Special Issue

Mass Atrocity Prevention (Part I)

Special Issue Editor

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Table of Contents

Editorial

Mass Atrocity Prevention: Forever Elusive or Potentially Achievable?

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Abstract
This editorial introduces the special issue, and considers what the articles in it tell us about the prospects of mass atrocity prevention.

1. Introduction

Can mass atrocities be prevented, and if so, how? Mass atrocity prevention has become a "growth area" in the academic literature, and in the policy world, as seen in an increasing number of academic articles and books on the topic (see, for example: Bellamy, 2011; Cushman, 2003; Evans, 2008; Gosldstone et al., 2010; Hamburg, 2010; Stamnes, 2008; Zartman, 2010), and increasing attention given to mass atrocity prevention by UN officials, by governments, and by NGOs. Various task forces—most prominently the US Task Force on Genocide Prevention—have made recommendations to governments (Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008; Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013; Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, 2009), the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has made proposals to strengthen mass atrocity prevention (UN, 2014), and NGOs such as The Stanley Foundation and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect have large and well-respected prevention programmes. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum recently launched the "Early Warning Project", to provide analysis of the risks of mass atrocities occurring around the world.

Reflecting this context, the call for papers for this special issue generated a large response, such that the accepted articles will actually fill two volumes. The special issue contains articles that analyse and contribute to the state of knowledge regarding factors that could lead to the perpetration of mass atrocities, and that critically assess responses to potential or ongoing situations of mass atrocities. The articles should prompt further debate in the academic literature, and among policy entrepreneurs and policy-makers.

2. Special Issue: Part 1

The first part of the special issue contains papers that consider and assess the factors that lead to mass atrocities, which could thus form part of strategy to prevent atrocities. A key overall lesson that emerges in this part is that knowledge of the context and conditions in particular cases of possible mass atrocity situations is crucial: policy toolkits and frameworks can provide a starting point in any mass atrocity prevention strategy, but without knowledge and intelligence of the local and regional dynamics, prevention strategies are unlikely to be effective.

In "Triggers of Mass Atrocities", Scott Straus analyses the utility of the concept of "triggers" in understanding and preventing mass atrocities. He finds that in some cases there are indeed "turning points" after which violence sharply escalates. But he still urges cau-

tion because the same sort of trigger may lead to different outcomes, and there are factors other than the trigger itself that matter if mass atrocities are perpetrated. Knowledge of specific cases could still, however, enable observers to try to predict whether certain triggers could lead to an escalation of violence.

Cecilia Jacob's "Evaluating the United Nation's Agenda for Atrocity Prevention" critiques the UN's framework for analysing atrocity crimes (UN, 2014). Using Pakistan as a case study, she shows that the framework would be more effective if it took into account the relational dynamics of atrocity crimes, and the links between the micro and macro dynamics of political violence in specific situations.

In "Understanding Mass Atrocity Prevention during Periods of Democratic Transition", Stephen McLoughlin compares the transitions in the early 1990s in Burundi and Guyana, and considers why processes of democratisation broke down into mass atrocities in the first case but not in the second. The explanation centres on the regional context and history of past atrocities, the quality of domestic political competition, and the state of the armed forces in each country. The analysis yields insights for prevention, pointing to the principal actors responsible for avoiding risk escalation, and the factors that can inhibit violence during times of heightened tension.

Collette Mazzuccelli and Dylan Hendon's "Unearthing Truth: Forensic Anthropology, Translocal Memory, and 'Prevention' in Guatemala" also focuses on the "local", in particular how families can contribute to mass atrocity prevention by pressing for transitional justice. They argue for "drilling down" to the structural roots of conflict so as to better understand how the risks of atrocities can be overcome.

In "Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator", Maartje Weerdesteijn argues that atrocities are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where crimes are legitimised through ideology. She compares the extent to which Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic were truly motivated by ideology or were using it instrumentally. She argues that leaders that are ideological are less responsive to international pressure and action than leaders that are non-ideological.

Ideology is also the focus of "Preventing Mass Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions", by Jonathan Leader Maynard. He argues that as ideology plays a role in the perpetration of mass atrocities, ideologies should also be studied from the perspective of mass atrocity prevention. Ideological strategies and interventions—such as peace broadcasting, peace education, or jamming anti-civilian media messages— should be used as part of broader prevention strategies.

A more critical view of the potential of prevention is provided in "The Viability of the 'Responsibility to Prevent'". Aidan Hehir casts doubt on the efficacy of prevention because the vast array of factors that might lead to mass atrocities makes early warning difficult, there is no clear causal link between various danger signs and the actual occurrence of mass atrocities, and the response of the "international community" to potential mass atrocities depends on the political will of states, which is also variable. Prevention is not impossible, but depends entirely on the "whims of particular states" and their "often nefarious political interests".

The final article in the first part of the special issue is a commentary by Bridget Moix, which examines the progress in protecting civilians from mass violence since the Responsibility to Protect appeared in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. She argues that in future there should be a greater focus on "upstream" prevention (that is, prevention well before violence is under way), and on strengthening local capacities to minimise the risks of atrocities and mass violence.

3. Special Issue: Part 2

The second part of the special issue critically assesses the response of a variety of actors to mass atrocities. The articles tend to consider the failures and limits of responses by states, international organisations, and regional organisations to situations of mass atrocities, though some authors point to progress made in terms of accepting the responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities. Many, but not all, of the articles in this part focus on the cases of Libya and Syria, two of the most recent and high-profile cases in which large numbers of people have been killed amid much criticism of outsiders' response.

The response of a variety of states to mass atrocities by Indonesia in East Timor in the late 1970s is the focus of Clinton Fernandes' article, "Accomplice to Mass Atrocities". He argues that Australia, the US, New Zealand and Canada did not "look away" but rather that they were aware of the humanitarian crisis and nonetheless provided military and diplomatic aid to Indonesia, which was largely responsible for the crisis. Intelligence and early warning, in other words, may not lead states to try to stop atrocities.

States have since declared that they have a responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes. One key question is what would drive states to fulfil this responsibility? In "Genocide Prevention and Western National Security: The Limitations of Making R2P All About Us", Maureen S. Hiebert analyses two well-known policy reports (Genocide Prevention Task Force 2008 and Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Centres 2009) that recommend atrocity prevention. She argues that both reports make the case for prevention on national security grounds, but the problem is that it is difficult to prove that national security interests are in fact implicated in particular cases of mass atrocities. Instead, western states might be motivated to prevent and respond to atrocities if it can be

shown that doing so is linked to safeguarding their reputations as responsible members of the international community.

Matthew Levinger's article, "A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention", illustrates how problematic the link is between mass atrocity prevention and national security interests. He analyses US President Barack Obama's communication strategies regarding threats of mass atrocities in Libya, Syria and Iraq, and shows that hardly ever did Obama's speeches make a link to threats to US national security.

The next two articles examine the policies and actions of two regional organisations, the European Union and NATO. "Is a European Practice of Mass Atrocity Prevention Emerging? The European Union, Responsibility to Protect and the 2011 Libya Crisis?", by Chiara De Franco and Annemarie Peen Rodt, analyses the European Union's practices during and after the 2011 Libya crisis. They argue that the crisis prompted the EU to incorporate—to a greater extent than ever before—its own interpretation of the responsibility to protect into its security culture and policy-making structures, largely by integrating it into its "comprehensive approach" to security and development.

NATO's actions in the 2011 Libya crisis are excoriated by Jeffrey Bachman in "R2P's 'Ulterior Motive Exemption' and the Failure to Protect in Libya". Bachman's critique of the NATO intervention centres on its ulterior motive for intervention—the overthrow of Qaddafi—which meant that it not only exceeded the UN Security Council's R2P mandate, but supported rebels who were committing human rights abuses and failed to protect civilians after Qaddafi was executed. Bachman's article again illustrates the dangers and dilemmas posed by linking national interests (in regime change) with the will to intervene to protect populations from mass atrocities.

The criticism of international responses to mass atrocities continues in the commentary, "Is R2P a Fully-Fledged International Norm?", by Jason Ralph and James Souter. They argue that outside actors have done more than just fail to respond to the atrocities inside Syria: they have failed to protect the refugees that have fled the atrocities, and have thus failed to fulfil their responsibilities to protect populations, just as they failed to help rebuild Libya after the 2011 crisis. Their argument is even more forceful considering the unprecedented refugee 'crisis' now facing Europe and the disturbing disarray it has provoked among governments.

Policy-makers clearly struggle with unpalatable dilemmas when mass atrocities are being perpetrated, as the range of possible and effective response narrows with escalations of violence. In "Perpetrators, Presidents, and Profiteers: Teaching Genocide Prevention and Response through Classroom Simulation", Waitman Wade Beorn shows how such dilemmas can be investigated in the classroom, through a simulation called GENPREVEX. Simulations have the potential to teach students about the complexities faced by decision-makers, and to be more aware of the world around them.

4. Conclusion

So is mass atrocity prevention an elusive or a realisable goal? Several of the articles in this special issue illustrate the challenges and limits of prevention policies and strategies, and cast particular doubt on the willingness and ability of various members of the "international community" to respond to possible and ongoing mass atrocities in a way that leads to their containment or termination. But this special issue also highlights several factors that, *if* incorporated into mass atrocity prevention strategies, could ultimately lead to fewer atrocities occurring worldwide. These could lead to more effective and legitimate "upstream" strategies that are based on expert knowledge of particular contexts and in conjunction with local actors.

Conflicts of interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Article

Triggers of Mass Atrocities

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Abstract

The concept of "triggers" enjoys wide usage in the atrocity prevention policymaking community. However, the concept has received limited academic analysis. This paper reviews the concept critically, develops a definition, and subjects the concept to empirical analysis. The paper offers a mild endorsement of the concept of triggers of atrocity. The paper identifies four main categories of triggering event but cautions that triggers cannot be separated from context or decision-makers.

Issue

This article is part of the special issue "Mass Atrocity Prevention", edited by Professor Karen E. Smith (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK).

1. Introduction

In recent years, analysts have developed increasingly strong models for identifying risk factors of genocide and other mass atrocities, in particular concerning the macro-level drivers of such violence (Goldsmith, Butcher, Semenovich, & Sowmya, 2013; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014).[1] However, less is known about the specific timing of when atrocities will start and what will make them start. The key question is: what shifts a country from being at risk of atrocities to atrocities beginning?[2]

To answer that question, analysts often employ the concept of "triggers," or specific events, occurrences, or tipping points that catalyze large-scale violence. Yet despite widespread usage of the term, in particular in policy, the concept has received limited scholarly attention and analysis. Indeed, some academics remain skeptical about the prospect of identifying specific triggers of atrocity. They worry that particular types of triggers do not have systematic effects on catalyzing atrocities; they emphasize the underlying conditions rather than specific categories of events.

The question has policymaking and theoretical relevance. On the policy side, understanding timing is crucial for better preparedness and for developing different approaches to prevention and timely response if atrocities begin. By the same token, understanding what ignites an atrocity crime could lead to new prevention measures—if the igniters can be defused then an atrocity crime may not take place. On the scholarly side, an inquiry into triggers has at least two areas of potential. First, a better understanding of the catalysts of atrocity may lead to new theoretical insights about the proximate drivers of atrocity. Second, studying triggers is an opportunity to adjudicate between competing theoretical models of genocide and mass atrocity.

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[1] For a review of major categories of macro-level factors, see Straus (2012).

[2] The paper uses the concepts of "genocide," "atrocities," and "mass atrocities" interchangeably. In general, the paper is looking to analyze a class of events in which large numbers of civilians are purposely killed. Such violence includes both group-selective deliberate killing, such as genocide, but also non-group selective killing, such as crimes against humanity.

With those concerns in mind, this paper presents a social scientific inquiry into triggers of mass atrocity. The paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what is a trigger of mass atrocity? Second, do specific categories of events have a systematic effect in starting or accelerating mass atrocity? Third, in light of the second question, does the analysis of triggers support or detract from any existing scholarship on the drivers of mass atrocity? To examine that question, the paper employs both conceptual analysis as well as an empirical analysis of a nonrandom sample of atrocity cases primarily since World War II.

The paper offers a mild endorsement of the concept of triggers. The paper finds that the effects of triggering events cannot be separated from their context or from the influential decision-makers who respond to the events. The same event often has quite different ramifications in different countries, which suggests that underlying risk conditions are most determinative for the outbreak of atrocities. Moreover, elites have some autonomy in setting in motion violence, which suggests that agency matters. Reactions to the events rather than only the events themselves are crucial.[3] At the same time, the paper finds that, under those circumstances, certain events can and do have independent effects on catalyzing large-scale violence against civilians. The paper offers a definition that seeks to capture these elements.

Empirically, the paper finds that the triggers most commonly associated with catalyzing mass violence concern changes to the strategic environment, which in turn lends support to strategic theories of genocide and mass atrocity.[4] Within the sample of cases, battlefield changes, assassinations, and territorial takeovers are those events that are most consistently associated with large increases in the scale and level of large-scale killing of civilians. That these types of events are associated with spikes in violence indicates that strategic concerns—retaining power, defeating enemies in wartime, responding to real and perceived threats—are a key dimension of the onset of atrocities.

2. Triggers of Atrocity in Policy Discourse

The concept of "triggers" is one of the most commonly used terms, within policy communities, to convey an event that signals the start of an atrocity. In his 2013 report on the Responsibility to Protect, the Secretary General referred to "triggers or drivers that create a permissive environment or engender a rapid escalation of tensions." The report in turn elaborated a number of specific triggers, including a non-constitutional change of government; events that spill over from a neighbor-

ing country, including armed hostilities or mass displacement; internal uprisings or unrest; the assassination of symbolic personalities; security vacuums following the removal of security forces from an area; and contests for power, such as elections when parties are factionalized along ethnic lines or where the electoral process lacks transparency" (UNSG, 2013, p. 6).

The 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, a US-based civil society effort to stimulate better policy on genocide prevention, references "*triggers* that can tip a high-risk environment into crisis." It identifies such triggers to be unstable, unfair, or unduly postponed elections; high-profile assassinations; battlefield victories; and environmental conditions such as drought (GPTF, 2008, p. 37).

Lastly, the updated United Nations Framework for Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, which was released by the joint office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect, refers to triggering factors as "events or circumstances that, even if seemingly unrelated to atrocity crimes, may seriously exacerbate existing conditions or may spark their onset." The Framework in turn elaborates 12 indicators of triggering factors, including the sudden deployment of security forces or start of armed conflict; spillover of armed conflicts or "serious tensions in neighboring countries"; actions taken by the international community perceived as threatening to a state's sovereignty; abrupt or irregular regime changes; attacks against the life or liberty of leaders or other serious acts of violence; incitement through propaganda; census and elections; sudden economic changes; discovery of natural resources; and commemoration events of past crimes (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014, p. 17).

Taken together, some of the key policy documents suggest two points. First, the concept of triggers indicates a change in circumstances but beyond that the concept remains imprecise. The Secretary General's report speaks of a "rapid escalation of tensions," the Task Force of "tip[ping] a high-risk environment into crisis," and the Framework for Analysis of "exacerbate[ing] existing conditions or [sparking] their onset." Second, the list of different possible triggers suggests a very wide range of events or occurrences that would cause an increase in violence. That large range would suggest that there are not really specific types of events that matter specifically for atrocities. Between these reports, triggers can be everything from economic crises, to environmental changes, to elections, to actions in the international community, to assassination and war. Both of these dimensions—a widely used but underspecified concept and a very expansive set of events that would qualify as triggers of atrocity—suggest a need for greater analytical attention to the subject.

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[3] For a discussion of elite decision-making in atrocity situations, see Straus (2015).

[4] Most forcefully articulated in Valentino (2004).

3. Conceptualization, Research Questions, and a Provisional Definition of Triggers

Turning to the academic literature, there is less explicit conceptualization and theorization of triggers of genocide or triggers of atrocities. That said, there are cognate terms that offer insight into any analysis of triggers of atrocities. One potential analogous concept in the academic literature is that of an "event." For example, sociologist William Sewell writes in a well-known essay of an "historical event" that "changes the course of history" (Sewell, 1996, p. 842). Such events *accelerate change* and have the potential to *transform relationships and structures*, he argues (Sewell, 1996). Sewell's main example is the taking of the Bastille in France in 1789, an event that was a key turning point that led to the French Revolution. Sewell's focus is less that of an event that triggers violence and atrocity. However, his conceptualization of an event that accelerates change and has the potential to turn subsequent actions and events in a particular direction is useful for conceptualizing a "trigger" of atrocity.

Substantively closer to the subject of atrocity, Donald Horowitz writes in his book on deadly ethnic riots of "precipitating events." Horowitz defines a precipitating event as "an act, event, or train of acts and events, antecedent but reasonably proximate in time and place to the outbreak of violence and casually related thereto" (Horowitz, 2001, p. 269).

Horowitz is not writing specifically about atrocities; his work here is on "deadly ethnic riots." Yet his conceptualization offers several useful insights. First is the idea of "precipitation," which conveys the sense that an event draws in energy from the environment. An event actualizes tensions and emotions that are already present in a particular setting and in turn funnels that tension and emotion in a particular direction. The event itself matters, but the event cannot be separated from the environment and the underlying conditions in which it occurs. The appropriate metaphor is that of a "spark" or an "igniter," in the sense that the event unleashes force, but where the environment and the underlying conditions are analogous to the fuel.

Second is the idea, like Sewell, that a precipitating event has a causal effect on the outcome of interest. By implication, without that specific act, event, or chain of events occurring, the violence that followed would not have happened or would not have happened in the way that it did.

These various claims may be expanded and translated into research questions that contribute to a research agenda on triggers of atrocity. The first key question is how much does the context, or underlying conditions, matter versus how much does the specific event matter when assessing why atrocities begin?

It is unlikely that a specific type of event will uniquely be responsible for igniting atrocities. That is the case because the same or very similar types of events take on quite different meaning and significance in different contexts. Consider the case of a presidential assassination. In 1993, Tutsi soldiers assassinated Burundi's first democratically elected, Hutu president. His assassination sparked violence against Tutsis in rural Burundi, which in turn sparked reprisals from the Tutsi-led army, which in turn spiraled into a long, devastating, atrocity-laden civil war. Less than a year later, the Burundian Hutu president was killed when the plane, in which he and the Rwandan president were traveling, was shot down over Kigali, the Rwandan capital. In Burundi, the new president's death had little observable effect in terms of triggering atrocities. In Rwanda, the shooting down of the plane was the catalytic event that unleashed the genocide. What explains this variation in the effect of the different assassinations in the same country or between countries?

Consider another, relatively recent example. In Israel and Palestine, the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli students in 2014 prompted Israel to conduct military raids inside of Hamas-controlled territory in the Gaza Strip, which in turn prompted Hamas in Gaza to launch missile strikes into Israel, which prompted Israel to launch more military strikes, and then the violence spiraled. However, the kidnapping and murder of a few students (or other civilians) in other conflicts rarely has such a triggering effect.

Another example is that of a disputed election. It is fair to say that in many countries that are experiencing transitions to democracy or that can be characterized as semi-authoritarian there are frequently doubts about the credibility of an announced election result. In some circumstances, the announcement of an apparently fraudulent election may spark riots and protest, which in turn will prompt security forces to repress those movements. That was the case in Kenya in 2007, Iran in 2009, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010. However, in other cases, the announcement of an apparently fraudulent result does not have the same effect. The question is why.

One hypothesis is that the underlying conditions—the events and developments that precede the event as well as the levels of tensions, fears, and uncertainty in the environment—shape the significance of the triggering event in question. What mattered in Rwanda was the extensive deterioration in the political and military environment that preceded the president's assassination. What mattered in Israel and Palestine was the ratcheting up of tensions prior to the kidnappings. What happened in Kenya were the land-related disputes that preceded and were at stake in the elections. If the context matters, then from an analytical perspective, it is important to ask how much analytical weight should be given to the "triggering event" per se.

Another hypothesis is that the event's characteristics matter. If the event lines up with the contours of

the underlying conflict, then the event will have greater impact. Consider the case of Burundi. In 1993, the assassination of the Hutu president was interpreted as evidence that the Tutsi elite would not allow Hutus to rule. The assassination thus signified to Burundian Hutu elites and ordinary civilians that Tutsis would not truly relinquish power, despite the democratic process. The symbolic and political significance of the event was great. By contrast, in 1994, the Burundi president who was killed was not the main target of the assassination. The main target was the Rwandan president. Thus, the 1994 assassination carried limited political significance in Burundi. It did not fit into the story of the political and military struggle in the country.

By the same token, consider the case of southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Most accounts claim that a dispute in a bar in the city of Osh between ethnic Kyrgyzs and ethnic Uzbeks quickly escalated into generalized fighting between civilians associated with both ethnic groups. The bar dispute followed the so-called "tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan and rising tensions between Uzbeks and Kyrgzs in different parts of the country. The context clearly mattered, and in the case of Osh the very local dispute resonated and fit into the contours of the broader political dispute. Indeed, most bar disputes and fights do not escalate into inter-ethnic violence that leaves hundreds dead, as was the case in Osh.

A second key question concerns a tension between intentionality, planning, and triggering events. In the way that Sewell and Horowitz conceptualize events, the idea is that events have some causal power to change the course of history. Context matters in their accounts but so do the events themselves. Events have independent causal power. They crystallize energy and emotion and present a new beginning to a situation. That idea, however, can downplay the role of individual or collective planning before the trigger and decision-making after or during it. The idea of a powerful triggering event suggests that the trigger itself is what prompts individuals to act. By contrast, a framework that emphasizes planning and intentionality—which is generally how analysts interpret atrocity situations—suggests that violence was envisioned well before the triggering event itself. In this latter interpretation, the "trigger" is largely epiphenomenal; it does not have causal significance. A trigger may explain the timing but in this framework the trigger is primarily the excuse for starting violence, while the real reasons for the violence have to do with elite planning well before the triggering event itself.

If analysts take the causal power of triggers seriously, there are arguably two primary ways to conceptualize such independent effects. One is to conceptualize triggers as events that in and of themselves are so powerful that they crystalize emotions and in and of themselves prompt individuals or collectives to commit large-scale violence. In this view, the atrocity is some-

what "spontaneous," an unforeseen reaction to a violation or transgression of such magnitude as to cause people to commit the unthinkable. To some extent, this is the perpetrators' alibi: the violence was unplanned; someone or something else caused them to act spontaneously. A total absence of planning and intentionality cuts against an atrocity framework, which emphasizes perpetrator responsibility for committing large-scale violence.

A more subtle interpretation recognizes that the events themselves matter but the key is how influential actors manipulate and use events. For example, in his study of violent riots in India, Paul Brass emphasizes that local actors transform symbolically significant incidents into what he calls "categorical events" that reflect broader, society-level contestation and conflict. Influential individuals encourage others to see an incident in a particular way that resonates with a broader dispute or tension; there are, in short, interests behind how and why different events taken on meaning (Brass, 1998, p. 27). The force of Brass's analysis, as it pertains to a discussion of triggers of atrocity, is to place the emphasis on elite response to events that have the potential to change perceptions. Here the events present a kind of elite opportunity. There is planning and intentionality but not necessarily before the event. The event has causal impact; it is the start to a new situation, in that sense a "trigger." But what matters is how elites respond. Elite agency matters. This view is consistent with an atrocity framework. It is a softer, more dynamic understanding of planning than one that views atrocities as planned out well in advance. It accepts that there is perpetrator responsibility but also recognizes how, in some cases, the atrocities themselves were not foreseen or at least foreseen in the way that they were carried out. The specific triggering event, which may not have been anticipated, is part of the causal chain.

Consider again the question of the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana, the former president of Rwanda. Few would contest the idea that the event triggered the genocide in the sense that the assassination marked the beginning of a new period of highly elevated violence. However, many who have studied or prosecuted the genocide claim that the genocide was planned and prepared well before the execution of the president. Others, however, claim that the assassination itself had an independent effect on the dynamics in Rwanda at that time. In the first version—triggers as epiphenomenal—the genocide was planned well in advance; the trigger had little to no causal power except to explain the timing. In the second version, a strong interpretation of the power of triggers downplays the role of planning and intentionality. The view emphasizes the power of unforeseen events to change how people act and to change the dynamics of atrocity. This is the perpetrator alibi: the assassination "caused" a

spontaneous reaction that led to genocide. A third way, as per Brass, is to recognize that the assassination was a significant event. It had the power to reorder perceptions and change strategic assessments. Yet the key issue is what influential elites did with the event. In the Rwandan case, Hutu hardliners associated with the former president and the ruling party established control of the state and ultimately orchestrated and encouraged the destruction of the Tutsi civilian population of Rwanda.

Consider again the case of Osh. In some interpretations of the violence, the key factor was less the bar dispute itself and more the local Kyrgz interests. Local Kyrgz actors took advantage of the dispute to oust large number of Uzbeks from the region, in turn capitalizing on their plight to gain commercial and political ground in the region. In this interpretation, the "trigger" was less powerful than political and economic opportunism and specifically the actions and intentions of a set of local actors.[5] This interpretation is closest to the third way or elite manipulation model. The violence was not planned out well in advance, it seems, and a bar fight in and of itself was not so powerful as to trigger inter-ethnic clashes. What mattered is how elites responded and in this case manipulated the event in order to achieve what they wanted.

A third, related question to ask is how much to isolate a specific triggering event from a process of escalation. We might think of a triggering event as the "straw that broke the camel's back" in the sense that one event occurred along a chain of events that each contributed to an escalation of tension and violence. In the same vein, we might consider a trigger a "tipping point" or that which pushes a situation over the edge. In his study of the micro-dynamics of atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia, Kluseman emphasizes that there is a period of tension, fear, polarization, and deterioration of relations that precedes significant violence (Klusemann, 2012). In that context, a precipitating incident can accelerate and crystalize those tensions and emotions, but the triggering incident cannot be separated from the deterioration and tension that preceded it. Again, context matters, and the event pushes the situation to a new level.

By contrast, we might consider an event along the lines of an earthquake, a "shock," in the sense that the event itself was so momentous and singular that on its own it reshaped the world around it. This question is, in some ways, a restatement of the two earlier questions. On the one hand, the question relates to the one about how much to weight the underlying conditions and tensions versus how much to weight the event itself. A straw-that-broke-the camel's-back approach is consistent with an approach that emphasizes the context and the conditions that precede the triggering

event itself. By contrast, an earthquake approach would downplay context and conditions, emphasizing the power of the event itself to escalate violence. Similarly, the straw-that-broke-the camel's-back approach is consistent with a view that triggers are largely epiphenomenal except in the sense that they explain timing. A shock approach is more consistent with the perpetrators' alibi. Both views are potentially consistent with the elite manipulation story.

Consider again the cases under discussion so far. In Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994, there were actions that preceded (and followed) the presidential assassinations that were critical for how events unfolded after the assassinations. Even though the presidential assassinations were momentous, a straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back approach would see the assassinations as part of a causal chain. By contrast, an earthquake approach would see the assassinations as so momentous as to change in a radical sense the political and strategic environments. In Israel and Palestine, the kidnapping and murder of the Jewish students was arguably one event in a spiral of violence; the kidnapping per se was not akin to an earthquake but is what tipped the situation into one that created a new period of violence. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the violence in June 2010 in Osh followed violence in another city in May 2010 and the ousting of the president in April of that year. As Horowitz suggests, in many cases, it might be better to consider a chain of events and a chain of escalation rather than a specific single event per se.

These reflections prompt a fourth question, which concerns magnitude. Triggers vary by type and by magnitude. Is there a specific type of event or occurrence that typically initiates a new, elevated period of violence? Are those types momentous in some way? In some cases, triggers have dramatic national implications. A coup, an assassination, or an announcement of an illegitimate election result has national implications. Those occurrences have ramifications for a society. By contrast, some triggers are very local. A fight may start in a bar. Police may raid a neighborhood. A mosque may be desecrated. A fire may start. Those more local events may, in certain contexts, usher in a period of violence that may grow well beyond the locality where the initial provocation took place. The key question here is: which triggering events have the greatest magnitude in the sense of igniting an atrocity? We can hypothesize that events of greater symbolic, political, or military significance are likely to have a greater precipitant or catalytic effect.

To summarize the discussion, when considering the question of "triggers of atrocity," there are several questions to consider, including:

- How to define a trigger from an academic perspective;
- How much to weight the power of the event (or

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[5] For this interpretation, see ICG (2010).

set of events) as opposed to the context and conditions in which the event or events occur;

- How much to weight the power of the trigger itself as opposed to the decision-making and planning before or after the triggering event;
- Whether to think of triggers as part of a chain of escalation or as having specific significance in and of themselves;
- How triggers vary by magnitude and characteristics.

These are all questions to be answered through empirical analysis.

As an initial working definition, I would define triggers of atrocity as "an event or chain of events that initiate a sharp escalation in atrocity violence."

The definition is parsimonious and flexible. The definition is agnostic on the four questions outlined in this section. The definition does not make a claim about context, intentionality, the process of escalation, or magnitude. Each of those areas deserves empirical analysis. This definition leaves room for the importance of context—triggers may take on meaning and significance in certain conditions. The definition leaves room for the idea that triggers are not necessarily one-off events, but may be part of a chain of events. We might hypothesize that triggers will trigger violence only if they have some significance in a political, military, social, or symbolic way but that claim is not inherent to the definition.

The definition implies that some events have the power to catalyze decision-makers or ordinary citizens to commit atrocities or levels of atrocities that they had not previously taken and many not have planned to take. The definition thus implies that triggers have independent causal power. That is, they change the dynamics of atrocity; counterfactually, then, without such events, the atrocity would not happen; would not happen when it did; or would not happen in the way that it did. Triggering events are essential turning points in the overall trajectory of violence. It seems to me that such a claim is essential if analysts seek to isolate "triggers" as being significant to when and why genocide and other forms of atrocity occur. Otherwise, we might think of triggers simply as events that mark, but do not trigger or independently influence, events.

The proposed definition is not a major departure from the conceptualization that Horowitz offers. Both definitions suggest that a trigger is an event or chain of events, proximate in time, and causally related to violence. The main differences are that a) the proposed definition applies to atrocities specifically (as opposed to deadly ethnic riots) and b) the proposed definition is a little more parsimonious than that of Horowitz. The main contribution is conceptual, rather than definitional, in the sense that this paper seeks to isolate and analyze key questions and hypotheses that pertain to an analysis of triggers.

It is worth noting is that not all atrocity cases will necessarily have clear triggers or sharp turns in escalation. There are "slow burn" situations in which famine, malnutrition, lack of medical care, or related factors may lead to high levels of civilian destruction. A case such as that of North Korea, in which there does not appear to be a clear trigger per se, but rather a more constant state of deprivation, repression, and persecution. Most atrocity cases do seem to have moments that signal a sharp spike in violence, but cases such as that of North Korea suggest that such spikes are not necessary for atrocities to occur.

4. Empirical Analysis of Atrocity Triggers

To probe some of the questions raised in the previous section, the paper analyzes a nonrandom sample of cases using qualitative methods. To date, there has been limited qualitative, comparative analysis of triggers of atrocity. In the quantitative literature on genocide, politicide, and mass killing, there has been analysis of "onset," which is different but akin to an analysis of triggers (Goldsmith et al., 2013; Harff, 2003; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2015). Many of these studies point to underlying conditions that increase the probability of atrocity in a country, such as infant mortality, a general period of instability, authoritarianism, exclusionary ideologies, prior genocides, or ethnic cleavages. But the studies also point to a number of plausible triggers: assassinations, leadership changes, election periods, military victories, and increases in defense spending, in particular.

That said, there is room for additional empirical analysis. First, there is no consensus in the quantitative literature on what triggers onset. Second, the quantitative literature is not explicitly focused on triggers per se but rather than measuring antecedent events that lead to crossing into a measure of onset (such as when civilian deaths reach a threshold of 1000 deaths per year). Third and most importantly, there is room for qualitative analysis that draws out some of the conceptual and theoretical issues discussed in the previous section. With its focus on mechanisms and with an ability to examine issues that are difficult to measure quantitatively across multiple countries, qualitative analysis is well suited towards this task. This section thus seeks to analyze a sample of atrocity cases with an eye towards developing a systematic analysis of triggers. It is a theory building exercise, as opposed to a theory testing one, built around a nonrandom sample of atrocity cases.

What then is the sample of atrocity cases? The concept of "atrocity" or "atrocity crimes" is generally defined in policy as including genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. That conceptualization would include a very large number of cases, given that there are no numerical thresholds for most of these crimes. As an exploratory empirical exer-

cise, this paper sought a manageable number of cases (N = 16) that nonetheless came from all world regions. In order not to bias which cases would be included in the universe of cases from which to sample, the paper draws on an established list of atrocity cases, in particular the mass killing case list in Jay Ulfelder and Ben Valentino's 2008 paper. This case list was supplemented with the post-electoral crisis from Kenya 2007–2008 in order to include a case that had a lower level of violence than many in the Ulfelder and Valentino case list and that was election related. From there, the sample of cases was purposively selected to conform to cases with which the author had some empirical familiarity. The analysis is broad-gauged, macro-level analysis based on the secondary literature.

The research questions asked for each case are: was there a sharp escalation in violence at an identifiable moment (i.e. was there a trigger, as defined above)? What prompted that sharp escalation in atrocity violence? To what extent did the context matter in driving the violence? To what extent did elite manipulation play a role? What kind of event or series of events triggered the escalation? Was the event a shock or a straw that broke the camel's back? The cases include:

- The Holocaust, 1941–1945
- Guatemala, 1960–1996
- Rwanda, 1963–1964
- Indonesia, 1965
- Nigeria, 1966–1970
- Burundi, 1972
- Ethiopia, 1974–1991
- The Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979
- India, anti-Sikh riots, 1984
- Bosnia, 1992–1995
- Burundi, 1993
- Rwanda, 1994
- The Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996–2004
- India, Gujarat, 2002
- Darfur, Sudan, 2003–2006
- Kenya 2007–2008

The analysis yields the following findings. In a general sense, in virtually all of these cases, there appears to be a point in time when an event or a development in a conflict initiates a sharp increase in violence. The concept of "triggers" is validated empirically, at least to an extent. In this sample, the primary triggers for atrocity are 1) significant changes in the strategic environment; 2) takeovers of territory with populations perceived to be associated with the enemy; 3) crackdowns on protest; and 4) violations of symbolically significant institutions.

4.1. Significant Changes in the Strategic Environment

The concept of changes in the strategic environment

connotes the idea that some event or development occurs in which leaders in a state experience elevated threat. That event in turn initiates a sharp escalation in violence. In most cases, the state actors are engaged in armed conflict, though this is not necessarily the case. In general, the findings are consistent with strategic theories of the origins of mass atrocities (Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Valentino, 2004).

The most common scenario is where non-state opponents of rulers in power launch a violent strike that signifies a direct and serious threat to the power of the ruling authorities. That threat in turn follows a period of growing strength on the part of the armed opponents or of growing weakness and vulnerability on the part of the ruling authorities. Concretely, such events are typically:

- Significant military advances by insurgent organizations;
- Coup or assassination attempts on heads of state or leading officials;
- Assassinations of heads of state or leading officials.

Of the 16 cases listed above, ten fit into this category, making this kind of trigger the most common scenario among the cases in this study. Guatemala was a long civil war but the peaks of violence that began in 1979 and the early 1980s followed significant gains by the Mayan insurgents in the Guatemalan highlands (Sullivan, 2012). In Rwanda, in 1963, the government launched large-scale violence against Tutsis after Tutsi exiles attacked the country and advanced on the capital. In Indonesia, the 1965 anti-Communist violence was triggered by a coup attempt, which military authorities blamed on the Communist party and which itself followed a weakened presidency (McGregor, 2009). In Nigeria, the anti-Ibo violence in 1966 was triggered by a coup in which an Ibo took power, and the 1967 and 1968 peaks of violence in the Biafran war were triggered by the start of that war and initial gains by the separatists. In Burundi in 1972, the anti-Hutu violence started after insurgents launched strikes against the Tutsi-dominated state. In Ethiopia, the violence spiked initially in response to political assassinations in the capital and later the violence spiked as the Tigrayan insurgents gained ground in the early 1980s. In India in 1984, the anti-Sikh riots followed by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by a Sikh bodyguard. In Burundi 1993 and Rwanda 1994, as discussed above, the violence followed assassinations of heads of state. Finally, in Darfur, the violence against non-Arabs spiked after a major offensive by insurgent organizations in early 2003, following growing strength on the part of the insurgents in that area.

These cases also provide answers for some of the questions in the previous section. First, political and military elites shaped the responses to the changes in

the strategic environment. That is, the events themselves provided a catalyst and they crystallized fear and tension, but behind the events themselves political and military elites made decisions about how to take advantage of the changes in the environment. In so doing, they framed the events in particular ways. The Indonesian military and ruling party, for example, blamed the Communist party for the coup attempt. The Rwandan interim authorities blamed Tutsi rebels for the assassination of President Habyarimana; in turn, they encouraged and orchestrated attacks against the Tutsi civilian population. These observations support the elite manipulation hypothesis. Elites often transform incidents into triggering events or at least manipulate the interpretation of events in order to start a campaign of violence.

Second, the triggering events cannot be separated from their context. In each circumstance, the incident took place within a fragile political or military environment, and typically an environment in which relations between opposing groups had significantly deteriorated prior to the trigger.

Third, the characteristics and magnitude of the event mattered. In most cases, the incidents themselves had characteristics that resonated with the reigning political or social cleavage of the day. Moreover, all of these events signaled threats to the state and to the ruling order. They had significance. For example, the Communists were a growing force in Indonesia, and at least some members of the party were likely responsible for the coup attempt. A Communist takeover would have dealt a major blow to the ruling order (McGregor, 2009). In India, the assassination of Indira Gandhi—the president—followed earlier violence, significant tension between Sikh nationalist parties and the ruling Congress Party, and other lower-level assassinations (Tambiah, 1996). In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide followed three and a half years of civil war, growing deterioration and distrust between government and rebel forces, and lower-level violence; moreover, the Tutsi-led rebels were plausibly responsible for the killing of President Habyarimana, again a president (Straus, 2006). In Darfur, the rebels launched an attack on government-held El Fasher and captured a colonel. That represented a direct threat. In Burundi in 1972, Hutu rebels launched attacks in the country at a time when officials worried that a Rwanda-style revolution could occur.

In sum, this cluster of events suggests that the trigger itself mattered but also that the event cannot be separated from the decision-making and actions of elites, from the context, and from the significance and characteristics of the event.

4.2. Takeovers of Areas with Hostile Populations

The second main scenario, which is arguably a subset of the first, is when political authorities or insurgent organizations make significant advances themselves and come to control new territory. In particular, when those authorities or organizations capture territory in which they plausibly face a threat from populations that they construe to be hostile or to be associated with their enemy, they in turn launch cleansing and repression campaigns to cement their power and territorial gains. In general, the finding is consistent with theories of atrocity that emphasize the importance of military takeovers (Uzonyi, 2015).

Of the case list above, the three main cases are the Holocaust, the 1975 violence in Cambodia, and the 1996-1997 violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the case of the Holocaust, the Nazi state clearly had persecuted Jews and other groups in the 1930s. The state had experimented with euthanasia programs against so-called "unworthy" disabled citizens. But the sharp escalations in murderous violence against Jews took place in 1941 following, in particular, the German invasions of Poland and the Soviet Union. The territorial takeovers meant that the Nazis controlled territory with millions of Jews and, in the Soviet case, Communists. It was in that context that the general plans for deportation of Jews shifted toward the mass killing and eventual extermination of Jews (Browning & Matthaus, 2004).

In the Cambodian example, the violence spiked after the Khmer Rouge took power in April 1975. Shortly after taking power, and riddled with internal rivalries, the Khmer Rouge executed large numbers of members of the former regime; they in turn evacuated the capital.

In the Congo, the violence spiked in late 2006 and early 2007 as Rwandan and AFDL forces gained control of territory in the eastern region. After sending hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees back to Rwanda (and Burundi), the joint Rwandan/AFDL forces began attacking and liquidating large numbers of the remaining Hutu refugee population in Congo (UNHCHR, 2010).

As in the other cases, the changes in territory cannot be separated from the context and from the political and military decision-making. A strong anti-Jewish orientation animated the Nazi elite, and thus the way in which they framed their struggle shaped the response to the territorial gains in the Soviet Union and Poland. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge had a radical ideology that called for a total and complete revolution of society and state. In the Congo, the Rwandan military and political authorities believed that they were locked in an epic fight with Hutu forces, and two years before Hutu authorities had committed genocide. In these cases, the political and ideological context was essential to the significance that the territorial gains took, and the context was essential to the trajectory of violence that followed the territorial gains. In these cases, the decisions of elites mattered; leaders chose to cleanse when they acquired territory. At the same time, the territorial changes changed the dynamics on

the ground—the territorial gains increased the perception of security risks or changed the calculations that elites made—in these cases triggering an escalation in violence.

4.3. Crackdowns on Protest

A less common, but nonetheless extant trigger for atrocity crimes is the repression of protest. In this scenario, political and security officials respond to organized and typically substantial street protest with a violent crackdown on the opposition. There are two main forms:

- In response to a contested election result;
- In response to a social movement looking to unseat a government.

The first scenario in this case is that electoral or political authorities announce the results of an election that the political opposition and some number of citizens find to be fraudulent. The opposition in turn organizes or encourages protests, which in turn prompt repression from security officials, which in turn leads to spiraling violence between supporters of the incumbents and supporters of the opposition. In the case list, the Kenyan violence in 2007–2008 is the main example; the contested elections in Iran and Côte d'Ivoire are out-of-sample examples of this type.

As with a significant change in the strategic environment and a military takeover of contested territory, the outcome of a national election has substantial implications. The results typically concern who controls the country. Much is at stake. Less well understood is why some contested election results provoke a spiral of violence while others protest fizzles, never materializes, or does not engender a violent state response. Initial research on post-electoral violence suggests that close elections matter and that confidence in electoral institutions matter. Where the opposition believes it should have won and where the opposition and citizens distrust the institutions that manage the electoral process, then they are more likely to turn to violence and street protest (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 2014; Taylor, Pevehouse, & Straus, 2015).

Another plausible scenario, which is not represented in the sample but which should be considered, is when political authorities repress violently a social movement that seeks some major change in the polity. An example would be when anti-government protests in Syria prompted violent crackdowns by state authorities.

4.4. Symbolically Significant Violations

The last category concerns triggers in which some symbolically significant violation takes place. In these cases, the violation signifies a transgression of some

sort; there is a rupture that in turn sparks individuals, often with encouragement, to attack those who are seen to the authors of the violation. As in all the other cases, the violation takes on power, in the sense of mobilizing people to act, only in certain conditions and only with some explicit or tacit support for leaders or officials in a particular community.

The main example in the sample is the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in India in 2012. In that case, a train car caught fire, killing Hindu pilgrims who were returning from a pilgrimage. In the immediate aftermath, Hindu civilians and some Hindu political leaders blamed Muslims for setting fire to the train, and they proceeded to attack and kill hundreds and maybe thousands of Muslim civilians during the course of several weeks.[6] The anti-Muslim took place in the context of worsening relations between Hindus and Muslims in the country, and the violence was endorsed by leading Hindu nationalist leaders in the country, notably the then Chief Minister (Nussbaum, 2007).

While there is only one case from the sample, similar kinds of triggers have occurred in India's past. Violence has taken place in relation to the religious site in Ayodhya. Hindus claim the site as the birthplace of the god Lord Ram, while Muslims had erected a mosque on the site. In 1992, a mob destroyed the mosque, triggering violence in different parts of the country that left several thousand dead.

In general, triggers of this type—that involved a symbolically significant violation—deserve some consideration as analyses of triggers go forward. These triggers seem to generate a smaller overall death toll than do changes in the strategic environment. The stakes matter, but in most cases the national government or a national organization is not directly driving the violence. As a result, the magnitude is less great than in those cases when states are committed to massacres to protect the state's interests.

5. Conclusions

To conclude, the concept of a "trigger" remains a useful one in the vocabulary of understanding and preventing mass atrocities. It seems clear that, in some contexts, certain events constitute turning points in the sharp escalation of violence. These turning points are appropriately conceptualized as "triggers" of atrocity. Overall, this paper has sought to push forward a research agenda on triggers by developing the concept, isolating key questions and hypotheses about triggers, and offering an exploratory empirical analysis of spikes in violence in a sample of atrocity cases.

Despite the endorsement of the concept of triggers

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[6] An Indian government report claimed about 1000 civilians were killed (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199.stm). Nussbaum (2007) claims about 2000 Muslims were killed.

in this paper, scholars and policymakers should remain cautious about how predictive or how causal triggers are. Empirically, the same category of event may lead to different outcomes. The paper's analysis yielded three findings that help to explain that variation. These findings in turn indicate that factors other than the event itself matter for why certain events have the power to initiate a sharp escalation of violence. First, context is critical. Triggers cannot be separated from the underlying conditions in which they take place. Second, the reactions and decisions of influential elites are central to whether or not events escalate into large-scale violence. Third, triggers of greater magnitude and triggers that graft onto the broader conflict will have greater significance. In particular, triggers that would seem to crystallize a direct threat to ruling authorities or that have broad, national implications seem to unleash the highest levels of violence. Certain events—battlefield advances, assassinations, assassination attempts, coups, coup attempts, territorial takeovers, protests, and symbolically significant violations— create the raw material to usher in a new period of violence. They increase the risk of atrocity but atrocities are not inevitable after those events take place.

To deepen the understanding of escalation and triggers, much work remains. The empirical analysis in this paper is a start but the analysis remains necessarily superficial based on macro-comparative analysis. To understand why some events trigger atrocity (or do not), more micro-level analysis of key decisions and developments would be useful. In addition, while the paper yielded findings on some dimensions of triggers—such as context, elite manipulation, and types of triggers—other issues remain underspecified. Whether triggers are best conceptualized as shocks or straws that broke the camel's back (or both) is indeterminate in the analysis. To what extent does perpetrator capacity to commit violence matter and how does that capacity interact with triggers? Are there other important triggers not covered here? The paper's empirical analysis did not find that economic conditions or changes constituted triggers. But are there other cases where economic changes sharply escalated violence? The same is true for propaganda.

Lastly, how can triggers be anticipated and how can an understanding of triggers be translated into useful policy? Knowledgeable observers of specific cases should look to make educated predictions about whether one of the triggers isolated in this paper is likely to occur in a context that would result in a sharp escalation of atrocities. Would a battlefield gain, for example, have the effect of increasing threat perception? Would a battlefield gain mark some change in the overall dynamics of an armed conflict? Is a situation especially tense? Is the language of elites suggestive of a deep sense of foreboding and concern, such that a change in the strategic environment could lead them

to change their tactics and use extreme violence? Finally, if, as this analysis suggests, triggers have power but their power depends on the ways in which elites interpret and use triggers, then that should create some space for external actors to influence those elites.[7] Even if a specific event could signal a new level of threat, there is still some margin for maneuver for influencing elites who would make the decisions that would determine if violence sharply escalates.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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[7] Alex Bellamy (2011) makes a useful distinction between "structural" and "direct" prevention, with the former focused on long-term underlying conditions that increase the risk of atrocity and the latter focused on short-term actions that can be taken to stop or mitigate atrocities. A policy focus on triggers would relate primarily to direct prevention.

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Article

Evaluating the United Nation's Agenda for Atrocity Prevention: Prospects for the International Regulation of Internal Security

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Abstract

In recent years the UN Secretary-General has promoted mass atrocity prevention as the priority agenda for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN, redirecting debates on R2P away from military interventionism towards improved state capacity to prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations. This focus has been illustrated in the UNSG's annual reports on R2P since 2009, and the 2014 "Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes", that emphasise state institutional capacity and the identification of atrocity-risk indicators. Through a case-study of Pakistan, this article problematizes the relationship between internal security and the UN agenda on atrocity prevention to evaluate the viability of promoting atrocity prevention as currently conceived by the Office of the UNSG in high-risk contexts. It argues that an atrocity prevention agenda informed by a responsive regulation framework would be more effective in taking into account the relational dynamics of atrocity crimes. This includes accounting for the interaction between the micro-dynamics of political violence with macro-dynamics created by lengthy historical conflicts and strategic repertoires.

Keywords

mass atrocity prevention; Pakistan; responsibility to protect; responsive regulation; social contexts of violence

Issue

1. Introduction

The Offices of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), and the Special Advisors to the UNSG on the Prevention of Genocide, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have displayed remarkably creative work in recent years in moving forward the international agenda on mass atrocity prevention through the promotion of the R2P principle. Since 2009, UNSG Ban Ki-moon has released annual reports on R2P and hosted an annual interactive dialogue among member states to foster dialogue and shared understanding of R2P as a norm to respond to mass atrocity crimes both in external states, and internally. This work facilitates, to a large extent, a conceptual reorientation of R2P away from its image as a justification for big powers to intervene in weak states

for which it has so long been criticised (Cunliffe, 2010; Hehir, 2013). Rather the UNSG has sought to emphasise the preventative aspects of R2P, and to place particular onus on states to improve their domestic responses to threats of atrocity crimes.[1] Given the clear efforts within the UN to redirect the language and trajectory of R2P discussions in recent years, this article seeks to do a number of things. In the first section, the article assesses R2P as an atrocity prevention framework to regulate state actors in responding to risk of atrocity crimes within their own sovereign jurisdiction. It is argued that the UNSG's efforts to frame R2P as a "preventive doctrine"

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[1] The definition of "atrocity crime" in this article are the four crimes addressed by R2P including genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

(Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2014) is a significant move given the high level of international support for the preventative pillars. However, the focus of the UNSG's annual reports on R2P remains primarily on macro-structural reform at the state-level, conceptualising prevention as a type of intervention, and over-emphasising the causal relation between macro-structural reforms with atrocity prevention.

In the second section, the article illustrates the shortcomings of the current UNSG's approach through a case study of Pakistan. This section examines the dynamics of political violence within Pakistan where atrocities have occurred to reflect on the salience of the UNSG's agenda to prevent atrocity crimes given its specific internal security challenges. This section argues that atrocity crimes inside Pakistan need to be considered in the broader social context of strategic repertoires developed through decades of conflict, both external and internal drivers of violence, and the robustness of civilian protection mechanisms within these states. The article investigates the logic of Pillar One in line with these contextual factors to make a more forceful argument for the reconceptualization of Pillar One that corresponds to the strategic realities of states facing high level risk of atrocity crimes.[2]

In response to this case study, the third section introduces a "social contexts of violence" approach that reconceptualises atrocity crimes through a relational framework (Gerlach, 2006, 2010; Karstedt, 2013). This approach accounts for the historical contextualisation of internal conflicts, and emphasises the interaction between the micro and macro dynamics of political violence that is salient for explaining mass violence in the context of case studies such as Pakistan. Finally, the chapter revisits the question of regulation of internal security, by arguing that a responsive regulation approach (Braithwaite, 2002) is a helpful model for thinking about prevention in a relational context as described by Gerlach and Karstedt. Responsive regulation is both philosophically and practically consistent with R2P, and serves as a corrective to the externally-driven agenda for atrocity prevention within existing UN frameworks. A responsive regulation approach adds value to the current framework as it places more emphasis on local peacebuilding resources, is attuned to relational contexts of violence, and promotes a philosophy of restorative justice that is found to be much more culturally salient and preferable to coercive external intervention in societies facing violent conflict and the risk of atrocity crimes.

2. Conceptual Constraints on Pillar One

Prevention has always been an integral aspect of the

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[2] For an analysis of Pillar One in relation to states facing a lower level of risk of atrocity crimes, see Jacob (2015)

R2P doctrine since its inception in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on R2P. Paragraph 138 of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document, unanimously endorsed by over 150 heads of state at the Summit, affirms the state's responsibility to prevent and protect its population from the four atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, now referred to as "Pillar One" responsibilities of the state (UN, 2009). Moving forward from principle to practice however has been a concern of R2P advocates (Bellamy, 2011; Evans, 2008; Thakur, 2011; UNGA, 2009). Whereas states unanimously endorsed the principle of state's primary responsibility for atrocity prevention at the World Summit in 2005, efforts by the UN to put flesh on the bones of this commitment only started four years later, and has gained its most significant traction through the UNSG's annual reports on R2P in 2013 and 2014 on Pillars One (state sovereign responsibility) and Two (international assistance) respectively.

The decision by the UNSG to provide deeper clarification of R2P in operational terms for prevention is an indication that R2P is increasingly being accepted at the international level to serve a regulatory function in global governance, even though its legal status remains imprecise (Rosenberg, 2009; Stahn, 2007; Strauss, 2009; Welsh & Banda, 2010). The most sophisticated policy and operational guidelines for atrocity prevention still focus on defining multilateral and national toolkits and responses to external crises in other parts of the world however (Albright & Williamson, 2013; Giffen, 2010; Meyer et al., 2013; Sharma & Welsh, 2012; UN, 2014; Waxman, 2009), with the specification of Pillar One duties for states own domestic institutional, legal and political reforms still largely indicative.

The UNSG's 2013 Report *Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention* does emphasise a wide range of domestic sites for intervention and reform to build state resilience to atrocity crimes. Specifically the report points to risk factors such as underlying patterns of discrimination and lack of accountability for past atrocity crimes as crucial areas for domestic prevention interventions. Sources of state resilience to atrocity crimes are cited in the UNSG's 2013 Annual Report on R2P, namely constitutional protections (paragraph 35), democratic electoral process (paragraph 37), the criminalisation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (paragraph 40), national accountability mechanisms (paragraph 41), transitional justice processes for past atrocity crimes (paragraph 42), security sector reform (paragraph 43), poverty reduction and economic equality (paragraph 45). Further the report identifies a national infrastructure for the promotion and protection of human rights, the rule of law and strong governance, and the mainstreaming of atrocity prevention within national administrations as

crucial institutional sites for atrocity prevention that build on the need for structural resilience.

The reorientation of the R2P discourse away from external interventionism is clearly a significant achievement. The 2014 UNSG report on R2P "Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect" builds on this reorientation by calling on states to reinforce the Pillar One capacity of states. However, the expectations on states for nation-wide capacity building, structural reform and institutional change are resource intensive, and geared heavily towards a governance, rule of law, and capacity building agenda at the macro-level that to a large extent sidelines a state's own experiences and internal dynamics of political violence. This focus is clearly articulated in the 2014 UNSG report on R2P:

> Preventive action at this stage (of general risk) requires more structurally focused strategies designed to help to build national resilience. The principle objective is the creation of State structures and institutions that are functioning and legitimate, respect human rights, and the rule of law, deliver services equitably, and can address or defuse sources of tension before they escalate. (A/68/947-S/2014/449, p. 4, paragraph 8)

The 2014 Atrocity Prevention Framework released by the Office of the Special Representative to the UNSG on the Prevention of Genocide argues that atrocities are "processes", yet makes a similar case that investing in the rule of law, legitimate and accountable national institutions, corruption, management of diversity and support for civil society and an open media have a direct causal relationship with the prevention of atrocity crimes, arguing: "[f]ailure by the State to provide such protection and guarantees to its population can create an environment conducive to atrocity crimes." (UN, 2014, p. 3). Accordingly it sets out a series of 14 risk factors that analysts can use to identify potential atrocity crimes.

While each of these areas of reform are crucial, and by no means contested in this article, the purpose of this assessment is to unpack some of the assumptions underlying the atrocity prevention framework that is used to define the contents and responsibilities of Pillar One for states. This agenda, I argue, is too narrow a vision for defining Pillar One per se, and pre-empts the potential significance of Pillar One as a much more ubiquitous and significant reorientation in thinking about states sovereign responsibility. States and key civil society actors should pay heed to the specific policy and legal recommendations embodied in existing atrocity prevention frameworks, however more work is still required in the R2P literature to conceptualise Pillar One responsibilities in the context of states' complex internal security settings .

The following section turns to the case of Pakistan, a state that experiences periodic attacks on civilians, to consider an example of the type of context in which atrocity prevention efforts need to be conceptualised. State security practices in this state are historically contingent, and not just symptoms of poor governance or the need for security sector reform in terms of capacity and organisation. The next section argues that for Pillar One prevention duties to be fully realised, there needs to be a much broader project of historical reinterpretation of internal conflicts and significant long-term reform in security practices that have developed over decades of militarisation. Pillar One duties of states are further complicated by international dynamics—such as the US presence in Afghanistan and air-strikes on the Taliban in Pakistan. Acknowledging social, political and historical contingency surrounding recent atrocity crimes in this state challenges the dominant conception of the range of responsibilities and contexts in which Pillar One duties of states correspond to. It provides the basis for an argument that is geared towards responsive regulation based on principles of restorative justice. This approach, it will be argued, is preferable to linear models of prevention that are conducive to ratcheting up punitive responses and violent escalation than seeking to find alternative, non-escalatory pathways when violence is imminent.

3. Pakistan: Conflict Trajectories and State Interpretation Pillar One Duties

On 16 December 2014, 141 people—including 134 children—were killed in an attack by the Pakistani Taliban on a military school in Peshawar. The attack was retribution for the government's anti-insurgency campaign in North Waziristan and the Khyber area. This is just one of the many atrocities committed by the Taliban against civilians and government targets in just over a decade, and takes place in the context of a broader national upsurge in multiple insurgent fronts, and anti-sectarian violence targeting Shi'a, Christian, Ahmadi and Hindu minorities (USCRIF, 2013, pp. 177-183).

Tracing these events back slightly further, we note that Western airstrikes in the early years of the 2001 war in Afghanistan exacerbated the divide been the Uzbek and Tajik populations of the north and the aggrieved Pashtun's in the South that caused many Pashtun Taliban fighters across the border into Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. The entrenchment of the Taliban movement in Pakistan has been effective in gradually galvanising a number of Sunni insurgents already operating in Pakistan (Kanwal, 2013), particularly a younger generation drawn more to an internationalised brand of Islamic militancy over fragmented tribal separatist ideologies. Indeed the Taliban tends to draw the sympathy of junior ranks of the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Johnson, 2011, pp. 167-168),

and many Pashtun soldiers have deserted the army, not wanting to fight fellow Muslims (Kanwal, 2013, p. 2). These trends have significantly affected the morale of the Pakistani security forces in conducting their counter-insurgency operations.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has grown from an estimated 2,000 fighters in 2002 to over 60,000 today (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), with thousands of Taliban fighters spilling over the borders into Pakistan. Pakistan's decades-long military strategy of fostering insurgency in Afghanistan to buffer its own national security by achieving "strategic depth" has caused a severe blow-back with the creation of the Pakistani Taliban since the U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban movement is seeking a revolution against the "apostate" Pakistani government due to its support for the Western-led invasion into Afghanistan. Following decades of fostering insurgency in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military has in recent years turned its focus towards countering insurgency on its own territory (Mullick, 2009).

As the 2014 school attack illustrates vividly, the interventionist pathways taken both by Western powers and Pakistan in Afghanistan since 2001, and the counter-insurgency strategies taken by the Pakistani security forces have to date lead to the escalation of violence in which thousands of Pakistani civilians have become direct targets, including bombings on civilians sites such as places of worship by militant groups, and widespread fatalities and displacement caused by the military's counter-insurgency operations. Between 2003 and March 2015, an estimated 20,228 civilians and 6,111 security personnel have been killed through terrorist violence alone in Pakistan. Some 30,695 terrorists and insurgents have been killed during this same period (SATP, 2015). The Pakistani government and military, divided as they are, view the Pakistani Taliban through the lens of internal security and state cohesion. Many of these internal security issues are the result of a long trajectory of policy choices favouring military escalation to deal with Pakistan's internal divisions along tribal, ethnic and religious lines since the early 1970s (Gazdar, 2006; Khan, 2012), particularly after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971.

Given this brief historical context in which to understand the killings of 141 civilians in 2014 and similar attacks (e.g. Craig, 2014) where do R2P responsibilities of the state to prevent and protect populations fit into the picture? In historical perspective, Pakistan's R2P obligations are very recent and are unenforced. The choices made in pursuing military options to internal crises are the consequence of a number of overarching factors including decades of strategic repertoires that resort to militarised repression of internal dissent, the internationalised conflict against the Taliban including U.S. air-strikes on Pakistan's soil that have exacerbated internal divisions, and significant U.S. funding to Paki-

stan's military that disproportionately privileges this sector. Furthermore, the current threat to civilian lives in Pakistan is periodic rather than sustained, low enough in numeric terms and shielded by geopolitical sensitivities of powerful states not to be considered a Pillar Three external intervention. In terms of R2P thinking, the expectations are that the state can and should be able to manage the atrocities such as the school bombing through their own domestic capacity. While this is a reasonable expectation, further thinking on what kind of actions constitute Pillar One responsibilities need to be clarified in this context.

The state of Pakistan has openly endorsed R2P, including Pillar One on the prevention and protection of civilians from atrocity crimes. At the UN General Assembly informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect in 2014, the representative of Pakistan Ambassador Masood Khan stated:

> The basic thrust of the first two pillars is to prevent atrocity crimes by building societies on the basis of reconciliation, justice and security. R2P response should not be activated only after eruption of or a full-blown armed conflict.

The Pakistan Ambassador qualified his support more explicitly by stating: "There should be no exceptionalism in pursuit of the goal of protection of civilians. Palestine is a case in point."

The Ambassador summed up the Pillar One principle with powerful acknowledgement of reconciliation, justice and security within societies as core responsibilities of states towards their own population. Indeed Pakistan's experience with Muslahathi Committee's to bridge traditional and state law and order systems evidences their recognition of the need for restorative justice approaches in a number rural spaces where the Taliban have gained popular support (Braithwaite & Gohar, 2014). However, the reference to Palestine shifts the focus away from the internal situation in Pakistan to which such statements are highly relevant. It also engenders a UN culture in which states are apt at identifying appropriate cases where R2P is relevant rather than embracing a more reflective stance on the internal security situation being faced in the home state.

Pillar One clearly has significant implications for regulating the counter-insurgency and civilian protection efforts within states, but I argue here that the scope of Pillar One as articulated in UN and related documentation separates the international prevention agenda from these contextual settings of political violence, including historical military trajectories and regional and international drivers, in which atrocities occur. This separation is consequently replicated and entrenched in state conceptualisations of Pillar One that fail to see their international obligations on R2P associated with their internal security objectives.

Therefore, in the case of Pakistan, the assumption underlying the principle UN documentation—that addressing a number of macro indicators related to governance and rule of law, security sector reform and human rights *constitutes* the Pillar One responsibilities of states—is misplaced for two reasons. First, it is not founded on an empirical basis for identifying the contexts in which atrocities occur but rather responds to a generic framework of structural factors supposed to have a causal relation with atrocity crimes. Second, it assumes that the actions and responsibilities of the state in relation to atrocities within its domestic jurisdiction are independent and prior to international assistance. It does not allow for historical and political complexity in which a range of domestic and international factors are at play in setting the trajectory of political violence and atrocity crimes at the domestic level. As such it places heavy onus on the state for reversing lengthy historical trajectories, and vilifies the state when it is deemed unable or unwilling to protect its own populations from atrocity crimes that are manifestations of broader intractable internal security quagmires. The "failure" of states on Pillar One duties therefore is deemed to warrant international condemnation and assistance and curtails the consideration of alternatives prior to external intervention (military or non-military) in which R2P may be considered a useful framework for preventing atrocity crimes.

Pakistan's experience brings into question the salience of equating Pillar One duties with a predetermined atrocity prevention policy framework in states facing protracted insurgency, secessionism or terrorism that have not been considered as R2P cases for Pillar Three external intervention yet face a high level of risk of atrocity crimes being committed against domestic populations. It also indicates that there are more specific considerations that need to be foregrounded in this agenda that include military repertoires, both external and internal drivers of violence, and the robustness of civilian protection mechanisms within these states. The next section considers the conventional logic surrounding Pillar One to explain why it has been so narrowly conceptualised to date in the R2P literature, before moving to consider alternative and more productive ways to conceptualise this aspect of R2P.

4. Reconceptualising Pillar One in Strategic Context

In 2012, Williams, Ulbrick and Worboys argued that there is a step missing in Pillar Three of R2P, namely the lack of a capacity for international coercive intervention when the UNSC fails to mandate action in the face of mass atrocities such as those in Syria. They outline criteria through which the limited use of force by the international community could be imagined without UNSC authorisation to ensure that R2P operates as

intended. They argue that "[a]lthough the use of force without Security Council authorization is a complicated and delicate question' their criteria for permitting non-UNSC authorized international military intervention is 'the most appropriate way to develop R2P moving forward." (Williams, Ulbrick, & Worboys, 2012, p. 476).

If it is the case that R2P is "missing a step" in terms of its most punitive and coercive capacity, it is also the case that there is a need to unpack the assumptions surrounding prevention embedded in the logic of the R2P doctrine to create more space at the less coercive end of the R2P spectrum to successfully protect populations from atrocity crimes. The conventional story told about the prevention element of R2P in the literature is as follows:

> First, individual states [are] primarily responsible for protecting their populations. ICISS categorized this aspect of the R2P as a state's "responsibility to prevent," outlining a state's obligation to eliminate the root causes of mass atrocities. (Williams et al., 2012, p. 482)

There are several assumptions embedded in this account that elucidates the reasons why these authors feel that Pillar One options are all too readily exhausted in the context of conflict scenarios, and that more rigorous capacity to resort to interventional military interventions is necessary. The first assumption is that prevention can be dealt with in isolation by states as a first step in a three tiered process. This assumes an inward-focussed state that has the capacity and will to counter domestic instability or conflict that is on an upward trajectory towards mass atrocity before it reaches an imminent stage. The situation in Pakistan requires us to take a step back to think about the multiple trajectories, and complicating factors related to geostrategic interest, national security calculations and military repertoires that unsettle this standard definition of what Pillar One means in the context of states. This also helps us to understand how states could conceivably endorse Pillar One in international forums without interpreting it as relevant to these proximate factors.

Pakistan's foreign policy goal of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan is a significant factor in its national security calculations, previously to serve as a buffer from the Soviet Union and to prevent Indian encirclement of its territory. This strategy has driven Pakistan's involvement in fostering insurgency in Afghanistan since the CIA created and supported the Afghani mujahedeen in the 1980s. Pakistan became the state most affected by terrorism following the U.S.-led invasion into Afghanistan and faces an intractable insurgency and radicalisation. Its internal security situation is therefore not an isolated case for which the Pakistan state is solely responsible—external factors such as dispropor-

tionate U.S. funding of the Pakistani military over other forms of assistance has facilitated its propensity towards militarised responses to domestic problems.

Many of these problems are of course not just the fault of external actors such as the U.S., and the Pakistani military is reaping much of the destruction that it has sown in Afghanistan, but the point here is that these broader geostrategic dynamics are part of the Pillar One spectrum in which prevention and protection efforts at the state level need to be conceptualised. I would like to bracket here that *international* responsibility in the context of prevention is just as much about not creating the conditions for quagmires in states as it is about external response in perceived failed states—this is an element that is absent in discussions on Pillar One but one that can be seen at the heart of many of today's protracted conflicts in which atrocity crimes are persistent features. The international community is not just the post-hoc solution to state failure on atrocity crimes, but is constitutive of the Pillar One context in which states are expected to act.

The second assumption embedded in the conventional account of Pillar One is that prevention corresponds to an "obligation to eliminate the root causes of mass atrocities", thereby assuming an anachronistic perspective of the trajectory of violence and internal conflicts in which atrocity crimes take place. Again here it is assumed that the so-called "root causes" are independent variables that can be isolated and eliminated through targeted state reforms. Yet this conceptualisation does not permit us to consider atrocities in terms of the lengthy historical trajectories through which they have emerged, or the relational context in which they are manifested. In the case of Pakistan, how might we "eliminate" root causes such as the process of nation-building, the geographic concentration of political power and resourcing in the province of Punjab, the perpetual anxiety over national cohesion that has guided its counter-insurgency campaigns since the 1970s, and its geo-strategic concern with achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan to mitigate India's strategy of encirclement. Without these contextual factors, it is impossible to explain the rise of Sunni-insurgency and the related surge in sectarian violence in Pakistan to which recent atrocities are attributed.

Here then, what we need to be concerned about is not just eliminating root causes per se, but rather changing trajectories that have been set in motion by responding to strategic repertoires. In this regard, the Pakistani military has been effective in gradually reducing collateral damage and improving the protection of displaced populations through its counter-insurgency strategy since 2009 when collateral damage became an important political factor at the national level (Mullick, 2009). Conceived this way, Pillar One should align much more closely with the strategic realities on the ground, given the rather utopian prospect of eliminat-

ing root causes before they lead to mass atrocity in contexts where political violence is already well entrenched. It also means however that *Pillar One reconceptualised is a much broader project, and much more ubiquitous than the limited and rare occasions in which coercive international interventions under a R2P pretext could be warranted*.

The next section introduces the literature on the social contexts of violence to challenge the empirical basis on which core Pillar One assumptions are founded. It argues that a relational approach to understanding the interaction between macro and micro-dynamics of violence provides a stronger basis on which to build a conceptualisation of Pillar One in the R2P literature that to date is not yet developed.

5. Rethinking Prevention through a Social Contexts of Violence Approach

In recent years there has been a growing interest in international relations and political science that is concerned with the micro-dynamics of violence at the local level (Autesserre, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006; Lemarchand, 2009) for explaining the large-scale armed conflicts and genocides that shape regional and international security. Simplified explanations or macro-narratives of conflicts such as those centred on ethnic rivalry in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo circumvent international understandings of the complex micro-sociological causes and dynamics of mass violence (Straus, 2008) that are often counter-intuitive to the macro-narrative, and cause expansive international peacekeeping efforts to repeatedly fail (Autesserre, 2010; Kemp et al., 2013).

The development of this important body of literature has significant implications for thinking about atrocity prevention. Scholars such as Susanne Karstedt (2013) argue that while genocides are rare, atrocities are much more common, and today tend to feature as events that "are of a smaller scale and reiterated" as opposed to mass genocides. Mass atrocities are conceptualised as part of broader trajectories of violence, embedded within historical contexts of social conflict, and therefore highly responsive to dynamic deterrence during the path of escalation to alter these trajectories (Braithwaite, 2014; Karstedt, 2013, p. 385; Klusemann, 2012, pp. 473-475).

Christian Gerlach, in developing a relational approach to the study of "extremely violence societies", (2006, 2010) argues that conventional studies of significant twentieth-century genocides have presented a narrow account of the dynamics of mass atrocities that have confined our understanding of such events. Firstly, conventional assumptions contained within studies of genocide focus on ethnicity/race or other singular elements of intent as a cause for systematic, one-sided violence. Where they do acknowledge multi-causality,

they still seek to single out a dominant explanatory factor. Secondly, conventional studies seek to explain genocide in terms of a neat categorical distinction that is separate from other forms of social violence, rather than seeking to identify the linkages between them. And finally, such studies emphasise the role of the state (genocide as a state crime) rather than on broad and multiple levels of social interactions where widespread mobilisation of populations is vital for explaining how violence can take place on a mass scale.

One of Gerlach's critiques of contemporary genocide studies is that it is heavily biased towards the state and structural mechanisms to prevent such violence that "work towards simplification and against contextualisation." (2006, p. 465). This assumption has to a large extent carried through to most atrocity prevention frameworks that place primary emphasis on governance, rule of law, and security sector reforms at the macro-level. While the UN's current approach to atrocity prevention has been broadly influenced by the fields of criminology, peace and conflict studies and public health (Sharma & Welsh, 2012), a sociological perspective contributes a complex picture of atrocity crimes (eg. Bakonyi & De Guevara, 2009; Kalyvas, 2006) that point towards the need for a dynamic and contextualised model of atrocity prevention for violence at the sub-national level.

Following on from these conclusions, Karstedt (2013) has argued that there is a move within genocide studies towards conceptualisations of atrocity crimes that have more legal and analytical relevance to the nature of contemporary political violence. The UN approach to atrocity prevention not only tends to focus on the macro level of state institutions and structures, but the prevention models that inform its approach assume a linear path of crisis escalation from risk through to imminence (Evans, 2008, p. 87; Sharma & Welsh, 2012). History shows however that micro-level violence below the state and systemic/regional violence peak and decline in non-linear trajectories, and conflict trajectories are shaped by the interaction between these micro-social processes with the macro-structures. (Berenschot, 2011; Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2012; Kalyvas, 2003, 2006; Karstedt, 2013, p. 386; Sanín & Wood, 2014; Tilly, 2003; Weinstein, 2007). A relational approach to the study of mass atrocity crimes therefore does not assume a Galtung-model of structural and cultural violence that makes societies prone to atrocities, but rather traces the events and trajectories that led to a specific event of genocide.

Another key limitation of models of structural preventions is that they assume a direct causal relationship between "root causes" and violence without contextualising the dynamics through which these root causes will develop into various forms of violence. It relies on "external diagnosis and prognosis" of risk that bypasses sources of domestic and local resilience

(McLoughlin, 2014, p. 410). In doing so, such models also de-emphasise the benefits of alternative approaches to prevention through empowering local agency and resilience of populations where history has proven that local strategies of escape and survival have prevented the greatest numbers of deaths from mass atrocity crimes (Mayerson, 2014). Indeed a number of scholars have begun to focus on agency where self-protection strategies are demonstrated to be crucial for survival well before international assistance is forthcoming (Baines & Paddon, 2012; Kaplan, 2013; Mégret, 2009)

The implications of a relational approach to mass atrocities for assessing the current UN atrocity prevention strategy is to question the general "nature" of a state as prone to such crimes based on an assumed causal relationship between given state structures with the likelihood of atrocity crimes. A relational understanding of mass-atrocity crimes is to some extent counter-intuitive to the central thrust of the UN's current approach to mass-atrocity prevention, as it argues for the need to recognise that both resistors and participants of violence are found in the same society, that violence ebbs and flows with peaks, and that broad social participation (alliances/coalitions) are needed for such extensive violence to take place. It is not questioned here that core governance and rule of law institutions such as the judiciary and security sector are crucial for successful prevention of atrocity crimes. What is argued here is that this emphasis on structural reform at the state level alone is inadequate without taking into account the micro-sociological dimensions of atrocity crimes at the sub-national level, and how those dynamics then interact with the macro and systemic levels. As the case-study on Pakistan illustrates, each of these levels are interconnected and shape the unique trajectories of conflict and mass violence in different ways. There is a need for a responsive approach to these social contexts of violence than is envisaged in multilateral atrocity prevention toolkits, as these place a heavy emphasis on escalation towards more coercive interventions.

6. Responsive Regulation: An Alternative Framework for Considering the Regulation of Atrocity Prevention

The purpose of this article has been to assess the UN's agenda on mass atrocity prevention, noting in the introduction that UN efforts to clarify R2P implementation frameworks point to an increasing regulatory role that R2P is occupying at the international level. In particular, recent reports published by the UNSG provide the basis for a legal and policy framework to guide state responses to atrocity crimes. These reports include recommendations for enhanced accountability of states on R2P duties to the international community through processes such as the Universal Periodic Re-

view in the UN Human Rights Council (UN, 2014). In this concluding section of the article, I briefly consider responsive regulation as an alternative regulatory model for R2P that complements these existing recommendations, yet accounts for a more dynamic and contextualised understanding that responds to both the micro and macro processes of atrocity crimes.

Responsive regulation is a dynamic framework in criminology that is based on the belief that because social conflict is relational, regulation will be more effective if it is responsive to the social contexts it seeks to regulate (Braithwaite, 2014). It promotes a philosophy that restorative justice is preferable to retributive justice, arguing that restorative models of justice are culturally salient for the prevention of crime in most parts of the world; and that the resort to coercive escalations is mitigated by inclusive dialogue that draws on local conflict resolution resources (Braithwaite, 2002). Responsive regulation seeks to avoid orthodoxy and rigidity in regulatory frameworks which to date has been a stumbling block for atrocity prevention efforts by external actors such as the European Union (Meyer et al., 2013) in responding to unique and contingent internal security environments.

A responsive regulation pyramid has at its widest base options for dialogue and reconciliation to build peace within communities and deter criminal acts. The pyramid allows for the capacity to resort to more coercive forms of enforcement as one moves up the pyramid, where punitive action would be warranted in the most extreme cases of criminal violation. What differentiates a responsive regulatory approach to criminal deterrence from traditional approaches is that it is concerned with pushing prevention strategies "down" the pyramid towards dialogic and restorative methods. Rather than moving up the pyramid to more coercive options when a restorative approach fails, responsive regulation seeks to widen the base by exploring alternative options that draw on local peacebuilding resources.

R2P reflects the pyramid to a large degree in that prevention at the base of the pyramid (Pillar One) is considered the preferred option, before escalating up towards coercive intervention at the peak of the pyramid (Pillar Three).[3] Yet current conceptualisations of R2P look rather like an upside-down pyramid whereby the broadest focus in the scholarly literature has tended to emphasise the most punitive and coercive end of the spectrum for assessing its conceptual validity and success. For this reason, I am arguing that R2P could be a much more effective regulatory framework in relation to the internal security concerns of states if states had much more accountability and incentive to push down the pyramid towards responsive, restorative ap-

proaches towards atrocity prevention. This includes expanding the creative options available in the articulation of Pillar One than currently exists in international atrocity prevention frameworks.

One clear example of the saliency of this approach to dealing with the prevention of atrocity crimes is found in the work by John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak on the rule of law in rural Afghanistan (2013a, b). These authors argue that the rise of the Taliban, and the ensuing atrocities that occur under their authority, was enabled by a lack of order and legitimate authority in rural Afghanistan. The fragmentation of the Afghan state following the Soviet invasion, and the subsequent rise of externally-backed armed Mujahedeen groups created competition for authority in rural areas where a power vacuum exists. US-led intervention into Afghanistan in 2001 pursued a "Hobbesian" solution by backing a leviathan government under Hamid Karzai, and supporting a strong, centralised state that failed to bring order or a legitimate rule of law in these rural spaces (Braithwaite & Wardak, 2013a). These conditions have enabled the Taliban to flourish, and so Braithwaite and Wardak offer a "Jeffersonian alternative" (Braithwaite & Wardak, 2013b) to state-building, arguing that macro-level state building efforts need to work in support of local justice systems, such as the *jirga/shura* courts to offer a legitimate alternative to rule of law provision in rural spaces that could draw away popular support from the Taliban.

Pakistan's limited experience of creating hybrid formal and traditional justice mechanisms through Muslahathi Committees (Braithwaite & Gohar, 2014) likewise demonstrate that employing restorative justice approaches within a rule of law framework limit local violence, increase the accountability of police to civil society, and play a role in preventing armed conflict. These context-specific responses support the rule of law and transitional justice as promoted in the UNSG's 2013 and 2014 reports, yet they conceptualise regulation in more dynamic, contextualised and locally-salient framework.

A recent survey conducted among the local population in Syria found that despite overwhelming decline in a desire for an internationally brokered peace settlement to end the conflict, there was widespread support for locally brokered ceasefires between warring communities—a strategy that some consider to be the most feasible option to scaling down the violence, the director of the study notes:

> [T]here was also a surprising degree of interest in traditional ceremonies of reconciliation at the local level, *sulha* and *musalaha*, ceremonies which involve apology, compensation, and the re-establishment of relations among neighbours. If the national conflict can be worked out there may be ways for people to use these kinds of local and tra-

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[3] For a model of R2P crisis escalation and response see Sharma and Welsh (2012)

ditional ceremonies to coexists, if not live in harmony. (Hoge, 2015)

These local traditional justice mechanisms discussed in these examples illustrate ways that responsive regulation can be conceptualised to promote justice and prevent atrocity crimes in societies facing high levels of risk of atrocity crimes. By emphasising social, political and historical contingency, this approach is well aligned with research on the micro-dynamics of political violence that is linked to mass atrocity crimes discussed previously in this article, and therefore offers an important resource for considering how international regulation of internal security to prevent atrocities may be conceivable.

This article concludes therefore by suggesting that a constructive research agenda should be built on a fuller consideration of the restorative elements for national peacebuilding and atrocity prevention that gives greater attention to the Pillar One duties of states. Pillar One, it has been argued here, is much more ubiquitous than is currently recognised given the narrow conceptualisation of Pillar One as synonymous with prevention frameworks. A broader conceptualisation of Pillar One should consider these prevention frameworks as useful tools among other options in the larger effort to locate and redirect the historical trajectories of conflict and deeply entrenched repertoires of state security actors to promote sovereign responsibility towards domestic populations.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Understanding Mass Atrocity Prevention during Periods of Democratic Transition

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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of why some countries experience mass atrocities during periods of democratic transition, while others do not. Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important source of stability and protection from mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. But democratic transition itself is fraught with the heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities. Indeed, a number of studies have identified regimes in transition as containing the highest risk of political instability and mass atrocities. What is overlooked is the question of how and why some regimes undergo such transitions without experiencing mass atrocities, despite the presence of a number of salient risk factors, including state-based discrimination, inter-group tension and horizontal inequality. Utilizing a new analytical framework, this article investigates this lacuna by conducting a comparative analysis of two countries—one that experienced atrocities (Burundi) during transition, and one that did not (Guyana). How countries avoid such violence during transition has the potential to yield insights for the mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocity crimes.

Keywords
Burundi; democratic transition; Guyana; mass atrocities; prevention; risk

Issue
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1. Introduction

In 1993, Burundi conducted free and fair elections after nearly thirty years under one party Tutsi-led authoritarian rule. The results heralded a new government under a diverse yet ostensibly Hutu-led party, Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu). Six months later, in an attempted military coup, soldiers abducted and assassinated its president, Melechior Ndadaye, along with Pontien Karibamwi and Gilles Bimazubute, the president and vice president of the National Assembly. This triggered a new wave of violence against both Hutus and Tutsis, and became the precursor to a drawn-out civil war, resulting in further atrocities that resulted in the killing of up to 400,000 civilians. A year earlier in

Guyana, the country also conducted free and fair elections for the first time in nearly thirty years. There, the minority African Guyanese government lost power to the larger Indian Guyanese-dominated party. While the tensions between the two groups remained high, and some post-election violence occurred, regime change took place in a climate of relative calm. Why did Burundi's transition herald mass killing and civil war? And how did Guyana, a country with similar risk factors,[1] manage to avoid such violence?

The purpose of this article is to outline an agenda for studying the relationship between democratic tran-

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[1] By "risk factors" I refer to factors that are commonly understood to be long-term antecedents to mass atrocities.

sition and mass atrocities.[2] Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important source of stability and protection from mass atrocities (Harff, 1998, 2003; Krain, 2000, pp. 45-46). But democratic transition itself is often fraught with heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities (Collier, 2009; Goldstone & Ulfelder, 2004; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000).[3] Both Snyder (2000, p. 88) and Mann (2005, p. 4) point out that nascent democracies, or countries in the early stages of transition from authoritarian rule are particularly at risk of identity-based divisions become the main fault line of electoral competition.

To date, there is limited knowledge on why some democratic transitions give rise to mass atrocities and others do not. Indeed, research into the causes of mass atrocities have overwhelmingly focussed on cases where such violence has occurred, and very limited understanding and emphasis is placed on the conditions that inhibit the perpetration of mass atrocities, despite high-risk conditions (Human Security Report, 2011; McLoughlin & Mayersen, 2013; Straus, 2012). Scholarship in the field of comparative genocide studies has generally overlooked the question of why genocide and other mass atrocities *do not* occur, despite the fact that the preconditions—or risk factors—commonly associated with such violence manifest far more frequently than such violent outcomes themselves (Straus, 2012, p. 343). Incorporating a better understanding of negative cases has the potential to yield fresh insights into prevention. In particular, it considers the question of what local and national actors are doing to mitigate the risk associated with mass atrocities, providing a counterbalance to much of the literature on conflict and mass atrocity prevention, which typically prioritizes external actors (McLoughlin, 2014a, pp. 418-419).

One approach to better understanding the nature of mass atrocity risk during periods of democratic tran-

sition is to conduct in-depth analyses of both positive and negative cases—countries that have embarked on a period of transition, distinguished by the perpetration or avoidance of mass atrocities (see, for example, Mayersen & McLoughlin, 2011; Straus, 2012).[4] My aim in this paper is threefold: to investigate the impact that long-term risk factors associated with mass atrocities have on countries undergoing democratic transition; to better understand how and why such risk becomes more acute during such periods; and finally, to identify and trace the political, economic and social processes that are instrumental in the avoidance of atrocities on the one hand, and in their perpetration on the other. In this article I present an analytical framework which forms the basis of such an investigation. Following this, I use the framework to conduct a brief analysis of one positive case (Burundi) and one negative case (Guyana). The purpose of the comparative analysis is to illustrate, in broad terms, how and why mass atrocity risk escalates and de-escalates during periods of democratic transition.

By conducting such an analysis I do not intend to argue that were it not for certain factors, outcomes in each country would have been dramatically different. Rather, the purpose here is to contribute to the growing body of research within comparative genocide studies, which seeks to redress the over-emphasis on "what goes wrong", by incorporating cases where similar patterns of risk have been effectively mitigated over time (see for example, Mayersen & McLoughlin 2011, p. 248). By doing so, this analysis seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of the causes of mass atrocities during periods of democratic transition, and to gain insights useful for prevention.

2. Background and Analytical Framework

Since the end of the Cold War, many states have sought to transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance. Many western states view this as a favourable development, and have invested considerable resources in support of democratization (DFAT, 2013; DFID, 2013; USAID, 2013). However, there has been a more mixed assessment to democratic transition within the literature on civil wars, genocide and other mass atrocities, due to evidence that transitions can increase the risk of mass atrocities (Collier, 2009; Collier & Rohner, 2008; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000). There is no question that democratic regimes are far less likely to commit mass atrocities than autocracies, (see, for example, Harff, 2003, p. 66, and Rummel,

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[2] I define mass atrocities as widespread and systematic violence targeted against unarmed civilians, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes.

[3] For the purposes of this analysis, I use the terms "democratic transition" and "democratization" to refer specifically to the initial process of moving away from authoritarian forms of rule to a process whereby, to use Linz and Stepan's words, "sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote…" (1996, p. 3). While Linz and Stepan also stipulate that such a transition is complete when the ability to generate new policies is apparent, and the separation of power between executive, legislative and judicial power is apparent, I am particularly interested in the early stages of transition, when such processes are under construction. The reason for this is that scholars have identified the early stages of transition as being time when violence is most likely under certain circumstances. How and why some countries manage to navigate this phase while others do not is the question under investigation here.

[4] The most common approach to understanding the causes of mass atrocities is to compare past cases where such violence has occurred. This is the dominant methodological approach in the field of comparative genocide studies, as Straus (2012, p. 343).

1994, pp. 23-24; 1997, p. 405). However, the process of transitioning authoritarian rule can be perilous. In successive large-*N* studies conducted by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), countries undergoing transition were found to be at greatest risk of political instability—genocide, rebellion, revolution or violent regime change—often characterized by mass atrocities. Another large-*N* study found that when poor countries (a per-capita GDP of less than US$2,750) undergo democratic transition, the risk of rebellion increases considerably (Collier & Rohner, 2008, p. 534), and with it the chances of mass atrocities. In addition, two strong claims emerged from two small-*N* studies: that "murderous ethnic cleansing" is "a hazard in the age of democracy", especially in new democracies (Mann, 2005, pp. 1-2); and that the international push for rapid democratization can lead to "nationalist conflict" if the process is commenced while national institutions are still weak, as it did in Rwanda and Burundi (Snyder, 2000, p. 16).

While this research clearly demonstrates the heightened risks associated with democratic transitions, there are a number of significant oversights. First, very little has been written about how regimes undergoing democratic transition avoid mass atrocities. Countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and Guyana all underwent democratic transitions without experiencing atrocities, despite the presence of risk. Second, although large-*N* studies identified heightened risk, we still do not fully understand what factors reduce risk during transitions.

To better understand why these different outcomes unfolded during democratic transition in these two cases, I use a three-tiered analytical framework. The first tier identifies key structural risk factors associated with mass atrocities: politicized social division, state-led discrimination (including the political and social exclusion of people, on the basis of identity), low economic inter-dependency, horizontal inequalities and prior atrocities (Goldstone & Ulfelder, 2004; Harff, 2003; McLoughlin, 2014).

Building on this, the second and third tiers are tailored specifically for periods of democratic transition. The second tier consists of key claims about the nature of risk during democratic transition, such as a dominant chief executive, factional division (political division on the basis of ethnic, racial or religious identity), and low GDP (Collier, 2009; Goldstone & Ulfelder, 2004; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000).

The third tier identifies local and national sources of resilience, which have the capacity to mitigate risk. These include policies that promote social cohesion, inclusive leadership prior to transition, strong rule of law, diffusion of power, and policies promoting horizontal equality (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997; Human Security Report, 2011; McLoughlin, 2014). The purpose of this part of the analytical framework is to identify and analyse processes of risk mitigation, or the breakdown of risk mitigation, during democratic transition.

3. Case Study Selection and Analysis

The choice of Burundi and Guyana rests on three premises. First, prior to transitions, each country contained structural risk factors associated with mass atrocities. The second is evidence of heightened risk during the transition away from authoritarian rule. For example, in both countries, electoral competition was fought along entrenched identity-based differences that had been a major source of tension (and indeed violence) in the past. The third premise is the point of difference between the two countries—that is, the occurrence (or not) of mass atrocities.

Both countries were subject to authoritarian rule by minority-led parties, whose authority was supported by minority-led militaries. Politicized identity-based tensions in both countries were characterized by two dominant identity groups—minority Tutsis and majority Hutus in Burundi; and in Guyana, between the minority African Guyanese, and the more numerically dominant Indian Guyanese. Minority-led rule fuelled these tensions through state-led discrimination in both countries.

There are also points of difference. While both countries experienced inter-ethnic conflict either in the early stages of independence, or in the final years of decolonization, the atrocities committed in Burundi, mostly against Hutus, far eclipsed the violence in Guyana. Moreover, the tensions in Burundi were further complicated by the violent dynamics unfolding in Rwanda, which had a strong impact on the country's political stability and inter-ethnic relations. Yet despite these differences, the comparative value of these two cases rests in the bipolar nature of identity-based tensions, and the fact that both countries endured almost three decades of authoritarian rule and entrenched discrimination, with minority-led regimes in control. While other countries going through transition at similar times—such as Zambia and Ghana—and indeed would certainly add value to a larger study, the particular configuration of risk in Burundi and Guyana, along with their broad commonalities, contribute to their comparative value.

There are two other benefits of this comparative analysis. First, it provides a platform for exploring why it is that on the one hand the prior atrocities in Burundi were surpassed by the length and severity of violence that ensued in 1993 and beyond; while on the other, it seeks to provide reasons as to why it was Guyana's democratic transition managed to navigate challenges in a way that resulted in the isolated cases of post-election violence falling far short of the limited atrocities committed in the lead-up to independence. Sec-

ond, it provides a lens over the contrasting ways that each country managed a hostile security sector during the early stages of transition; as I explore further below, the behaviour of the armed forces and the police during transition was a crucial dimension to the escalation or de-escalation of risk in both countries. While the circumstances that unfolded in both countries were contextually specific, there are broad lessons for prevention that can be gained, which could provide insights for other countries facing similar risk factors.

3.1. Burundi

From the advent of independence in 1962 to the resumption of free and fair elections in 1993, Burundi contained three long-term risk factors associated with mass atrocities: politicized social division, state-led discrimination, and prior atrocities.

Politicized tensions between Tutsis and Hutus were already acute by the time the territory embarked on independence. While society in pre-colonial Burundi had been unequal, within a royal hierarchy that attributed more power overall to Tutsis (approximately 14 per cent of the population) over the majority Hutus (85 per cent of the population), the Kingdom's princely class, the Ganwa were neither Hutu nor Tutsi, and many Hutus exercised positions of power. Belgian colonial influence made the relations more rigid—while ruling indirectly, they placed all political and economic power in the hands of the Ganwa and Tutsi, further depriving the majority Hutu (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 41-57).

This strict division of power underscored tensions in the initial phase of independence, when Burundi's constitutional monarchy presided over a parliament with both Hutu and Tutsi representatives, in the ruling party, Union pour le Progrès National (Uprona). Despite the initial promise of an ethnically diverse political landscape, the competition for power over key positions spilled into violence. Burundi's first prime minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe (a Hutu), was assassinated by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee in 1965. The king appointed a Ganwa as a successor, a move that angered the majority Hutu parliament. An attempted coup by the Hutu army officers in year was crushed by the Tutsi-dominated army. Soon, however, competition for control of the state was played out between Hutu and Tutsi elements within the government. A Tutsi-led military coup consolidated this power in the hands of Tutsi elites, while at the same time eliminating all Hutu leaders from key positions within the bureaucracy and military (Wolpe, 2011, p. 8). Firmly in control of the security forces, the army launched a coup in 1966, declaring the advent of the First Republic.[5] In the wake of the

coup, the army installed a predominantly Tutsi government, turning Uprona into an instrument for Tutsi control (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 74). While in neighbouring Rwanda Hutus overthrew the monarchy and removed Tutsis from power, in Burundi Tutsi elites maintained their hold on power through repressive military rule that lasted for three decades. This hold on power compounded the grievances felt by Hutus.

From the beginning of the First Republic, state-led discrimination against Hutus escalated and became increasingly entrenched. With the Tutsi elites' gaining control of the mechanisms of state, a range of repressive measures were enacted. Hutus were deprived of parliamentary representation. By the 1980s, seventeen Hutu MPs made up the sixty-five-seat parliament. The exclusion became even more acute in the cabinet, where only four of the twenty ministries were given to Hutus. In Uprona's fifty-two-member Central Committee, only two Hutus were present. There was one Hutu ambassador of the twenty-two posts available; and only two out of fifteen governors were Hutu (Uvin, 2009, p. 10). Yet even among Tutsis, representation was disproportionate. Most of the upper echelons of the military, as well as Burundi's three presidents between 1965 and 1993 were Tutsi-Hima[6] from Bururi province in the southwest of the country (Uvin, 2009, p. 9). This added greater complexity to the discrimination in the country—not only were ethnic Hutus profoundly under-represented in government, but control was firmly the hands of Tutsi elites from one province.

Exclusion was evident in educational opportunities, although both Hutus and Tutsis suffered. Hutus were under-represented at tertiary level, while amongst Tutsis, Bururi province was again disproportionately favoured. Indeed, 60 per cent of international aid for education was reserved for Bururi—Bururi students comprised 15 per cent of the total enrolments at the University of Burundi (Uvin, 2000, p. 10). The most deprived were Hutus. Of the small pool of students who went onto secondary school following primary education, considerably less than half were Hutus. At university level, only a third of enrolments were Hutu (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 108-109). Indeed, allocation of teachers and resources for education at all level varied greatly throughout the country. Bururi received the greatest resources. Other provinces, including Bujumbura City, Makamba, Gitega, Muramvya and Mwaro also received a generous share of resources. Other provinces in the north and the east of the country, received less than half of all teachers and resources, despite comprising more than two thirds of the population (Jackson, 2000, p. 25). Most Hutus were deprived of

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[5] The Second (1976–1987, under Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza) and Third (1987–1993, under Maj. Pierre Buyoya) Republics

were also the result of coups.

[6] Tutsi-Hima are Tutsis who are largely (but not entirely) from Bururi province, known for their anti-monarchical stance (Lemarchand, 1994, pp. 11, 81).

education and opportunities for employment within the state sector (including the army and the police); and these limitations resulted in an inequality of economic opportunity. This uneven distribution of resources had two effects. First, it favoured Tutsis in some provinces, and second, it heightened ethnic rivalry in the north and the east (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 122-123).

The over-representation of Tutsis at tertiary level had a flow-on effect with public sector recruitment, with most bureaucratic positions going to Tutsi graduates (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 65). The public sector was the primary source of wealth and opportunity in Burundi, so the inequality of opportunity that existed at all levels of the education system. This further compounded the exclusion of Hutus, while at the same time fostering a Tutsi elite who had control of import licences and other profit-making opportunities. This discrimination in the education and the public sector had a profound impact on inter-ethnic tensions, in the early 1970s, when it became increasingly clear that many Hutus had no purchase in Burundi's First Republic. As Lemarchand notes, "state-society interactions took the predictable form of increasingly brutal encounters between a Tutsi-dominated army and the Hutu opposition" (1996, p. 80).

Indeed, previous responses by the Uprona regime to Hutu opposition dramatically compounded the risk of atrocities during the transition in 1993. As Harff points out, one of the most the significant impacts on the risk of future atrocities, is prior atrocities (2003, p. 66). There were two instances in Burundi's recent history where atrocities were perpetrated against Hutus. The first was the military regime's resorting to the most brutal tactics to crush dissent in 1972. In April of that year, a loose coalition of Hutus—students, schoolteachers, petty traders, some refuges from Zaire and some elites in Bujumbura—carried out a massacre of Tutsis, numbering in the thousands (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 93-96; Mthembu-Salter, Berger, & Kikoler, 2011, p. 3). The response from Burundi's army was brutal and swift. First, they engaged in counterinsurgency strategies against the rebellion. Then they targeted all Hutus they suspected as having been part of the rebellion. In the process they conducted a pogrom that killed up to 250,000 Hutus, and displaced many more (Abrams, 1995, pp. 147-148; Bowen, Freeman, & Miller, 1973, p. 1; Chrétien, 2003, p. 316; Uvin, 2009, p. 10; Weinstein, 1972, p. 17).[7] Almost all educated Hutus were killed, further depriving them of access to the mechanisms of power.

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[7] The precise numbers killed vary according to different sources. Uvin, for example, estimates over 80,000 were killed, while Chrétien claims that at least 150,000 were killed. Both Weistein and Bowen et al. estimate the deaths to be up to 250,000.

Tensions peaked again in 1988 under new president Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya promised to bring about a rapprochement between Hutus and Tutsis by lifting restrictions on freedom of expression and releasing Hutu political prisoners (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 119). This lifted hopes, but also triggered student strikes, mainly in secondary schools. This led to another increase in tensions, particularly in the western provinces of Ngozi and Ntega, which shared borders with Rwanda, and housed large numbers of Rwandan Tutsi refugees. In Ngozi province in particular, the Tutsi administrator of the Marangara commune invoked violent rhetoric in his efforts to quash what he perceived as "illegal and nocturnal tribalist reunions" among the Hutu community. This rhetoric brought back memories of 1972, further compounding tensions. Violence broke out in neighbouring Ntega, provoking inter-ethnic attacks on both sides. The army intervened, crushing the violence while specifically targeting the Hutu population, including women and children (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 120-127). Casualties numbered around 20,000, according to Human Rights Watch (2009).

These atrocities compounded risk in two main ways. First, they caused mass displacement, in particular resulting in growing refugee numbers in Tanzania. It was amongst the refugee community that Hutu militias gained strength. Chief among these were the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu), which had emerged in the diaspora community in Tanzania after the 1972 mass killings. Hutu groups that initially provoked unrest in 1988 were organized by Palipehutu. Palipehutu were committed to overthrowing the Uprona government, and seeking retribution for the 1972 killings (Uvin, 2009, pp. 11-12). Consequently, they were not interested in power sharing options that could arise from a process of democratization, thus viewing democratization as a threat to their own power. Second, these two atrocities were instrumental in further entrenching cleavages between Hutus and Tutsis, already salient as a result of decades of discrimination and disenfranchisement. With a Tutsi-led military at one end of the spectrum, and Hutu militia groups at the other end, the space for moderate Hutu and Tutsi elites appeared fraught from the outset. While the 1988 atrocities spurred Buyoya to reform Burundi's political landscape, and ultimately embark on democratization, as Lemarchand points out, it also resulted in a "further hardening of ethnic lines" (1994, p. 590). As Burundi was about to embark on its democratic transition, ethnic tensions were becoming more pronounced.

Thus, up until the early 1990s, Burundi's history was one of political repression, in which the Tutsi-dominated military regime discriminated against Hutus, and treated dissent with extreme violence. In other words, Burundi's first three decades of independence were marked by repressive rule, widespread

discrimination, and atrocities. Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania had spawned militia groups such as the Pali-pehutu, while Tutsi refugees from Rwanda had spurred Tutsi elites in Burundi to take a hard line against Hutus.

Burundi's democratic conducting of free and fair elections in 1993 followed a five-year period of liberalization. While there was international pressure for Burundi to democratize, particularly coming from international donors (Snyder, 2000, p. 300), to initiate democratic reform the political will on the part of Buyoya and others in the government, was also strong. Following the 1988 atrocities, Buyoya enacted a number of new policies designed to give greater freedom to all of Burundi's citizens. He included more Hutus in the government, appointing a Hutu prime minister; he introduced a Charter of National Unity, which sought to lift discrimination experienced by Hutus. Most importantly, he introduced a new constitution, which included provisions that placed clear limits on executive power, established the importance of human rights, and sanctioned a multi-party democracy (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 131). The constitution was put to a referendum in 1992 with an overwhelming majority voting in its favour (African Elections Database, 2015). Thus, it was during Buyoya's tenure that the exclusion of Hutus in government and the public sector began to receive redress. Indeed, with the raft of liberalization measures that took place between 1988 and 1993, the country's return to free and fair elections was the culmination of five years of preparation.

However, this push for reform did not put an end to tensions that had remained high after the 1988 atrocities. Instead, between 1988 and 1993, inter-ethnic tensions escalated. Burundi's economic decline contributed to these tensions. From the late 1980s the country endured negative growth and increasing debt, which in no small part was due to a drop in the price of coffee; and imposed structural adjustment policies exacerbated inequalities (Uvin, 2009, p. 11). Pressure from refugee communities also mounted. Burundi's neighbouring countries had been accommodating mostly Hutu refugees since the atrocities in 1972. In 1991 the estimated refugee population was 240,000, mostly living in Tanzania. With limited resources available, it proved to be prohibitively costly—only a few thousand were repatriated prior to 1993 (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 172-173). Complicating things further, some members of the repatriated populations engaged in anti-government violence in late 1991, further deepening the tension that had already existed (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 173).

In addition to this, the 1993 campaign further aggravated tensions between Hutus and Tutsis. During the campaign, electoral competition was characterized by two major parties—the Hutu-supported Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu), and the incumbent Tutsi-led Uprona. Many Tutsis who attempted to join Frodebu were often branded as traitors, and were the target of physical intimidation by Uprona supporters (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 10). Palipehutu's members also sought to further aggravate tensions—the militia increased its infiltrations from Tanzania, while rumours of the army's plans to retaliate with brutal force began to abound (Uvin, 2009, p. 12). Palipehutu's professed goal of Hutu domination, along with its attempts to undermine democratic reform resulted in it not receiving legal recognition as a political party in the lead-up to the elections, which prompted them to further escalate tensions through demonstrations and terrorist attacks (Prunier, 1994, p. 16). In response, many Palipehutu members joined Frodebu, a move which spurred Uprona to accuse the party of being the "legal arm" of Palipehutu. The presence of Palipehutu within Frodebu further cemented this ethnic polarisation in the lead-up to the 1993 election; and indeed, after the election, many local Frodebu leaders throughout the country were also Palipehutu militants (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 10).

At the same time, the one sector that Buyoya was not able to influence in terms of personnel, was the army, meaning that the security sector, which had wielded considerable power, remained under the control of Bururi Tutsis. The military defied changes that Buyoya had initiated to facilitate democratization—there were unsuccessful coup attempts in 1989 and 1992, reflecting the increasingly obstructive role that the security sector were playing (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 565). While the military's chief of staff publicly endorsed the newly elected president Ndadaye, following the 1993 election, mistrust between the army and the new government remained high (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 578). Burundi's internal security was becoming harder to manage.

The election in July yielded a predictable outcome. Frodebu received nearly two thirds of the vote, effectively ending thirty years of Tutsi rule. In a spirit of rapprochement, following the precedent set by Buyoya after 1988, the new president, Ndadaye included a number of Tutsi representatives in the new cabinet, not dissimilar from that of Buyoya from the late 1980s. With the peaceful change of power, Burundi's transition initially inspired great optimism. However, it was at the lower levels of governance that rapid change of personnel took place—provincial governors and communal leaders were almost entirely replaced by Frodebu cadres (Uvin, 2009, p. 13). For the military, the concern of the rapid Frodebu'ization of the government (and fears the military would be next) spurred an attempted coup in October 1993.

The coup that was instigated by the eleventh battalion of the army (and joined by other elements) was ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a new government, but violence soon followed in the ensuing chaos. The battalion apprehended Ndadaye, as well as the

president and vice-president of the national assembly, assassinating them soon after. Other members of the government sought refuge with the French embassy, demanding international protection in the wake of the attempted coup. With the government in hiding, and the army rejecting any request for foreign involvement, the ensuing violence unfolded in a power vacuum (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 14). The assassination of Ndadaye provoked an immediate reaction throughout Burundi. Many Frodebu officials—ostensibly Palipehutu members—organized retaliatory violence against Tutsis, and prepared to mount a resistance against the army by blocking roads and destroying bridges. As in 1972 and 1988, the army also responded, engaging in widespread killing, committing "widespread and indiscriminate repression of ordinary Hutu peasants" (Prunier, 1994, p. 24; Reyntjens, 2005, p. 14; Uvin, 1999, p. 262). Violence committed on both sides resulted in the killing more than 50,000, and displacing up to one million people (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 14; Uvin, 1999, p. 262). Extremist actors on both sides stepped up attack and counter-attack.

While some order was regained in 1994 with a compromise government (consisting of Uprona and Frodebu elements), this soon fell apart after the new president (Ntyamira) was killed in the plane crashed that also killed the Rwandan president Habyarimana, triggering the genocide there. Although Uprona and Frodebu managed to agree on an equal number of ministries by the end of 1994, the new government was marred by growing factional division between the two parties, rendering the government unable to function. Eventually another coup was instigated in 1996, this time initiated by Buyoya. Once again, a similar pattern of violence followed—Hutu militias attacked Tutsi militia groups and army barracks, pre-empting what was perceived to be an inevitable return to anti-Hutu violence. Tutsi militia groups, and the army then terrorized the Hutu population, engaging in disproportionate reprisal attacks (Uvin, 1999, pp. 262-263; Uvin, 2009, pp. 14-15). Tensions were further escalated by unchecked hate propaganda—printed publications often incited anti-Hutu violence, and even printed the names of Hutu government workers to be targeted (Uvin, 1999, p. 262). By 1998 the violence claimed the lives of more than 200,000, and by the 2006 truce up to 400,000 lives were lost, with 800,000 having fled the country (Wolpe, 2011, p. 5).

In accounting for why civil war and widespread atrocities were committed during the transition, risk factors associated with transitions need consideration. The first is executive power. Given the peaceful change of office that occurred after the election, executive power appeared to be functioning as it was meant to in the new democracy. However, factional division was still a salient issue, despite the efforts of both Buyoya's government and the nascent Ndadaye regime, two fac-

tors need further exploration—the continuing factional divisions that characterized the violence; and the weakening of moderate Hutu and Tusti elites as tensions escalated.

Yet this factional division itself was complex. Within the government, there appeared to be greater inter-identity cooperation than ever before. Both the previous and new governments demonstrated an explicit intention to ensure that both Tutsi and Hutu representatives were included. Buyoya's Third Republic government comprised equal numbers of Hutus and Tutsis, as did Ndadaye's 1993 government. On the surface, the growing inclusivity of the government seemed to address previous grievances based on Hutu exclusion. However, given the extent to which Hutus had been deprived of public sector positions since the 1960s, it was the new government's attempt to rebalance personnel in these areas (and the public pressure to do so), which led to elements within the military elites once again marginalizing moderates on both sides, and initiating another coup. The military was the only sector that Buyoya was not able to touch, during his efforts to rebalance political representation and recruitment within the government. The military itself was not simply disproportionately controlled by Tutsis—its leadership was controlled by Tutsis from Bururi. Thus, the threat that the democratic transition posed for military elites was not simply a manifestation of Hutu-Tutsi tensions, rather it was the threat to the hold of power enjoyed by Bururi Tutsis in particular.

The atrocities committed in late 1993 and early 1994 were the product of a complex array of structural risk factors, escalating tensions, and triggered by the attempted coup in which Ndadaye and other newly elected elites were assassinated. The long-term discrimination and repression of Hutus by the Uprona regime in Burundi was the primary driving factor behind the articulation of political competition along ethnic lines during the beginning of transition away from authoritarian rule. Prior atrocities in 1972 and 1988 compounded these grievances, and created a large diaspora population in neighbouring countries, from which extremist Hutu militias emerged. Principal among them was Palipehutu. It was no surprise that the major contender, alongside the incumbent Uprona was a predominately Hutu party, Frodebu. During the campaign, tensions between supporters of both parties were further aggravated by two things—the physical intimidation of Tutsis who actively supported Frodebu, and the infiltration of Palipehutu members within the ranks of Frodebu. Although the initial election went relatively smoothly, the entrenched Tutsi elite became threatened by replacement of personnel with Hutus. Although cabinet initially included many Tutsis, at lower levels within government departments, there almost all positions changed hands to Frodebu supporters. Many newly appointed officials in the provinces were

members of Palipehutu, whose professed aim was retribution for past atrocities. Burundi's military was both indisciplined and increasingly concerned about the Frodebu'ization of the public sector. An attempted coup by one battalion, and the ensuing assassination of Ndadaye triggered an immediate reaction in provinces throughout the country, much of which was organized by local officials who had ties with Palipehutu. This saw Hutus attacking Tutsis. The military then responded, with widespread killing of Hutus.

3.2. Guyana

Guyana embarked on a transition away from authoritarian rule in 1992, with the holding of the country's first free and fair elections since 1964. Prior to this, the country contained three long-term risk factors associated with mass atrocities. The first is politicized tension between the country's two largest identity groups—African Guyanese and Indian Guyanese. Second, during the period of one party dominance between 1964 and 1992, Indian Guyanese endured state-led discrimination, including disenfranchisement, unequal access to public sector positions, particularly in the country's police and military. Political opponents were also disproportionately targeted by the African Guyanese-dominated police. Third, while the country did not endure violence on the scale that Burundi did, Indian Guyanese citizens were subject to widespread violence in 1963 and 1964 after uprisings throughout the country triggered a repressive response from the military, resulting in what Perry Mars has labelled "near-genocidal warfare" (2001, p. 260). Although this violence (less than 1000 civilian deaths) was on a much smaller scale than what had occurred in Burundi—both in 1972 and 1988—this episode nonetheless underscored tensions between both groups over the ensuing decades. Not surprisingly, these tensions found expression in political competition during the resumption of multi-party elections in 1992, with the defeat of the incumbent African Guyanese People's National Congress (PNC) to the Asian Guyanese dominated People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C).

Guyana's first three decades of independence were characterized by tensions between the country's two major identity groups—African Guyanese and Asian Guyanese. Guyana's African population were transported to South America as slaves during Dutch colonial control in the 17th and 18th centuries. Under British control slavery was declared illegal in 1836. The colonial administration in Guyana imported indentured labourers from the Indian subcontinent to replace former slaves in the sugar cane plantations (Hinds, 2010, p. 1). This new wave of Asian migration was a cynical move to subvert the prohibition of slavery—the new migrants earned marginally more than the African slaves had before. The administrators forbade the new-ly liberated African slaves from owning property or engaging in commerce, thus further entrenching their poverty. What unfolded was a duel tiered hierarchy of exploitation, with the newer migrants only slightly better off than the former group. This inevitably triggered tensions, and prompted both groups to organize politically to empower their own (see Wilson, 2012, pp. 77-78).

Tension between African and Indian Guyanese communities was further fuelled by the British colonial rule in the post-war period. Whenever one community staged an uprising, the British administrators tended to recruit members of the other community to suppress them (Mars, 2009, p. 508). When the British introduced universal suffrage in 1953, it retained control of the security forces. With the election of Cheddi Jagan and his socialist (and initially multi-racial but Indian-dominated) PPP, the colonial overseers suspended the constitution and maintained order through the African-dominated police force, under the command of British officers (Jagan, 1997, pp. 124-131; Mars, 2009, p. 510). With the PPP splitting after the 1957 election, African Guyanese leader Forbes Burnham formed the PNC, with political competition emerging along distinct ethnic lines. Election-related tensions increased, and the African-dominated security sector became increasingly at odds with the Indian Guyanese dominated government. Prior to independence, the British changed the electoral system from "first past the post" to proportional voting. This gave the "capitalist" PNC the edge in the 1964 election; successive elections beyond independence in 1966 maintained this status quo (until 1992) through a series of rigged elections. Under Burnham, the African-dominated armed forces enjoyed a close relationship, to the extent that they pledged allegiance to Burnham and the PNC, rather than the country. The combination of a minority-led government and a security sector doing the bidding of that government has strong parallels with the authoritarian system in Burundi.

Indeed, the political dominance of the PNC between 1964 and 1992 was supported by the African Guyanese-dominated military and police. The role the security sector played in support of the PNC government was particularly apparent in the aftermath of elections, which were typically flawed. Disputed election results often triggered post-election protests by Indian Guyanese PPP supporters, and these were frequently met with brutal repression by the police force. Opposition and authority in Guyana had a clear ethnic dimension—political protests were largely Indian Guyanese in character, and were usually repressed (often violently) by African security forces. In order to maintain its hold on power, the PNC invested heavily in the security sector, making Guyana the most militarized state in the Caribbean. As Hinds states, the implication was that the coercive apparatus of the state, under the control of the African Guyanese, functioned as a tool of African ethnic domination (2010, p. 41).

Political power since independence in 1966 has been characterized by competition and tension between African Guyanese—roughly 30 per cent of the population—and Indian Guyanese—comprising approximately 43.5 per cent (Wilson, 2012, p. 88). Between 1964[8] and 1992, Guyana was ruled ostensibly by an authoritarian regime controlled by the predominantly African Guyanese People's National Congress (PNC). As in Burundi, PNC supporters controlled government institutions during this period (Wilson, 2012, pp. 82-85). This control of government by a minority-led party fuelled tensions between government supporters and Indian Guyanese, who were mostly PPP supporters. The PPP was initially a socialist party that attracted support from both main groups, but dissatisfaction by some African Guyanese members at what they perceived as an imbalance in the leadership, spurred the formation of the PNC. Electoral competition became a zero-sum game, with the PPP and the PNC promoting policies that benefitted their ethnic supporter bases. Following a PPP victory in the 1961 elections, victory marches turned violent as their supporters levelled racial insults at Africans in the street. This then led to violent attacks against Africans in Indian-dominated villages; and the following year, many Indian Guyanese came under attack in Georgetown as tensions rose (Hinds, 2010, pp. 9-10). Violence escalated after the colonial administrators changed the electoral system to proportional representation, a move which saw the fortunes of the more favoured PNC rise against the socialist PPP. This underscored the identity-based violence, which grew as the territory moved towards independence.

The violence that erupted at this time was not on a scale that comes close to the atrocities committed in Burundi. Despite this, a violent episode in the 1960s compounded inter-ethnic tensions and made rapprochement and cooperation more difficult in the ensuing decades. In 1963 and 1964, the ethnic violence that erupted resulted in hundreds of deaths and widespread damage to property (Mars, 2001, p. 360). Following PNC control of the government from 1966, a litany of repressive attacks were committed against Indian Guyanese at strikes and political protests. Brutal tactics instigated by the African-dominated police against largely Asian protesters was the pattern of violence to follow, particularly during the years of PNC government control. One impact of this inter-ethnic conflict, particularly the violence that occurred on the eve of independence, was to drive a physical wedge between these two communities. Multi-ethnic villages

were commonplace, but after 1964 these diverse communities no longer existed due to the migration of ethnic communities. This saw the homogenization of regions and communities (Mars, 2001, p. 361). Not only did tensions remain high, but social cohesion suffered.

During the period of one-party rule by the PNC, from 1964 to 1992, Indian Guyanese citizens were subjected to exclusion and discrimination. In successive elections between 1966 and 1992, the PNC held onto power by conducting fraudulent elections (Hinds, 2010, pp. 11-17). This helped the PNC remain in power for more than two decades, despite the PPP having the backing of the more numerically dominant Indian population. One of the consequences of this was the favouring of Africans in the bureaucracy and security forces. Although the PNC ensured that the cabinet remained diverse, with representations from the Indian Guyanese community, the criteria for employment in the state sector became ethnicity as well as party affiliation. This was especially apparent within both the army and the military, where there were few Indian Guyanese represented (Hinds, 2010, p. 49; Wilson, 2012, p. 95).

Given these risk factors, it is not surprising that the introduction of free and fair elections in 1992 heralded political competition characterized by ethnic difference. Guyana's shift away from authoritarian rule was accompanied by ethnic-based factional division, which was reflected by the ethnic character of the two major parties. Because the Indian Guyanese population was larger in number than the African Guyanese, free and fair elections would inevitably herald a change of government. Yet the ranks of the police force and the military continued to be dominated by African Guyanese. Although the PPP attempted to broaden its appeal beyond its ethnic base by rebranding itself as PPP/Civic (PPP/C), the two major parties were still distinctly divided along ethnic lines. This time, the PPP/C's larger support base saw it victorious at the elections, heralding the presidency of Cheddi Jagan. Tensions between the two parties have also continued to simmer ever since, with the PNC supporters refusing to recognize the election results, and taking to the streets to protest. Between 1992 and 2001 in particular, election cycles were accompanied by low-level street violence (Hinds, 2010, pp. 23-25).

While Burundi's transition was stalled from the beginning through a violent backlash instigated by the Tutsi-led military, Guyana's relatively peaceful transition was by no means assured. In both countries rapid and widespread changes to personnel within the public sector took place. During the period of authoritarian rule between 1966 and 1992, public offices, police and military were dominated by African Guyanese, but declared their allegiance to the PNC first and foremost. So, in 1992, Guyana's democratic transition saw an African Guyanese dominated government (that had filled virtually all positions of public power with people of Af-

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[8] This was two years before independence, but this election heralded the government which would steward the territory to self-rule. Prior to this, in 1953, the British administrators introduced democratic representation through a colonial legislative council. The two major parties were formed in this period.

rican background) on the verge of losing far more than an election. To compound these tensions, the after the victorious PPP gained power in the 1992 election, they "initiated a program of witch-hunting against top civil servants suspected of PNC sympathies" (Hinds, 2010, p. 21), much in the same way that Frodebu did.

Yet inter-ethnic tensions in Guyana simmered without dangerously escalating. Here, two sources of resilience had a positive impact. The first is the cooperation of the armed forces with the new government. Between 1985 and 1992, the security forces within Guyana—most importantly, the military and the police—evolved from being a supporter of the PNC, to participating in the transition process, and supporting the newly elected government. Although African Guyanese comprised 90 per cent of the armed forces, the military cooperated with the PPP/C government, allaying fears that they would instigate a coup. As Hinds states, "the upper echelons of the forces remain loyal to the government of the day" (2010, p. 41).

How did the armed forces—previously a tool for the PNC government—defer to the PPP/C government despite the new government's promise to reform the police and the army? One answer to this can be found in the action of the successor to Forbes Burnham, who died in office in 1985. His successor, Desmond Hoyte, came to power at a time when international pressure for Guyana to democratize was growing (Griffith, 1997a, p. 158; Wilson, 2012, p. 84). Hoyte was initially a supporter of Burnham's vision, but after becoming president, he determined that Burnham's leadership had been profoundly flawed, and that many of his "prescriptions and initiatives" had failed (Griffith, 1991, p. 150; Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). This, coupled with international pressure, prompted Hoyte to initiate a raft of reforms to facilitate democratization, improve human rights, and improve Guyana's stagnant economy (Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). The first step was to change the relationship between the PNC and the government. Prior to Hoyte's tenure, all branches of government had played a subordinate role to the PNC. Hoyte ended government funding of the PNC, and in doing so weakened the party's hold on the government (Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). He then reshuffled ministerial portfolios, demoted ministers who had been closely aligned with Burnham, (Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). This paved the way for the resumption of free and fair elections in 1992.

Given the close alignment between his predecessor and the armed forces, the question of how the armed forces would accommodate democratic change was a prescient one. Indeed there were lingering concerns—both domestically and internationally—that the military still retained their loyalty to the PNC, and might declare martial law during the 1992 campaign, in order to facilitate a PNC victory (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275). Hoyte took advantage of the retirement of Major-General Norman McLean, controversially placing an In-

dian Guyanese officer—Joseph Singh—as acting Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Forces. Singh became the first Indian Guyanese to be head of the defence forces (Griffith, 1991, p. 152). In addition, he repealed the National Security Act. The Act, introduced in 1966 allowed for detention without charge for up to three months of anyone who was deemed to be acting in a way "prejudicial to public safety or public order." Although it had never been used, its presence had been a source of fear, particularly among opposition supporters (Griffith, 1991, p. 154).

Hoyte appointed another man of Indian descent—Balrum Raghubir—as Police Commissioner (Griffith, 1991, p. 152; Guyana Times, 2014). In 1989, Hoyte also introduced the Police Complaints Authority Act, in order to address nearly three decades of unchecked police brutality, levelled primarily at the Indian Guyanese population. Complaints were made public, and dozens were investigated each year. In 1989, for example, five police officers were charged with manslaughter after a death-in-custody case (Griffith, 1991, p. 154). Hoyte not only changed the leadership of the police, but also increased its transparency and accountability.

Hoyte's proactive move to bring about these changes precluded any potential internal resistance that might have arisen from a succeeding Indian Guyanese head of state attempting the same changes. While the armed forces was predominantly populated by people of African descent, the multi-ethnic character of the highest ranks was instrumental in ensuring that it was loyal to the democratically elected government, rather than the PNC specifically. This change of culture at the highest level had a strong effect on the political stability of the country during its democratic transition. According to Griffith, Hoyte's decision to change leadership in the police and the army prior to democratic elections in 1992, was crucial to the security forces going beyond their previously narrow allegiance to the PNC government (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275). In addition, Guyana did not have a history of military coups, unlike Burundi. In Burundi, the military had on numerous occasions initiate military coups to change leaders. By contrast, the security sector in Guyana had previously supported the PNC government, but had never enacted regime change through a coup. As such, the military in Guyana did not have the same ubiquitous hold over power that the military did in Burundi. Nevertheless, it was Hoyte's foresight that concluded that the strong relationship between his PNC government and the military needed to be addressed prior to the introduction of democratic elections, and he did this in the only way practically possible—by changing the leadership. It was impossible to alter the entire composition of the army and the police in a few short years, but greater diversity at the elite level saw a change in culture that precipitated a support of the elected government, which would inevitably be PPP-

led. Having heads of police and army that understood and supported this transition was crucial to Guyana's transition (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275).

However, the security forces' elite-level support for the new government did not precipitate a major change in culture through the rank and file. The majority of soldiers and polices continue to be comprised of African Guyanese, which has had implications especially for police-community relations. Many Indian Guyanese continue to place little trust in the police to provide public safety, which has led to many Indian businesses hiring private security firms to protect them from criminal activity (Mars, 2009, p. 514). There are numerous vigilante groups that are active in the country—some of which have been accused of "indulging in physical and verbal abuse of citizens" (Mars, 2009, p. 515). While Hoyte's change of leadership both in the Disciplined Forces and the Guyana Police Force was instrumental in the security sector supporting the democratic change of regime in 1992, identity-based tensions between the police and the community continue.

The second source of resilience is the existence of popular counter-narratives to the ethnic divide, in the form of broad-based alternative political parties. In addition to these two parties, two small but significant minority parties have influenced the national of political competition. The Working People's Alliance (WPA), was a class-based party, appealing to the working class of all ethnic groups in the country. Formed originally in 1974, it remained active after 1992, winning approximately 2 per cent of votes in the 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections (Trefs, 2005, pp. 366-368). The Alliance for Change (AFC) was formed in 2005. It too was multi-ethnic in appeal, and advocated a reform ticket, which attracted 8.1 per cent of the votes at the 2006 election (Wilson, pp. 87-88), and 10.3 per cent in the 2011 election, securing seven seats (out of sixty-seven) in the parliament (BBC, 2011).

Both parties were influential in the way that they offered counter-narratives to ethnocentrism of the two major parties. By doing so, they challenged both parties to also broaden their appeals. The PPP/C had already attempted this with its "Civic" wing. The PNC's reaction to both the PPP/C's rise to power, and the growing popularity of alternative parties was to also broaden its appeal by trying to win a portion of the Indian vote. This did this by establishing a "Reform" wing, which included the membership of prominent Amerindians (Wilson, 2012, p. 36). PNC/R went on to form a coalition called A Partnership for National Union (APNU), which the AFC joined prior to the 2015 election. The APNU presented a more diverse membership, and advocated a "celebration of ethnic diversity" to underpin their governance (APNU & AFC, 2015). At the 2015 election APNU won a majority of seats, precipitating the first change of government since the 1992 election (BBC, 2015). Thus, once the former PNC moved beyond

its appeal as an African Guyanese party to incorporate a broader support base, political competition moved beyond its initial bipolar character. The AFC's multi-ethnic support base—and its counter-narrative to the largely mono-ethnic identity of the two major parties—was instrumental in this shift. The importance of this counter-narrative can be seen in the way that it provided a more inclusive vision of political participation. Previous research on factors that inhibit risk associated with mass atrocities has pointed out that governments and leaders who foster an inclusive ideology—transcending identity-based divisions—can have a strong impact on the mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocities (Mayersen & McLoughlin, 2011, p. 251; McLoughlin, 2014, p. 157; Straus, 2012, p. 357).

Guyana's period of democratization is not without its challenges. Cheddi Jagan's initial promise to continue reforms after the 1992 election stalled once he won office. Subsequent PPP/C-led governments (under the presidencies of Janet Jagan, Bharrat Jagdeo and Donald Ramotar) became more authoritarian in character (Wilson, 2012, p. 97). However, the security forces' loyalty to the government of the day ensured that a popularly elected government would not be brought down by a coup. This represented a significant change in culture within the armed forces, which itself was a product of the foresight of Desmond Hoyte. In addition, no identity group in Guyana holds an absolute majority in terms of population, unlike the Hutus in Burundi. For Guyana this has opened up the possibility of other counter-narratives in the political discourse, led to the election of a multi-ethnic coalition in 2015.

4. Conclusion

Since the introduction of free and fair elections in 1992 and 1993 respectively, the fates of Guyana and Burundi could not be more different. Yet neither the atrocities in Burundi, nor the relative stability in Guyana were inevitable from the outset. While Guyana has avoided large-scale violence, tensions remain high, and sporadic political violence still occurs (Hinds, 2010, p. x). Risk is still salient in Guyana—more than two decades of democracy has not entirely eliminated tensions between the two main groups. Burundi's transition took place in a much more volatile environment, yet the violence that escalated in late 1993 was triggered by a relatively obscure leader of one battalion in the military. The military itself was not subject to changes in personnel in the years leading up to 1993, in contrast to the rest of the public sector. Indeed, at independence, Burundi's prospects looked bright, with Uprona effectively representing both Hutus and Tutsis, under the country's royal head of state. Guyana entered independence following inter-ethnic violence, and a deeply divided political landscape. In accounting for why the move away from authoritarian rule in Burundi

led to widespread atrocities, while similar tensions in Guyana did not escalate violently, this analysis yields three key observations.

First, Burundi's unstable neighbourhood and past atrocities exacerbated risk considerably. A history of atrocities and repression led to highly charged diaspora communities of displaced Hutus in Tanzania and Rwanda, forming militias, seeking to overthrow the Tutsi-led government. The instability and escalating violence in Rwanda further heightened the perceived threat to security that the Tutsi elites experienced. By contrast, Guyana's history of African dominance was not characterized by the same level of violence. Although there was inter-ethnic violence on the eve of independence, subsequent anti-government resistance was mostly voiced through non-violent protests. Harff's claim that prior atrocities are a significant risk factor for future atrocities holds true in these two cases.

Second, political competition in Guyana had another significant dimension during transition. While the return to free and fair elections certainly heightened tensions between those of African and those of Indian descent, non-ethnic alternatives were always visible. During Burnham's tenure, the multi-ethnic WPA provided a counter narrative to the ethnic divide between government and opposition. The AFC later emerged as the main alternative, growing in popularity to win more than 10 per cent of the vote in 2011, and subsequently forming part of a winning coalition in 2015. Such counter narratives not only provided an alternative for the voting public, but they also pressured the two main parties to broaden their own support bases, thus moderating their rhetoric and images. While counter narratives were also initially present in Burundi in the early years of independence,[9] the purging of Hutus from the police force and Uprona, and the military coup in 1966 established Tutsi dominance in both the government and the security forces. During the return to multi-party elections in 1993, only Frodebu and Uprona won seats in parliament, although a small number of minor parties also contested (EISA, 2010). The extent to which the demographic breakdown in both countries contributed to different political outcomes warrants further research. Guyana's population of indigenous and other groups comprised a strong support base for the AFC; and the fact that both Indian Guyanese and African Guyanese communities comprised less than half of the population meant that no group could rely on their own ethnic base alone to secure an outright electoral majority. Burundi's population is less diverse, and more bipolar in character. Yet this alone does not

account for the perpetration of atrocities in 1993. Burundi's pre-colonial history was largely stable, with a monarchical structure that transcended this division. It is also clear during Burundi's transition that extremists on both sides played influential roles, further polarizing electoral competition, and lessening the possibility of cooperation rapprochement.

Third, and most significantly is the similarity in the state of the armed forces in both countries at the advent of democratic transition. Both countries had been ruled by minority-led governments with the overt support of the military. In Burundi, the Tutsi-led military had power over the government, and was responsible for crushing dissent in the most extreme ways, even committing genocide in 1972. In Guyana, the military and police comprised predominantly of African Guyanese. During the period of autocratic rule between 1966 and 1992, it effectively functioned "as a tool of African ethnic domination" (Hinds, 2010, p. 41). It was frequently deployed to counter opposition movements, which were largely comprised of Indian Guyanese (Hinds, 2010, p. 11). Yet in Guyana, the shift of power from the PNC to the Indian-dominated PPP in 1992, did not trigger a military coup and targeted violence as it did in Burundi. Instead, after the defeat of the incumbent PNC in 1992, the armed forces remained loyal to the new government. Indeed the Guyanese armed forces underwent a significant change in culture at the elite level—from being subject principally to Burnham and the PNC, prior to 1985, to being subject to the country as a whole. This change was brought about by Desmond Hoyte, prior to the 1992 elections. In his efforts to add greater balance to the public sector and government, he made the crucial decision to appoint new (Indian Guyanese) leaders in both the Guyanese Police Force, and the Disciplined Forces. Yet the extent to which this change of leadership affected cooperation with the Disciplined forces demands further scrutiny. More research is needed into precisely how the Disciplined Forces transitioned from a staunch supporter of the authoritarian PNC government, to a more transparent and accountable institution. In particular, more research is needed to attain a better understanding of the extent to which the chief of staff himself changed the culture of the Disciplined Forces.

Similar changes to personnel within government and the public sector were implemented by Buyoya prior to the 1993 elections. Crucially, he did not make any changes to the military. While it would have been impossible to overhaul the composition of the military in such a short time, the case of Guyana provides an illustration of the impact that strategic changes to the armed forces at the elite level can have.

This article's comparative analysis of the early stages of transition in both Guyana and Burundi highlights the ways that pre-existing identity-based tensions can

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[9] Two examples stand out. At independence, Burundi was initially a constitutional monarchy, with the monarchy comprising of Ganwa—a princely class that was neither Tutsi nor Hutu. And prior to the 1966 coup, Uprona comprised both Hutus and Tutsi, with the first prime minister being a Hutu.

escalate in the form of multi-party political competition. The processes of risk mitigation in Guyana were not a panacea to these tensions, but understanding them is insightful in better understanding how such tensions can be managed over time. A combination of elite-driven reform and popular (and inclusive) counter-narratives to the old identity-based divisions provided pressure valves during a volatile period of change. New leadership in the security forces helped to facilitate a change of culture at the top, towards supporting a democratically elected government, rather than simply being loyal to the former PNC government. In Burundi, the continuity of dominance that the military maintained into 1993, ensured that the perpetrators of much of the past atrocities maintained their power. Political reform without a change of culture within the military put them and the Frodebu government at odds with each other, with devastating consequences.

This analysis provides a glimpse of the contributing factors of risk escalation and risk mitigation when similar key variables are at play. Improving our understanding of both why atrocities occur, and how mass atrocity risk is mitigated during democratic transition, yields insights for prevention, both in terms of some of the principal actors responsible for avoiding risk escalation, and in terms of an absence of inhibitive factors during times of heightened tension. The concept of prevention itself has seen a shift over the last few years, from being understood as processes that address the causes of potential deadly violence, to strategies that build resilience and mitigate risk (see Ban Ki-moon, 2013). This shift in approach demands that we better understand not only why atrocities occur, but also how and why they are avoided.

Acknowledgments

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Unearthing Truth: Forensic Anthropology, Translocal Memory, and "Provention" in Guatemala

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Abstract
This article deliberately examines the search for truth after decades of conflict in Guatemala. Excavations of mass gravesites and the painstaking exhumation processes carried out by professional forensic anthropology teams continue to allow families to locate lost relatives—reclaiming truth and supporting calls for justice. For Guatemalans, the search for truth now transcends national borders, especially among migrant communities in the United States. The family remains the central unit through which the work of Guatemalan forensic anthropologists is undertaken. In an effort to engender deeper insights about these exhumation processes from a social science perspective, this analysis promotes the use of specific "tools" in Guatemalan forensic anthropology investigations. The first is an exhumations concept map, which yields important questions meant to stimulate meaningful analysis. The second, Story Maps, is a technology application with the potential to mediate digital access to the emerging Guatemalan translocal space. The research in this analysis suggests that these "tools" strengthen Burton's notion of "provention" in Guatemala.

Keywords
forensic anthropology; Guatemala; provention; Story Maps; transitional justice

Issue
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1. Introduction

Guatemala continues to recover from the armed conflict that plagued the country for decades. A brutal civil war that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands saw violence that disproportionately targeted indigenous communities in the Guatemalan highlands. Family members of victims continue to seek the truth and push to hold perpetrators accountable, both in country and among diaspora communities abroad. Exhumations carried out by professional forensic anthropologists have come to embody the search for truth in Guatemalan society given requests by the indigenous to locate their lost relatives. This phenomenon transcends

borders as communities of Guatemalans, particularly in the United States, continue actively to pursue truth. Forensic evidence has proven able to bring closure to indigenous families and successfully establishes detailed scientific records (Snow, Peccerelli, Susanávar, Robinson, & Ochoa, 2008, pp. 91-95). As such, exhumations have become an integral part of the transitional justice context in Guatemala. As Guatemalans emigrate, though so too does their quest for closure—creating a phenomenon of translocalism.

The Guatemalan forensic anthropology engagement over decades introduces a historical perspective to a research inquiry pertaining to the relative newness of transnational life. Like that of Bryceson's research,

the transnational focus in this article is on family members (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002, pp. 3-30). Given the state's lack of acknowledgment regarding the internal violence that terrorized Guatemala's indigenous Maya population, the identification of the disappeared by family members contributes to the transitional justice of the country by challenging impunity and clarifying history (Mazzucelli, 2015).

Transitional justice in the Guatemalan context is defined as the way a society "transitioning" from "repressive rule or armed conflict deals with past atrocities" and, more specifically, how the society "overcomes social divisions or seeks 'reconciliation'" among its diverse peoples (Call, 2004, p. 101). In the practice of transitional justice—a relatively new field in its own right—a recent phenomenon has emerged, causing an intersection of two disciplines that might otherwise be unlikely. Since the late 1980s, the process of exhuming human remains in post-conflict settings for the purposes of building criminal cases, creating a historical account or providing closure for victims' loved ones has gained momentum. This reality has created a space for hard science—namely forensic anthropology and archaeology—in transitional justice practices and literature. Unlike truth commissions and retributive trials, however, forensic anthropology's entry into post-conflict settings as a restorative tool is underrepresented in the existing social science literature. Forensic anthropologists are able to reflect on the use of their trade as it relates to human rights, yet typically through their unique lens. They are able to analyze, for instance, how effectively they can identify a victim, his or her cause of death, age, gender, etc., from their remains. This sort of analysis is extremely useful. However, social scientists typically seek to understand the broader implications for victims, communities, local and state power structures, etc., of the tools utilized to promote transitional justice. Research in this vein, as it pertains specifically to the use of exhumations, requires more attention.

The responsibility inherent in this research is to be aware "that to write social science is not just passively to 'report findings' but to enter into a whole range of power relations. Thus, instead of the disinterested observer we sometimes imagine ourselves to be, we are in fact changing what we observe by the very fact of reporting it, if not in the actual observing itself" (Luker, 2008, p. 8). In Guatemala only several thousand remains have been identified in recent years from among the hundreds of thousands of documented disappearances. The situation has led to sociopolitical cleavages that remain pervasive in Guatemalan society. This reality urges on-going forensic investigation and academic inquiry into exhumations that reveal these "underlying" cleavages. The ambition of state leaders who commit heinous crimes against their populations is to write historical narratives, which forget to relate that violence ever occurred or that the "disappeared ones"

ever existed. In Guatemala, the millions of documents still being microfilmed provide evidence of mass atrocity in records that were kept meticulously over time by state officials (Mazzucelli, 2014; visit to the Guatemalan National Police Historical Archive, with reference to digitized documentation, https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu). As millions of documents are digitized in a broad international cooperation, the site that houses Guatemala's historical memory (Doyle, 2005, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB170) becomes a focal reference place to encourage critical reflection and proactive inquiry beyond the country's borders.

In the spirit of intellectual curiosity, as the authors reflect on the linkages between forensic anthropology and transitional justice, the "social-psychological element, reflected in the notion of reconciliation" is explored in the Guatemalan case (Kauffman, 2005, p. 2). The notion of restorative justice is particularly relevant with its focus "more on transforming social relations so that past atrocities will not take place again" (Crocker, 1999, pp. 43-64), thereby laying a foundation for what may be defined in the 21st century as the emergence of mass atrocity "provention" (Sandole, 2014, pp. 24-26). In citing "provention" to frame our reflections on mass atrocities in Guatemala, the authors reference the research of John Burton, the Australian public servant and academic whose writings pioneered the conflict resolution field for over 40 years during the postwar era. The neologism "provention," introduced by Burton in the conflict resolution literature, is the "prevention of an undesirable event by removing its causes, and by creating conditions that do not give rise to its causes" (Burton, 1990, p. 3). According to Dunn, provention is "a general theory of positive social change, where conflict is a central problem area, where the goal is the dynamic of a peaceful society (constituted at all levels of human behavior), where the relationships are sustained by legitimate mechanisms of reciprocated support and not by coercive measures or by elites, by virtue of their own authority" (Dunn, 2004, p. 128). There is perhaps no context that demonstrates more explicitly the need for "provention" than Guatemala. In thinking about the steps necessary to "remove [underlying] sources of conflict, and more positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control behaviors" (Burton & Dukes, 1990, p. 161), it is critical to recall the internal armed conflict that lasted thirty-six years. Guatemala's internal violence claimed the lives of two hundred thousand people with tens of thousands more "forcibly disappeared" during the latter part of the last century.

Forensic anthropologists have continued to work tirelessly since the end of the conflict to uncover and identify remains, to build evidence for cases ultimately to be levied against perpetrators, and to work bringing closure to families. This work in Guatemala to "respect these spaces that belong to the communities" (Maz-

zucelli, 2015, p. 66) persists as the State refuses to acknowledge past transgressions on a massive scale. It is this work that places the family at the center in the experience of locality in Guatemala, as the transformation of the cultural landscape occurs slowly, thereby speaking in ways to the manner in which "provention" has been framed.

2. Unearthing Guatemala's Twentieth Century Landscape

This article references existing literature in its selection of a cultural approach to analyze the twenty-first century Guatemalan landscape (Henderson, Nolin, & Peccerelli, 2014, pp. 98-99). This approach relies on a postmodern view of culture defined as "a system of meaning and identity that accounts for why and how people in any particular setting act as they do" (Ross, 1997, p. 67). Of central importance is interpretation, which researchers on the ground explain is "based on our knowledge and experience with the mass grave exhumation in Guatemala" (Henderson et al., 2014, p. 99). Reflections on the process to exhume and identify "disappeared ones" (*desaparecidos*) murdered during the twentieth century internal armed conflict in Guatemala, 1960–96, reveal the role of the family as integral to the collection of forensic evidence and the return of bones "to be properly memorialized, thus ending their long years of hiding in plain sight" (Snow et al., 2008, p. 116). In the quest to understand the specificity of the Guatemalan context, particularly to establish the family as the unit of analysis through which its twentieth century's postcolonial landscape is uncovered, psycho-cultural interpretations may, as Taylor explains, provide "inter-subjective meanings which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act" (Taylor, 1985, p. 36).

The relationship between the indigenous and the landscape in Guatemala has been shaped over many centuries by internal violence. The memories of brutality perpetrated initially by European colonizers and, more recently, by the State, especially the Army (Henderson et al., 2014, p. 101) are buried deep in the individual and collective mass consciousness across generations. The graves of those murdered, of the forcibly "disappeared," are waiting to be uncovered by families in remote areas throughout the countryside as well as central locations in urban cemeteries (Snow et al., 2008, p. 89). In 1997, the creation of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) established a non-governmental organization (NGO) that began gradually, in painstaking ways, to establish trust with families by documenting evidence to discover what happened in Guatemala (Peccerelli, 2014). Forensic investigations are undertaken to create spaces to find the disappeared; as a result, evidence is gathered, truth is known, and forced disappearance becomes visible. One case details the story of Mili-

tary Base No. 21, established in 1971, located outside of Cobán, Alta Verapaz (Henderson et al., 2014, pp. 108-110). After its deactivation in 2004, a Regional Training Center for Peace Keeping and United Nations Operations (CREOMPAZ) began to work in a place where victims of forced disappearance lay buried. Names and remains, the identities, of the disappeared remained invisible, hidden underground, for decades.

Family members participate in the excavation process, evoking "the strong connection the survivors have to the dead" (Henderson et al., 2014, pp. 108-110). The experience of locality in Guatemala is that families engage in the grassroots transformation of the cultural landscape as participants in acts of resistance: what is repressed and denied in historical terms is altered in physical space (Henderson et al., 2014, pp. 108-110). Appadurai's insights are in particular respects still relevant: "A good deal of the violence associated with the foundational ritual (Bloch, 1986) is…the force that is required to wrest a locality from previously uncontrolled peoples and places. Put in other terms (de Certeau, 1984), the transformation of spaces into places requires a conscious moment…" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 183). The family is the protagonist in "a conscious moment" during "the process of excavation and exhuming a mass grave" that Henderson et al. argue is "an act of place making for the victims and survivors" (2014, p. 111).

The Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation's (FAFG's) vocation to gather forensic evidence during the process to identify remains establishes a connection to the land that families share. The process of exhumations continues in Guatemala given the overwhelming need to respond to families who "want truth," seek justice, "want the bodies back" just as these families "want everyone to know their families did nothing wrong" (Peccerelli, 2014). The protagonist in Guatemala's narrative of cultural transformation is the family, whose members search for truth "in a country thick with political and legal impunity" (Henderson et al., 2014, p. 101).

In Quiche, north of the country near the border with Mexico, (Mazzucelli, 2015, p. 67) the working space created to attempt even a small mass grave exhumation "requires an active level of engagement with the cultural landscape" (Henderson et al., 2014, p. 110). The journey these indigenous families embark upon in the search for truth as an act of historical reconciliation is part of the story created by Dr. Snow (1928–2014). His work as a pioneering forensic anthropologist (McFadden, 2014, p. 1) inspires the lives of those who devote their lives to uncovering the truth of historic transgressions perpetrated against local communities by states around the globe (Koff, 2005, p. 10). Dr. Snow is respected as the father of a movement to apply scientific inquiry to uncover human rights violations that states from Argentina to Ethiopia continue to ignore (The Economist, 2014). In Latin America, the

continuation of Dr. Snow's work sustains hope to those families who search for their loved ones through exhumations of bones in unmarked graves.

In Clyde Snow's case, the process of identifying victims really emerged in 1979 in the wake of an American Airlines crash that killed 273 people. Snow worked with a computer programmer to develop a program that could match victims' information and dental records with skeletal remains (Vaughn, 2001). This was done under the auspices of an investigation. Yet, the experience also suggests something more. Identifying the victims was the primary goal. Anyone could easily cross-reference any survivors with the flight manifest. Meticulously determining the identity of remains, however, suggests a desire to provide victims' families with some sort of closure. This is very much consistent with forensic anthropology's entry into the transitional justice discipline. Nonetheless, in specific contexts the goal of accumulating evidence has overshadowed the original intent of taking care of the victims' needs. This finding has significant implications in reflecting on the potential to nurture restorative justice and thereby sustain "provention" in the Guatemalan context. Clyde Snow's engagement in the country with that of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation's (FAFG's) team consistently placed the victims' needs and those of the family members at the forefront of their work.

Forensic anthropologists follow in the footsteps of Clyde Snow by writing new chapters in the story that is his legacy to the world. The Guatemala case affirms this legacy as one in which each family in civil society plays a specific role. In light of her work on different continents, Clea Koff explains that, in forensic anthropologist investigations "interacting with the dead, we affect the living: we alter their memory and understanding of past events" (Koff, 2005, p. 260). In this article's inquiry, rewriting history for states takes place at a level under the ground as graves are exhumed. This is a different image of international relations: the bones that speak rely on evidence that nuances more traditional systemic explanations identified by political theorists (Waltz, 1959, pp. 1-15). Moreover, rewriting history by exhumation applies scientific inquiry in a radical departure from the instrumentalist focus on the elite construction of narrative (Jesse & Williams, 2011, pp. 11-12). Koff relates that "it's clear how our work affects the memories of families, as the dubious relief afforded by the contents of a body bag replaces fears and wonderings about missing relatives. At that moment, the event that has been remembered as responsible for the disappearance of a loved one is re-remembered as the event that caused that person's death" (Koff, 2005, pp. 260-261).

3. Integrating Maps to Deconstruct the Guatemalan Context

The exigencies of the Guatemalan case linking forensic anthropology and transitional justice concerns led Dylan Heyden to create an exhumations concept map that represents a starting point in developing a broader understanding of exhumations in general by seeking their deconstruction. The purpose of the map is to guide scholars and practitioners to ask relevant questions and to draw conclusions that touch upon a deeper reality that must inform "provention" efforts in exhumation contexts. The map uses a common metaphor— exhumations as a "tool." It is common to hear this phrase used within the literature (Eppel, 2014). Scholars use this terminology, however, to refer to exhumations as a mechanism. This makes the concept much less tangible. A tool like a hammer or a saw is something that can be more carefully deconstructed. After all, the hammer or saw is made up of certain materials, produced by a certain company, used for specific tasks, and is often not the only tool being used to complete a task. Applying this metaphor to exhumations, the same sort of questions may be asked. The exhumations concept map reflects this reality.

As introduced in this article, Heyden's creation of the exhumations concept map, aims to augment the existing body of work by focusing simply on the use of exhumations in more recent historical post-conflict settings. His research demonstrates that exhumations in general are used in diverse post-conflict environments. Yet, the way exhumations manifest themselves varies greatly, thereby warranting further study. In this context, Guatemala is one of the most important cases in which exhumation processes may be explored further due to the duration of its internal armed conflict as well as its ethnic dimension. A common metaphor that links each separate facet is used—deconstructing the characteristics of exhumations as a "tool" to guide this analysis. The term "tool" is employed quite frequently in the literature in order to refer to exhumation as one of many mechanisms that contribute toward the truth, justice, and reconciliation. However, taking this language literally and thinking about exhumations in a way that parallels a hammer or a saw is useful. Here, for instance, concept mapping is integrated to organize and discuss the importance of the following questions: 1) Who asks for the tool to be yielded?; 2) Who wields the tool?; 3) What is the make or brand of the tool?; 4) How is the tool used in relation to other tools?; and 5) Whether the tool is being used to build or tear down structures? This analysis may be used less to make sweeping normative claims about exhumations; ascribing value judgments is problematic in that this suggests exhumation processes can be replicated elsewhere producing similar outcomes. These claims also fall victim to the problem of defining success and failure for transitional justice, which may vary greatly depending on different actors' preconceived notions of these ideas.

At this juncture, the authors reflect in the constructivist tradition on the applications of Story Maps

(http://storymaps.arcgis.com/en), which, Mazzucelli suggests, may broaden virtually different contexts as digital public spheres. Narratives of indigenous family as well as inter-ethnic relationships in Guatemala may thereby be explored in more depth. This idea relates to a visit by Mazzucelli in Guatemala City to the interactive exhibit "Why Are We the Way We Are?" which highlights inequality and racism throughout the history of the country. The exhibit, based on substantial anthropological and historical research, aims to address the central themes influencing power relations in Guatemala. The historical journey upon which the visitor embarks allows for an understanding of "the construction of inequality and racism as a tool of domination and oppression in order to benefit the country's small economic and political elite" (Paniagua, 2012, p.34). The series of artistic and curator resources are meant "to engage the interest of visitors" thereby provoking their questions pertaining to their own positions on inequality and racism (Paniagua, 2012, p.34).

The exhibit is participatory in its approach with an audience that is directed at ladino (a mix of mestizo or hispanicized) children and young people from the capital. These younger generations generally "do not have access to appropriate opportunities to learn, reflect, and engage in dialogue about issues such as racism, prejudice and inequality," (Paniagua, 2012, p.34) which is a measure of the exhibit's success. Yet, little is known about the follow up to the discussions about racism, prejudice and inequality in the classroom, when everything returns to "normal" in the aftermath of the visit to the exhibit (Paniagua, 2012, p.34). Of greater significance in thinking about the linkages between transitional justice and forensic anthropology is that although the exhibit "presents the armed conflict as a tragic episode which is part of the larger historical framework of oppression and racism of the country," enough information is not offered to allow the visitors to understand that the impunity for these crimes today is evidence of the persistence of racism and inequality (Paniagua, 2012, p.34).

Given the need to follow up about discussions pertaining to racism and inequality in the classroom by pointing to their persistence in society as a result of the internal armed conflict, the uses of Story Maps take on a particular relevance as a fundamental way to strengthen "provention" efforts. This is true within the Guatemalan society as well as on a more transnational scale through the diaspora given its growing participation in the exhumation process. Although the FAFG is just beginning to reflect on ways to serve Guatemalan families in the diaspora, it is possible to reflect on potential applications of Story Maps, to relate the translocal context to a global audience by relying on data that forensic evidence provides (Mazzucelli, 2014, p. 91). The use of Story Maps may achieve such visualizations through careful inclusion of family member testimonies, responses to forensic investigations as the remains of loved ones are identified,

images of local oriented exhumation processes, maps that detail the areas in which exhumations occur, narratives that relate the journeys of family relatives to exhumation sites, multimedia content that speaks to migrant experiences in Guatemalan local communities in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, and text depicting the narrative of translocality as this is established by different family members. The narrative may chronicle the journeys of the diaspora thereby relating locales of origin in Guatemala to destinations families identify as they emigrate. In other words, these journeys may establish the necessary connections that nurture "provention" more broadly in the translocal space. In this context, the selection of Story Maps must be assessed over time with respect to the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) being applied in the mass atrocity response context with particular focus on the ethical and security challenges in question (Mazzucelli & Raymond, 2016, forthcoming).

The migration from Guatemala over the past several decades indicates that, while the family inside the country remains the locus of "provention" concerns, emerging translocal connections among family members in the diaspora assume increasing significance (Mazzucelli, 2015, p. 69). The indigenous Maya and ladino (mixed) peoples may be distinguished as "two migration streams from Guatemala" without reliable empirical data to visualize the breakdown for either stream (Jonas, 2013, p.1). During the 1980s, the close relationship between the internal armed conflict and the economy led to a significant increase in migration for "a combination of political and economic reasons" (Jonas, 2013, p. 2). One reason to focus on the Guatemalan diaspora concerns its cohesive presence as a large congregation in specific areas: 750,000 in Los Angeles; and 250,000 in Langley Park outside DC (Trull, 2015, p. 1). Fredy Peccerelli explains: "Over 1.5 million Guatemalans…are there because of the conflict…have people that are missing…that forcibly disappeared" (Trull, 2015, p. 2). In Langley Park, the Guatemalan locality is produced in the search for the peace that finding the remains of a loved one can provide (Trull, 2015, p. 3).

The term coined by Schiller and her colleagues, namely, "transmigrants," which refers to immigrants who build "social fields by maintaining a wide range of affective and instrumental social practices spanning borders," (Faist, Fauser, & Reisenauer, 2013, p. 12) is relevant in exploring the Guatemalan translocality. The diaspora is a group comprised of members who experienced territorial dispersion over time resulting either from a traumatic experience or specialization in long-distance trade (Cohen, 1997). The Guatemalan diaspora is emerging as a community which, although without propinquity, links "through solidarity to achieve a high degree of social cohesion through a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations" (Faist et al., 2013, p. 15) in the production of translocality.

As the FAFG expands its services to the United States, relations between the Guatemalan locality in country and the one in Langley Park or elsewhere are likely to become more intricate as the need to nurture "provention" deepens. Grassroots activism can persistently contest through place-making what the State continues to ignore. Given its role as the NGO providing forensic anthropological expertise and services to connect these localities in a global context, the FAFG may begin to expand the translocal space that "dignifies victims of enforced disappearance and other violations by uncovering evidence, disclosing their stories, giving them a name and a proper burial, and reuniting them with family members" (FAFG, 2015, p. 2).

The article's findings assert that the FAFG's engagement relies on the "social ties," (Faist, 2004, p. 4) that may be defined as the smallest analytical units in a translocal space. For the purposes of this research, social ties "represent a sustaining and continuing series of pluri-local practices between at least two individuals" (Faist et al., 2013, p. 54). In order to deepen these social ties, the FAFG has a vocation to be present for the Guatemalan diaspora "enhancing respect for human rights by uncovering truth, grave by grave, fostering knowledge about the past and providing tools to promote accountability" (FAFG, 2015, p. 2).

Given the polarization that still exists in the Guatemalan society, there is a danger that the country is likely to remain a "divided nation of "remembers" and "forgetters" for whom the "future continues to look very much like the past" (Kauffman, 2005, p. 24). Story Maps can, through the integration of collected empirical data, make visual, in the emerging context of diasporic interventions, what observers assert: in Guatemala, local efforts—among them exhumations—had the most success in changing "lived experience and perception" (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008, p. 152). In other words, empirical data from the ground may provide a basis to understand the memorialization that exhumation processes embody visually, in yet another way, by reflecting on their meaning geospatially (Ferrand, Thomas III, & Dunning, 2012).

4. Exhumations as a "Tool"

Guatemala is perhaps the most important country in which to begin specific qualitative research on exhumations through a social science lens. Its content is unique with arguably one of the longest sustained periods of internal armed conflict in recent memory. The violence in the country is very much rooted in sociological and ethnic inequalities. Exhumation processes are simultaneously a specific lens with which to explain these issues and an explanatory framework. Inequalities play out in the daily operations of truth seekers while their work helps to elucidate broader transitional justice concerns, including the backlash that has influenced the transitional justice context. Only by speaking with the different actors engaged in exhumation processes, including forensic anthropologists in the field, and, when possible, families, relevant government officials, and others offering services to victims' living relatives, can the purpose of the inquiry be realized. That purpose is to drill down to the local level of analysis within Guatemala to assess the extent to which "provention" is nurtured by evaluating different achievements, challenges, and trends in exhumation processes within families, and the larger communities in which they live, with respect to a broader transitional justice context.

Since exhumations have become so engrained in the transitional justice culture, it is important to understand the process on the ground and, more specifically, how the exhumation process impacts the family within the larger community. The Guatemalan context provides a starting point to assess the relevance of Story Maps and the exhumations concept map (see Figure 1) introduced in this article.


Figure 1. Exhumations concept map.

The following sub-sections reflect, on the five main questions posed in the concept map as these pertain to Guatemala drawing comparisons when helpful to elucidate the exigencies of the local context: 1) who asks for the tool to be used or who initiates exhumations?; 2) who wields the tool or which actors are physically conducting exhumations?; 3) what brand is the tool or what is the mandate and what does it reflect?; 4) what is its relation to other tools or is exhumation being used to support a truth commission or trials and is there any accompanying psychosocial support for victims' families?; 5) is the tool used to build or tear down structures or what are the ultimate long-term impacts exhumations hope to achieve?

4.1. Who Asks for the Tool to Be Used?

Perhaps one of the most telling components of any attempt to incorporate exhumations into a transitional justice process is determining which actors called for their initiation in the first place. This is different than those who physically do the digging. Exhumations are often initiated by international organizations, the State or local actors. This information is important because it clearly explains the origins of the mandate that forensic anthropologists are given in their efforts to discover the truth. Each level also has its own trade-offs.

The local level offers the best ability for families of victims in the most impacted communities to have a voice in the process. In her research on exhumation processes in Zimbabwe, Shari Eppel reflects, "In Zimbabwe, the reburials were a locally controlled process, which occurred when the government responsible for the massacres remained in power" (Eppel, 2014, p. 405). She argues that in spite of the repressive regime that maintained power, the rural community of Matabeleland was able to benefit through locally oriented exhumation processes. Local efforts also have the added benefit of taking into consideration the local contexts, which broader efforts cannot. For instance, Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza argue that in Guatemala, local efforts—among them exhumations—had the most success in changing "lived experience and perception" (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008, p. 152). The authors contend that exhumations specifically are a local endeavor. While by law the exhumation of a clandestine grave cannot proceed without a representative from the Public Prosecutor's office or a judge—sometimes hindering the process—the endeavor is purely local (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008, p. 152). Once remains are recovered and identified, communities organize public reburial ceremonies consistent with local traditions. In the case of Guatemala, the impact the conflict there had on the Mayan community is strong.

Local oriented exhumation processes, therefore, emphasize the necessity for communities to heal and remain consistent with the Mayan *cosmovision* or cos-

mology that proper burial is necessary to maintain the balance of the living and the dead. As Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza reveal, communities, national NGOs, and religious authorities typically fund exhumations. The authors also explain that, at the time the article was written in 2008, the efforts of two forensic anthropologists, which began in the early 1990s, led to 700 persons being identified. The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) documents nearly 200,000 victims over the course of the conflict (CEH, 1999, p. 17). The Guatemala case highlights the potential funding and resource problems that might exist with respect to a conflict of such magnitude, which is one of the difficulties of local exhumation processes.

Besides being less capable of adapting to local realities, state-led exhumation processes require a state-level admission of conflict. In cases where violence was perpetrated by the state itself, as in Chile, Argentina, Peru, or Guatemala, the likelihood of successful state-led exhumations depends largely on the ability of state power structures to transition into ones more likely to admit wrongdoing. This has occurred to varying degrees in Chile, Argentina, and Peru; yet much less has been done in Guatemala (Navarro-García, Pérez-Sales, & Fernández-Liria, 2010, pp. 1-18). This reality makes the need to nurture "provention" critical, notably through exhumation as "place-making" in country while strengthening translocal connections among families that comprise the Guatemalan diaspora.

4.2. Who Wields the Tool?

Once actors decide to instigate exhumation processes, they often decide who will be involved in the physical labor of excavating sites and identifying remains. For the most part, this involves employing highly trained forensics teams; in some cases, locals have assumed responsibility to begin digging up mass graves. The impacts of this can be detrimental to what is, for all intents and purposes, a crime scene. Forensics experts precisely document their findings, which, in some cases, are then utilized in legal proceedings or to support a national truth commission. Forensic anthropologists and transitional justice practitioners are often critical of instances when local actors seek to act on their own. In Guatemala, as the experiences of the FAFG reveal:

> The process of exhuming reveals the truth and evidence required to challenge impunity (EPICA, 1998). Surviving family members and loved ones have the right to know the truth. Losses associated with the disappearance of a loved one are as permanent as is the crime (Boss, 1999). The family member's involvement, whether providing testimony, *antemortum* data, DNA sample, and/ or being present at the exhumation, is cathartic and allows for the mourning process to close (EPAF,

2012). One point the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team (EPAF, 2012) and the FAFG emphasize during every stage of the forensic process is the importance of dignifying the dead. Since the victims of Guatemala's internal armed conflict were reduced to 'bare life', these victims have been buried in clandestine graves without the proper burial according to their spiritual and cultural beliefs (CEH, 1999). The time and effort spent properly exhuming, identifying, then returning the remains to family members disassembles the 'bare life' state the victims were reduced to during the internal armed conflict. (Henderson et al., 2014, pp. 106.)

For the members of the FAFG Team, respecting these spaces that belong to the families means that:

Through forensic and social anthropological processes, the FAFG exhumes the truth of Guatemala's brutal past to fulfill the promise of the fundamental right to life for the victims and survivors, as well as historical clarification. Since 1992, the FAFG has exhumed 6,990 remains in 1,513 investigations throughout the country (Figure 1). At first, the FAFG focused their forensic efforts upon known sites such as rural massacres, but now it is concentrating on the search for the disappeared –*los desaparecidos*– people whose whereabouts and fate are unknown (FAFG, 2010). The epicenter of the search for the disappeared is located at La Verbena cemetery, in Guatemala City, where the FAFG hypothesizes that individuals of forced disappearance during the internal armed conflict are hidden in the depths of bone wells (Snow *et al.*, 2008). (Henderson et al., 2014, p. 106.)

In Guatemala, the FAFG's efforts to centralize the work of exhumation as "place-making" integrate the family into the process without sacrificing the integrity of forensic evidence collection. The Foundation's vocation to provide closure for the families while engaging the judicial process demonstrates a two-pronged approach to "provention" as the focus remains on restorative justice. This inquiry seeks to establish Guatemala as a baseline from which to assess other investigations.

4.3. What Brand Is the Tool?

In the survey of the literature, the degree of universality required among forensic methods in order adequately to identify remains and use findings for evidence purposes was briefly discussed. With this in mind, it is important to consider that in each instance where forensic teams enter a post-conflict setting they are influenced both by their pre-conceived notions of justice and reconciliation as well as their particular mandate. In the cases of both the ICTY in Bosnia and

the ICTR in Rwanda, when both employed forensic teams to carry out exhumations of mass graves, one of the primary purposes of both bodies was to compile evidence that would ultimately be used in criminal proceedings. Consideration for victims is present in varying degrees in both cases. Indeed victims were by no means completely shut out of the process; yet, the mission of justice, first and foremost, is clearly outlined in both mandates.

In contrast, other local oriented processes have created more grassroots community-led ways of dealing with remains once they are identified. Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza explain that in Guatemala:

Once bodies have been…identified, many local communities organize massive public reburial ceremonies. These are moving, impressive affairs, during which hundreds of people turn out to accompany the coffins to the burial ground, prayers are said, food and memories are shared and a marker or memorial is erected (2008, p. 167).

The success in Guatemala of a community-spearheaded exhumation process stands in contrast to the re-traumatization that survivors have undergone in Rwanda. The key variable is definitively context, which speaks most definitively to the profound need to retain the focus on the family in the quest to nurture mass atrocity "provention" as a civil society imperative.

4.4. What Is the Tool's Relation to Other Tools?

The relationship between exhumation processes and other transitional justice "tools" has been implicitly addressed in the previous sections. Two primary functions that exhumations often have support either a truth commission, justice proceedings or, to some degree, both the commission and proceedings. In Chile, the connection was less straightforward. The truth commission prompted exhumation processes, which ultimately led to trials. Guatemala was a little more dysfunctional as well (Navarro-García et al., 2010, pp. 1-18). Yet, in other cases, exhumations represent the first attempt to gather information. Ultimately, because forensics often supports other transitional justice mechanisms, the use of trained forensic experts is critical. Otherwise the information becomes unusable. It is important to note also that very few contexts solely involve exhumation processes. There are also no direct links between exhumations and other mainstream transitional justice processes such as reparations. Yet, as Navarro-García et al. point out, in Latin America a clear connection between psychosocial services and community oriented exhumations does exist (2010, pp. 1-18). This is likely due to the fact that re-traumatization is a main concern, especially with the employment of exhumation processes. The most im-

portant concept is that exhumations are not applied in a vacuum. There exists an inevitable interplay between exhumations and other transitional justice tools.

4.5. Is the Tool Used to Build Up or Tear Down Structures?

The notion of the larger purpose of exhumation processes is perhaps the most complex question to tackle. This is because the question is more theoretical in nature. To understand whether or not exhumations are being utilized along with other tools to build up structures—supporting broader concepts like representative democracy, rule of law or other institutions for peace—or tearing down barriers to reconciliation, goes beyond the other tools that exhumations support. Instead this question seeks to read *between* the lines of a particular mission or mandate. For instance, a reading of Eppel's piece on Zimbabwe reveals her opinion that exhumations in the Matabeleland region of the country were largely successful. The language she uses points to the underlying goals of exhumations in this context: to mitigate potential causes of future conflict. She argues that after reburials, "major family rifts linked to unresolved grief, displaced anger and fear were resolved" (Eppel, 2014, p. 411). In this case, the purpose of exhumations was to tear down structures. In Spain, the goal is similarly to tear down structures, in particular the 'pact of forgetting' and culture of taboo surrounding the civil war that pervades to this day (Rubin, 2014, pp. 105-107).

Perhaps, though, it is unfair to separate the act of tearing structures down and building new ones. In Spain, if exhumations prevail, Spanish citizens may be able to build upon the truth to create a system, not of forgetting, yet, rather, of facing the past. In Guatemala, the dichotomy between building new structures while tearing others down is also present. Consider that reports indicate the majority of victims during the civil war in Guatemala were of indigenous origin (Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008, p. 155). By employing exhumation techniques and revealing this truth, Guatemalan activists are actively tearing down the racism that fueled the conflict in the first place. Simultaneously, communities are marking gravesites and creating structures that memorialize the atrocity. These are structures of memory that communities create to sustain "provention" as a strategic imperative while simultaneously working to mitigate other barriers.

Yet, for organizations like the ICTY and the ICTR, their support of exhumation techniques ultimately relates directly back to supporting the very legal framework from which they originated. By trying criminals for human rights violations in international courts, these organizations give more legitimacy to themselves and the ability of international human rights law to be applied in future contexts. There is unquestionably a degree of concern for local communities in which in-

ternational criminal tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR operate. Still the purpose of exhumations for these organizations ultimately transcends the local, or even state, context to reach the international environment. Building a case in Rwanda is indeed important for the Rwandan people; from a legal perspective, however, this experience creates a precedent for similar criminals elsewhere.

5. Drawing Lessons from the Maps in the Guatemalan Case for a Broader Research Inquiry

Both the concept map and Story Maps elucidated in previous sections represent two distinct tools aimed at 1) producing richer research insights and 2) guiding practitioners in the field, both in order to drill down to the roots of barriers to "provention" in the Guatemalan context. The questions that make up the concept map, for instance, when applied to Guatemala could each represent a starting point for more thorough inquiry. Months of research, for instance, could be devoted to understanding why exhumation processes were initially orchestrated by local actors—not state or international ones—and the sociopolitical and ethnic cleavages that prohibit an authentic state recognition of the conflict. This, however, is beyond the scope of this article. The point is as a research tool these lines of questioning can serve to go beyond surface level examinations that focus strictly on the impacts of exhumations—taking them for granted. Instead the process of deconstructing that this concept map promotes encourages drilling down to the structural roots of conflict and discovering how they can be overcome. This concept map also serves to benefit practitioners in their understanding of local contexts, especially power dynamics. Questions like "what is the tool's relation to other tools" also serves to promote self- awareness of practitioners' roles in the general transitional justice panorama.

Similarly, if Story Maps were integrated in the Guatemalan context, the application would serve a similar purpose. This article has illustrated, for instance, the translocal experience of Guatemalans and the diaspora communities in Los Angeles and Langley. Story Maps have the power to mirror the translocal space on a digital platform, visualizing narratives and data geospatially. Not only could this tool serve to solidify the family as the central unit of analysis; it would also serve as a public resource for those with and without ties to the conflict. Certainly the potential of such a technology to memorialize the conflict in a timeless digital space is in line with the broader goals of "provention"— particularly with respect to achieving an official recognition of wrongdoing.

In Guatemala, families have proven to be central to the work that forensic anthropologists have achieved thus far. There is, however, a tremendous amount of work still to be done. Social science research has also

only begun to scratch the surface of forensic anthropology's role in the broader transitional justice context in Guatemala. While the goals set forth in this article are modest with respect to the amount of research that remains, the authors hope that scholars continue their efforts to unearth truth in a country that so desperately seeks this commitment to clarification in light of past transgressions.

Acknowledgments

Conflict of Interests

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Article

Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator

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Abstract

The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber's terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and NATO's bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities.

1. Introduction

Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic have orchestrated the perpetration of horrendous atrocities until foreign powers intervened to prevent them from doing so any further. The crimes which were perpetrated in Cambodia from 1975 until 1979 only ceased when Vietnam deposed Pol Pot from power and the atrocities which were inflicted by Milosevic's regime in Kosovo in 1999 only stopped after NATO intervened with a large scale bombing campaign. In both situations the humanitarian motivations of the intervention are questionable but they likely prevented much more suffering in the long term (Bazyler, 1987, p. 608; Roberts, 1999, p. 108). These situations raise important questions in relation to mass atrocity prevention and the role foreign powers play in mitigating their occurrence. Looking at

these case studies in comparative perspective provides important insights on a key factor which influences whether pressure from the international community is successful, namely the willingness of the leader to change its policy and stop the perpetration of atrocities. There are striking similarities between the case studies that make for an interesting comparison. Both foreign powers tried to come to a peace agreement before resorting to military intervention (Bellamy, 2001; Burchett, 1981, pp. 148, 160) and both of the leaders faced much stronger forces (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 140; Womack, 2003). However, there is also one crucial difference; while Milosevic eventually was willing to reach a peace agreement with NATO, Pol Pot fought until the bitter end.

Both cases have been studied extensively, but due to the extremely secretive nature of Pol Pot's regime,

much less information is available on the situation in Cambodia, and more specifically on Pol Pot and his decision making process, than there is about Milosevic and his rule throughout the 1990s.[1] While this is undoubtedly reflected in the analysis below, it will be argued that there is sufficient knowledge to analyze what ultimately influenced Pol Pot's decision making process and how this contributed to Pol Pot's unwillingness to yield to pressure from foreign powers, most notably Vietnam.

While the article focuses on the case studies mentioned above, its findings might be relevant for other situations in which the international community aims to mitigate mass atrocities. In 2005, the international community determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. Yet with so many attempts to stop mass atrocities failing miserably for a variety of reasons, it seems worthwhile considering why these leaders made such different choices when they faced military intervention.

Increasingly, scholars have come to believe that the role the individual decision maker plays in determining the course of action of a particular regime deserves more attention (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hagan, 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001). When scholars analyze the individual as a decision making unit it is often assumed that individuals act on the basis of a rational consideration, even when this is bounded by human cognition and emotions (Hanoch, 2002; McDermott, 2004b; Mercer, 2005; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Rosati, 2000; Simon, 1985). This perspective, however, is unable to accommodate the role ideology plays in the decision making process (D'Avray, 2010, pp. 2, 29-31, 43-46). This is especially problematic when the causes of mass atrocities are analyzed since ideology plays an important role in motivating and instigating the atrocities (Alvarez, 2008). Therefore, a more nuanced perspective on rationality is required. Using the work of Max Weber it is argued that a different perspective on rationality, which takes into account the role that ideology may play, can provide additional insights in the decision making process.

Firstly, the role of dictators and ideology in motivating and instigating mass atrocity is examined. By analyzing the situations in Cambodia and the region which was formerly known as Yugoslavia[2], it will be argued

that the leader plays an important role in transforming a situation in which atrocities may be committed, to one in which they are actually perpetrated, thus justifying a focus on the leader when efforts are undertaken to bring these crimes to a halt. The section thereafter focuses on the role of the individual and his rationality in the foreign policy decision making process. The rationality of Pol Pot and Milosevic will subsequently be examined after which an assessment will follow on how this influenced their decision making process when Vietnam and NATO threatened to intervene.

2. Dictators and Mass Atrocity

There were many pre-conditions, which heighten the risk of mass atrocities, present in Cambodia and Yugoslavia. It was each of these leaders, however, that managed to transform these preconditions into a situation in which these crimes were actually perpetrated.

2.1. Preconditions and the Role of the Leader

Several authors have suggested that the most important preconditions are a non-democratic system of government (Fein, 1995; Krain, 2000; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Rummel, 1994)[3], difficult life conditions because of economic or political crises or war (Alvarez, 2001, pp. 68-71; Shaw, 2007, pp. 104-105; Staub, 2000, pp. 369-370; Wayne Nafziger & Auvinen, 2002; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2005), pre-existing schisms among different groups in the population and a history of past atrocities (Harff, 2003; Kuper, 1981; Staub, 2000, pp. 369-372).[4]

A non-democratic leader has less restraints to prevent him from perpetrating mass atrocities (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011, pp. 149-151; Kinne, 2005). He may use the state's resources to influence a nation's collective memory and manipulate the narrative to transform historical enemies into those that have contemporary relevance (Chirot & McCauley, 2010, pp. 64-65; Smeulers & Grünfeld, 2011, pp. 248-249; 265; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2005, pp. 106-109). In addition, he may use economic and political upheaval and redirect the discontent of the population towards particular vulnerable groups (Staub, 1989, pp. 48-49; 2010, p. 174). Finally, the leader may be instrumental in setting up the institutions which facilitate the process of perpetrating atrocity crimes. In this sense, the leader often plays a

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[1] For an overview of the academic debate regarding both case studies see Kiernan (2010) on Cambodia and Ramet on the wars that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (2005).

[2] When I refer to "Yugoslavia" I mean the region which existed between 1918 and 1991 under different names. After Yugoslavia started to fall apart, the roles of the different subregions becomes more important for the analysis, and therefore the article refers in those instances to particular regions by their name e.g. Serbia or Kosovo.

[3] While some authors argue all dictatorships are more prone to commit atrocities, others argue that this is more likely in weak regimes when they are in the process of becoming more democratic. Most scholars agree, however, that stable democracies are least likely to perpetrate these crimes, making the authoritarian nature of a regime—regardless of whether it is weak or strong—an important risk factor.

[4] For an overview of the most important preconditions that have been identified see Harff (2003).

very important role in inciting and instigating mass violence. In the next two sections it will be explained how Pol Pot and Milosevic played such an important role in their respective country.

2.2. Pol Pot in Cambodia

Pol Pot played a crucial role in inciting and legitimizing the crimes that were perpetrated in Cambodia. The country had always been known as the "gentle land" but it had its own troubled history (Jones, 2006, p. 185; Vickery, 1984, p. 7). Cambodia was once home to the great Khmer speaking kingdom Ankor but it crumbled after the 15th century through numerous foreign invasions mostly stemming from its more powerful neighbors Thailand and Vietnam (Chandler, 1998, p. 12; Peang-Meth, 1991, p. 443). The country thereafter became subject to French colonial hegemony, the repressive regime of Sihanouk and eventually Pol Pot rose to power in the wake of heavy American bombing, an economic downturn and through a brutal civil war (Chandler, 2008; Vickery, 1984). By this time, the distraught population in the countryside, which had suffered disproportionately from all the hardship and felt exploited by the more prosperous urban population, were highly susceptible to the message of equality the Khmer Rouge brought to their homes (Hinton, 1998, p. 363; Vickery, 1984, p. 25).

2.2.1. Using Ideology to Legitimize the Crimes and Redirect Anger

The ideology of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge was rooted in this history. The anti-Vietnamese sentiment that was propagated by the elite stemmed partly from the country's historical subjugation (Chandler, 1979, p. 413; Takei, 1998, pp. 60-62). Traditionally most of the Sino and Vietnamese minorities had lived in the cities and as soon as Pol Pot rose to power he ensured that the cities were emptied to avoid further foreign influence, while at the same time dispersing potential opposition (Jackson, 1989, pp. 46-47). In addition, they hoped that emptying the cities would help them to improve the production of rice (Jackson, 1989, p. 48). The Khmer Rouge lived under the mistaken assumption that it had been water management and rice production which underlay the success of the Khmer nation in Ankorean times (Kiernan, 1996, p. 8; Straus, 2001, pp. 54-55). Becker explains how Pol "was preoccupied with returning Cambodia to its rightful place as the descendant of the Ankor Empire" (Becker, 1998, p. 121) and he is quoted as having said "If our people can build Ankor, they are capable of anything" (Chandler, 2008, p. 298). Pol Pot sought to accommodate old traditions and belief systems within his revolutionary ideals (Becker, 1998, pp. 60-61). Under his leadership the Khmer Rouge sought to reclaim land that was tradi-

tionally thought to be Cambodian, the Kampuchea Krom region, but which had been in Vietnamese hands since 1840 (Chandler, 2008, p. 97; Jones, 2006, p. 186).

Pol Pot also relied heavily on the pre-existing animosity between the rural and the urban population. All of the country's problems before the revolution were blamed on the urban classes (Edwards, 2004, pp. 59-60; Hinton, 1998, p. 363). Pol understood whom his audience was and the prejudices they held, and deliberately directed his message to the peasants because he knew they were more susceptible to it than the bourgeoisie (Becker, 1998, p. 122). After he got into power the urban population came to be seen as enemies of the people that needed to be crushed (Edwards, 2004, p. 59; Hinton, 1998, p. 363).

Next to these preexisting cultural proclivities that Pol Pot used, much of the Communist ideology was inspired by other communist regimes, most notably China and the Soviet Union. Pol Pot just sought to implement it more drastically and more rapidly than all the other regimes had done, to counter those elements which had prevented a perfect transition in those societies (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 320; Quinn, 1989b, pp. 219-240). Pol Pot said he was "building socialism without a model", although he recognized being inspired by the thought of Mao Zedong (Becker, 1998, p. 185; Chandler, 2008, p. 256; Morris, 1999, p. 70). In reality, however, he seems to have been heavily influenced by the Chinese and within these modern communist theories sought to accommodate traditional Cambodian animosities (Becker, 1998, pp. 121-122).

2.2.2. Institutions

The Khmer Rouge indoctrinated mainly the young and impressionable through propaganda and harsh, often brutal, training techniques (Quinn, 1989a, pp. 237-239). They were seen as "a blank page", and were sought out because they were pure and receptive to the ideology (Hinton, 1998, p. 363; Midlarsky, 2005, p. 316). In addition, Pol Pot sought out minority groups (particularly from the Northeast) that he knew had grievances which could be exploited (Quinn, 1989a, p. 236).

He used violence against enemies from outside of the country, particularly the Vietnamese, while continuously purging his own party ranks (Quinn, 1989b, p. 180). Most of the latter victims were sent to detention centers such as Tuol Sleng prison which in fact was more of an extermination center than a prison (Fawthrop, 2005, p. 78). Much of the other violence against the population was perpetrated when the cities were emptied and throughout Pol's reign in the communes where the aim was to destroy the old society to create a communist utopia and destroy anyone who might stand in the way of this transformation (Quinn, 1989b). In this institutional set up both victims and perpetrators were thus forced to accept the ideology

and conform to the pre-existing beliefs of the Khmer Rouge. Victims were forced to confess and thus confirm the existence of enemies in society while the perpetrators were indoctrinated and forced to accept the new worldview (Fawthrop, 2005, p. 78; Quinn, 1989a, pp. 237-239).

2.3. Milosevic in Yugoslavia

Milosevic, too, used already existing preconditions to create a situation in which atrocities were actually committed. After the death of Josip Broz "Tito", Yugoslavia faced an economic downturn, a political power vacuum emerged and the end of the Cold War eroded the country's prestigious position as the head of the non-aligned movement, causing the population to become susceptible to the message of new political leaders (Fine, 2006, p. 309; Jovic, 2001, p. 101; Woodward, 1995, pp. 15-17). Noticing how the nationalist rhetoric of Serbian intellectuals resonated with the population, Milosevic decided to use this message to expand his own power. In doing so he contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Kollander, 2004, pp. 7-8).

2.3.1. Using Ideology to Legitimize the Crimes and Redirect Anger

During Milosevic's reign, he used the media to strengthen his own support base and legitimize his policies (Brosse, 2003, p. 5). In his propaganda campaign the history of the Serbian nation was reinterpreted. After Tito's death, his legacy of brotherhood and unity were cast aside and replaced with a more divisive ideology (Jović, 2004, pp. 101-102). A landmark moment in this process was the publication of the SANU memorandum which was leaked to the press. It used the nation's past to foster tensions between different groups in the population. It gave the battle of Kosovo of 1389, that was of mythological importance to the Serbian nation, renewed relevance by drawing parallels between the injustice suffered by the Serbs on the battlefield and the manner in which the Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo were being treated by the Albanian population in more recent decades (Kollander, 2004, p. 8; Morus, 2007a, pp. 149-152). It also resurrected memories of WWII to enflame tensions between the different nations and suggested that the present difficulties Serbs experienced were a mere continuation of their victimization during this time (Morus, 2007a, p. 150).

There is reason to believe that the memorandum was created in collusion with nationalist politicians (Brosse, 2003, pp. 37-38). Milosevic was one of the politicians who used the rhetoric of the memorandum, and the outrage it sparked among the Serbian population, to his own advantage. This became most evident in two speeches, in 1987 and 1989, he held at Kosovo Polje which were widely broadcasted in the media and transformed Milosevic into a unifying force and savior of the Serbian people, thus cementing his power within the party (Brosse, 2003, p. 40; Morus, 2007b, p. 9). During the later speech, Milosevic presented the decision to end Kosovo's autonomy as "late justice" for those who had sacrificed themselves in battle 600 years earlier (Bieber, 2002, pp. 101-102). In this manner he used the already existing history and myths of the Serbian people to advance his own political goals. Serbia's population listened, because his message resonated with them and because Milosevic took charge of their discontent and gave it a direction. He demonized the other nations to unify his own.

2.3.2. Institutions

Milosevic armed Serbs outside of Serbia in the early 1990s and coopted key figures in the Yugoslav army (JNA) (Judah, 2009, pp. 169-170). However, the JNA was plagued by demoralized soldiers and as discipline started to wane, paramilitary groups were erected to supplement the regular forces (Cohen, 2006, pp. 468-469; Mueller, 2000, p. 43). Milosevic pragmatically formed their ranks by emptying the prisons and by recruiting football hooligans and unemployed men willing to plunder (Alvarez, 2006, p. 9; Ron, 2000, p. 297). Milosevic relied on these individuals to commit most of the atrocities and this arrangement conveniently also provided him with "plausible deniability" (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 55-57; Ron, 2000, p. 293). These units were used throughout the wars in the early 1990s and again when violence erupted in Kosovo (Stewart, 2007, pp. 260-261).

3. Ideology and the Decision Making Process

Ideology is thus used by dictators to incite and instigate the crimes, but this does not mean that they actually believe in the message they propagate themselves. Some might be genuine believers while others will simply use it instrumentally. These distinctions however are lost in contemporary theories on the decision making process of individuals in the foreign policy arena. Foreign policy analysis does not sufficiently take the role that ideology plays in the decision making process into account.

3.1. Rationality, Ideology and Foreign Policy Decision Making

Numerous factors determine the foreign policy that a country will pursue but several scholars have placed renewed emphasis on the role the individual leader plays (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann et al., 2001). Dictatorial leaders in particular wield much influence, often making them what Hermann et al. call a "predominant leader" (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 84-85).

Foreign policy decision-making literature has made great strides in pointing out the limits of the rational decision making processes of these individuals. Limits result from the human capabilities to calculate all options rationally, stem from biases and the decision making process can be distorted by emotions (Marcus, 2000; McDermott, 2004a; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Renshon & Renshon, 2008; Rosati, 2000).[5] Considering these limits, it has been argued it is more useful to speak of bounded rationality (Simon, 1985).

Research on the conscious decision making process of individuals, nevertheless, still assumes individuals seek to attain particular preferences if the costs are not too high. The problem with this conceptualization is that it leaves little room for the role ideology may play. Ideology is not the same as a preference because it may cause people to behave in a certain way that actually goes against their preferences (D'Avray, 2010, pp. 2; 29-31; 43-46).

This oversight may be remedied by acknowledging that there are different kinds of rationality, as Max Weber has done. Weber identified four types of social action—action which is oriented to the behavior of others—two of which are rational (Weber, 1964, pp. 113-115). The typology is composed of instrumental rational action, value rational action, action which has an affectual orientation and a last type of action which stems from "habituation or long practice" (Weber, 1964, p. 115). What primarily separates the latter two types from the rational variants of social action is the conscious or voluntary nature of the rational variants, the idea that they are not done unthinkingly (Eisen, 1978, p. 59; Swidler, 1973, p. 38). Since the focus of this article will be on the conscious decision making process of leaders, the focus here will be on the first two types of action.

The first type of rationality, instrumental rationality, resembles what we commonly associate with rational action. According to Weber it is oriented to a "system of discrete individual ends" (1964, p. 115) and in the decision making process the "end means and secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed" (Weber, 1964, p. 117). Alternative means may be considered as well as the alternative consequences of the means used, and the relative importance of different ends (Weber, 1964, p. 117). Priorities may be shifted, and goals may be abandoned when the costs get too high (Varshney, 2003, p. 86).

The second type of rationality is oriented to "a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of ex-

ternal success" (Weber, 1964, p. 115). For the present research it is important to note that in situations of mass atrocities these beliefs are often incorporated in an ideology which can be seen as a system of beliefs (Alvarez, 2008, p. 216; D'Avray, 2010, p. 76). These goals, according to Weber, are pursued regardless of the personal costs it may entail and regardless of what the consequences of the course of action may be (Weber, 1964, pp. 116-117). The person acting out of a value rational orientation feels obliged to act in that matter to fulfill particular "demands" which he believes are required by "duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it consists" (Weber, 1964, p. 116). These goals will thus be pursued with incredible perseverance.

These two types of action are not mutually exclusive. Weber explains it is possible for a person to pursue a value rational goal by instrumental rational means (Weber, 1964, p. 117). In addition, Weber points out that behavior is seldom characterized by merely one type of social action but the analytical framework may serve as ideal types[6] that allow us to ascertain which rationality predominated for a particular individual and how this impacted their behavior. Considering the important role that ideology plays in the perpetration of mass atrocities it is worthwhile investigating how these different types of rationalities underlay the behavior of Pol Pot and Milosevic and how it impacted their behavior.[7] The theory of Max Weber will therefore be applied to assess which rationality dominated for Pol Pot and Milosevic by analyzing the lives and decisions of Pol Pot and Milosevic before they were faced with foreign intervention.

3.2. Focusing on Pol Pot and Milosevic

Not even undemocratic leaders are able to rule alone completely and they always require a small band of influential elite to maintain power (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011, p. 82). The extent to which these confidants are able to shape and influence the decision making process, however, differs. In the case of Milosevic and Pol Pot, there is evidence that ultimately they were the ones making the decisions. In Cambodia, this holds true especially from 1976 onwards, at which point Pol had drawn all power to himself. Khieu Samphan, who was formally head of state but was actually a figurehead of Pol

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[5] Emotions in this sense may affect rational calculation but may also circumvent any rational calculations and dictate behavior altogether (Hanoch, 2002; Kaufman, 1999; Lobel & Loewenstein, 2005, p. 1050).

[6] These ideal types according to Weber, are a "conceptually pure type of rational action…which has the merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity" and may be useful to assess "to which actual action is more or less approximated" (Weber, 1964, pp. 92, 117).

[7] Max Weber's different types of rationality have earlier been applied to the war between Vietnam and Cambodia but from a cultural perspective, rather than one which focuses on the decision making process of the individual (Morris, 1999).

(Chirot, 1994, p. 226; Short, 2004, p. 453), explains how the latter:

"would listen impassively and with immense patience to detailed reports from lower-level officials…[when he] reached a conclusion which satisfied him, he would make his decision, which then became irrevocable. Afterwards he would call a meeting [of members of the standing committee], explaining the problem before them in such a way that, without anyone realising it, the discussion was oriented towards the result he desired…Then he would announce his decision, making it appear that everyone contributed to its formulation. There was no vote. It was stated: 'The collectivity has decided'" (Short, 2004, p. 340).

Milosevic likewise was prone to take all the decisions himself and according to Cohen "his personal views dictat[ed] how all important issues would be resolved" (Cohen, 2006, p. 452; LeBor, 2003, p. 158). A close adviser of Milosevic for instance reportedly explained how "he practically does not need advisers…for in the end everything ends up as what he orders" (Cohen, 2006, p. 452). While each leader, therefore, relied on a small circle of confidants for power, they were ultimately in control of the most important decisions that needed to be taken.

3.3. The Rationality of Pol Pot

In order to assess what kind of rationality predominated Pol Pot's behavior it is important to look at his life story leading up to the war with Vietnam.

3.3.1. The Younger Years

Pol Pot was born as Saloth Sar in the village Prek Sbauv in a family of prosperous farmers (Chandler, 1999, pp. 7-8). During his school years, he was never really interested in politics (Chandler, 1999, p. 18; Short, 2004, p. 42) and his first steps along the ideological path seem somewhat disingenuous. He was first introduced to Communism when he was given a scholarship to study radio-electricity in Paris in 1948 (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 10-11). These were the years when the French Communist movement had reached the zenith of its success, Stalin's personality cult had reached its peak, the Communists were victorious in China and the Korean War had started. As Chandler explains, Pol became a communist "when it was the popular thing to do" (Chandler, 1999, p. 25). Pol seemed unconcerned with his academic career during this time. Although he enrolled in the classes he never completed his examinations and thus lost his scholarship (Chandler, 1999, p. 26; Short, 2004, p. 50; 82). He was preoccupied with the communist movement and came to believe he

needed to devote himself to the revolution. The works of Marx were too complicated for him to completely grasp, but he came to see communism as a way for good to triumph over evil (Short, 2004, pp. 65-66). Socialism and nationalism became intertwined in the minds of the young Cambodians and the purpose became to free Cambodia and turn it into a socialist utopia (Chandler, 1999, pp. 27-31; Short, 2004, pp. 52-58).

After his scholarship was revoked, Pol Pot decided to return to Cambodia to aid the revolution from there (Chandler, 1999, p. 40; Short, 2004, p. 82). Although in Cambodia Vietnamese patronage on the road to independence was resented (Chandler, 1999, pp. 90-91), Pol was not vehemently anti-Vietnamese in those years. A former class mate remembers him stating in 1954 that "the wheel of history" dictated that Cambodians be friendly with Vietnam "which is so much stronger" (Chandler, 1999, p. 45).

He returned to Cambodia having found his destiny and was utterly devoted to the struggle for independence and the socialist revolution (Chandler, 1999, p. 40) but was at this point in time more pragmatic on how this should be obtained and acknowledged that the help of the Vietnamese was indispensable.

3.3.2. Rise to Power

After the country gained independence in 1954, Pol worked as a teacher to cover up his clandestine party work (Chandler, 1999, pp. 43-53) until he is forced to flee to the eastern part of the country after Sihanouk's policies became more repressive. At this point in time he becomes a full time revolutionary (Becker, 1998, p. 11; Chandler, 1999, p. 63). The hardships he had to endure and the sacrifices he made in the next seven years were to harden his ideological zeal. After 1963 Pol met few non-believers which reinforced his self-assurance, his sense of destiny and his paranoia and belief that there were enemies undermining his plans (Chandler, 1999, pp. 64-65).

The prospects of winning the civil war through their guerilla tactics initially seemed bleak and living conditions were harsh; he suffered from malaria and at times needed to walk for days to a new settlement (Chandler, 1999, pp. 80-81, 89; Short, 2004, pp. 145, 172). In early 1970s, however, the tide was turning (Chandler, 1999, p. 85). By 1974 the communists had fought their way to the capital Phnom Penh and had started to create their communist utopia in the areas already under their control (Chandler, 1999, pp. 99-103).

3.3.3. His Reign

They eventually conquered Phnom Penh on April 17 1975. Within twenty-four hours the Khmer fighters evacuated the city, and drove its population into the countryside. Thousands died of exhaustion and malnu-

trition (Chandler, 1999, pp. 1, 103-104). Pol Pot believed their radical collectivization efforts were necessary to achieve complete independence (Valentino, 2004, p. 134). This idea of self-reliance also meant that although the regime maintained friendly relations with China and the Republic of Korea, from whom they also accepted foreign aid, their relationship with the country's neighbors was hostile (Kiernan, 2001, pp. 193-195). It was one of the primary reasons why Pol Pot wanted such a swift and thorough revolution. He believed that "if we run really fast, Vietnam won't be able to catch us" (Short, 2004, p. 293).

The project to reform the country had a prominent racial component and was oriented against minorities, especially the Vietnamese, and seen as part of the ancient struggle between Cambodia and Vietnam (Edwards, 2004, p. 62; Kiernan, 2001, pp. 193-194). The Khmer Rouge viewed Vietnam as alien and domineering and determined to take over their country (Turley & Race, 1980, p. 96). Traitors were defined as "Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds" that had to be eliminated (Kiernan, 2001, p. 192)

Pol Pot purged his own party from those he believed were obstructing the revolution and the victims included many who had been close to the leader for years (Becker, 1998, p. 202; Quinn, 1989b, pp. 197-204). Pol Pot saw "a sickness in the party", stating, "we cannot locate it precisely. The illness must emerge to be examined" but believed that enemies "have been entering the party continuously—perhaps only one person, or two people, they remain" (Chandler, 2008, pp. 267-268) and he sought to eliminate them all. He believed any disagreement to be treacherous (Chandler, 2008, p. 266) and was never prepared to examine the feasibility of his policies, but considered any failings to be the work of traitors (Becker, 1998, p. 192; 201).

In order to recreate the great nation that Cambodia had once been, the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot held on to a totalistic philosophy that dictated that the goals should be achieved "at all costs" (Jones, 2006, pp. 185-186; Kiernan, 2001, pp. 194-195; Valentino, 2004, p. 137). Survivors remember how the phrase "keeping [you] is no gain, loosing [you] is no loss" became common, signaling how human lives were considered worthless (Chandler, 1999, p. 117).

3.3.4. Conclusion: The Value Rational Leader

Pol Pot stumbled upon the communist ideology rather unintentionally but his dedication to the cause was real. In Paris the seeds were sown for Pol's value rational orientation. However, during the early days of fighting, Pol was quite pragmatic and help from the Vietnamese Communists was seen as necessary to achieve their goals (Chandler, 1999, pp. 41-64, 89). In those early days, Pol was trying to achieve the value rational goal through instrumental rational means by cooperating

with the Vietnamese. Throughout the struggle, his ideological zeal seems to have hardened. He was willing to pursue his utopian ideals even when this meant he personally had to endure hardships and the chances of success were slim. As he grew closer to his vision of a better and greater Cambodia, and made sacrifices along the way, his dedication grew stronger and his behavior grew more rigid. He was less willing to compromise and became convinced that everything needed to be done in accordance with the ideology, regardless of what the consequences were in terms of human life. He started to care less about the costs and consequences; an aspect of value rational action that would turn out to be detrimental for Cambodian society and eventually his own position of power.

3.4. The Rationality of Milosevic

When Max Weber's theory on the forms of rational social action is applied to the life of Milosevic a very different picture emerges and a much more pragmatic and opportunistic outlook becomes apparent.

3.4.1. The Younger Years

Milosevic was born on 20 August 1941 in Pozarevac Serbia in a region which had a loaded history because several important battles against the Turks were fought there and because it is the birthplace of the Chetnik resistence movement during WWII. There is no evidence, however, that Milosevic was particularly interested in the history or in Serb nationalist traditions early on (Sell, 2002, pp. 11-12; 72). His mother, who primarily raised him after his father abandoned the family, was a dedicated communist (LeBor, 2003, pp. 7-8). She has been described as ambitious, protective and dominant. She would push Slobodan to excel in school and would dress him up every day "in a fresh white shirt, like a junior version of the communist official she hoped he would be" (LeBor, 2003, p. 13). He became serious and well-mannered although he did not have many friends (LeBor, 2003, p. 13; Sell, 2002, p. 15). A class mate remembers that "even at that time it was clear to me that he was absolutely devoted to his personal ambitions" (LeBor, 2003, p. 14). During his years in high school he met his future wife Mira Markovic. Although the two undoubtedly loved each other, the relationship had a functional element as well since Mira's family was very well connected to the communist elite at the time (LeBor, 2003, pp. 16-21).

After high school he studied law at Belgrade University where it turned out he was a politician at heart, skillfully engaging in party politics (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 22; Sell, 2002, p. 19). During this time he struck up an intimate friendship with Ivan Stambolic and in the years after his studies, his career advanced rapidly because he continuously followed in the foot-

steps of Stambolic (Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 25-26; Sell, 2002, pp. 24-25).

3.4.2. Rise to Power

In 1984, Milosevic became the head of the Belgrade Communist Party as Stambolic moved up to become the president of the Serbian league of communists (LeBor, 2003, p. 58; Sell, 2002, p. 25). When two years later he tried to follow Stambolic as well in becoming the head of the Serbian Communist Party, he only managed to do so because Stambolic threw his weight behind him (Stevanovic, 2004, p. 26). Throughout his rise to power he seemed to adjust his political message to the audience he was catering for. When he dealt with a more progressive audience or people from the West, he portrayed himself as a modernizer but within Yugoslavia, he maintained an appearance as a staunch conservative that stood up for Tito's legacy to maintain political support from especially the older generation (LeBor, 2003, pp. 66-69). This also became apparent when the SANU memorandum was leaked to the press. Stambolic outright rejected the document, but Milosevic started to ride the wave of nationalism, while claiming to remain true to communism. He denounced the memorandum in closed party sessions but refrained from doing so publicly, thus making both the nationalists and conservatives believe he was their ally (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 42; LeBor, 2003, p. 79). Throughout his career, Milosevic never stayed true to any particular ideology. He may have started out as a socialist but eventually it was his nationalist stance which helped to tear Yugoslavia apart (Kollander, 2004, p. 8).

When Milosevic started to use more Serbian nationalist rhetoric, fractures started to emerge in the alliance between Stambolic and Milosevic (LeBor, 2003, pp. 78-83). The final rupture occurred during the eighth session of the Serbian Communist Party where Milosevic betrayed his old friend, forcing Stambolic to step down after he was subjected to an extensive smear campaign in December 1987 (LeBor, 2003, p. 94; Vladisavljević, 2004, p. 196).

After he removed Stambolic from power, Milosevic replaced thousands of officials with his own loyalists and he launched his "anti-bureaucratic revolution" (LeBor, 2003, p. 101; Shigeno, 2004, p. 143). Bureaucracy became a catch all phrase to refer to enemies more generally that were defined through a Serbian nationalist lens (Shigeno, 2004, pp. 143-144). Organized rallies were held throughout the country and the protestors demanded their local leadership stepped down (Gagnon, 1994, p. 150). In 1988 and 1989 this was successful in Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo (Gagnon, 1994, p. 150; Sell, 2002, pp. 81-83). Kosovo's autonomy was subsequently abolished in 1989 and after his speech in the same year, he did not visit the region for another six years (Sell, 2002, pp. 87, 94). Mi-

losevic tried to employ similar tactics in Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia but it caused a backlash; in the 1990 elections, parties which favored decentralization in Yugoslavia won, partly as a response to Milosevic staunch nationalist stance (Gagnon, 1994, pp. 150-153).

3.4.3. His Reign

It was widely believed Milosevic wanted to dominate all of Yugoslavia at this point but through his nationalist stance he inadvertently contributed to its downfall. After the Slovenes and Croats walked out of what would be the last meeting of the League of Communists, Milosevic was clearly upset when he saw his prospects of dominating Yugoslavia disappear (LeBor, 2003, p. 134; Sell, 2002, pp. 95, 104-105). Milosevic then quickly modified his goals; if he could not be Tito's successor and dominate the entire Yugoslavia, he would extend Serbia and at least dominate most of the old territory (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 63).

While the war against Slovenia was brief, Milosevic was unwilling to let Bosnia and Croatia go since they had large numbers of Serbs living in their borders. The wars there would be brutal and last until 1995. Milosevic showed little concern for the plight of his nation as LeBor points out; "the equation was simple enough; war ensured political power, political power demanded war" (LeBor, 2003, p. 146). He also needed the crises to deflect attention from the consequences that were the result of his own mismanagement (Post, 2004, p. 185).

Several demonstrations were organized in opposition to Milosevic's regime in the early 1990s. Milosevic responded by compromising and acquiescing to some of their demands or by coopting the opposition leaders (Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 77-79; 123-137; LeBor, 2003, pp. 161-163; 196-199). Milosevic throughout showed himself capable of compromise when this would ensure his hold on power, an attitude that also predominated when he decided to work towards peace in order to lift the sanctions that were imposed on his regime (Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 188-189; LeBor, 2003, pp. 219-220). As the consequences of the sanctions became more burdensome for Serbian society, unrest among the population started to rise which Milosevic saw as threatening to his continuing hold on power (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 176; LeBor, 2003, p. 220).

In the following years, Milosevic would abandon the Serbs living outside of Serbia. According to Doder and Branson, Milosevic at this time "showed his true colors, abandoning the national dream that had once stirred his people when he realized that it was an impediment to his rule" (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 212; Sell, 2002, p. 228). Milosevic stood by as the Serbs in the Krajina region were cleansed and did not even make arrangements for the thousands of refugees which consequently made their way into Serbia (Sell, 2002, p. 242). He also turned his back on the Bosnian

Serbs; after they repeatedly failed to accept peace plans, Milosevic broke off political and military relations and the media in Belgrade started to demonize them (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 199; LeBor, 2003, pp. 231-234). In addition, he remained passive when NATO started to bomb the Bosnian Serbs, and convinced them it had become necessary to start negotiations (LeBor, 2003, pp. 238-243, 262). According to Kollander, "Milosevic was ultimately convinced that it was in his best interest to abandon the Bosnian Serbs" (Kollander, 2004, p. 15).

As the Bosnian Serbs were losing territory fast, they succumbed to the pressure of letting Milosevic negotiate on their behalf but signed only reluctantly, under the threat of being arrested by Milosevic if they did not do so (LeBor, 2003, pp. 240-241; Sell, 2002, p. 254). The final agreement secured some of the most important elements for the Serbs, including the continuation of their name, *Republica Srpska,* but Milosevic also had made some surprising compromises, such as giving up Sarajevo (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 225; Sell, 2002, pp. 249-254). The Bosnian Serbs were discontent but Milosevic's propaganda campaign worked over time to hail him as a great peacemaker.

3.4.4. Conclusion: The Instrumental Rational Leader

Milosevic acted out of an instrumental rational orientation. His behavior was oriented to obtain discrete individual ends, namely to obtain and maintain power. The desire to obtain power and success was something Milosevic grew up with. His mother was the first women who pushed him to excel and after he met Mira, she further stimulated his ambitions. Growing up, the most important relationships he had also had a functional element to it and he was willing to betray his best friend when this served his best interest. His most important motivators throughout seem to have been success and power, never truly being devoted to any ideology. He grew up in an area that was important for Serbia's past but there is no evidence that this past was ever important for him. He was never a devoted nationalist or communist. He used a different ideological stance for different audiences and as one former associate explains, Milosevic "decides first what is expedient for him to believe and then he believes it" (Cohen, 2006, p. 439). According to Weber, when an individual acts on the basis of instrumental rationality, the expectations of others and the changing circumstances will be taken into account. In addition, the relative importance of the different aims is considered, allowing the individual to shift priorities when costs become too high. Milosevic hoped to dominate Yugoslavia in its entirety but when that was not possible, changed his plans to extend Serbia and rule most of it. Throughout he showed a willingness to compromise and shift his goals.

4. The Intervention of NATO and Vietnam

Pol Pot and Milosevic had different kinds of rationality predominate their decisions but the question remains whether, and if so how, this impacted the choices they made when they were confronted with the threat of military intervention. The two leaders stood at a crucial juncture in their rule when two much more powerful forces threatened to intervene militarily in response to horrendous human rights violations that their regimes had perpetrated in contentious border regions. In the next two sections it will be analyzed how the different types of rationality that predominantly guided the behavior of both of the leaders, influenced their response to these threats.

4.1. Vietnam's Intervention and Pol Pot

The war between Cambodia and Vietnam had been simmering for years before a final offensive, which was to remove Pol Pot from power, was undertaken by Vietnam. Throughout their time in power, the Khmer Rouge had violated the territorial integrity of Vietnam on numerous occasions (Burchett, 1981, pp. 145-162). By 1977 the conflict had escalated to the point where the Khmer Rouge were continuously carrying out large scale attacks against Vietnam. It was followed in April 1977 by a restrained counterattack on the part of the Vietnamese (Burchett, 1981, pp. 147-148). The Khmer Rouge, however, continued their attacks and refused to search for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Burchett, 1981, p. 148).

The situation deteriorated further in the second half of the year (Burchett, 1981, p. 148). The attacks of the Vietnamese in December 1977 were the most severe to date, probably aimed at forcing Cambodia to come to a cease fire but Cambodia decided to break all diplomatic relations instead (Chandler, 1999, p. 142; Short, 2004, p. 377). Vietnam was surprised as the move made their skirmishes public and withdrew its troops on January 1st 1978 under the scrutinizing glare of the world. Cambodia saw it as a victorious moment but its troops had suffered many more casualties in comparison to the much stronger Vietnamese army. Convinced that Vietnam wanted to take over their country they began a "holy war" (Chandler, 1999, p. 143; Short, 2004, p. 378). Pol wanted to "smash them so that they are completely gone from our beloved land" where nothing but "piles of enemy's bones" would remain (Kiernan, 1996, p. 387).

Vietnam tried to initiate once more a peaceful solution on February 5th 1978. Its three-point plan stipulated that:

"1) An immediate end shall be put to all hostile military activities in the border region; the armed forces of each side shall be stationed within their

respective territories, five kilometres from the border.

2) The two sides shall meet at once in Hanoi, or Phnom Penh, or at a place on the border, to discuss and conclude a treaty on mutual respect and a border treaty between the two countries.

3) The two sides shall reach an agreement on an appropriate form of international guarantee and supervision" (cited in Burchett, 1981, p. 160).

The Khmer Rouge never replied (Burchett, 1981, p. 161). Had Pol accepted it, he probably would have been able to cling to power but he was unwilling to let go of the aggressive stance he had taken thus far toward the Vietnamese. In the months that followed Cambodia took the violent initiative and committed gruesome crimes (Chandler, 1999, p. 143; Kiernan, 1996, pp. 388-389).

Pol Pot would argue that victory was inevitable as long as one Cambodian would be able to kill 30 Vietnamese:

"In terms of numbers, [each] of us must kill 30 Vietnamese…That is to say, we lose one against 30. We will therefore need two million troops for 60 million Vietnamese. In fact, [that] will be more than enough…because Vietnam has only 50 million inhabitants…and we will still have six million Cambodians left. We must formulate our combat line in this manner in order to win victory…We absolutely must implement the slogan of one against 30" (Short, 2004, p. 387).

By this time he was no longer concerned with the realistic prospects of success although he occasionally showed that he was aware of how gloomy prospects for victory were. At one meeting in August he said "We can hold on for a certain time…but if the present situation continues, it will become impossible. We can now afford to sustain only partial losses. If things go on as they are, we will face the risk of collapse." (Short, 2004, p. 388).

Early in January 1979 the Khmer Rouge were defeated and Pol Pot had to flee (Chandler, 1999, pp. 156-157). The final offensive made Vietnam a pariah state in the international community. China even launched a brief attack on Vietnam as a punishment for the invasion (Gordon, 1986-1987, p. 66; 71). Even though China had been unwilling to send a delegation of "volunteers" to Cambodia, it had given material support to the Khmer Rouge and was an ally of the regime (Chandler, 1999, p. 153; Gordon, 1986–1987, p. 69). When Pol Pot had to abandon Phnom Penh he believed he would manage to return to power, convinced the Vietnamese would perish in "a volcano of national

indignation" (Short, 2004, p. 397). In these final moments he was remaining hopeful against his better judgment (Short, 2004, p. 397).

The goals that Pol Pot pursued, realizing his socialist utopia and safeguarding the country from Vietnamese domination were sacred and no compromises were possible, regardless of the costs this would entail for him personally. It is certainly possible to overestimate the psychological roots of the conflict over the geopolitical and economic factors but the hatred and determination of Pol Pot seems to have greatly exasperated the crisis (Chandler, 1999, p. 133).

4.2. NATO's Intervention and Milosevic

Like the war between Vietnam and Cambodia, the conflict in Kosovo had been brewing for years. Kosovo was never a primary concern for either the US or the European countries as long as the conflict did not escalate. At the same time, however, they feared that the situation could become highly destabilizing for the region if violence would spiral out of control (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 1, 9). The Bush administration, therefore, warned Milosevic already in 1992 that aggression against the Albanian Kosovars would lead to military intervention on the part of the US, in what was to become known as the Christmas warning. The Clinton administration would reaffirm the commitment of the US in 1993 (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 9) but when Serbian violence against the Kosovar Albanians ensued, they did not follow through (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 189). After Dayton, Washington felt it had lost its leverage over Milosevic as they feared taking a stance might endanger the fragile peace in Bosnia. If they had made a credible early threat of military action or sanctions, some argue it could have caused Milosevic to concede to NATO's demands, but the international community felt too reliant on Belgrade for the successful implementation of the Dayton accords (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 184-188).

In October 1998 Holbrooke, US' special envoy to the Balkans, managed to negotiate an agreement with Milosevic in which the latter consented to withdraw his troops and allow international monitors in the area (LeBor, 2003, pp. 281-282). It dampened the humanitarian disaster as it allowed humanitarian assistance into the region and permitted refugees to return during the harsh Balkan winter, but the agreement did not resolve the conflict and key details were ill defined and held in check by unarmed monitors (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 23; 59-62). The agreement was forged with Milosevic through a combination of threats and promises it would stave off more forceful military intervention (Crawford, 2001–02, p. 510; Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 47). The alliance, however, had no hold over the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and when they exploited the "shift in balance" as Milosevic had

expected, the latter started Operation Horseshoe that sought to have a broad region—shaped like a horseshoe—emptied of its Albanian inhabitants (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 58-59). The massacre at the village Racak became the symbol of the breakdown of the Holbrooke agreement (Roberts, 1999, p. 113).

At that time Milosevic did not take the prospect of NATO bombing very seriously (LeBor, 2003, p. 286). He was unsure whether it would happen at all, given the division among the NATO countries, but believed that even if NATO would actually bomb Serbia, his regime could withstand it and that it could possibly even boost his domestic support when Serbia's citizens rallied around the flag (LeBor, 2003, p. 287). After not following through when Milosevic violated the Christmas warning, once again NATO failed to act on the threat that bombing would occur if Milosevic did not comply with the cease fire. It was a pre-existing trend. Throughout the Yugoslav wars, threats had not been followed up with actions (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 64-66) and, Milosevic reckoned that a bombing campaign, if it would commence, would be "polite" (LeBor, 2003, pp. 286-287).

This was reflected in Milosevic' attitude during the Rambouillet negotiations that followed. He sent a low level delegation that was preoccupied with drinking heavily and singing patriotic songs (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 79). When, however, the Serbs finally did seem serious in their effort to negotiate, the negotiators violated their own ground rules by amending the draft agreement at Serbian request (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 81). It is likely this once more reinforced Milosevic' belief that NATO's ultimatums should be taken with a grain of salt and this was exacerbated by the fact that ground forces were openly ruled out (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 189-190).

NATO's bombings were eventually caused by the refusal of Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. He feared that this would endanger his continued rule as signing the Agreement would mean that he would have largely given up Serbian hegemony in the area and there was no support among the population for such a decision (Hosmer, 2001, p. xii). He expected to be bombed as a result of it, but believed it would be brief and mild. He figured that the fragile alliance in NATO would not hold up when he showed that bombing would actually be counterproductive, that it would not stop the atrocities and he decided to increase the level of violence (Hosmer, 2001, p. xii). He, however, was wrong. NATO's determination actually hardened as the violence increased and, after initially rallying around the flag, it was the backing of his own support base that waned (Hosmer, 2001, pp. xiii-xiv). Milosevic started fearing for his own position and eventually became willing to negotiate when he believed NATO was prepared to execute more severe bombing raids, launch ground troops and when he realized Russia became less willing

to protect the country diplomatically (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 5; Hosmer, 2001, pp. xiii-xxiv).

Milosevic was willing to settle because it allowed him to maintain what was most important to him; power. What Milosevic did to the best of his capabilities is to calculate what was in his own best interest to do. He tried to take the ends, the means and the secondary results rationally into account and weigh them, indicating he acted on the basis of instrumental rationality. He thought about the alternative means to the end but miscalculated when he thought that increased ethnic cleansing would demoralize NATO. When thinking of the relationship between the end and the secondary consequences, he found that the risk for ground troops had become too high and finally decided that, as he was thinking of the relative importance of the different possible ends, power was more important to him than winning the war over Kosovo.

5. Conclusion

Often when atrocities are perpetrated, the dictator plays a crucial role in creating the environment in which these crimes become possible. He incites and legitimizes them and sets up the institutional structure that is necessary for their perpetration. The leader therefore should be an important element in strategies to prevent such crimes. Not every leader, however, is alike. While ideology almost always plays an important part in this process, not every dictator wholeheartedly believes in the ideology he propagates. The extent to which he is truly committed to the ideology, impacts the leader's responsiveness because a different type of rationality may actually be dominating his behavior than the (bounded) instrumental rationality, which is usually assumed to determine his reaction.

History has often shown that the creation of a utopia for a country may result in horrifying atrocities that are difficult to stop or prevent. Some goals are too important to sell out, leading to a total disregard of foreign policy threats to stop the crimes that are deemed necessary by the dictator for realizing the all-important goal. This should not be interpreted unequivocally as irrational behavior. A dictator that acts out of a value rational orientation will be more inclined to disregard the consequences of his policies. He will follow a course of action because he believes it to be the right thing to do, taking for granted any costs that may follow. In this manner the type of rationality that underlies the behavior of a dictatorial leader may be an important element in determining the responsiveness of a dictator to foreign policy measures.

The debate about rationality in international politics should move beyond cognitive limitations on rational behavior to also consider differences in the kind of rationality that dominates a person's behavior. Weber's different types of rationality could help to nuance

and understand the relationship between rationality and foreign policy by not only placing a focus on cognitive limitations but also on the role ideology plays in rational behavior.

The instrumental rational leader will be more calculating and thus more receptive to foreign policy incentives or disincentives from other countries. Nevertheless, this does not mean that his behavior will conform to what can be considered objectively as the most beneficial course of action for him. Human errors and cognitive limitations remain important limitations to rational considerations. It is therefore important for the third party to send unison messages that leave little room for misinterpretation.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

Acknowledgments

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Article

Preventing Mass Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions

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Abstract

Both scholars and international actors frequently stress the important role played by anti-civilian ideologies in escalating risks of mass atrocities against civilians. Yet strategies to combat and counter anti-civilian ideologies remain an uncertain and understudied component of atrocity prevention, and scepticism about their efficacy is to be expected. This paper provides a preliminary framework for thinking about strategies and interventions designed to counter the ideological causes of mass atrocities. First, I briefly clarify what existing research seems to suggest the role of ideology in mass atrocities is, and is not. I caution against cruder or overly strong theses about the role ideology plays, but clarify that whilst ideology's actual causal impact is varying and complex, it is also significant. Second, I clarify what ideological interventions and strategies might be reasonably expected to do, and comparatively assess them against more dominant existing prevention tools to show that their preventive potential is sufficiently high to warrant usage. Finally, I provide guidelines on how the effort to formulate ideological strategies and interventions for preventing mass atrocities should best proceed.

Keywords

discourse; genocide; hate speech; human rights; ideology; mass atrocity; prevention

1. Introduction

Scholars and international actors have frequently identified ideology as a factor which affects the risk of mass atrocities (Alvarez, 2008; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 37; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, p. 375; Malešević, 2006, p. 209; Shaw, 2003, pp. 40-41, 100-123; Straus, 2012a; Valentino, 2004, pp. 71-72). Prominent early-warning or risk assessment models, such as those of Barbara Harff (2003) or the UN Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (United Nations, 2014), also generally incorporate measures of ideology, or ideologically implicated phenomena like propaganda, hate speech, or extremism, into their core monitoring criteria. If ideology plays a significant causal role in mass atrocities, it should be a logical object of study for mass atrocity prevention.[1]

Yet little such study presently exists. Strategies to combat anti-civilian ideologies (Slim, 2007)—via interventions such as peace broadcasting, empowerment and protection of moderate voices, regulation of ideological producers like the media and political parties, or educational efforts designed to cultivate opposition to violence—are weakly formulated in theory, and rarely attempted in practice.[2] Whilst the post-Cold War period has seen a considerable increase in military and economic attempts to combat humanitarian crises, a

[1] For early work, though not orientated around the concept of ideology, see Metzl (1997), Price (2000), Price and Thompson (2002).
[2] Such policies are more prevalent in peacebuilding and counter-terrorism, see Bratić (2008) and Gregg (2010).

self-reinforcing inertia holds back ideological strategies. Given the dearth of knowledge about them, such strategies are understandably seen as carrying uncertain prospects of success, and therefore rarely used. In a vicious cycle, this then results in few cases for the empirical research that would improve understanding of their prospects of success and best practices.

This paper makes the case for escaping this vicious cycle, and turning ideological strategies and interventions into key components of mass atrocity prevention. I argue that on comparative analysis ideological strategies and interventions are not inferior to dominant military, economic and diplomatic policies of prevention, if they are conducted with appropriately modest ambitions and sophisticated planning. We need more prevention tools, not fewer (Bellamy, 2011, p. 6). Ideological strategies are unlikely to independently halt a genocide or mass atrocity on their own, but they have the potential to substantially frustrate campaigns of violence and thereby save lives, whilst carrying fewer risks and lower costs than more radical interventions. They ought to be a key element (one of several) in the atrocity prevention toolkit.

I make this argument in three steps.[3] First, I clarify what existing research seems to suggest the role of ideology in mass atrocities is, and is not. I caution against cruder or overly strong theses about the role ideology plays, but clarify that whilst ideology's actual causal impact is varying and complex, it is also significant. Second, I comparatively assess ideological strategies against conventional prevention tools to show that their preventive potential is sufficiently high to warrant usage. Third, I provide guidelines on how the formulation of ideological strategies and interventions for preventing mass atrocities should best proceed.

My argument here is *not* that ideological interventions and strategies will assuredly end mass atrocities once and for all. But no existing policy or set of policies meets such a high standard. Prevention remains a somewhat experimental endeavour, and the considerable risks involved are warranted only because the consequences of inaction are so severe. It is therefore crucial to formulate prevention policies with extensive and sober attention to risks and contextual complexities, and with a wide range of potential preventive tools under consideration. The ultimate objective should be to generate a panoply of different ideological strategies and interventions to be made available to policy makers, with guidance on how they should be implemented, their prospects of success, and the conditions when they are and are not advisable.

I also emphasise that whilst my argument here is partly normative—advocating ideological strategies—I

do not fully address all relevant normative controversies here. Like all atrocity prevention tools, ideological interventions and strategies can be misused and abused, and carry moral risks, with free speech concerns particularly salient. Such concerns warrant debate, but again, they are not fundamentally deeper or more intractable than those attached to other established prevention policies. They should not stop ideological strategies and interventions from being part of the prevention toolkit.

Throughout this paper, I use ideology to mean *a distinctive system of normative and/or purportedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which shapes their understandings of their political world and guides their political behaviour.* This is a self-consciously broad definition, consistent with key trends in the specialist study of ideology (Freeden, 1996; Gerring, 1997; Hamilton, 1987; Jost, 2006; Knight, 2006) as well as much work on political violence and mass atrocities (Alvarez, 2008, pp. 215-220; Sanín & Wood, 2014, p. 214). It abandons the misleading assumption that ideology always takes the form of highly elaborate theory, immovable convictions, or fanatical dogma. Instead the concept of ideology should be used expansively to grapple with the wide variety of distinctive systems of ideas through which individuals and groups engage in "actual political thinking" (Freeden, 2008, p. 197).[4] I use *ideological strategies* to refer to an overall effort to counter the ideological causes of mass atrocities with respect to a particular context, and *ideological interventions* to refer to the specific tools that may be deployed as part of such a strategy.

2. How Ideology Catalyses Mass Atrocities

A key obstacle to considering exactly *how* ideology catalyses mass violence is the common tendency to confine it to only a narrow range of especially blatant causal roles. Often, both in studies that emphasise ideology's role (Goldhagen, 2010; Kaufman, 2001, 2006) or that express some scepticism (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 44-48; Mueller, 2000; Waller, 2007, pp. 40-53, 102-104, 124, 185) scholars focus on intergroup hatreds, explicit incitement, exterminationist tendencies, or other overt forms of extremism, and portray "ideological" individuals as highly committed "true believers". Ideologies do *sometimes* play such roles, and a few participants in mass violence match classic images of the hate-filled fanatic. But confining our attention to such extreme ideological manifestations results in a very narrow lens of focus. It deflects attention from the broader range of causal links between ideology and mass atrocities, and from the more nuanced range of ways in which ac-

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[3] For a succinct policy-brief on ideological strategies (of which I was the principal author) see Australian Civil-Military Centre & Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (2013).

[4] I shall not focus on conceptual/definitional issues further in this paper, but for clarifications see Leader Maynard (2014, pp. 823-825; 2015, pp. 191-193).

tors can be influenced by ideology (Leader Maynard, 2014).

Close research on perpetrators, like Christopher Browning's (2001) work on Police Battalion 101 or Lee Ann Fujii's (2008, 2009) study of Rwandan genocidaires illustrates the wrongness of crude, monocausal explanations cashed out only in terms of ideological fanaticism and ethnic hatred. But they do not show that ideology, understood more broadly, lacked causal power in shaping perpetrator behaviour—and Browning himself explicitly affirms its importance (Browning, 2001, pp. 150-151, 182, 220-221). Ideologies can encourage violence at far weaker or more ambivalent levels of belief than fanaticism, and through mechanisms beside hatred. And whilst *total internalisation* of an ideology in given individuals is rare, *partial internalisation* is common, with particular atrocity-justifying beliefs, assumptions, frames or ethics influencing perpetrator behaviour (Leader Maynard, 2015). The exact role ideology plays thus varies across individuals according to different degrees of internalisation, and the presence or absence of other motives connected with self-interest, opportunism, experience of coercion, conformity to peer pressure, and so forth (Smeulers, 2008). In general, ideological plays a synergistic and often necessary role in tandem with such motives to link them to violence. So fanaticism may be rare. But all mass atrocities nevertheless possess, as Alvarez (2008, p. 215) argues, "an ideological component that is integral to enabling and facilitating the perpetration of this particular form of group violence."

The body of research supporting this claim is extensive. Amongst the direct perpetrators of atrocities, studies like Omar Bartov's (1994) detailed examination of the letters and diaries of Wehrmacht soldiers, Michael Mann's (2000) biographical analysis of fifteen hundred perpetrators, or Yaacov Lozowick's (2000) study of German bureaucrats under the Nazis, emphasise how internalisation of Nazi ideology was important for participation in genocide. So does the testimony (against their self-interest) of former perpetrators and witnesses, in memoirs like those of the Commandant of Auschwitz Rudolf Hoess (1959) or the Bolshevik-turned-dissident Lev Kopelev (1977), or in interview data collected by Jean Hatzfield (2005) in Rwanda or Orlando Figes (2002) in the former Soviet Union. At the level of elite policy makers, documentary evidence like that collected in John Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov's (1999) compendium of Soviet government texts from Stalin's terror or Jeremy Noakes and Jeffrey Pridham's (1988) similar volume on Nazi atrocities repeatedly illustrate how ideological justifications shaped the decisions to initiate atrocities. Ideology is also highlighted in numerous comparative case studies. Stuart Kaufman (2001) emphasises the importance of elite decisions to deploy, or refrain from, exclusivist and aggressive symbolic politics that resonate with broader populations

in determining whether ethnic atrocities occur. Eric Weitz (2003), Michael Mann (2005) and Scott Straus (2015) all similarly demonstrate how conceptions of states as ethnically pure communities create strong pressures towards what Straus terms "mass categorical violence". And Alex Bellamy (2012b) analyses the role played by recurring justificatory patterns in mass atrocities across cases as wide ranging as the French revolutionary terror, the Armenian genocide, the Boer War, genocide against the Native Americans, Belgian exploitation of the Congo, the Holocaust, Stalin's Great Terror, and a range of Cold War atrocities by capitalist and communist states alike.

Exactly how ideologies causally contribute to violence is complex, however (Leader Maynard, 2014, pp. 825-833). Both the *specific ideologies* of political actors, and the broader *ideological environment* in which those actors exist, shape their behaviour. All political practices, violent and non-violent, occur in certain ideological environments: social worlds characterised by distributions of different ideologies amongst the population and the embedding of those ideologies in institutions and discourses.[5] Such environments are always vitally heterogeneous, but they are nevertheless patterned and analysable. Rather than a chaotic anarchy of disagreement and mutual incomprehension, they have a complex topography defined by certain convergences and divergences in ways of thinking. In these ideological environments, certain things are thinkable and sayable, certain things likely to provoke support from certain groups and opposition from others, certain things likely to be widely believed and others given little credence, certain things comprehensible, resonant, powerful, and fashionable, and certain things ephemeral, turgid, mysterious or dull. Along with the material environment, this ideological environment (plus individuals' own personal ideologies) shapes actors' political behaviour: determining the likely outcomes of certain claims, policies, and events and consequently the costs and benefits political actors perceive as accruing from certain acts. Ideological environments are changeable and constantly changing, in large part through the dissemination of new ideological discourse by influential actors. But as all efforts to change them occur within the existing environment, ideological change occurs by rapid or gradual accretion, building off what has been laid before (Ball, Farr, & Hanson, 1989, p. 3).

Both overall ideological environments and particular ideologies within those environments can, on bal-

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[5] These ideological environments are one aspect of the broader "political environments" described by Wolfsfeld (2004, p. 25). They include but are not exhausted by structures of "norms" in the sense widely studied by international relations theorists (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), since ideologies contain more than just normative beliefs and perceptions.

ance, *catalyse* or *restrain* mass atrocities (Straus, 2012b, 2015). But ideologies or ideological environments shouldn't be thought of as simply pro- or anti-violence in their totality. All ideologies, and thus all ideological environments, contain a broad amalgam of ideas, some of which are conducive to violence, and some of which problematise it. Possibly barring the strongest forms of pacifism, no ideology contains absolutely no material for the justification of mass violence (Ceadel, 1987). Equally, even a mass murderous ideology like Nazism contained some elements (such as an adulation of discipline and order) that restrained violence in certain times and contexts—contributing, for example, to the early emigration rather than mass killing of Jews, the prohibition of rape in the occupied Eastern territories, and the generally lower level of violence in occupied Western Europe (Bartov, 1994, pp. 60-69; Browning, 2004, Ch. 3; Semelin, 1993, pp. 5-20). Most ideologies and ideological environments possess a greater mix of catalysing and restraining elements than Nazism or Pacifism. Ideologies and ideological environments are thus characterised by an aggregate *balance of pressure* at particular points of time, and it is this balance between catalysing and restraining elements which is critical (Semelin, 1993, p. 141; Straus, 2015, pp. 34-41).

Difference in this balance of ideological pressure is a key variable in distinguishing contexts where mass atrocities are a real possibility from those where they are unlikely. This is true between cases: Straus (2015) shows how differences in the ideological environments of Rwanda and Sudan, on the one hand, and Senegal, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire on the other, were critical for genocide occurring in the former but not in the latter. But such ideological variation also matters within cases. Vladimir Solonari (2010, p. 193-199) highlights how varying participation in the persecution of Jews in Romania during World War II was shaped by local Christian attitudes: general indifference facilitated violence against Jews, but violence was lower in areas of ideological opposition (see also Semelin, 1993, pp. 139-140). David Yanagizawa-Drott's (2014) study of the impact of the RTLM radio station in Rwanda likewise demonstrates that areas with greater saturation of Hutu power ideology saw substantially higher violence. And Jacques Semelin (1993) shows how varying levels of resistance to genocide in Nazi occupied Europe similarly rested on the strength of local ideological attitudes opposed to violence against Jews (see also Monroe, 2011).

Importantly, these attitudes did not just matter because they directly encouraged resistance. Knowledge of the ideological inclinations of the local populace shaped decisions by policy makers too: Nazi concerns about, for example, public opinion in Scandinavia encouraged comparatively weak implementation of Holocaust policies in Denmark, Norway and Nazi-allied Fin-

land (Semelin, 1993, pp. 132-133, 137-140). By contrast, (correct) expectations of local sympathy for mass violence against Jews in much of Eastern Europe facilitated the choice for radical exterminationist policies in these areas. So the ideological topography of a society influences the topography of violence.[6] And this topography of violence is analytically and morally important. A more varied topography of violence may not count as a mass atrocity "prevented". But it may mean more areas where dozens, hundreds or thousands of potential victims might be saved.

The specific ideologies espoused by individual actors—whether elite decision-makers, potential direct killers, bureaucratic intermediaries, bystanders, or rescuers and resisters—can catalyse or restrain violence in a wide range of ways. Three cross-cutting distinctions are of particular importance. First, elements of ideologies may actually *constitute* the sincerely internalised beliefs of members of these various categories, but they may also be used for key *instrumental* functions, such as mobilising support, politically legitimating actions to others, providing co-ordinating roadmaps for policy, and so forth (see also Sanin and Wood, 2014). Second, ideologies may shape key emotional and *evaluative* stances, thereby shaping normative beliefs and key value commitments (Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Sanín & Wood, 2014, pp. 220-222), but they may also provide or shape key *descriptive* beliefs about matters of fact (Hochschild, 2001). Indeed the evaluative and descriptive beliefs tend to be heavily interrelated. Hutu power ideology in Rwanda, for example, rested in part on a deep evaluative degradation of the Tutsi and a spread of a genocidal norm permitting mass violence (Fujii, 2004; Melson, 2003). But at least equally critical were descriptive claims that Tutsi *really were* engaging in calculated conspiratorial activities to undermine the state from within, to assist the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front, and to exterminate the Hutu, claims which seemed plausible in light of the broader ideological environment (Semelin, 2005, pp. 171-174; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014, p. 1954). Finally, ideologies may actually *motivate* action, making atrocities appear desirable, but they also *legitimate* action, making atrocities appear permissible. Even if many perpetrators of atrocities have rather mundane, self-interested materialist motives—as some scholars suggest (Gerlach, 2010; Mueller, 2000)—ideology may still be necessary to make violence in pursuit of those motives seem legitimate. Clearly, for example, colonialist atrocities against indigenous peoples were heavily motivated by greed. But mass murder which would have been unthinkable against fellow Europeans was rendered easy in the European empires by ideological notions of the low moral

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[6] It is obviously not the only factor here—levels of control and the nature of local social networks are, for example, also critical, see Semelin (1993), Kalyvas (2006) and Fujii (2008).

status and minimal rights of "natives" (Bellamy, 2012a).

Research on mass atrocities has identified a wealth of different ways in which ideological beliefs justify violence by producing motives and legitimations. I have suggested elsewhere (Leader Maynard 2014, pp. 829-833, 2015, pp. 195-212) that most of these can be organised into a framework of six key recurring "justificatory mechanisms". Ideologies tend to catalyse violence by:

i) encouraging *dehumanised* conceptions of potential victims;
ii) asserting that the victims are *guilty* of crimes and thus deserve to suffer violence;
iii) constructing dangerous *threats* to society, or groups within society, and assertively connecting these threats to potential victims;
iv) engaging in the *destruction of perceived alternatives* to violence, making it seem inevitable or the only option;
v) *valorising violence through virtuetalk*, where violence is framed as demonstrating praiseworthy character traits like duty, toughness, loyalty, patriotism, etc.; and
vi) identifying *future goods* or specifying key political objectives which the violence, it is promised, will yield.

These all encourage people to side-line competing ideological restraints on violence, and provide the claims, impressions, semi-conscious attitudes and frameworks of reasoning that can make violence look like the right course of action (see also Chirot and McCauley, 2006, p. 5). The ideologies of key policy makers of atrocities are typically characterised by all these justificatory mechanisms. And they are disseminated via media, educational and political institutions, and social networks—becoming *to varying degrees* internalised by members of broader groups and societies. Through such ideological dissemination, the ideological environment is thereby altered in ways that raise the likelihood of mass atrocities.

Emphasis of ideology should not involve a denial of other causal factors, and the centrality and blatancy of ideology will vary across cases. Its role is stark in the totalitarian atrocities of Nazi Germany (Bartov, 1994; Koonz, 2003), Stalinist Russia (Arch Getty & Naumov, 1999; Goldman, 2011), Khmer Rouge Cambodia (Chandler 2000; Hinton, 1998; Jackson, 1989) or Mao's China (Bellamy, 2012b, pp. 237-259). In a wide range of other cases, ideology's role is less obvious but still critical. In the Yugoslavian wars, for example, there is good evidence that many killers were motivated more by loot and the internal dynamics of vicious hooliganistic paramilitary groups than by high nationalism (Mueller, 2000). And the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian populations were far less penetrated by long-standing ethnic animosities that is commonly suggested (Gagnon, 2004; Malešević, 2006, pp. 168-184). Yet the patterning of violence remained consistent with its underlying ideological rationale in spite of these other motives and mindsets. Nationalist discourses, myths and rumours conducive to violence were heavily disseminated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the result that these potential perpetrators and their supporters had internalised ideological conceptions that shaped behaviour, including threatening representations of other groups, perceptions that violence was the only acceptable course, and brutal militarist attitudes, especially amongst the paramilitaries (Cigar, 1995; Semelin, 2003, pp. 358-361). And ideology also filled important instrumental roles, being utilised opportunistically by elites to mobilise support, denounce and castigate moderates, and to co-opt paramilitaries and funnel their violence against other ethnicities (Gagnon, 2004; Gordy, 1999). Cross-case variation thus inheres in the different specific ways ideology exerts causal pressure, and the varying strength of that pressure vis-á-vis other factors. Binary frameworks that merely ask whether ideology "does" or "does not" matter, by contrast, are simply too blunt for both scholarly and practitioner analysis.

3. The Need for Ideological Prevention

Even if ideology is a key cause of mass atrocities, it does not necessarily follow that ideological prevention strategies are advisable. International policy makers have often treated the ideological foundations of violence as immutable. The wars in Yugoslavia produced a panoply of such statements, with President Bush describing the conflict as rooted in "age-old animosities [and] century-old feuds", US Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger asserting "this war is not rational. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is hatred; it is not for any set of values or purposes; it just goes on," (Power, 2003, p. 282) and John Major famously stating to the UK Parliament that outside intervention would be futile given the "ancient hatreds" involved (Allcock, 2000, p. 2). Such portrayals are now almost universally rejected in scholarship. But the more nuanced understanding of the role of ideology I have advanced still does not suggest that it is easy to counter ideological catalysts of atrocity. As Benjamin Valentino points out, "influencing the basic structures or attitudes of societies from the outside remains an extraordinarily difficult task…international actors do not yet understand how to build democracies or foster more harmonious relations between groups." (Valentino, 2004, p. 238) Policy makers therefore currently respond to risks of atrocity with a more familiar set of policy tools: military intervention, peacekeepers, economic sanctions, and mediation (and sometimes also international justice mechanisms, and international commissions of inquiry).

But it is the very familiarity of some of these atrocity prevention tools which is the problem, creating a beguiling impression of a powerful, "hard" toolkit of standard responses which states and the UN Security Council can implement. On close comparative inspection, it is not clear that traditional tools for atrocity prevention are superior to ideological strategies. I assume that all tools of atrocity prevention should be kept available to policy makers, and that multi-method co-ordinated approaches are necessary for success. So in identifying the weaknesses of traditional atrocity prevention tools in this section I am not arguing that they should not be used. But they are not of some different order of viability when compared to ideological strategies. It is therefore problematic, given the mediocre performance of standard tools, that they currently crowd out more innovative approaches (de Waal, Meierhenrich, & Conley-Zilkic, 2012, p. 18).

3.1. The Uneven Record of Traditional Prevention Tools

An uncomfortable reality about research on the traditional tools of atrocity prevention is the rather gloomy picture it paints of all of them. Almost all these tools suffer from "rally round the flag effects", being utilised by local political elites to legitimate their regime and generate national and regional solidarity against outsiders, perversely increasing atrocity perpetrators' power (Krain, 2005, p. 371; Peskin, 2009, pp. 307-309; Smith, 2012, p. 11; Weiss, 1999, p. 502). Evidence on these tools' efficacy, though extant, is extremely uneven, with few clear cut successes. As Alex Bellamy (2010, p. 599) points out, "with only two partial exceptions, once begun, genocidal killing ends in only one of two ways—by perpetrators deciding they have achieved their objectives or with their military defeat" (see also de Waal et al., 2012, pp. 19-21). Of the two exceptions, one (the mass killing of the inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains in Sudan) was stopped by local resistance combined with disagreement amongst policy making perpetrators, the other (mass killings of Bosnians from 1992–1995) was ended by an international political process but with local resistance and military coercion bringing Serbian groups to the table (Bellamy, 2010, p. 599; de Waal et al., 2012, pp. 25-26).

Yet *military action*, the policy which does appear able to end genocides and mass atrocities, carries huge costs and risks. In most of the cases where military interventions did end atrocities, they came too late in the day to halt much of the killing, and were conducted for self-interested rather than humanitarian reasons. Some contemporary cases could *tentatively* be called successes—Sierra Leone in 2000, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Australian-led intervention in East Timor the same year, and Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991. But they sit alongside cases with decidedly mixed results, including the 2011 Libya

intervention that supported rebel forces but did not prevent a descent into civil war. Traditional military interventions are hugely expensive—as of July 2015, US military operations against ISIS had cost $9.4m a day, at a total of $3.2bn (Shabad, 2015). They also carry heavy costs in human life and political capital, and they destabilise states and regions, themselves threaten civilians, and typically generate a need for long term reconstruction and state-building which the international community has rarely seemed able or willing to meet. When military operations lack UN sanction they may also erode international law, damage relationships between the world's most powerful states, and legitimise unilateral action for more dubious motives (Russia notably invoked the "responsibility to protect" norm during its military intervention in Georgia in 2008). Like peacekeeping (see below) military interventions can also exacerbate mass killing in the short run by creating a range of incentives for armed groups to target civilians more intensely (Hultman, 2010; Krain, 2005; Wood, Kathman, & Gent, 2012).

There is now an effort to add greater sophistication to military responses. Planners highlight a wide range of options from fairly uncoercive "flexible deterrent" tools—such as security assistance arrangements, force deployment to nearby allies to signal resolve, surveillance and monitoring operations, and so forth—through to direct military interventions of various forms, from targeted "oil spot" or "demilitarised zone" operations through to full scale air and ground campaigns (Sewall, Raymond, & Chin, 2010, pp. 65-80, 110-115). Some such policies may further diplomatic solutions, though they can also interfere with them. More generally, credible threats to ultimately use military action are vital for lending force to preferable first choice measures like sanctions and peacekeepers (Lopez, 2013, pp. 790-791). But these positive advances do not eliminate most of the concerns regarding military action. Many of the softer forms may also simply lack preventive efficacy—Mathew Krain (2005, p. 380) notes that the "only overt military interventions that appear to be effective in reducing the severity of genocides or politicides are those that explicitly challenge the perpetrators of the atrocities".

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations avoid some of the costs and risks of more overt military intervention, and fulfil functions vital to atrocity prevention. But evaluative research paints a patchy record of efficacy. A common concern is that peacekeeping missions may in fact exacerbate the risk of violence and mass atrocities in various circumstances. They may incentivise killers to work more quickly to finish ethnic cleansing, can alter the balance of power and thereby increase strategic incentives for civilian targeting, and have ineptly provided "safe havens" which are not adequately protected, and thereby concentrate civilians for perpetrators to target. They can also function as an

empty bluff in the absence of real political will that, once exposed, encourages further killing and undermines deterrence (Hultman, 2010, p. 30; Krain, 2005, pp. 366-368). Controlling for the fact that peacekeepers are likely to be sent to more violent-prone crises may eliminate the finding that they tend to make things worse (Melander, 2009). And peacekeepers have clearly made a positive impact in certain cases—often through the delivery of humanitarian aid (Weiss, 1999, p. 22). But the statistical impact of peacekeeping on mass killings of civilians remains disputed. The weak capacity of many peacekeeping forces for the sorts of robust action sometimes required to prevent mass atrocities is one reason for their uncertain or erratic efficacy (Burgess, 2011; Tardy, 2011).

Economic sanctions are a third major policy tool used by international actors, but again their record of performance is concerning. Sweeping comprehensive sanctions have been abandoned by international actors in light of extensive evidence on their egregious humanitarian impacts—sanctions on Iraq are estimated to have led to 100,000 to 227,000 excess deaths among young children (Drezner, 2011, pp. 97-98). They also frequently encouraged corruption, including within the UN system. As Thomas Weiss summarises, comprehensive sanctions are a tool which typically "afflicts vulnerable groups, complicates the work of humanitarian agencies, causes long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations and penalizes neighbours" (Weiss, 1999, p. 500). Instead, international actors now deploy a range of smart or targeted sanctions to pursue political objectives, including atrocity prevention. Targeted sanctions involve a range of item-specific, country-specific or institution-specific exceptions, and use financial instruments and selective embargos to target elites and bastions of regime support (Lopez, 2013, pp. 774-777; Tostensen & Bull, 2002; Weiss, 1999, p. 504). But such exceptions weaken the power of sanctions to actually hurt target states and, as Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull (2002, p. 382) put it: "one cannot overlook that they are a form of sanctions 'leakage' and thus undermine the effectiveness of a sanctions regime". Implementing the complex rules of targeted sanctions and preventing evasion by targets is also exceptionally difficult (Drezner, 2011, p. 103; Grebe, 2010; Lopez, 2013, p. 788; Michaelsen, 2010). Political obstacles in the UN Security Council have also been a problem for targeted sanctions, postponing implementation in ways that allow targets to take adaptive measures, and producing watered down sanctions regimes of no meaningful atrocity prevention capacity (Lopez, 2013, 778-779). Such problems led to the heavy modification of a Security Council draft resolution on the violence in Darfur: rather than targeting sanctions against over thirty individuals as originally planned, the final measures targeted just four (Lopez, 2013, 778-779). Some sanctions regimes may even worsen atroci-

ties. Arms embargoes can freeze existing balances of power and can thereby undermine resistance to state or non-state atrocity perpetrators—this may have occurred in both Yugoslavia and Syria. Dominic Tierney concludes that "much of the impact of UN arms embargoes in civil wars can be summarized as irrelevance or malevolence" (cited in Drezner, 2011, p. 103), and Tostensen and Bull (2002, p. 402) similarly conclude that "sanctions experiences generally have been disappointing…the optimism expressed in some academic circles and among decision makers…appears largely unjustified." There are some plausible success stories, such as Libya's 2003 renunciation of its support for terrorism, and abandonment of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the application of pressure on Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, and on Libya in 2011, though more research is needed to identify evidence of causal impact (Jentleson, 2006; Lopez, 2013, pp. 780-784). A rough success rate of around 33% for sanctions is commonly asserted in social science research (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliot, 2007; Lopez, 2013, p. 788). Again, sanctions are an important atrocity-prevention tool (Lopez, 2015). But they are both unreliable and risky.

Another key tool for atrocity prevention lies in *diplomatic and mediation efforts*—less controversial and shorn of the potential for egregious material damage involved in military actions and sanctions. Diplomatic efforts are a critical component of every effort to prevent an emerging high risk of conflict or mass atrocities (Welsh, 2015). But they are clearly often insufficient. Kenya in 2007–2008 is often cited as a key example of diplomacy being used to prevent a mass atrocity, but few other clear cases have been suggested in the literature (Sharma, 2015). In light of Kenya, "coercive diplomacy" is frequently touted as providing the more robust mechanism needed to induce potential perpetrators to come to the table. But one major study (not focused on atrocities) suggests it achieves some success in only 32% of cases, and remains reliant on outside actors credibly promising harder action should the negotiating parties fail to reach a functional agreement (Art, 2003, p. 405).

The addition of *international criminal justice tools* and UN *monitoring and fact-finding missions* to the conceptualised atrocity prevention toolkit is welcome, but these tools are also of uncertain efficacy. International criminal justice tools have aided post-violence reconstruction and reconciliation in states, have advanced the development of relevant international law and, through the ICC's complementarity principle, supported domestic legal regimes for preventing violence. But there is not yet any real evidence of a significant deterrent effect, and ICC indictments have clearly created counterproductive rally-round-the-flag effects, most famously in Sudan (Peskin, 2009, pp. 307-309; Smith, 2012, p. 11). Fact-finding missions play a range of important roles, but there is again little evidence for

the main preventive causal mechanism attributed to them—the "power of witness"—through which being in the glare of the international community's attention is hoped to deter atrocities (Grace & Bruderlein, 2012, p. 2). Ultimately the power of witness effect rests on consistent and predictable international action to constrain and punish those who are so witnessed, and since that record is at best emergent the weak present deterrent effect is unsurprising (Krain, 2005, pp. 366, 378).

3.2. How Do Ideological Interventions and Strategies Compare?

A proper appreciation of the costs, prospects, strengths and weaknesses of the traditional conflict and atrocity prevention tools just surveyed sets the bar that ideological interventions and strategies should be measured against. My central argument is that they meet that bar. They are of a comparable order of feasibility measured against cost and risk, and therefore ought to be a more central component of the atrocity prevention toolkit.

Evaluating the impact of ideological strategies is inherently difficult, but three key sources of empirical research provide a strong starting point for thinking that they can have a positive impact. The first is the extensive work I summarised in section 2 on how ideological catalysts of and restraints on violence can be critical in determining where atrocities (or other forms of mass political violence) do and do not occur and the scale and intensity they take. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014, pp. 1986, 1989-1991) concludes his study of the causal impact of RTLM in Rwanda by estimating that jamming the radio station, as the United Nations Force Commander in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire, requested, might have cost around $4 million and saved upwards of 50,000 lives, as well as reducing long-term damage to human capital formation and political stability. The number of lives saved might fall according to how the regime substituted for the loss of radio capability, but would remain substantial. The most helpful research on ideological causes compares contrasting cases. As noted above, in his extensive comparative study of genocides in Sudan and Rwanda with non-genocides in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Senegal, Straus (2015, p. x) finds that "to explain variation—to explain why countries with similar crises experience different outcomes—the role of ideology is essential." Gadi Wolfsfeld's (2004) study of the role of media in peace negotiations highlights the contrast between the generally damaging role of the Hebrew press in the Oslo peace process, and the broadly supportive role media played in Northern Ireland regarding the 1998 Good Friday agreement. Wolfsfeld roots the contrast partly in differences in media norms—one target of ideological interventions and strategies. Kurspahić's (2003)

study of the critical catalytic role played by the media in the Yugoslavian Wars and their post-conflict environment charts the general failure of outside intervention. But Kurspahić roots this failure in specific errors of policy, highlights what could and should have be achieved with superior planning and implementation, and emphasises the need for what I am terming ideological interventions.

Two forms of ideological intervention are already widely attempted: regulation of the media environment by international interveners during and after conflict so as to constrain ideological dissemination (as Kurspahić's book highlights), and civil society interventions focused on peace building, peace broadcasting and peace education to promote ideological restraints on violence. The second main source of empirical research on ideological strategies and interventions comes in a small number of dedicated evaluations of such efforts. Paul Collier's and Pedro C. Vicente's (2013) quantitative study of the impacts of ActionAid International Nigeria's (AAIN) experimental intervention against political violence in the Nigerian elections in 2007 is the most rigorous empirical examination of such an ideological campaign thus far. The AAIN's two week campaign, in collaboration with local NGOs, aimed to delegitimise violent intimidation, give individuals a sense of political empowerment, and promote collective action to resist violence. The organisers distributed 18,000 units of campaign materials (T-Shirts, caps, hijabs, leaflets, posters and stickers), and held roadshows, theatre events and town meetings in locations across Nigeria (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. F332-335). Collier and Vicente's experimental study of the campaign involved a baseline survey prior to the intervention, and comparison of its effects in 12 enumeration areas visited by AAIN campaigners with 12 control areas that were not (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. F335-337). This "found clear and statistically significant effects of the campaign on diminishing perceptions of political violence and increasing empowerment of the population against political violence" (Collier & Vicente, 2013, p. F344). Even more importantly, the campaign reduced the actual likelihood of violence by 47% in the areas targeted (Collier & Vicente, 2013, pp. F350-351).

No other campaign against violence has been so thoroughly studied, but some other research projects exist. A study by Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. Green of counterviolence radio interventions in Rwanda found that whilst the programmes might not have affected the deep convictions of listeners, they substantially promoted expressions of dissent, perceptions of social norms, and methods of dispute resolution in ways conducive to non-violence (Paluck, 2009; Paluck & Green, 2009). An edited volume by Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson (2002) includes five case studies of broadcast media during and after violent conflict.

These highlight the mixed record of ideological interventions and point to numerous improvements in future efforts. But they do find benefits in international efforts in Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor—though more in post-conflict recovery than immediate prevention.

Finally, a wider volume of evidence comes from independent assessments of the activities of civil society projects by groups like Search for Common Ground, Fondation Hirondelle, Radio La Benevolencija, Peace-Tech Lab and Studio Ijambo. In 2008, Vladimir Bratić produced a list of around 40 projects in 18 countries that could broadly be characterised as peace broadcasting or peace education, mainly run by such civil society actors (Bratić, 2008, p. 495). Such projects are regularly subject to evaluative assessments, though these understandably vary in their scientific rigour (for one extensive collection made available by Search for Common Ground see http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/learn-type/evaluation-reports). Since it is difficult to conduct an ideological intervention without having *any* positive impacts, the challenge for future empirical research is to a) differentiate really significant and cost-effective impacts reported in these assessments from admirable but relatively inefficient ones, and b) to trace whether evidence of attitude changes and a greater sense of security, empowerment, and pacific inclinations amongst those subject to such programmes translates into lower violence in the long-run. Still, such assessments consistently emphasise the impact of campaigns in affecting attitudes towards violence, empowering resistance, and educating populations (for two notable examples of specific reports on impact see Kogen, 2013; Search for Common Ground, 2012).

So despite the need for more research, this threefold evidence base is encouraging, especially measured against the comparatively low costs and risks of ideological strategies relative to most traditional tools of conflict and atrocity prevention. As Edward R. Girardet (cited in Price & Thompson, 2002, p. viii) writes: "Governments, international organisations, and humanitarian agencies…are often willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on humanitarian or peacekeeping operations, but are reluctant to allocate sufficient funding to ensure that people are properly and accurately informed. Normally, this does not take a great deal of money." Ideological efforts to spread accurate information and foster negative attitudes towards violence ought to be deployed more widely. We should not downplay the risks. Getting involved, directly or indirectly, in the ideological battles of a society carries symbolic and physical dangers to those who do so. And from the more macro perspective of international prevention policy, many ideological interventions create a tension with long-standing commitments to neutrality embedded in the United Nations system. It is increasingly recognised, however, that this is an operating principle which most atrocity-prevention efforts problematise (Bellamy, 2011, p. 1). Comparatively low costs and risks, and prospects for a positive impact, require preventive actors to devote more attention to ideological strategies.

4. Designing Ideological Strategies in Atrocity Prevention

In this final section, I provide guidelines on how ideological strategies could be formulated by relevant preventive actors. I consider, in turn: 1) what the feasible objectives of ideological strategies are; 2) who the relevant preventive actors might be, and how different sorts of actors should interact; 3) what sorts of ideological interventions these actors might deploy; and 4) what key principles should be followed in order to make ideological prevention strategies effective.

4.1. Objectives

To be successful, the proper aim of ideological interventions and strategies in atrocity prevention must be clearly conceptualised. Such campaigns cannot just import an external intervener's own notions and norms straight into the target society, nor radically transform its complex, culturally distinct ideological landscape. Instead, feasible ideological strategies aim to erode the general pervasiveness and strength of ideological justifications of atrocity and bolster specific ideological restraints on violence against civilians. Such strategies should target policymaking elites, potential direct perpetrators of violence, and broader society and its ideological environment (including major media organisations). Varying attitudes towards violence amongst all of these groups affect the constellation of macro, meso and micro level decision-making processes that lead to atrocities either occurring or being averted (Straus, 2015, pp. 41-51).

Preventive actors must recognise that the most committed "true believers" in anti-civilian ideologies will typically remain resolute in pressing for violent action. The decisions of these sorts of individuals are better targeted by "harder" preventive tools that alter the costs and benefits they care about, if possible. But the fact that most perpetrators of atrocities are not such true-believers is critical for the reasonable prospects of ideological strategies. This is especially true amongst the broader public, and this is where most existing ideological efforts have focused. But even elites and potential perpetrating organisations are ideologically heterogeneous, and will contain individuals with varying degrees of support, ambivalence, and reluctance towards violence. Efforts (especially by local actors) should therefore also focus "upwards" at elites, since the ideological standpoint of the elites is often the most crucial factor in determining whether violence

occurs or not (Straus, 2015; Valentino, 2004). Outside actors might, for example, be able to share intelligence with elite policy makers that reduces their perceptions of other groups as threatening, reducing the pressure for atrocities.

So effective ideological strategies do not assume it is possible to convince everyone or initiate mass "conversions" in attitudes towards violence. Instead prevention efforts should contest the ideological and information monopolies which convince relatively ordinary people that violence may be a necessary course, inject doubts and reluctance into mass sentiment, and weaken the popular pressures for discriminatory nationalist, religious or ethnic demagoguery. The realistic aim is to thereby shift the balance of ideological pressures—amongst elites, potential perpetrators, and broader publics—in ways that create obstacles for violence. Since atrocities occur as the result of a complex intersection of causal forces, ideological strategies may not "prevent" an atrocity. But they can encourage opposition, non-implementation, and rescue; hold open opportunities for alternative non-violent courses; and result in considerably more limited campaigns of violence, saving large numbers of lives. Just as importantly, ideological strategies synergistically support other preventive actions—by delegitimising those who advance campaigns of violence and weakening the forces they are able to mobilise around them. Ideological strategies should also strengthen the social fabric for post-violence reconstruction and reconciliation, and they may indirectly serve broader conflict prevention and counter-terrorism objectives.

4.2. Actors

Ideological prevention can be conducted by a range of actors: the United Nations, regional organisations, external states, international or local non-governmental organisations, or even the governments of at-risk societies themselves. But for all ideological strategies, cultural and context sensitivity and a primary reliance on local authorities, movements, organisations and voices for most of the "front-line" ideological work is critical. As Thompson and Price (2003, p. 195) remark (regarding media development, but the point should be a guiding principle for most ideological interventions) efforts are "best designed and implemented by non-governmental actors—professionals and activists—with IGOs and governments lending assistance as required."

This is both normatively important, but also a practical requirement for success. In most societies, external actors, organisations and states have far lower credibility, authority and ideological influence than local actors, and lack the expertise local actors have in navigating their contextually rich ideological landscape (see also Gregg, 2010, p. 293). The exception might be particularly respected individuals with international

reach. The British and US governments are not likely, for example, to have significant ideological influence over potential perpetrators of ISIS atrocities. But Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, the world respected Islamic scholar who published the first authoritative fatwa against terrorism and suicide bombing in 2010, might.[7] Non-governmental organisations, national or transnational, are also potentially powerful. Patrice McMahon (2007) highlights the role of such organisations in the avoidance of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, and they may also be vital for mobilising action by external actors, when needed, to deter or intervene to prevent violence, as Geoffrey Robinson (2010) shows regarding East Timor in 1999. External actors are, however, needed to bring important financial, technological and educative resources and to provide expertise and coordination. A major expansion in such support by the world's most powerful states and leading international organisations will be an important first move in stepping up ideological prevention efforts. There are also, as I discuss below, particular sorts of intervention that external actors are best placed to conduct.

So an effective overall strategy of prevention vitally rests on cross-scale mobilisation, co-operation and coordination. Christian Gerlach (2010) has influentially highlighted how extremely violent practices typically rest on the mobilisation of coalitions of actors with interests in violence. In parallel, the only effective way to generate powerful practices of counterviolence is to mobilise coalitions of the many international, regional, national and sub-national forces with interests in preventing atrocities. This is particularly important in light of the trade-offs that exist between different desirable aspects of ideological interventions, such as impartiality. More impartial strategies (like providing reliable sources of basic information, propagating awareness of legal commitments and international norms, or disseminating public calls for intergroup dialogue) have the advantage of maintaining actors' credibility amongst multiple target audiences, but may be of weak force in countering the really pernicious justifications of violence. The reverse is true of more committed campaigning, and the loss of impartiality involved could be damaging to other prevention tools or discrediting to the local actors one is seeking to support (Babbitt, 2012, pp. 375-384). Balancing such trade-offs is easier when actors can create a co-ordinated division of labour between different sorts of stakeholders: the United Nations may be well placed to fill more impartial functions, whilst concerned external states or regional organisations such as the African Union, OSCE, Arab

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[7] Qadri has also recently published an Islamic Curriculum on Peace and Counter-Terrorism through his non-governmental organisation *Minhaj-ul-Quran,* see http://www.minhajpublications.com/latest-books-peace-deradicalisation-counter-terrorism

League or European Union may provide key resources and capacity to local actors, who themselves actually take on the more explicit campaigning.

4.3. Interventions

Specific ideological interventions can be schematised according to two vital dimensions—systemic vs targeted, and coercive vs persuasive. The former distinction tracks whether the intervention/strategy is a long run campaign to change the ideological environment in a state that simply carries a considerable background risk of future violence/atrocity, or a reactive, short-run intervention to counter an escalating risk of imminent atrocities (Reike, Sharma, & Welsh, 2015). The second distinction captures whether the intervention is an attempt to consensually change attitudes and beliefs, or a forcible action, usually aimed at disabling the production and dissemination of anti-civilian ideologies (Leader Maynard, 2015, pp. 218-224). Both distinctions are continua, but simplifying them dichotomously produces an efficient summary (not exhaustive) of major ideological interventions and strategies, as in Table 1:

Table 1. Major forms of ideological intervention.

	Persuasive	Coercive
Systemic	- Peace broadcasting - Peace education - Pluralisation	- Criminalisation - Chartering
Targeted	- Peace broadcasting - Empowering resisters	- Jamming - Destruction

At the systemic-persuasive level are the existing efforts of local and transnational civil society organisations to engage in *peace broadcasting* (the propagation of ideas through major media) and *peace education* (participatory pedagogic and training practices). A third systemic-persuasive ideological intervention, *pluralisation* involves seeking to generate greater access to a wider range of media (in the broadest sense) in recognition of the particular danger of ideological monopolies. For example, pluralisation might involve encouraging more penetration by international media organisations such as the BBC, Al Jazeera, and CNN, all generally rated as highly trustworthy by citizens which have access to them in states across the world (Geniets, 2011). These cannot be captured by local anti-civilian ideologies, and undermine the monopolies within which those ideologies can come to appear like "common sense". Increasing access to online social media is also important, although as well as providing a means for opening up the ideological monopolies of closed or partially closed societies, these can facilitate radicalisation within online ideological "echo chambers" (Schissler, 2014; Thompson, 2011). Less obvious methods include international educational and vocational exchanges, or publishing internationally collaborative school textbooks.

Coercive-systemic measures include the establishment of legal regimes that obstruct the production and dissemination of anti-civilian ideology. Sometimes this may involve *criminalisation* of incitement or extreme forms of dangerous speech, and the provision of easily accessible avenues for civil actions against the dissemination of slander and libellous rumours and claims. Equally, measures I shall term *chartering,* in which media organisations, political parties, intellectual bodies or other relevant ideological producers commit to legally enforced standards for reporting, political campaigning, or education offer a somewhat less coercive measure that can still be given legal teeth.

Systemic ideological interventions are generally more powerful than targeted interventions. Ideological change is a very real phenomenon, but generally takes time. And in the crisis environments where risks of atrocity sharply escalate, radicalizing appeals have various advantages over calls for moderation and restraint. Nevertheless, targeted ideological interventions exist and may be vital in generating obstacles to violence and reducing participation and death rates. The most important targeted-persuasive ideological intervention is likely to be *empowering resisters*. Perpetrators of atrocities typically identify and even compile lists of opponents and moderates, whether individuals or groups, who are often early targets of violence. Preventive actors should also have an up-to-date awareness of such potential resisters of violence—religious leaders, political figures, intellectuals, and the leading members of major social movements—and can offer them protection, asylum, co-ordination, resources to propagate ideological restraints on violence, or other forms of support. *Peace broadcasting* also remains relevant at this level (whereas peace education is generally only feasible at the systemic level). Saturating a society with moderate voices and ideological restraints on violence could fragment violent campaigns, encouraging desertion and non-participation.

The most controversial, but better practiced, forms of targeted intervention are coercive—the jamming of ideological dissemination and disabling, capture or destruction of relevant hardware (Price, 2000). By *jamming*, I denote all coercive methods that block dissemination without causing lasting human or physical damage. This may include shutting down websites, disabling SMS networks, banning or breaking up extremist rallies or even detaining radical preachers and inciters, as well as the blocking of radio and television transmissions. *Destruction,* by contrast, involves the infliction of lasting damage or harm, ideally only infrastructural but often also human. Radio and television installations that cannot be feasibly jammed might be physically disabled or destroyed, or the most influential and extreme articulators of anti-civilian ideologies can even be killed. But in most circumstances, destruction will prove highly counterproductive to atrocity-prevention

efforts. Such acts fuel the narratives of atrocity-justifiers, delegitimise preventive actors, and fragment the coalitions of such actors necessary for effective prevention, by placing local partners in a bind in deciding whether to support an attack that may have killed their co-nationals or to denounce their international allies. Such actions are, however, part of the conceptual space of ideological intervention tools, and fuller normative investigation than I can provide here is necessary to conclude when if ever such actions are justified. Jamming is more likely to be of use to preventive actors. But the international community still lacks clear guidelines on when jamming might be justified and appropriate in atrocity-justification efforts. Again, all targeted-coercive measures (and most systemic-coercive measures) also raise free speech concerns that require consideration.

4.4. Making Ideological Strategies Effective

Nevertheless, such free speech concerns are not simply overriding. It is critical, if mass atrocities are to be prevented, to resist the alluring metaphor of a 'marketplace of ideas', where the sufficiently free circulation of ideas is assumed to create the best chances for truth and morality to thrive. This misguided metaphor, and an accompanying faith in the auto-corrective properties of freer and freer speech, remains problematically influential amongst many state and non-state actors involved in violent contexts (Allen & Stremlau, 2005, pp. 3-10). Yet it lacks empirical foundation, and fundamentally fails to appreciate how the production and consumption of ideology actually works. Real world societies, especially those at most risk of atrocities, do not match idealised images of truth-seeking public communicative spaces. As a now extensive body of research in psychology, sociology and communication studies emphasises, ordinary consumers of ideology are not strongly motivated by how well-grounded claims are in real evidence, and ideological producers frequently have strong commercial and political agendas driving what they produce (see Boudon, 1989; Cohen, 2001; Edelman, 1977; Glaeser, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2013; McChesney, 2004; Varki & Brower, 2013). These *non-epistemic motives* of both producers and consumers often give them huge incentives to articulate and believe in utterly false or dangerous ideas—as the unyielding resilience of many political myths in the freest media environments demonstrates (IPSOS MORI, 2014). Ideological producers have become extremely sophisticated at packaging even the most absurd claims so as to seem reasonable and compelling. And consumers of ideology rarely cross-check facts, rarely shop around for alternatives to their traditional sources of information, are often religiously or politically committed to key "epistemic authorities", and often lack the capacity to check up on many claims.

Consequently, both mainstream news media and social media online have willingly justified, supported, denied or covered up mass atrocities, notably in Nazi Germany and Yugoslavia (Allen & Stremlau, 2005, p. 2; Kurspahić, 2003; Straus, 2015, p. 48; see also Schissler, 2014). As Wolfsfeld (2004, pp. 15-23) points out, free media are especially likely to distort reality in conflict-prone and peace-building contexts, due to misalignment between the incentive structures of news media and the requirements of a peace process. "Peace is most likely to develop within a calm environment," Wolfsfeld argues, "and the media have an obsessive interest in threats and violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events. Progress towards peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs of the other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards adversaries." (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 2) The "epistemic tyranny" of closed societies may be the biggest obstacle to a well-informed and morally reflective public, but an unregulated "epistemic anarchy", where a panoply of agenda-driven organisations and groups are able to propagate entirely unfounded claims, and where citizens lack reliable reference points and the skills and resources to interrogate ideology, is not much better.

The solution has two components that should be embedded in ideological strategies to prevent atrocities. First, an epistemic rule of law—a regulated media and political environment that protects free speech rights but also sets standards for the assertion of facts under the authority of "news", and commits major ideological producers to ethical best practices (Bratić, 2008, p. 501). Where media function effectively to promote rights, democracy, and non-violence, it has not been due to the stripping away of all regulation, but due to an effective balance of standards and checks (though worryingly ones that, in many wealthy states, have been progressively dismantled, see McChesney, 2004). And these should be supported by responsible media norms (Wolfsfeld, 2004, pp. 38-43). This makes it much harder for dangerous local or national ideological monopolies to emerge.

Second, a concerted effort by preventive actors to actually participate in that ideological environment in a strategic and locally rooted fashion is vital. There is no truly "neutral" interaction with the ideological environments in which mass atrocities are a significant risk, and to refuse to engage systematically in bolstering forces that uphold rights and call for non-violence is simply to retire from the field of battle and allow other ideological protagonists to dominate social space. All atrocities, though typically witnessed by the world as a sudden event, are rooted in longer term processes of social radicalisation involving ideological campaigning. The same must be true of ideological efforts to prevent atrocities (Bratić, 2008, pp. 500-501). These cannot rely

on idealised assumptions of perfectly rational actors, who will be won over as soon as they presented with the "best" arguments. Instead ideological strategies must be based on realistic theories of political thinking and persuasion rooted in leading psychological and sociological research (Della Vigna & Gentzkow, 2010; Gardner, 2006; Jost & Major, 2001). The non-epistemic motives behind belief formation need to be engaged with, and strategies should draw on the expertise of the communications specialists, media strategists, public relations industries, and political campaigners who are best practised at ideological battles in the real world.

As noted, ideological strategies need to erode justifications of atrocities and embed ideological restraints. My identification of six justificatory mechanisms for atrocities is intended to highlight the diversity of pathways through which atrocities can come to look permissible or even desirable, and consequently highlight how a broad range of restraining responses are required. Theorists of atrocity prevention have already identified some of the powerful pacific norms that should be generated: Alex Bellamy (2012a, p. 180) proposes "universalism", Hugo Slim (2007, p. 277) "humanization" and David J. Simon (2012, p. 6) "humanism" and "non-divisionism". These are well chosen, since dehumanisation, moral exclusion and the portrayal of some social groups as fundamentally lacking legitimate membership in the state are critical foundations for the justification of violence (Alvarez, 2008; Leader Maynard, 2015, pp. 195-199; Opotow, 1990; Straus, 2015). But such norms are also insufficient—they block some paths of justification for atrocities but leave others open (for example, the presentation of violence as virtuous and heroic, or the denial of alternatives to violence). So we need to flesh out these concepts into a better ideological map for counterviolence. Existing research suggests six main overlapping ideological restraints on atrocities that provide a starting point for thinking about more comprehensive future efforts.

First, as Bellamy and Simon identify, the fragmenting of societies into divided groups is key to mass violence. Conversely, appeals to *inclusive unity* at the national or communal level, which do not cast some members as outsiders, have been effective in resisting violence. Straus (2015) finds that more inclusive founding narratives were critical to non-occurrences of genocides in Africa, and Susan Benesch (2014) identifies the proliferation of inclusive discourses surrounding the build-up to the relatively peaceful 2013 elections in Kenya as a potentially important pacific force. Second, as *human rights* norms have spread they have created fundamental and well-researched challenges to intergroup discrimination and state-led violence (Risse-Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Sikkink, 2011). Third, the ideological embedding and institutionalisation of *civilian immunity* has been critical to changing military practices by many world states—resulting in a notable

reduction, though not elimination, of war time atrocities (Bellamy, 2012b, pp. 220-222, 300-348). Fourth, just as violence can be valorised and portrayed as virtuous, so it can be subject to *devalorisation* by peace messages that exhort virtues of non-violence, and disparage violence as irresponsible, disruptive and hooliganistic (Benesch, 2014). Fifth, violence is much less likely if key actors, groups and broader populations can be convinced of its *inefficacy*, and in particular, the risk it poses to critical social objectives like economic development and political stability. Finally, deeper rejections of violence as in *pacifist or pacificist doctrines* (Ceadel, 1987), and the promotion of social change through nonviolent methods like civil disobedience and peaceful protest can massively alter the way in which societies respond to those who call for violence—as in the AAIN campaign reported on by Collier and Vicente (2013).

This is not an exhaustive list. Credibility attacks on those calling for violence, highlighting the crimes with which they have been associated, or otherwise undermining their epistemic and normative authority, may also, for example, be effective. But these six restraints provide a starting point for thinking about the content of ideological preventive action.

Like all prevention, ideological interventions and strategies to prevent mass atrocities rest crucially on will—although they are not as demanding in this respect as some other tools. But as Richard Caplan (2011, p. 131) points out, a major determinant of the will to prevent *is* the capacity to prevent. Actors will show more will to deploy ideological strategies if these have been well prepared and the necessary practical tools are in place. States, organisations and civil society actors thus need to continue to develop the international counterviolence architecture needed for ideological strategies of prevention: the institutions, professional networks, ground-level operations, funding arrangements, epistemic communities and hardware necessary for both strategic and targeted, and coercive and persuasive, preventive action. Such an architecture is already partially developed with respect to peacebuilding and conflict prevention (and also the rather different field of military PSYOP practices) but needs to be extended to mass atrocities. One important and easy advance, already underway, is to insert an "atrocity-prevention lens" (Bellamy, 2011, 2015) into existing practices and structures. And an immediate step for preventive actors is to make sure that such an atrocity-prevention lens includes attention to ideological strategies in those organisations with explicit prevention mandates: United Nations agencies, regional actors committed to prevention like the African Union and ECOWAS, and relevant state institutions. But greater capacity-building is also needed—of both hardware (material resources, institutional capacity, volunteers and organisations) and software (educational materials, training, knowledge and imagery).

5. Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that ideology plays a critical but complex role in shaping the probabilities of mass atrocities, and the extent and pattern of violence where atrocities do occur. Ideological fanatics are relatively rare, but more partial, selective, ambivalent, or latent forms of ideological internalisation allow anti-civilian ideologies to alter the behaviour of large numbers of ordinary people. Variation in ideological attitudes and beliefs is therefore one key factor explaining inter-case and intra-case variation in violence. For this reason, greater planning and implementation of ideological strategies to prevent mass atrocities is urgently needed. On comparison with other prevention tools, ideological strategies are not fanciful or impractical relative to their costs and risks. They are unlikely to lead to wholesale conversions of the true believers in anti-civilian ideologies. But they can erode the broader appeal of those ideologies, bolster the sorts of ideological restraints that discourage participation in campaigns of violence, and alter the balance of ideological pressures on both elite policy makers and ordinary citizens.

This paper provides initial guidelines for thinking about the range of available ideological interventions, and how they might best be used as part of broader synergistic applications of multiple prevention tools. Both actors with explicit atrocity-prevention mandates and those who are stakeholders in any high risk setting—be they citizens, local organisations, transnational organisations, governments, neighbouring states, regional organisations or international bodies—can and should deploy ideological strategies. But ideological efforts to prevent mass atrocities remain at their earliest stages: more research is needed. Atrocities by transnational non-state organisations like ISIS, which draw on a narrow slice of radicalised supporters from across the globe rather than broader support within an established society, present particular challenges. Research on terrorist radicalisation and counter-radicalisation needs to be brought into work on ideology and atrocities more generally if we are to advance thinking on how to prevent anti-civilian violence by terroristic, criminal, paramilitary and other non-state actors (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Nevertheless, persisting intellectual and practical challenges are intrinsic to the life-cycle of prevention tools. More established methods, especially military operations and economic sanctions, went through many extremely costly failures before it really became feasible to think that they might be used with good prospects for success. Refining ideological interventions and strategies will similarly take time, involving failures and only partial successes. But that learning process promises to be less costly than it is for most other tools. And it may ultimate provide a powerful, inspiring, and non-violent component of a functional atrocity prevention toolkit.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The Viability of the "Responsibility to Prevent"

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Abstract

The efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; causal indeterminacy, and a dependence on the political will of states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. The vast array of factors which can be cited as potentially contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes mitigates against the determination of definite "conflict triggers". This does not mean prevention is impossible but does limit the efficacy of "early warning systems". The dynamics of the "four crimes" within R2P's purview further limits the efficacy of prevention as the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken in response to a perceived existential crisis. This significantly limits the scope for leveraging the "internal" aspect of R2P as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. Thus the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international community. So long as the response of the "international community" is predicated on the political will of states, however, the efficacy of prevention in these areas will be limited, as the "international" response is prey to narrowly defined national interests.

Issue

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1. Introduction

This article argues that the Responsibility to Prevent, though vaunted as the most useful element of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), has limited potential efficacy. The Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; first the efficacy of prevention generally is undermined by causal indeterminacy. This problem is accentuated in the context of the Responsibility to Prevent due to the specifics of atrocity crimes—in terms of the conditions under which they are perpetrated—and the related mechanisms by which such acts—when in gestation—can be prevented. This latter fact leads to the second problem, namely that the Responsibility to Prevent depends ultimately upon the political will of

states, and especially the national interests of the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5).

This article begins by charting the evolution of the Responsibility to Prevent before turning to an analysis of the literature on prevention strategies. Here I demonstrate that the array of factors which can plausibly be cited as contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes is so vast it mitigates against the determination of definite "conflict triggers". This does not mean prevention is impossible, of course, but it limits the efficacy of "early warning systems". The article then looks more specifically at the "four crimes" within R2P's purview and argues that the dynamics of these atrocities further limits the efficacy of prevention; the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken

in response to a perceived existential crisis whereby those who decide to engage in such acts consider their very existence to be in jeopardy. This, therefore, significantly limits the scope for leveraging the "internal" aspect of R2P—namely the responsibilities of the host state—as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. This means, therefore, that the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international community. As argued, however, so long as the response of the "international community" is essentially predicated on the political will of states, the efficacy of prevention in these areas will be limited. This is not because it is impossible to mobilise political will, but rather that at times the political disposition of the key states that determine the "international" response— especially the P5—is to actually support the perpetrator, or just ignore the victims, due to a lack of national interest. The problem inhibiting effective preventative action is, therefore, the structural conflation of politics and law-enforcement which R2P does not in any way address.

2. The Responsibility to Prevent

From its inception R2P has emphasised the importance of prevention. In its 2001 report *The Responsibility to Protect*, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) described prevention as "the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect" (2001a, p. xi). In recent years the "responsibility to prevent" has been increasingly lauded in similar terms as both the most important and most viable aspect of R2P; in 2009 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that the "the ultimate purpose of the responsibility to protect [is] to save lives by preventing the most egregious mass violations of human rights" (2009, p. 28). Likewise Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre on R2P stated, "R2P has real value precisely because it has the potential to improve the prevention of mass atrocities and protection of vulnerable populations" (2015, p. 26). According to Simon Adams, Director of the Global Center for R2P, "R2P is primarily a preventive doctrine" (2013, p. 1), a sentiment echoed by Gareth Evans, co-chair of the original ICISS (2009, p. 79). Indeed, by 2011 R2P had, according to Thomas Weiss, a "virtually exclusive emphasis on prevention" (2011, p. 1).

Clearly there is a link between responding to intra-state mass atrocities and preventing them; it stands to reason that any strategy aimed at reducing the damage caused by intra-state mass atrocities would naturally promote the prevention of these conflicts. Yet, R2P very definitely emerged from a concern about *response* rather than *prevention*; the impetus for the establish-

ment of the ICISS was the question posed by Kofi Annan in the wake of the controversy surrounding NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo; "if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica— to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" (ICISS, 2001a, p. vii). The ICISS described its report as a "response to this challenge" and indeed in the first sentence of the report described *The Responsibility to Protect* as

> about the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention"; the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take collective—and in particular military—action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state. (ICISS, 2001a, p. vii)

Later the report notes, "The 'responsibility to protect' implies *above all else* a responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection" (ICISS, 2001a, p. 29). The genesis and remit was, therefore, clear; improving the international community's capacity to *react* to intra-state mass atrocities.

Given this, some have argued that the increased focus on prevention is a form of evasion and/or a misguided distraction from the key issue of reaction (Chandler, 2009; Hehir, 2012, pp. 103-116). Indeed, Weiss described the emphasis on prevention as "preposterous" and "a superficially attractive but highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard issues of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention". The concern with prevention, he claimed, "obscures the essence of the most urgent part of the spectrum of responsibility, to protect those caught in the crosshairs of war" (Weiss, 2007, p. 104).

Beyond this question of the contested importance of prevention within R2P, the actual added value of the Responsibility to Prevent has been the source of some debate. Research into, and calls for greater focus on, prevention existed prior to the emergence of R2P; the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, for example, was established in 1994 and had published some 26 reports, ten books and the landmark study *Preventing Deadly Conflict* prior to the ICISS report. UN Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld, Pérez de Cuéllar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan had each championed prevention as a key goal of the organisation and catalysed a plethora of studies on prevention (Miall, 2004).

The premise that preventing mass atrocities is preferable to responding to them is conceptually sound in terms of the preferential relative costs—in financial and humanitarian terms—of the former over the latter (Fein, 2009, pp. 321-322; ICISS, 2001b, p. 27; OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 2). This has long been asserted and is,

indeed, a contention with an empirical basis established before the advent of R2P (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

The ICISS report's recommendations on prevention do not especially advance these reflections on prevention; the prescriptions are quite vague and no more than a restatement of existing orthodoxy. Indeed, Bellamy described the ICISS's analysis and prescriptions on prevention as "brief, confused and unoriginal" and he recommended they be re-written (Bellamy, 2009, pp. 52-53). Likewise, Weiss dismissed the ICISS recommendations as "mumbling and stammering" (Weiss, 2007, p. 104). Michael Newman, in fact, claimed ICISS paid "inadequate attention to prevention" (2009, p. 190). Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the final 2005 World Summit *Outcome Document* (United Nations, 2005) recognised a variant of R2P and a third—Paragraph 140—recognised the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. Paragraph 138 mentions prevention—noting, "This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means"—but there is little beyond this single acknowledgment. Neither the 2001 ICISS report nor the World Summit *Outcome Document*, therefore, advanced detailed, or novel, recommendations on how to operationalise preventative measures and do not constitute a source of guidance for policymakers seeking to craft new preventative initiatives; indicatively the UK Government's "Building Stability Overseas Strategy"—which aims to "improve our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict"—does not mention R2P (UK, 2012, p. 2).

The increased focus on prevention within R2P began to receive its most coherent stimulus in 2009 when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon published his report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* which stressed the centrality of prevention to R2P (2009, p. 10). Since then the UN Secretary General has published annual reports on R2P with the 2010 and 2013 reports focused specifically on the issue of prevention. The prescriptions in these reports have been accompanied by publications from the Offices of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect (OSAPGR2P), particularly its 2014 "Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes". These reports, therefore, constitute the most comprehensive and official treatment of the responsibility to prevent and form the primary sources for the forthcoming analysis.

3. Is Prevention Possible?

Investigations into how to prevent conflict predate the emergence of R2P and there are myriad books, articles, and reports across many disciplines which have advanced various recommendations. R2P deals with a particular set of "four crimes" however, and thus, is orientated towards a specific type of prevention. The 2005 World Summit *Outcome Document* stipulated that R2P is concerned with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These atrocity crimes are, it has been suggested, of a gravity, nature and genesis which makes the determination of how best to prevent them different to studies on general conflict prevention (Bellamy, 2011a). Indicatively, in his 2010 report Ban Ki-Moon noted, "Preventing the incitement or commission of one of the four proscribed crimes or violations is not necessarily the equivalent of preventing the outbreak of armed conflict" (2010, p. 4).

This does not mean, however, that the prevention of these crimes bears no relation to the prevention of conflict; the two are certainly linked on a number of levels. Rather, atrocity crimes comprise dynamics which, as discussed in later sections, though stemming from the same broad framework of conflict prevention, are characterised by particular features and related imperatives for those concerned with preventing them. Thus, while "atrocity prevention" and "conflict prevention" are not synonymous, they are certainly related, and this is reflected in the Responsibility to Prevent literature. This poses an initial difficulty for the efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent in so far as determining strategies for effective prevention—whether in terms of conflict or atrocity—is hampered by causal indeterminacy.

By definition discussions on improving prevention occur in the context of a failure to prevent; there is little need to agonise over ways to prevent things which do not happen. This creates an initial problem insofar as the discussion tends to focus on failures; "successful" prevention is often un-noticed or at least unheralded. As Payam Akhavan noted in the context of the OSAPGR2P, "The Special Adviser has a thankless job. His success in early warning and prevention is necessarily measured in terms of what *does not* happen" (2005, p. 11). That which "does not happen" invariably tends not to be acclaimed of course. In this sense, we are often simply not aware of the countless conflicts and atrocities which have *not* occurred, which *have* been successfully prevented. We can of course point to certain cases where there is widespread agreement that a looming conflict was prevented—the United Nations Preventative Deployment mission stationed on the Macedonian/Serbian border from 1992 to 1999 is often cited in this regard (Stamnes, 2005)—but such claims are by definition counterfactual. There is, therefore, by necessity, a degree of indeterminacy regarding what particular policies or actions successfully prevented conflicts or mass atrocities. As noted by the ICISS, "There are only a few unambiguous examples of successful preventative diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, while the catalogue of failed preventative action and missed opportunity is lengthy" (2001b, p. 27). Thus, the capacity to learn from these successes is limited.

This problem regarding the paucity of established

success templates relates to a more pervasive problem with prevention; identifying catalysts for conflict and/or atrocity commission is far from exact. Conflict can hardly be said to occur in a vacuum and while there are certain well established enabling conditions, there are so many that prescriptions become invariably vague. Clearly, conflict and atrocities do not occur in societies where there is social harmony; suggesting that disharmony constitutes fertile ground for their outbreak, however, does not lend itself to establishing focused preventative proposals. Indicatively, to mitigate the occurrence of the societal tensions that *could* lead to violence the ICISS recommended that states should implement a number of policies including,

> A firm national commitment to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens....Efforts to ensure accountability and good governance, protect human rights, promote social and economic development and ensure a fair distribution of resources (ICISS, 2001a, p. 19).

These are quite clearly very expansive prescriptions, incorporating an array of issues which arguably stretch the scope of "preventative" action to such an extent that they lose coherence and focus. Likewise, in outlining what he describes as "structural policy options" designed to ameliorate the outbreak of conflict, Ban Ki-Moon's prescriptions on the Responsibility to Prevent in 2013 similarly include an immense range of guidelines;

> history has shown that building societies that are resilient to atrocity crimes reinforces State sovereignty and increases prospects for peace and stability. Building resilience implies developing appropriate legal frameworks and building State structures and institutions that are legitimate, respect international human rights law and the rule of law in general, and that have the capacity to address and defuse sources of tension before they escalate. It means building a society which accepts and values diversity and in which different communities coexist peacefully (2013, p. 2).

These may well be laudable goals but they are clearly vague and vast; what is being suggested here amounts to the universal promotion of democracy, judicial impartiality and good governance. Thus, the normative society advanced as a means to realise the Responsibility to Prevent comprises constitutional and institutional components that by definition imbue the prescriptions with a political and ideological flavour that mitigates against consensus and strays into the micro-management of intra-state politics (Lund, 2004, p. 124; Welsh, 2010, p. 153). In addition, the absence of one or more of these normative features of good governance

does not guarantee conflict; as Ban Ki-moon noted, "The presence of risk factors does not directly or inevitably cause atrocity crimes. Societies can exhibit multiple sources of risk but not experience atrocity crimes" (2013, p. 4). Thus, it cannot be authoritatively stated that the absence of these features leads to conflict, just that it *could*. The OSAPGR2P's analysis of the occurrence of atrocity crimes confirms this noting that many states exhibit "the presence of most of the risk factors, but atrocity crimes have not yet taken place" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 6).

If the Responsibility to Prevent is presented as a means to address the factors which can potentially lead to conflict and/or atrocity crimes, then it will arguably face dealing with an eclectic range of issues beyond the feasible scope of any single concept. For example, the range of enabling factors which contributed to the mass atrocities in Darfur from 2003–2008, includes inequitable farming practices and global warming (De Waal, 2007; Faris, 2007); can R2P realistically advance prescriptions on how to manage agricultural practices in Africa and tackle global warming without diluting its focus on mass atrocity prevention?

This also highlights a problem with the very idea that early warning systems constitutive a means of preventing conflict. Like the maxim that prevention is preferable to response, the notion that we should improve early warning systems is difficult to reject. This has become one of the dominant themes of the Responsibility to Prevent; Paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit *Outcome Document* pledged states to "support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability" and the Secretary General's reports focus much attention on the need to improve early warning capacity within the UN. Yet, given the array of potential factors that could lead to the outbreak of conflict or the commission of atrocities, early warning systems arguably have an invidious remit; the list of warning signs is potentially infinite if one accepts that corruption, underdevelopment, disease, global warming, poor education, and many other factors contribute to the escalation of societal tensions. The problem facing those advocating prevention is, therefore, that the array of possible triggers is so vast, warnings, if issued at all, can be inherently speculative and thus lacking in imminence. As Henry Huttenbach warned, "...the capability to predict wars, civil strife and revolutions, let alone specific genocides, with any kind of reasonable, rational certitude escapes even the most knowledgeable" (2008, p. 472). There is a rich body of literature reflecting on past atrocities with a view to determining the key catalysts and warning signs; the results are certainly instructive but far from homogenous (Goldstone et al., 2010; Harff, 2003; Held, 2009; Straus, 2007). This is further accentuated by the fact that R2P is concerned with "four crimes"—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing—which

each have very different definition's and catalysts, and thus the scale and scope of possible warning signs is enormous.

Additionally, certain crises have erupted in an extremely short period of time without previously exhibiting any notable warning signs (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 7). The crisis in Libya in 2011 is an obvious example; as noted by Bellamy,

> None of the world's various risk-assessment frameworks viewed the country as posing any sort of threat of mass atrocities. Neither was a conflict widely anticipated. For example, CrisisWatch, the early-warning arm of the International Crisis Group, did not even mention Libya in its report of February 2011, and did not issue a "conflict risk alert" until after the conflict had actually erupted (Bellamy, 2011b, p. 4).

The underlying cause of this conflict clearly related to the plight of those who had suffered under Gaddafi's regime for so long—which certainly *had* been flagged by human rights organisations (Amnesty International, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011)—but the means by which this could have been mitigated—such as recommended by Ban Ki-Moon in 2013—simply could not have been applied in February 2011. As Jennifer Welsh, the UN Special Adviser on R2P, accepts, "Structural or root-cause prevention strategies would have had little to say about this particular country" (2011, p. 7). One can certainly argue that the appropriate time to deal with the underlying causes of popular disquiet in Libya was five, ten or even twenty years earlier, but if this line of argument is adhered to then prevention becomes a call not just for universal democratisation, but for a near-revolution in international politics in terms of inter-state relations.

Continuing with Libya as the example, after decommissioning his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, Gaddafi was rehabilitated in the international community; trade with Libya increased, states openly sold arms to Libya, and the country's notorious jails were used in the network of venues involved in the extraordinary rendition process (Black, 2009; Open Society Foundation, 2013). If, as is clear, Gaddafi's regime was supported by the outside world and, as a result, enabled to engage in the very domestic oppression which led to the mass uprisings and resultant violence in 2011, then a causal link can be made between the policies of say the UK, France and Italy towards Libya and the crisis within the state in 2011 (Amnesty International, 2012). Yet, surprisingly little attention is paid to the deleterious role played by external actors in fomenting internal disaffection in the official reports on the Responsibility to Prevent. Neither of Ban Ki-Moon's reports, for example, recommend that states stop selling arms to, or trade with,

despotic regimes, despite this being a causal factor in the explosion of popular unrest across the Middle East in 2011 (PAX, 2015; Smith, 2011). The OSAPGR2P's 2014 report does briefly mention this; it lists "Armed, financial, logistic, training or other support of external actors, including States, international or regional organizations, private companies, or others" as one of the eight "indicators" under "Risk Factor 5: Capacity to Commit Atrocity Crimes" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 14). There are a total of 14 Risk factors in the report each with between six and eighteen "indicators"; the one mention of negative external influence in the report is, therefore, relatively minimal.

The narrative on prevention thus often coheres with a particular view of intra-state crises which neglects to recognise the part played by the external in creating internal problems (Orford, 2003, p. 85). The situation is thus often framed in binary terms with a sharp distinction between the internal and the external; intra-state crises are invariably framed in exclusively endogenous terms with little or no references to exogenous causes (Collins, 2002; Williams, 2005, p. 113). Kofi Annan's 2006 report on related issues *did* note the negative role played by external actors in escalating intra-state societal tensions, but such warnings were not made in the context of Ban Ki-Moon's prescriptions on the Responsibility to Prevent (Annan, 2006, p. 28). This of course presupposes two things; that external forces are not a causal factor in the occurrence of internal crises, and that a greater role for external actors is axiomatically a good thing; research suggests, particularly in the context of the preventative measures taken with respects to Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, that this is not always the case (Jones, 1995, p. 226; Wheeler, 2002, p. 214). Indeed, the ICISS acknowledged, "…when sustained measures have been undertaken, results have been mixed" (ICISS, 2001b, p. 27).

While this section has highlighted some potential problems related to prevention it has not sought to suggest that prevention is impossible. Rather the intention has been to demonstrate that while conflict prevention and atrocity prevention are different, both suffer the same problems of causal diffusion, indeterminacy and potential causal bias. This does not render prevention strategies inherently flawed or impotent but must temper expectations as to the potential efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent. Building on these initial reflections, the following sections assess the particularities of atrocity prevention to highlight a further problem related to the Responsibility to Prevent, namely the centrality of political will.

4. "Triggering Factors"

Mass atrocities invariably involve acts of sadism and wanton violence, but they are not the product of a flash of madness in the way a random act of violence

may well be. By their very nature mass atrocities are, as perverse as it may seem, calculated and the product of careful deliberation (Howard, 1984, pp. 14-15). As Bellamy notes, "…mass atrocities tend to be rational, intentional and organized…it is actually quite difficult to persuade people to inflict harm intentionally on others" (2015, p. 29). Those who commit mass atrocities have clearly determined that their interests are best served if they resort to extreme violence; such acts are not committed on a whim or accidentally, however callous the act itself may be.

The decision to engage in such acts also cannot be born from an ignorance either of the legal prescriptions against such violence or the moral illegitimacy of systematic slaughter. In certain cases atrocities are, of course, carried out after a period of dehumanisation—whereby a target group is cast as sub-human as occurred most notably with respects to the Tutses prior to the Rwandan genocide (Hintjens, 1999)—but invariably the authorisation of atrocity committal will be from actors aware of the humanity of their victims.

This, therefore, enables a distinction to be made between conflict prevention and atrocity prevention; in the course of a conflict the warring parties seek military victory; atrocities—particularly ethnic cleansing, systemic crimes against humanity, and genocide—however, involve a determination to eliminate—either through extermination or expulsion—a perceived foe. Rather than stemming from strategic calculations based on a desire to achieve particular material aims, these crimes are calculated to inflict particular harm to individuals and thus "affect the core dignity of human beings" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 1). Atrocities stem from underlying enabling factors which overlap with those related to conflict but, crucially, the decision to engage in a mass atrocity is different to the decision to engage in conflict; the latter may be born from a desire for greater material wealth, territory, or political change, whereas the former emerges from a sense of existential threat, invariably impelled by a particular catalyst described in the OSAPGR2P's report on prevention as "triggering factors" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 3). The OSAPGR2P defines these "triggering factors" as "unpredictable events or circumstances [that] aggravate conditions or spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, prompting the perpetration of atrocity crimes" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 17).

Those atrocities committed in the post-Cold War era which have generated the most international revulsion, such as in Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), Darfur (2003–2008), and Syria (2011–2015), have been undertaken by groups/actors who considered their victims to constitute an existential threat which had to be eliminated. The decision to plan a mass atrocity in each case preceded some political trauma; in the Rwandan case the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane on April 6th provided the catalysts for the Hutu to initiate the genocide; the violence in Srebrenica was the most horrific massacre to occur in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia but it certainly wasn't the first. It occurred in the context of the savage escalation in identity-based violence which began in 1991 during which ethnic identity became a political fissure and the basis upon which new territories were demarcated; the conflict in Darfur had a long history but attacks by the Sudanese Liberation Army against government military installations in February 2003 led to the subsequent government-led brutal campaign; in Syria the turning point occurred in late March early April when the protestors changed their demands from reform to the overthrow of Assad's regime. This was accompanied by a series of violent incidents such as the burning down of the Baath Party headquarters in Daraa on 20th March and the killing of 7 policemen. The chances of dissuading the perpetrators from committing the atrocities was always minimal once the Rubicon of "existential threat" had been crossed.

Determining when this catalyst or "triggering point" will occur is, by definition, extremely difficult; as noted by the OSAPGR2P, "Triggering factors are not always predictable and a strong mitigating factor might weaken or disappear" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 6). Thus the timeframe for, and potential efficacy of, preventative action was limited in each case. This means that the more holistic approaches advocated—as discussed above—were highly unlikely to have any traction during the period after the political trauma and before the commission of mass atrocities. Certainly, ideas related to education, employment, inter-communal dialogue etc. are far too long-term to have had any meaningful effect at this stage. Thus "Pillar I" namely the "internal" dimension of the Responsibility to Prevent—the host state's responsibility to protect its people from harm (Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 10)—is of limited effectiveness; the key, therefore, to preventing the commission of mass atrocities once an existential threat has been evoked is operationalising Pillars II and III, namely the external aspect (Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 15). Those about to engage in the commission of mass atrocities are likely to be dissuaded from doing so only by external actors.

4.1. The External Dimension

Reduced to its most basic components, prevention—in the context of mass atrocity crimes—involves external actors dissuading—possibly through coercive means—those planning to commit a mass atrocity from executing their plans. Naturally, if a group plans to commit a mass atrocity and then, through a process of exclusively internal deliberation, decides that this plan is no longer appropriate, there is no need for preventative action.

Prevention is thus by definition predicated on dissuading an agent from taking a particular course of ac-

tion and thus, it involves a bi-lateral dynamic. There are, therefore, two actors against whom the responsibility to prevent is leveraged; the group(s) planning the attacks and the external actor(s)—the "international community"—implored to prevent the attacks. This coheres with the internal and the external dimension of R2P which is central to the concept as reflected in the UN Secretary General's "Three Pillars" of R2P (Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 2). Both internal and external agents decide what action to take on the basis of a series of factors which determine the potential efficacy of preventative action.

Those committing mass atrocities clearly believe it is both in their interests and within their capacity to undertake a mass atrocity (Valentino, 2005, pp. 66-91). In terms of the latter, no group will plan to engage in a mass atrocity crime if it determines that in so doing their own situation will deteriorate. The decision to use force in this way is, therefore, logically born from a sense of capacity. Of course, not all actors with the capacity to commit atrocities against their enemies do commit these acts; while this is a necessary condition it is not an automatic trigger.

This rational calculation also means, therefore, that many groups which may actually want to commit mass atrocities are dissuaded from so doing simply because they calculate that the consequences would be, on balance, deleterious. There are, however, some cases where groups have, ostensibly, engaged in forms of violence designed to actually *increase* their own oppression, at least in the short term. Alan Kuperman has suggested that groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Sudanese Liberation Army engaged their respective enemies in such a way as to provoke them into committing atrocities against their people which would both galvanise their own communities and, more importantly, compel the international community to intervene on their behalf (Kuperman, 2006; for an opposing view see, Bellamy & Williams, 2012). In these cases, therefore, though the strategy employed is actually designed to accentuate the group's own suffering in the short term, the logic is ultimately that they will prevail with the aid of external support, and thus the balance of consequences remains a determining logic.

With respects to the means by which external agents can exercise leverage on potential perpetrators of mass atrocities, the key period is the immediate aftermath of the catalyst or "trigger point", when the cost-benefit analysis is undertaken; it is during this phase that coordinated international pressure is most effective and most needed. The decision not to commit an atrocity once an existential crisis is deemed to pertain, is therefore, dependent on altering the balance of consequences calculation so that committing the atrocity will be perceived as imprudent (rather than simply illegal or immoral). By definition the crimes R2P is orientated towards involve one party of vastly superior

strength targeting another; this means that these crimes derive from a balance of consequences decision-making process which favours the latter. The means by which the costs of committing an atrocity are increased to the point where to undertake such acts would be manifestly self-defeating, derives from the positions taken by the international community and thus the leverage exercised by external actors is a function of political will. This has profound consequences for the Responsibility to Prevent. The problem is, the means by which this "international" action is coordinated and operationalised is essentially state-based and ultimately dependent on the P5.

While R2P has been presented by many of its advocates as revolutionary (Feinstein, 2007) and an idea "that has begun to change the world" (Bellamy, 2015, p. 111), it has actually not led to, nor has it sought to impel, any change to the existing international legal order. R2P is a restatement of existing laws—each of the "four crimes" were illegal long before R2P (Focarelli, 2008; Stahn, 2007)—and, perhaps more significantly, seeks to work with rather than alter the process by which these laws are enforced (Bellamy, 2015, p. 14; Evans, 2008, p. 137). This means in practice that the concept recognises the powers vested in the Security Council and does not involve, or propose, any institutional change (Davies & Bellamy, 2014).

International human rights law is extensive in its scope but this comprehensive remit is undermined by the process by which it is enforced. While international law establishes a range of inviolable human rights, in practice this system is based on self-regulation (Fitzmaurice, 2014, p. 182). State's essentially police themselves with respects to their adherence to the human rights laws they commit themselves to abide by (Henkin, 1990, p. 250). The only viable means by which the state's adherence to international human rights law can be coercively enforced is through Chapter VII of the UN Charter; this requires the consent of the Security Council and thus the veto power of the P5 becomes a key barrier to the enforcement of human rights law. Other UN bodies—such as the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner for Human Rights—may issue recommendations and condemnations but they do not have the power to enforce compliance or punish criminality (Mertus, 2009, p. 34). This, indeed, is reflected in the OSAPGR2P's overview of international law on human rights and atrocity prevention (2014, pp. 1-3).

In a functioning domestic political system individuals obey the law either because they agree with the law or they fear punishment if they do commit a crime (Hurrell, 2005, p. 16). Thus, even if the moral conviction that murder is wrong is lacking, an individual faces considerable disincentives to kill, in the form of retrospective punishment meted out by the police and judiciary. If however the judicial system, police and government are corrupt, and the individual believes s/he

can escape punishment, then, provided s/he has no moral qualms about committing murder, a perceived need arises, and the potential murderer calculates that s/he has the capacity to undertake this action, then the chances that such an act will be committed naturally increase. This is, essentially analogous to the situation which pertains at present in international politics, a situation R2P has not remedied.

In the context of the Responsibility to Prevent, the manner in which preventative influence is exercised is largely dependent on the assent of the P5. In his 2010 report Ban outlined how Responsibility to Prevent would be operationalised;

> When the Special Advisers, based largely on information provided by, and in consultation with, other United Nations entities, conclude that a situation could result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, they provide early warning to me and, through me, to the Security Council (2010, pp. 7-8).

Thus while reform of the early warning mechanism would ensure that warnings would be expedited more rapidly through the UN system, ultimately these reports would be placed before the Security Council for its consideration. Here politics invariably takes over; as Francis Deng stated when he was OSAPG, "every time an issue is brought to the Security Council you can predict how Russia, China and the others will vote" (Hehir, 2012, p. 223). The Secretary-General also notes the potential role of Regional Organisation acting through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter but again, while these bodies do not comprise a veto-wielding P5, they are state-based and cannot be said to be immune from the influence of political interests.

The only actual institutional innovation initiated in the context of the emergence of the Responsibility to Prevent is the creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in July 2004[1] (Annan, 2004, p. 2). The OSAPG was heralded by some as a potentially significant innovation and indicative of the new importance afforded to prevention (Hamburg, 2008, p. 226; Ramcharan, 2008, p. 180). Yet, in addition to being allocated a paltry budget (Deng, 2010) the mandate of the OSAPG was, and remains, heavily restricted and the capacity of the adviser to act independently was consciously circumscribed by the Security Council during the drafting of the OSAPG's mandate (Hehir, 2010, 2011). This has meant that though a new office was created with a specific remit to work on the prevention of genocide, the institutional distribution of power within the UN was unaltered.

This coheres with the findings of the ICISS who noted, that while states had often lauded the importance of prevention these declarations, "…have not, however, been matched by an equal commitment by member states to build UN preventative capacities" (ICISS, 2001b, p. 29)

This all means in practice that a state which commits, or plans to commit, an atrocity crime can be shielded from external censure if they happen to have an ally amongst the P5; as Deng noted, whenever a crisis is brought to the P5, "you are going to get one member or another of the P5 to defend that country" (Hehir, 2012, p. 224). The case of Syria is illustrative here; once the rebel forces threatened the very existence of Assad's regime in March/April 2011 it clearly constituted an existential crisis for Assad personally and the regime around him. In determining how to respond Assad would have known that the tactics he came to employ were illegal; it is implausible that he was unaware when planning his violent response that the tactics he aimed to employ would involve breaking international law. Yet, in determining whether or not to commit these atrocity crimes he will certainly have been influenced by the fact that Russia has a permanent seat on the Security Council and thus the capacity to veto any proposed international censure. Thus, in terms of the external dimension of the Responsibility to Prevent a key means of dissuading Assad from engaging in mass atrocity crimes—namely the fear of external censure—was much less potent. Illustratively, on 22nd May 2014 despite the appeals of the UN Secretary General and the UN Hugh Commissioner for Human Rights, Russia and China vetoed a proposal put to the Security Council to refer Assad to the International Criminal Court (ICC); the use of the veto in this case—the fourth time it had been exercised by Russia and China in the course of the response to Syria—came as little surprise and once again highlighted the influence of politics on law enforcement. This constitutional conflation of politics and law enforcement clearly impacts on the efficacy of prevention; despite the ICC's existence, if the determination as to who is tried there is a political rather than a judicial one, then its punitive potential is a less effective deterrent than it could be.

The institutional configuration of the UN, and specifically the powers vested in the P5, thus whilst not a causal factor in Assad's decision to engage in mass atrocity crimes, constituted an enabling factor. In the same way we can say that Israel's tactics towards Gaza in 2014 derived from a sense that though these actions were illegal they would be protected from punishment by the US at the Security Council. Of course, having an ally on the P5 does not shield a government from international criticism; both Syria and Israel have been widely condemned by an array of actors from journalists, to academics to UN officials and other states but, crucially, though this condemnation has surely been

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[1] The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide merged with the Office of the Special Adviser on R2P in 2011

unwelcome, it has not been sufficient to sway these states from engaging in their actions, as they consider them to be impelled by an existential threat.

Thus, we can determine that those who decided to commit mass atrocities do so through a process of rational evaluation of the costs and benefits involved. Likewise, the international community's disposition during the immediate pre-atrocity phase is determined on a similar cost-benefit basis. This helps explain, for example, the differing response of the international community to the cases of Libya and Syria in 2011. With respects to Libya the UN reacted with unusual speed; in the Security Council passed Resolution 1970 on 26th February which sought to dissuade Gaddafi from engaging in mass atrocities. This was very clearly an attempt at preventative action employed only ten days after the situation began to rapidly deteriorate. Less than three weeks later on 17th March the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 with sanctioned the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. In this case, the nature of the Gaddafi regime and regional geopolitics were more of a factor in determining the international response than the scale of human rights abuses taking place; if the UN Security Council acted only on the basis of the scale of the potential or actual suffering then the response to Syria would not have been as lamentable as it has proved (Hehir, 2013; Morris; 2013). Clearly the speed with which the Security Council passed resolution 1970—aimed at preventing a mass atrocity—contrast sharply with the lamentable inaction and disunity which has characterised the Council's response to Syria.

The difference between Libya and Syria stemmed from the very different relationship between Libya and the international community, and Syria and the international community. The different response was essentially a function of the fact that Gaddafi, unlike Assad, did not have powerful allies willing to shield him from external censure. Whilst, as noted earlier, Gaddafi had very definitely "come in from the cold" since decommissioning his weapons programme he remained an isolated figure, actively despised by many in the West, and indeed, the Middle East (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, pp. 841-842). Assad, however, though also a divisive figure in the Middle East, benefitted from the robust support of Russia.

Thus, the leverage excised by the Responsibility to Prevent is heavily dependent on political will, as opposed to legal procedure and judicial oversight. This, severely restricts the efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent as, to a great extent, the holistic approaches to conflict and atrocity prevention—which as discussed earlier are problematic in themselves—are ultimately of secondary importance to the political disposition of the great powers, a dynamic far less malleable than the measures advocated by Ban Ki-Moon. This is reflected in the literature on conflict prevention generally; as Bruce W. Jentleson observes, "Almost every study of

conflict prevention concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the lack of political will" (2009, p. 293). The ICISS report itself noted, "It is possible to exaggerate the extent to which lack of early warning is a serious problem…lack of early warning is an excuse rather than an explanation, and the problem is not a lack of warning but of timely response" (2001a, p. 21). Thus while paragraph 138 of the *Outcome Document* called for greater emphasis on early warning and Ban Ki-Moon called for greater sharing of information on looming atrocities, these do not constitute solutions to the problem posed by the P5's political approach to human rights law enforcement. Illustratively, graphic reports on the deteriorating situation in Darfur were regularly brought to the Security Council's attention from 2003 on, to little effect (Peters, 2009, p. 524). As Gregory Stanton succinctly observers, "Early warning is meaningless without early response" (2009, p. 319). Remedial action which did have a positive effect in Darfur was primarily the result of unilateral initiatives undertaken without the Security Council's collective support (Deng, 2010; Mayroz, 2008, p. 366; Straus, 2005). The fact that many of these initiatives did have a positive effect—USAID in particular has played a pro-active role in the region (USAID, 2015)—serves to further expose the Security Council's ineffectiveness.

Again, it is necessary to state that these institutional problems, though clearly of profound importance, do not mean preventative diplomacy can *never* be successful. The problem is not that preventative action cannot work but rather that the primary means by which it can be effectively leveraged is compromised by competing national interests amongst the P5. Two examples regularly cited as evidence of successful preventative intervention are the international community's response to the crises in Ivory Coast in November 2004 and Kenya in December 2007 (Ban Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 24). In both cases the intervention of the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide—Juan Méndez in 2004 and Francis Deng in 2007—helped to diffuse an escalating crisis. In the same way, it is simply untrue to say that, owing to the structure of the UN, the international community can *never* respond to actually occurring humanitarian crises; at times the response to crises has been timely and robust. The problem, however, is that these cases are the exception. Owing to the existing legal system the more common response is "inhumanitarian non-intervention" (Chesterman, 2003, p. 54) namely a situation where, despite the obvious humanitarian need, the lack of national interests amongst those with the capacity to act results in inaction. Precisely the same problem impacts on the efficacy of the responsibility to prevent; arguably more so given that calling preventative action is based on *possible* tragedy. As Weiss remarked,

Logically speaking if you can't even get people mobilised to do something in the midst of a crisis, the idea that somehow even before you have a crisis, they're all going to align and put money into it seems to me to be against the nature of human beings and certainly against the nature of the interstate system (Hehir, 2012, p. 112).

The responsibility to prevent, as currently advanced, therefore, does not address the main obstacle to consistent and effective preventative action; the state-based nature of the international legal order and specifically, the powers vested in the P5. Without seeking to address this structural barrier the efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent, will be limited.

5. Conclusion

Though initially catalysed by a perceived need to improve the international community's *response* to intra-state crises, R2P has increasingly focused on prevention. The "Responsibility to Prevent" indeed, has become widely championed at the primary aim of R2P and the means by which the concept as a whole can have the greatest impact. This article has argued, however, that the future efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent will be circumscribed by causal indeterminacy and the barrier presented by the constitutional configuration of the UN Security Council.

Tackling looming crises naturally demands an understanding of how these crises emerge; the range of possible contributing factors is, however, so vast that this is arguably an unfeasibly onerous task which can at best only provide very general guidelines. Indicatively the ICISS urged the international community to tackle the "root causes" of internal conflict namely poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of resources (2001a, p. 22). Collectively addressing these three issues is clearly an enormous, if not impracticable, task (Lund, 2004, p. 122). Advocating expansive holistic changes—such as democratisation, impartial judiciaries, and equitable wealth distribution—constitutes an ideologically-inspired agenda for the micro-management of intra-state politics which is alienating—insofar as it will be perceived as political—as well as unfeasible.

Aside even from the scale and political nature of these "preventative" measures it is not clear that there is actually a causal link between the oft-cited danger signs and the actual occurrence of atrocity crimes; as the OSAPGR2P accepted, "…it is impossible to draw a direct causal relation between the presence of particular risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity crimes" (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 7). Thus, we remain unable to authoritatively determine causal patterns when it comes to identifying specific danger signs, and thus remain prey to the cumulative effect of case-specific exigencies.

Additionally, simply noting that these features exist

in a particular society does not in itself catalyse action. The UN's enquiry into the Rwandan genocide certainly noted gaps and weaknesses with respects to early warning information sharing but ultimately concluded that the "fundamental failure" was "a persistent lack of political will" (Security Council, 1999, p. 3). As Ban Ki-Moon noted, "…the crucial element in the prevention of genocide remains responding to concerns, once these have been communicated" (Human Rights Council, 2009, p. 17). History suggests that political will is all too often lacking, especially with respects to prevention which by definition seeks to mobilise action on the presumption that something *might* happen. In his 2014 report the Secretary General lamented,

there is still too little will to operationalize prevention. This is manifest most clearly in the reluctance of States to place country situations on the agenda of regional or international organizations before they reach a crisis point. It is also reflected in the resource allocations of many Member States, which still prioritize crisis response (2014, p. 18).

As R2P has not altered, or indeed sought to alter, the means by which the Security Council reacts to intra-state crises—looming or actual—the structural barriers to effective and consistent action—manifest in the competing national interests of the P5—remain. The Responsibility to Prevent is left, therefore, largely dependent upon the whims of particular states and thus prey to their often nefarious political interests.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Commentary

Moving Upstream and Going Local: The Responsibility to Protect Ten Years Later

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Abstract

Ten years ago the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet today, horrific violence against civilians continues in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This article examines some of the progress and gaps in the international community's efforts to better protect civilians against mass violence over the past decade. It proposes two emerging directions for advancing the R2P agenda in the coming years: 1) greater focus on upstream prevention, and 2) increased support for locally-led peacebuilding and prevention actors and capacities.

Issue

This commentary is part of the special issue "Mass Atrocity Prevention", edited by Professor Karen E. Smith (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK).

Ten years ago, the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine at the 2005 World Summit. Ten years later, horrific violence against civilians has now devastated tens of thousands of lives in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan, with potential new waves of killing feared in countries like Burundi and Myanmar. Have we, as a global community, made any progress in making good on the now 70-year commitment of "never again", or has R2P been just another unfulfilled promise by international leaders?

The answer is a bit of both. Since the signing of the 2005 World Summit Document that committed global leaders to the three pillars of R2P, important progress has been made at the normative, policy, and practical levels. R2P laid out three pillars of responsibility, and some progress on each can be seen. These include: 1) primary responsibility of states to prevent and protect their own people, 2) responsibility of the international community to support states in implementing that commitment, 3) and responsibility of the international community to intervene under UN authorization if prevention fails.

Normatively, R2P expanded the narrow focus on genocide, and the definitional debates that often obstructed effective action to prevent it, to require action against a broader set of international crimes against civilians. While the inclusion of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against civilians marked an important step in moving the international community beyond paralyzing debates to prove genocidal intent before acting and breaking out of the numbers game of measuring human suffering, the normative frame for R2P has expanded even further first to encompass a general narrative of "mass atrocities" and in more recent years "atrocity prevention" as a rising normative frame around which policymaking and practical efforts are now developing. While defining what constitutes "atrocities" or "atrocity prevention" and how it differs from broader violent conflict prevention may create new definitional debates, moving beyond R2P's original four

crimes may be an important evolution to help the international community shift focus further "upstream" in its efforts to avert deliberate violence against civilians.

The most critical normative shift since R2P's adoption has, in fact, been the move away from a dominant focus on intervention after atrocities unfold—when the international community's tools are more limited and the consequences of spiraling violence much greater—to a much more serious focus on prevention before the killing begins. Although debates over military intervention can still consume the attention of policymakers and the press, dedicated work by a growing number of academics, policymakers, practitioners, civil society groups and local communities to improve capacities for early warning and preventive action are slowly but steadily gaining ground. Looking forward to the next ten years of international efforts to make good on the promise of R2P, continuing this shift in focus and resource investment toward earlier prevention will be critical.

At the policy and structural level, important steps have been taken that offer some hope. The United Nations, along with regional multilateral organizations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, have created offices, dedicated positions, and governmental networks for early warning and response of genocide. These networks are made up of a growing number of government officials being trained (often by nongovernmental organizations) in genocide and atrocity prevention and developing relationships across regions that can foster information-sharing and analysis, complementary policy development, and practical action among decision-makers responsible for prevention and response within countries and regions at greatest risk. R2P's primary focus not on external intervention but rather state responsibility for protecting populations has been one of the most important contributions of the norm, and a growing number of national governments have identified "focal points" on genocide and atrocity prevention and put into place new policies and structures for preventing and responding to mass atrocities. In establishing specific genocide prevention mechanisms within the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region's, leaders in the region made a commitment to owning the problem of mass violence in their countries with the vision of moving from a "genocide-prone" reality to a "genocide-free" future. External powers are also creating internal structures to try to strengthen their capacities as well. The Obama Administration's commitment to make mass atrocity prevention a "core national security interest and core moral responsibility of the United States", as outlined in Presidential Study Directive 10 in 2011, and subsequent establishment of the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board within the White House's National Security Council, is one example.

In practice, the R2P doctrine has also been employed in a number of situations to try to prevent or de-escalate atrocity crises. In response to the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2007/2008 that killed some 1,300 people and displaced tens of thousands, the international community invoked the responsibility to protect as part of a coordinated diplomatic messaging and mediation effort to compel the country's leaders to restrain the violence and reach a negotiated settlement. A multi-year preventive effort followed within Kenya and by many in the international community to avert another electoral crisis five years later. In the Central African Republic, as fears of genocidal violence rose in 2013, the international community mobilized a significant response to what has been one of the most neglected countries in the world. In this case, while the response still came too late to save thousands of lives and may be difficult to sustain for the time it will take to ensure a path out of decades of cycles of violence, governance and development crises, the role of specific atrocity prevention mechanisms like the US Atrocities Prevention Board and United Nations-authorized peacekeepers did make a difference. In Libya in 2011, a NATO military intervention was mobilized to respond to what was seen by some as a pending slaughter of thousands of civilians. Unfortunately, in that case, the results are much less encouraging, with continued chaos, hundreds of armed militias, and the rise of new extremist elements targeting civilians. Now, as Burundi teeters on the edge of a potential atrocity crisis, the international community is again mobilizing to apply as many tools as possible—high-level diplomatic engagement, individual sanctions, UN Security Council action, human rights monitoring, peace messaging, community radio, humanitarian aid, and other support to civil society. As Burundian police cracked down on civil society protests in late April, the Burundian military played a remarkable role to directly protect civilians in the streets, a testament to the potential for civilian protection norms to take hold among key individuals and institutions even while state leaders are perpetuating abuses.

What are the lessons we should learn from the past ten years and where is the R2P landscape headed? While we should affirm and continue supporting the normative, policy, and practical steps that have been taken over the past decade, far too many lives continue to be lost and destroyed to become complacent. The failures of the global community in recent years demand renewed commitment and concerted work to make R2P a reality, not just rhetoric. In Darfur, ten years after a massive international mobilization by governments and civil society, little is being done while civilians continue to be killed and raped in large numbers, having become the forgotten genocide of our time. In Syria, despite significant international attention, the violence continues unabated, including direct targeting of communities with barrel bombs and chemical weapons, while a regional crisis of extremist vio-

lence, ungoverned space, and humanitarian catastrophe unfolds. These and other cases underline the reality of how complex and difficult implementing R2P still is, and how much more still needs to be done.

Two emerging directions can help ensure the next ten years build on the gains thus far and improve our approaches and tools for preventing violence against civilians in future. First, the shift toward further "upstream" prevention must continue. Rhetorically, we have come a long way since just ten years ago in focusing on the need to "stop the killing before it begins" through better early warning and analysis, preventive diplomacy, and dedicated programs and funding before mass violence ensues. But the persistent challenges of mobilizing political will and resources without the headlines of a crisis, and proving what works when things do not happen, remain. We need to build a stronger empirical evidence base on prevention through creative research that tackles the counterfactual challenge rather than succumbing to it. And we need focused education, advocacy, and engagement with policymakers to demonstrate convincingly the reality that prevention is more effective and less costly than responding after violence is underway. Moving upstream can also avoid the nasty problem of military interventions that seem like the only option available, but often introduce an additional danger into already highly complex and dangerous crises, fueling conflict and suffering in the long run.

Second is the growing focus on strengthening local capacities—national capacities but particularly local civil society—to be more resilient against the risks of atrocities and mass violence. A growing body of research is documenting the ways in which communities act, often on their own accord and sometimes in partnership with national and international groups, to resist, rescue, and protect against attacks on civilians. This includes, for example, local peacebuilding, self-protection strategies, nonviolent action, community-based early warning and response systems, human rights documentation, peace messaging, and promoting tolerance, dialogue, and positive economic interdependence across conflict groups. Effective prevention requires shoring up the "front lines" where violence against civilians occurs. These front lines are local communities. Recognizing their agency (not just victimhood) and primary role in helping the global community implement R2P is a necessary and critical shift for the coming years. Most attention and resources still go toward Pillar I and Pillar III, while the greatest promise lies in Pillar II, which must include supporting civil society, not just state capacities for protection and prevention. Investing more resources and support to local civil society so they can identify, design and develop the mechanisms they need in order to build long-term peacebuilding and prevention capacities, understand and act on risks in their earliest stages, hold their governments accountable for protecting their populations, and engage external support from the international community when needed, should be priority number one in the years ahead.

Preventing mass violence against civilians has become, rightly, a growing global cause, but it also remains, tragically, a deeply local reality for far too many people. As such it requires both global and local solutions.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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