPs can also themselves be a cause of turbulence. If their recommendations push the boundaries of what is deemed to be politically feasible or acceptable, they may be a source of environmental turbulence if they disrupt established interest groups or the political status quo. They may also serve as sources of policy turbulence or scalar turbulence by proposing recommendations that disrupt the status quo in other policy arenas or at other scales of governance.

The focus of this article is on DMPs as a source of turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. Whether and to what extent this is the case is likely to be shaped by their specific institutional characteristics as well as the broader context in which they are commissioned and operate. Here, I identify three key characteristics of DMPs that I suggest shape the degree to which DMPs may be a cause of turbulence in climate

governance: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the range of information and material to which participants are given access; (b) the nature of participation and the degree to which the participants are empowered to shape the deliberative processes in which they participate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant policymaking processes.

3.1. Mandate and Framing

A first important characteristic in terms of turbulent governance is the mandate of the DMP and how the topic is framed. According to a recent OECD report, the question for deliberation ought to be broad enough to allow for numerous possible recommendations, but not so broad as to lead to side-tracking (OECD, 2020, p. 85). Deliberative processes arguably work best when framed around a distinct, specific policy question that needs to be answered (Devaney, Brereton, et al., 2020). Narrower framings can facilitate clear results over shorter timeframes, whereas broader framings can incorporate a wider range of topics but may be slower and produce less clear-cut recommendations (Bryant & Stone, 2020). Other things being equal, more specific recommendations are harder to ignore and therefore are more likely to generate turbulence in the wider governance system.

A related characteristic concerns the way in which climate change is framed as a policy problem in the context of a DMPs. The deliberative process is underpinned by the provision of relevant information on the topic under consideration, and usually involves an overview of the topic and diagnosis of the problem at hand, followed by more detailed information and outlining of possible solutions (Gerwin, 2018). As Capstick et al. (2020) argue, there is no "neutral" way of framing climate change. Diversity of information sources is important, as is giving participants control over which sources and types of information they wish to access (newDemocracy, 2019). The greater the range of information sources, the less constrained is the nature and content of this information by dominant interests and perspectives, and the greater the control that participants have over the material to which they are exposed, the more potentially transformative and disruptive the DMP may be.

3.2. Agency of Participants

Who participates in a DMP and to what degree the participants themselves are provided with opportunities to shape the processes in which they participate constitute another important set of characteristics with respect to turbulent governance. The representativeness and inclusiveness of DMPs are key factors in the legitimacy of these processes (Olsen & Trenz, 2016; Pow, 2021). Some models of deliberation such as enclave deliberation emphasise the benefits of dedicated forums for disempowered groups (Brown, 2006; Karpowitz et al., 2009), but DMPs are characterised by random selection that gives each member of the public an equal chance of participation. This can take the form of "pure" random selection and stratified random selection in which the sample reflects important characteristics of the wider population such as gender, age, socio-economic status, ethnicity, geography, etc. (Farrell et al., 2019). The size of the process is also an important characteristic, particularly for stratified sampling: The larger the number, the more likely it is to capture important demographic characteristics of the wider population.

The degree to which participants in a DMP are empowered to shape the process is an important cross-cutting characteristic. One aspect of this concerns the mandate and information to which participants are exposed. The greater the scope for participants themselves to share these aspects of the process, the more potentially transformative the process and its outputs may be. A further important dimension concerns the decision-making procedures used to arrive at outputs, and what form those outputs should take, for example a series of recommendations on which the members vote, a narrative report, or some other form.

3.3. Policy Coupling and Integration

The degree to which a DMP is coupled with the broader policy system is an important institutional characteristic in terms of its potential to generate turbulence for the wider governance system. One relevant institutional characteristic concerns the commissioning authority. A DMP can be commissioned by government, by civil society, or by another entity such as an academic institution. We can distinguish further between commission by the executive and legislative branches of government. DMPs commissioned by policymakers are likely to be more tightly coupled to the policymaking process (Setälä, 2017; Thompson, 2019). Farrell et al. (2019) advocate for an independent chair and professional secretariat, and that DMPs should be kept at arm's length from government thereby maintaining a credible level of independence and allowing for citizen-led approaches to designing the agenda and process.

Another important dimension of policy coupling concerns the outputs of a DMP and how those outputs are integrated into the wider policymaking process. This is among the most challenging dimensions of DMPs from both an analytical and practice perspective. There is no consensus in the literature on this issue, with a recent review by the OECD arguing that "research that links the outcomes of these processes to citizens' perceptions of their trust, fairness, and effectiveness is also lacking" (OECD, 2020, p. 165). Gerwin (2018) argues that DMP recommendations should be binding, which was the case for city-level citizens' assemblies held in Poland. In the case of the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly, the government committed in advance to put the assembly's recommendations to a referendum (Bua, 2019; Setälä & Smith, 2018), but many other scholars suggest that

recommendations should not be binding. This, however, creates the risk of cherry-picking by decision-makers (Font et al., 2018). Farrell et al. (2019) recommend that there should be clear guidelines in advance on how recommendations will be dealt with.

The more empowered a DMP is in both of these respects—in terms of the role of the participants in shaping the outputs and recommendations and the degree of pre-commitment to implementation—the more likely the process is to generate turbulence for the wider policy system. The broader political context is also an important factor. The prominence of climate change on the policy agenda and the mobilisation of societal stakeholders either in support of, or in opposition to, the outputs of a DMP will shape the impact that such processes have on the wider policy system.

Table 1 summarises the findings of the above discussion, which has drawn attention to the importance of mandates and framing, participation and agency, and policy coupling in shaping the how DMPs relate to turbulent governance in the context of climate transitions. DMPs with non-specific mandates, in which the participants are given limited scope to shape the process, and which are only loosely coupled and integrated into broader policymaking processes are less likely to cause turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. By contrast, DMPs that address specific mandates, give participants a strong role in shaping the process, and are tightly coupled with broader policy processes are more likely to be a source of turbulence for the broader governance landscape. The next section uses the framework developed in this section to structure an analysis of two of the most high-profile climate-focused national DMPs to date, in Ireland and France.

4. Deliberative Mini-Publics and Climate Governance: Evidence From the Irish and France Climate Assemblies

The analysis in this section focuses on national level citizens' assemblies on climate change in Ireland (2016–2018) and France (2019–2020). The analysis focuses on two early examples of national-level processes that fulfil the criteria of both DMPs and the narrower category of citizens' assemblies. The discussion below considers each case study, structuring the analysis around the framework developed in Section 3.

4.1. The Irish Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change

In Ireland, a Citizens' Assembly was established in 2016 to consider five topics, one of which was climate change. It met on 12 occasions between October 2016 and April 2018. Its deliberations on climate change took place over two weekends in September and November 2017. The most high-profile of the five topics—and the one for which the assembly is arguably best known—was the politically controversial topic of abortion. Climate change was not part of its original remit as set out in the parliamentary resolution providing for its establishment; rather, it was added as a result of a Green Party amendment to the resolution (Devaney, Torney, et al., 2020).

The mandate of the Citizens' Assembly on the topic of climate change was exceptionally broad. This was set out in the terms of reference, which were set down in a resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The question to be addressed with respect to climate change was "how the State can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change" (Citizens' Assembly, 2018, p. 48). No timeframe (e.g., 2030 or 2050) was set out and there was no indication of what being a "leader" might entail. This provided an exceptionally broad canvas for the assembly and constrained its ability to feed into specific climate policy processes. There was no mandate, for example, to shape the country's 2030 climate change targets or pathways towards those targets, nor was there an opportunity to shape a specific climate change policy framework such as the state's statutory National Mitigation Plan or National Energy and Climate Plan.

The work programme divided the topic of climate change into a broad overview of climate change science and policy, sectoral consideration of energy, transport, and agriculture, food and land use, as well as a session on international perspectives on climate leadership featuring contributions from Scotland and Denmark (Citizens' Assembly, 2018, Chapter 3). The scope of the assembly was constrained by the limited time devoted to the climate change topic. While the assembly met for 12 weekends in total over a period of 18 months, only two of those meetings were devoted to the topic of climate change. This included a total of 26 hours of listening, discussion and deliberation, with presentations from 15 climate change experts and six individuals championing low carbon transition (Devaney, Torney, et al., 2020). Within

Table 1. Core characteristics of DMPs and their relevance for turbulence.

	Design characteristics	Characteristics likely to generate turbulence
Mandate and framing	Specific vs. broad mandate	Specific mandate
	Constrained vs. unconstrained framing	Unconstrained framing
Participation and agency	Agency of participants	Strong role for participants
Policy coupling and integration	Commissioning authority and its role	Independence from commissioning authority
	Degree of pre-commitment to implementation	High degree of pre-commitment

each sectoral section, this was limited to typically two expert speakers, with no speakers invited from interest groups such as business groups or NGOs. Separate categories of speakers were identified: experts and "exemplars" of climate action. The effect of this constraint was to limit the breadth of evidence presented to the participants, potentially therefore limiting the breadth of their recommendations.

The assembly's 99 participants were selected by random sample stratified by a range of demographic characteristics including age, gender, social class, and region (Citizens' Assembly, n.d.-b). A steering group composed of the chair, secretariat, and a representative group of members provided a channel for members to provide input to shaping the process (Citizens' Assembly, 2018, Chapter 2). The extent to which the participants were able to shape the process through this channel is unclear. A draft ballot paper was prepared by the chair and secretariat, with input from the expert advisory group and steering group, and then put to the full membership for discussion and approval. Once the ballot paper was approved, voting on each of the 13 recommendations was by secret ballot. All recommendations were endorsed by 80% or more, including politically contentious recommendations to increase the level of an existing carbon tax, to place a tax on greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, and to end subsidies for peat extraction (Citizens' Assembly, 2018). The assembly's recommendations became a focal point for policy entrepreneurs, particularly within civil society, seeking to strengthen Ireland's response to climate change. Welcoming the formal publication of the assembly's report on climate change in April 2018, the Stop Climate Chaos coalition hailed the recommendations as "a mandate for revolutionising Ireland's climate policy" (Stop Climate Chaos, 2018).

In terms of coupling and integration with the policy process, the assembly was established by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, but the commissioning authority had no role in the running of the process. An independent secretariat composed of staff seconded from the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) was tasked with supporting an independent chair (retired Supreme Court Judge Mary Laffoy), who was appointed by government to lead the process. An expert advisory group was composed of experts in climate change science and policy, and deliberative democracy provided external advice to the chair and secretariat. The resolution mandated the creation of a special parliamentary committee to examine the assembly's recommendations on only one of the five topics under consideration, namely Ireland's constitutional ban on abortion. The parliamentary resolution establishing the assembly required for the other four topics only that parliament would respond to each recommendation (Citizens' Assembly, n.d.-a). Despite not being required, in the case of the climate change topic a similar model to that required for follow-up on the abortion topic was adopted, and a special parliamentary committee was established to consider the recommendations. This special committee—the Joint Oireachtas (Parliamentary) Committee on Climate Action—was established in July 2018. Over a period of approximately six months, the committee considered the recommendations of the assembly—in greater detail than the assembly had been able to, a process that included calling a range of expert witnesses.

The parliamentary committee published its own recommendations in March 2019 (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019). These recommendations largely amplified and developed the assembly's recommendations, including developing the assembly's recommendation to place climate change at the centre of policymaking into a proposal to comprehensively revise the state's 2015 framework climate law. This recommendation was subsequently incorporated as the central climate governance commitment of a government Climate Action Plan published in June 2019 (DCCAE, 2019). Following a lengthy legislative process that was interrupted by a general election in February 2020, the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Bill was signed into law in July 2021. However, not all of the assembly's recommendations were implemented. The most significant exception was the assembly's recommendation to place a GHG tax on emissions from agriculture. Accounting for over one-third of Ireland's GHG emissions, the debate on the role of the agriculture sector in addressing climate change is particularly contentious. The assembly's recommendation was not endorsed by the parliamentary committee, which recommended only that the topic be given further consideration.

Taking a longer-term perspective, the most consequential impact of the assembly's recommendations may turn out to be the revision of the climate law. The amended climate law puts in place an enhanced governance framework, with binding five-year carbon budgets and stronger accountability provisions. This framework may indeed introduce significant turbulence into the broader governance landscape, moving climate change concerns closer to the centre of policymaking. The broader context, including the publication of the IPCC report on global warming of 1.5 degrees as well as a rise in societal awareness of the climate crisis, illustrated for example in the school strikes for climate, played a key role in creating the conditions for these significant developments. The assembly itself and its recommendations are best characterised as an inspiration or spur that set this process rather than its proximate cause.

4.2. The French Citizens Convention for Climate

The French Citizens Convention for Climate was widely seen as a response to the *gilets jaunes* protests against a rise in fuel tax (Eymard, 2020). An initial response to the protests, the *grand débat* convened by President Macron, convened 18 regional citizen conferences, each

inviting about a hundred randomly selected citizens to deliberate for a day and a half (Giraudet et al., 2021). However, the *grand débat* was widely criticised as being a smoke screen as well as for "not following the basic standards of deliberation design" (Ehs & Mokre, 2021). The Citizens Convention for Climate was formally initiated in July 2019 by a letter from the prime minister. It convened for the first time in October 2019 and met over seven 2.5-day sessions between October 2019 and June 2020.

In terms of its mandate, the convention was commissioned by the executive and was tasked with deliberating on how to define a series of measures to achieve a reduction of at least 40% in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (compared to 1990) in keeping with the principle of social justice (Citizens Convention for Climate, n.d.). As such, it was a relatively specific mandate, with a defined timeframe (2030) and predefined level of ambition in terms of the decarbonisation target (40%). The reference to social justice stemmed from the convention's origins in the *gilets jaunes* protests. The specificity of the mandate arguably provided greater scope for the convention to contribute to near-term climate action policies, though how far the recommendations would go in delivering on the 40% target was not quantified at the time (Giraudet et al., 2021).

A wide range of speakers were invited, including those considered to be neutral experts as well as those invited to present a particular perspective. A review of the convention conducted by a range of independent researchers who observed the process argues that the group of experts tasked with informing the participants shaped the process and its recommendations (Giraudet et al., 2021). According to this assessment, the way in which the debates were structured by the organisers meant that experts and speakers with opposing views were rarely given the opportunity to challenge each other's evidence. The assessment by the group of observers also noted that the degree to which the invited experts shaped the deliberations varied across different thematic areas, but that overall it was significant (Giraudet et al., 2021).

The convention consisted of 150 participants, who were selected using stratified random sampling. These participants were stratified in order to be representative of the diversity of the French society on the basis of socio-demographic criteria: gender, age, level of education, place of residence (urban, suburbs, rural, etc.), geographical area (including overseas territories), and socio-professional category (Citizens Convention for Climate, n.d.). The governance of the convention was structured around five groups: (a) a governance committee tasked with setting the agenda and rules, consisting of representatives of think tanks, trade unions, business, government officials, and academics with relevant expertise; (b) A group of three guarantors nominated by the National Assembly, the Senate, and the Economic, Social and Environmental Council; (c) a group of 19 experts tasked with providing technical background on climate policies and technologies; (d) a group of six legal experts tasked with providing feedback on the participants' recommendations; and (e) a consortium of deliberation facilitators.

According to Giraudet et al. (2021), the most distinctive feature of the French convention when compared to other citizens' assemblies on climate change was its approach based on "co-construction" between citizens and experts. Citizens were split into five thematic working groups: "consuming," "travelling," "housing," "eating," and "producing and working." Recommendations were prepared by sub-groups of the whole membership with support from the committee of legal experts and specialists with expertise in decarbonisation (Saujot et al., 2020, p. 6). In addition to the formal deliberations, some of the members met with civil society and policymakers outside of the formal process and organised debates themselves, leading Saujot et al. (2020, p. 6) to describe the process as "a co-construction process by the 150 citizens in interaction with several groups of actors both within and outside the convention." Indeed, the term "co-construction" was included in the letter from the prime minister commissioning the process.

In terms of policy coupling and integration, as noted above, the convention was commissioned by the executive branch of government. The Economic, Social and Environmental Council was in charge of overseeing the organisation of the event and of ensuring its independence, including that of the governance committee. Nonetheless, it was strongly coupled with the policy system from the start by virtue of the fact that President Macron committed to submitting the convention's recommendations "unfiltered" to a referendum or to parliament, or to direct regulatory application (Eymard, 2020). As Giraudet and colleagues note, the meaning and implications of the "unfiltered" stipulation were never fully clear. One interpretation placed an obligation on government to implement the recommendations regardless of their content, but an alternative interpretation placed an obligation on the convention to produce recommendations that were readily implementable (Giraudet et al., 2021).

The convention's recommendations consisted of 149 measures in total. Of these, three were selected by the participants to be proposed for referendum. These were two constitutional reforms and the recognition of ecocide as a crime. In a speech delivered a week after the publication of the convention's recommendations, President Macron committed to supporting 146 out of 149 of the recommendations but declined to accept three, namely amending the preamble of the constitution, imposing a 4% tax on corporate dividends, and reducing speed limits on motorways (Giraudet et al., 2021). In February 2021, the French government published the Climate and Resilience Bill as its response to the convention's recommendations. This bill was judged by the Convention's members themselves as an

insufficient response (Huffpost, 2021). As the bill progressed through the legislative process it was further weakened. The final version, agreed by the National Assembly and the Senate in July 2021 was criticised by civil society as being inconsistent with the original recommendations of the Convention (Bauer-Babef, 2021).

Overall, the combination of a relatively tightly-defined mandate and a process that granted significant agency to the participants themselves through a co-created process provided the basis for a set of recommendations that have the potential to create significant turbulence in France's climate governance landscape. President Macron's commitment in advance to submit the convention's recommendations "unfiltered" to either a referendum, to parliament, or to direct regulatory application created the possibility of significant turbulence, but it was revoked in the end. Macron rejected three of the convention's recommendations from the start, and the implementing legislation lessened the strength of others.

5. Discussion

This article has explored the conditions under which democratic innovations such as DMPs are likely to cause turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. Drawing on the deliberative democracy literature, I identified a set of DMP characteristics of relevance, centred upon: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the ways in which climate change is framed as a policy problem; (b) the degree to which participants are empowered to shape the deliberative processes in which they participate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant policymaking processes. Two recent national-level citizens' assemblies have been discussed, focused on climate change in Ireland and France to explore the utility of this framework. The previous analysis shows considerable diversity among these processes in respect of all three categories across the two cases, which is summarised in Table 2.

In terms of mandates and framing, there was significant variation. The French convention was given a relatively specific mandate, tasked with considering how to achieve 40% decarbonisation by 2030 in a spirit of social justice. By contrast, the mandate in the case of the Irish citizens' assembly was much more open-ended, without a specified timeframe or decarbonisation target. The circumstances in which the two processes were established varied. In the Irish case, climate change was added to the agenda of an assembly focused primarily on the topic of abortion, almost as an after-thought. In the French case, by contrast, the convention was widely seen as a government response to the *Gilet jaunes* protests against an unpopular fuel tax.

The two assemblies also varied in terms of the agency given to the participants themselves. The French convention operated in a co-creative manner, with a comparatively strong role for the participants themselves to shape the process. The Irish assembly was, by contrast, run in a way that did not give as much agency to the participants. The manner in which the participants were involved in designing (as opposed to merely voting on) those outputs also differed.

In terms of policy coupling and integration, while both processes were commissioned by government, they were governed in ways that were more or less at arms-length from government, though the arrangements differed in each case. Each of the processes reported to the commissioning branch of government, but the degree of pre-commitment by government to considering the recommendations varied considerably. In the Irish case, the assembly's recommendations were considered by parliament, with little explicit pre-commitment except to consider them. By contrast, the French president pre-committed to submitting the recommendations "unfiltered" either to referendum or to parliament.

According to the expectations developed in Section 2, the contrasting characteristics of the French and Irish DMPs ought to have resulted in limited turbulence in the Irish case and significant turbulence in the French case. This is not how the story played out. In the Irish case, albeit over a longer timeframe, the Citizens' Assembly resulted in significant policy turbulence, most notably through a major overhaul of the 2015 climate law. In the French case, by contrast, President Macron did not follow through on this commitment to submit the Convention's recommendations "unfiltered" to a referendum, to parliament, or to direct regulatory application. He rejected three of the 149 recommendations from the start, and the final version of the legislation designed to implement the convention's recommendations, the Climate and Resilience Bill, has been criticised by civil society for not going far enough to honour the spirit of those recommendations. These findings point to the limitations of

Table 2. Characteristics of Irish Citizens' Assembly and French Citizens Convention for Climate.

Design characteristics	Irish Citizens' Assembly	French Citizens Convention for Climate
Mandate and framing	Non-specific mandate, constrained framing	Specific mandate, less constrained framing
Agency of participants	Largely top-down process	Process co-created with more agency given to participants
Policy coupling and integration	Loose coupling and integration	Tighter coupling and integration

focusing on the specific design characteristics of DMPs in order to understand their likely impact. The findings also emphasise the importance of context and contingency in assessing their contributions to the governance of climate transitions.

6. Conclusions

This article used the cases of the Irish Citizens' Assembly and French Citizens Convention for Climate to explore when and how climate-focused DMPs are likely to cause turbulence in the governance of climate transitions. The framework developed in Section 2 focused on central characteristics of DMPs, including their mandates and framing, the degree of agency given to participants, and the extent of policy coupling and integration. The empirical analysis showed that these factors matter, but that the broader context and contingent factors matter as well—perhaps even more.

The contrasting fates of the two cases point to a tension at the heart of the use of DMPs in climate change governance that ought to be investigated through further research. To what extent is the disruptive and path-breaking potential of deliberative democratic innovations constrained by an inherent wariness on the part of governments to delegating agency to bodies over which they have limited control? Is there a trade-off between the degree of separation from government and the likelihood of follow-up on recommendations? A more distant relationship from the government may increase autonomy and independence over agenda and operation, but it may also result in government being less amenable to implementing recommendations from a DMPs.

It is too early to form a definite assessment on these questions, and future research ought to devote further attention to this area. The question of broader impact of DMPs is the least studied and understood in the literature. It is also among the most important topics in this field, and as more DMPs are implemented with varying design characteristics, and as more time passes, it will be important to conduct follow-up research to examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, such processes shape the governance of climate transitions. As discussed in the introduction, the EGD aims to ensure a just transition by placing citizens at the centre of the climate transition, including by building on the growing experience of citizens' dialogues and assemblies across the EU. Given the scale of transformation across all sectors of economy and society envisaged as part of the EGD, citizen participation will indeed be central to its success or failure. In this context, policymakers and scholars ought to learn lessons from high-profile instances of democratic innovations such as those discussed above.

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The author was a member of the expert advisory group to the Irish Citizens' Assembly 2016–2018 for its deliberations on the topic of climate change. Some of the analysis in this article draws on this experience.

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Article

Polish Climate Policy Narratives: Uniqueness, Alternative Pathways, and Nascent Polarisation

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Abstract
European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU's level of ambition, stirring some turbulence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament's climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identifies three distinct policy narratives: *Poland is in a unique situation*, *Poland pursues an alternative pathway*, and *climate policy endangers competitiveness*. The *alternative pathway* narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the *unique situation* narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland's uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party's narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

Keywords
climate policy; European Green Deal; Poland; polarisation; policy narratives; Sejm

Issue
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1. Introduction

European Union (EU) climate politics have become polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU's level of ambition, creating some turbulence in EU climate politics. Through this, Poland has shaped EU climate policy, but it has not succeeded in reducing its overall level of ambition. Nonetheless, it has left its imprint on features of not only EU climate policy but also the broader European Green Deal (EGD), most notably but not exclusively the Just Transition Fund. To understand and explain Poland's behaviour of unsettling EU climate politics, this article delves into Polish parliamentary debates on climate policy between 2015 and 2020. It analyses how Polish parliamentarians and government representatives who were invited to speak in parliament advocate and justify their policy positions, and the climate policy narratives they construct. The analysis identifies three policy narratives that mark discussion in the Polish parliament: *Poland is in a unique situation*, *Poland pursues an alternative pathway*, and *climate policy endangers competitiveness*. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party's narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

Since the 1990s, the EU has gradually developed and increased its climate policy's level of ambition. In December 2019, the European Commission President von der Leyen ramped up ambitions—thereby creating some turbulence in EU climate policy—when the European Commission published the EGD

Communication (European Commission, 2019). The EGD is a comprehensive action plan to make the EU's economy sustainable. It pursues the overarching goal of climate neutrality by 2050, ratcheting up previous EU targets. The EGD's goal of raising the EU's climate ambition from the previous 40 percent target to 55 percent by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, requires an increase in investments and political will. The EGD announcement was followed by the Covid-19 crisis shortly afterwards. This created a turbulence and intensified the initial EGD challenge: Fundamentally changing the EU economy and increasing investments to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 in times of recovery from economic hardship due to Covid-19. Turning environmental and climate challenges into opportunities requires political commitment by all EU member states. Even if many laws are decided by qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU, the European Council decides the political guidelines by consensus. Moreover, EU climate policy needs to be transposed into member state policy, which is difficult when the government does not support the overall EU goals.

This article focuses on the policy narratives deployed in Poland's lower house *Sejm* to generate a better understanding of the underlying rationale of potential clashes between Poland and the European Commission/other member states. Analysing Poland's narratives on EU climate policy can help us understand why it resists EU goals and how policy objectives could otherwise be aligned. Policy narratives construct reality in different ways and reveal the meaning that individuals or groups attach to a specific policy. Different narratives lead to different policy outputs (Shanahan et al., 2018). Policy narratives thus go beyond observing facts to explain interests. Instead, they are a strategic construction of those facts by highlighting some aspects while neglecting others. This article's analysis therefore goes beyond the observation that Poland depends highly on coal for its electricity production—which to a great extent is mined domestically—and that transitioning out of coal is a great structural challenge, requiring massive investments in new infrastructure while at the same time accounting for the social impacts. It focuses on how Polish politicians advocate and justify their policy positions and what climate policy narratives they construct to do so. The study covers the period 2015–2020 to observe the stability and change of narratives in response to turbulence, in particular the EGD. 2015 coincides with the taking office of the Law and Justice (PiS) government, a right-wing populist party (Zuk & Szulecki, 2020).

The article contributes an in-depth analysis of the climate policy narratives used within the Polish parliamentary debate to improve our understanding of Polish political actions and their underlying rationale. Most academic studies analyse the Polish governments' activities at the EU level, while only few studies unpack domestic dynamics and details of the Polish debate. Zuk et al. (2021) focus on citizens' attitudes towards the use of coal, while Zuk and Szulecki (2020) analyse the Polish right-wing populist media's discourse on energy transition. Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015) focus on politicians and show that despite the growing salience of climate policy in the Polish parliament, there was no polarisation among political parties that would have shifted their positions further apart from each other. They rather remained uniform in opposing ambitious climate policy. My analysis starts when Marcinkiewicz and Tosun's (2015) study ends—in the year 2015—providing a continuation of their research and conducting a qualitative content analysis of speeches by Members of the Polish Parliament's lower house. The analysis contributes to existing literature with its qualitative analysis of policy narratives that captures the nuances of argumentative patterns. So far, no analysis has specifically identified the different policy narratives.

The next section describes Poland's situation with regards to ambitious climate policy, the EGD, and polarisation among political parties on the issue. This is followed by an analytical framework to guide the systematic analysis of the narratives that actors use to argue for their policy preferences in Sejm debates. Section 4 describes the research design and method. The subsequent section presents the identified Polish policy narratives on the transition to a climate-neutral economy. Three distinct narratives were identified which portray Poland's situation as unique, postulate that Poland pursues an alternative pathway, and which see climate policy as a threat to competitiveness. Contrary to previous studies, the findings show nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other. The concluding section discusses the results and places them in the broader context of the EGD and turbulent governance.

2. Poland, the European Green Deal, and Polarisation

Poland is highly dependent on domestically produced coal for its electricity production, which poses a huge challenge for transitioning to climate neutrality and raises energy security concerns. It therefore does not come as a surprise that Poland has developed a track record of opposing EU climate policy decisions. This section first sketches Poland's main challenges with regards to the climate neutrality transition to provide the facts based on which the policy narratives are constructed. Then, it briefly introduces the EGD to highlight the turbulence it introduced before moving to a review of previous research on domestic climate policy polarisation to which this study aims to contribute.

2.1. Poland's Climate Challenge

Poland is the EU member state with the most carbon-intensive electricity sector due to the large share of coal in its energy mix. In 2019, more than 72 percent of Polish electricity was produced from hard coal and

lignite, which in fact was a decrease from previous years (Zuk et al., 2021, p. 2). Coal is not only a sensitive issue because of this large share of the energy mix but also because most of the coal is mined domestically. Eighty-six percent of EU coal production takes place in Poland (Zuk et al., 2021, p. 2). Moreover, the Polish coal sector depends on government subsidies and the grid infrastructure is poor, requiring investment (Brauers & Oei, 2020, p. 5). This raises questions of energy security. Poland's future energy mix needs to be reliable, and concerns about renewables' volatility frequently are raised in the political debate. Moreover, due to political and historical reasons, dependence on Russian gas—a fossil fuel that emits fewer greenhouse gases (GHGs) than coal—is a situation that the country strictly aims to avoid. Those factors explain the massive challenge that Poland faces with regards to climate policy. If it wants to transition out of coal, the country needs to make enormous investments in its electricity production and transmission infrastructure. Additionally, a significant number of workers depend directly or indirectly on the coal sector, which means that cushioning the social impact is difficult but highly important. Further, due to subsidies, electricity prices are relatively low. If new investments lead to price increases, the social impact could move beyond coal workers and extend to low-income households. Considering those factors, Brauers and Oei (2020, p. 1) conclude that Poland requires climate policies that are "implemented jointly with social and structural policy measures, addressing a just transition for the affected regions in line with the vision of a 'European Green Deal.'"

Transforming Poland's energy sector is further complicated by the close entanglement between the government and the coal sector. State-owned energy companies were merged with some of the coal mining companies to rescue them from bankruptcy (Brauers & Oei, 2020), simultaneously linking energy companies' interests to that of the coal industry while also making the government partial owners of coal companies. In addition, the miners' unions have a particularly strong political influence (Brauers & Oei, 2020). As a general tendency, the Polish government has upheld a position very close to the interests of industry and large GHG emitters (Jankowska, 2011, p. 171). These structural factors can explain that when implementing the EU's climate policy for 2020—which was adopted in 2008—Poland resisted implementing renewable energy policy and instead made it fit with its coal-related interests. These experiences led to continued Polish opposition to ambitious EU climate policy for 2030 due to negative policy feedback and path dependency (Skjærseth, 2018, pp. 509–510).

2.2. EU Climate Policy and the European Green Deal

Although it was joined by other Central and Eastern European member states on several issues, Poland stands out as the EU member state that most often opposed EU climate policy decisions and consistently dissented from the majority position in the Council of the European Union (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2019). The country has become overtly assertive, stressing its reliance on coal and defending its vital national interest (Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017, p. 94). So far, this has not hindered EU climate policy from moving forward, but it has shaped elements of its design. Initiatives such as the Just Transition Fund can, in part, be seen as a response to Polish concerns for requiring support to tackle the challenge.

At the EU level, several financial instruments directly or indirectly aim to support Poland and other EU member states in their transition to a climate-neutral economy. The EGD includes a Just Transition Mechanism, which provides support to mobilise at least 150 billion euros during the period 2021–2027 to address the transition's social and economic effects. Its three pillars are: a Just Transition Fund, the InvestEU Just Transition scheme, and European Investment Bank public sector loans. The Just Transition Fund provides grants to coal regions for economic diversification in their transition away from coal. This includes the reskilling of workers and assuring their active participation in designing the transition process. The InvestEU scheme supports energy and transport infrastructure investments. European Investment Bank loans also cover investments in energy and transport infrastructure while also covering energy efficiency measures. Already prior to the EGD, there was a fund aiming to support investment in EU member states' old infrastructure as part of the EU Emissions Trading System. The Modernisation Fund is fed by two percent of the allowance auction revenues. This fund is a solidarity mechanism to help the member states with the greatest challenges and was adopted as the result of Poland's and other Central and Eastern European countries' demands for their energy situation duly to be considered (Skjærseth, 2018). In addition to those funding schemes specifically dedicated to a just transition, Poland receives significant amounts of EU funding from the post-Covid-19 recovery package and EU cohesion funds. This creates a formidable opportunity to invest in transforming the country's electricity production, among other infrastructure investments. While there are some rules for the kinds of investment that can be made with the recovery funds, it is up to Poland and the other member states to determine how to use the grants and loans.

2.3. Climate Policy Polarisation in Poland

Looking at the political dynamics within Poland, research on climate policy polarisation remains inconclusive. While Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015) find that political parties did not polarise on climate policy, Zuk et al. (2021) find that public opinion about transitioning out of coal runs along political ideology lines: Supporters of the right-wing parties Law and Justice (PiS) and

Confederation (Konfederacja) plead to maintain the status quo, while backers of centre and liberal parties support the energy transition and climate policy. However, according to Zuk et al.'s survey, citizens agree across political party lines that the transition to clean energy of the Upper Silesian region—the largest coal basin in Europe—should be supported financially by the government (Zuk et al., 2021). My analysis contributes to these studies on domestic climate policy polarisation by analysing parliamentary debates since 2015. It delves into the details of policy narratives that political actors construct to justify their policy position, an analysis that—to my knowledge—has not yet been conducted.

Since the transition to climate neutrality requires profound economic and societal changes, it creates winners and losers, similar to the trends of globalisation (Koopmans & Zürn, 2019). This can widen cleavages within societies and among countries. Whether and how to remedy this development is subject to much political debate and polarisation. Polarisation is defined as a process when positions drift apart towards more extremes (de Wilde et al., 2016). Political parties can drift apart on their position of how climate policy should be designed and also on the relationship between climate policy, on the one hand, and economic growth and social prosperity, on the other. In a polarised debate, opposite arguments tend to be made. One typical discussion in climate policy is whether it is an opportunity to create new jobs and economic growth, or whether it is a threat to economic competitiveness and people's livelihood (Slominski, 2016). My analysis identifies policy narratives to then assess their evolution over time, determine whether different narratives have been used by different political parties, and to understand to what extent polarisation has taken place. The next section delves into the details and role of policy narratives.

3. Policy Narratives

The analysis of policy narratives can help explain underlying rationales of policy choices and identify coalitions and degrees of polarisation in a political arena. A narrative is a story that justifies policy positions by interpreting reality in a certain way. Narratives play a role in an actors' processing and communication of information, and the construction of such a story can shape an actor's decisions and policy choices. Different policy realities are thereby created when individuals or groups attach different meanings to certain policies. In practice, this is done when actors highlight certain aspects and neglect others to sway the opinions of other actors to support certain policy choices. Policy narratives are often bound by ideologies and belief systems (McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 229–230). While knowing a country's policy position does not necessarily reveal the reasons for the choices made, analysing the narratives used in the political debate can uncover those rationales and perceptions. For this reason, this article focuses on the climate policy narratives that Polish parliamentarians and government representatives construct in parliamentary debates.

The Narrative Policy Framework was developed based on the observations above. This framework guides the systematic analysis of narratives used by actors to argue for their policy preferences (Shanahan et al., 2018). A policy narrative generally has four elements (McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 228–229):

a) The specific setting in which it is situated. This refers to certain parameters such as geography, economic conditions and other factors pertaining to the policy problem. This setting can serve as a policy narratives' focal point.
b) Different characters figure in a narrative. These characters include the hero who (tries to) solve the problem, the villain who (allegedly) causes the problem, the victim that is distressed by the villain and helped by the hero, the opponent who rejects the policy but is not a villain, and the ally who is aligned with the hero.
c) The plot describes the relationship among the characters and situates them within the setting.
d) The moral refers to the policy solution that a narrative promotes.

As a minimum, a policy narrative must at least have one character and put forward a policy preference (moral; Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 457).

Policy narratives operate simultaneously at the micro, meso, and macro level. Micro-level analyses focus on how individuals construct and are influenced by narratives. Meso-level research zooms into the deployment of policy narratives by different groups, and macro-level studies focus on how narratives shape public policy (McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 230–246). The focus of my study on Poland's climate policy debate is situated on the meso level, identifying the policy narratives shared by different groups of Polish politicians in parliament. I find that actor groups strategically construct and communicate policy narratives to justify and reflect their shared policy preferences and that groups with competing policy preferences tend to construct competing narratives, which emphasise different elements. By tracing different group's policy narratives over time, possible policy belief changes are detected, which can be induced for example by changes in the setting (McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 237–240).

Actors and groups can employ different policy narrative strategies. When they perceive themselves as losing on an issue, actors tend to construct narratives that expand the scope of the respective policy issue to achieve results that are more favourable to them. On the contrary, perceived winners strive to contain the scope of a policy to maintain their benefit (Jones & McBeth, 2010; McBeth et al., 2007). Narratives construct a causal story that strategically connects elements to assign responsibility or blame. Moreover,

policy narratives often villainise the opposition while portraying the constructor of the narrative as a hero (McBeth et al., 2014, pp. 241–242; Shanahan et al., 2013). Identifying policy narratives and evaluating their strength/dominance provides insights into the polarisation among different groups. Additionally, understanding the policy narratives used to construct political realities helps explain policy processes and their outputs. The following section describes how the Polish climate policy narratives were identified.

4. Research Design and Methods

I employed a combination of inductive and deductive content analysis of climate policy debates in the Polish parliament's lower house, the Sejm. The analysis spans the period 2015–2020, which covers the entire eighth Sejm legislative term and the first year of the ninth legislative term. Analysing the debates of 2020 is crucial for an analysis of Polish perspectives on the EGD and the turbulence it stirred, since the Sejm debated EU-level developments such as the EGD and its Just Transition Fund. Furthermore, analysing the eighth term provides insights into the Polish debate directly preceding the development of the EGD, which is important since adoption of the EGD could have shaped subsequent Polish narratives and positions. In short, this timeframe allows for an analysis of whether and how the EGD created a turbulence in Polish climate policy.

The analysis includes all Sejm plenary and committee debates on national, EU, and international climate policy which were identified through the Sejm website's search tool. A total of 165 speeches were found. At times, a dialogue with multiple interventions by one speaker occurred, since many debates had the form of an information session by a government representative to Members of Parliament (MPs). In such cases, all interventions were grouped in one document and counted as one speech. Annex I in the Supplementary File provides an overview of all analysed debates. The format of information sessions by the government added a glimpse into the government's perspective to the analysis. All speeches were translated into English by Polish native speakers. On this, since I analysed whole arguments—rather than semantics—translating the speeches was suitable.

A content analysis (Mayring, 2014) of all speeches was conducted, using the qualitative content analysis software NVivo (Jackson & Bazeley, 2019). The coding proceeded in two steps. First, I thoroughly read all speeches and took notes on recurring arguments and narratives. Based on this first step, I identified different narratives and coded all speeches accordingly in a second step. In several debates a minister or high-ranking government representative gave a longer speech outlining the government's position on the respective topic. Some MPs asked questions rather than making statements that revealed their point of view. In these instances, questions were not coded. Instead, I only coded statements in which MPs and government representatives took a position. NVivo allows for matrix coding queries that relate the coded statements to specified characteristics such as the speaker's political affiliation or the year in which the speech was given. This enables the analysis of trends and patterns. Section 5 presents the results of this empirical analysis.

5. Polish Climate Policy Narratives

Three distinct policy narratives could be identified that transcend most of the analysed Sejm climate debates. The first stresses Poland's unique situation, which highlights that the country's situation is different from the other EU member states and claims that Poland requires special consideration and financial support to (re)shape its specific climate and energy policy. The second builds on the first policy narrative and postulates that Poland (needs to) pursue(s) a special pathway. Prior to 2019, the described pathway was the continuation of using coal while absorbing emissions through forests and technological innovation. The policy narrative also stresses Poland's sovereignty in taking policy decisions, particularly with regards to its energy mix. The third narrative portrays climate policy as a threat to (international) competitiveness and economic growth. Analysis of the different narratives shows an incipient polarisation among the political parties on climate policy in 2020. This section first describes each of the narratives before discussing polarisation.

5.1. Poland is in a Unique Situation

A prominent narrative that transcends almost all debates is the assertion that Poland is in a unique situation. This was illustrated in a statement made by Michał Kurtyka (non-partisan), Minister of Climate and Environment, at the 2020 debate on the EGD and Poland's position: "All 28 countries agreed that we would move towards climate neutrality for the continent, while at the same time acknowledging—all of our 27 partners recognised it—the uniqueness of Poland" (M. Kurtyka, January 15, 2020). This narrative on Poland's uniqueness has translated into multiple calls for special consideration and more financial support for Poland from the EU. Compared to previous years, this part of the policy narrative became much more prominent in the 2020 discussions on the EGD and the Just Transition Fund. This is illustrated, for instance, by MP Tomasz Piotr Nowak's (Civic Platform) intervention: "We should possibly veto or threaten to veto the climate neutrality target to demand more funds apart from the Just Transition Fund and the Modernisation Fund for the transformation of the Polish energy industry" (T. P. Nowak, December 9, 2020). The individual references to the different narratives and their elements over time are shown in Figure 1 (see also Annex 2 in the Supplementary File).

In this policy narrative, Poland is victimised as a country that faces particularly great challenges conditioned by its setting of a highly-carbon intensive energy system. The EU is not portrayed as a villain but rather as a character who bears the responsibility to support the distressed country of Poland. The claim of Poland's uniquely-challenging situation is translated into a responsibility for the EU/other EU member states to act in solidarity of Poland. The proposed policy solution is to recognise Poland's uniqueness and to, therefore, increase (financial) support. This narrative does not exclude Poland's willingness to change its energy system, but it has a passive connotation, making change dependent on external support.

5.2. Poland Pursues a Different Pathway

Related to the narrative on Poland's uniqueness is the policy narrative on Poland pursuing a different pathway to climate neutrality and safeguarding its sovereignty. This narrative postulates that Poland can continue using coal while absorbing emissions through technological innovation and forests. In this context, several actors refer to the Lisbon Treaty provision that reserves the sovereign right for member states to determine their energy mix (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2009, Article 194). This narrative was illustrated by MP Anna Paluch's (PiS) statement at the 2020 debate on a draft resolution announcing the climate emergency:

> The implementation of the objectives of the low-carbon economy is one path, but the other path—the one that Poland has been promoting for years […]—is to strike a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and the absorption by biosystems. (A. Paluch, January 8, 2020)

Another example is: "I believe that coal does not contradict climate protection. Therefore, it is necessary to implement a resource and energy economy in Poland in which coal does not contradict climate protection. We will have to invest in new coal technologies" (P. Sałek, December 29, 2015). A number of politicians strongly promote forests to absorb carbon, which was one of the aspects that Poland promoted when hosting the 2018 COP: "Poland is a model in this respect… issues related to the Polish model of forest management will also be discussed" (J. Szyszko, November 25, 2015). However, the analysis revealed that this policy narrative was strong before 2019 and faded away afterwards, being replaced by the claim that Poland requires special consideration and financial support, which is part of the first narrative.

Poland's right to pursue its own climate pathway is, at several occasions, justified in reference to the Paris Agreement. Politicians consider the wording of the Paris Agreement that refers to net-zero emissions and the absences of the word *decarbonisation* a Polish success: "There is nothing in the Paris Agreement about the fight against coal. The word decarbonisation is absent. There is only the so-called climate neutrality, and that has been preserved" (P. Sałek, December 29, 2015). Some actors refer to the Paris Agreement as the agreement that binds Poland, rather than EU-level decisions:

> As far as the source of the law is concerned, for Poles the source of law is the Paris Agreement, because this is an agreement that has been ratified by Poland. Climate neutrality in the second half of the 21st century is part of the Paris Agreement. In the strictly legalistic language, the Conclusions of the European Council are not a source of law. The source of law will be only the legal acts that will result from this. (M. Kurtyka, January 15, 2020)

In 2020, an EU Climate Law was adopted, which changed this line of argumentation by turning the EU climate neutrality goal by 2050 into a binding obligation. This EU-level event coincided with the shift in Polish narrative from the continuation of coal to conditional change.

This policy narrative emphasises Poland's sovereignty and aims to minimise the EU level's role and influence on Polish climate policy. It portrays Poland as a hero who pursues its own pathway against the interference from the villain EU. The narrative goes beyond emphasising that Poland is in a difficult situation in terms of the climate neutrality transition and rather outlines a sovereign and distinct approach compared to its EU partners. The reason for this different pathway is again the setting of a highly carbon-intensive energy system but also of the country's unique (forest) resources. In this narrative, the scope of the discussion on EU-level climate policy is expanded to include the option of GHG sequestration through forests and innovation as an alternative pathway to the decarbonisation promoted by the EU. This expanded scope is deemed more favourable for Poland. The proposed policy solution is that Poland takes sovereign decisions. This emphasis on sovereignty makes the narrative more difficult to reconcile with the EGD. Financial support from the Just Transition Mechanism alone seems inadequately equipped to influence this policy narrative and bring it in line with the EU's objectives. Yet, the shift away from the narrative of preserving the status quo of coal use while absorbing GHGs, towards the narrative which highlights the need for financial support to transition, shows that positions have changed and other options are now considered. However, the emphasis on Poland's distinctness remains.

5.3. Climate Policy Threatens Competitiveness

Overall, a third narrative runs through the debate, which argues that climate policy threatens Polish and EU competitiveness and economic growth. EU-level policy is portrayed as harmful to the Polish economy:



Figure 1. Individual references to the narrative over time (2015–2020).

> I would like to emphasise the fact that the government is right to disagree with this type of restriction, because our natural resource, which is coal, will suffer a great deal under this solution. I think that our entire economy would slow down quite sharply if we were to adapt to these requirements. (P. Olszówka, February 8, 2017)

Further, several actors fear carbon leakage, which describes the situation in which companies relocate to outside of Europe where they are not covered by the same rules, allowing them to continue emitting GHGs. The analysis found that the narrative of climate policy threatening competitiveness is predominantly used by PiS politicians and to some extent by Polish People's Party (PSL) representatives, as shown in Figure 2. Yet, the party is not entirely cohesive on this aspect. In the debate on the results of the European Council summit which took place on December 10–11, 2020, Konrad Szymanski, Minister for European Affairs from the ruling PiS party stated:

> I think that throughout the whole discussion on transformation, we should take into account not only the costs of the transformation in themselves but also the costs of the lack of transformation. I have the feeling that this element is completely missed and that there is the impression that the lack of transformation generates zero costs for the economy. (K. Szymanski, December 16, 2020)

Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 1, many individual references continue using the policy narrative of climate policy harming competitiveness in the 2020 debates. While the quote above is an exception to this trend, it could hint at a recognition of EGD policies by individual politicians. Yet, drawing conclusions based on one quote seems premature.

In this policy narrative, EU climate policies are villainised as incurring a burden on and a disadvantage for the Polish economy in the setting of a world that does not follow the EU's example of ambitious climate policy. Poland is characterised as the victim of this policy. The proposed policy solution is the lowering of the EU's level of ambition. However, another policy proposal that could help address this narrative's concerns is a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as proposed by the European Commission in the summer of 2021.

6. Polarisation

The three identified policy narratives are not put forward by all political parties alike and they do not constitute opposing narratives. Rather, the governing party



Figure 2. Individual references to the narratives per political party (2015–2020).

PiS dominantly uses all three narratives. This higher number of individual references is not surprising since PiS has more representatives in parliament than the other parties. In the ninth legislative term, it counted 198 of 460 MPs and its electoral coalition United Right 235 MPs, which was almost the same in the eighth term. Yet, it is surprising that no distinct opposition narrative was identified. Certainly, in the eighth Sejm legislative term, no clear polarisation trends could be identified, confirming earlier findings by Marcinkiewicz and Tosun (2015). Yet, in 2020 the picture slightly changed. On the one hand, two opposition party coalitions each submitted a draft resolution on the climate crisis and climate emergency, on which a polarised debate took place. One resolution was introduced by the Left (centre-left political parties) and the other one by Civic Coalition (centre-right political parties). The Civic Coalition resolution included a climate neutrality target by 2040 and the Left resolution by 2050. In the debate on the draft resolutions, polarisation between the government party (PiS) and other right-wing parties, on the one hand, and the Civic Coalition and the Left, on the other, was evident. Most statements that Poland should adopt more ambitious climate policy were made in 2020 by a growing number of political parties.

As mentioned above, the narrative claiming that climate policy threatens economic competitiveness was predominantly used by PiS MPs. In 2020, a counter-narrative highlighting that Poland could gain competitiveness through climate policy emerged, and was used by a few Civic Platform MPs. It emphasised the need for investments. Moreover, some Civic Platform, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD; since 2020, New Left), Nowoczesna, and Green MPs called for more ambitious climate policy (see Figure 2). This points to a change in Polish climate policy of earlier periods. It shows nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

7. Conclusions

In EU climate debates, Poland has opposed decisions to increase the Union's level of ambition at multiple occasions, creating political turbulence at the EU level. Poland's position can be linked to three distinct narratives that I detected in the national parliamentary climate debate: First, politicians perceive Poland as being in a unique situation, which requires solidarity and recognition by the other EU member states. Second, politicians advocate for Poland to pursue an alternative pathway, which combines the continued use of coal with emission capture through forests and technological innovation. In this second narrative, the country's sovereignty is emphasised. Third, climate policy is described as detrimental to economic competitiveness. The EGD and its Just Transition Mechanism respond to the first narrative, by recognising Poland's challenges in transitioning to climate neutrality and supporting it in this process. The other two narratives are, however, more difficult to reconcile with the EGD.

Despite this, the analysis shows that the *alternative pathway* narrative faded at roughly the same time as the

EGD was proposed at the EU level, while the *unique situation* narrative simultaneously became stronger. Before 2019/2020, the narrative defending and preserving the status quo and emphasising that Poland is active on climate policy—just differently than the others—was strong. With the EGD, the narrative shifted towards calling for recognition of Poland's uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support. Nascent polarisation was noticed at this same time. While it is not possible to make causal claims based on the narrative analysis, the correlation suggests that the EGD has contributed to creating some turbulence in the Polish climate debate. Other factors such as public opinion, the need to modernise the electricity system, and weather extremes seem likely additional factors amplifying a possible EGD turbulence.

Turbulence is an event that is "highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected or unpredictable" (Dobbs et al., 2021, p. 317). The EGD constitutes what Dobbs et al. (2021) label a *policy turbulence*, which consists of the adoption of a fundamentally new policy that has changed, to some extent, the parameters and expectations based on which EU member states make their climate policy. The narrative shift that was noted in the 2020 Sejm debate hints at this. The design of how the EGD "governs with turbulence" (Dobbs et al., 2021, p. 317) is of course not the result of a unidirectional process from the EU to Poland. The Polish position and narratives also have left an imprint on the EGD. Nonetheless, the European Commission's proposal and resolve to increase climate ambition and integrate it in many other policy fields has received a noticeable response in the Polish parliamentary debate. Future research could delve into the causal links between the EGD and changes in Polish climate policy narratives and positions, identifying to what extent it created a turbulence.

EU climate policy is based on decarbonisation, which includes abandoning the use of coal. This is diametrically opposed to the narrative of Poland's pathway that continues to rely on coal. The Just Transition Mechanism aims to soften opposition to exiting coal by aiming to create alternative economic opportunities for affected communities. A stronger local narrative on the opportunities could help counter the alternative pathway narrative. This links to Zuk and Szulecki's (2020, p. 9) conclusion that energy transition in Poland is not only a technological and financial issue. Rather, it relates to cultural, ideological, and political problems. EU financial support would need to be part of a mix of measures, which addresses ideological and related aspects of Polish decarbonisation to persuade Polish actors to get on board. This also links to the third narrative on competitiveness in that a counter-narrative on the opportunities created through climate policy could support just transition finances. First signs of such a counter-narrative have been noted in the 2020 debates.

The introduction of new funds like the Just Transition Fund aims at supporting Polish and other EU member state coal regions. By making the climate neutrality transition fairer and more inclusive, the European Commission aims to generate more support for the ambitious EU climate targets as set out in the EGD. My analysis shows that there is some receptiveness to this development. However, narratives highlighting Poland's sovereignty in taking energy-related decisions and portraying climate policy as detrimental to economic competitiveness are difficult to change with financial support alone. Engagement, recognition, and counter-narratives seem good complementary measures. My analysis shows signs of polarisation among political parties. Very few MPs used an emergent counter-narrative highlighting that low-carbon investments can generate economic growth. Climate policy has, to a limited extent, become an arena for party competition.

As such, my qualitative analysis of Polish climate policy narratives has shown that support for or opposition to EU-level climate policy can be justified with very different stories. Depending on the prevailing narrative, the EU reaction needs to be different. This article constitutes a first step to understanding the role of climate policy narratives in the interaction between the EU and its member states and how policy narrative analysis can help align both levels' policies.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the author (unedited).

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Article

A Nice Tailwind: The EU's Goal Achievement at the IMO Initial Strategy

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Abstract
In April 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reached agreement on its Initial Strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping. The Initial Strategy was a success for the EU, as it achieved its long-term objective of reaching an international agreement on greening shipping. However, several factors call into question whether the "success" was the result of the role played by the EU. Using process-tracing, we provide insight into the factors and the mechanism that led the EU to achieve its objective with the Initial Strategy. The article finds that the EU's goal achievement was the result of a mechanism triggered by (1) its overarching objective for action in the IMO on emissions in international shipping; (2) an entrepreneurial coalition partner; and (3) mounting momentum for action in the IMO. While the EU, including through its member states, played an important role in the negotiations, it only did so relatively late in the process, building on the successful work of the Shipping High Ambition Coalition. Based on this case study, we note implications not only for the proposed aspects of the European Green Deal related to greenhouse gas emissions from shipping, but also our understanding of the EU as an international (climate) actor.

Keywords
climate negotiations; European Green Deal; European Union; maritime emissions

Issue
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1. Introduction

As the urgency of the climate crisis has become increasingly apparent, various international initiatives have been taken to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both comprehensively and in specific sectors. While shipping-related emissions make up a relatively small amount of the total global emissions (approximately 2.89%), these emissions could grow between 90–130% over 2008 values by 2050 on a business-as-usual track (International Maritime Organization, 2020). With an internal mandate and a designation by the Kyoto Protocol as the competent forum for climate change issues related to international shipping, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has come under significant pressure to act on emissions reductions, particularly from ambitious climate actors like the EU.

In April 2018, at the 72nd Meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the IMO adopted its Initial Strategy on Reducing GHG Emissions in Shipping (hereafter Initial Strategy) which lays down the first steps for the decarbonization of the sector. While the Initial Strategy establishes targets for reductions in carbon intensity and GHG emissions, it remains a non-binding political declaration.

In a communiqué, the European Commission (hereafter Commission) heralded the Initial Strategy as a "significant step forward in global efforts to tackle climate change" and noted that "the EU and its member states played an instrumental role in brokering and securing this deal with our international partners" (European Commission, 2018a). The statement suggests that, at least in the eyes of the Commission, the EU achieved its goal at the IMO thanks to its active role in the

negotiations. However, two factors potentially contradict this self-assessment. First, the EU itself is not a fully-fledged member of the IMO, nor does it have clear-cut competence over GHG emissions from shipping (Cinelli, 2019). Therefore, it was relatively constricted in the negotiations because of its legal status and competences. Second, research by Corbett et al. (2020) suggests that the successful outcome in the negotiations can largely be attributed to the entrepreneurship of the Marshall Islands. These two factors call into question whether the EU's "success" in the IMO was the result of the role played by the EU, or rather of the EU benefitting from a fortuitous negotiating context.

This article therefore answers the following research question: How was the EU able to achieve its objective in the IMO Initial Strategy of 2018? Using the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, we examine the factors at both the EU and international levels that led to the EU achieving its objective of action in the IMO on GHG emissions reduction. Note that due to the EU's lack of membership in the IMO and the unclear competences on GHG emissions in shipping, the EU in this article refers to EU institutions or EU member states acting on the basis of an established Union objective or position. This article unpacks the complexity surrounding emission reductions in international shipping, which is particularly timely as shipping emission reduction is included in the Commission's 2019 European Green Deal.

In that regard, a notable provision of the European Green Deal is the 2021 legislative proposal by the Commission to revise the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and to include shipping emissions in the ETS (European Commission, 2021). Whereas the ETS will undoubtedly play an important role for the achievement of the European Green Deal's target of climate neutrality by 2050, it seemingly also carries implications for EU leadership at the global level (see Dupont & Torney, 2021). The Commission proposal to amend the ETS directive notes the insufficient progress in the IMO on GHG emissions reduction and that "EU action can also inspire and pave the way for the development of market based measures at global level, e.g., as regards the maritime transport within IMO" (European Commission, 2021, p. 8). The Commission proposal thus seems to be an attempt to drive decarbonization across the sector, both inside and outside the EU. Moreover, the proposed ETS reform not only significantly precipitates the decarbonization timeline established by the Initial Strategy but also could conflict with the IMO's propensity for global-level action. The further implementation of the European Green Deal via a reform of the ETS is thus expected to create even more turbulence, or "interactions of events or demands that are highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected, or unpredictable," at the international level (Ansell et al., 2016, p. 3). Therefore, an understanding of how the EU reached its objective with the Initial Strategy can help us frame the challenges and opportunities facing the European Green Deal's attempts not only to fit sectors like shipping within its climate goals but also to drive change around the world.

The article is structured as follows. The following three sections discuss the EU as an international (climate) actor, its role within the IMO and its climate diplomacy for shipping. Next, we provide an overview of the IMO Initial Strategy negotiations. Then, we present our analytical framework and methodological approach for examining EU goal achievement in this context. Following that, we break down the different elements of the causal mechanism. We then frame our findings within the current European Green Deal dynamic, notably the proposed inclusion of shipping in the ETS. Finally, we conclude and place our findings within the literature.

2. The EU as an International (Climate) Actor

Although the EU's participation in international organisations and other international institutional frameworks is often hindered by external and internal legal constraints (respectively related to the EU's status and competence distribution) and by divergences in member states' preferences, the EU has developed working methods allowing it to be recognized as an actor in international organizations (Wessel & Odermatt, 2019). There is a rich literature on how the EU acts in international institutions, focusing on its actorness (Drieskens, 2017), performance (Jørgensen et al., 2011), or the EU's ultimate effectiveness, impact, or influence. Although research on the latter dimension has mostly assessed the EU's effectiveness by comparing the EU's initial position to the outcome of the international negotiations (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2017; da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Van Willigen & Kleistra, 2013), scholarship increasingly takes into account what the EU did to achieve its predetermined goals (Groen, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2015). Indeed, a fine-tuned assessment of the EU's goal achievement in international negotiations requires determining the extent to which the correspondence between the objective of the EU and the outcome of the international negotiations can be attributed to the EU's purposive action (Schunz, 2021).

Since the early 1990s, the EU has established itself as an international actor with leadership ambitions on environmental matters (Adelle et al., 2018; Delreux, 2011)—particularly in the field of climate change (Oberthür & Dupont, 2021; Parker et al., 2017). While the EU has long sought to lead by example with ambitious climate targets, the EU in recent years has employed a bridge-building approach to work with like-minded progressive allies to achieve consensus-based outcomes at the international level (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013). The EU solidified its role as a climate "leadiator" with its successful climate diplomacy in the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Oberthür, 2016). This leadership has notably taken place in negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Additionally, the EU has sought to extend its leadership beyond the UNFCCC—multilaterally in other international fora, bilaterally via agreements, support and conditionality, and unilaterally.

3. The EU at the IMO

The EU's ability to formally participate in an international organization depends not only on its legal status (e.g., member or observer) but also the relevant competences in play (Wessel & Odermatt, 2019). While it has long argued for full membership, the EU remains an ad-hoc observer at the IMO. Though the Commission maintains an accredited representation (Cinelli, 2019), EU member states are accustomed to acting individually in IMO negotiations (Gulbrandsen, 2013). Compared to other environmental issues, the EU's legal competence on GHG emissions in shipping is much murkier. The Commission has argued that as GHG emissions in shipping fall under climate change, the Union has some competence over such issues. However, this competence has thus far remained unexploited within the IMO. Nonetheless, member states usually coordinate their positions for IMO negotiations. Coordination is often difficult due to significant mismatch in the dynamic of large EU member states (e.g., France and Germany) versus smaller member states with strong shipping interests and therefore influence in the IMO (e.g., Cyprus, Greece, and Malta). The EU's position is usually hashed out in the Shipping Working Party of the Transportation Council configuration. EU member states usually speak in their national capacity as IMO members, with the Council Presidency seeking to speak first if possible to present the coordinated EU position (Gulbrandsen, 2013).

The literature on the EU in the IMO, particularly on environmental issues, is relatively sparse. However, scholars have examined the EU's potential to shape the IMO via its own internal legislation. For instance, a study by van Leeuwen and Kern (2013) finds that the EU has become an important player in IMO environmental policies, thanks to its ability to develop binding and enforceable policies on ships based in and traveling to the Union. As such, it can threaten the IMO with unilateral legislation. For instance, following the shipwreck of the tanker Erika off the coast of Brittany in 1999 and subsequent 10,000 tons oil spill, the EU threatened its own action on mandating double hulls for tankers. This prompted the IMO to hasten its existing schedule for the phasing out of single-hull tankers. After another accident—the running aground of the tanker Prestige and over 60,000 tons oil spill in 2002—the EU found the new IMO timeline insufficient and implemented its own shorter horizon in July 2003. The IMO adopted the text of the EU legislation at the international level several months later. Moreover, the pattern has extended to other areas. In 2015, the EU adopted the MRV Regulation (Monitoring, Reporting and Verification) to track the fuel consumption of ships docking in its ports. Poulsen et al. (2021) note that the IMO then adopted its own global fuel data collection system in 2016 as a response to the MRV. This fits with larger work on the EU's ability to sets standards at the international level via internal legislation, which Bradford (2020) refers to as the "Brussels Effect." On several occasions, the EU, via unilateral action has served as a source of turbulence at the IMO by disrupting the status quo.

The EU had been in favour of an agreement in the IMO to regulate shipping GHG emissions since at least 2003, adopting Council conclusions to that effect (Council of the European Union, 2003). However, different EU actors remained sceptical of the possibility of the IMO acting to address emissions. A Council document from 2012 noted "it should also be clear that not much progress can be expected in IMO… to reduce maritime GHG emissions" (Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 17). Nonetheless, the Commission, through its observer status, continued to work to increase support for GHG emission reduction in the IMO, including by sponsoring a pilot program designed to build capacity for GHG emission reduction in shipping in key developing regions (European Commission, 2018b). As for unilateral action, in 2013, the Commission proposed a tiered strategy for reducing international shipping emissions (European Commission, 2013). The first part of the strategy, eventually adopted as the MRV Regulation in 2015, was seen as a means of encouraging IMO action while eventually building an emissions reduction scheme if the IMO were not to act (Martinez Romera, 2017). Nonetheless, as for EU climate action in the IMO, the status quo of generalized coordination accompanied by member state latitude has persisted. In that sense, the EU actors at the IMO have been relatively insulated from internal EU turbulence, which has been defined by a push among some actors, notably the European Parliament, for more ambition in decarbonizing international shipping.

4. Climate Change at the IMO and the Negotiations on the Initial Strategy

Questions related to climate change at the IMO are handled via its MEPC. The MEPC meets twice yearly and has the authority to adopt regulations related to "the prevention and control of pollution from ships" (Amendment to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 1975). The MEPC acts by majority vote, though consensus is the norm. The majority vote creates a negotiation dynamic that is different from the UNFCCC in that texts can advance despite objections or reservations from particular parties (Hackmann, 2011; Hayer, 2016).

Climate-related action within the IMO has traditionally been a complicated issue for the following four reasons. First, the international nature of shipping makes the attribution of emissions relatively complex (Selin et al., 2021). Ships are often registered in a "flag of convenience" system, meaning ship owners are free to register their vessels in the country of their choosing (Lister et al.,

2015). Moreover, ships often travel between many different countries on a single voyage, making the calculation of emissions attributions rather complicated. Second, the IMO uses a "no more favourable treatment" scheme, where all vessels are treated equally (Doelle & Chircop, 2019; Hackmann, 2011; Lister et al., 2015). There is no differentiation between developing and developed countries as there is in the UNFCCC. Third, the power dynamic in the IMO is such that countries with the largest ship registries maintain an outsized influence in the organization (Hayer, 2016; Martinez Romera, 2017). While each IMO member state has one vote, states with the largest registries traditionally have more clout in the decision-making process, as they are the most impacted by regulations and contribute most to the budget (calculated by tonnage registered; Hayer, 2016). Major ship registry states (notably Liberia, Marshall Islands, and Panama—often considered small players outside the IMO) are influential in the IMO. Finally, NGOs and industry have a long history of exerting influence in the IMO and in its negotiation outcomes (Hackmann, 2011; Martinez Romera, 2017).

Despite this complexity, from 2011 to 2014, the MEPC took a series of decisions mandating increased efficiency standards for newly-constructed vessels and efficiency management plans for existing vessels (Joung et al., 2020). The aforementioned data collection system was agreed upon at MEPC 69 (2016) in order to track fuel consumption, as a first step towards emission reduction (Poulsen et al., 2021).

The momentum on climate action within the IMO shifted in 2015, with two main events: a surprise proposal from the Marshall Islands at MEPC 68 in May; followed by the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) of the UNFCCC in December. The Marshall Islands, the third largest shipping registry in the world, had until that point been represented at the IMO by shipping industry officials, and it had embraced an industry-friendly position on climate action (Corbett et al., 2020). However, at MEPC 68, Foreign Minister Tony de Brum presented a "Fair Share" proposal calling on shipping to do its part to work towards mitigating global temperature increase, citing the perilous future for his own country if no action were taken (Corbett et al., 2020; Selin et al., 2021).

While the proposal was not adopted, the Marshall Islands' change in representation and position opened a new dynamic in the IMO in favour of climate action (Corbett et al., 2020). Furthermore, the Paris Agreement increased momentum for climate action amongst IMO member states and industry (Corbett et al., 2020; Hayer, 2016; Selin et al., 2021). Over the next years, a majority of IMO member states (including bigger geopolitical players like China), industry, and the IMO secretariat moved towards an agreement (although with varying levels of ambition).

At MEPC 70 in October 2016, IMO member states agreed to a roadmap for adopting a GHG emissions reduction strategy within two years. An Intersessional working group on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships (ISWG-GHG) met three times outside of the normal MEPC meetings in order to draft the strategy. The Initial Strategy was adopted at the MEPC 72 in April 2018. It calls for: (1) a review of ship efficiency standards for new ships with the goal of reducing carbon intensity; (2) a reduction of carbon intensity of international ships by at least 40% by 2030, with efforts towards 70% by 2050 (compared to 2008 levels); and (3) a peak in GHG emissions from international shipping as quickly as possible and a reduction of GHG emissions in 2050 by at least 50%, while working towards phasing emissions out in a way consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals. It is at its core a political declaration and as such is non-binding (Doelle & Chircop, 2019). The Initial Strategy is to be revised in 2023.

5. Understanding Goal Achievement: Analytical Framework and Method

EU goal achievement in international negotiations has traditionally been understood as the extent to which predetermined objectives (input) are present in the final negotiation outcome (output; Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2017; da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Van Willigen & Kleistra, 2013). Yet, it has also been acknowledged that goal achievement is affected by the EU engagement in the negotiations (process), and particularly the degree to which the EU's diplomatic activities fit with the international constellation of power and interests (Groen, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2015). Indeed, the process element is key as well, as it links the EU's initial objective to the outcome and clarifies the extent to which the EU has (co-)shaped the negotiation outcome. In this case, the EU maintained an overarching objective to seek action within the IMO on GHG emissions reduction from shipping. However, it developed a specific negotiation position prior to MEPC 72. This position reflects the evolution and operationalisation of the aforementioned, long-sought EU policy objective on reaching an agreement in the IMO on GHG emissions reduction from shipping.

In order to better understand the EU's contribution to correspondence between its objective and the outcome of the Initial Strategy negotiations, we employ the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, which allows us to develop a case-specific explanation of the factors that led to the outcome (i.e., the EU achieving its objective) and the cause(s) that triggered it all (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). We craft a causal mechanism—the process linking the cause to the outcome—in working backwards, looking for minimally sufficient explanations of the elements of the mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). While this causal mechanism works backward from the EU achieving its objective (outcome), we are not testing goal achievement theory as such, instead exploring how the EU achieved its outcome in this particular case.

We triangulate data collected from official documents (EU, EU member states, related coalition partners, and IMO) and 13 semi-structured interviews. We interviewed 10 officials from the EU (Commission and Council Secretariat) and its member states involved in the negotiations and/or the preparation of the EU position (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File). Additionally, we interviewed three "non-EU" sources involved in the negotiations to check findings from our EU-centric sample. The interview transcriptions and documents were coded manually in NVivo.

6. Causal Mechanism Leading to the EU Achieving its Overarching Objective

In line with the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, we created the following causal mechanism (Figure 1). This section first discusses the causes, then the five steps in the causal mechanism which lead to the outcome.

6.1. Causes

The explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing permits us to look more holistically at the underlying factors without which the EU would not have achieved its objective. A first cause is the EU's overarching objective to handle GHG emissions reduction in shipping in the IMO. However, that alone was insufficient, otherwise an agreement would likely have been reached earlier, as the EU had already been stating that preference since 2003. Thus, we look elsewhere to see what factors contributed to the EU reaching its objective. Two additional causes stand out: a motivated entrepreneur with similar objectives, and international momentum. These causes also served as sources of turbulence in the negotiations, as they up-ended the status quo within the IMO, shifting the parameters of the discussion on GHG emissions reduction in the IMO. In that sense, they served as part of the "tipping point" of ushering in a different dynamic of climate action (Dobbs et al., 2021).

6.1.1. Cause 1: EU Seeks Action on GHG Emissions Reduction in IMO

A logical first cause is the EU having an overarching objective to regulate GHG emissions from shipping through the IMO, which dates back to 2003. Moreover, an impact assessment on EU unilateral action in shipping in 2013 stated "strong preference for a global approach led by the IMO" (European Commission, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, support for negotiations in the IMO was also reflected in Conclusions from the Environment Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (Council of the European Union, 2015, 2016). Hence, the EU had a long-standing and broadly-shared objective of pursuing action in the IMO to regulate shipping emissions. Such action required an agreement in MEPC.

6.1.2. Cause 2: Motivated Entrepreneur (Marshall Islands) with Similar Objectives to EU

The remarkable turnabout by the Marshall Islands in 2015 constituted a significant shift in climate governance on shipping. A state that had previously been a prominent defender of the shipping industry as a flag registry radically changed position at MEPC 68. Its proposal significantly altered the general attitude amongst the different stakeholders—from industry to member states—within the IMO on climate change (Interviews 1, 3, 5, 7; Corbett et al., 2020). This should be framed in the larger push of the Marshall Islands on climate change. That same year, the Marshall Islands played a prominent role in the creation of the High Ambition Coalition in the UNFCCC, which helped deliver the Paris Agreement (Brun, 2016).

6.1.3. Cause 3: Momentum Builds for Action in the IMO

The increasing momentum for climate action in the IMO also stands out as part of the triggering of the mechanism. Externally, the road to COP 21 and the subsequent Paris Agreement in 2015 kickstarted new political momentum for action in the IMO, establishing



Figure 1. Causal mechanism.

a level of ambition to which the international community and, by extension, the IMO were accountable (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13). IMO member states and the IMO as a whole were pushed to act in way consistent with the commitments and temperature targets made in Paris (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 13; Council of the European Union, 2018; International Maritime Organization, 2018a). The Paris Agreement inserted political pressure into the IMO to take action. Additionally, advancements in technology in the shipping sector and a number of pilot projects demonstrated that energy efficiency measures often made good sense economically (Interviews 8, 13).

Together, these three causes created an opening for action in the IMO on GHG emissions reduction. In that sense, they triggered the causal mechanism that eventually led to the Initial Strategy and the EU's successful outcome. The EU's overarching objective is only one cause of the goal-achievement mechanism. However, it was the favourable external circumstances—those situational circumstances exogenic to the EU's objective (Oberthür & Groen, 2018)—that were necessary for the mechanism to be triggered.

6.2. The Mechanism in Action

6.2.1. Step 1: Marshall Islands Seeks Coalition with EU Actors

In September 2015, the Marshall Islands, with the assistance of several scientific advisors, organized a dinner on the side-line of an ISWG-GHG meeting with representatives from Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Commission to discuss potential collaborations (Interviews 1, 5, 7; Corbett et al., 2020). The Marshall Islands stressed that it and other Pacific states wished to contribute substantively on climate action in the IMO, but they lacked the necessary resources to send delegations to the IMO meetings scheduled throughout the year in London and make proposals. It therefore requested support from the European actors to facilitate this (Interviews 3, 5).

6.2.2. Step 2: EU Actors Respond Favourably and Engage in Coalition

Those EU actors solicited at the dinner responded favourably, and a collaborative network was formed. The group met regularly, both on the side-lines of IMO meetings and in other contexts. The ambiguity of the shipping GHG competences and the strong state-level tradition in the IMO seem to have given EU actors the flexibility to join this coalition. They could agree to collaborate without needing to go through official EU coordination channels. Moreover, several EU and member state officials noted a preference amongst certain member states to work outside of the EU in the context of the new coalition (Interviews 4, 5, 9, 11). Two years later, at a meeting in the South Pacific, a Marshallese official, who had also been involved in UNFCCC negotiations, introduced the network as the "Shipping High Ambition Coalition" (SHAC; no direct connection to the "High Ambition Coalition" beyond that), and the name stuck (Interview 5). The original EU actors in SHAC were later joined by the other EU member states, with the exception of Cyprus, Greece, and Malta. Coordination mainly occurred between the aforementioned original EU actors alongside the Pacific states.

6.2.3. Step 3: SHAC Coalition Members Lay Groundwork for Ambitious GHG Emissions Reduction Targets

Shortly after its inception, SHAC worked to determine what a "fair share" contribution from shipping to GHG emissions reductions would look like and how it could be put into place (Interview 5). Within the IMO, SHAC coordinated the submission of proposals and GHG emissions reduction strategies (Interviews 3, 5). In that sense, SHAC members often served as a check on the level of ambition in the IMO, stressing the existential nature of the climate threat to SHAC's island members. As an official noted, SHAC "in a way kept the whole negotiation honest, because it meant that there were those in the room that would fundamentally look at what was proposed and say 'That's not good enough.'" (Interview 13). Outside the IMO, SHAC sought to bring more political attention to the issue of emissions from shipping. The technical, non-climate background of most delegates in the IMO often led to a difference between a state's position on climate in the IMO and other climate fora like the UNFCCC (Interviews 5, 7, 9, 11). Along those lines, the SHAC coordinated presentations on the urgency of action within the IMO at different UNFCCC Conference of the Parties meetings. The most prominent example of SHAC's efforts was the "Tony de Brum Declaration," presented at the One Planet Summit, a high-level international meeting organized by France for the second anniversary of the Paris Agreement in 2017. The declaration, drafted by France and coordinated in the SHAC, stressed the urgency of action within the IMO in a way consistent with the Paris Agreement. One EU member state official remarked, "The idea was to go above the experts who come to the IMO and go to the political level above" (Interview 5). SHAC members also coordinated outreach efforts, via the members' own contacts and diplomatic networks, during their regular meetings (Interviews 3, 5, 6, 7, 11). Such action was mostly concentrated on convincing others of the urgency of action in the IMO.

6.2.4. Step 4: EU Develops Coordinated Position in Negotiations Within Broader Ambitious Context

As SHAC worked to raise the urgency of action within the IMO, the EU intensified its coordination for MEPC 72 in early 2018. The member states and the Commission

coordinated an EU position in the Shipping Working Party. The Council Presidency, Bulgaria, but here represented by its predecessor Estonia, needed to generate consensus among not only the ambitious SHAC EU member states but also the traditionally shipping-heavy Mediterranean states (Interviews 4, 9, 11). The Shipping Working Party ultimately took four meetings (instead of the usual one) to draft a compromise coordination document for the negotiations, agreed upon two weeks before MEPC 72. The position, which included ambitious targets with relatively open-ended language, "gave something for the ambitious countries and something for the other countries that weren't so ambitious" (Interview 11).

The existence of SHAC seems to have at least indirectly shaped internal EU coordination within the Shipping Working Party, as the EU member states in SHAC reflected SHAC's ambition in the Shipping Working Party. Additionally, EU institutional actors were regularly informed of and included in SHAC's meetings. An EU member state official suggested that SHAC influenced the final EU position, saying "we went to the IMO negotiations with the higher ambition than we would have otherwise" (Interview 9).

6.2.5. Step 5: The EU Deploys Robust Diplomacy for MEPC 72

Following the coordinated position, the EU deployed a series of diplomatic activities related to the negotiations. The activity can be broken down into three categories: (1) bilateral outreach in the weeks leading up to the negotiations; (2) persuasion and discussion during the negotiations; and (3) exerting EU institutional pressure during the negotiations. The first two elements were coordinated by Estonia (on behalf of the Council Presidency), while the Commission and European Parliament delegations exerted pressure during the negotiations. Although they were working towards the same goal, the actions were largely undertaken independently of each other.

First, once a position was agreed upon, the Council Presidency worked to extend EU leverage using SHAC and the diplomatic and historic ties between EU member states and third states (Interview 9). They also engaged with the IMO secretariat, who was in favour of an agreement (Interviews 1, 9) and who, along with the ISWG-GHG chair, facilitated the process in such a way that left an opening for input on ambitious action (Interviews 4, 12, 13).

Second, as for persuasion, a particularly interesting innovation on the part of the Council Presidency was the inclusion of a climate negotiator in its delegation, as opposed to the typical transport-specific delegation (Interviews 4, 9, 11, 12). The negotiator informally engaged with delegates from smaller states unfamiliar with climate governance and explained the larger principles governing climate action in the Paris Agreement and the urgency of action, including at several informal meetings organized by the chair of the ISWG-GHG (Interviews 4, 9, 11).

Third, concerning EU institutional pressure, during the final negotiations, the European Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, Violeta Bulc, was present, as was a delegation of the European Parliament. Commissioner Bulc met one-on-one with different states and "put the case to them so that they understood why it was important" while the delegation of the European Parliament met with different stakeholders, "playing the bad cop," sending the message to other IMO member states that the EU would take unilateral regulatory action in the field of international shipping: "Well, if you don't do something, then we will" (Interview 8). Together, their presence underscored the political appetite for ambitious action in the EU, notably among the two institutional actors that would otherwise be excluded via exclusive member state coordination. It also gave the impression of a relatively united EU front. According to an EU member state official, "the EU was kind of united at the IMO, and that actually helped a lot in terms of the final agreement as well" (Interview 9).

Through this diplomacy, the EU was able to drive the negotiations in a way that allowed it to achieve its objective of reaching an agreement at the IMO. An official from a non-EU country noted: "I would say the European bloc was clearly influential in having a strategy which was meaningful when it comes to creating a clear new direction for shipping" (Interview 12).

6.3. Outcome: EU Achieves Overarching Objective (yet not the Precise Targets)

With the final agreement, the EU achieved its objective of an agreement being reached within the IMO. However, while action on GHG emissions reduction in the IMO was attained by the EU, the Union's specific negotiation position was only partially reflected in the final agreement. First, whereas the EU supported "the objective of 70% and pursue efforts towards 100% reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping by 2050 (compared to 2008 levels)" (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 14), the IMO members committed themselves to "to reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050" (International Maritime Organization, 2018b, p. 5) in the Initial Strategy. Second, although the EU preferred to "reduce CO2 emissions per tkm as an average across international shipping by 50%" and to "pursue efforts towards 70% by 2030 relative to 2008 levels" (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 14), the Initial Strategy mentions "to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping, by at least 40% by 2030" (International Maritime Organization, 2018b, p. 5). As the EU communiqué noted: "While the EU had sought a higher level of ambition, this is a good starting point" (European Commission, 2018a). Thus, EU goal achievement must be nuanced in that the overall goal of an agreement was met, but it did not fit

entirely with the eventual precise ambitious targets the EU had hoped for.

7. Implications for the European Green Deal

Our case study allows us to make several important observations about the underlying dynamics of climate action at the IMO, which will likely affect how the EU could achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal in the IMO. In keeping with the theme of the thematic issue, we make three main reflections which are framed within several dimensions of the concept of turbulence.

A first reflection is that the proposed inclusion of shipping in ETS is a more aggressive move than anything the EU undertook in the Initial Strategy negotiations. It can be construed as a unilateral threat to drive progress in the IMO. However, unilateral threats did not appear to play an irrefutable role in the EU achieving its objective at MEPC 72, though several implicit references came up. Nonetheless, the EU does have a successful track record of using threats to achieve its objectives at the IMO (Poulsen et al., 2021; van Leeuwen & Kern, 2013). Thus, it is possible that the inclusion of shipping in the ETS could spur international action, as evidenced by the shipping industry's proposal of $5 billion in research funding for decarbonization following the European Green Deal announcement (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2020). However, several interview respondents feared that unilateral action would affect the potential for future action on climate in the IMO—an opinion shared by the IMO secretary general to the presidents of the EU institutions in late 2016 (International Maritime Organization, 2017). At the same time, the urgency of the climate crisis has become all the more apparent, and the IMO has done relatively little beyond the Initial Strategy to address the impact of shipping on climate change (Healy, 2020). In that sense, unilateral action could serve as a source of turbulence in the IMO.

A second reflection is that the EU seeking action in the IMO on GHG emissions reduction, as it hopes to do with the European Green Deal, was only one of the causes that triggered the mechanism. If the EU wants to bring about more ambitious action in the IMO, based on the Initial Strategy negotiations, it would be well-served to find partners with similar objectives and influence in the IMO and it needs international momentum. Although climate action in shipping continues to gain traction since the adoption of the Initial Strategy—notably with the Niulakita Declaration, discussed at the 2019 G7 Biarritz Summit and calling for further GHG emissions reduction in international shipping—the push for recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic and ensuing environmental turbulence could impact the pressure placed on the IMO to take more forceful action on climate.

Finally, the EU's status at the IMO and the unclear competences on GHG emissions in shipping paradoxically also seemed to contribute to the achieving of its objective at the IMO. It allowed more ambitious EU member states to act outside the EU, notably in SHAC. The consensus-based EU position gave ambitious EU member states room to manoeuvre, while the more shipping heavyweight member states were comfortable with the open-endedness of the position. If adopted, the proposal to include shipping in ETS would seemingly strengthen the EU's competence on GHG emissions from shipping, which could reduce the leeway for EU member states in the IMO (Interviews 5, 8). This dynamic could infuse what Dobbs et al. (2021) refer to as horizontal turbulence into the EU approach to the IMO and potentially impact EU member state coalition building with other IMO actors.

Overall, the European Green Deal charts a new course for incorporating EU climate ambition into shipping. While the final scope of the revised ETS remains to be seen, it is likely to represent a significant departure from the past ways in which the EU has successfully pursued its objectives at the IMO. In that sense, the European Green Deal looks to be a source of turbulence both within the EU and in the IMO.

8. Discussion and Conclusion

This article analysed the factors and the mechanism that led to the EU achieving its objective of reaching an international deal on GHG emissions reduction from shipping with the IMO's Initial Strategy. While the EU had long sought action on emission reductions in the IMO, the causal mechanism was not triggered until 2015, with a radical change of position by the Marshall Islands and an increase in momentum for climate action in the IMO. Collectively, these three causes enabled the EU to achieve its overarching objective of reaching an IMO agreement on GHG emissions from international shipping. This case therefore shows that it was not simply EU activity that permitted the EU to achieve its objective. Instead, here, the favourable circumstances were important causes without which the mechanism would not have been triggered.

These findings have two notable implications for the literature. First, with respect to the study of the EU within international organizations, they provide an example of the EU's ability to achieve its objective even in situations where it is not a full-fledged actor. The EU's loose coordination structure actually played an important role in the causal mechanism. In a sense, it helped facilitate the EU's ultimate goal achievement in that it gave the ambitious member states the space to manoeuvre outside of official EU coordination and eventually fed back into the EU position. This could have implications for our understanding of the EU's role in a variety of fields in which it is not a completely established actor or in international institutions where the EU is not a full member or party. However, as we have engaged in the outcome-explanation variant of process-tracing, caution should be used in extrapolating our findings beyond this specific case, where alternative explanatory factors could be at

play. To that end, future research on EU goal achievement in other areas where the Union is not an established actor is needed.

Second, our case study somewhat challenges the EU's role as a climate leader outside of the UNFCCC. It calls into question the extent that this leadership extended into the IMO. The EU seemed to have abandoned hope of an agreement in the IMO in the early 2010s. Moreover, it was the Marshall Islands that approached the EU about a coalition. Together, these steps are more indicative of a reactive actor. While the EU may have indeed had climate leadership ambitions for action on climate change in shipping, it was actually relatively restrained by not only its membership status and limited competences but also by the unique dynamic of the IMO. Along those lines, there is a pressing need for more research in not only the IMO but also other non-UNFCCC fora handling climate change. As our findings have shown, these often-forgotten fora remain important pieces of the global climate governance puzzle.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the author (unedited).

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