New Approaches to Political Leadership

Editor

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Editorial

Editorial: New Approaches to Political Leadership

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Abstract
This editorial introduces the special issue and considers what the articles tell us about new approaches to political leadership. The editorial explains how each article engages with the core puzzles of political leadership and brings together many diverse theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of political leadership, a vibrant area of study currently in the midst of an academic renaissance.

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "New Approaches to Political Leadership", edited by Mark Bennister (Canterbury Christ Church University, UK).

1. Introduction

Political leadership sits at the heart of how we explain the functioning of various political systems and public policy decision making. A myriad of approaches, frameworks and concepts exist within the very broad field of leadership studies; an essentially contested subject area. Without a single unifying theory of leadership, Elgie (2015) notes that the study of leadership is ontologically and epistemologically diverse. Such diversity is in fact attractive to scholars, able to pick through a field that has yet to prioritise any one approach over another. It is now well established that leadership is the product of the interaction between leader and the environment within which the leader is operating. This forms the fundamental paradigm of interactionism. But this takes us only so far and, in contrast to leadership study in the business field, political leadership study is much less coherent. At the heart of the interactionist paradigm, there are many 'puzzles' of political leadership in democracies. For instance, should leadership be promoted or constrained? And how does leadership effect, and be effected by, the contexts and situations in which it is exercised? The

growth in interest reaches across disciplines and scholars, from political scientists to psychologists and anthropologists. Units of research now extend beyond the traditional analysis of elected representatives and formal office holders. Political leadership is exercised by individuals and groups with considerable influence, operating in a variety of leadership zones to impact on policy and decision making.

The recent rich flowering of research presents opportunities for scholars to move the field forward. Publications have emerged to consolidate and energise research in the area. Prominent amongst these has been work that makes sense of the study of leadership (Elgie 2015), the methods and analytical approaches (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014), the normative democratic leader (Kane & Patapan, 2012), and trends in the evaluation of prime ministerial performance (Strangio, 't Hart, & Walter, 2013). Much of this literature has sought to re-evaluate research approaches in the field, but there has also been a flowering of applied research. Political science, and other related disciplines, has sought to measure and theorise political leadership in order to predict (or at least explain) the success and failure of party leaders, heads of government, mayors, gover-

nors, or leadership teams at the apex of government (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014, p. 150). Now, greater attention is being paid to the leadership impact on so called 'wicked' policy issues and factoring in leadership to explain policy failures in uncertain times.

This special issue complements the renaissance of interest in political leadership and bring together some important new research in the field from a broad variety of scholarly angles. Approaches range from the conceptual through to the organisational and on to the highly empirical gathering of evidence of leadership traits. Contributors ask questions to challenge some of the assumptions prevalent in the literature. Several of these questions go to the heart of the agent-structure paradigm that is so embedded in interactionism. For example, to what extent do leaders shape the environment in which they operate? Can leaders overcome organisational and situational constraints to influence outcomes? Can leaders 'stretch' these institutional boundaries? How responsive are leaders to public concerns? To what extent do the relational aspects of leadership matter? Why do leaders rise and fall so swiftly? Can anti-conventional leaders be effective? Where do non-democratic leaders come from? As citizens invest greater expectations on those that lead to deliver, they are easily and often let down. This special issue presents theoretical and applied contributions that further enhance this diversity of study and provide innovative new dimensions to address some of these puzzles.

The special issue therefore brings together methodological approaches that do not often sit together, from the theoretical to the highly empirical. With such a diverse set of puzzles and approaches the call for papers generated a positive response. The final twelve articles present theoretical and conceptual analyses, empirical case studies, new data sets (both qualitative and quantitative) and innovative new forms of evaluation of leadership. I have grouped the articles around four core puzzles of political leadership, relating to party leadership, governance, crisis (mis)management and agency

2. Restraining Leadership: How do Parties Shape Leaders and Leaders Shape Parties?

Party leadership has long been a neglected topic in the study of political parties (Costa Lobo, 2014). This reluctance to recognise a role for political leaders has been tempered somewhat by recent studies focusing on personalisation and presidentialisation (Karvonen, 2010, Poguntke & Webb, 2007). Party leadership studies have largely concentrated on either the impact on party organisation or the role of leadership effects on electoral performance. Emmanuelle Avril (2016) here takes a firmly organisational approach, indeed borrowing from organisational theory and utilising participant observation, to analyse the impact of the UK Labour

party's leadership under Tony Blair. The 'unintended consequences' can be seen in the subsequent leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. As Patrick Diamond (2016) explains, Labour elected a leader in 2015 who eschews the Blairite organisational doctrine of electability and prime ministerial credibility in favour of position politics and conscience-based policy.

3. Governance Relations: How Out of Touch Are Leaders from the Public?

Rich case study analysis has been a core component of leadership study. Four articles take particular cases and utilise innovative frameworks to analyse the leadership puzzle in each. Once elected, politicians at the centre of government are portrayed as out of touch and elitist, but Jenifer Lees-Marshment (2016) challenges such assumptions with a new perspective from behind the closed doors of government. Her ground breaking research in UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand found that leaders in government are refreshingly and surprisingly deliberative when confronting challenging environments. The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once a year. Tina Burrett (2016) asks what factors explain Japan's revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, the article applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) developed by Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. With the crucial leader-follower relationship at the centre of their study, Femke van Esch, Rik Joosen and Sabine van Zuydam (2016) introduce the technique of cognitive mapping to explore the congruence in beliefs on European integration of four Dutch political leaders and their followers. Although the study finds a significant gap between some leaders and their followers' narratives on Europe, it finds no evidence that this narrative congruence is related to the credibility of these leaders in the eyes of their followers. With non-elected leaders under studied, Henriette Müller (2016) presents a case study of the EU Commission Presidency, examining institutional development and personal performance in office. Using Jose Barrosa as a case study (and utilising *candidate-media agenda convergence* theory), she finds that the Presidency still depends more on the incumbent's personal capacities to lead than the office's institutional structure.

4. Cognition, Contingency and (Manufacturing) Crises: What Shapes Leaders and Leadership Environments?

Moving beyond empirical cases, the collection gathers together three conceptual and reflective articles. Moshe Maor (2016) draws on insights from social networks, social cognition and the study of emotions, to offers a set of ideas and a series of predictions on how

the agency-audience and reputation relationship may impact on agency behaviour. Crises provide political elites with opportunities, but also threats to legitimacy and can make or break leadership in office. Understanding, reacting and making decisions become critical in such situations. Staying with the conceptual theme, András Körösényi, Gábor Illés and Rudolf Metz (2016), working at the apex between contingency and agency, present the analytical notion that leaders may both interpret and invent crises. In an overview of the burgeoning scholarly literature on political leadership and crisis since 2008, Cristine de Clercy and Peter Ferguson (2016) evaluate what sort of questions are being asked, and identify some new lines of inquiry.

5. How Much Do Style, Situation and Background Matter?

Political leadership tends to focus on formal executive office holders in western liberal democracies, as noted above. The next three articles reach beyond the usual units of analysis. Alix Kelso (2016) delves deep into parliamentary leadership points in studying committee chairs in the UK House of Commons. She recommends that leadership analyses can indeed go beyond studies of presidents, prime ministers, and party leaders. Individual points of leadership in political institutions may apply to lowly political figures who may not automatically spring to mind in the context of political leadership, but who are nonetheless performing important leadership roles in a system of dispersed democratic governance. Margaret Hermann and Christiane Pagé (2016) ask if leadership matters in the governance of civil society organisations? In particular, do the CEOs of humanitarian and development NGOs exhibit different leadership styles and perceive their work environments in different ways as the literature suggests. To explore this question, they interviewed 96 CEOs - 32 from humanitarian NGOs and 64 from development NGOs and apply *leadership trait analysis* to the data. Also presenting new data, Alex Baturo (2016) asks do democratic leaders have distinct personal backgrounds compared to those of their peers in dictatorships, do they tend to hold different prior careers and posts while climbing the 'greasy pole' of politics? Comparing leaders' careers in democracies and dictatorship and their personal background, experience in politics, prior to their tenure, Baturo found that overall, leaders in party regimes, in this respect, have more in common with democratic leaders than with other dictators.

6. Conclusion

So what do these diverse and illuminating approaches to the study of political leadership tell us? Although there has been a considerable growth in scholarly literature, political leadership remains largely ill-defined

and conceptually diverse. This is perhaps to the researcher's advantage. There are now multiple approaches and methodologies to utilise; a variety of toolkits and frameworks to pick from. This special issue demonstrates how multi-disciplinary research can present potential solutions to complex leadership puzzles.

First conceptual and analytical assumptions that have characterised the field can and should be challenged. For instance political leadership is not simply hierarchical in nature, there are various zones of political leadership. Individuals operate within institutional and situational contexts, impacting on decision making from inside and outside the immediate governmental sphere.

Second scholars can learn new and innovative research techniques to confront puzzles of leadership. For example, participant observation and in-depth interview techniques from within organisations such as parties or government departments can tell us how much of an impact leadership style and action has on the organisation. This way we can better understand the organisation's responsiveness to public demands.

Third political leadership fascinates and intrigues. We are uncertain if it is a force for good or bad; if it should it be empowered or constrained. There is both a wariness of dominant leaders in democracies and an assumption that contemporary leaders are not responsive to electors. However, several articles in this issue present evidence that leaders are not so out of step with the public and can be responsive to followers.

The study of political leadership will continue to present particular methodological and conceptual challenges to scholars. Yet the rewards for pursuing such research are evident. If we return to interactionism we see how in this special issue, leadership shapes and is shaped by multiple forces, including here political parties, crises, civil society organisations, legislatures and government.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The (Unintended) Consequences of New Labour: Party Leadership vs Party Management in the British Labour Party

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Abstract

This article draws from the fields of political science and of organisational studies to explore the short-term and long-term impact of New Labour's party management on the quality of party processes as well as on party reputation. It is based on the long-term ethnographic participant observation of the Labour Party at local and regional levels, as well as national events such as annual conferences. The article starts by identifying the distinctive features of New Labour's party management. It then examines the "unintended consequences" of this brand of party management, showing this model to be mainly self-defeating. The final section provides a general assessment of the impact of New Labour's party management from the perspective of organisational learning and innovation. Overall the article stresses the long-term poisonous effects of this brand of leadership and management on political organisations and on politics in general.

Issue

This article is part of the issue "New Approaches to Political Leadership", edited by Mark Bennister (Canterbury Christ Church University, UK).

1. Introduction

Although in most models successful leadership is equated with winning and with holding onto office, longevity in power cannot be the only variable used in assessing leadership, especially in a country such as the UK where the Prime Minister is also a party leader and where, as a consequence, there exists a powerful dialectical relationship between internal and external consequences of individual leadership. Therefore, even though there is an impression of immediate success through the historic series of election victories, assessments of Tony Blair's leadership must also include the effects on the long-term electoral prospects of the party, the level of internal democracy, the ability of the party to keep evolving, as well as the attitudes and feelings of members. A complete evaluation of leadership would need to consider the triangle of agency, followers and environment as well as the outcomes re-

sulting from the relations between the three. However this article seeks to analyse the issue of political leadership specifically in its interaction with party management, which, according to Buller and James's statecraft model (2012), constitutes one of the five criteria by which to assess leadership. The dimension of individuality and personality cannot be set aside, nor can the context in which the evolution took place. But the decision to take party management as a focal point reflects the fact that, under New Labour, this dimension took centre stage.

The approach, based on the identification of a long-term trend towards increasing organisational convergence between public and private organisations (Avril & Zumello, 2013), combines analytical tools and concepts borrowed from both the field of political science and that of organisational studies. Pioneer political comparatist Joseph LaPalombara urges political scientists to pay more attention to the concept of "organisa-

tional learning", which at present draws most of its knowledge from studies of the firm, arguing that "people who see similarities in organisations, in whatever sphere they may be found, are basically correct in their perceptions" (LaPalombara, 2003, p. 575). This trend is reflected in a growing body of literature on toxic/bad/destructive leadership indicating that political scientists are beginning to appropriate tools and concepts previously confined to the business sphere. Thus McAnulla's (2011) analysis of Blair's leadership draws the "toxic triangle" model of destructive leadership from management studies experts Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007), while Tim Heppell (2011) borrows from business academic Lipman-Blumen (2004) to test the applicability of the concept of "toxicity" to the study of five controversial political leaders, including Tony Blair. This coincides with the recent rise of critical approaches to leadership which emphasize destructive leaders' behaviour, underlining the destructive dimension of charismatic leadership (Collinson, 2012; Kellerman, 2012).

The main objective of this article is to make a contribution to bringing these two fields together by looking at the *practice* of management in the Labour Party. Indeed, the subfield of organisational learning, which focusses on improving actual decision-making processes with a view to successfully adapting to changing environments, is of particular relevance to the study of party management. A characteristic of this study, therefore, is to be firmly grounded in empirical evidence[1]. The method adopted for this research is best understood as a form of grounded theory, where categories and concepts are drawn from the data. It is an approach which is empirically based but borrows a variety of thinking tools and concepts to identify patterns so as to make implicit belief systems explicit. Applied to New Labour party management, this method of enquiry helps uncover the main elements of a sweeping—

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[1] This study is based on the empirical study of the changes undergone by the party and their manifestations at local, regional and national level, using ethnographic methods of data collection. As opposed to Lewis Minkin, whose seminal work on Labour party management (Minkin, 2014) has constituted a very useful source of information for this article, and who, as an adviser, enjoyed access to the party hierarchy and sought to have an influence on the evolution of party structures, I confined myself to roles which, like him, allowed me to collect the viewpoints and feelings of a wide range of actors, would give me access to behind the scene information not available to mere observers and would help me experience events as other party members did, but never with a view to exerting direct influence. More specifically, my focus was on the operational level. The different roles I assumed (observer, party member and campaigner, conference visitor or delegate, steward etc.) from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s allowed me to witness first-hand the culture clash between traditional members and the intake of new members as well as the tensions between local parties and regional and national party staff arising from the organisational reforms.

yet implicit—culture change designed to replace whatever was left of the traditional Labour conference delegate democracy with a new organisational culture sustained by a number of structural as well as behavioural changes. Therefore the aim of this article is to show the distinctiveness of New Labour's party management relative to previous forms, to reveal its mostly hidden mechanisms, and to highlight the short-term effects as well as the long-term consequences of the new managerial approach whose effects are still felt today. Seeking to understand how and why the New Labour party management generally seemed to negate its own objectives, this article opens with a definition of New Labour's brand of party management, then analyses its (often) unintended effects and impact on the organisation, leading to a more general assessment of the relationship between party management and organisational learning, so as to draw lessons from the New Labour experiment on change management in political parties.

2. Defining New Labour's Brand of Leadership and Management

Although party management has always existed and is consubstantial to any party, close analysis of the evolution of party organisation under New Labour shows that the development of a managerial system stands as one of Blair's main achievements and makes him historically different from previous Labour leaders (Minkin, 2014). It must be acknowledged from the outset that management in political parties is unavoidable and even useful. Like any other organisation, a party needs to coordinate its activities, to engineer organisational cohesion and generally to create an atmosphere of trust, so as to obtain the desired outcomes as defined by the leadership at a given point in time. If we take a historical perspective of the Labour party, we see that party management, even in its less palatable dimension of procedural fixing, has always been there, since tensions inevitably appear between the strategic and the operational levels, with party managers mediating between the two. What is meant by management here is not simply the administration of the party machine (even if this aspect also needs to be taken into account) but refers to "what the managers, past and present, themselves often talked of as 'management': the attempt to control problem-causing activities, issues and developments in order to ensure that outcomes were produced which the managers considered to be in the party's best interests" (Minkin, 2014, p. 1). In this perspective, management is a function conducted alongside other functions. What can be observed in the case of New Labour is that this dimension takes a new and distinctive turn, taking precedence over all other functions, in order to create cohesion and consensus within the party. The result is what Minkin describes as

a "permanent revolution", or a "rolling coup", a succession of waves designed to take full control of the organisation. There is a tendency among academic and journalistic assessments of New Labour to question the very "newness" of the project and to seek to highlight elements of continuity, either with previous Labour experiences or with the Conservative administrations. I argue along with Minkin that, when it comes to management of the party, New Labour was fundamentally different and novel.

The analysis of New Labour's particular brand of management requires us to first explore the tension between management and leadership. There exists a well-established classic literature on the relationship between leadership and organisational structures. Max Weber (1922/2013) first pointed out the continuities of structure deriving from the bureaucratic form present within all large-scale organisations and Robert Michels (1915) highlighted, through his "Iron law of oligarchy", the bureaucratization of political parties. Angelo Panebianco (1988) then put forward the electoral-professional party model characterized by the strengthening of the role of leadership through greater reliance on professionals and the use of new forms of communication techniques. More recently, Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1994) theorized the emergence of the highly centralized cartel party. On the other hand, the conventional wisdom in business theory about the respective roles of the leader and the manager, which states that the leader "does the right thing" and the manager "does things right", although crude, is quite relevant to political parties and constitutes a convenient starting point to an evaluation of New Labour's party management. In this view, the manager administers, has a short-range view and relies on control, while the leader innovates, has a long-range perspective and inspires trust. Even though leadership and management are very distinct concepts, in practice there is a natural overlap between the two. In the case of New Labour, it appears that they did more than overlap and that Blair's leadership was actually largely subsumed in management, a situation which Minkin defines as the "managerised" party (Minkin, 2014, p. 700).

A key dimension of the reforms is that they were based on a diagnosis of the party's weaknesses as resulting from tensions between party and government which had plagued previous Labour governments (the experience of the Wilson governments, repeatedly defeated at conference, stood out in particular). The New Labour project aimed to address this problem and was designed to bring party and leadership into alignment. Following the ideological adaptation brought about by the Policy Review conducted under Neil Kinnock, which, through a market research approach, aimed to identify the wishes of the electorate and adjust party policy accordingly, the views of the leadership were considered to be aligned with those of the voters. This

meant ensuring that the local parties, the unions as well as dissident MPs could not get any traction. One key aspect of Blair's outlook—and one which clearly distinguishes him from previous reformist Labour leaders such as Kinnock—was also his lack of affinity with the Labour Party. In fact he appears to have generally regarded the party as the enemy, or at the very least an encumbrance and a source of embarrassment, rather than an asset and a source of leadership strength (Buller & James, 2012, p. 548; Minkin, 2014). As a result, the whole New Labour management strategy rested on a negative evaluation of the party, of its previous leaders (of whom almost no mention was ever made) and of its organisational culture. Blair saw the party both as a vehicle for his political ambition and as an obstacle to be overcome. He recalls rather candidly in his autobiography that upon John Smith's death he had seen his opportunity to take hold of the Labour Party "like I suppose someone in business spots the next great opportunity, or an artist suddenly appreciates his own creative genius, or a coach or player knows that their moment for glory is about to come" (Blair, 2010, p. 59). At the same time he was telling his adviser Philip Gould "it's time we gave the party some electric shock treatment" (Gould, 1998, p. 218). The view was that the party needed to be corrected, its ideological baggage discarded and its traditional practices abandoned. Blair and his allies therefore thought it best to import a management culture which was alien to the party, resulting in a frontal and systematic attack on all the elements of the traditional Labour Party culture.

If we now try to characterize the New Labour variant of party management, a number of key features can be identified.[2] A first feature is an ethics of delivery, more specifically an ethics of delivering to the leader rather than to the party, which lead to the extensive use of procedural fixes. Procedural tinkering is a constitutive part of management, which is outcomes rather than process oriented, and is to be expected. But this was taken to a new level with New Labour. Not only were rules and procedures seen as nothing more than time-wasting devices and scorned as "processology" (Minkin, 2014, p. 137), but there were used as "flexible instruments of power" (Minkin, 2014, p. 666) to deliver results regardless of the manner. A second major feature of New Labour's party management was

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[2] The elements presented in this section are based on Lewis Minkin's *The Blair Supremacy* (2014), private conversations with Minkin, as well as discussions during a workshop on Minkin's book organised by the PSA Labour Movements Group at the University of Leeds in October 2014, with contributions from Eric Shaw, Mark Wickham-Jones, Tim Heppell, Matt Beech, Lewis Minkin and myself. Some of these contributions have been published as a symposium in the *Political Studies Review* (see Avril, 2016).

the increased politicization of national and regional party staff (which was part of the wider "professionalization" of the party). Party officials became partisan "party organisers" delivering to the leader and making up a praetorian guard around Blair. These elements were then underpinned by a culture change which is probably the most distinctive feature of New Labour. The modernisers around Blair—and Blair himself— developed a specific attitude and behaviour, linked to their self-perception as an elite, a vanguard, imbued with a moral superiority which justified all the fixing. The New Labour people were steeped in a culture of being "bold" and unstoppable and relished the idea that they could get away with anything.

The elements of New Labour's change management strategy were hidden and dressed up in an official discourse of democratization. The reforms were said to aim at establishing a direct relationship between the leadership and the members, at doing away with what was dismissed as archaic routines (formal meetings were systematically described as excruciatingly boring and not an activity in which any sane member of the public would want to engage) so as to create a "vibrant", "healthy" party which would be attractive to new categories of members. In practice, this meant the removal of most decisions from the formal decision-making arena of the annual conference, through the creation of policy forums where discussions were supposed to bring about a more "consensual" approach. However, despite initial hopes (for a positive evaluation of the reforms, see Russell, 2005) the democratic quality of the new processes of policy making is very doubtful as procedures were designed so as to ensure the right results would emerge and dissenting voices struggled to make themselves heard (Heffernan, 2007, p. 156). The move towards direct democracy led to the erosion of the elective power of activists and the idea of increased membership participation did not entail increased membership influence (Avril, 2013). Generally, the new democratic processes presented in the 1998 *Partnership in Power* review document translated into mere consultation exercises with no real impact on policy formulation. Overall, New Labour's style of management can be defined as a form of a top-down, command-and-control "over-management", which translated into a pattern of self-reinforcing practices the effect of which was not only to produce counterproductive outcomes but more seriously to lead to a situation where the organisation found itself caught in a spiral of ever tightening control.

3. The Unintended Effects of New Labour's Party Management

We will now look at some of the ways the New Labour management reforms are seen to have failed to achieve their main goals and then assess the impact

which some of the modernisers' errors of judgement had on the party. The counter-intuitive effects of change management have already been pointed out in the literature (notably Panebianco, 1988, p. 241). What is distinctive in the case of New Labour is that this specific party management approach appears to have been intrinsically self-defeating. Thus reforms which were designed to increase control often resulted, when implemented, in loss of control. The best-known cases, well documented and extensively commented upon in the media, are the messy handling, in 2000, of both the Livingstone mayoral candidacy in London and that of Rhodri Morgan's campaign to lead the Welsh Assembly, where the Labour leadership's efforts to manipulate the outcome generated outraged media comments and spectacularly backfired, since in both cases the candidates which the party leadership manoeuvred against went on to win. But even if the New Labour managers' "control freakery" and procedural fixing is a well-established fact, its extent and effects have been greatly underestimated.

A first unintended outcome was a result of the party leadership's belief that their views and those of the voters were the same (Avril, 2013; Minkin, 2014). The party (the trade unions and the Constituency Labour Parties) was seen as holding views which were harmful because they were thought to be at odds with how the voters felt. Those who held such views therefore needed to be contained. This strategy was particularly visible at the party conference where the New Labour managers used all the tricks in the book to ensure that there would be no damaging platform defeats. As I was able to observe, to avoid any coordinated rebellion, the principle of mandate was actively discouraged and inexperienced conference delegates were briefed by party staff to vote according to personal preferences, and not, as had been the practice, to reflect the majority views of their local party. This occasionally led to delegates from the same constituency voting against each other. Prior to crucial votes being taken, constituency delegates were often coaxed and/or intimidated through one-to-one encounters with ministers, and then through high-ranking party officers staring at them from a few feet away during the vote. The Leader's speech was now introduced by lengthy and loud warm ups of rousing pop songs and videos to the glory of the leader, with party organisers leading the clapping. But Minkin provides several little-known examples showing that the belief in an alignment between the leadership and the voters was incorrect since, in some cases, it was in fact the leadership which was at odds with public sentiment (Minkin, 2014, p. 599). With constituency delegates being sometimes persuaded to vote in ways which went counter to the wishes of the wider membership, the leadership in effect cut itself off from feedback from the floor.

The sustained efforts to control the grassroots were

based on a misconception of local parties and members, who were seen, in keeping with the old Duverger model, as dangerous radicals who would thwart the modernisers' ambition to make the party more responsive to the voters. However, the rare empirical studies that have investigated the supposed ideological gap between Labour members and Labour voters (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002) have shown it to be in fact a matter of degree rather than of a real divergence of opinions. The weakened organisational vitality (as seen through the decline in membership as well as in the low level of participation in internal elections) resulting from the disregard for the importance of local party activists was considered a risk worth taking. But the cost of alienating the party became apparent during the 2005 general election campaign when internal party discontent expressed itself mainly through diminished activism and with many local parties positioning their parliamentary candidates clearly in opposition to the New Labour line. Even more paradoxical for a party whose main objective was to win elections, one of the most immediate and most significant effects of the New Labour's party management, which worked hand in hand with management of the media, was the toxification of the party's image. As a string of events exposed the party leadership's willingness to bend the rules (starting with the Ecclestone scandal, then with the attempts to stop Ken Livingstone, and culminating with the controversial handling of the Commons over the Iraq war), New Labour soon found itself mired in a narrative of manipulation and deceit. As a result, from early on, public perceptions of New Labour were that it had a toxic influence on British political life (Avril, 2016).

Other arguments to support the view that the modernisers' achievements fell short of their objectives include the fact that many of the changes associated with New Labour (such as the renegotiation of the relationship with the trade unions, or the more voter-oriented approach to policy-making) were initiated under Neil Kinnock and John Smith, well before Blair took over the party in 1994. Let us not forget either that Blair had not managed to get overwhelming support in 1994. In addition, Minkin's study shows that, overall, Blair never managed to establish a complete "supremacy" over the party and that he faced constant and often effective resistance from the PLP, the unions and the CLPs. In fact, according to Philip Cowley (2007), parliamentary rebellions were a direct result of Blair's autocratic style of leadership. Finally, even though Blair is commonly referred to in the literature as a "dominant" leader by virtue of his exceptional personal characteristics, his formidable status and resources as Prime Minister, and the very favourable conditions in which he started his premiership—even accounting for the often paralyzing tension with his internal challenger Gordon Brown—it is noticeable that he failed to make his position more secure and was eventually forced by a distrustful parliamentary party to step down at a time which was not of his own choosing. The gradual and inexorable depletion of Blair's capital, as highlighted by Bennister and Worthy (in press), can be accounted for to a large extent by his dysfunctional leadership and management methods. Overall the New Labour example shows that a command and control approach, which is supposed to entrench the leader's position, is likely to generate powerful countermovements.

New Labour was therefore clearly not the success story it has been described as. Not only is election victory obviously not the only criterion of success, but even in electoral terms the party's accomplishments need to be set against the fact that the New Labour governments presided over a period of rising concern about disaffected voters. The record level of abstention in the 2001 general election was such a shock that it prompted the setting up of the Audit of Political Engagement. In addition, Blair's leadership cannot be assessed in isolation from the project which was designed to sustain him in power. Party management under Brown retained the same features. In fact, the Blair/Brown duopoly was a constitutive part of the project and one of its main weaknesses. The new emphasis on consensus-building, on bringing party and government closer together, instead turned a pluralistic party into a highly factionalized one (Avril, 2016). In their unshakable belief that any public display of disagreement would be electorally damaging, the New Labour managers engaged in party management that was so heavy-handed that it eventually led to systemic failure. Awareness of these shortcomings was occasionally voiced by leading figures in the party, including key adviser Philip Gould who in 2000 acknowledged in a leaked memo that the New Labour brand had become "badly contaminated", notably by a perceived lack of integrity. "Almost every issue that has caused us difficulty has been anticipated"—he tellingly wrote—"but we have been powerless to turn foreknowledge into effective preventative action." (*The Guardian*, 2000). The puzzle, then, is to understand why the New Labour managers proved unable to change their ways.

4. New Labour's Anti-Learning Practices

There is an assumption that internal cohesion, in other words the harmony between the various groups which make up the organisation, is the condition for its durability. The Labour Party had patently suffered in the past from its image as a torn party. Shaw refers to this as a "debilitating civil war" which "impressed upon the public mind the image of an incessantly brawling and congenitally divided party" (Shaw, 1994, p. 166). However, even if disagreements are undeniably costly in electoral terms, one can also consider that too much consensus and the blandness of a "sanitized" party are

also harmful (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 207) since this type of party simply ends up putting the voters off as they can no longer distinguish between all the different parties. It also discourages activists, who lose any incentive to get mobilised and to campaign. Moreover, internal divisions may even help keep the party healthy, preventing it from ossifying, and counterbalancing the oligarchic tendencies identified by Michels. Internal contestation maintains the political organisation's dynamism and ability to innovate. The quest for consensus in the shaping of the New Labour party may therefore have been severely misguided from an organisational learning perspective.

Shaw expressed concern at the gradual centralisation of power in the New Labour Party, fearing "dwindling organisational vitality and ideological exhaustion" (Shaw, 1994, p. 166) and he underlined the necessity for an organisation wishing to avoid sclerosis to allow for the development within itself of units capable of autonomous action whose effect will be to provide an arena within which new ideas can be generated (Shaw, 2002). Instead, the New Labour approach reflected a strict implementation of the principle of collective responsibility (which Shaw compares, as Richard Crossman had done in his time, to Leninist democratic centralism), with minority opinions being ignored. This problem was clearly seen in the way the newly created policy forums functioned, where minority opinions often failed to even be recorded. Shaw concludes that "a malleable party is unlikely to be an energetic one", as shown by the mounting apathy within Labour ranks (Shaw, 2002). In an interview I conducted in 1995, Vladimir Derer, founder of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, expressed the view, echoed by many party members, that only political debate can keep activists, whom the leadership relies on to run the local parties and campaigns, interested. Participation in the political debate, which "wine and cheese evenings" could never replace, is an essential motivation for partisan engagement. Internal divisions and the possibility of expressing one's disapproval of the official line are a condition for organisational vitality. Therefore, if the risk of implosion is very real—as illustrated by the catastrophic party split of 1981 and the current disastrous public display of tensions between Corbyn and most Labour MPs—devitalisation may be just as dangerous.

Another danger is the loss of a critical mind. One of the most interesting revelations coming out of Minkin's observation of New Labour's party management is a mechanism which Minkin refers to as "wilful blindness" or "blinkered realism" (Minkin, 2014, p. 709), a well-known phenomenon referred to in the field of organisational studies as "skilled unawareness" (Argyris, 2012). In this model, we find an in-group of people who overrate their ability to make the right decisions, who are in complete denial of any discrepancies, are not able to see the warning signs, and who tend to

blame any failures on external factors. This behaviour results in a dysfunctional decision-making process reminiscent of Irving Janis's famous exposition of "groupthink" (Janis, 1972) which, he explains, is likely to result both in irrational decisions and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups. Janis describes the symptoms indicative of groupthink: first, overestimation of the power and morality of the group (whereby excessive optimism and the unquestioned belief in the morality of the group causes members to ignore the consequences of their actions); second, closed-mindedness (warnings which might challenge the group's assumptions are ignored and dissenters are stereotyped as weak, evil, biased or stupid); third, pressure towards uniformity (leading to the self-censorship of ideas which deviate from the consensus, with members under pressure to conform).

The parallels with the behaviour and mind-set of New Labour managers are striking. Refusal to conform to the new orthodoxy exposed party members to accusations of disloyalty and the risk of being silenced at any cost. Left-winger Liz Davies, who served for two years on the party's National Executive Committee before resigning, illustrates in her book this pressure to conform and the harmfulness of such *esprit de corps*. She describes the nonsense pervading some of the NEC meetings where "cabinet members or Millbank staff would repeat the most implausible versions or explanations of events (the *Guardian* was a Tory paper, the election result was a disaster for Livingstone, rules existed even though no one had written them down) and nearly everyone around the table would nod in agreement" (Davies, 2001, p. 173). NEC members, concerned that they might lose other members' approval, carefully strove not to deviate from the consensus, opting to keep their doubts and worries to themselves for fear of being seen as disloyal, thus feeding the shared illusion of unanimity. This process, which executive management expert Karl Albrecht calls "learned incapacity" (Albrecht, 2003, pp. 17-38), condemns the organisation to certain failure, for when group members have literally "learned not to learn" errors no longer appear as such and the systematic response to emerging problems is the reckless decision to press on in the wrong direction.

The plebiscitary party model developed by Seyd and Whiteley stresses the same thwarted processes. This model, characterised by "a veneer of democracy disguising centralisation and control" (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002, p. 176), is a threat to the party's chances of survival since this "empty" structure can no longer fulfil key traditional functions such as campaigning and recruitment. "The key problem"—they argue—"is that unaccountable power tends to make leaders stupid, out of touch and unwilling to do the hard work of building a rational case for policy initiatives" (Seyd & Whiteley, 2002, p. 174). Although Minkin is critical of

the plebiscitary model as applied to the Labour party, showing that early attempts initiated by Blair at conducting internal referendums (such as on the 1997 party manifesto) were considered internally as fiascos and were quickly abandoned (Minkin, 2014), both lines of analysis converge in stressing that orthodoxy and centralised control are a danger to the organisation which finds itself cut off from a vital source of innovation and more likely to make mistakes. Although it is obvious that an undisciplined party is almost guaranteed to lose elections, we can argue that the New Labour managers' exclusive concern for internal cohesion was even more harmful in the long run. This echoes Heppell's definition of toxic leaders as "those individuals whose leadership generates a serious and enduring negative, even poisonous, effect upon the individuals, families, organisations, communities and societies exposed to their methods" (Heppell, 2011, p. 243). In fact, "toxic"—or "destructive"—leadership is not only harmful to the organisation, since it subverts its structures and is negatively correlated to members' well-being and commitment (Schyns & Schilling, 2013), but also self-destructive. The way the New Labour leadership stifled all dissenting opinion, imposing a new orthodoxy throughout the organisation, turned the party into an exemplar of Goleman's classic "toxic organisation", an organisation which closed itself to new ideas for fear of having to question its own assumptions and where people stopped asking "how and why things [were] done" (Goleman, 2002, p. 195).

Some tenets of the field of innovation research, which emerged in the 1960s and rapidly expanded from the mid-1990s, also help shed light on some of New Labour's organisational shortcomings. In the so-called knowledge economy, innovation is universally regarded as vitally important to organisations of every nature. As the growing uncertainty of the working environment of businesses finds an echo in politics, where the effects of globalisation and technological change are also felt, parties are seeking new ways to respond to the challenge of a clientele that is increasingly difficult to attract and to retain. Clayton Christensen (2000) explains in his landmark book on innovation how traditional big businesses, which developed systems aiming at eliminating everything that the clients did not want, found themselves in a position of no longer being able to respond to the customers' expectations when these changed. Christensen thus identifies a "dilemma" which is that, in business, efficient management—management focused on the short-term needs of customers and on improving the product—often turns out to be the very cause of eventual failure. This is a warning which the New Labour managers would have been well advised to heed when they devised a whole communication strategy aimed at "Middle England", a specific and narrow segment of the market deemed to be key. In his classic work on the rules of innovation,

James Utterback explains that once a new idea has been created, the future of the organisation will depend on whatever will be done with that new idea. He goes on to highlight the paradox of leaders closing ranks around an innovative idea so as to protect it, and concentrating on the product which the process has led to rather than on the process itself. "It is a great irony"—he writes—"that wisdom for many firms that derive current good fortune from radical innovations of the past lies in erecting barriers to these same types of innovations today" (Utterback, 1996, p. 224). This hostility to any further change which might threaten the new idea is clearly reflected in the Labour party modernisers' main concern to defend the New Labour "project", to unite the various sections of the party around it, rather than to create the conditions for new ideas to continue to emerge. Indeed, a key manifestation of the New Labour party management is the way the modernisers were trapped in a self-protective outlook whereby the problems resulting from Blair's leadership were never raised despite mounting evidence of poor decision-making. Blair himself simply could not question the assumptions on which his whole management of the party had been based and the New Labour managers around him generally found it difficult to accept that their approach may have produced adverse effects. Peter Mandelson, despite being one of Blair's main champions, describes him as someone who, once he had an idea, became "firm and persistent" about it, was "confident in his own overall judgement" and "expects the agreed plan to be carried out to the letter by those who work for him" (Mandelson & Liddle, 1996, p. 53). In sum, what the field of innovation research tell us is that innovation is not so much about discarding the "old" as it is about harnessing the collective wisdom of the organisation's members.

A more appropriate organisational model, it is argued, is that of the "learning organisation", as originally defined by Peter Senge or Bob Garratt,[3] where the learning potential of the organisation is considered as its only really long-lasting competitive advantage. This approach, also known as "action learning", which was pioneered by Reg Revans in the UK and Chris Argyris in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, and later popularized by Peter Senge, calls for a re-evaluation of the traditional managerial practices based on an obsolete taylorist and mechanistic conception of organisations. Action learning, also known as "double loop" learning, is a process of detection and correction of errors which

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[3] We need to distinguish between two schools: on the one hand, "organisational learning", as theorised by Chris Argyris (see for example Argyris, 2004) which looks at the learning mechanisms within organisations, and, on the other hand, "the learning organisation" whose proponents focus essentially on advocating the adoption of new ways of functioning, as in the case of Peter Senge (1990) and Bob Garratt (2001).

protects the organisation against modes of functioning that go against its long term interests. While single loop learning refers to corrections that do not question in-built theoretical assumptions, double loop learning challenges the mental models and allows for the governing norms and values to be adjusted (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Crucially here, action learning is based on the idea that the key to improving performance does not lie with the abstract theories put forward by management experts, but with the practitioners themselves who learn from their own actions and experience (Boshyk & Dilworth, 2010).

To assert its "newness", New Labour wanted a clean break from Labour's past, but what was swept away in the process was also the "accumulated wisdom of past experience" (Minkin, 2014, p. 143). New Labour's "anti-learning practices" (Minkin, 2014, p. 715) thus betrayed its inability to adopt the learning methodology required for the creation of new ideas. The effect of this inability to learn from mistakes and the systematic corruption of the party's internal democracy was to alienate both the members and the voters. In this sense, it is true to say that internal consensus and cohesion, as they manifested themselves in New Labour, constituted obstacles to innovation and therefore endangered the survival of the party. The antidote to this self-defeating management model lies with a leadership model which takes the well-being of members into account and which can generate an atmosphere of trust, where the aims of the party are not focused so much on explicit linear goals and more on the expressive functions of membership.

5. Conclusion

This analysis of the practice of party management under New Labour has shown the benefits of an approach drawing together the fields of political science and organisational studies to study the evolution of Labour Party power structures and processes under the leadership of Tony Blair. This approach is further bolstered by the fact that New Labour explicitly sought to emulate the private sector, with Blair trumpeting his admiration for management thinkers such as Charles Handy and Charles Leadbeater (who became his adviser). It is ironic that as Tony Blair became leader and as New Labour was swept into power, an entire wave of groundbreaking management books, developing the model of the learning organisation (Senge, 1990), offering new thinking on innovation—the books by Utterback (1996) and Christensen (2000) first came out in 1994 and 1997 respectively—and underlining the crucial importance of emotional intelligence in leadership (Goleman, 1998, 2002), came out in close succession, repudiating the managerial tenets which had dominated the 1980s and 1990s. Despite Blair supposedly seeking advice from high profile management thinkers, none of this new

thinking seems to have filtered into New Labour's party management. At the time when New Labour was practicing self-censorship, in the business world emphasis was being placed on the production of new ideas as the best way of developing competitive advantage. Engaging fully with employees in strategy and delivery was now shown to be the key to achieving the organisation's objectives. The New Labour reforms, which aimed at increasing efficiency essentially through the suppression of any dissenting voice, were therefore out of step with this new thinking. In addition, Blair's model of the CEO being able to make decisions on the hoof without the encumbrance of procedures was anything but based on the practical realities of management in corporations. New Labour thus drew inspiration from thinking that was divorced from practice, on precepts which were being questioned within the private sector, and on a distorted vision of corporate life.

The rise and demise of the New Labour brand demonstrates that lack of respect for due process, emphasis on short-term success, and rule bending all have a short-term as well as long-term cost. The management processes, the rules and procedures an organisation follows, are more than mere technicalities. They affect the party's image and reputation in ways which reverberate beyond the boundaries of the organisation and which have an impact on the way the party engages with the voters. Rule twisting results in a loss of trust internally and externally, reinforcing voters' negative appraisals of political elites. The fact that Tony Blair is now widely disliked, perceived as he is as a "celebrity'" bent on raking the money in, gives an indication of this cost. But the damage goes much further since the whole organisation became tainted. The Labour Party was left discredited and disconnected, with weakened ties to its "natural" constituency. Therefore what this article has shown is how this kind of "dominant" leadership, which can be said to be strong in a command and control sense, achieves results that fall considerably short of what was sought (Bennister & Worthy, in press; Brown, 2014) and is even largely counterproductive.

The post-Blair Labour Party, where lack of charisma in leaders has become a virtue, bears the hallmarks of this legacy, in a way which recalls the predicaments of the post-Thatcher Conservative Party. Indeed, the toxic/heroic ambivalence outlined by Lipman-Bluman (2004) is particularly relevant to the analysis of the poisonous legacy of charismatic leaders such as Blair. An organisational culture which erects the loyalty and compliance of team members as its cardinal values, and where leaders are encouraged to believe in their own narrative that all is well despite evidence to the contrary (Collinson, 2012), fatally curtails a party's ability to learn and to evolve. Contrary to Minkin's hopeful statement that, with the end of New Labour, the damage has largely been undone, descriptions of Ed

Miliband's excessive reliance on a very small circle of trusted allies and of his tendency to interpret any criticism as a sign of disloyalty (Wintour, 2015) seem to confirm that the organisational reflexes acquired in the New Labour years are very difficult to shake off (Heffernan, 2007). This analysis of the legacy of Blair's brand of party management has therefore underlined the long-term impact of this organisational transformation on the way the Labour Party has since continued to (dys)function as an organisation, with wider consequences for British politics. The line of inquiry presented in this article thus opens many avenues for further research on the leadership and management of political organisations.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Assessing the Performance of UK Opposition Leaders: Jeremy Corbyn's 'Straight Talking, Honest Politics'

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Abstract
This article contributes to a burgeoning literature on political leadership, offering an interim assessment of Jeremy Corbyn's tenure as leader of the UK Labour party. At the time of writing, the candidate of the party's Left had been leader for a mere seven months. Media commentators and pundits have been critical of Corbyn's platform and performance, gleefully predicting his imminent demise. On the other hand, the 'Corbynistas' who swelled Labour's ranks in the aftermath of the 2015 defeat have remained steadfast and committed supporters. Their hope is not only that Labour will win the next election, but that Corbyn can recast the landscape of British politics by challenging the economic and political establishment which has assented to the growth of inequality and austerity.

1. Introduction

Making predictions about what might happen in 2020 on the basis of Corbyn's leadership since September 2015 is a perilous task. His leadership style will inevitably evolve while Corbyn's strategy is likely to adapt in response to events. Nonetheless, empirical evidence indicates that 'leadership image' is defined early in a leader's tenure (Bale, 2015); leaders of the opposition have found it almost impossible to escape negative perceptions formed at the beginning of their period of office, as the Conservative party discovered under William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, and Labour found under Ed Miliband (Richards, 2016). Examining Corbyn's position now cannot tell us with any certainty how events will unfold, but provides an interpretation of prospective political developments.

The concept of 'party leader image' is examined in the emerging scholarly literature on political leadership, particularly on Labour leaders and leaders of the opposition (Bale, 2015; Buller & James, 2015; Clarke & James, 2015; Heppell, 2012; Theakston, 2012). A set of criteria has been developed within American political science, analysing leadership through the investigation of behavioural and cognitive traits (Foley, 2008; Greenstein, 2009). However, these leadership attributes are not necessarily appropriate to the context of Britain and continental Europe, particularly when applied to non-presidential political systems.

Corbyn offers an intriguing case-study for understanding the performance of British opposition leaders. Firstly, his victory in the Labour leadership contest was unexpected: 'one of the most extraordinary political sagas in recent decades' (Richards, 2016, p. 17). At the outset, members of the Campaign Group in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) debated whether it was worth running a candidate; of 1200 party members surveyed in the summer of 2015, only two believed Corbyn would become leader; another demoralising defeat for the organised Left, on the defensive since

the demise of Tony Benn's influence in the 1980s, appeared inevitable (Bale & Webb, 2015). Corbyn told *The Guardian* in June 2015 that his chances were slim:

> "We had a discussion among a group of us on the Left about how we might influence future developments of the party. All of us felt the leadership contest was not a good idea—there should have been a policy debate first. There wasn't so we decided somebody should put their hat in the ring to promote that debate. And, unfortunately, it's my hat in the ring." (cited in Hattenstone, 2015)

Secondly, Corbyn arguably possesses few conventional attributes of a 'successful' political leader: he is inexperienced having never previously held high office either in a Labour government or within the party bureaucracy (Richards, 2016). Ross McKibbin (2015, p. 26) concludes Corbyn 'is probably unique in his lack of conventional qualifications for the job'. His experience of handling the national media and overseeing the party's organisational machinery was non-existent. Corbyn served as an official in a public sector union, but his experience of trade union politics was limited (Wintour & Watt, 2015). He was regarded as a maverick and serial rebel with few allies in the parliamentary party; he had long-standing ties to Irish republicanism (Fenton, 2015) while allegedly expressing sympathy with Hamas and Iran in the Middle-East (Finlay, 2015). It was precisely Corbyn's lack of conventional qualifications, his status as the heroic 'anti-candidate' that enabled him to win (McKibbin, 2015). According to his colleague, Clive Lewis:

> "Jeremy is Jeremy. He isn't a rock star politician, he doesn't have the looks, he doesn't wear slick clothes, but in a way he is an anti-hero. He's genuine, authentic and he just seems to have resonated with people." (cited in Wintour & Watt, 2015)

Thirdly, the circumstances of Corbyn's victory were unusual: the new leadership election procedure had been intended to strengthen democratic participation in the Labour party, as well as dealing with adverse publicity encountered by Labour over the parliamentary selection in the Scottish seat of Falkirk (Syal, 2014). The classical thesis of 'the cartel party' is that power within social democratic parties across Europe is shifting from the grassroots to the 'party in office' (Katz & Mair, 2009); yet the Corbyn phenomenon appears to refute Katz and Mair's thesis. Centre-left parties are experimenting with new methods of democratisation intended to revitalise their social base and political appeal (Faucher, 2015). Nonetheless, it is unclear whether democratisation makes opposition parties more electable; it may produce less predictable outcomes in leadership elections, as the Corbyn ascendency underlines.

Finally, Corbyn has claimed he would be different to previous leaders, in particular, Tony Blair. In style and disposition, Corbyn is the antithesis not merely of Blair, but of almost all previous post-war Labour leaders including Attlee, Wilson, Callaghan and Kinnock. There is a passing resemblance to Michael Foot given his commitment to anti-American unilateralism and pacifism; however, Foot attained high office in the 1974-79 Labour administration and was regarded as a conciliator in party terms. The most telling comparison is between Corbyn and George Lansbury (Fielding, 2016), leader from 1931 until 1935: to those who found Ramsay MacDonald's 'betrayal' in 1931 repugnant, Lansbury was a 'prophet' and 'poet', an inspirational figure who would have led Labour to a great election victory; to others his 'ritual martyrdom' and 'woolly-minded sentimentality' threatened the party's status as a serious contender for office leading to his defenestration at the hands of Ernest Bevin, who famously told Lansbury at the 1935 party conference, 'stop hawking your conscience around from body to body asking to be told what you ought to do with it' (cited in Reid & Pelling, 2005, p. 69; Fielding, 2016).

Corbyn rejects the moderate and pragmatic tradition of post-war leadership espoused in very different ways by Attlee, Wilson, Callaghan, Kinnock, Smith, Blair and Brown. In this sense, Corbyn's ascendency marks a watershed in the politics of the Labour party, and in the nature of British political leadership. The parallel with Lansbury is apposite: Corbyn and Lansbury became leader following an economic crisis in which moderate social democracy was discredited; their opponents, MacDonald and Blair, were both subject to a 'betrayal myth'; having attained high office they allegedly abandoned socialism and were often willing to collaborate with the Conservative party. MacDonald and Lansbury were reputably polar opposites in the 1930s; Corbyn is the reverse of Blair in the contemporary context (Fielding, 2016). In particular, Corbyn's victory has been interpreted as a repudiation of Blair's approach to 'managing' the Labour party, apparently centred on tactics of covert manipulation of party institutions that led eventually to the New Labour leader's downfall (Minkin, 2014).

Having clarified what makes Corbyn's leadership distinctive, this article will proceed in the following way. The first section will delineate the criteria by which the performance of opposition leaders has been assessed in the academic literature. The paper will incorporate yardsticks for evaluating political leadership developed by Stuart Ball (2005) and Tim Bale (2015). The second section addresses Corbyn's performance since his election in September 2015, drawing on academic commentaries, journalistic accounts and survey data. The final part of the paper will indicate what we might expect from Corbyn's tenure as Labour leader. While assessments of leadership traditionally focus on

the imperatives of winning elections and office-seeking, it is important that we do not adopt an overly restrictive understanding of politics: for Corbyn and his supporters, electability is not the sole purpose of the Labour party. They insist that policies should be pursued according to whether they are right in principle, irrespective of whether they enable Labour to win elections (Richards, 2016).

2. Judging the Performance of Party Leaders

Jim Buller and Toby James (2011, pp. 535-536) assess the performance of party leaders by focusing on five elements of 'statecraft': forging a winning electoral strategy; achieving a reputation for governing competence; efficient management of the party machine; winning the key arguments among opinion-formers and the political elite; and reforming the constitution to protect the party's electoral interests. They draw on Jim Bulpitt's seminal article on Thatcherism where political leadership is defined as the rational pursuit and maintenance of high office (Bulpitt, 1986). Buller and James insist the statecraft interpretation provides a useful heuristic: it focuses attention on leadership 'cliques' while taking account of the structural context in which leaders operate.

There are, however, problems with the statecraft approach in evaluating Corbyn's leadership. As Griffiths (2015) indicates, statecraft raises a number of methodological and epistemological issues for political scientists. Bulpitt construes politicians as 'office-seekers' intent on winning power: in ontological terms, this implies a limited and exclusive definition of politics which neglects other elements of political behaviour (Griffiths, 2015, p. 4). The criticism is appropriate when applied to Corbyn, who insists that upholding 'moral principles' outweighs attaining parliamentary power in the British state. In addition, the concept of statecraft is problematic as an epistemology: Bulpitt (1986) cannot demonstrate that office-seeking is 'the main bias' of politicians, even in the case of Margaret Thatcher; politicians tell us something about why they act and think as they do through biographies and retrospective accounts, but they are notoriously prone to *post hoc* rationalisation (Griffiths, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, Bulpitt focuses on the behaviour of the 'court' and insular 'clique' surrounding the leader, but in so doing ignores institutions and actors beyond the sphere of 'high politics' (Buller, 1999; Griffiths, 2015, p. 7). In the Labour party, these include the parliamentary party, the trade unions, the National Executive Committee (NEC), local government, and the party membership, all of whom are capable of constraining the leadership's room for manoeuvre.

Bulpitt's concept of statecraft eschews ideology emphasising the rational pursuit of power, a useful corrective to accounts of Thatcherism that focus on ideo-

logical motivations; yet an understanding of statecraft is inadequate when applied to Corbyn's leadership style. Corbyn is not a politician driven by the imperatives of the statecraft approach. He rejects the politics of 'valence' in favour of 'position' and principle, the claim that politicians should support policies and ethical causes beyond their impact on electoral performance and governing competence. As Buller (1999, p. 703) points out, even the Thatcher and Major administrations 'provide examples of the party leadership pursuing policy ideas with little or no respect for the Statecraft Strategy apparently underlying them'. Corbyn's leadership is rooted in 'position' rather than 'performance' (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2014). While Bulpitt treats ideology as significant only in so far as it enables politicians to win elections, Corbyn assigns primary importance to ideology and ethical beliefs.

Mark Bennister, Paul t'Hart and Ben Worthy (2015) adopt a markedly different approach, applying the concept of 'political capital' derived from Pierre Bourdieu to the study of leadership. They argue that political authority is a scarce resource that leaders must use wisely: they need the skills and capabilities to be an effective leader while leaders have to mobilise and motivate their own supporters; for that reason, political capital wherever possible has to be replenished (Bennister, t'Hart, & Worthy, 2015). These scholars draw attention to the 'dynamic interplay' between the leader's personal characteristics and the structural environment they confront: some leaders seek to overcome institutional constraints; others are content to accept the prevailing political context. Bennister, t'Hart and Worthy's 'leadership capital index' then emphasises four criteria of 'public communication', 'policy platform', 'party management', and 'emotional intelligence' to distinguish between distinctive types of political leader: depleted 'lame duck' leaders who are barely in office; 'low capital' leaders presiding over demoralised and divided parties; 'medium capital' leaders who are content to 'muddle through' and get by; 'high capital' leaders who gain momentum from legislative and electoral success; and 'exceptional capital' leaders who are in a position to 'make the weather' (Bennister, t'Hart, & Worthy, 2015).

The leadership capital index is an important conceptual tool in the study of political leadership; however, it is better suited to the study of leaders in government rather than opposition. In contrast, Ball (2005, pp. 4-5) and Bale (2015, pp. 61-62) have outlined five criteria by which to judge an effective opposition leader, drawing on their respective studies of the British Conservative party:

- First, 'fresh faces': does the leadership promote talent to signal a change of political generations and the renewal of the party in the wake of electoral defeat?

- Second, 'cohesion': are they able to maintain loyalty and discipline to project a unified image to the electorate; divided parties have rarely enjoyed sustained electoral success?
- Third, 'visibility': is the leader able to fashion a distinctive, eye-catching agenda which captures the imagination of the electorate, wins the confidence of opinion-formers to project governing credibility, and distances the party from a potentially 'toxic legacy'?
- Fourth, 'efficiency': has the leader been able to build a party machine that can take on the government of the day, the basis for election victory?
- Finally, 'adaptability': is the party leadership sufficiently pragmatic to respond to events, changing its strategy where necessary to win power?

These five yardsticks offer comprehensive if parsimonious criteria for assessing the performance of opposition leaders. Leonard Stark defined three attributes for successful opposition leaders: the ability to maintain 'party unity', to make the party 'electable', and to project an image of 'competence' – the capacity to deliver on policy commitments in office (Denham & Dorey, 2015). In contrast, Ball's criteria underline the enormous challenge party leaders out of government face: it is unsurprising that being Leader of the Opposition is viewed as a thankless task. Opposition leaders have limited resources; their access to the media is restricted; they are rarely able to shape events; and more time is spent reacting to initiatives launched by the governing party (Bale, 2015). In the following section of the article, Ball and Bale's framework is applied to evaluate Corbyn's brief tenure as leader.

3. Assessing Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Leader

Jeremy Corbyn was elected with 59.5 per cent of first preference votes giving him an unprecedented mandate: he almost won a simple majority in all sections of the Electoral College: 84 per cent of newly registered supporters who paid £3 to join the party after the May 2015 election voted for him, as did 57.6 per cent of the affiliated trade unions and 49.6 per cent of full members (Gamble, 2015; Mason, 2015a). However, only 15 out of 232 Labour MPs cast their first preference votes for Corbyn. In total, Labour now has 565,000 members and registered supporters, compared to 185,000 full members when Ed Miliband was elected in 2010; this is a significant development in the political and social composition of the party (Rutherford, 2015). Corbyn's supporters have been divided into three groups: the generation of 'baby-boomers' who grew increasingly disillusioned with New Labour as instinctive supporters of oppressed minorities; young people who have been

alienated by austerity, the sharp rise in university tuition fees, and the inaccessibility of the housing market; as well as white collar employees in the public sector who stand to lose most from the retrenchment of the state (Rutherford, 2015). More than two-thirds of Labour party members are middle-class (ABC1s); 56 per cent are university graduates and 44 per cent are employed in the public sector (Bale & Webb, 2015).

In this context Corbyn might be classified, like Tony Benn, as a 'post-bourgeois' politician:

"'Post-bourgeois', a term of art in American political science, describes the politics of the post-industrial society in which acquisitiveness among the increasingly affluent and educated middle-classes supposedly gives way to less material values, such as participation or free speech." (Jenkins, 1981, p. 4)

Corbyn emphasises freedom, democracy, participation and openness in decision-making which supplanted the traditional materialist preoccupations of the labour movement in Britain since the 1960s and 1970s. Assembling a socially diverse coalition ostensibly opposed to austerity, inequality and western military hegemony has been a political triumph (Gamble, 2015); as the polling organisation *You Gov* has pointed out, however, Corbyn's supporters are 'not remotely representative of the country'. Detractors of Corbyn observe that the growth of party membership and the increased turnout for the party leader at political rallies appears to be in direct contradiction to the esteem in which he is held by citizens. This observation is consistent with Kenig's (2009) comparative survey which indicates that democratising political parties does not make them more electorally competitive or connected to voters; a wider membership may be no more representative of the country.

How well does Corbyn score on the criteria for opposition party leaders delineated by Ball (2005) and Bale (2015)? On the positive side of the balance-sheet, Corbyn has been assiduous in promoting 'fresh faces' in his front-bench team, taking advantage of the reform introduced by Ed Miliband that the leader should have the right to select their Shadow Cabinet rather than a vote in the PLP. The 2010 and 2015 intakes have featured heavily in Corbyn's Shadow Cabinet through the appointment of Heidi Alexander as Shadow Health Secretary and Owen Smith as Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary. The new Shadow Chancellor, John MacDonnell has never held ministerial office, while none of Labour's economic team has any previous association with the Blair-Brown era, giving the party the opportunity to move on from the 2008 financial crisis which severely eroded its reputation for economic competence (Wintour & Watt, 2015). It is anticipated that younger MPs on the Left from the 2015 intake such as Clive Lewis and Cat Smith will soon occupy

prominent Shadow Cabinet positions (Mason, 2015a). Many of the politicians from the pre-2010 era have either departed front-line politics or retired.

Corbyn's team also moved to promote party 'cohesion', emphasising unity in the wake of a divisive and fractious leadership contest. Corbyn adopted three distinct party management strategies: he accommodated a diversity of views within his Shadow Cabinet retaining prominent 'Blairites' such as Lord Falconer and (until recently) Pat McFadden as Shadow Europe minister; Corbyn sought to mobilise the party's activist base by allowing and even encouraging internal dissent and debate; and he fought to assert control over party policy especially in foreign affairs, notably on intervention in Syria and the renewal of Trident (Finlay, 2015). Corbyn's objective in undertaking the January 2016 reshuffle was to enhance his authority over foreign policy and defence, ensuring the opposition spoke with 'one voice' (Kettle, 2016). The reshuffle removed McFadden and the Shadow Culture Secretary, Michael Dugher while demoting Maria Eagle, Shadow Defence Secretary, and triggering the resignation of three junior Labour spokespeople (Stephen Doughty, Jonathan Reynolds, and Kevan Jones). Most so-called 'moderate' MPs have continued to serve on the front bench. Corbyn has been able to call on the instinct of loyalty firmly entrenched within the 'ethos' of the party (Drucker, 1978). At the same time, unity is enforced by reminding MPs of the strength of Corbyn's mandate, and the extent of grassroots support encapsulated in the Left's organisation, 'Momentum'. He may lack formal credentials and experience, but Corbyn secured a decisive mandate in September 2015: democratic leadership contests are 'rituals of legitimation' (Faucher, 2015, p. 812).

In relation to 'visibility', Corbyn has been able to call upon support from commentators on *The Guardian* and *The Morning Star* who advocate a radical alternative to 'austerity-lite' policies (Chakrabortty, 2015). Even Martin Wolf, *The Financial Times* commentator, argues that Corbyn is right to confront 'outworn shibboleths' and to develop policies that improve the rate of growth by forging an 'entrepreneurial' and 'strategic' state (Wolf, 2015). On issues such as withdrawal of tax credits, Labour has apparently put the government on the 'defensive', combining to force George Osborne to undertake a 'u-turn' in his autumn statement (Mason, 2015a). If the recovery in the British economy stagnates during 2016 because of a global slowdown and fear of an impending 'Brexit', Corbyn's 'radical' economic alternative may gain traction. And if Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) are a critical opportunity for the Leader of the Opposition to enhance his authority and credibility, Corbyn's performances have won some reasonable reviews; the tactics of using questions proposed by 'real voters' has occasionally unnerved the Prime Minister (Mason, 2015a).

Labour's leader sought to emphasise his economic credibility by appointing a group of internationally renowned economists to his panel of advisers, notably Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Piketty, Simon Wren-Lewis, and David Blanchflower. Three notable policies have been proposed by Corbyn's team: a state investment bank to support public infrastructure through 'people's Quantitative Easing'; an extensive 'crackdown' on tax evasion and tax avoidance to reclaim more than £120 billion in lost revenue (Wintour & Watt, 2015); and the renationalisation of the railways bringing franchises back into public ownership (Mason, 2015b). Corbyn has moved to beef up Labour's communications capability, appointing Seamus Milne, a senior *Guardian* journalist, as Executive Director of Strategy and Communications. Particular emphasis has been given to the importance of social media in reaching beyond the mainstream press. This approach aims to capitalise on Corbyn's strategic advantage: his 'authenticity' and his distance from the tactical 'evasions' of the political class (McKibbin, 2015).

In promoting Labour's 'efficiency' as an opposition, Corbyn has defied pessimistic predictions, most notably in the December 2015 Oldham by-election in which Labour's share of the vote increased, although this was mainly due to a sharp reduction in support for the Conservative party since May 2015. Labour appears well placed to mount a serious challenge in the London mayoral contest (Mason, 2015c). The key to mobilisation is the growth of membership; it is hoped this will release new political energy enabling Labour to become an organisation akin to a social movement as well as an election-winning machine; members will contribute more than £8 million to the funding base of the party, making Labour less reliant on corporate donations (Gamble, 2015); however, the proposed reforms of trade union finance will require union members to 'opt in' to the political fund.

Finally, Corbyn has demonstrated a willingness to adapt pragmatically to circumstances. He has shifted position on UK membership of the European Union (EU) in response to pressure from the parliamentary party, and the wider membership; 85 per cent of members will vote for Britain to remain in the EU (Bale & Webb, 2015). On Syria, he eventually conceded a 'free vote', minimising resignations from his Shadow Cabinet. Despite his radical mandate, Corbyn has acted cautiously on economic policy; his Shadow Chancellor has struck a moderate tone, even signing up to Osborne's Charter of Fiscal Responsibility on the eve of the Labour conference (although the position was later reversed) (Watt, 2016). There is an awareness that Labour has suffered from the absence of economic credibility; the party needs to tread cautiously in making new commitments on tax and spending; few concrete policies have been forthcoming (Richards, 2016). This tactic indicates that Corbyn is prepared to act pragmatically where necessary.

Despite this, Corbyn's leadership still has notable vulnerabilities reflected in recent opinion surveys. These weaknesses are less to do with ideological positioning on the Left-Right spectrum;[1] they stem from the fact that too few voters believe Corbyn is capable of being Prime Minister. A poll conducted within days of Corbyn's victory indicated 30 per cent of voters believed he would perform 'well' as leader, but 48 per cent feared he would do 'badly'; only 17 per cent thought it was likely Labour would win the next election (61 per cent believed Labour would lose) (You Gov, 2015). Just 23 per cent of voters thought Labour could be 'trusted' to run the economy, against 50 per cent who did not. The economy was a major weakness under Ed Miliband as the party's reputation for financial stewardship had been undermined following the 2008 crisis; but Labour's position has weakened further under Corbyn: 40 per cent of voters trust the Conservatives to 'take the right decisions' on the economy, against 23 per cent for Labour (Kellner, 2015b). Corbyn continues to rate highly among voters on attributes of 'honesty' (35 per cent) and 'principle' (43 per cent). At the same time, by November 2015, 52 per cent believed Corbyn was performing poorly, against 32 per cent who thought he was doing well; only 14 per cent felt Corbyn was likely to become Prime Minister, while 39 per cent wanted him to stand down immediately (Kellner, 2015a).

Examining Ball (2005) and Bale's (2015) criteria provides an indication of Corbyn's exposed position. Inept party management has been an important factor (Kettle, 2016). Corbyn came under criticism following his first round of Shadow Cabinet appointments, failing to appoint more women to senior positions and undermining his commitment to bring in more 'fresh faces'. The front bench reshuffle in January 2016 was attacked for being incompetently co-ordinated, lasting more than three days and exacerbating the perception that Labour was a divided party (Watt, 2016). The reshuffle was a reminder of the constraints under which Corbyn is operating: having initially briefed the press that the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Hilary Benn, and the Shadow Chief Whip, Rosie Winterton would be casualties, Corbyn's team were forced to retreat after an overwhelmingly hostile reaction from the PLP (Kettle, 2016).

The 'cohesion' of the party has been undermined by the structural problem that Corbyn's leadership confronts: his narrow base of PLP support. Having won the votes of only 15 MPs in the leadership contest (the other 20 MPs who nominated him did so to ensure the Left had a candidate), Corbyn has fought to maintain his legitimacy within the parliamentary party. As a 'se-

rial rebel' under previous leaders, he has struggled to play the loyalty card effectively. There is now a fault-line with the PLP on one side, and grassroots members on the other (Gamble, 2015). The handling of Trident and Syria indicates major party management problems; Corbyn's 'prevarication' about whether to allow a free vote on Syrian intervention in December 2015 signalled he has no convincing strategy to manage his parliamentary colleagues; the attempt to put pressure on MPs through directives from Momentum and the decision to conduct a last minute plebiscite among party members merely antagonised them (66 MPs then voted with the Government following a passionate speech by Hilary Benn in the final debate) (Richards, 2016). Corbyn's objective is to democratise the Labour party promoting greater participation and pluralism, but opponents insist he is intent on purging Labour of its residual Blairite elements (Dathan, 2016). We will return to this theme in the concluding section.

Corbyn has encountered additional problems in projecting 'visibility'. He had been written-off by most opinion formers and a hostile press even as his victory in the leadership contest was confirmed; controversy over the reshuffle led to open disagreement with the BBC over the coverage of a frontbenchers' resignation (Watt, 2016). While *The Guardian/Observer* have a combined audience of 5.3 million, the vociferously hostile *Sun* and *Sun (Sunday)* have 13.5 million readers (Hollander, 2013). There are doubts about the breadth of Corbyn's appeal given his cultural identity as a Left-wing metropolitan liberal representing the constituency of Islington North, allegedly 'a world away' from the concerns of most uncommitted Labour voters (a suspicion reinforced by the appointment of Emily Thornberry, Corbyn's Islington neighbour, as Shadow Secretary of State for Defence). It is claimed that a moderate version of Corbyn's views on the central policy issues relating to the economy, welfare, immigration and foreign affairs was decisively rejected by voters in the 2015 general election (Rutherford, 2015).

The relief among Corbyn's team following Labour's victory in the Oldham by-election underlines that he is not in a position to ignore or discount electability (Pidd, 2015). It might be argued that any leader would have a formidable task in restoring Labour's 'efficiency' as an opposition party. Labour has not won a major election for a decade while the party has suffered a sharp erosion of support due to the unpopularity of its previous leaders and its inability to manage the immigration question (Clarke et al., 2014; Evans & Chzhen, 2013). The 2015 election underlined the fracturing of Labour's electoral base, particularly in Scotland where the party's vote haemorrhaged. Labour faces testing Scottish parliamentary elections in May 2016 and may lose its majority in the Welsh Assembly where a recent poll indicated the party would decline to 27 seats (three short of a majority) (*BBC*, 2016); it has not won a Lon-

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[1] On a Left–Right scale from +100 (very right-wing) to -100 (very left-wing), the average voter places themselves close to zero; Corbyn is judged to be -76 (You Gov, 2015).

don mayoral election since 2004. In the North of England, Labour's traditional strongholds have been under attack from the UK Independence Party (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). The social base of the labour movement, notably trade union membership, has suffered a marked decline since the 1980s, particularly in the private sector (Richards, 2016). Labour's travails cannot be attributed solely to Corbyn's leadership performance, but as Curtice points out: 'it can often be difficult to disentangle cause and effect in the relationship between a party's overall standing and the rating of its leader' (cited in Bale, 2015, p. 59).

Finally, there are limits to Corbyn's 'adaptability' which might undermine his success. He largely rejects the hard-headed instincts of previous leaders, while his commitment to Labour as a party of government is ambiguous. Corbyn's supporters are less motivated by the imperative of winning elections; they want to articulate their values and reject the New Labour legacy of Iraq and inequality (Rutherford, 2015). 71 per cent of those who voted for Corbyn in the leadership contest believed parties should put forward policies 'irrespective of whether they help to win elections' (Kellner, 2015a). This rejection of orthodoxy was underlined by Corbyn's refusal to sing the national anthem at a Remembrance Day service, and his equivocation about whether to become a member of the Privy Council (Mason, 2015c). In rejecting New Labour, Corbyn is emphasising his reluctance to play the game of 'valence' politics, despite the fact 'valence' remains the best predictor of electoral outcomes in Western European democracies (Clarke et. al., 2014). For McKibbin (2015), the danger for Corbyn is that he is compelled to compromise too far, disillusioning his own supporters. This disposition makes future 'adaptability' and pragmatism less likely.

4. The Verdict: A Different Type of Leader?

Assessing Corbyn's performance ostensibly indicates a mixed picture. Applying the criteria offered by Ball (2005) and Bale (2015), Corbyn's leadership cannot be portrayed as an outright failure after seven months in office. In promoting new talent, partially maintaining unity and discipline, and achieving 'visibility' and 'efficiency' in relation to the party machinery, Corbyn can point to achievements. There is a disjuncture between his portrayal as 'unfit' to be Prime Minister and his performance as opposition leader. While Corbyn's ratings appear negative, this does not mean he is an incompetent Leader of the Opposition, or that his party cannot win a general election (Bale, 2015, p. 71). It is not only 'party leader images' that are decisive, but partisan identification and how far the party is trusted to manage the economy (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2011). Corbyn rejects the emphasis given to electoral success as a measure of leadership performance;

'statecraft' approaches encourage an ontologically narrow view of politics (Griffiths, 2015). If Corbyn struggles to make progress on the criteria of electability and prime ministerial credibility, he has energised thousands of supporters while striving to alter the dominant discourse with his commitment to 'straight talking, honest politics'. Even if we adopt a fundamentally pluralistic view of leadership attributes, however, Corbyn still faces major impediments to success while his performance so far has been problematic.

Firstly, Corbyn is a leader operating in a parliamentary system in which he does not have the support of the majority of his MPs: 'At this moment of great triumph, he suddenly finds himself more trapped as a politician than he has ever been' (Richards, 2016, p. 12). The decision to downgrade the role of MPs in the leadership selection process creates a structural division in the party. Leaders had been elected by the PLP for three quarters of a century since 1906 (Denham, 2013). This system had the advantage that MPs themselves had a mandate from their own electors, and an understanding of what was necessary for the party to win elections; the marginalisation of the PLP and the abolition of the previous Electoral College are likely to prove destabilising (McKibbin, 2015).

Corbyn's route to success is to operate as a 'Bonapartist' figure, mobilising the mass ranks of the party membership. This conflicts with the Left's traditional view of party democracy, however, which has emphasised the importance of holding the leader in check by dispersing authority and power across a plurality of institutions, namely the PLP, the NEC, the trade unions, and the party conference; it was conference in particular that was believed to be the party's 'sovereign body' (Faucher, 2015). The Left felt uncomfortable with 'hero-worshipping' leaders, insisting leadership was a collective endeavour; since MacDonald, it feared Labour's leaders would betray socialism, mesmerised by the 'aristocratic embrace' of the political establishment (Cronin, 2004; Faucher, 2015). In the 1970s, it was believed that Labour governments had refused to implement party policy, fuelling demands for democratisation reasserting the authority of conference (Cronin, 2004, p. 217). The 'Bennite' Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was focused on how to ensure the leadership remained loyal to the programme agreed at the annual conference. Corbyn in 2016 would like different rules to apply, using his support among members to control the PLP; however, the trade unions, as well as the parliamentary party, are reluctant to allow the leader to act unilaterally, particularly on the touchstone issue of Trident renewal (Watt, 2016).

Secondly, Corbyn is self-evidently a 'position' politician in an era of valence and 'performance' politics. Since the 1980s, British politics has become increasingly focused on performance, mediated through party leaders and their ability to deliver competent, efficient

government (Clarke et. al., 2014). Arguably, his intention is not merely to win the general election, but to permanently transform both the Labour party and the terms of debate in British politics (Gamble, 2015). Corbyn's supporters are motivated by 'his manifest opposition to the dominant ideology of modern Britain, to the 'system' and its disreputable character' (McKibbin, 2015, p. 26). This point underlines the inadequacy of statecraft approaches: Corbyn's 'main bias' is not office-seeking but ideological transformation (Gamble, 2015). Corbyn perceives the role of ideology as more than an instrument for attaining power. In 2005, a group of Labour voters defected because they objected to the position adopted by Blair on Iraq: they believed the war had been catastrophically handled as no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were discovered; the escalation of the conflict appeared to encourage the growth of Al Qaida in the Middle-East (Clarke et. al., 2014). As Clarke et al. (2014, p. 6) indicate, there are two predominant models of voter choice: the 'valence' model which emphasises competence, leadership and credibility, and the 'positional' model which infers 'people vote for the party that is closest to them on the issue or set of issues that matters most'. In so far as elections matter, Corbyn's leadership is predicated on a positional view of voter behaviour influenced by voters' disquiet over the Iraq war; over the last forty years, valence has nevertheless provided 'more powerful statistical explanations of voting'. It is the capacity of valence to trump positional strategies that casts doubt on Corbyn's approach.

The crisis confronting the Labour party is that it appears divided between diametrically opposing political traditions: the pragmatic, 'office-seeking' tradition of Wilson and Blair which is still heavily represented within the PLP; and the 'politics of conscience' practised by Lansbury and Corbyn now embodied in the grassroots of the party (Fielding, 2016). One strategy is to attempt to reconcile these traditions, narrowing the gap between principle and power (Gamble, 2015). Nonetheless, events underline Corbyn's reluctance to embrace ideological and organisational appeasement as a party management strategy. Instead, Corbyn's supporters will strive to transform the character of the PLP; representatives of the Momentum organisation are urging mandatory reselection as they did in the early 1980s, while reasserting control over party conference; constituency boundary changes under current party rules make it possible to apply further pressure to sitting Labour MPs (Gamble, 2015).

In his approach, Corbyn is striving to 'make the weather' as leader rather than accepting the structural context he inherited. This strategy is comprehensible in its own terms; the Left has an unprecedented opportunity to refashion the Labour party in its image, a position it will be reluctant to forfeit after decades in the wilderness. The risk for Corbyn, however, is that efforts

to reshape or even 'purge' the PLP will recreate the historical schism that nearly destroyed Labour in the early 1980s. Major question-marks over the viability of Corbyn's leadership of the party in the long-term are likely to remain.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Deliberative Political Leaders: The Role of Policy Input in Political Leadership

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Abstract
This article provides a fresh perspective on political leadership by demonstrating that government ministers take a deliberative approach to decision making. Getting behind the closed doors of government through 51 elite interviews in the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the article demonstrates that modern political leadership is much more collaborative than we usually see from media and public critique. Politicians are commonly perceived to be power-hungry autocratic, elite figures who once they have won power seek to implement their vision. But as previous research has noted, not only is formal power circumscribed by the media, public opinion, and unpredictability of government, more collaborative approaches to leadership are needed given the rise of wicked problems and citizens increasingly demand more say in government decisions and policy making. This article shows that politicians are responding to their challenging environment by accepting they do not know everything and cannot do everything by themselves, and moving towards a leadership style that incorporates public input. It puts forward a new model of Deliberative Political Leadership, where politicians consider input from inside and outside government from a diverse range of sources, evaluate the relative quality of such input, and integrate it into their deliberations on the best way forward before making their final decision. This rare insight into politician's perspectives provides a refreshing view of governmental leadership in practice and new model for future research.

Issue
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1. Introduction

Academic research argues that the formal power of our political leaders is circumscribed by the media and public opinion and more collaborative approaches to leadership are needed given the rise of wicked problems and citizen demands for more say in government decisions and policy making. Through 51 interviews with government ministers in the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand about their leadership, approach and use of public input in decision making this article demonstrates that politicians are responding to their challenging environment by accepting they do not know everything and cannot do everything by themselves. They are moving towards a leadership style that is more deliberative in nature because it considers and integrates input from a range of sources before making final judgements. The article provides and overview of previous literature, outlines the methodology used in new empirical research, and presents a new model of Deliberative Political Leadership drawn from this empirical data for use in future research.

2. Overview of Previous Research: The Need for New Forms of Political Leadership

Politicians are conventionally viewed as power seeking individuals; seeking power through elections in order to use the formal authority and resources of government to implement their vision given that the official position of prime minister or minister generates formal and informal power (see Burkhardt & Glass, 2010, p. 560; Komives & Dugan, 2010, p. 111). However a review of previous research finds that many have argued that theoretically political leadership should include representing majority and minority views, creating a sense of vision, nudging the public to new directions, and utilising superior skills including media management, crisis management and practical governing to secure significant change (see Elgie, 1995, p. 3, or Lees-Marshment, 2015, Chapter 2 for detailed literature discussion).

Empirically research has also argued that leaders can no longer act as power-wielding superiors because there are a number of challenges that they face. Not only are there the constraints on power that those such as Neudstadt (1960) noted, in the 21st century the public are harder to persuade to accept new ideas (Brooker, 2005, p. 22); less trusting of political leaders (Hartley & Bennington, 2011, p. 205); and want their own views to be listened and responded to (Barber, 1988, p. 3; Coleman, 2005, p. 273). As Kane and Patapan (2012, p. 18) explain, whilst political leaders still make significant decisions they do so on behalf of all the people who can of course remove them from power at the next election and they thus have to 'carefully balance authority with submission, command with obedience, and power with deference'. A notable example of this is how President Obama sought election as president in 2008 to enact universal health care in the US, fought to get the legislation through Congress, continued to battle to prevent it being repealed by Republican opposition and manage government shutdown at the end of 2013, and then engaged in a communications campaign to get the public to sign up to ensure it was a success on the ground. Political leaders also have to manage wicked policy problems such as climate change, obesity, binge drinking and ageing of the population where there is no clear cut support for a particular direction (Hartley, 2011, p. 333; Hartley & Bennington, 2011, p. 206). Add in the overall context of a political marketing environment (Lees-Marshment, 2012) and politicians are unable to simply do what they think is right. There is also a greater public desire for participation in government decisions. As Sorensen (2006, p. 98) argues, 'we are witnessing a change in the way society is being governed'; a move from a focus on formal institutions of governance to a more fluid behavioural interactive process of governance where 'an increasing number of public and private actors have a substantial effect' on how society is run.

As for how leaders should respond to these challenges, again we have plenty of conceptual strategies, models and approaches that political leaders might adopt to maintain support and achieve their goals. Terms discussed in the literature include broker, chameleonic, charismatic, consultative, entrepreneurial, managerial, mobilising, reactive, servant and visionary (e.g. Elgie, 1995, p. 4; Peele, 2011, pp. 234-235). Research also discusses the importance of particular skills including agenda setting, communicating, game playing, adapting and being self-aware (e.g. Bell, Hargrove, & Theakston, 1999; Boin, McConnell, & t'Hart, 2010, pp. 234-236; Genovese, 2008). There is significant research on how leaders have used communication and media management to attract public attention to gain support for their policy proposals (e.g. Edwards & Wood, 1999; Helms, 2005; Kernell, 1986); other work argues politicians utilise public opinion to inform their decisions (e.g. Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000); whereas others talk about leaders needing to interact with followers (Burns, 1977, p. 274). Broader literature including nonpolitical work suggests a number of new approaches to fit an environment of increased public input into politician's decisions such as learning (Burkhardt & Glass, 2010, p. 567); reflective (Goodin, 2009); facilitative; (Cheyne, 2004; Genovese, 1994, p. 24; Lipman-Blumen, 2010, pp. 772-773; Sorensen, 2006, p. 104); interactive (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000) and appreciative (Whitney, 2007, p. 338). As Masciulli and Knight (2009, p. 117) argue, 'leaders should be able to choose from a leadership repertoire (or toolbox)' and offer a 'mixed collaborative leadership style that works best to suit given circumstances'. And research in non-leadership fields such as public administration also talks about the need for more participatory forms of government using terms such as collaboration, active citizenship, cooperative inquiry and co-creation (see Lees-Marshment, 2015, Chapter 2. Figure 2.8).

This overview of previous literature demonstrates that there are a range of ideas in the literature about new forms of leadership that politicians might adopt. However, there is a gap in empirical research on recent political leadership—i.e. not what political leaders should do, or need to do, but what they really do in practice. We say leaders should be evolving, we argue they need to be, but we have not yet explored whether and how they might be actually doing that. This research therefore sought to fill this gap by interviewing political leaders in order to get a sense of what political leadership is like in reality. The next section outlines the methodology before presenting the new empirical research.

3. New Research Methodology: Interviews with Government Ministers

This new research sought to get behind closed doors

and asking politicians directly what they thought of and how they used public input in central or federal government where constraints and pressures are greatest. The research therefore conducted in-depth interviews with 51 government ministers who were, or had been, in power during the administrations of Prime Ministers David Cameron, Stephen Harper, Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard, John Key and President Obama to obtain their perspective on how public input can be used in government and within a leadership framework.

Public input was defined broadly, including market research, policy research, meetings between members of the public and politicians both formal/organised and informal/spontaneous, public letters/emails/calls to politicians, formal consultation including legislative hearings, and deliberative events. Any form of input that conveyed the views, experiences, behaviour and knowledge of those in society who are not elected or unelected figures (i.e. politicians) in government was considered relevant. Ministers and secretaries were chosen because they meet the definition of being in a position of senior political leadership. They are typically elected politicians, who have significant decision making power and budgets and their actions are highly visible to the public through media coverage and are subject to public input and opinion (see Hartley, 2012, p. 101). In the US this included secretaries who are the most appropriate equivalent; and in the UK it also included Baronesses and Lords in significant positions (see Riddell, Gruhn, & Carolan, 2011, p. 33, who also include Lords).

The challenges of securing interviews with political elites has been well documented. As Richards (1996, p. 200) noted, 'by definition, elites are less accessible' and 'inevitably, elite interview samples tend to be a lot smaller'. Rhodes, t'Hart and Noortdegraaf (2007, p. 214) discuss how 'ministers and permanent secretaries are powerful men and women. They can refuse interviews, deny access to the organisation, declare documents secret, and insist on anonymity for both themselves and their organisation'. In their work on politician's views on deliberation Nabatchi and Farrar (2011, p. 3) secured just 11 interviews with state legislators, and failed to secure interviews with federal politicians. Whilst this research could have aimed lower, such as councillors in local government, to get at the leadership dimension it was important to analyse leaders working at top levels of government with all the related pressures decision making at that level includes. A plan for getting access and conducting the interviews was drawn up utilising literature on interviewing political elites, such as Aberbach and Rockman (2002), Goldstein (2002), Lilleker (2003) and Richards (1996); and advice on the letters to be sent was sought from former political advisors to prime ministers. Knowing from previous research that there was a strong potential for a poor response rate led to firstly a letter being sent by post and then at least a further 3 contact attempts made where email was available. Not surprisingly, the US was under represented in the sample, arguably due to the lack of public contact details for secretaries contact details (ministers, in contrast, are also elected MPs who need to be publicly contactable). But overall, securing 51 interviews with senior level politicians in central or federal government was a significant achievement. In the total list there were 272 potential interviewees for all 5 countries, so 51 represents a 19% response rate, with the interviews producing over 150,000 words in total. See Figure 1 for a list of those interviewed.

1. Alan Griffin, former Australian Minister for Veteran Affairs
2. Andrew Mitchell, former UK Secretary of State for International Development
3. Baroness Neville-Jones (Pauline), former UK Minister of State for Security & Counter-Terrorism
4. Brendan O'Connor, former Australian Minister for Immigration and citizenship; Employment Participation; Home Affairs; Homelessness/Housing; Small Business; Humane Services; Justice; and Privacy
5. Caroline Spelman, former UK Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
6. Cheryl Gillan, former UK Secretary of State for Wales
7. Chris Evans, Former Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Tertiary Education, Skills, Science and Research
8. Chuck Strahl, former Canadian Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities and Minister for the Canadian Wheat Board.
9. Craig Emerson, former Australia Minister for Competition Policy & Consumer Affairs; Small Business, Independent Contractors & the Service Economy; and Trade & Competitiveness
10. David Emerson, former Canadian Minister of International Trade; Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Minister for the Pacific Gateway and the Vancouver–Whistler Olympics
11. David Ogden, former US Deputy Attorney General
12. Gary Grindler former US acting Deputy Attorney General
13. Jason Clare, former Australian Minister for Home Affairs and Justice, and Defence Material
14. Jean-Pierre Blackburn, former Canadian Minister of Veteran's Affairs; National Revenue; and Minister of State for Federal Economic Development; and Agriculture
15. John Banks, New Zealand Minister for Regulatory Reform and Small Busines
16. John Boscawen, former New Zealand Minister of Consumer Affairs
17. Lindsay Tanner, Former Australian Minister for Finance and Deregulation
18. Lord Howell (David) Former UK Minister of State (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

19. Lord Green (Stephen), UK Minister of State For Trade and Investment
20. Lord McNally (Tom) UK Minister of State (Justice)
21. Minister Bill English, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand and New Zealand Minister of Finance
22. Minister Candice Bergen, Canadian Minister of State for Social Development
23. Minister Chester Borrows, New Zealand Minister for Courts
24. Minister Craig Foss, New Zealand Minister of Commerce, Minister of Broadcasting and Minister of Consumer Affairs and former Minister for Civil Defence, Racing and Senior citizens
25. Minister Jonathan Coleman, New Zealand Minister of Defence and Minister of State Services and former Immigration Minister and Broadcasting Minister
26. Minister Judith Collins, New Zealand Minister of Justice, Minister for ACC, Minister for Ethnic Affairs and former Minister for the Police, Corrections and Veterans Affairs
27. Minister Michael Woodhouse, New Zealand Minister for Veterans Affairs and Immigration
28. Minister Murray McCully, New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs
29. Minister Nikki Kaye, New Zealand Minister for Food Safety, Minister of Civil Defence and Minister of Youth Affairs
30. Minister Oliver Letwin, UK Minister for Policy
31. Minister Paula Bennett, New Zealand Minister for Social Development and Youth Affairs/Employment
32. Minister Pita Sharples, New Zealand Minister for Maori Affairs
33. Minister Simon Bridges, New Zealand Energy and Resources and Minister of Labour and former Minister of Consumer Affairs
34. Minister Steven Joyce, New Zealand Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment
35. Minister Tony Burke, Australian Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities
36. Minister Tony Clement, Canadian Minister for the Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario and former Minister of Health and Minister of Industry
37. Monte Solberg, former Canadian Minister for Citizenship & Immigration; and for Human Resources and Skills Development
38. Peter Kent, former Canadian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Environment
39. Ray La Hood, former US Secretary of Transport
40. Rob Merrifield, former Canadian Minister for Transport
41. Robert Debus, Former Australian Minister for Home Affairs
42. Robert McClelland, former Australian Attorney-General; Minister for Emergency Management; Homelessness; and Housing
43. Rodney Hide, former New Zealand Minister for Local Government and Regulatory Reform
44. Secretary Vincent Cable, UK Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills
45. Senator Kim Carr, former Australian Minister of Innovation, Science and Research; and Human Services
46. Sharon Bird, former Australian Minister for Higher Education and Skills
47. Simon Crean, former Australian Minister for Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government
48. Sir Gerald Howarth, former UK Minister for International Security Strategy
49. Sir Nick Harvey, former UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces
50. Steven Fletcher, former Canadian Minister for Democratic Reform and Transport
51. Stockwell Day, former Canadian Minister for International Trade, Emergency Preparedness and Asia-Pacific

Figure 1. Ministers and secretaries interviewed from the Rudd/Gillard, Harper, Key, Cameron and Obama governments 2013–2014.

As Peele (2005) advocates, studies of political leadership need to be open to 'experimentation with different approaches, techniques and frameworks' in order to 'unlock the secrets of what is a multifaceted process'. To increase the chances of finding new perspectives, and avoid the trap of falling into standard critique of politicians, the interviews adopted an appreciative inquiry approach. There is already a vast literature identifying weaknesses in the practice of collecting and using public input which tends to a common view that politicians are to blame for many of the problems. An appreciative inquiry approach seeks to identify what might actually work—the best of existing behaviour and potential for future development (Cooperrider, Whitney, & Stavros, 2008). As Lilleker (2003, p. 208) noted, the benefits of elite interviews include 'insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take place out of the public or media gaze'. Such interviews provided an insight into what goes on in the minds of key decision makers. Cooper-

rider et al.'s (2008) suggestions for appreciative inquiry approach questions were considered and adapted to produce new questions in the same style, which were more reflective and constructive. This helped to create a more comfortable place for politicians and may have increased the response rate. The ethical framework may also have helped, as it provided the ministers with the chance to edit transcripts before they were used in the research, even if only 4 made significant changes; (the rest made none or corrections to grammar/names/facts only).

The 5 countries gave a reasonable spread in terms of ideology, with two left-leaning governments; two right-leaning governments and one right/liberal coalition. More former than current ministers were interviewed (61 versus 31%); and—not surprisingly—more men than women, but no discernible impact on the data was found. To facilitate reflection on any potential differences in interview data by country, quotes were colour coded by country, and whilst very minor differ-

ences were noted such as a greater tendency to critique civil servants in Australia and less favouring of consultative styles of leadership in Canada they were not large or solid enough to change the overall conclusions.

Whilst politicians' perspectives—like any subject—produce highly subjective data (Richards, 1996, p. 201) because we have nothing of this nature in existing research, and that political leadership is about high level individuals rarely accessed by researchers, the data produced gives an invaluable insight not previously seen. As the aforementioned quote from Peele suggests, political leadership can be a somewhat secretive processes, and the value of interviews is it enables us to go behind usually closed doors, thus doing as Richards (1996, p. 200) argues and 'provid[ing] the political scientist with an insight into the mind-set of the actor/s who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live'.

Interviews were analysed and organised under the question headings, grouped into three main themes: managing public input, integrating public input into decision making, and new forms of political leadership with nearly 85,000 words of organised interview data before identifying of overall themes in political leadership behaviour. This data provided ground breaking insights into the changing roles of political leaders. From this, a new model of Deliberative Political Leadership was created which is presented below.

4. Research Results: Emergence of Deliberative Political Leaders

This section presents the results of the empirical re-search by presenting a new model of political leadership derived from the data, called Deliberative Political Leadership. Deliberative political leaders consider constructive and conversational input from inside and outside government from a diverse range of sources, evaluate the relative quality of such input, and integrate the input into their deliberations on what is the best way forward before making their final decision. There are four core components to this leadership model: see Figure 2.

This model of Deliberative Political Leadership connects and combines the concept of deliberation from the deliberative democracy field with leadership from political leadership field. It is fully acknowledged that the term deliberative is an area of major debate—as indeed is leadership—but this research is simply focusing on core principles from both concepts. So in deliberation, a range of inputs and perspective should be considered and issues should be discussed in a constructive manner; in leadership and leaders should listen, show vision, and make decisions.

Below the data that informed the creation of this model is presented. Firstly, discussion explores how ministers accept lack of power and knowledge, therefore proactively seek constructive public input and evaluate its quality. Secondly it demonstrates how they adopt the four components of the Deliberative Political Leadership Model: getting out and about, being consultative, sharing solution finding and judging. Thirdly it discusses why ministers thought that taking these approaches was valuable to them in their leadership role.

Figure 2. Model of deliberative political leadership.

4.1. Ministers' Accepted Lack of Power and Knowledge

The same constraints on leadership noted in academic literature were acknowledged by the ministers when interviewed. The power bestowed to our leaders is now very limited; as one minister noted 'it's certainly not a, as you say, "get yourself into a leadership position and then tell people what to do thing" because the world's not like that' (Joyce). As the public is more connected and informed they want to be heard, making governing more complex. Ministers also conceded the limits of their knowledge and capacity and that they seek expertise from elsewhere. Figure 3 displays some of the comments made in interviews.

4.2. Ministers Proactively Seek Constructive Public Input

Secondly, and in response to this, ministers proactively seek diverse constructive public input and do so from a range of different sources: academic experts; think tanks; overseas research based/policy advice; professional associations; frontline staff; civil servants; organised stakeholders; individual stakeholders; general public; underrepresented; formal consultation/submissions; market research. Ministers expressed significant respect for the public perspective, with Bill English, NZ Deputy Prime Minister noting that 'the models of hairy-chested change all assume the public are pretty stupid and can't quite understand the issues and will be irrationally resistant to change, and that's generally wrong'. However they also discussed

the value of government staff, outside experts, professionals and so on. No one source emerged as superior to the others.

Indeed, the overall conclusion was that when it comes to finding the best policy solution, no one is god. Not the minister, not an NGO, not a policy expert. One interviewee commented 'you shouldn't assume that there is some god-like creature that can have some tablets of stone that they can hand down to you as to what is actually occurring in society' (Carr). Ministers need to 'get a range of input' (Coleman); that they 'shouldn't rely on one source. No matter how good they are, 'everybody gets it wrong sometimes' (Griffin). Each method or source has 'their own benefits' (Bergen) so input has 'to come from a number of different sources in order to be valid' (Clement) and 'a number of different mechanisms' (Clare) should be used. Given this, it was important to actively seek alternative sources of information:

> 'As a minster you're not passive…You're not just an empty vessel. You're not just a receiver. A minster's job is to actually be engaged' (Carr).
> 'Good ministers go out and seek alternative points of view to challenge the advice that they've been given' (Clare).
> 'You've always got to be engaged in a bit of lateral thinking and thinking "ok, who else is effected by this? Who else should I need to be talking to?"…I made a conscious effort to engage with people that hadn't been engaged with before' (Gillan).

'We're in a different game now…the hierarchies of the western world are much more collapsed'
Steven Joyce, New Zealand Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment
'Ministers have a lot of power [but] the nature of democracy means that they very rarely have control of any particular problem and can't by themselves, or by the virtue of directing government, necessarily solve something.'
Chris Evans, former Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
'There are many more people that want their voices heard…yes government ministers do know much more than other people. But I think people now know a lot more.'
Cheryl Gillan, former UK Secretary of State for Wales
'It's not just politicians, it is the organised state at large that is shrinking in significance and reach and power.'
Lindsay Tanner, former Australian Minister for Finance and Deregulation
'The whole input into government is now much more complex than when I came into politics nearly fifty years ago now.'
Lord McNally (Tom) UK Minister of State (Justice)
'So the game's changed in the last twenty years…there is now a huge diversity of opinion.'
Sir Nick Harvey, former UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces
'If I'm unsure I'm equally not scared to then either pick up the phone and start ringing around or think it's about time I spent a day on the road…[and] I've put in smarter people than me to implement policy because that's their strength not mine.'
Paula Bennett, New Zealand Minister for Social Development
'I don't consider myself expert. I'd rather rely on other people and other expertise'
Ray La Hood, former US Secretary of Transport
'You don't have a monopoly on ideas just because you happen to be in an office.'
David Ogden, former US Deputy Attorney General
'I can't do everything, I can't do anything on my own'
Judith Collins, New Zealand Minister of Justice
'I would always argue the partnership case…individually we can't do much, collectively we can do great things.'
Simon Crean, former Minister for Regional Australia

Figure 3. Ministers' reflections on their limited power and knowledge.

'You've got to push to make sure you're exposed to the conversation, because everything around you will try to prevent it…when I was Agriculture Minister I said "ok, well I come from the city, I don't come from a farming background, I'm going to go off and spend a lot of time on farms"…when I came back [departmental staff said] "ok, well now you've done all the travelling, we can now get some real work done"…it was viewed as sort of a stunt…and I was like "no no no, this is how I operate. This is what I'll do." So you need to keep pushing to make sure that you're having your meetings on the ground, because the bureaucracy, generally, will function through formalised meetings with peak bodies' (Burke).

4.3. Ministers Evaluate the Quality of Input

Thirdly, ministers also evaluate the quality of input they receive before taking it into account. For example, they reflect on whether public opinion is uninformed or influenced by misconception. As one interviewee commented 'that's why you have to have structured consultations and you have to have carefully designed surveys in order to sift out what is real opinion or just transitory prejudice' (Cable). But they also understand that all opinions, regardless of the source, are biased in some way: 'you're always mindful that they had an interest sometimes in opposing or supporting a particular policy' (Solberg); 'everyone's got an agenda' (Bennett) and 'none of this is value free, none of it. There's no objective truths, there are policy options' (Carr). Professional groups obviously argue in their own interest; the select committee process in parliament 'tends to attract people with a particular stance on an issue' (Coleman); consultation exercises tend to attract 'people with a view' or 'a strong vocation' (Borrows); expert and advisor conclusions are based on 'on particular presumptions' (Burke). It doesn't meant such views are wrong or should be dismissed—it should all be listened to—but in combination with alternative perspectives: 'any professional occupation that bring forward a request for legislation or regulation, it will, by nature, be self-serving…you have to measure that against the other interested people who will be effected' (Day).

Ministers also discussed the need to reflect on the skill of those putting forward an argument. Just because a civil servant or professional lobbyist is more effective at making a case does mean their point is superior to that made by a member of the public: 'you couldn't treat it like a court where you might give added value to the strength within advocacy' (Griffin). They need to assess how robust the information is by testing it against other views:

'Some of the assumptions upon which that advice was determined, I would have tested. I'd also test the assertions made by stakeholders. So if someone said to me the following about housing which did not accord with my own internal advice I would ask the department to test it, or I would appoint someone independent of this Parliament' (O'Connor).

'What you've got to do is assess that information against your anecdotal understanding, looking for clues that maybe the information is not as robust as it looks. So, by definition, if you've got a set of information telling you that the economy's strong and consumer confidence is high or whatever and the people you are talking to, day in day out in the area you represent, are all wringing their hands and worrying about where their next meals coming from then…ask yourself "well, why is there such a contrast?"' (Tanner).

'We have to look at the credibility of the organisations of the people that are interacting with us and, like in any situation, at least try to test the validity of what's being said. So number one "is the description of the problem accurate?"' (Grindler).

Political leadership is not only about getting a wide variety of input, but assessing its' quality, synthesising the multi-perspectives it offers, and interpreting the lessons it offers carefully.

Given this, political leaders are thus moving to a deliberative form of leadership consisting of getting out and about, consulting, sharing solution finding and judging.

4.4. Out and About: Deliberative Political Leaders Get Out Of the Office and Interact With Those on the Ground, on the Street and Working in the Front Line to Inform Their Decisions

There was a strong sense amongst the interviewees of the need to get out of government and out in the community—whether this was the general public or front line public sector staff—to ensure they had an effective feel for what was going on. The NZ Minister for Courts Chester Borrows described his leadership as 'I get out and about…we go out early and then we think about what we've been told before we make a decision'. Others talk of getting 'out of the Bowen triangle' [the heart of NZ government] (Joyce) and 'meeting businesses up and down the country' (Green). Gary Grindler recalled how he and the US Attorney General once flew to a centre where young men and women who had experienced a variety of problems in their lives were boarding for a period of time and they had a private conversation with every young man and women in the class receiving the programme to get their perspective on what was working or needed changing. Deliberative political ministers don't want to wait for people to come to them: 'you need to get out in the broader community and go and talk to the local shopping centre owners and community groups' (McClelland). There is also a strong physical as-

pect to this with discussions about supermarkets, sports clubs, fairs, markets and barbecues: see Figure 4.

4.5. Consultative: Deliberative Political Leaders Listen to a Range of Perspectives in Participatory Dialogue before Making Decisions

When asked directly about their leadership style a common theme was consultative, collaborative, listening or participatory. As Bill English, NZ Deputy PM said 'political leaders have got choices about how they do business…when you chose a course that is more participative…you can build higher levels of trust through the process'. Others talked of being 'inclusive' and 'taking on board other people's opinions and views' (Gillan); being 'very open, very transparent…we were very collaborative and we listened to all points of view and really followed the recommendations and suggestions' (La Hood); 'consultative…actually asking…people who do the job' (Collins); and 'talking to groups and to interested parties' (Evans). This doesn't take away the politician's right to make decisions but as English said 'you can get there without having to assert that role—you gain greater trust'.

4.6. Shared-Solution Finding: Deliberative Political Leaders Work in Partnership with Those outside Government to Identify Solutions; Sharing Responsibility as Well as Power with the Public

Building on this, ministers also discussed moving to another level and working with others to identify solutions. Thus 'delivering through government is, in essence, about partnerships' (Crean) and ministers seek to 'share policy formation' (Spelman). They focus on the way forward, 'working hard with members of the public to say what's the solution' (Woodhouse); 'getting people that participated in solving a problem' (Ev-

ans); 'getting alongside each other to work out what we need to do' (Bennett) and 'work[ing] with them to achieve better outcomes' (McCully).

For example Caroline Spelman, former UK Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, noted how 'the concept of responsibility sharing in animal welfare has been achieved in the UK and basically we set up a board which is part industry, part stakeholder, part politicians, to look at the transition to sharing the cost of animal welfare'. Similarly former US Secretary of Transport Ray La Hood recalled how they sponsored two distracted driving summits which engaged people from all over the country: 'we got input from them about what the problem is, but also about what the solution is. We engaged the telecommunication companies, the cell phone companies, the car manufacturers, and law enforcement and legislators'. It isn't an equal partnership—as New Zealand Social Development Minister Paula Bennett said 'at the end of the day I've got levers in power that they don't have'—but it is about working together. It is about seeing that 'all people have leadership in them and all people can be leaders' (Collins) and 'losing that power though by the day' (Bennett) and being 'prepared to share power' (Spelman).

4.7. Judging: Deliberative Political Leaders Exercise Careful Judgment by Weighing Up Public Input before Then Deciding the Best Course of Future Action

Finally, political leaders do of course have to make decisions in government and thus making their own judgement remains part of the new leadership model. Ministers get to a 'time where you draw the line' (Foss) and 'that's as far as you can go, and then you move' (Griffin). Talking about that decision making stage, ministers discussed weighing up the merits of different inputs, arguments and factors; judging the input they have received; and balancing conflicting perspectives.

'Sitting by a booth at a farmers market or a trade fair and people can just walk up and give you their views on unsolicited, unfiltered.'
Stockwell Day, former Canadian Minister for International Trade
'I spend a lot of time doing site visits; a lot of time out of the office, a lot of time out on the ground' *Tony Burke, Australian Minister for Sustainability*
'You've got to get grass roots, put your sneakers on, go in.'
Paula Bennett, New Zealand Minister for Social Development
'You've actually got to go to the frontlines to see what's going on, and to see some of the issues that people have and say "why is that like that? What can we do?"…you have to get out of the office to go and do that.'
Judith Collins, New Zealand Minister of Justice
'Watching my sons play soccer on the weekend one of the most useful forums, because if it really was an issue with people they'd raise it with you. If it was just a Canberra or press issue, an insider's issue, people wouldn't raise it with you.'
Chris Evans, former Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
'You meet on the marae. And you go face to face, eye to eye. And that's the only way.'
Pita Sharples, New Zealand Minister for Maori Affairs
'Go to the rugby club and wander up to the supermarket and actually people come up and tell you what they think…the type of people who won't make an appointment with an MP because they are just too busy.'
Jonathan Coleman, New Zealand Minister of Defence

Figure 4. Ministers' discussions of getting out and about physically.

As one interview joked, whilst it would be good if there were 'a secret chemistry!' (Joyce) there isn't a clear formula for this. Instead, politicians have to use their judgement. As Chris Evans, former Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship explained 'you don't actually ever say "well I value this as point seven percent of the decision making process." There's no formal calculation. But it's just judgements you make after the range of inputs'.

And of course practical politics has to be brought into the final decisions, considering in Canada for example 'how would they view this at the Tim Hortons?' (Clement); or in New Zealand 'as the Prime Minister is one to say "it's not a game of perfect we're playing here, it's politics"' (Joyce). Or in the US 'the White House is a part of the policy discussion of course because they may be the ultimate decision makers' (Grindler) and in Canada 'you receive a letter from the Prime Minister telling you "I want to see you working on this, and on these matters"' (Blackburn). But overall these final decisions are better made after getting appropriate input: once decisions are made ministers are responsible for them and they can be 'most confident in making those decisions when you feel you've given an opportunity for all sorts of input to come to you as the decision maker' (Bird).

5. The Value of Deliberative Political Leadership

In their interviews ministers also explained why being more consultative and collaborative helps them be leaders. It creates more options, improves policy, identifies politically-doable solutions, creates support for change, saves money and helps policies work as intended. They recalled how 'I learnt things that sent me off in different directions' (Bennett) and input can 'alert you to what may have been unforeseen or unpredicted consequences that with some amendment and change can make the policy outcomes better' (Bird). Being open to input can help identify where opposition might be overcome: 'having a public debate has made the possibility of change much more possible in a whole range of areas' (Evans). It also creates legitimacy and acceptance for decisions and increases compliance once legislation is enacted or new programmes implemented: 'it gives people a stake in saying "hey, we helped solve this problem. And here's the solution." And many of these people are the ones who carry out the solution' (La Hood). Ministers need to be 'prepared to modify your thinking based on any valid contributions that they make' as 'they may well come out and defend it, because it becomes their document' (C. Emerson).

Adopting a more collaborative form of leadership also helps creates long-lasting change, thereby supporting leaders' vision and generating political capital to lead more change. Simon Crean, former Australian

Minister for Regional Australia noted that those initiatives he had taken the time to develop with public input had 'stood the test of time. They haven't been unpicked'. Paula Bennett's comments on this echoed her counterparts' concessions of not being the source of all power and knowledge: 'if the community doesn't own this thing I will come and go. So yes I've shown the leadership to get it going, I push it, I'm important. But I will be gone and they will be far more important than I am…unless they are completely brought into it, and now are owning it on the ground, it's only another fancy piece of paper'.

6. Implications: Opening Our Eyes to More Collaborative and Constructive Political Leadership

Changing conditions and contexts require new leadership approaches in government, with Sorensen (2006, pp. 105, 112) arguing that 'politicians must govern society in new ways' and we need the 'formulation of a new politician role'. This article provides such a role: the Deliberative Political Leader. Deliberative political leaders consider constructive and conversational input from inside and outside government from a diverse range of sources, evaluate the relative quality of such input, and integrate the input into their deliberations on what is the best way forward before making their final decision. They get out and about, consult, and share the process of solution-finding before weighing up all the information when making their final judgement. Through 51 interviews with government ministers in the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand it has become evident that senior politicians are evolving to less authoritative, power-focused leaders who accept the limits of their own power and knowledge, proactively seek greater non-governmental input into their decision making, and reflect on such ideas before making their own decisions. This fits with many existing conceptual arguments in existing literature as to what political leaders should be like. But it provides empirical evidence that political leaders are actually like that in practice not just theory.

This new theoretical model can be used in future empirical research on other ministers, government departments, and prime ministers/presidents. It could also be applied to lower levels of government such as governors and mayors. Whilst it is unlikely that all leaders will fit into this concept on all policies all of the time, by opening our eyes to the possibility we will be more likely to identify such developments in political leadership behaviour. Future research could also use alternative methods of empirical research instead of self-reported perspectives in elite interviews, such as analysis of politician's speeches, policies and actions to further explore the extent to which this new model is being followed. It could also connect more directly with

policy making, connecting with scholarship on the complex origins of leaders' policy making and review to what extent the input they receive now comes from more and more actors.

The broader implications of this research are also that the nature of political leadership is less certain. As the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand Bill English observed, leaders need to develop 'the ability to tolerate ambiguity and non-linear processes' which can be 'more challenging of leadership because it's less predictable'. It also makes governance more pluralistic, organic, intuitive and fluid and 'uses use frameworks that don't always fit with the mainstream public policy analysis'. Political power is less defined: as another interviewee put it, 'political power is very much overstated these days. I think power in our community is very diffuse' (Evans). Instead of seeking and then using formal power, political elites are more facilitators of discussion to create solutions before making their final judgement. There is a sense of powerless power: politician's authority is contested and complex and has to be constantly renegotiated. Both research and practice needs to take account of this more complex and chaotic understanding of political leadership and explore more suitable responses such as the more deliberative form of leadership suggested by this article.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Explaining Japan's Revolving Door Premiership: Applying the Leadership Capital Index

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Abstract
The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once a year. What factors can explain Japan's revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, this article applies the *Leadership Capital Index* (LCI) developed by Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. Leadership capital is the aggregate of leaders' political resources: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI thus allows analysis of the interplay between individual capacities and contextual conditions in determining leaders' ability to gain, maintain and deploy power. The LCI is applied to answer two questions. Firstly, what accounts for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? In which of the LCI's three leadership dimensions do Japanese leaders lack capital? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some prime ministers to retain office for longer than average (>2 years)? In particular, the article analyses the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) Japan's longest serving prime minister since the 1970s, and incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has held office for three years since December 2012. As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the tenure of Japan's prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies.

1. Introduction

The turnover in holders of Japan's highest office is famously rapid. From 2006 to 2012, six prime ministers served Japan in as many years. Japan's revolving door premiership has been attributed to the weak capacity of the prime minister's office. But what then accounts for the relatively long tenure and predominant leadership of premiers such as Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) and Shinzo Abe (2012–)?

To explore the varied fortunes of Japan's leaders, this article applies the *Leadership Capital Index* (LCI) developed by Bennister et al. (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office be-

tween 2000 and 2015.[1] Leadership capital is defined as aggregate authority, composed of three dimensions: a leader's skills, relations and reputation. The LCI provides a tool for systematically comparing leaders across these three broad areas that combines quantitative and qualitative elements. It thus allows more nuanced analysis than models relying on a single methodological approach by capturing the interplay between individual capacities and contextual conditions in determining leaders' ability to act (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 417).

Bennister et al. employ an analogy between capital and authority to illustrate the difference between mere office holding and exercising political leadership. Politi-

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[1] Shinzo Abe's two premierships (2006–2007 and 2012–) are accounted separately throughout the article.

cal authority is analogous to financial capital in that some leaders have it, while others do not. Like capital, authority can be saved, spent purposefully or frittered away. Office holding concerns gathering and conserving leadership capital, while leading requires spending it wisely and replenishing one's stock. Exercising leadership entails keeping stakeholders invested while tackling difficult and complex problems (Burns, 2003, p. 20; Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009, p. 4).

This article uses the LCI to systematically compare the authority of Japan's prime ministers in order to answer two questions. Firstly, does a broader lack of leadership capital, rather than mere institutional weakness, account for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? If so, in which of the three leadership dimensions composing the LCI do Japanese leaders have low stocks? Do different Japanese prime ministers suffer from the same type of leadership deficit? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some Japanese prime ministers to retain office for longer than average (>2 years)? What factors allowed Junichiro Koizumi to become Japan's second longest serving prime minister under the 1947 Constitution? Why is incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on his way to beating Koizumi's record, despite the fact that his first premiership ended ignobly after just one year? As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the authority of Japan's prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies. I conclude that with minor adaptations to account for bureaucratic, factional and one-party dominant nature of Japanese politics, the LCI is a useful tool for robust analysis of political leadership in Japan.

In the sections that follow, I first examine existing scholarship on prime ministerial leadership in Japan. I then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of 'leadership capital', before presenting its three main forms (skills, relations and reputation capital). Next I introduce the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) and apply it to my nine prime ministerial subjects. I conclude by summarising my answers to the two research questions outlined above and discussing further development of the LCI.

2. Leadership and the Authority of the Japanese Prime Minister

Under the 1947 constitution, 32 prime ministers have held office in Japan, among whom only five have spent four or more years in office. Owing to their short tenure, for most of the post-war period, Japanese prime ministers were considered institutionally weak (Shinoda, 2011, p. 48). Until the 2000s, the policy-making role of the Japanese prime minister was largely overlooked, with attention instead focusing on Japan's powerful bureaucracy and factional politics within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Krauss & Nyblade, 2005, p. 357). Aurelia George Mulgan used the term 'un-

Westminster' system to describe Japan's policy-process:

"The [Japanese] system does not produce strong cabinet government with a prominent leadership role played by the prime minister, but a dual power structure of party-bureaucracy policy-making in which the prime minister and cabinet play a subordinate, rather than a superordinate role." (2003, p. 84)

The unusually long premiership of charismatic Junichiro Koizumi from April 2001 to September 2006, however, led to a reassessment of prime ministerial authority (Machidori, 2006). Yet after raising expectations that his five immediate successors could not fulfil, Koizumi's strong leadership was recognised as an exception rather than the new norm (Mishima, 2012; Shimizu, 2005; Uchiyama, 2010). Shinzo Abe's dominance since returning to the premiership for a second non-consecutive term in December 2012, however, suggests that Koizumi's strong leadership was not unique and that the leadership capacity of Japan's highest office should be reconsidered (Burrett, forthcoming).

An increased potential for prime ministerial leadership within the Japanese government from the 1990s is attributed to changes in political communications, electoral reforms and/or a greater concentration of resources in the prime minister's office (Kabashima & Steel, 2012; Krauss, 2000; Krauss & Nyblade, 2005; Otake, 2006). Changes in the relationship between politics and the media in Japan have led to a greater focus on the prime minister (Krauss, 2000). Japanese prime ministers such as Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe successfully exploited new media dynamics to advance their personalised political agendas (Burrett, forthcoming). Changes in political communications allow leaders to circumvent their parties and appeal directly to voters, a process enhanced by electoral reforms introduced in 1994.

Under Japan's multi-member-district postwar electoral system, large parties were forced to run more than one candidate per constituency, producing incentives for intraparty factionalism. Each voter would cast just one ballot, but in a district that would send on average three-to-five members to the House of Representatives, the lower house of Japan's bicameral parliament. Any party seeking to win two or more seats in a district would have to nominate multiple candidates. Intraparty factions helped to oil the wheels of a system of parallel party machines by providing patronage and financial support to different candidates within the same district (McCall, Rosenbluth, & Thies, 2010, 2010, pp. 55-56). The institutionalizing of factions within the LDP, that ruled Japan from 1955 to 1993, constrained the policy- and appointment-making powers of the party leader. To win the LDP presidency, and thus nomination to the post of prime minister, required a large factional power base. Changes introduced to the Japa-

nese electoral system in the wake of the LDP's defeat in 1993 general election were designed to weaken factions' influence over both district election campaigns and national leader selection. The lower house electoral system was altered from a multi-member-district, Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, to a combination of 300 single-member-districts and 11 proportional representation (PR) constituencies (180 seats). Under the new electoral system—used for the first time in 1996—political competition takes place along party lines (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2004). As a consequence, factions have lost control of the LDP leadership selection process, giving the prime minister potentially greater freedom over policy-making and cabinet appointments (McCall et al., 2010, p. 110).

Changes to the Japanese electoral system not only altered how the LDP selects its leaders, but also reordered the wider party system (Schoppa, 2011). Undoubtedly, developments in the party system have had important consequences for the power and agency of the Japanese prime minister, not least in eventually bringing to office three premiers from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The PR element of the new electoral system has further encouraged fragmentation in a party system already prone to splits, mergers and defections. Colleagues with personal, policy or political grudges against the prime minister are easily tempted to jump ship, knowing that the PR ballot will act as a lifesaver to any new party that can attract a few per cent at the polls. The prevalence of personality politics in Japan—initially encouraged by the multi-member-district system—further exacerbates fragmentation, and along with the PR ballot, serves to entice populist mavericks to establish their own political parties. Splits and defections ordinarily reduce confidence in the prime minister, undermining his leverage with what remains of his party. Electoral reforms have thus been a double-edged sword for the authority of the Japanese prime minister over his own party.

The potential authority of Japan's prime minister relative to that of other political actors has also been strengthened by a series of administrative innovations from the late 1990s that have shifted the locus of policy-making from Japan's powerful ministries to the cabinet office. To reinforce the authority of the prime minister and the cabinet, in 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto formed the Administrative Reform Council. The reforms subsequently passed by the Diet in July 1999 enacted significant institutional changes to strengthen the power and function of the cabinet secretariat—the prime minister's support staff, equivalent to the British prime minister's office (Shinoda, 2005, pp. 800-801). During his premiership from 2001 to 2006, Junichiro Koizumi introduced further reforms aimed at strengthening the policy-making power of the prime minister vis-à-vis Japan's bureaucracy (Mishima, 2007, p. 727). From 2009 to 2012, the DPJ government

added its own reforms of bureaucratic power. Margarita Estévez-Abe argues that institutional changes in Japan over the past two decades have cast the die in favour of a Westminster system that centralizes power in the hands of the party leadership and prime minister, leading to 'the Britannicization of Japan' (2006, p. 633).

Yet in Britain, between 2000 and 2015, only three prime ministers held office, compared to three times that number in Japan. Despite developments enhancing the potential authority of the Japanese prime minister since the 1990s, few incumbents manage to maintain power for long. What light can the concept of 'leadership capital', explained below, shine on the weak authority and subsequent short tenure of many Japanese prime ministers?

3. Leadership Capital

In their original article, Bennister et al. draw on Pierre Bourdieu's conceptualising of varieties of capital (economic, cultural, social, political) in constructing their theory of leadership capital (2015, pp. 418-419). For Bourdieu, political capital is largely symbolic. It is the process by which 'agents confer on a person…the very powers they recognise in him', giving that person credit to 'impose beliefs' and 'recognised principles' (in Bennister et al., 2015, p. 418). John Thompson similarly conceptualises political capital as a form of symbolic power that imbues its holder with 'the capacity to intervene in events, to influence the actions and beliefs of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms' (2000, p. 98). In exercising symbolic power, leaders draw on various kinds of resources, including their reputation, popularity and accumulated prestige, assets that Thompson terms their *symbolic capital* (Thompson, 2000). Thompson argues that the use of symbolic power is not incidental or secondary to the struggle for political power, but essential to it:

> "Anyone who wishes to acquire political power or to exercise it in a durable and effective fashion must also use symbolic power to secure the support of others within the political sub-field and within the broader political field." (2000, p. 102)

Bourdieu and Thompson's theorising enables the identification of three elements of political power that are central to Bennister et al.'s concept of leadership capital and to the categories composing the LCI that they develop to operationalise this concept (Figure 1).

Firstly, leaders must have the personal political skills to gain and maintain political power (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 39; King, 1991, p. 42). Leaders' personalities and styles matter to the outcome of the policy process. Harold Lasswell (1936) pioneered the use of leadership typologies to understand the relationship between

personality and leaders' performance. James Barber (1972) and Richard Neustadt (1991) offer typologies of presidential leadership in the United States. Also focusing on the U.S., Fred Greenstein (2001) provides a six-point framework for evaluating leaders' political and personal skills based on: (1) proficiency as a communicator (2) organisational capacity (3) political skills (4) policy vision (5) cognitive style and (6) emotional intelligence.

Figure 1. Components of Leadership Capital. Source: Bennister et al. (2015, p. 422).

Second, political power is relational. Bourdieu saw political power as derived from public trust granting a leader the capacity to mobilise supporters (In Bennister et al., 2015, p. 419). Leadership is an interaction between individuals, rather than action by one individual. As Robert Tucker writes, 'Leadership is a process of human interaction in which some individuals exert or attempt to exert, a determining influence on others' (1981, p. 11). James MacGregor Burns' definition of leadership similarly focuses on the interaction between leaders and their followers:

> "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers." (1978, p. 18)

Relational Capital (R1) thus refers to the loyalties leaders mobilise, not only among voters but also among party colleagues, the media, business elites, bureaucrats and others possessing their own forms of capital that shape the leadership environment (Figure 1). Why people follow, or at a minimum accept a leader, shapes the nature of leadership authority. Burns argues that interaction between leaders and their followers takes two fundamentally different forms. The first form Burns calls transactional leadership (1978, p. 19). The transactional leader interacts with followers for the purpose of exchange. The exchange can be economic or political: the trading of votes between candidate and citizen, or the swapping of goods. The purposes of each party are re-

lated, at least to the extent that each party stands to gain from the exchange. Beyond this exchange, however, the parties have no wider purpose holding them together. Transactional leaders accumulate capital through technical competence and 'bringing home the bacon', rather than through a mobilising narrative. Burns calls the second form of interaction between leaders and followers transforming leadership (1978, p. 20). The transforming leader interacts with followers in a way that changes them both. For Burns, transforming leadership is inspirational leadership that gathers capital by mobilising followers behind a particular vision or set of ideals.

Essential to leader-follower relations are followers' perceptions of a leader's skills. In the LCI, leaders' *Skills Capital* is separated into 'soft' (S1) and 'hard' (S2) skills. Hard skills are instrumental and transactional, while soft skills concern inspiration, persuasion and shaping the preferences of others (Nye, 2008). Perceptions of a leader's skills also relate to his or her *Reputational Capital* (R2). A leader's reputation is determined by their own behaviour and its observable impact, but also through interpretation of their behaviour by followers, colleagues, critics and other observers (Greenstein, 2000, p. 182). By spending political capital, leaders can reinforce, alter or destroy their reputation, with important consequences for their future authority (Dahl, 1961, p. 229). Leadership capital increases when a leader's reputation meets two conditions: when its normative nucleus is considered appropriate for the times; and when the gap between political promises and performance is slight (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 423; Skowronek, 1993). Leaders' reputations are most effective when their personal biography, political philosophy and in-office decisions are widely perceived to align.

Analysing political leadership through the prism of leadership capital assumes that it is the interaction between an individual's personal capabilities and their institutional and situational environment that determines a leader's ability to act. Prime ministers, however powerful, are dependent on institutional structures and on the wider context in which they operate (Heffernan, 2003, p. 368). Although all leaders must work within constraints, some possess personalities more disposed to challenging these constraints than others (Herrmann, 1988; Keller, 2005). The manner in which different prime ministers approach similar situations varies significantly depending on their individual character, as Anthony King observes:

> "Different people bring different personalities to the job; they have different goals; they adopt different styles; and they find themselves operating in different political environments. Second, there is variety within the lifetime of a single premiership." (1991, p. 42)

There can be no doubt that Junichiro Koizumi's crusader style of leadership varied wildly from Yasuo Fukuda's

more managerial approach. Nor can it be denied that Shinzo Abe's governing style was more dominant at the start of his second premiership than during his first. What is more difficult to discern is the extent to which policy and other political outcomes are determined by individual capabilities (oratory, charisma, negotiation) versus context. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had little choice but to take a conciliatory approach to working with Japan's powerful bureaucracy and the divided factions within his own party, given the backdrop to his premiership—a lack of personal mandate, the ongoing nuclear crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant and economic stagnation. But Noda's conciliatory approach may also have been the case in any context. In his speech to the party caucus that made him prime minister, Noda described himself as more of a loach—a type of bottom feeding fish—than a 'goldfish in a scarlet robe' (Hayashi, 2011). Noda's self-description suggests he was a conciliator by nature and not just owing to circumstance.

Robert Elgie (1995) offers an interactionist model for the study of political leadership, combining personal and systemic elements. His approach, designed for comparative analysis of leadership across liberal democracies, supposes that 'political leaders operate within an environment which will both structure their behaviour and constrain their freedom of action' (1995, p. 8). Elgie supposes that leaders possess agency—the capacity to act independently—allowing them to shape the environment in which they operate, if only up to a point, to improve their chances of success. The LCI similarly understands political authority as the product of a leader's perceived skills and the environment in which they operate. Capital accumulated or spent in one area has an impact on other elements of leadership capital.

4. The Leadership Capital Index (LCI)

The LCI is a diagnostic checklist for analysing a leader's stock of authority, designed to identify variations in the aggregate level of leadership capital (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 423). In this study, the LCI is applied comparatively to nine Japanese prime ministers to create a leadership league table (Table 3). It is used to provide a snapshot of the political authority of each leader at the mid-point of their premiership. Ideally, snapshots would be taken at various intervals during each leader's tenure, as authority tends to ebb and flow over time (Breslauer, 2002, p. 13; Bynander & Hart, 2006). Looking at only one moment in a leader's tenure could potentially create a biased picture. But for the nine leaders analysed here, selection bias is limited by the short tenure of most subjects. Seven of the nine leaders were prime minister for less than 15-months. To mitigate bias, for the longest serving leader, Junichiro Koizumi, three snapshots are analysed, at the start, middle and end of his five-and-a-half-year premiership (Table 5).

The LCI assesses leadership capital as an aggregate of skills, relations and reputation and has the potential to provide a more nuanced picture of a leader's authority than approval ratings or other quantitative data alone (Table 1). The variables included relate to the three elements of leadership capital defined above. Many indicators relate to perceptions and are measured using a mixture of 'hard' empirical data (public opinion polling, election results) and 'soft' interpretive assessments (expert panels, political biographies, media reports). This follows the approach used by Bennister et al. in their original article and is in line with an emerging mixed methods paradigm (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 245; Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Hesse-Biber & Burke Johnson, 2013, 2015). The sources of LCI measurement are outlined in Table 2.

I have operationalised the Index using nine of the ten criteria suggested by Bennister et al. (2015, p. 424). The indicators included in the original LCI, 'chosen by a process of reduction, distilling a vast array of variables often used to access political leadership down to a manageable number of 10', are appropriate for assessing leadership in any parliamentary democracy, including Japan (Bennister et al., 2015, p.425). To better fit the context of Japanese politics, however, I have replaced one indicator—that measuring public trust in a leader—with a measure of perceived relations between the leader and the Japanese bureaucracy. I have made this change for two reasons. First, in Japan, public opinion data on trust in politicians is not collected separately from personal approval ratings. As personal ratings polling data is used to measure public perceptions of a leader's skill (S2), it would not be appropriate to use this data a second time to populate another indicator.

Second, relations with the bureaucracy are an important factor determining Japanese prime ministers' ability to exercise authority. In most parliamentary democracies, governments operate under the convention of ministerial responsibility. Ministers take responsibility for the activities of their departments based on the notion that authority rests with elected politicians. Public servants follow ministers' instruction and are accountable to them. Ministers in turn answer to parliament and the public for everything that happens within their departments. In Japan, bureaucrats do not regard themselves as accountable to their ministers and there are few mechanisms through which to enforce accountability. Rather, Japanese bureaucrats largely consider themselves an independent source of political authority (George Mulgan, 2000, p. 187). Bureaucrats often have their own agendas and do not, as a matter of course, follow the instructions of ministers. Unlike in other parliamentary democracies, where publically defending policy is the duty of the minister, Japanese bureaucrats openly advocate particular policy positions, sometimes those contrary to their minister's position. Bureaucrats can even answer questions on the floor of the Japanese parliament in place of ministers.

Table 1. Leadership capital index of a Japanese prime minister.

Criteria	Indicator	Measurement (score of 1 low to 5 high)
S1	01 Political/policy vision	(1) Completely absent
		(2) Unclear/inconsistent
		(3) Moderately clear/consistent
		(4) Clear/consistent
		(5) Very clear
S1	02 Communication skills	(1) Very poor
		(2) Poor
		(3) Average
		(4) Good
		(5) Very good
S2	03 Personal poll rating	(1) Very low (< 20%)
		(2) Low (20-34%)
		(3) Moderate (35-49%)
		(4) High (50-64%)
		(5) Very high (> 65%)
S2	04 Longevity (time in office)	(1) <1 year
		(2) 1-2 years
		(3) 2-3 years
		(4) 3-4 years
		(5) >4 years
S2	05 (Re)election as party leader (margin)	(1) Very small (<1% of electors) (1)
		(2) Small (1-5%)
		(3) Moderate (5-10%)
		(4) Large (10-15%)
		(5) Very large (>15%)
R1	06 Party polling relative to most recent election result	(1) < -10% (1)
		(2) -10 to -2.5% (2)
		(3) -2.5% to 2.5% (3)
		(4) 2.5 to 10% (4)
		(5) >10% (5)
R1	07 Likely serious challenge at next party presidential election	(1) Very high
		(2) High
		(3) Moderate
		(4) Low
		(5) Very low
R1	08 Working relations with the bureaucracy	(1) Very poor
		(2) Poor
		(3) Average
		(4) Good
		(5) Very good
R2	09 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform	(1) Very low
		(2) Low
		(3) Moderate
		(4) High
		(5) Very high
R2	10 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness	(1) Very low
		(2) Low
		(3) Moderate
		(4) High
		(5) Very high

Table 2. Source of LCI measurement.

Criteria	Indicator	Measure
S1	01 Political/policy vision	Soft (expert)
S1	02 Communication skills	Soft (expert)
S2	03 Personal poll rating	Hard (polling)
S2	04 Longevity (time in office)	Hard (chronology)
S2	05 (Re)election as party leader (margin)	Hard (vote count)
R1	06 Party polling relative to most recent election result	Hard (polling)
R1	07 Likely serious challenge at next presidential election	Soft (expert)
R1	08 Working relations with the bureaucracy	Soft (expert)
R2	08 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform	Soft (expert)
R2	09 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness	Soft (expert)

Table 3. LCI measure of Japanese prime ministers 2000–2015.

	Mori	Koizumi	Abe 1	Fukuda	Aso	Hatoyama	Kan	Noda	Abe 2[i]
S1 01 Political/policy vision	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	2	4
S1 02 Communication skills	1	5	2	2	1	1	2	3	2
S2 03 Personal poll rating[ii]	2	4	3	3	2	4	2	2	4
S2 04 Longevity (time in office)	2	5	1	2	1	1	2	2	4
S2 05 (Re)election as party leader (margin)	NA (2)[iii]	5[iv]	5	5	5	4	5	4	4[v]
R1 06 Party polling relative to most recent election result[vi]	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	1	3
R1 07 Likely serious challenge at next presidential election	1	5	2	2	1	2	1	2	5
R1 08 Working relations with the bureaucracy	3	4	3	4	3	2	2	3	4
R2 09 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform	1	4	2	2	2	1	2	2	4
R2 10 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness	1	4	2	2	1	1	1	2	4
Total score	16	42	25	27	20	20	21	22	38

Notes: [i] Abe was the incumbent prime minister at the time of writing. Analysis of his second premiership is up to and including December 2015; [ii] Monthly personal poll ratings are given as average for each premiership (see Appendix); [iii] Mori was elected party leader unopposed in a emergency ballot after Prime Minister Obuchi died following a stroke. Mori's total score has been adjusted based on average score for the other nine indicators; [iv] Koizumi first won election as LDP president in April 2001. He was re-elected unopposed in August 2001. He won a third clear victory against three challengers in September 2003; [v] In 2012, Abe lost the first round presidential ballot in which both party chapters and parliamentary representatives could vote to Shigeru Ishiba. He won the second round run-off ballot in which only parliamentarians can vote by 54.8 per cent to Ishiba's 45.2 per cent. Abe was re-elected as party president unopposed in September 2015. The score given here averages his performance over these two presidential elections (Abe would receive a score of 3 in 2012 and 5 in 2015); [vi] In Japan both the upper and lower houses of parliament are elected in national elections. Upper house elections take place every three years, with half the seats up for election each time. Lower house elections take place at least every four years, with the prime minister having the power to dissolve parliament. Japanese elections use a mixed electoral system, with both single member districts (SMD) and a PR ballot. Election results used here combine both SMD and PR ballots.

In addition to including bureaucratic relations, I have made one other partial change to the LCI offered by Bennister et al.. In their original, to measure public perceptions of a leader's skill (S2), the leader's current personal poll ratings are presented relative to that leader's ratings at the most recent election (Bennister et al., 2015, p. 424). In Japan, very few prime ministers come to office at a general election. In fact just five of the 32 prime ministers that have served under the 1947 post-war constitution came to office this way. Among the nine prime ministers studied here, just two—Yukio Hatoyama and Shinzo Abe—took office as the result of a general election (see Appendix).[2] The other seven all came to power part way through par-

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[2] Junichiro Koizumi came to power in April 2001 after the resignation of Yoshiro Mori, but subsequently won the 2003 and 2005 general elections.

liament after their predecessor resigned. In the Japanese case, comparing a prime minister's personal ratings to those at the last election is inappropriate, as in the majority of cases a different leader was in office at that time. To capture public perceptions of a leader's skills, I use personal approval polling data without comparison to ratings at the last election (Table 2).

5. Applying the LCI: Japan's Prime Ministers 2000–2015

The following analysis uses the LCI to answer the two research questions posed in the introduction to this article. Analysis is based on hard data combined with insights from biography, media reports and my personal interviews with Tokyo-based politicians, political advisors and journalists.

### 5.1. Explaining Short Tenure

Among the nine prime ministers analysed here, seven served less than 15-months in office (Table 3). Applying the LCI reveals that the leadership of short-serving prime ministers has several features in common. All suffered from a lack of policy vision and an inability to shape their party's platform that severely limited their authority. In each case, these leaders failed to offer either transformational or transactional leadership. They were neither able to gather capital through mobilising ideals and aspirations, nor by 'delivering the goods'.

In most cases, weak communication skills exacerbated leaders' inability to offer a coherent personal and policy narrative. Although all seven prime ministers came to office with healthy personal approval rat-

ings, these quickly evaporated when they failed to articulate a clear purpose in seeking power. Each saw his personal approval ratings drop by 30 per cent or more between the start and end of his premiership (Figure 2).

Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori ended his premiership with approval ratings of single digits and is the lowest scoring leader on the LCI (Table 3). Among the leaders studied here, Mori is a special case, coming to office after sitting Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi suffered a stroke. As LDP general secretary, Mori was elected prime minister unopposed in an emergency vote. He is mainly remembered for his gaffes, scandals and undiplomatic comments. Even before becoming prime minister, Mori was described in the Japanese media of having 'the heart of a flea and the brain of a shark' (BBC, 2000). Without Obuchi's sudden death, Mori would not have become prime minister, which helps explain his exceptionally low LCI score.

LDP Prime Ministers Abe (in his first term), Fukuda and Aso were undone by divisions within their party as well as by their personal leadership deficiencies. Policy ruptures related to vested interests within the LDP hampered efforts to tackle Japan's stagnant economy, the top priority of Japanese voters (Mishima, 2012, p. 278). All three leaders lacked the party management skills and direct popular support to overcome obstacles to economic reforms erected by members of their own party. Abe appointed his personal friends to key positions within the cabinet and bureaucracy, but failed to control them when bitter infighting occurred. Fukuda's technocratic nature often left him as a bystander in policy debates. Aso's tenancy to make flippant remarks and privileged personal background made him look out of touch.

Figure 2. Prime minister's personal approval rating by month in office (%). Source: NHK (2015). Retrieved from http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/index.html

Ko Mishima (2012) notes structural reasons for the dearth of leadership ability at the top of the LDP in the 2000s, citing the disappearance of the traditional career path to the premiership. In its earlier days, promotion within the LDP was based on seniority, allowing politicians to systematically build the knowledge and skills necessary for policy-making (Mishima, 2012, p. 281). Politicians had to prove themselves able before reaching the cabinet. Furthermore, when intraparty factions controlled leadership selection, only those with good brokering skills could win the LDP presidency. As factional power has declined within the party since the 1990s, those without leadership skills and training can rise to the top. Abe and Fukuda came to the premiership after relatively short careers compared to their predecessors. Aso had a longer career, but his experience was narrower than that of most past prime ministers. Abe, Fukuda and Aso are all descendants of previous prime ministers, providing them with the networks to win the LDP presidency despite their leadership deficiencies.

The decline of faction-based leader selection has also left prime ministers more vulnerable in the face of declining personal approval ratings. Loyalties within the LDP and DPJ are now more fluid, leading party representatives to abandon a prime minister with falling public support. In the past, a prime minister was secure in office even if he lost public confidence, as long as he maintained his factional coalition (Matsumoto, 2001). Today, parliamentarians are more concerned with the reputation of their party leader than in the past, as since electoral reforms in 1994 introduced PR ballots and SMDs, voters focus more on the image of national parties than on the personal traits of their local candidates (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). The personal popularity of the national leader plays an important role in creating the party's public image.

Fixed term elections for the party presidency encourage challenges to an unpopular prime minister among his intraparty rivals (Takayasu, 2010).[3] Prime ministers often choose to jump before they are pushed, resigning rather than facing a leadership challenge they may not survive. Assuming office outside of the election cycle deprived most of the prime ministers studied here of a popular mandate, further weakening their authority and position vis-à-vis intraparty rivals. An exception is Yukio Hatoyama, who led the DPJ to election victory in August 2009, becoming head of the first single-party non-LDP government since 1955.

Despite his electoral mandate, Hatoyama served just 256 days in office, the shortest tenure of any prime minister included in this study (see Appendix). Hatoyama propensity for making rash policy pronouncement

on television, without the political skills to realise them, proved his undoing. In particular, his u-turn on a promise to relocate the U.S. Futenma marine military base outside Okinawa cost him public, press and party support. Hatoyama played an important role in launching the DPJ in 1996, largely owing to a personal fortune inherited from his mother. It was his financial rather than leadership capital that propelled him to the party leadership. The DPJ made most of its political gains under Hatoyama's predecessor Ichiro Ozawa, who was forced to resign the leadership following a financial scandal just three months prior to the 2009 general election. Hatoyama was elected leader with Ozawa's backing.

Like their immediate LDP predecessors—Abe, Fukuda and Aso—the DPJ's three prime ministers—Hatoyama, Kan and Noda—largely failed due to their inability to offer a convincing plan for economic recovery. The DPJ initially talked of implementing a social democratic style 'Third Way' (*Daisan no Michi*) between traditional LDP state-guided capitalism and neoliberalism, but quickly fell back on the latter. The three DPJ prime ministers also lost public confidence by failing to implement many of the new spending programmes listed in the party's 2009 manifesto due to a lack of funds. Hatoyama and Kan were hampered in their efforts to find additional money by non-cooperation from the bureaucracy. Even prior to taking office, Hatoyama caused friction with officials by naming curtailment of bureaucratic power as his top priority. Ministerial-led decision-making exacerbated existing policy and personality divisions among ministers and the wider parliamentary party.

Although the DPJ does not possess formal factions like the LDP, informal groups of parliamentarians gather around potential party leaders. But these groupings hold limited power over their members and are only one factor influencing the outcome of party leadership elections (Schmidt, 2011). Hatoyama, Kan and Noda were not backed by a stable alliance of groups. Like their LDP counterparts, their support among parliamentary colleagues was predicated on their public popularity. Kan, for example, was elected to replace Hatoyama in June 2010 following media reports that he was voters' preferred choice (Mishima, 2012, p. 290). Kan's stance as the anti-Ozawa candidate was another factor in his success. Admired and reviled in equal measure, Ichiro Ozawa, known as the 'shadow shogun' for his skill in backroom dealing, was a source of party division for all three DPJ prime ministers (George Mulgan, 2015). Ozawa's leadership challenge to Kan three months after the latter took the helm created a fatal schism within the party (Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, 2013).

Beating Ozawa initially gave Kan new buoyancy in the opinion polls (Figure 2). But Kan quickly squandered his new mandate as DPJ president by mishandling tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands following a skirmish between a Japanese Coast

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[3] The LDP holds presidential elections every three years (every two years until 2002). The DPJ held presidential elections every two years until 2011, but extended the presidential term to three years in 2012.

Guard vessel and a Chinese fishing trawler on 7 September 2010. Beset by scandals and misjudgements, Kan seemed to be already on his way out of office when the Great Tohoku Earthquake and resulting Fukushima nuclear disaster struck on 11 March 2011. If managed effectively, crises can boost a leader's reputation. In times of crisis, people look to their leaders to 'do something'. Successful crisis management can turn mere politicians into statesmen. But when a crisis is mismanaged, their visibility makes leaders the obvious scapegoat (Boin & 't Hart, 2003, p. 544). To turn a crisis into an opportunity, leaders must shape the way a crisis is perceived and present convincing plans to manage its ramifications (Foley, 2009, p. 502).

When confronted by crisis, Naoto Kan struggled to provide a reassuring response. His difficulties in managing the Fukushima disaster became bound up with pre-existing doubts over his capacity for leadership. Under the glare of media focus, Kan's infamous temper and tendency to micromanage unnecessary details became a source of public criticism. His preference for relying on a small inner circle of personal advisors strained his working relations with the bureaucracy, delaying the emergency response on the ground (National Diet of Japan, 2012). Opinion polls in the months following the disaster showed two-thirds of voters were disappointed with the Kan's handling of the Fukushima crisis (*The Economist*, 2011a). Thus when Ozawa again tried to unseat Kan by conspiring with the LDP to pass a non-confidence vote in the lower house, the prime minister had no option but to resign to forestall the vote.

Taking power following Kan's resignation in August 2011, the DPJ's final prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda attempted to overcome party divisions by using seniority rather than political affiliation to appoint his cabinet. But despite his considerable skill at building consensus, Noda was not able to hold his party together. The DPJ had become, in the words of Diet member Akihisa Nagashima, 'like Afghanistan': an ungovernable collection of tribes revolving around loyalty to a few chieftains rather than to a common ideology (*The Economist*, 2011b). Noda faced opposition from Ozawa and Hatoyama's supporters on tax increases, social benefits reform, and Trans-Pacific free trade. But he proved willing and able to build alliances within the bureaucracy and opposition parties to bypass his intraparty opponents. In June 2012 Noda successfully brokered a tripartite agreement with the opposition LDP and New Komeito to raise consumption tax from 2014.

Passage of the consumption tax bill, however, came at a high price for the prime minister. Interpreting Noda's bill as an attempt to move the DPJ to the right, 50 left-leaning parliamentarians resigned the party whip (*The Economist*, 2012). Although in recognition of his tactical victory and tenacity, Noda's approval rating initially rose after passage of the consumption tax bill, his popularity soon declined as his party began to im-

plode (Inoguchi, 2013, p. 188). Smelling blood, the LDP withdrew their cooperation with Noda, redoubling their efforts to force a general election (*The Economist*, 2012).

Unlike the other short-tenured prime ministers studied here, Noda was more the victim of circumstance than of his own failings. By any measure, Noda came to power in difficult circumstances, inheriting escalating territorial tensions with China, a faltering economy and a cumulative annual government debt that had reached 200 per cent of GDP. The March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, compounded Japan's economic quagmire. Public disappointment with his DPJ predecessors also weighed heavily on Noda. Throughout his premiership, the DPJ lacked a majority in the House of Councillors, which was lost at the July 2010 election. To pass legislation aimed at speeding recovery from the 2011 disasters and tackling the deficit, Noda required support from the opposition LDP and New Komeito. But with public support for the DPJ languished at around 20 per cent, he lacked the relational capital to bring the opposition to the negotiating table. LDP leaders were reluctant to reach legislative deals with Noda that could forestall the calling of a general election, which the LDP was confident it would win. The DPJ's unpopularity further led to a spate of defections by its own parliamentarians. By mid-November 2012, Noda had lost his majority in the House of Representatives, forcing him to call a general election.

5.2. Explaining Long Tenure

Since 2000, only two Japanese prime ministers have served more than two years in office (Table 3). Junichiro Koizumi was prime minister for five-and-a-half years from April 2001, finally resigning in September 2006 owing to party imposed term-limits, despite retaining high public approval (Figure 3). At the time of writing, Shinzo Abe was entering the third year of his second non-consecutive term as prime minister. Re-elected to the premiership at the December 2012 general election, Abe was previously prime minister for one year following Koizumi's resignation in September 2006. Articulation of a clear policy vision and a related personal narrative are at the heart of both leaders' success (Table 3).

Junichiro Koizumi won the LDP presidency on his third attempt in April 2001, only after a huge popular vote from grassroots members forced the hands of party bosses (Stockwin, 2008, p. 105). Koizumi used his mastery of television and the popular press to appeal to his party's rank and file above the heads of LDP elders who abhorred his radical neoliberal agenda. He went on to win three national elections by appealing directly to the electorate with the campaign slogan 'Change the LDP, Change Japan'. Koizumi's share of the vote actually strengthened over the course of his time in office (Table 4). His long hair and natural charisma were refreshing in a political system characterised by convention.

Figure 3. Prime minister Koizumi's personal approval ratings April 2001–September 2006 (%). Source: NHK (2015). Retrieved from http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/index.html

Table 4. General election results 2003 and 2005.

	2003		2005	
	SDM Seats	**PR Seats**	**SDM Seats**	**PR Seats**
Liberal Democratic Party	168	69	219	77
Democratic Party of Japan	105	72	52	61
New Komeito	9	25	8	23
Communist Party	0	9	0	9
Social Democratic Party	1	5	1	6

Source: Election Resources (2015). Retrieved from http://www.electionresources.org/jp

By Japanese standards, Koizumi's domestic agenda was radical. Cabinet posts were to be allocated on merit and no longer by faction. Spending on public works was to be slashed, and government borrowing capped. Banks would have to acknowledge the full extent of their bad loans and then sort them out to get the economy moving again. Above all, Koizumi planned to privatise the Japanese postal service, which lay at the heart of the parasitic relationship between Japan's politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups.

Shinzo Abe's first premiership was marred by his indecision on economic reform and by poor party management that led to a series of scandals involving his senior ministers. Ultimately, Abe's leadership was dealt a fatal blow by the LDP's defeat in the House of Councillors election in July 2007. Six weeks later, Abe announced his resignation. But in September 2012, a combination of his own actions, the right circumstances and a bit of luck allowed Abe to regain his party's leadership (Burrett, forthcoming). Poor health was the official reason given for his 2007 resignation. In staging his comeback, Abe's PR team used his recovery to build a narrative of personal drive and discipline in the face of adversity.[4] To prove his newfound vitality, once re-elected LDP president, Abe hit the ground running with a clear set of policy aims. Abe's first premiership had lacked policy focus, but Abe 2.0 made 'Abenomics'—his plan to revive the economy through fiscal stimulus,

monetary easing and structural reforms—his programme showpiece. In focusing on the economy and promising neo-liberal structural reforms, Abe borrowed from the Koizumi playbook. Supported by a much-improved PR operation that includes Koizumi's image guru Isao Iijima, Abe and his economic plan became ever-present on Japanese TV screens. His insistence that a reluctant Bank of Japan reverse deflation with significant quantitative easing, contrasted positively with the incumbent DPJ government's muddled economic strategy.

Abe's bold and theatrical behaviour drew lessons from Koizumi's leadership. In 2005, Koizumi dramatically withdrew the whip from 37 LDP parliamentarians opposed to his privatisation of Japan Post before calling a general election in which he ran his own hand-picked candidates against his former colleagues (Mishima, 2007, p. 734). Koizumi, whose popularity and political authority had been waning prior to the election, was rewarded with a landslide (Figure 3). But Koizumi's victory was less the result of public enthusiasm for privatisation than of support for his strong and decisive leadership. Likewise, Abe's comeback and second term popularity owed more to voters' approval of his bold advocacy of Abenomics than to support for the specifics of his plan.

Concentrating his efforts on reviving the Japanese economy allowed Abe to win back a majority for his government in upper house elections in July 2013. For Abe, this was a personal victory, as it had been on his

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[4] Author's interview with Japan Times journalist, June 2014.

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watch in 2007 that the DPJ had replaced the LDP as the largest party in the House of Councillors. But despite impressive gains in the July 2013 elections, in the upper house Abe still relies on coalition partners, New Komeito, for his majority. Koizumi also governed in coalition with Komeito throughout his premiership.[5] But in neither case was coalition a major constraint on the prime minister. Associated with the Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai, Komeito is a pacifist party relying predominantly on the religious faithful for its votes. Yet, despite its pacifist leanings, Komeito remained in government with Abe after his reinterpretation of Japan's peace constitution to allow for collective self-defence (Burrett, forthcoming).[6] Similarly, Komeito continued in coalition with Koizumi despite his decision to introduce legislation allowing the Self-Defence Forces (Japan's military) to be deployed to Iraq in 2003. In both cases, defence reforms were controversial with the Japanese public (Ishibashi, 2007; Yoshida, 2014). But Koizumi and Abe were able to maintain their coalitions owing to their broader electoral appeal. Throughout their premierships, both were personally more popular than their party, minimising the chances of a serious leadership challenge or backbench rebellion by government MPs.

The examples of Abe and Koizumi show how if

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[5] Koizumi inherited a coalition government in April 2001. He failed to turn his 60 per cent approval rating into a majority for his party in the November 2003 general election and continued to rely on coalition partners. Koizumi finally won a majority for his party in the lower house in the September 2005 general election, but continued to rely on New Komeito for a majority in the upper house.
[6] Article 9 of Japan's constitution bars it from using force to resolve conflicts except in the case of self-defence. In July 2014, the Abe cabinet reinterpreted the constitution to henceforth allow Japan to fight overseas to aide its allies.

spent wisely, leadership capital in one area provides dividends in others. Personal popularity allowed both leaders to challenge the policy status quo within the LDP. Their bold actions reinforced public perceptions of their leadership as decisive, giving them a stronger hand in dealing with intraparty dissent. Koizumi in particular faced strong opposition from within LDP ranks as he attempted to dismantle patronage and pork barrel networks that had maintained the party's power, but constrained its policies, for decades. Koizumi, however, managed to turn this opposition to his advantage. His war against post office privatisation rebels sealed his reputation as the slayer of vested interests, allowing him to leave office at the height of his authority, contrary to the downward trajectory of most premierships (Laing & 't Hart, 2011).

Although Koizumi left office on a high note, did he leave a lasting legacy? Did he exercise leadership or merely hold office? Few leaders achieve as much as they hope or promise. Although evaluations of Koizumi's premiership are generally favourable, there are reasons to question the extent of his accomplishments and the endurance of his legacy (Anderson, 2004; Shimizu, 2005). This conclusion does not suggest that there were not significant achievements. Koizumi left office undefeated at the polls, with strong economic performance underpinning his general election victories. He also energised Japan's dealings with the world, albeit controversially in his support for the U.S.-led 'War on Terror'. Domestically, Koizumi introduced substantial reforms to the state apparatus, which ultimately strengthened his authority over parliament and his own party (Table 5). But facing stiff opposition from within the LDP, Koizumi delayed in embarking on his personal reform agenda until late in his premiership, curtailing his domestic legacy.

Table 5. LCI measure of Junichiro Koizumi over time (2001–2006).

	K1 May 2001	K2 Jan 2004	K3 Sept 2006
S1 01 Political/policy vision	4	4	5
S1 02 Communication skills	5	5	5
S2 03 Personal poll rating	5	4	4
S2 04 Longevity (time in office)	1	4	5
S2 05 (Re)election as party leader (margin)	5	5	5
R1 06 Party polling relative to most recent election result	2	2	2
R1 07 Likely serious challenge at next presidential election	5	5	5
R1 08 Working relations with the bureaucracy	4	4	4
R2 08 Perceived ability to shape party policy platform	3	2	4
R2 09 Perceived parliamentary effectiveness	3	3	4
Total score	37	38	43

Stubbornly resisted by his own party, Koizumi's reforms were all partial and much delayed. In the face of opposition, bold proposals were diluted. Rather than the savings and insurance functions of Japan Post being abolished, they would continue as separate organisations, and privatisation would be delayed to 2017 (*The Economist*, 2006b). But Koizumi began the break up of Japan's 'iron triangle'—big business, the bureaucracy and the LDP—making government a bit more accountable and efficient. In expelling 37 parliamentary rebels who voted against privatisation, and putting up allies to run against them in a snap election in 2005, Koizumi destroyed the old LDP.

Koizumi's achievements in foreign policy were also partial. Koizumi moved to 'normalise' Japan's foreign and security policy. Challenging the limits placed on Japan by its post-war pacifist constitution, he sent refuelling tankers to the Indian Ocean and peacekeeping troops to Iraq (Ishibashi, 2007). He worked with the U.S. to make Japan less dependent on America's military umbrella and shoulder more of the burden of its own defence, but stopped short of amending the constitution to assert Japan's right to participate in collective security (Pekkanen & Krauss, 2005). Despite his foreign and security policy successes, Koizumi marred his international reputation by visiting Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates 14 war criminals along with millions of Japanese war dead (Hiwatari, 2005). His actions not only damaged relations with key trading partners China and South Korea, but also made territorial disputes harder to settle, and hardened opposition to Japan's attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (*The Economist*, 2006a). In short, Koizumi's Yasukuni visits undermined his ambition to make Japan more 'normal'—i.e. ensuring a presence in international political affairs equal to its economic status. In December 2013, Abe's visit as prime minister to the controversial shrine similarly poured cold water on already cool relations with neighbouring states occupied by Japan in World War Two.

External forces limit all prime ministers; in the case of Koizumi, a major constraint was hostility to his reform agenda from members of his own party. Koizumi used his personal popularity to outmanoeuvre his LDP opponents and trump the faction system that had hitherto controlled Japan's prime ministers. He introduced institutional reforms that changed the way authority is accrued to the prime minister's office. Thanks to these reforms, political advancement came to depend more on loyalty to the prime minister than to faction. But battling his party ran down the clock on Koizumi, constraining what he could achieve during his two-term-limit as LDP president.

Koizumi did more than merely hold office. He may not have achieved as much lasting change as transformative prime ministers like Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda, but a number of his reforms live on.

The economic policy of Japan's current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, contains elements of Koizumi's laissez-faire approach, including a commitment to further deregulation to promote growth. Abe has also carried forward Koizumi's ambition to amend constitutional restrictions on collective security. Perhaps most significantly, Koizumi's powerful exercise of leadership changed the image of the prime minister in Japan. After Koizumi's success, Japanese voters began to demand that the prime minister lead policymaking with more force. Some commentators predicted a new era of strong prime ministers (Machidori, 2006; Takenaka, 2006). But Koizumi's immediate successors failed to live up to the expectations raised by his leadership. Koizumi proved a hard act to follow. His strong personal leadership hollowed out his party, leaving it in a state of disarray.

Koizumi paid little attention to building structures within the LDP to allow his revolution to continue beyond his tenure as party president. He failed to build new policy groupings around his neoliberal agenda to replace the traditional LDP *zoku* (policy tribes) that his leadership undermined. A natural loner, he neglected to groom potential protégés to carry forward his reforms. Ultimately, Koizumi's personal leadership traits—especially his willingness to take on vested interests and challenge the status quo—proved more adept at destroying the old than creating the new. He lacked the bargaining skills to build new structures when confronted by opposition from other authoritative actors.

In his second term, Shinzo Abe has clearly learned from Koizumi's mistakes, in particular by paying closer attention to party management than his predecessor. Abe has successfully remade the LDP in his own image, by selecting candidates sharing his right-wing ideology to contest the 2012 general election. The hundred-plus freshmen representatives who rode to power on Abe's coattails in December 2012 have largely remained loyal to the prime minister. Unity within his parliamentary party has allowed Abe to pass controversial security and secrecy legislation at breakneck speed. In achieving constitutional and security reform, Abe has gone further, and faster, than Koizumi.

Abe has also paid closer attention to political appointments than Koizumi, who by temperament tended to act as a lone wolf. During his first term, Abe staffed the prime minister's office and cabinet with parliamentarians to whom he was personally close, giving them roles such as 'Special Advisor to the Prime Minister'. But Abe's friends proved poor lieutenants. Decision-making became bottled-necked, and bitter turf wars ensued, as Abe's inner circle jealously guarded their access to the prime minister (Burrett, forthcoming). A dysfunctional chain of command contributed to Abe's downfall. In his second term, Abe clearly demonstrated greater political skill in making appoint-

ments than during his first premiership. For his second government, Abe was quick to choose Yoshihide Suga as his chief cabinet secretary. His appointment reflects Abe's recognition of Suga's political ability, rather than a personal connection between the two men. Abe made it clear that Suga was the gatekeeper to the Prime Minister's Office. This made Abe's second government much more effective in managing policy, parliament, and public relations, than his first administration. In comparison, Koizumi's tendency for self-reliance limited what he was able to achieve.

Despite running a tighter ship second time around, Abe's policy legacy to date is a mixed picture. Like Koizumi before him, Abe has delayed in introducing economic reforms opposed by vested interests within the LDP. Abe came to office promising massive structural reforms to boost economic growth. To his credit, Abe has tackled some of Japan's most entrenched interest groups. Abe has broken the power of the agricultural cooperatives, bypassing their objections to sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal. The prime minister has also reformed corporate governance with unexpected speed and determination. But labour reform, desperately needed to raise productivity, remains untouched (Harding & Lewis, 2015).

Despite the fanfare, Abenomics has not revived Japan's economy. The BoJ's monetary expansion and asset purchases have pushed the value of the yen down to multi-year lows against the dollar and sparked a stock market rally that ran from just before Abe took office in late 2012 through most of 2015. But, the Japanese economy has performed unevenly, falling into recession in mid-2014 and then swinging between quarters of growth and contraction in 2015. Rather than focusing on badly needed deregulation and structural reforms, Abe spent much of 2015 battling to pass unpopular security legislation. Although voters admire Abe for his strong convictions, few share his obsession with security reform, especially when it comes at the expense of the economy. As was the case with Koizumi before him, Abe's nationalist principles are divisive both at home and abroad. But despite their failings, Koizumi and Abe are the contemporary Japanese prime

ministers to whom all others are compared, and in most cases, found wanting.

6. The LCI in the Japanese Context

When applied to Japanese case studies, two problems arise with the LCI as it is operationalised here. First, biases in the electoral system that benefit larger parties—in particular the LDP—complicate the use of polling data on party support relative to the most recent election result as an indicator of a prime minister's relations with the electorate as leader of his party (Table 3, indicator 06). Disparities in population size between electoral districts, which in some cases is as extreme as four to one, benefits the LDP that tends to do well in smaller, rural constituencies (Kabashima & Steel, 2012; Reed, 2003). Electoral pacts and the fact that many smaller parties lack the means to field candidates in every district, leads to substantial tactical voting in SMD ballots. The impact of tactical voting is seen when comparing the vote share received by each party at the 2014 general election in the SMD and PR ballots (Table 6). When casting their PR ballot, voters are more likely to vote for their true preference, as proportional distribution means seats and votes correlate more closely than in the SMD ballot. For this reason, if applying the LCI to Japanese leaders in the future, scholars may prefer to compare party polling relative to only the PR election results.

Second, using party support data to gauge the prime minister's relations with the public is further complicated by the fact that a party and its leader can have very different standing in the public mind. The LDP dominated government for many decades from 1955, with voters returning the party to power whether or not its leader was personally popular. Partly, this was because policy was driven by the ruling party and its allies in business and the bureaucracy, rather than by the prime minister. Despite a personal approval rating of just 17 per cent, Prime Minister Mori was re-elected in the June 2000 general election, with the LDP receiving 41 per cent of SMD votes and 28 per cent in the PR ballot (Figure 2). Since

Table 6. December 2014 general election results.

	SMD		PR	
	% Vote	Seats	% Vote	Seats
Liberal Democratic Party	48.1	222	33.1	68
Democratic Party of Japan	22.5	38	18.3	35
Japan Innovation Party	8.2	11	15.7	30
New Komeito	1.4	9	13.7	26
Japanese Communist Party	13.3	1	11.4	20
Party for Future Generations	1.8	2	2.7	0
Social Democratic Party	0.8	1	2.5	1
People's Life Party	1.0	2	1.9	0

Source: Election Resources (2015). Retrieved from http://www.electionresources.org/jp

Junichiro Koizumi's dominant leadership changed public expectations of the prime minister, the fortunes of party and leader have become more intertwined. Public assessment of the prime minister and his party, however, continue to be somewhat separate. For most of his premiership Koizumi was considerably more popular than the LDP (NHK, 2015). Koizumi used this situation to his advantage, setting himself up in opposition to his own party, a tactic used successfully by Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair (Hennessy, 2001). Looking at Koizumi's consistently low rating for party support on the LCI creates a misleading picture of his relationship with the electorate (Table 5). A similar problem is observed for Shinzo Abe, who was also more popular in his second term than his party (Table 3) (NHK, 2015).

For the LCI to better fit the Asian context more broadly, the dynastic nature of the region's politics must be taken into consideration. Political families are a feature of politics in India, Thailand, Japan and several other Asian states. Among the nine Japanese leaders analysed in this article, four are either the sons or grandsons of former prime ministers. Thought must be given to how to operationalise the benefits conferred by family networks within the LCI. One-party dominance is another feature of Japanese politics that is common across Asia. When one party dominates the political scene, LCI indices measuring inter-party support levels may be less important to leadership authority than intra-party factional politics.

7. Conclusion

Applying the LCI to Japanese leaders reveals a lack of policy vision and an inability to communicate a clear purpose for seeking power as the underlying causes of short tenure in most cases. Prime ministers lacking the necessary skills to acquire and deploy leadership capital have become more likely to achieve office since changes to the Japanese electoral system in 1994. Electoral reform precipitated the decline of factions within the LDP that had sustained a seniority-based promotion system requiring potential leaders to hone their political skills in a variety of party positions before reaching the premiership. Electoral reform also eventually brought to power three prime ministers from the DPJ. LDP dominance for much of the post-war period deprived most DPJ politicians of more than fleeting ministerial experience. Outside of government, DPJ leaders were unable to develop the networks within the bureaucracy necessary to facilitate effective policy-making once in office. In most cases, poor leadership skills quickly translated into falling public popularity, with negative consequences for the prime ministers' relational and reputational capital. Personal poll ratings of less than 25 per cent were a tipping point from which a leader was unable to return. Ironically, electoral reforms brought to office leaders with poorly developed skills at the same moment as party leadership became a more important factor in determining voter choice at elections.

Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe (second term) managed to sustain power for substantially longer than their counterparts by articulating a coherent personal and policy narrative. Koizumi's leadership capital was enhanced by his charisma and uncommon communication skills. Although Abe worked on his public speaking skills between his first and second governments, he remains a rather underwhelming performer. The lesson here is that the message is more important than the manner in which it is delivered. Koizumi and Abe both also benefited from factors not captured by the LCI. Abe took office after three years of unpopular DPJ rule. Since their election defeat in 2012, the DPJ has been riven with internal disputes (divisions that actually began before the party lost power and were a factor in its defeat), not least over controversial issues such as collective self-defence. In the December 2014 general election, the DPJ won just 73 seats, a result only marginally better than when it lost power in 2012. Abe has been able to exploit the weakness of opposition parties to push controversial reforms such as the 2013 Secrecy Act and the reinterpretation of Article 9, policies that were unthinkable in the political context of his first premiership. Koizumi, in contrast, faced a surging opposition, his attacks on his own party helping the DPJ to win new ground. But despite Koizumi's criticism of his party, both leaders benefited from leading the LDP. Decades of incumbency affords the LDP special leverage over Japan's bureaucracy and with smaller political parties. For the latter, coalition with the LDP offers the most assured route to office.

Koizumi's personal skills were a key factor in sustaining his leadership capital for so long. His dominant behaviour, however, was less suited to delivering lasting change. Abe's reforms have also been partial. Although he has announced hundreds of structural reform initiatives, few have been turned into tangible legislation (Kingston, 2014). Despite their difficulties in achieving their agenda, the conviction politics of Koizumi and Abe undermine the dominant paradigm that strong leadership is the antitheses of Japanese cultural preferences for consensus and conformity.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Appendix

Table A1. Route to power and longevity in office.

Prime Minister	Days in Office	Route to Power
Mori	386	Internal Party Election
Koizumi	1979	Internal Party Election
Abe 1	365	Internal Party Election
Fukuda	364	Internal Party Election
Aso	357	Internal Party Election
Hatoyama	256	General Election
Kan	451	Internal Party Election
Noda	481	Internal Party Election
Abe 2	1070*	General Election

Note: * Until 31 December 2015.

Article

Responsive to the People? Comparing the European Cognitive Maps of Dutch Political Leaders and their Followers

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Abstract
Political leaders are often perceived as unresponsive to the daily concerns of citizens, especially when European integration is concerned. Academic research, however, provides at most mixed evidence for the existence of such a gap. This article tries to shed light on this discrepancy by introducing an alternative measure to study leaders' responsiveness—narrative congruence—and explores the assumption that responsiveness increases leaders' credibility in the eyes of their voters. As narrative congruence is a more intricate measure that captures leaders' and followers' policy preferences and argumentation, it may better capture the gap between their positions and therefore provide a more adequate explanation for citizens' support for their leaders than traditional congruence measures like issue saliency and ideological distance. To provide a first test of this, the technique of cognitive mapping is introduced and used to explore the congruence in beliefs on European integration of four Dutch political leaders and their followers. Although the study finds a significant gap between some leaders and their followers' narratives on Europe, it finds no evidence that this narrative congruence is related to the credibility of these leaders in the eyes of their followers.

1. Introduction

As democratic representatives, political leaders are expected to be responsive and able to relate to their followers' daily concerns (Flinders, 2012; Lijphart, 1999; Reicher, Haslam, & Platow, 2014). After all, elected leaders are given a mandate by citizens to act on their behalf (Manin, 1997). According to democratic theory, political leaders respond to this need for responsiveness among others because of the threat of electoral sanction and moral obligation (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Thomassen, 1994). There is thus an implicit as-

sumption that responsiveness results in public support of party supporters for political leaders, for example in terms of perceived credibility (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Reicher et al., 2014).

While the extent to which leaders should follow and voice citizens' concerns is debated (Thomassen, 1994), surveys show citizens are dissatisfied with the responsiveness of their leaders who are regularly perceived as elitist and technocratic (Hay, 2007; Hendriks, Van der Krieken, Van Zuydam, & Roelands, 2016; Reicher et al., 2014). In the public debate, the gap between political leaders and citizens' positions on the

European Union (EU) is seen as especially pronounced. After decades of 'permissive consensus' in which citizens seemed content to leave European affairs in the hands of their leaders, the current public debate shows signs of a 'dismissive dissensus': European affairs have become highly polarised, Eurosceptic parties have won support, and trust in the EU has declined (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Van den Berg & Van Eijk, 2012). Intriguingly, however, academic studies provide mixed evidence for the existence of a gap between leaders and their followers on European issues (Arnold, Sapir, & Zapryanova, 2012; Carruba, 2001; Lindeboom, 2012; Steenbergen, Edwards, & De Vries, 2007; cf. Dekker & Den Ridder, 2011; Walczak & Van der Brug, 2012). Both in terms of pro/anti-European or left/right ideological orientation as well as issue saliency, studies find a relatively close correspondence between government and citizens preferences. Still, a substantial group of citizens feel unheard by their political leaders (Hendriks et al., 2016).

This article therefore introduces an alternative type of congruence—narrative congruence—to study the responsiveness of political leaders' positions on the EU that might shed light on the discrepancy between citizens' dissatisfaction with their leaders and the relative high congruence found in many studies. In addition, we explore whether congruence indeed coincides with attributed credibility to political leaders. This article thus aims to answer the question whether narrative congruence exists between political leaders and their followers and if this form of congruence fosters leaders' credibility ratings. To answer this question, the technique of cognitive mapping is used. Unlike the more common elite interviews and surveys, this technique allows us to determine traditional congruence measures like issue saliency and ideological distance as well as the overlap in the narratives in which leaders' and followers' positions are rooted. Moreover, in contrast to traditional narrative analyses, cognitive mapping allows the narratives of large groups of citizens to be studied and aggregated (Gaxie, Hubé, & Rowell, 2011; Van Inglegom, 2014).

Empirically this article focuses on Dutch EU politics as a first test of the concept and measure of narrative congruence and its effects on leaders' credibility. Since the Dutch 'no' to the European constitution in 2005, a lack of trust in EU politics has become a prevalent phenomenon for the traditionally pro-European Dutch. Combined with the notion that The Netherlands has one of the most proportional representative political systems in the world—increasing the chance of finding a political leader who is responsive to your beliefs (Golder & Stramsky, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005)—it constitutes a critical case for responsive EU leadership and is therefore interesting for a first probe into a new concept and method. Specifically, in this study the European beliefs of four Dutch political lead-

ers most visible in the debate in the months surrounding the 2014 EP elections are traced: the Liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the Social-Democrat minister of foreign affairs Frans Timmermans and the two main opposition leaders Alexander Pechtold of the pro-European Liberal Democrats and Geert Wilders of the Eurosceptic Freedom Party. A focus on these leaders ensures balance and variety across the political landscape and maximizes what we can learn from this study (Stake, 1995). The 2014 EP elections increased political attention for the EU and situating our study in the months surrounding this event enabled us to source enough speeches in which the four leaders address the issue at stake.

2. Responsive Leadership in a European Setting

In recent decades, Europe has taken centre stage in the public debate in many member states. After decades of 'permissive consensus', the current public debate is characterised by a high degree of polarisation. Increasingly, the domestic political agenda is occupied by European issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Despite attempts of political leaders to depoliticize the public debate, the increasing competences of the EU, competitive party politics, and several crises have pushed the EU centre stage (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). While for decades the 'Europhile' elite has claimed to know what kind of Europe was best for its citizens (Startin & Krouwel, 2013), presently Euro sceptics insist they voice citizens' true concerns. For both normative and empirical reasons, it is thus important to examine the extent to which leaders are responsive to the peoples' preferences in the European domain.

Despite widespread concerns about the gap between citizens and political elites, most empirical studies 'find very little evidence for allegations that political elites are out of step with the masses when it comes to EU policies' (Steenbergen et al., 2007, p.30; cf. Arnold et al., 2012; Dekker & Den Ridder, 2011; Walczak & Van der Brug, 2012). This seems to be the case both in terms of the pro/anti-European positions, left/right ideological leanings as well as the prioritisation of issues. However, within this general pattern, national, partisan, and individual-level variations in the strength of the party/voter connection do exist (Best, Budge, & Mcdonald, 2012; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007): the congruence between leaders and the public is stronger in proportional representative systems. Moreover, the likeliness of voters adopting party elites' positions is increased when the voter is highly attached to the party (Lindeboom, 2012; Ray, 2003). Finally, Carruba (2001) finds that while overall they approximate the public's preferences, elites generally take more extreme positions. The state of the art in academic research is thus all but conclusive about the gap between political elites and their constituents that features so

dominantly in the public debate on Europe. In this paper, we introduce a different way of looking at congruence that may shed light on this discrepancy.

The dominant way to measure leader-follower congruence in academic literature is to establish the overlap in issue saliency and ideological distance (Golder & Stramsky, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Lindeboom, 2012). Overlap in issue saliency concerns the extent to which leaders and voters agree on what issues are most important and pressing and should be prioritized (Verba & Nie, 1972). Ideological distance refers to the extent to which leaders and voters share a position on an ideological scale like the traditional left/right or pro/anti EU scale. Both measures are usually established through large-scale survey research like the Eurobarometer.

These measures, however, are limited in three ways. Firstly, congruence in issue saliency may establish whether leaders and their followers see the same issue as important, but does not indicate whether it is perceived as positive or negative, why it is seen as salient or how it should be solved. Ideological distance does suggest a very broad preferred policy direction but is unable to reveal whether leaders and followers agree on specific measures or why. In addition, the survey-questions used to establish issue saliency and ideological distance have the disadvantage of being formulated top-down by the researcher and not allowing citizens much room to tell their own stories. Moreover, survey questions are often one-dimensional and do not allow for nuanced or ambivalent responses (Schaffer, 2010), nor do they tap into the substantive reasoning and rationale behind people's perceptions on contentious issues (Gaxie et al., 2011; Van Ingelgom, 2014).

In this paper, we introduce a third and more intricate measure of congruence: narrative congruence. This measure captures leaders' and followers' evaluation of the issues they raise, and their preferred direction for solution. In addition, narrative congruence is a more qualitative measure that tracks the arguments and storylines used by leaders and citizens to support their position. As it delves deeper into the way people make sense of the world, this measure potentially offers a more powerful reflection of their European beliefs.

The three forms of congruence are compatible and hierarchically organized in terms of how detailed and far-reaching the meeting of minds is that they measure (see Figure 1). While congruence in issue saliency indicates that there is a shared concern and ideological congruence signals actors' general political leanings, narrative congruence builds on this information and adds knowledge concerning why actors perceive issues as positive or negative, how different issues relate to one another, and specifies actors' preferences on specific directions for solution. The higher leaders climb in this hierarchy of congruence, the more intricate and

complete the overlap with their followers' views will be. Moreover, as democratic theory suggests, this may mean that it is more closely related to the support leaders receive.

Figure 1. Hierarchy of congruence.

In studies on congruence, only limited attention has been paid to its consequences for citizens' support (Esaiasson & Wlezien, 2016), even though the relationship is often implicitly assumed. Public support may entail many different things, like citizens' satisfaction with leaders' actions or confidence in their leadership (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Miller & Listhaug, 1999; Norris, 2011). This study focuses on credibility as an indicator of followers' support because it is most closely related to congruence. Studies show, for instance, that the more leaders voice peoples' thoughts, the more convincing their problem analysis and concern for citizens' views are (cf. Mayne & Hakhverdian, forthcoming). Credibility consists of three dimensions: perceived competence, trustworthiness, and caring (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969). Competence relates to leaders' knowledge and skills: do citizens think they offer the right problem analysis and know what needs to be done (O'Keefe, 1990)? Trustworthiness entails whether voters believe leaders are honest and reliable (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Caring means that leaders are empathetic towards their voters' problems, and that they take their interests at heart (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). Of the three dimensions, caring in particular seems relevant, as it deals specifically with the question of whether voters feel their leaders relate to their concerns.

3. Methods

The different levels of congruence between leaders' and citizens' narratives of Europe will be established using the technique of cognitive mapping, while citizens' support for the party leaders is determined through survey-research.

3.1. Cognitive Mapping

Cognitive mapping is used in political science, social psychology and organizational studies to uncover peoples' beliefs (Axelrod, 1976; Bougon, Weick, & Brink-

horst, 1977; Van Esch, 2014; Young & Schafer, 1998). Cognitive maps consist of concepts and the causal and utility relationships between them that together make up an actor's belief system. Causal relations refer to the relationship between cause and effect or means and ends, while utility relations determine whether a concept is valued positively or negatively in a normative sense. When these concepts and relations are represented graphically, the concepts are depicted as points and the relations as arrows (see Figure 2).[1]

The cognitive maps of Dutch citizens were derived from a sample of 300 adults, enlisted randomly via a commercial polling agency. The maps were elicited directly via the web application DART, from two weeks prior to the European Parliament elections of May 2014 until a week after. A freehand approach was used as this is the most efficient and valid way (Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). Respondents were first asked to select seven out of a list of 50 pre-defined concepts that in a pilot were found to be associated with European integration by Dutch citizens and experts. Subse-

quently, respondents drew arrows between the concepts to indicate how, in their eyes, these concepts were linked. The direction of the arrow indicates the direction of the causal effect (cause → effect) while the colour of the arrow indicates whether the effect is deemed to be positive (green) or negative (red). This allowed respondents a choice of nearly 5000 different relations to compose their cognitive map from. In addition, respondents were asked to complete a short survey about their demographic characteristics and political behaviour. Respondents' answers concerning the party they intended to vote for in the 2014 EP elections were used to aggregate their individual cognitive maps into a collective map of the followers of the respective party leader. This focus on party supporters results from our interest in the responsiveness of political leaders to their constituents' views.

The cognitive maps of the Dutch national political leaders are based on three public speeches or interviews concerning Europe held between 03-11-2012 and 02-09-2014. Only speeches that addressed the EU specifically and substantially were selected until enough data was gathered to draw a cognitive map from.[2]

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[1] Figures 2–5 show an excerpt of the leaders' maps using only the concepts also present in the maps of their followers, indicating the overlapping relations in dark-grey arrows. Only the most salient relations from the voters' map are shown in light-grey arrows with the exact limit dependent on the size of the map.

[2] For the leader of the Social-Democrat party, Diederik Samsom, not enough data was available. For Pechtold, the party bureau was contacted to obtain enough speeches.

Figure 2. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Pechtold and D66 voters. Source: Pechtold (2012, 2014a, 2014b).

The selection thus represents the limited available data from the period surrounding the 2014 EP elections. To create the cognitive maps, causal and utility relationships alluded to by leaders are manually coded from the selected texts, the coding was transparently and digitally documented in CM software MAPS.[3] To make comparison between the leaders' and citizens' maps possible, concepts in the maps of the leaders were standardised using the same 50 pre-defined concepts presented to the citizens (Laukkanen & Wang, 2015). The standardisation results in an abstraction of the leaders' views that ensures that the map is a reflection of their more general view of European integration. An additional 32 concepts were identified in the speeches of the leaders that represented distinctly different issues than those presented to their constituents. To draw the maps, network software Gephi was used (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009). All in all, this resulted in maps of 83 to 180 relations per leader.

Cognitive maps can be analysed in various ways. The relative strength of ideas is established by their saliency (S)—the frequency with which they are mentioned. The more salient a relation, the larger it appears in the map (see Figure 2). In addition, scholars may study the 'consequent paths' feeding out of a concept into other concepts as well as the value of these relations (positive, negative, non-existent).[4] These analyses inform leaders' scores on the three different forms of congruence. Congruence in issue saliency was measured by establishing the overlap of the concepts used by the leaders and voters and the overlap in how salient these concepts were in their maps. The average of these two is taken as the measure of issue saliency. With regard to ideological distance, the paper focuses on the pro/anti EU dimension. To calculate this measure, we categorised all concepts as pro-European (for instance: the Euro), anti-European (splitting up the EU) or EU-neutral (political stability), and as generally positive (social justice), negative (recession) and neutral (debate).[5] The pro/anti EU scale was constructed by at-

tributing one point to the scale when a causal relation implied a positive reference to the EU and deducting one point when a causal relation implied a negative reference to the EU. Finally, this score was divided through the total number of times European concepts were connected to come up with a comparative measure that ranges from -1 to 1. The difference between the scores of the leaders and followers results in the ideological distance. The narrative congruence between the leaders and their followers is established by qualitatively comparing leaders' and followers' maps. To structure this analysis, we followed four steps. Firstly, we established how many direct relations between two concepts are identical in the leaders' and follows' map. In addition, salient (indirect) relations linking multiple concepts were compared to see if leaders and followers arrive at similar conclusions. The third step involved a search for directly contradicting arguments. Finally, by analysing the utility relations, we established the overlap in how leaders and followers evaluated the shared concepts in their maps. Although quantification cannot capture the full meaning of this analysis and the indirect relations are only studied qualitatively, some frequencies are provided as a tentative proxy for the outcome of this analysis. As the technique of cognitive mapping has not been used to measure congruence before, for all measures, leaders' ranking is used to determine what scores are interpreted as high or low.

3.2. Measuring Support through Survey Research

The credibility of Pechtold, Rutte, Timmermans and Wilders was derived from an existing survey on credible political leadership that was administered by CenterData to the LISS panel (Van Zuydam, 2014). This panel provides a representative sample of the Dutch population. In the survey, 3295 respondents were asked to evaluate all cabinet ministers of cabinet Rutte II and parliamentary party leaders active at the same time. The questionnaire was administered three times: in August 2013, January 2014, and June 2014. The response rate was respectively 78.5, 82.2 and 81.5 percent. Four leaders were randomly selected for each respondent to evaluate. Cross referencing the leaders evaluated by the respondents with their vote in the 2014 European elections resulted in a subset of 36 to 56 evaluations for each of the four leaders in this study.

We measured the credibility of the leaders on three dimensions: their perceived competence, trustworthiness, and caring in the eyes of their (potential) voters. For each leader they professed to know, respondents were presented six Likert items (6-point with in addition a "don't know" answer); two for each credibility dimension. The responses on these items in the three waves were integrated, which resulted in an average overall score for each respondent on each of the six items. Subsequently, the answers for each dimension

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[3] For the CM coding rules, see Wrightson (1976). All texts were double coded by two of the authors.

[4] The value of a relationship (positive, negative, non-existent) is indicated by a +, - or 0. Only negative saliency scores and those above 1 are noted in Figures 2–5. Concepts linked via a positive consequent path to a positively valued concept, or via a negative consequent path to a negative concept are positive. Concepts positively feeding into a negative concept, or negatively feeding into a positive concept are negative.

[5] Two coders (including one of the authors) categorized the 50 pre-set concepts independently in the realm of another study. Two of the authors independently coded the 32 additional concepts from the leaders' maps. Overall, the intercoder reliability of the European/Anti-European and Positive/Negative dimensions was respectively 0,96 and 0,71 (Cohen's Kappa) representing an excellent and good intercoder reliability (Gwet, 2012).

were combined into an additive scale, resulting in three indices for each leader: a competence, trustworthiness, and caring index. Chronbach's α based on the aggregative, overall score for each studied leader and each index—in total thus 12 indices—was in most cases between 0.8, and 0.96. Only twice was Chronbach's α lower at 0.786 and 0.794. In addition, a total credibility index was calculated if valid responses on at least four of the six items were available. Chronbach's α for this scale ranged between 0.914 and 0.962 for all four leaders. These indices were used to establish leaders' credibility according to citizens.

4. Congruence

4.1. Issue Saliency and Ideological Distance

The cognitive maps of Alexander Pechtold and his followers scored highest in terms of issue saliency congruence. Of the 39 concepts used by Pechtold, 28 are also present in the map of the supporters of his party. In 57 percent of these cases, they also agree on the relative saliency (in terms of relative rank) of the issues (see Table 1). This agreement covers key concepts like European integration, the common European interest and democracy. D66 voters are, however, much more concerned about economic political stability, economic growth, freedom and peace than Pechtold, who rates free trade as more salient. The beliefs of Mark Rutte are slightly less representative of his supporters' at an overlap of 26 issues. This amounts to 68 percent congruence, but does not include issues salient to his voters like the Euro, labour-migration or human rights. Their mutual agreement on the relative saliency of the shared concerns is only 54 percent and also predominantly involves low-saliency concepts.

Geert Wilders ranks third with a concept overlap of 64 percent of his map. This congruence includes salient concepts to his followers like recession, the Dutch interest, having the Euro and the Dutch exit from the EU.

The overlap in issue saliency is, however, only 50 percent and includes only low ranking concepts. Former minister of Foreign Affairs, Timmermans, has the lowest score in issue saliency overlap: despite the high number of concepts (58) in his map, the concept overlap is only 50 percent. In terms of relative saliency Timmermans' speech-acts are also the least representative at a score of 36 percent. While Timmermans is more concerned with solidarity, European identity and the status of the EU in the world, his voters stress issues like economic growth, peace, social security, equality and political stability.

The leaders and their followers also differ considerably on their evaluation of the EU measured in terms of ideological distance (see Table 2). Although the leaders and their followers agree on whether they are pro- or anti-European, in all instances the leaders hold stronger views. Even Rutte, who is closest to his voters with a difference of 0.15, is more positive than his followers. Pechtold's score is 0.23 more positive than his voters and Timmerman's score exceeds his followers' by almost double that. The most extreme difference is found for Wilders, who is the only leader with a clear anti-EU perspective, at a hefty 0.84 points more anti-European than his followers.

Overall, these findings show that congruence in terms of issue saliency for these leaders and followers is at a reasonable level and only dips below 50 percent for Timmermans. The scores on ideological distance corroborate the conclusions of previous studies as they reveal similar ideological leanings between leaders and followers with the leaders taking more—and sometimes far more—extreme positions (Carruba, 2001). However, moving up in the hierarchy of congruence also reveals a declining level of congruence. This raises the question whether studying the narratives underlying leaders and followers' positions may reveal further dissonance and reflect the feeling of disjunction reported by Dutch voters.

Table 1. Issue saliency congruence (score and rank).

Leader	Issue Saliency / Concept overlap (% of leader's map)	Saliency Overlap (% in relative rank)	Average
Pechtold-D66	72 (1)	57 (1)	64.5 (1)
Rutte-VVD	68 (2)	54 (2)	60.0 (2)
Wilders-PVV	64 (3)	50 (3)	57.0 (3)
Timmermans-PvdA	50 (4)	36 (4)	42.0 (4)

Table 2. Ideological distance (score and rank).

	Leader	Followers	Ideological Distance
Rutte-VVD	0,69	0,54	0,15 (1)
Pechtold-D66	0,79	0,56	0,23 (2)
Timmermans-PvdA	0,9	0,46	0,44 (3)
Wilders-PVV	-0,84	-0,0049	0,84 (4)

4.2. Narrative Congruence

Reviewing the cognitive maps in a qualitative and holistic manner by looking at the causal and utility relations, reveals that the narrative congruence between Pechtold and the D66 voters is the highest amongst our set of leaders (Table 3). Of the 57 unique direct relations between concepts, twelve are also present in his followers' map, whereby the positive links between European integration, the common European interest and prosperity as well as between free-trade, prosperity, democracy and voice are the most salient to Pechtold (Figure 2). Moreover, agreement exists on the positive effect of European integration on peace and that free-trade is in the common European interest, arguments that are salient in the mind of the D66 voters. It is therefore clear that both Pechtold and his followers are principled pro-Europeans for many of the same reasons. The D66 voters, however, also support the EU because it fosters political stability, freedom, the protection of human rights and has led to the establishment of the euro. In Pechtold's mind, these effects are also positively but only indirectly associated with the EU. Moreover, when taking into account the indirect relations in the maps, more similarities appear. Firstly, Pechtold states that by fostering free trade the EU not only promotes economic growth, but also peace, and employment and thereby public support for the EU. His supporters agree with this positive evaluation of free trade for similar reasons, with part of the effects being mediated by the existence of the Euro which in their eyes provides a strong argument in favour of European integration, as it fosters free trade, freedom, and economic growth.

There is, however, one marked contradiction between Pechtold's and his followers' narrative on Europe: their evaluation of the relationship between European integration and democracy. While the D66 voters feel Europe contributes positively to democracy, Pechtold identifies a negative relationship. Democracy is a positive value and salient concern for both Pechtold and his supporters: they agree that democracy

provides citizens with the opportunity to participate and voice their preferences, and while Pechtold feels that having a voice in politics brings equality, prosperity and is in peoples' interest, his followers positively relate democracy to political stability and free trade. The contradiction in their belief of how the EU affects democracy is therefore an important one, although Pechtold and his voters agree that increasing the EU's powers will enhance democracy.

Finally, reviewing the normative dimension of the narratives by analysing the utility statements of Pechtold and the D66 followers, reveals an overlap of 82 percent in their evaluation of shared concepts. Overall, the cognitive map of Pechtold thus shows a reasonable level of narrative congruence with the map of his followers.

The maps of Rutte and his followers contain eight identical relations (Figure 3). Firstly, their mild support of European integration relies in part on their shared belief that European integration serves both the Dutch and the common European interest. Moreover, Rutte believes that the EU stimulates free trade, which positively affects economic growth, which is in the common European interest and ultimately promotes prosperity. This exact line of reasoning is found in the narrative of the VVD voters, although it is less salient to them. Moreover, both maps contain the argument that recession has a negative effect on prosperity and the liberal idea that freedom is in the best interest of The Netherlands. The most noticeable difference is that Rutte makes no mention of the Euro while this is one of the most salient concepts in the mind of the VVD voters. They are ambiguous about its value, however, as they consider the Euro to positively contribute to economic growth, but to have an overall negative effect on prosperity. In contrast to Rutte, their overall assessment of the EU on prosperity is thereby negative. The one direct contradiction in the map of Rutte and his followers also concerns the economic effects of the EU and lies in the fact that Rutte feels European integration has no effect on financial stability, while his voters feel it has a positive effect.

Table 3. Narrative congruence (score and rank).

Narrative Congruence Leader	Direct relation overlap	Direct relation contradiction	Evaluation overlap (% of shared concepts)	Overall
Pechtold-D66	12/57 (1)	1/57 (2)	82 (1)	4 (1)
Rutte-VVD	8/99 (3)	1/99 (1)	73 (3)	7 (2)
Wilders-PVV	8/81 (2)	3/81 (4)	79 (2)	8 (3)
Timmermans-PvdA	7/130 (4)	3/130 (3)	69 (4)	11 (4)

Figure 3. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Rutte and VVD voters. Source: Rutte (2013, 2014a, 2014b).

Overall, the VVD voters also identify much more non-economic benefits of Europe than their leader, such as: equality, social cohesion, political stability and democracy.

A further indirect similarity in argumentation relates to the type of Europe Rutte and his followers envision. In his speeches, Rutte speaks abundantly about subsidiarity which he positively associates with innovation, free trade, efficiency and employment. The centrality of this concept in his map indicates that Rutte favours a strong autonomous role for the member states and generally objects to giving Europe more powers. His supporters think a federal Europe would enhance political stability and social cohesion, but overall also favour an intergovernmental Europe. They associate European integration predominantly with the concept 'Europe of the states' which they feel is strongly in the European interest, and they identify drawbacks to European leadership and an increase in European powers.

In terms of the normative evaluation of the shared issues in their maps, Rutte and his followers value 73 percent of the concepts the same. This congruence concerns concepts that are very salient to the voters, and contributes to Rutte's scores on narrative congruence. Overall his score is thereby considerable but still substantially lower than Pechtold's.

Wilders' narrative congruence with his followers is similar and only slightly lower than that of Rutte. Of the 81 unique direct relations in his map, eight are also present in the map of his supporters. Reflecting their shared Eurosceptic attitude these relations include the argument that European integration is against the

Dutch interest as it leads to a loss of sovereignty, democracy, and political stability as well as that national pride is in the Dutch interest (Figure 4). The PVV supporters also identify several positive consequences of the EU, one being that it reduces poverty. Yet overall they share their party leader's negative assessment of the EU and agree that leaving the Union (Nexit) would serve the Dutch interest. While Wilders feels a Nexit would stimulate economic growth and employment, his supporters argue it would counter the recession and increase Dutch sovereignty. Some PVV voters fear, however, that leaving the EU could lower Dutch national pride and increase poverty. Finally, the PVV leader and his followers also share the idea that the Euro is not in the common European interest as it increases poverty and induces the provision of aid to other states. However, while Wilders only identifies negative effects of the introduction of the Euro, his supporters also see some benefits as, in their mind, it stimulates free trade and thereby economic growth. Overall Wilders and his followers share a negative evaluation of the Euro, and wish the Dutch would have retained their national currency. While Wilders feels this would have increased the Dutch national sense of pride, his followers argue it would have safeguarded financial stability.

Apart from the eight overlapping relations, the maps of Wilders and his followers contain three contrasting claims. Firstly, while Wilders denies a relationship exists between European integration and peace, his supporters argue the EU did foster peace. In addition, a direct contradiction exists between Wilders' argument that European integration has contributed to

Figure 4. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Wilders and PVV voters. Source: Wilders (2013, 2014a, 2014b).

the recession and his followers' positive assessment of the EU's effect. Finally, while the PVV supporters feel the EU is neither in their own nor the Dutch interest, some feel it does serve the common European interest whereas Wilders is adamant that it does not. However, since all of these concepts and relations are not very salient to either map, the differences are relatively inconsequential for the broader narrative congruence.

Further evidence of a reasonable level of narrative congruence is provided by the relatively high overlap (79 percent) in how Wilders and his followers evaluate the concepts they share. So, although Wilders focusses more on the issue of sovereignty and democracy, and his supporters take a predominantly economic view—in terms of narrative—their views of Europe still show a reasonable alignment.

Finally, there is a stark difference in Timmerman's narrative on Europe and that of his supporters. Firstly, of the 130 unique relations in his map only seven find an exact match in the map of the PvdA voters, while in three instances a direct contradiction exists (Figure 5). Amongst the seven overlapping relations are the arguments that European integration fosters peace, the protection of human rights and equality, as well as increases the powers of the EU. However, while Timmermans feels the EU fosters economic growth his supporters are ambiguous about the effects of European integration on economic growth. They do agree with their leader that free trade leads to economic growth, but in contrast to Timmermans do not associate free trade with European integration in any way.

Furthermore, Timmermans also sees positive associations between the EU and social security, political stability, freedom, and the opportunity for people to voice their concerns whereas his supporters do not.

What broadens the divide even further is that the PvdA voters in our sample were very concerned about the Euro, which in their eyes had a positive impact on economic growth and efficiency but a negative effect on social justice, free trade, freedom, and sovereignty. Timmermans, however, makes no mention of the Euro. Timmermans and his followers do agree, however, that (more) European integration and an increased status in the world would promote financial stability and security. Additional differences result from Timmermans' strong association of European integration with solidarity. In his view solidarity fosters European integration and is in the common European and Dutch national interest. Solidarity also informs the formation of a European identity, increases financial stability and Europe's status in the world, which in turn fosters political stability and security. In contrast, the PvdA voters in our sample mention solidarity only once, and feel European integration has in fact reduced solidarity. Finally, the considerable divergence in Timmermans and his followers' narrative on Europe integration is illustrated by the fact that they do not share his strong belief that the EU is a major contributor to the common European and Dutch national interest.

The differences in argumentation already signals a stronger divergence in how Timmermans and his supporters value the topics they both discuss compared to

Figure 5. Combined excerpt from the cognitive map of Timmermans and PvdA voters. Source: Timmermans (2013, 2014a, 2014b).

other leaders. Moreover, the differences include several issues that are salient in the minds of the PvdA voters like social security, protection of human rights, equality and free trade. Thereby the overlap between the European narratives of Timmermans and his followers show the most considerable differences in this study.

Looking at the narrative congruence for all leaders, it stands out that the direct overlap in relations is low. However, at the same time these leaders also hardly directly contradict their followers. Looking beyond the direct causal relations, our analysis shows that by displaying a holistic image of their views a more in-depth comparison between leaders and voters is possible. The analysis reveals for instance that Pechtold and his followers are staunch advocates of European integration because of its positive economic effects but that they disagree about its consequences for democracy. Rutte and his followers also agree that the EU improves the Dutch economy, but favour a Europe of the states and disagree on the role of the Euro. For Wilders, his stronger opposition to the EU than that of his followers was also traced back to the fact that the PVV voters identify several positive effects of the EU and Euro where Wilders sees none. For Timmermans, the source of the divergence between his narrative and that of his followers emerges from their different views on the effects of European integration on economic growth and

free trade, and the role of solidarity. Finally, the analysis suggests that convergence in argumentation fosters alignment in terms of normative worldview.

4.3. Credibility

Turning to the credibility of the four leaders in the eyes of their supporters, our analysis reveals that Timmermans' average perceived competence, trustworthiness, and caring score ranges between 9.46 and 10.16, ranking him first on all three dimensions. Consequently, his credibility ratings can be considered to be high to very high. This high standing includes the caring dimension which means that Timmermans is considered to connect especially well with his party's supporters' concerns and ideas. Rutte's attributed scores on the three dimensions range between 8.22 and 9.21 (Table 4), a high score. Moreover, his perceived caring is also relatively high according to his voters, meaning they feel Rutte empathizes with their concerns.

In Pechtold's case, the scores awarded to his competence, trustworthiness, and caring range between 7.55 and 9.31. While he is thus attributed less credibility than Timmermans and Rutte, his credibility is still medium to high. A closer look at Pechtold's evaluations reveals that his perceived caring scores lowest of the three dimensions, meaning that his party's supporters are not fully convinced that he understands their concerns and ideas.

Table 4. Perceived credibility of the leaders (in score and rank).

	Competence		Trustworthiness		Caring		Overall credibility	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Timmermans	10,16 (1)	2,04	9,67 (1)	2,14	9,46 (1)	2,48	28,24 (1)	6,8
Rutte	9,21 (3)	2,24	8,44 (3)	2,7	8,22 (2)	2,53	25,66 (2)	7,15
Pechtold	9,31 (2)	2,39	8,72 (2)	2,24	7,55 (3)	2,67	24,72 (3)	7,1
Wilders	7,63 (4)	3,31	7,02 (4)	3,59	6,99 (4)	3,65	21,32 (4)	10,05

Note: Credibility dimensions range between 2 and 12, total credibility between 4 and 36.

Table 5. Summary of all the scores on congruence and credibility (in rank).

	Issue Saliency	Ideological distance	Narrative congruence	Overall congruence	Overall Credibility
Pechtold-D66	1	2	1	1	3
Rutte-VVD	2	1	2	2	2
Wilders-PVV	3	4	3	3	4
Timmermans-PvdA	4	3	4	4	1

Wilders' credibility, finally, is also medium, as the average scores on the three credibility dimensions range between 6.99 and 7.63. In particular, his followers judge his perceived caring as relatively low. Consequently, it can be argued that Wilders is considered to only moderately relate to his party's supporters concerns and ideas.

5. Conclusions

This article started out by noting that academic studies find, at most, mixed evidence for the perceived gap between leaders' and citizens' views on Europe that features so prominently in the public debate. Using the technique of cognitive mapping with its focus on the narrative underlying citizens' and leaders' positions, this study finds evidence of the existence of such a gap in the case of four Dutch leaders. While in terms of issue saliency the congruence is mixed and ranges between 42 to 64.5 percent of leaders' cognitive maps, the ideological distance between Timmermans and especially Wilders and their respective voters is considerable. Finally, the narrative congruence is far from complete but only in the case of Timmermans and his followers a true disconnect in their stories of Europe exists. This shows that the hierarchy of congruence does indeed hold: moving up the hierarchy reveals more evidence of a gap between leaders and voters. More importantly, narrative congruence reveals the overlap and differences in the argumentation behind leaders' and voters' score on issue saliency and ideological distance, and thereby informs us why a gap between leaders' and followers' assessment of the EU exists, or not.

In contrast, the study finds no support for the commonplace assumption that by being responsive to the will of the people, leaders will be seen as more credible by their followers. Particularly in the case of

Timmermans, who is seen as the most credible and caring by his party's supporters, his low scores on all three forms of congruence are striking (Table 5). The scores for Pechtold show a similar lack of impact of congruence on credibility as his speech-acts were most representative of the views of his voters, but his perceived credibility and especially caring was lower than expected. For Wilders the discrepancy is smaller, as he showed a considerable lack in congruence for issue saliency and ideological distance and a moderate narrative congruence, and his credibility is seen to be low. Only for Rutte the congruence scores do line up with his perceived credibility. Overall, however, none of the measures of congruence aligns plausibly with leaders' credibility in this study. Even in terms of caring, the sub-dimension of credibility that is theoretically linked most clearly with congruence, the scores do not line up.

This study also inspires some broader conclusions. Firstly, the study indicates that the technique of cognitive mapping, and especially the narratives it unveils, provides an interesting complement to the methodological tool-box of scholars interested in responsive leadership. The measure offers valuable additional insight in the normative evaluation of policy goals and instruments as well as into the argumentation behind leaders' and followers' position on contested issues like European integration. Secondly, although the lack of evidence for a connection between congruence and credibility is remarkable in light of commonplace assumptions in the literature, this article only includes a limited number of cases and respondents. Moreover, future research should keep in mind that while nowadays European integration is a very salient subject in the public debate, voters may have very different things on their mind and develop issue-specific measures for rating the credibility of political leaders. Reflecting on the remarkable support for Timmermans, for instance, raises the question of his position on oth-

er issues but also on the role of non-cognitive factors in assessing leaders' credibility.

All in all, further study is needed to establish to what extent the findings in this article hold in general. Nonetheless, it does show that narrative congruence and the technique of cognitive mapping offer a valuable and viable way to measure the responsiveness of political leaders to the concerns of their followers. Moreover, in a timeframe in which voicing the will of the people is often seen as a prime commodity for political leaders, our findings—although tentative—may be a timely reminder that leadership is not only about reflecting the will of the people. It is also about taking the lead and guiding your followers into directions unknown. The case of Timmermans may indicate that in gaining the support of the people, this may be as much the missing link in European leadership as responsiveness.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Between Potential, Performance and Prospect: Revisiting the Political Leadership of the EU Commission President

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Abstract
This contribution argues that although the latest EU treaties formalized the Commission presidency to substantial degree, it remains a constitutionally weak office for the provision of political leadership. The capacity to lead thus still strongly depends on the individual incumbent. As a first step, the article examines the legal-procedural structure of the office before and after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Secondly, it analyzes the political leadership performance of the Commission president José Barroso in comparison with his predecessor Jacques Delors. In bridging formal institutional rules with concrete performances this article contributes to the understanding of the relationship between structure and agency in international institutions as well as to the growing literature on political leadership in the European Union.

Issue
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1. Introduction

The president of the European Commission has always played a key role in the political system of the European Union (EU) and the larger process of European integration (Spence, 2006, p. 27). However, while "the incumbent is not able to fulfill the manifold functions attributed to him without exercising *political* leadership, [the institutional structure of the, H.M.] presidency is not designed to exercise such leadership" (Drake, 2000, p. 11; Kassim, 2013a, p. 1; Kassim et al., 2013, pp. 156, 160, 178; Tömmel, 2013, p. 789). In fact, it has ever since been an institutionally weak office. Nonetheless, scholars have observed a "strengthening of the Presidency since 2005" especially inside the Commission and that "the powers of the presidency have…come to match the importance of the office" (Kassim, 2013a, p. 3; Kassim, 2013b, p. 1; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 152). The presidency thus seems to be more powerful institutionally than ever before in European

integration. In both acknowledging and qualifying this academic enthusiasm, the paper's aims are twofold.

First, it determines to what extent the institutional position of the office did actually change after the latest EU Treaty, namely the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. In this regard, the analysis reveals that the office's strong formalization inside the Commission had only very limited effects on the office's political power vis-à-vis other EU institutions, but was in fact an attempt to bring the office in line with increased institutional constraints. As a second step, the paper substantiates this claim by analyzing the leadership performance of José Barroso in comparison to his famous predecessor Jacques Delors through one of the office's key demands, the provision of public leadership in the European public spheres. The paper draws on theories of politicization of international organizations, which assume that the public visibility of an office increases alongside its institutional strengthening. Its analysis demonstrates that the office's latest formalization did not substantially increase the presi-

dent's political role and authority at the European level (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, pp. 149-150; Rauh & Zürn, 2014, p. 126; Zürn, 2013, pp. 19, 32).

2. The European Commission Presidency: What Kind of Leadership Potential?

Political leadership "is an essentially inter-personal process…between the leader (or leaders) and a set of followers within a particular group context", in which the leader obtains greater attention and influence, but only if followers let them do so (Ahlquist & Levi, 2011, p. 5; Elgie, 2015, p. 26; Keohane, 2010, p. 53). Understood as this reciprocal-dynamic interaction, then, political leadership in executive offices does not only depend on the institutional *structure* of the office (positional leadership), but equally involves the incumbent's *agency* to lead (behavioral leadership) (Elgie, 2015, p. 27; Helms, 2005, pp. 19-20; Helms, 2016, p. 6). Regarding this agency-structure duality, scholars argued that "the more the power is concentrated in the hands of an individual leader (*structure*), the greater the influence of that leader's personality and preferences (*agency*)" (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 140; Elgie, 1995, p. 204).

However, the opposite is also equally true. Applying the agency-structure duality to the supranational level of the European Union, this article argues that the weaker the institutional structure of an office, here the Commission presidency, the more the provision of political leadership by its incumbents depends on their personal agency. In this sense, the argument does not simply "recogniz[e] the importance of individuals" in international relations, but paradoxically still holds them paramount when it comes to political leadership in the European Union (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 145; Helms, 2016, p. 5; Ross, 1995, p. 27; Spence, 2006, p. 27).

2.1. Presidential Leadership Functions

In accordance with the EU Commission's main functions (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/1), its president aims to fulfill three concrete leadership demands: *agenda-setting leadership*, *mediative-institutional leadership* and *public leadership* (Cini, 1996, pp. 36-37; Curtin, 2009, pp. 62-63; Endo, 1999, pp. 26, 63-64; Tömmel, 2013, p. 790; Wille, 2013, pp. 61, 64; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 164; Peterson, 1999, p. 48). Combining these three distinct functions, active political leadership in supranational organizations is understood as the capacity "to attempt and succeed in going beyond institutional constraints, thereby expanding and creating resources and opportunities" in order to influence and achieve mutually desired, publicly supported political goals over a certain period of time (Endo, 1999, pp. 26, 28; Greenstein, 1992, p. 109; Tömmel, 2013, p. 790; Peterson, 1999, p. 48). Successful Commission presi-

dents thus strategically transfer political ambitions of Pan-European scope into consensual agendas (*agenda-setting leadership*). These can then be effectively mediated through the intra- and inter-institutional arenas of decision-making at the European level (*meditative-institutional leadership*) and gain support among European public spheres (*public leadership*).

According to the Rome Treaty, the Commission "shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end" (EUR-Lex, 1957, Art. 155; EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/1). As its first representative, the Commission president has here always sought to provide political guidance and formulate the strategic goals of the Commission and the union more broadly (Curtin, 2009, p. 91; Peterson, 1999, p. 47). Political agenda-setting means to make choices "over the relative salience of individual dossiers, judgments as to their relative merits, efforts to get proposals into a shape in which they can be negotiated and…assess[ed] of their acceptability by the Council [and the Parliament, H.M.]" (Curtin, 2009, p. 74; Pollack, 1997, p. 102; Princen, 2009, p. 19). In seeking to ensure "policy expertise and institutional persistence", Commission presidents strategically invest in and prioritize the political agendas of the Commission in conjunction with the College of Commissioners, the European Council and Parliament more broadly (Kassim, 2013a, p. 14; Peterson, 1999, p. 48; Pollack, 1997, pp. 102, 121). While the Rome Treaty left many "unknown or 'grey' areas", much depended on the presidents and their College "to prioritize the issues and thus clarify the future agendas of the Community" (Endo, 1999, p. 38).

The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties assigned this agenda-setting function to the president in a more official fashion: "The Commission shall work under the political guidance of its president…" (EUR-Lex, 1992/2002, Art. 219/217). Taking into account the Commission's right of initiative within the EU institutional framework, the treaties clearly enhanced the president's potential to set political agendas and provide "policy leadership" (Kassim, Connolly, Dehousse, Rozenberg, & Bendjaballah, 2016, p. 7). However, while the Lisbon Treaty reinvigorated the president's pre-eminence vis-à-vis commissioners, it left out the small but significant word "political". It states: "The President shall lay down guidelines within which the Commission is to work" (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/6(a)). Whereas the office's managerial functions were repeated—to "decide on the internal organization of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body" (EUR-Lex, 2002, Art. 217/1, 2007, Art. 9D/6(b))—its political function has again grown vague. Therefore, although the demand to provide political *agenda-setting leadership* has been essential to the Commission presidency throughout the process of European integration, the Lisbon Treaty still leaves room for multiple interpretations.

The European Union is a polycentric system in which the Commission presidency holds the key intermediary position. Its incumbent is the only actor who participates equally in all three major arenas of policy formulation and decision-making as a member and first representative of the College of Commissioners, the European Council (even without voting rights), and through regular participation in plenary sessions of the European Parliament. No other individual political position can so self-evidently move across of all these three arenas. Therefore, it is not only essential for the incumbent to invest in consensus-building to meet his/her leadership potential; the office itself plays a central mediating role in the EU's inter-institutional framework (Cini, 2005, p. 7; Endo, 1999, p. 37; Peterson, 1999, p. 48). In other words, convincing member states and the Parliament's political groups of a certain agenda is both process and substance of successful leadership by Commission presidents. Although the treaties only indirectly provide for the mediative function (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/1 + 9D/6 (a-c), 9B/2), the institutional structure shows that such leadership is at the core of the office (Endo, 1999, p. 37).

To help build compromises in the three different EU arenas, the president does not only need to express to other players *what* needs to be done but, more importantly, *how* it can be done. For this the president requires administrative-procedural and technocratic expertise to provide solutions at the legal-procedural level (Curtin, 2009, pp. 61, 99). The Lisbon Treaty, and the Nice Treaty before it, vests the president with the previously mentioned power over the Commission (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/6 (b)). However, administrative-procedural expertise does not just consist of effectively running an organization. It also includes perspectives on (re-)organizing administrative processes, thus attempting "to expand institutional resources [and] lifting institutional constraints" (Endo, 1999, p. 36; Peterson, 1999, p. 48). As a consequence, political mediation and technocratic expertise are two sides of the same coin. The first refers to the political sphere of initiating, negotiating and agreeing on *what* needs to be done politically. The latter points to the procedural side of this process, namely offering insight into *how* political initiation and agreement can be realized and implemented properly. In terms of leadership functions, these two demands can be subsumed under *mediative-institutional leadership*.

Finally, the president aims to (re-)present the Commission and the union more broadly. In this sense, s/he does not only represent the Commission and defend its influence and prestige but also serves as promoter of the 'community interest' both in the European and international public spheres. The Lisbon Treaty states more explicitly than the Nice Treaty that the Commission "shall ensure the Union's external representation" (EUR-Lex, 2007, 9 D/1); however, it remains vague on the matter of the presidency. The link between the Commission president and the European public spheres is still less strong than that between national leaders and their constituencies. Yet the incumbent is nonetheless accountable and responsive to the European public, especially following the 2014 European elections. As occupant of one of the highest European public offices, the Commission president relies on a positive image in the public sphere to steer and maintain political support (Tömmel, 2008, p. 140; Wille, 2013, pp. 89, 91). This function, of not only representing the Commission technically, but also creating public attention and support for the Commission's agenda and European issues more broadly, can be identified as *public leadership*.

2.2. Institutional Resources and Constraints

While the functions of an office are linked to its legal-procedural structure, the presidency's institutional resources and constraints to provide political leadership confirm the mixed picture presented above. Since the Rome Treaty, the appointment of Commission presidents has undergone enormous changes: From nominating the president by the Council in 1957 to electing him/her in the European parliamentary elections through top-candidates of the European political groups in 2014. While it was the member states' prerogative to appoint the College of Commissioners and its president unanimously (EUR-Lex, 1957, Art. 158), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) enhanced the role of the European Parliament as a consultative organ in the nomination process (Endo, 1999, p. 70; Nugent, 2001, p. 62). Since 1995, the Treaty also provides the president with limited influence on the nomination of commissioners (Nasshoven, 2011, p. 87). Meanwhile, the president-elect and the nominated College have become subject to a vote of approval by the Parliament before being officially appointed by the Council (EUR-Lex, 1992, Art. 158: 2), which is why the Commission's investiture procedure had also been aligned to the European elections (Nugent, 2001, p. 45).

However, both the Nice and Lisbon Treaties changed this procedure in profound fashion. First, the European Council aims at nominating the president by a qualified majority instead of unanimity (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 17). This change offers more dynamism in choosing a president, as the selection cannot be blocked by a member state anymore, which most likely avoids 'lowest-common denominator' nominations (Nasshoven, 2011, pp. 89-90). Second, the candidate needs to be elected by the Parliament before the selection of the College, representing the Parliament's political majority after the latest European elections (Wille, 2013, p. 63). Third, the president-elect and the nominated College are subject to hearings and finally a parliamentary vote. In addition, the Parliament has a veto right against the nominated

College, and in 2013 decided to nominate their own top-candidates (*Spitzenkandidaten*) for the Commission presidency in the 2014 elections (Kassim, 2016, pp. 2-3). On the one part, this increased reliance on the European Parliament aims at expanding the political legitimacy of the Commission president and increasing his/her political influence and public visibility. On the other, this new dependence on party-political directions also poses a threat to the president's political independence and the Commission's function of representing the Union's common interest (Kassim, 2016, p. 5). In addition, although the president might have been elected by a majority of MEPs, s/he cannot necessarily count on this majority during his/her term since faction or coalition compliance do not exist in the EP. Finally, the concurrent political dependence on two powerful but antagonistic institutions, the Parliament and the Council, poses a crucial challenge to actually provide leadership at all.

Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced two further high-level EU positions, which weaken the Commission president's agenda-setting potential, mediation powers and his/her public visibility (Christiansen, 2012, pp. 230, 237; Tömmel, 2015, p. 9). For one part, there is the permanent president of the European Council who, by "chairing and driving forward [the Council's] work" (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 B/6(a)) potentially limits the Commission president's prerogative of mediating in the Council, promoting the Union's general interest, and thus also reducing the Commission president's agenda-setting influence (Curtin, 2009, p. 77; Dinan, 2013, pp. 1258, 1262-1263). Before 2009, the Commission president developed the Council's agenda together with the rotating Council presidency and thus had a much more direct access to member states (Endo, 1999, p. 60). In addition, due to the Council's rotation, the Commission president also had a generally more pronounced overview over current European affairs than individual heads of government and state. However, the permanent Council president now holds this key position of direct access to the rotating presidency, and this constrains the Commission president's opportunities to influence Council proceedings (Tömmel, 2015, pp. 13, 18-19, 21-22). For example, the close relationship that existed between Commission president Jacques Delors, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterrand during the 1980s, would be much more difficult to obtain today with the permanent Council president intervening between the two sides (Dinan, 2013, p. 1266; Endo, 1999, pp. 62-63). For another, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) who by "ensur[ing] the consistency of the Union's external action[s]" (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9E/4) also diminishes the president's international visibility even if s/he is not formally assigned to the CFSP (Barber, 2010, p. 59).

Inside the Commission, the main constraint arises from the requirement that each member state still del-egates one commissioner (EUR-Lex, 1957, Art. 157). The Lisbon Treaty aimed at diminishing the number of commissioners "corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States" (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/5). However, despite this, the European Council in May 2013 decided to continue the former practice until the accession of the 30th member state (European Council, 2013). Thus the Commission president is confronted with commissioners of 27 different nationalities and political backgrounds (Döring, 2007, pp. 224-225; Egeberg, 2006, p. 11; Smith, 2003, p. 142). The president is provided with the right to influence the selection process of commissioners and distributes portfolios among them. Nonetheless conflicting relationships may arise concerning policies, competences, portfolios, and personalities (Döring, 2007, p. 224; Endo, 1999, pp. 78, 81; Spence, 2006, p. 55). Yet the principle of one commissioner per member state also increases the legitimacy of the Commission to provide European-wide policy solutions. Moreover, the president may still benefit from the increase in commissioners, since a larger number may prevent any single commissioner from building his/her own power base inside the Commission.

Another ambivalent intra-institutional constraint potentially emerges from the College's principle of collegiality (RoP [1963]/2000, Art. 1). Whereas this principle once represented a key source of legitimacy for the Commission's actions, it has become increasingly difficult to apply it to an ever-expanding organization. The latest treaty revisions clearly enhanced the president's role (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/6(a)); still, the College of Commissioners represents a group of politically high-profile and quite independent individuals (Spence, 2006, pp. 38-39; Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 222). Even with a stronger hierarchy of seven vice presidents among them, as introduced by Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014, the president can neither rely on a formal coalition agreement, nor does s/he decide independently on the composition of the College or make use of a stronger voting power than the other commissioners (Cini, 2005, p. 2; Kassim, 2016, p. 7; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 156). However, apart from these institutional constraints, the Lisbon Treaty also provided the office with some legal-procedural resources, especially within the Commission, through the requirement to once again adopt its own Rules of Procedure (RoP) (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 249; European Commission, 2010). The term "political guidance" did disappear from the Lisbon Treaty, but was reintroduced in the amended RoP of 2010. These rules permit the president to "lay down the political guidelines within which the Commission shall exercise its functions…, [and] steer the work of the Commission in order to ensure it is carried out" (European Commission, 2010, Art. 3 (1)). It can, however, be debated whether it is more significant to refer to "political guidance" in the Treaty or in the Commission's internal Rules of Procedure.

While the Rome Treaty already permitted the president to convene, share, and set the College's agenda, today the rules are also formulated that only the secretary-general and the president's head of cabinet are allowed to attend College meetings, privileging the president vis-à-vis other commissioners (Endo, 1999, p. 40; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 156, 2016, p. 8; Nugent, 2001, p. 68; European Commision, 2010, Art. 10 (1)). This exemption equally applies to the modification of propositions, the restructuring of the agenda, and the signing of minutes (European Commission, 2010, Art. 6 (5); Art. 11 (2)). In addition, the president is not only vested with the right to distribute Commission portfolios during the investiture procedure. S/he can also reshuffle them later during the term, demanding resignations by commissioners (except for the High Representative), as well as creating and controlling portfolios added to his/her own responsibilities (EUR-Lex, 2002, Art. 217 (4), 2007, Art. 9 D/6 c; European Commission, 2010, Art. 3/6, Art. 22).

Finally, two further resources emerge from the president's cabinet and the Commission's Secretariat-General. Since the early days of the Commission, the president has always had more advisers and personal staff than other commissioners, allowing for the opportunity to influence and modify the Commission's agenda at the Cabinet's working level (Kassim et al., 2013, p. 156; Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 235). In addition, the RoPs' latest amendments have officially elevated the Secretariat-General from an executive secretary of the Commission to a rather "political body" working for the president providing him/her with substantial up-streaming power inside the Commission (Endo, 1999, p. 41; Kassim, 2013a, pp. 14-15; Kassim et al., 2016, pp. 7-8; European Commission, 2010, Art. 20 (1)). Consequently, while many of the institutional resources have been available to the president since the first Commission took office, only relatively few, though essential, resources have been added since the latest treaty amendments were made.

2.3. The Leadership Potential of the Commission President

The analysis of the Lisbon Treaty and certain sections of the Commission's Rules of Procedure demonstrated that neither the political functions of the Commission presidency nor its legal-procedural resources were substantially altered or strengthened by the latest revisions. Despite introducing a paragraph dedicated to the office, the Lisbon Treaty remains relatively vague as to the office's political leadership functions. Moreover, the creation of new EU positions substantially challenges the Commission president's potential for agenda-setting, inter-institutional mediation and public visibility at the European level. All in all, the Treaty hardly made the office more powerful in its political functions. The same applies to the office's legal-procedural re-

sources. Although the president now officially determines the internal organization of the Commission, mainly through the Commission's Rules of Procedure, many of these "new" rights have been used since the very first Commission took office. In fact, apart from the closer, though important, alignment of the Secretariat-General to the power resources of the Commission presidency, the Lisbon Treaty did not substantially extend the office's institutional powers. It rather aligned them with its increased constraints regarding the Commission's expansion (Christiansen, 2012, p. 237; Curtin, 2009, p. 74; Tömmel, 2008, pp. 120-121).

In conclusion, the formalization of the office, based mainly on managerial-organizational changes inside the Commission, does not automatically imply more political leadership on the part of the Commission president. The institutional structure is still a mixed picture for the Commission president. The balance of resources and constraints has remained relatively stable over the course of European integration with generally weak institutional opportunities to fulfill the leadership demands, especially in the inter-institutional realm. This means that increased resources inside the Commission, have been relatively neutralized by increased institutional constraints both in- and outside the Commission. To extend Kassim's words, it was not just "Hallstein and Delors [who] relied on personal standing and authority" and their own strategic choices to tackle the office's institutional constraints and provide political leadership; Barroso's power and those of present and future presidents—despite latest treaty revisions—remains all in all still more reliant on personal capacities than "the constitutional strengthening of the office" (Kassim, 2013a, p. 16; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 174).

3. The Leadership Performance of José Barroso

To observe these personal challenges of balancing strong political demands with weak institutional powers, it is worth analyzing the public performances of Commission presidents. The literature on EU politicization suggests that increased authority of supranational institutions due to treaty revisions leads to an increase of media attention in the European public spheres on said institutions (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, pp. 149-150; Rauh, 2014, pp. 2, 4; Rauh & Zürn, 2014, pp. 125-126; Zürn, 2013, pp. 13, 15, 19).[1] Following this line of argument, and hypothesizing that the Lisbon Treaty would have strengthened the presidency (in contrast to the findings of the previous section), public attention on, for example, José Barroso, Commission president be-

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[1] Politicization means the transfer of a decision/institution into the realm of politics, increasing public attention on it, in terms of increased salience and polarization, as well as the mobilization of new resources to match the increased attention (Rauh & Zürn, 2014, pp. 125-126).

tween 2004–14, would have most likely increased after the coming-into-force of said treaty in 2009.

To verify this assumption, a theory of *candidate-media agenda convergence* is applied to study the public performance of José Barroso. In addition, a cursory comparison to his predecessor Jacques Delors, Commission president between 1985–95, who is often regarded as the pinnacle of leadership success for Commission presidents, is drawn to further strengthen the argument (Brummer, 2014; Hayes, 2008, pp. 135-136, 143, 2010, pp. 595-596; Kassim et al., 2013; Tömmel, 2013). In doing so, Barroso's and Delors' speeches, and the topics they addressed, are compared with the issues they were associated with in newspaper articles. The strength of this overlap between the presidents' topics and the issues they were related to in the media is then understood as an indicator of their capacity to provide public leadership at the European level. This assumes that the more concentrated the manner in which the issues were addressed, the more likely they were to be covered by the media (Hayes, 2008, pp. 135-136, 143, 2010, pp. 595-596). The British *Financial Times* (FT), one of the prime newspapers which covers EU-related topics for a Pan-European readership, serves as exemplary media source.[2] The following section systematically compares the main topics of Barroso's 588 speeches and Delors' 265 speeches with the 174 FT articles covering Barroso between 2004–14, and

[2] For a similar methodological approach see Kurpas et al. (2008).

the 312 articles reporting on Delors between 1985–95.[3]

3.1. The Public Impact of Presidential Speeches

The distribution of speeches and newspaper articles already provides some contradictory results as both follow different cyclic developments (Figure 1). Barroso started with a lower number of speeches at the beginning of each term (on average 30.5 speeches p.a. between 2004–5 and 2009–10), reaching the highest frequency of speeches in mid-term (compare 75 and 82 speeches in 2008 and 2011 respectively). The end of each term in office (2009 and 2014) is then characterized again by lower numbers of speeches, 40 and 45 respectively.[4] However, the newspaper articles invert

[3] The speeches were retrieved from the Archives of the European Commission in Brussels (Delors), and the website of the European Commission (Barroso) (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b). The dataset of speeches consists of full speeches given at public or semi-public conferences, opening speeches and keynote addresses, detailed or closing remarks and interventions. The FT articles were retrieved from the FT digital archive and the LexisNexis database. Both databases were systematically consulted for articles in which the term "Delors" or "Barroso" was mentioned in either the headline or as a subtitle for the respective period.
[4] The low number of speeches in 2006 (22) can be interpreted as an outlier due to a low retrieval from the European Commission database for this year.

Figure 1. Correlation of presidential speeches and FT articles (1985–95, 2004–14).

this pattern. Although the FT increased its coverage of Barroso during 2004 and 2005, with a total of 41 articles, it did not follow Barroso's strong outreach strategy in the years 2007 and 2008; it in fact decreased its coverage even further compared to 2005. Only during Barroso's reappointment in 2009 did the FT again increase its reporting, reaching its second highest point of coverage with 27 articles. Although Barroso gave most speeches of his incumbency in 2011/12, the FT's reporting on Barroso decreased even further, thus remaining lower than during his first term (with 11 articles on average during 2010–14). Despite slight increases in coverage in 2008/9 and 2011, Barroso was thus generally not able to draw public media attention to his political agenda by increasing his public outreach efforts. In fact, during his second term, media coverage was even lower than in the first term (114 and 60 articles respectively), although he had delivered more speeches in his second term (262 and 326 speeches respectively).

Comparing these results to the public media performance of Jacques Delors, it becomes even more apparent that Barroso was largely unsuccessful in steering and focusing public attention onto himself despite increased public exposure (Figure 1). Across 1985-95, Jacques Delors gave about 265 speeches, making a particularly 'strong outreach push' at the beginning of each of his terms, which were covered by the *Financial Times* with an overall amount of 312 articles. As the graphs reveal, the FT's coverage was not only higher in absolute terms than Delors' outreach, but also nearly symmetrically covered Delors' public exposures. The theory of *candidate-media agenda convergence* argues that "public opinion [intends] to encourage convergence [between] [politicians'] and media agendas", since both tend to "alight on similar sets of topics [due to their, H.M.]…unwilling[ness] to focus on issues that lack public salience" (Hayes, 2010, pp. 595-596). As a result, "media appear generally responsive to themes emphasized by [politicians]" except when, for example, media do not acknowledge the authority of the politician in a particular area or disagree with the importance of issues set by the politician (Hayes, 2010). In accordance with this argument, Delors' results do not only confirm that a close symmetrical coverage of speeches and articles is possible. It also indicates a successful outreach strategy, thereby showing that Delors' success was not just caused by a positive context of his incumbency, but equally included his own strategies and leadership capacity. As for politicization theories of international organizations, the disparity between the higher FT coverage of fewer of Barroso's speeches across his first term and more of his speeches gaining lower FT coverage in his second term also indicates that the Lisbon Treaty may indeed not have strengthened the office's political and public authority, e.g. due to the creation of new EU high level positions.

3.2. The Public Convergence of Presidential Speeches

The second step evaluates to what extent Barroso and Delors were able to link their main political agendas to their presidencies in the public media. In his 588 speeches, José Barroso addressed eight main topics in his central political agenda, which were apparent throughout his two terms to varying degrees of intensity.[5] The first topic was *growth, jobs, and innovation*, in which Barroso sought to steer the political debate towards new financial investments in order to stimulate European-wide economic growth, employment and technological innovation (Cini, 2005, pp. 5-6; Kassim et al., 2016, p. 13; Kurpas, Grøn, & Kaczyński, 2008, p. 19). With 21%, this main topic was the leading single issue of his political agenda throughout his presidency. The second essential point of Barroso's agenda was *Europe's future and renewal* capturing 14% of his main topics, while his third most important topic was *globalization*, which amounted to 12%. Fourth, the topic of *European values, culture, citizens and civil society* was another one of his central concerns (14%) (Cini, 2005, pp. 5-6). Addressed in a total of 61% in the category of main topics these four issues were central to his political agenda and of continuous importance throughout his presidency.

These agenda items were accompanied by four additional main issues that were, characterized by greater fluctuation, due to a strong influence by internal/external political events at the European level. These four topics were, first, *the Euro area including the institutions of Ecofin, EFSF and ESM* (11%). Here, Barroso addressed most notably the financial governance of the Eurozone, which became particularly important in 2009, 2010 and 2011 at the height of the European financial debt crisis and the economic and financial situation in Greece and other southern European states. Second, this topic was accompanied by more general elaborations about the *EU single market and economic governance* (9%), in which Barroso argued for a deeper economic and financial integration of the European Union. The third main topic was the

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[5] The content analysis of Barroso's and Delors' speeches and respective FT articles was conducted with the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA. One speech/article may address more than one topic, but each topic was only coded once in a speech/article. The coding of speeches/articles followed an exploratory approach, guided by a set of four higher-ranking categories, which had been developed alongside the frequency, and as such the significance of topics. Speeches: (1) Delors'/Barroso's main topics/political agenda, (2) general EC/EU issues, (3) EC/EU internal/external events, and (4) EC/EU policies. Articles: (1) Delors'/Barroso's main topics, (2) general EC/EU issues, (3) EC/EU policies, (4) FT coverage of Delors/Barroso apart from their agenda. For the purpose of this paper only the categories concerning the presidents' main topics are being analyzed.

EU's *external cooperation and its partnerships* (11%). Here, again, questions of globalization and international economic governance played an important role. Finally, Barroso also focused on *climate change, environment and sustainable development* (8%). However, this topic decreased in significance after the 2009 UN climate summit in Copenhagen and the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis (Kassim et al., 2016, p. 12; Schout & Buirma, 2014, p. 3).

Comparing these results to those of Delors' political agenda, a huge divide becomes apparent. First, although Delors had also addressed around seven issues in the category of main topics over the course of his presidency (*completion of the single market* (14%), *technological cooperation and innovation* (10%), *financial and monetary cooperation* (21%), *institutional functioning of the Community* (16%), *social dimension and social cohesion* (18%), closer *political cooperation and political union* (10%), and finally *external cooperation* (11%)), he addressed not more than five central topics at the same time. This is in line with studies of public opinion, which concluded that public spheres hardly focus on more than five issues at one time (Jones & Baumgartner, 2004, p. 2; Princen, 2009, p. 20). In fact, Delors developed a strong thematic and dynamic overlap among his main topics, strategically interlocking each topic with the former one, the so-called method of *engrenage*. These topics ranged from the completion of the single market (Single European Act, 1986/7) to stronger social cohesion (Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 1988/9), and finally closer financial and monetary cooperation (Economic and Monetary Union, 1992) (Drake, 2000, p. 14).

Taking into account Delors' success in setting Europe's political agenda during his presidency (Endo, 1999), the distribution of Barroso's political agenda indicates that, with eight broad main topics, Barroso's agenda was continuously overloaded and thus in part diluted when compared to his predecessor. Second, the development of Barroso's main topics suggests a two-pronged agenda strategy. On the one hand, he focused on his first four main topics in a way that was relatively independent of actual political developments. These four topics were characterized by strong generalizations, ones easily applicable to a broad range of political occasions. On the other, he followed political developments at European level closely in an ad-hoc reactive mode, e.g. climate change or the EU financial system (Hodson, 2013, p. 303; Schout & Buirma, 2014, p. 6). However, while Barroso's four constant and four fluctuating main topics remained somewhat separate and detached from each other, it can be assumed that it was potentially more difficult for Barroso's audiences to actually identify his political priorities and his main political agenda. The analysis of the *Financial Times*' reporting on Barroso's main topics confirms this assumption.

The newspaper reported most notably on Barroso's comments about the *Euro/EMU/Ecofin/EFSF/ESM* and the EU's financial governance (at 26% in the coverage of Barroso's main topics). In addition, the FT paid particular attention to Barroso when he announced and discussed matters of the *EU single market/economic governance*, as well as his central topic of *growth/jobs/innovation/Lisbon Agenda* (with 22% and 18% respectively). The FT also reported frequently on two of Barroso's other main topics (namely *EU external cooperation/partnerships/development* as well as *climate change/environment/ecologic governance* with 17% and 12% respectively). This seems at first to be a good result in terms of a convergence between agenda and public coverage. Yet the reporting of the *Financial Times* nearly inverted the priority setting of Barroso's agenda. Barroso put a strong focus on economic growth, the EU's future, European values and globalization (which made up to 61% of his main topics), less often addressing the more fluctuating main topics of the Eurozone as well as financial and economic governance, EU external cooperation and climate change (with only 39% in the overall distribution of main topics). Conversely, however, the *Financial Times* covered these latter fluctuating topics far more often (with 77% in the overall coverage of Barroso's main topics) than his four stable topics (23%) (Figure 2). As these findings illustrate, despite a general overlap between Barroso's agenda-setting and FT coverage, the different priority settings and issue attention between José Barroso and the *Financial Times* are obvious.

In contrast, the FT followed Delors' agenda and priority setting much more closely (Figure 3). While Delors focused most notably on the topic of closer *financial and monetary cooperation*, the FT also covered this topic in the majority of its articles on Delors' main topics (39%), thereby even exceeding the frequency with which Delors had addressed this issue (21% of main topics). This indicates that Delors' agenda items had become politicized to a significant degree (Drake, 2000, p. 51). Delors' second, third and fourth main topics (*completion of single market*, *social dimension* and *institutional functioning*) were also covered by the newspaper with largely the same priority setting (16%, 14% and 10% respectively). Finally, Delors' three other main topics (*technological cooperation*, *political cooperation* and closer *political cooperation and political union*) were also covered roughly in accordance with his priority setting (6%, 10% and 5% respectively). Hence, a high thematic convergence and partially strong politicization can be observed between the main topics of Delors' speeches and the topics he was associated with in the FT.

In summary, three major conclusions derive from analyzing the public convergence of presidential speeches. First, a general overlap between the topics addressed in the speeches and the topics Barroso was

**Figure 2**. FT coverage of Barroso's main topics.

Figure 3. FT coverage of Delors' main topics.

associated with in the *Financial Times* can be identified, though the newspaper featured them at a very different frequency and focus. Of his eight main topics, only two were frequently covered by the newspaper. Since the other main topics such as the EU's future hardly constituted a substantive agenda, they were covered much less frequently by the newspaper. Although Commission presidents usually represent the Commission's collective mission and the union's common interest, and therefore seek to address European issues in more general terms, rhetorical vagueness or commonplaces potentially threaten an incumbent's seriousness and may thus have an adverse effect on his/her media coverage. In contrast to Delors' strong convergence of thematic coverage, the *Financial Times* inverted the priority setting of Barroso's main topics.

As a result, Barroso largely failed in presenting and disseminating his political agenda to the public spheres.

Second, and taking cursorily into account the context of Barroso's presidency, it becomes apparent that even when Barroso's media coverage was relatively high, it did not necessarily relate to his own contributions, but rather coincided with key events at the European level. This becomes particularly evident in the FT's coverage of Barroso in the years 2004/5, 2008, 2009 and 2011, where his outreach efforts coincided with central events at the European level such as the Commission's (re-)appointment, the international financial crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis.

Third, the sharp decrease in the FT's coverage from Barroso's first to his second term (although he had given more speeches) substantiates the assumption that

after 2009 Barroso's public attention had been potentially decreased by other EU offices. This indicates that the Lisbon Treaty has hardly strengthened the political powers and authority of the Commission presidency at the European level.

4. Conclusion: What Kind of Leadership Prospect?

The goal of this paper was twofold. First, it aimed to analyze the institutional role of the Commission presidency and its legal-procedural powers before and after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in an effort to evaluate the office's political leadership potential. Second, it sought to explore the public performance of the Commission president José Barroso in comparison to his successful predecessor Jacques Delors in order to further substantiate the article's argument. In this regard, Barroso's and Delors' public performances were analyzed by comparing the frequency and main topics of their speeches with their respective coverage in the newspaper *Financial Times*. Only one newspaper and one other incumbent, Jacques Delors, were used to illustrate Barroso's public performance and future analysis therefore needs further research on other newspapers and presidents. Nonetheless, the study allows for two main conclusions which also clarify the office's leadership prospect.

First, with regard to theories of politicization in global governance, the FT's sharply decreased coverage of José Barroso during his second term illustrates that the Lisbon Treaty may not have increased the political role of the Commission president at the supranational level. If the Treaty had significantly strengthened the office, more frequent coverage of the president would have been likely especially since Barroso dramatically increased his public exposure. However, the opposite was the case. In particular, the creation of two new EU offices potentially contributed to Barroso's decreased media coverage. Second, while supranational institutions can only make a significant impact on European policy-making if they use "their formal powers and competences to a maximum", this study demonstrated that this 'maximum' still largely depends on the individual leading these institutions and his/her strategic choices, which have to be redefined by each incumbent (Tömmel, 2014, p. 28). Barroso was thus far from offering "entrepreneurial or pre-eminent" leadership when it came to his public performance (Brummer, 2014, p. 343; Kassim, 2013a, pp. 16, 18).

In conclusion, since the Lisbon Treaty hardly increased the office's institutional powers especially in the EU's inter-institutional realm, the prospect for the Commission presidency indicates that the exercise of its leadership functions still strongly relies on the incumbent's personal leadership capacities. In the words of Barber: "What the [Lisbon] treaty does not contain,…is that vital ingredient for success—political will-

power" (Barber, 2010, p. 66). The strengthening of managerial-organizational functions alone does not automatically imply that actual political leadership is or can be provided. Otherwise Barroso's public performance would most likely have been stronger than that of Delors'. The predominant reliance on the dispositions of individuals in supranational institutions indicates a strong vulnerability as to whether they function effectively or not. The creation of supranational institutions with relatively weak legal-procedural resources may indeed be in the interest of member states, since it safeguards their national sovereignty and control over major political developments at the European level. Yet it also hinders the institution's actual effectiveness. Weak institutional powers (structure) do not indicate less, but paradoxically *more* dependence on the relatively unpredictable variable of individual capacities (agency) to successfully execute an office's political leadership demands. Hence a strong reliance on individuals counterweighs the central aim of institution-building, namely a stable exercise of power and the provision of continuity and predictability in decision-making processes.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Article

Missing Areas in the Bureaucratic Reputation Framework

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Abstract
Drawing on insights from social networks, social cognition and the study of emotions, this conceptual article offers a set of ideas and a series of predictions on how systematic variation in two sets of relationships may bear on agency behavior. The first is the agency-audience relationship which revolves around how and what multiple audiences think about public agencies, how these thoughts impact upon agency behavior, how information regarding this behavior is transformed within multiple audiences and how it influences audience memory and behavior regarding that agency. The second is the relationship between the reputation of an agency head and the reputation of that agency. The article identifies six broad areas that offer the most promising possibilities for future research on bureaucratic reputation, calling on researchers to incorporate insights from the aforementioned literatures, to dimensionalize these sets of relationships and to assess the generalizability of reputation's effects.

Issue
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1. Introduction

During the last decade or so, the concept of bureaucratic reputation and the derived process of reputation management in the public sector have been entering from off stage into the field of public administration (e.g., Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012; Wæraas & Maor, 2015). On the cusp of the new millennium, scholars were exposed to the basic theoretical foundations for the study of bureaucratic reputation and autonomy in the shape of a seminal contribution by Dan Carpenter (2001). A decade later, another seminal contribution followed (Carpenter, 2010a). The bureaucratic reputation framework that has emerged is comprised of four elements: the specific view of reputation which enables an agency to claim a unique contribution to the public good; the multifaceted nature of reputation; the existence of multiple expectations by multiple audiences, and the context of today's knowledge society

and blame culture which fosters conditions that intensify agency concerns with reputational risk (Maor, 2015). Agency is used here in its broad sense, that is, government authority, rather than in the narrow sense, that is, "modern" agency (Bach, Fleischer, & Hustedt, 2010, p. 13).

Studies informed by this framework have revealed a large set of processes and phenomena. Recent findings have related to the consequences of reputational concerns for the way agencies approve some drugs more quickly than others (Carpenter, 2002) and allocate resources across tasks (Gilad, 2012). Additional research has dealt with endogenous construction of jurisdictions (Maor, 2010) and the observability of regulatory decisions and errors (Maor, 2011). Researchers have also examined the duration of enforcement decisions (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013), as well as the changes in an agency's outputs and the mix between its outputs and other activities (Maor &

Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2016). Still other studies have demonstrated the extent and the ways regulatory agencies manage their reputations through the strategic use of communications (Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013). Carpenter (2001, 2010a) has offered some generalized answers to issues regarding reputation and power, and has summed up the contribution of this scholarly literature: "The lesson of this scholarship is that, when trying to account for a regulator's behavior, *look at the audience*, and *look at the threats*" (Carpenter, 2010b, p. 832; italics in original).

Given these insightful findings, it is rather surprising that so little attention has been devoted to the social processes by which collective perceptions regarding a public agency emerge. At the end of the day, social approval or disapproval of an agency is based on collective perceptions. But precisely how do such perceptions emerge? What mechanisms are at play throughout this process amongst multiple audiences who may have dramatically different values and expectations? What forms of communication are embedded within different segments of society that facilitate or inhibit the transmission of reputation-relevant information? Furthermore, under some conditions, traits and/or behaviors of individuals within an agency—especially the agency head—may be linked together in the minds of members of the political elites and the general public. What people know about an agency may parallel what they know of the agency head. Besides, if the agency head is famous by virtue of his past achievements, he or she may be deemed worthy of attention. So what is the relationship between an agency head's reputation and agency reputation in a media-saturated environment? The need to deepen our understanding of Carpenter's insights is therefore of utmost importance.

Drawing on robust findings from social networks, social cognition and the study of emotion, this article offers a set of ideas and a series of predictions on how systematic variation in two sets of relationships may bear on agency choices. The first is the agency-audience relationship which revolves around how and what individuals, groups and society as a whole think about public agencies, how people's thoughts and concerns impact upon agency behavior, and how information regarding this behavior is transformed within multiple agencies, and influences audience memory and behavior regarding that agency. In other words, how does agency response to reputational threats reverberate amongst different audiences and feed back to the agency's perception of reputational threats and opportunities? The second is the relationship between agency head reputation and the reputation of that agency. For example, what impact does a newly appointed agency head with a good or bad reputation have on the agency's behavior and how long is this

maintained? Understanding these two sets of interactions is fundamental to grasping the process by which bureaucratic reputation emerges, assessing the importance of reputation and its role, and understanding how to manage it effectively. This paper is therefore meant to be expositional and exploratory. The aim is not to provide an overall analytical framework but rather to sketch out the pieces of two missing parts in the bureaucratic reputation framework, and to conjecture as to how bureaucratic scholars should empirically confront them. Furthermore, the aim is not to elaborate the state of the art of bureaucratic reputation theory—a task recently undertaken elsewhere (Wæraas & Maor, 2015), but rather to develop a research agenda which is rooted in a political science approach.

The article identifies six broad areas that offer the most promising possibilities for future research on bureaucratic reputation: (1) the manipulation of emotions by an agency in order to increase the audience's attention to some reputation-relevant information; (2) the variation in audience information processing and behavior as derived from the relative importance they attach to an agency; (3) the variation in audience information processing and behavior as derived from cultural attributes; (4) the variation in communication strategies undertaken by agency heads who enjoy a good reputation compared to those who enjoy a bad or indistinct reputation; (5) the variation in the alignment of agency heads, who enjoy different levels of reputation, with the agency's main audiences and with the agency management, and (6) the variation in the agency's strategies with potential negative consequences which are executed by agency heads who enjoy a good reputation as compared to those who enjoy a bad or indistinct reputation. The article calls upon researchers to incorporate insights from the literatures of social networks, social cognition and emotion, to dimensionalize the aforementioned sets of relationships and to assess the generalizability of the effects of reputation.

The article proceeds as follows: the second section explores the ideational and definitional grounds, the third elaborates on the major premises of bureaucratic reputation as an audience-based approach; the fourth focuses on the role of the media in the interplay between agencies and audiences, the fifth elaborates on the main premises of agency head reputation and its interaction with agency reputation, the sixth discusses the link between agency head reputation and agency autonomy—a link which is at the heart of the political science approach to bureaucratic reputation, and the seventh briefly elaborates on the measurement of organizational reputation as well as the reputation of the agency head. The final section concludes. Before delving into the substance of this article, the next section considers early research in bureaucratic reputation and the setting up of the definitional ground.

2. The Ideational and Definitional Grounds

Scholars of politics have long been aware of the need to look at reputational concerns at the individual and organizational levels. According to Goffman (1959), for example, many aspects of politics are not only about overseeing or giving account but also about advancing one's standing in the eyes of one's audience and about being seen as a reputable actor. This is why "[…] the formative years of a policy-making agency are of crucial importance in determining its behavior" (Wilson, 1989, p. 68). During the formative years, "[a]mong the critical decisions facing leadership, closely related to the definition of mission, is the selection of a clientele, market, target, allies, or other segment of the environment to which operations will be oriented" (Selznick, 1957, p. 104). Recognizing the importance of this selection process requires a nuanced understanding of the role of culture in the environment within which agency operates. This is because "[i]n order for a reputation to have an effect, both sides involved in a transaction must *ex ante* have some idea of the meaning of appropriate or equitable fulfillment of the contract" (Kreps, 1990, p. 93; italics in original). The traditional view is that agency culture is insulated from external political and social forces. In contrast, the bureaucratic reputation perspective is premised on the idea that bureaucratic culture (read, "internal culture") influences key parameters in an agency's operation and language through agency interaction with institutional actors, such as political executives, legislators, advocacy groups and political parties—all are operating within a particular cultural context (read, "external culture") (Carpenter, 2001, p. 376, fn. 22). This inseparability of "internal" and "external" cultures (Kreps, 1990) is equally relevant in the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. Moe (1984), for example, lays out in simple terms the role of bureaucrats' reputation as an important mechanism that facilitates the monitoring job of politicians over the bureaucracy. According to Moe, "[o]ne [mechanism] is the reputation of bureaucrats. Over time, politicians are able to observe bureaucratic behavior and, for many of the more important actors, arrive at tacit agreement as to their honesty, competence, ideology, innovativeness, and other qualities of relevance" (1984, p. 767).

Despite how insightful and thought-provoking the aforementioned observations were, they did not trigger much research on bureaucratic reputation during the 1980s and 1990s, although some political scientists did make contributions to this subfield (Heimann, 1997; Quirk, 1980; Rourke, 1984; Wilson, 1989; Whitford, 2002). However, that has changed since Carpenter (2001) first noticed that agencies attempt to cultivate reputation that will enable them to gain autonomy, and theorized about it. According to Carpenter (2010, p. 33), "[r]eputations are composed of

symbolic beliefs about an organization—its capacities, intentions, history, mission—and these images are embedded in a network of multiple audiences." This definition, over which there is no disagreement among scholars (Maor, 2015, p. 19), centers on the evaluation of the organization's unique character and activities by multiple audiences. Reputation uniqueness, according to Carpenter (2001, p. 5), refers to the demonstration by agencies that they can create solutions (e.g., expertise, efficiency) and provide services (e.g., moral protection) that no other agency in the polity offers. This idea resembles the notion of "distinctive competence" labeled by Philip Selznick (1957) who claimed that it is the role of organization leaders to advance and protect such competencies and the resources underlying them. This implies that bureaucratic reputation relies on the external audiences' perceptions of the quality of agency outcomes that these audiences really care about, and the effectiveness of its actions, which distinguish the agency from others in the polity.

3. Bureaucratic Reputation as an Audience-Based Approach

In this section, we offer relevant observations regarding agency-audience relationships when social network and social cognition perspectives are taken into account. A convenient starting point is the premise that audiences observe public agencies. When they do so, they bring into play a variety of factors including prior knowledge, goals, mental frames, heuristics, distraction, motivation, emotion, and others. Ultimately, issues arise concerning what the audience will remember about the agency, what information regarding the agency will be suppressed (e.g., Najmi, 2013), and how information that audiences rely upon in shaping their attitudes contributes to their judgment regarding the agency. But audience descriptions and perceptions of bureaucratic agencies are remarkably diverse and may change over time. This diversity arises because audience perceptions are not about physically objective reality. What they "see" in agencies is largely inferred, assumed and/or felt, and may vary across time, culture, and subculture (Carpenter & Krause, 2012).

Taking into account the "social" and the "psychological" requires delving into the audiences' histories, key personalities, relationships, motivations, goals, intentions, and plans. Together with various aspects of the audience's social environment, these factors converge to shape the communication and interaction between audience members, and the processes by which they come to understand social reality (e.g., attribution and attitude formation). Audiences strive to make sense of agency actions by wondering about their causes, and vice-versa. They may do this directly, or by relying on institutional intermediaries, such as the media and various specialized organizations, or other agencies or audiences.

Of greatest relevance is the fact that the interpretation of information is context dependent because being socialized in a given context implies acquiring cultural, behavioral and other assumptions. These contextual factors prioritize different motivations and preferences which lead to different ways of perceiving reality. For example, Western cultures revolve around individualistic values, emphasizing the needs of the self over others (e.g., Greenwald, 1980). This, in turn, may produce a focused attentional strategy (Balcetis & Cole, 2013). Asian cultures, on the other hand, are considered collectivist, given their emphasis on group happiness and the happiness of significant others over the needs of the self (Balcetis & Cole, 2013). Collectivist cultures may cause attention to be dispersed among different objects (e.g., Duffy & Kitayama, 2010). Different ways of perceiving reality imply different reputational threats and opportunities derived from different audiences. Cultural factors may therefore contribute toward an explanation of the ways agencies prioritize different audiences over time and the ways audiences prioritize different agencies over time.

The aforementioned processes also result in information communicated to the agency whose outcomes affect whether those involved will interact again, under what circumstances and for what purposes; whether they will influence or affect each other in other ways, even in absentia; or whether the whole interaction will be remembered or will lead to enduring changes in their attitudes, intentions and expectations. Audiences may expect different things from different agencies over time, and so the same agency behavior may produce different reputational consequences for different agencies. Audiences may also have conflicting expectations from some agencies, and complementary expectations from others. And some audiences' expectations may be more prominent, and more consequential than others. In addition, information about public agencies may be processed differently than information about individuals and groups. The key point here is that agencies may have specific relationships with particular audiences in particular time periods. Another point is that many aspects of the interrelationships between agencies and audiences might be better understood in terms of what we know about social networks, social cognition and affective experiences (e.g., moods, emotions)—both as constraints and as targets for instrumental manipulation—which are fairly distant from bureaucratic politics.

How do theories of emotion and affect bear on theories of bureaucratic reputation? Emotion generally refers to particular feelings (e.g., sadness, anger) that are "intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite cause and clear cognitive content" (Forgas, 1992, p. 230). Affect, according to Finucane, Peters, & Slovic (2003, p. 328), refers to "'goodness' or 'badness' (1) experienced as a feeling state […] (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a specific stimulus […]". Emotion and affect influence behavior in two distinct ways. First, people anticipate and factor in their likely feelings about the potential consequences of different modes of agency actions. Second, people may be influenced by immediate emotions experienced at the moment of choice (e.g., Rick & Loewenstein, 2010) among bureaucratic agencies and at the moment of choice among the public goods they produce.

Two interrelated streams of research—one concerns affect (i.e., good/bad feelings) which is represented by the *affect heuristic*, and another concerns *affect-as-information*—provide ample evidence of the impact affect and emotion have on subjective probabilities, value, and risk-benefit balance (for a review, see Finucane, 2013). The *affect heuristic* refers to people's tendency to base their judgment (e.g., of a public product, agency, or policy) on what they think and feel about it (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000, p. 5). "If they feel good about [it], they tend to judge risks as low and benefits as high; if they feel bad about it, they may judge the opposite […]" (Peters, 2011, p. 90). The *affect-as-information* literature "asserts that affective reactions serve as information about what one likes or dislikes" (Clore & Palmer, 2009, p. 22). According to this line of thought, Zajonc (1980, 1984), Bargh (1984) and LeDoux (1996) have demonstrated that affective reactions to stimuli are faster than cognitive evaluation, and therefore provide a crude assessment of the behavioral options people face. Recently, Lodge and Taber (2013) found that "[…] all thinking is suffused with feeling, and these feelings arise automatically within a few milliseconds […] of exposure to a sociopolitical object or event" (p. 19). The affect heuristic combined with Lodge and Taber's (2013) findings imply that agencies operating in relatively high emotional domains, such as those concerning life and death (e.g., the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the European Medicines Agency and the European Food Safety Authority) may face a relatively high level of emotion-based audience reactions compared to agencies operating within relatively neutral domains (e.g., Groenleer, 2014). In other words, an agency has to factor in the possibility that audiences with different emotional attributes and at different emotional states may respond differently to different types of news concerning the agency.

Further, an agency may attempt to influence which emotions its audiences have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions (Maor & Gross, 2015). At the same time, an agency may be exposed to attempts undertaken by emotional entrepreneurs (Maor & Gross, 2015) to influence audiences' emotions towards the agency. In addition, because agency tasks are multi-dimensional, agencies operating in emotional domains can be criticized for technical tasks, which are not emotionally laden, while

agencies working on more neutral domains can be criticized on moral aspects of their reputation, which are more emotionally laden. In essence, this calls for studies that take into account the emotions attached to the domain in which the agency operates, contingent on the specific dimension (i.e., performative, technical, procedural and moral) that is challenged with related task characteristics and on the emotional entrepreneurs that operate in the policy domain.

But how do audiences prioritize different expectations over time? Specifically, how independent are the dimensions by which audiences evaluate agencies? Do these dimensions reflect the real, underlying behavior of public agencies, or merely audiences' perceptions about agency characteristics? And how independent are the dimensions by which agencies evaluate audiences? Carpenter (2010) has directed attention towards key dimensions, be they performative, moral, procedural, and technical traits of the organization. An agency does not have a strong reputation per se, but rather a strong reputation for the protection of public safety, public health, public morality and so on. Carpenter's four faces of an agency's reputation highlight the dimensions over which the relative standing of the organization is assessed vis-à-vis other agencies. Carpenter's statement also implies the existence of multiple reputations—and therefore, multiple expectations by external audiences regarding each of these dimensions. Each external audience selects the dimension/s of reputation which will receive priority in its assessment of the organization. But do audience perceptions vary along Carpenter's (2001) four dimensions of competence? When audiences undertake comparative judgments of agencies, do these dimensions have a compensatory relationship so that, for example, learning that an agency is high on the performative trait lowers estimates of morality (e.g., in the case of an agency in charge of deporting illegal immigrants)? In other words, do some audiences tend to differentiate dimensions of agency reputation in a comparative context in a compensatory direction? These questions should be central to our subfield but are not.

4. Agencies, Audiences, and the Role of the Media

As an audience-based approach, the bureaucratic reputation framework seriously takes media coverage on board. Recent studies have already demonstrated the extent and the ways regulatory agencies manage their reputations through the strategic use of communications (e.g., Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013). Agencies also build reputation by shadowing practices and policies pursued by agencies that possess good reputations (Maor, 2007, 2011); by affiliating with established players and by appointing top management teams who enjoy good reputations (Petkova, 2012).

When an agency is first encountered, an audience starts by categorizing the agency based on salient features of characteristics and behaviors. When an audience is first encountered, agencies start by doing the same thing. Although media coverage can serve to bias the perceptions of both agencies and audiences, they can also attune perceivers to each other's actions, evaluations and behavior. Thus, media coverage can bias perceivers and make them more sensitive to certain signals, and moderate the accuracy with which agency behavior is recognized. Specific agency behavior can also attune audiences to functionally important actions and other signals. These signals can mobilize perceivers' cognitive and perceptional resources in preparation for action. Thus, certain signals may be capable of attuning perceivers to relevant agency behavior.

Agency characteristics and behavior may place it in certain categories in audiences' perception. These effects may be ramified throughout subsequent stages of information processes. Furthermore, what an audience perceives may be due, in part, to what it expects to see—its expectation and belief regarding the agency. Although these perceptions and thoughts are influenced by media coverage, they are also motivated phenomena—audiences may work harder to extract (accurate) information regarding certain agencies relative to others. Audiences may also be better at encoding and remembering information regarding agencies whose operations are important to them, relative to others. For example, decisions by the U.S. Environment Protection Agency may be more important to environmental policy interest groups than to education policy interest groups. This tendency of audiences to readily think about public agencies which are important to them is not a point of debate. The question is not whether agency characteristics and behaviors are important in reputation formation but rather when they are more likely to be influential in the interpretation of structurally and situationally invariant information.

The discussion on agency audiences leads to the following propositions:

(i) When faced with negative media coverage, an agency will tend to manipulate emotions in order to ensure that its audiences selectively attend to some types of information regarding the agency while ignoring others.

(ii) An agency's perception of each of its audiences will determine what information is generated for consumption by each audience, how that information is generated, how the feedback is evaluated, and what inferences are drawn from it.

(iii) Audiences will more quickly process differences between past and present agency behavior for agencies whose operations are important to them.

(iv) Audiences will more quickly infer agency characteristics from the behavior of agencies whose operations are important to them.

(v) Audiences may be better at encoding and remembering information regarding agencies whose operations are important to them.

5. Agency Head's Reputation

Although many bureaucracy scholars emphasize the importance of agency heads (Aberbach & Rockman, 2000; Adolph, 2013; Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Kaufman, 1981; Seidman & Gilmour, 1998; Wilson, 1989), scholars of organizational reputation tend to ignore the reputation of the single leader at the top of an agency's hierarchy in their explanations of agency behavior. Agency head here refers to an individual who is statutorily authorized to make legally binding decisions on behalf of an agency. The agency head's reputation can be conceptualized along Carpenter's (2001) coordinates as a set of beliefs about an agency head's individual capacities, values and intentions that are embedded in audience networks.

The tendency to ignore the reputation of agency heads may lie in the similarity between the factors that influence agency head's reputation and those that influence organizational reputation, or in the methodological obstacles that hamper the ability of scholars to differentiate between these two constructs in normal practice. This neglect may be justified as long as one assumes that agency-head reputation moves in tandem with organizational reputation, and that agency heads' incentives are fully aligned with those of their organizations. This assumption is sensible insofar as audiences' assessments of agency heads affect organizational reputation and vice versa. However, there are a number of key differences between these two constructs, namely, the shorter horizon over which the agency head can build his or her reputation compared to an agency that has been doing it for decades; the relative instability of the agency head reputation when new information is revealed relative to organizational reputation which has been developed over multiple decades, and the portability of the agency head's distinct reputation (Graffin, Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012). Furthermore, there are certain times at which these two constructs may move in separate directions—for example, when a change in agency head leads to agency reputation and agency head reputation to converge around the average level of reputation. These differences raise a question which to the best of my knowledge has never been examined: What impact does a newly appointed agency head with a good/bad reputation have on agency behavior and how long is it maintained?

6. Bureaucratic Autonomy and Agency Head's Reputation

Bureaucratic reputation has been considered a key factor in determining agency autonomy. Autonomy prevails, according to Carpenter (2001, p. 4), when agencies can establish a reputation and persuade political executives to defer to agency wishes. "Under these conditions, politicians grant agency officials free rein in program building" (Carpenter 2001, p. 4). Given that the same factors that contribute to agency autonomy may differentiate among agency heads, it is rather surprising that agency autonomy has become a well-charted territory, but less so, the variance amongst agency heads. Take, for example, professionalism (Weber, 1946; Wilson, 1989). According to Wilson, "[i]n a bureaucracy, professionals are those employed who receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners located outside the agency" (1989, p. 60). However, Wilson does not consider the possibility that there are professionals in administrative agencies who enjoy worldwide esteem (e.g., FDA Medical Officer Frances Kelsey who reviewed the thalidomide case), others that enjoy good reputation in the geographical region or in the relevant territory, and others who enjoy bad or indistinct reputation. Other factors contributing to agency autonomy and thereby to the differentiation among agency heads are the cultivation of external audiences (Carpenter, 2001, 2010) and the management of audiences' conflicting views and assessment criteria in light of the agency's understanding of its distinct multidimensional reputation (Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013); the pursuit by agencies of "strategic neutrality", i.e., when agencies act politically in a way that does not unite opponents (Huber, 2007); the presence of multiple competing principals (Hammond & Knott, 1996), and the inattention by elected officials who operate alongside well-informed bureaucrats (Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989).

Agency heads may also vary in their ability to strike political bargains at the national or federal levels and adhere to these bargains by imposing systematic and uniform local enforcement policies. They may also vary in their ability to pit one principal against another (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991), manipulate principal-agent relationships (Riker, 1986) and manage informal compliance and resistance mechanisms in bureaucratic politics (Carpenter & Krause, 2015). Some agency heads may be well-informed relative to other agency heads and possess the necessary skills to transfer information into knowledge (i.e., "connect the dots"). Some agency heads may be loyal to the president who picked them (Krause & O'Connell, 2015), and some may fit the political environment of bureaucracy insofar their ideology is concerned (Bertelli & Grose, 2009, 2011; Clinton, Bartelli, Grose, Lewis, & Nixon, 2012;

Nixon, 2004). Agency heads may also vary in their career concerns (Adolph, 2013; Alesina & Tabellini, 2007; Dewatripont, Jewitt, & Tirole, 1999) and in their level of care about their organizational identity, especially in terms of their preferences for cooperation or for team spirit when they serve an assigned role and function within the organization (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; March & Simon, 1992).

The aforementioned variance in agency heads' ability, ideology and care of organizational identity may lead to variability in their reputations as well as in their concerns about the risks and opportunities associated with their future reputation (and compensation). In addition, different audiences may be differently affected by the aforementioned traits. This, in turn, calls for a more in-depth analysis of the mediating role of audiences in shaping agency heads' reputation, and thereby, the variability in agency heads' reputations. Given that bureaucratic agencies have, to a greater extent, become mediatized, the same goes for the head of the communications department who handles the actual day-to-day processes of reputation management.

In the modern-world media environment, reputational concerns of agency heads may extend beyond the internal games agency heads play to manipulate principals' inferences regarding their ability, ideology and so on. At the outset, the social construction of leadership images involves, among others, the belief that individuals determine the fate of organizations (Chen & Meindl, 1991, p. 524). When this belief bears on the popular press and its readership, the risk management agenda of an agency head expands. Further, in the modern information environment, all major policy decisions made by agency heads are observed, and so are all relevant agency outcomes. In addition, national and international league tables, which provide quality metrics for agency and agency head reputation, are "[…] perceived and articulated as a source of reputational risk" (Power, Scheytt, Soin, & Sahlin, 2009, p. 302). However, the media still seeks interpretations of these decisions and outcomes. Negative commentary by informed or expert third parties, such as the business press (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999), may tilt the probabilities towards opinions that are reputationally less favorable for agency heads. Consequently, some agency heads may enter the fray by adopting various presentational strategies (Hood, 2011) in an attempt to explain their objectives, methods and decisions. Others will do so on a smaller scale, and some may even consider keeping silent (Maor, forthcoming). Whether to intervene in the media environment, and if so, how "loud" should one do it, may be directly related to an agency head's reputation. This, in turn, is most likely to be manifested when an agency encounters shocks in the form of agency head succession and following an unexpected positive or negative event (Graffin et al., 2012). In both cases agency reputation and agency head reputation are likely to be distinct. In the former case, this is due to the early stages in the agency head's tenure, in the second, the relatively high visibility of agency policy and the agency head's presentation of this policy. Questions related to these interrelationships and the derived reputational mechanisms at work should come to the fore in the area of bureaucratic reputation.

The discussion of an agency head's reputation raises the following propositions:

(i) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation might fight hard to build a positive reputation, and thus respond vigorously and "loudly" to any hint of criticism in all of the above cases. By contrast, an agency head who enjoys a good reputation is more likely to talk less when facing criticism. In addition, an agency head with a bad or indistinct reputation is expected to be more inclined to respond to public judgments, especially during his or her early tenure and shortly before the end of tenure.

(ii) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation are more likely to be aligned with the agency's main audiences rather than with the agency management. By contrast, agency heads with a good reputation are more likely to be aligned with the agency management rather than the agency's main audiences.

(iii) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation are more likely to be concerned with both the level and variability of their reputation when compared to agency heads who enjoy a good reputation.

(iv) Agency heads at the early stages of their career will be less likely to engage in activities which have potentially negative consequences when compared to agency heads who enjoy a good reputation.

(v) Agency heads who enjoy a good reputation will tend to increase transparency especially regarding their active, bolder policy activities when compared to agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation.

(vi) When agency heads enjoy a good/bad reputation, the level of agency reputation will converge towards the level of the agency head's reputation.

7. Measurement

None of the current bureaucratic reputation scholars measure reputation per se, but rather reputational threats as manifested in the media. There is however a literature that compares citizen's perceptions of agency performance relative to their expectations and considers the impact of widely disseminated agency performance information on citizen perceptions (e.g.,

Jacobsen, Snyder, & Saultz, 2014; Lavertu, 2015). There are also studies that consider the ideological reputation of U.S. agencies, applying measurement models to synthesize the perceived reputation of agencies among experts (e.g., Clinton & Lewis, 2008). Organizational theory scholars have also wrestled with the measurement of reputation, with some applying an overall measure while others apply an attribute-specific measure (Dowling & Gardberg, 2012). For example, Fombrun (2012) defines firm reputation as a collective assessment of a company's attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference group with which the company competes for resources. This conception, therefore, implies an overall measure of "attractiveness". At the same time, reputation varies across audiences and attributes because it is directed toward specific stakeholders. As a result, firms can have multiple reputations (Greenwood, Parkish, & Deephouse, 2005; Jensen & Roy, 2008). Reputation additionally accounts for past behavior and/or performance (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 2005). Because of these characteristics, Jensen, Kim and Kim (2012) make the case that a firm's reputation should be attribute-specific rather than an overall assessment. Scholars of bureaucratic reputation should note that much of the reputation literature in organizational studies is moving in this direction. At the same time, there are numerous indicators of a firm's reputation that are not available to scholars of bureaucratic reputation, such as share prices and the existence of long-term, global and local, consumer-based reputational rankings. Thus, there still remains a scope for gaining interesting insights regarding bureaucratic agencies by using the overall measure.

Regarding the measurability of agency head reputations, drawing on the methodological insights of studies of corporate reputation (Graffin et al., 2012; Milbourn, 2003), one may focus on five indicators which capture the variance in agency head reputation within a defined period, namely, agency head experience—operationalized in terms of their last-post tenure; background—whether the agency head was hired from inside or outside the agency; performance in their last post—operationalized in financial and organizational terms; CEO awards, and media salience—a count of press articles that mention the agency head's name.

8. Conclusions

Reputation approach to bureaucratic organizations embraces a large set of processes and phenomena (e.g., Busuioc & Lodge, 2015; Maor, 2015). However, it is challenged here as lacking in crucial components, namely, agency-audience interrelationships, and the relationships between agency head reputation and agency reputation. The prototypical scenarios arguably involve an agency which encounters a reputational threat and then reacts in order to protect its reputation. But missing is the perceiver of agency actions who encounters or learns about the agency's (and the agency head's) efforts to protect and enhance its reputation, the ways he/she refines an impression, and thereafter, the various thoughts and memories which subsequently shape his or her behavior regarding the agency (and the agency head). Missing also is the richness of the multiple transformation of the information communicated by the agency to a given audience. Further, the way agency response to reputational threats reverberates amongst different audiences (6, 2014) may impact on the relationship between agency head reputation and the reputation of that agency. This is because culture underlies an agency's reputation with its employees and clients, and "the violation of the culture will generate direct negative externalities insofar as it weakens the organization's overall reputation" (Kreps, 1990, p. 126). So far, the literature on bureaucratic reputation has not delved into these issues, but an interesting research agenda awaits those answering this article's call for action.

But why should scholars of bureaucratic politics bother to develop reputational theories beyond Carpenter? According to Maor (2015), Carpenter puts too much emphasis on the exogenous threats to agency reputation while underestimating their endogenous processing, given agencies' understanding of their distinct reputations. The agency-audience relationships as well as the relationships between agency head reputation and agency reputation may play a key role in the intra-agency process of interpreting and acting upon reputation information. This role is currently an uncharted territory. In addition, Carpenter too greatly emphasizes the institutional persistence of legislative and presidential decisions which lend stability to bureaucratic autonomy, thereby lending stability to good reputation. But institutional persistence cannot be guaranteed, as indicated, for example, by Lewis's (2002) finding that 62% of U.S. agencies created between 1946 and 1997 have been terminated and that political turnover is one of the primary causes of termination. Assuming that agencies recognize the possibility of termination following, for example, a significant operational failure, it is reasonable to expect that reputation information will be seriously looked at and acted upon. The agency-audience relationships as well as the relationships between agency head reputation and agency reputation may play a key role in this process.

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back. All remaining errors are my own.

Conflict of interests

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Article

Contingency and Political Action: The Role of Leadership in Endogenously Created Crises

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Abstract
Among the recent literature about leadership and crisis situations two main strands are to be observed: structuralist ones mainly treat political leaders as reactive agents who have relatively little room for maneuver, while constructivist ones put greater emphasis on the opportunities in interpreting crises. Our claim is that there is a third analytical possibility mainly neglected in recent literature that is even more voluntaristic than the constructivist approaches. In this scenario, there is no external shock; leaders do not only interpret, but also "invent" crises. To make our claim plausible, we build a conceptual-descriptive typology of the potential relationships between crisis situations and agency. The typology is founded on Kari Palonen's differentiation between Machiavellian and Weberian types of contingency, but uses his originally conceptual historical argument for analytical purposes. To underpin our theoretical argument, we present short illustrative examples to all three types of crisis scenarios (the structuralist, the constructivist, and the voluntarist one).

1. Introduction

Great leaders need crisis situations to gain power to (re)act (Genovese, 1979; Rossiter, 1948), but crisis situations need great leaders in order to be solved as well (Tucker, 1968, p. 745, 1981). To put a twist on that paradox: there are two extreme ways to perceive and conceptualize extraordinary situations and to deal with them. On the one hand, a crisis could be seen as an exogenously given situation for leaders to manage in a technocratic or conventional way; on the other, it can be seen as a situation generated endogenously by leaders acting in an innovative way. While researchers usually explore leaders' responses to exogenous crises, such as industrial accidents, natural catastrophes, ter-

rorist attacks or responses to economic or international financial crises, our focus is on endogenously generated and/or shaped crises. The first goal of this paper is to emphasize the role of political agency in crisis generation and in re-defining it, something that is very much neglected by approaches focusing on structural determinants. Secondly, the paper aims to provide a general conceptual typology of the relation between political agency and crisis.

The problem arises from the structure–agency debate. "Agency" is usually understood as a capacity to act intentionally, voluntarily upon situations, as a property of actors to be able to formulate and implement decisions. On the other hand, "structure" means the situation, context and political environment. It re-

fers to the conditions within which actors operate and seize the opportunities, and which determine or constrain their actions. Essentially, structure and agency are two sides of the same coin, as they coexist in a political process. (Hay, 2002, pp. 89-135). A fundamental problem for political leadership studies is how the relationship between the political actors and the environment in which they find themselves is managed. Calls for research into the dilemma of the structure–agency problem in leadership studies are not new (Hargrove, 2004; Jones, 1989; Masciulli, Molchanov, & Knight, 2009; 't Hart & Rhodes, 2014). In this paper, we will encounter the structure–agency problem in a more concrete setting, that of crises and extraordinary situations. In a crisis situation, where leadership differs from agency in ordinary times, this dualism is more problematic. At least three different perspectives can be distinguished within the literature concerning the relationship between structure and agency in crisis. Firstly, the structuralist approach moves within a challenge/reaction scheme, where the change of structure triggers agency (Structure → Agency). For structuralist authors crisis means a more or less objective situation for agents, i.e. political leaders remain in a reactive role. As Ronald A. Heifetz (1994) notes, leaders define the problem, decide how to tackle it, and then work towards adaptation of either values, reality or both. Leadership is triggered by the emergence of complex problems. For Boin, McConnell and 't Hart (2008) crises are triggered in a variety of ways, but always by external or exogenous forces (natural catastrophes, malfunctions of a society's sociotechnical and political administrative systems, or by internal or external enemies), or political scandals (Boin et al., 2008, p. 3). Recently, Jim Buller and Toby S. James (2015) have argued for the analytical primacy of structure on the grounds of philosophical realism. They have emphasized the role of 'emergent properties' of previously unrelated structures that often result in outcomes that are unanticipated and difficult to control for the agents.

Secondly, constructivists attribute a greater role to political leaders in shaping the situation and they transcend the challenge/reaction scheme. They emphasize the intersubjective factors of a crisis situation: crisis is interpreted by political actors for the broader public (Structure ←→ Agency). As Mark Blyth (2003) argues, "structures do not come with an instruction sheet", and even exogenous shocks must be interpreted to have a meaning for the people and for politicians as well. Keith Grint is interested in the processes "through which decision-makers persuade their followers, and perhaps themselves, that a certain kind of action is required". He adds that "…leadership involves the social construction of the context that both legitimates a particular form of action and constitutes the world in the process.…[The question is] not what is the situation, but how it is situated." (Grint, 2005, pp.

1469-1471, italics original). Wesley W. Widmaier and his colleagues aim to give a "constructivist analysis of wars and crises, which we define as events which agents intersubjectively interpret as necessitating change." (Widmaier, Blyth, & Seabrooke, 2007, p. 748). Recalling historical cases Joseph S. Nye emphasizes that "…leaders sometimes help to enlarge a crisis and exacerbate the distress that triggers the process of charisma creation" (Nye, 2008, p. 57).

A third perspective, usually neglected in the literature, is the role of agency beyond interpreting an external shock, that is generating crises (Structure ← Agency). This missing case emerges in politics if the radicalized version of the constructivist approach is accompanied with a robust role of voluntarist political agency, where the crisis is "invented" by the agent(s). Intersubjective processes of "meaning making" begin to play a role after this invention took place. As Hook's (1957) concept of the "event-making man" evaporated from the literature, this robust role of political agents is taken into consideration only in connection with revolutionary leaders. Robert C. Tucker notes that in the case of revolutionary leaders we can see "…how an act of leadership can be self-fulfilling: it can help bring about the very situation that the leader has diagnosed as already existing." (Tucker, 1981, p. 113). The first aim of this paper is to highlight the role of leadership in endogenously created crises.

But what if we conceive these perspectives as just different types of relations between leaders and crisis situations? In that case, bringing together those perspectives would be a legitimate goal, because each can be useful in enlightening different types of crises. Bearing this in mind, the second aim of this paper is to establish a conceptual typology that is able to incorporate all these approaches. Our central concept in this typology is contingency. Relying heavily on the works of Kari Palonen (1998, 2001), we describe contingency as the nature of relations between structure and agency. Contingency can serve both as a constraint on political action (as in The Prince of Machiavelli) as well as a means for such action (as in the works of Max Weber). We take crisis, as a situation with an extraordinarily high level of contingency, to highlight this "dual nature" of contingency for political agency. This concept, in our view, is suitable to soften the rigidity of the structure-agency dualism. In this paper we focus on incumbent leaders, who lead crisis governments (Corwin, 1978, p. 78; Edinger, 1967, p. 15, 1975, p. 257; Kellerman, 1984, p. 71; Rossiter, 1948, p. 3) and who make things happen that would not happen otherwise (Blondel, 1987, p. 3; Cronin, 1980, p. 372; McFarland, 1969, p. 155).

Based on this conceptual framework, our paper provides a general typology of contingency, i.e. the relationship between political agency (leadership) and structure/structural change (crisis), and sets out empirical examples within it. Such a typology can serve gen-

erally "as a heuristic device to enable us to understand why those charged with decision-making sometimes appear to act in ways that others find incomprehensible." (Grint, 2005, p. 1475). More concretely, it can help in (1) mapping different perspectives concerning the relationship between structural factors and agency during crises; (2) to revitalize a somewhat neglected third perspective noted above.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we define the concept of crisis and give a conceptual differentiation related to contingency. Second, we analyse the possible relationships between contingency and political action and differentiate between two types of contingency, drawing on Palonen's comparison of the Machiavellian and the Weberian Moments. Third, we develop a fourfold typology of the relationship between political agency and different states of affairs: normalcy and three different types of crisis. Each type will be highlighted through empirical examples. Finally, we draw a few conclusions.

2. Crisis and Contingency

First of all, we need to clarify what we mean by crisis. One of the recent papers on crisis and leadership defined the former with three criteria: threat, uncertainty, and urgency (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005). By threat we mean high-stake politics, which characterizes crises, vis-a-vis low-stake politics in normal times. Urgency here means a commanding necessity of action in the case of crisis, which is absent in the case of normality, when the pressure for urgent action is not present or low. In this paper, we focus mainly on the second component, uncertainty, identifying it as a subtype of a broader concept, contingency. Contingency can mean indeterminacy ("It could be different"), or uncertainty ("We cannot know") (Schedler, 2007). We assume that contingency is present both in states of the normal functioning of politics and in times of crisis. But while in the former it is usually indeterminacy, in crisis situations it can rather be characterized as uncertainty. The factor that distinguishes the two is the presence (in case of indeterminacy) of rules, conventions and authorities that reduce the spectrum of possible choices. The formulation of Michael Oakeshott properly describes indeterminacy in the normal state of affairs:

> "But in stipulating general conditions for choosing less incidental than the choices themselves, in establishing relationships more durable than those which emerge and melt away in transactions to satisfy a succession of contingent wants, and in articulating rules and duties which are indifferent to the outcome of the actions they govern, it may be said to endow human conduct with a formality in which its contingency is somewhat abated." (Oakeshott, 1990, p. 74)

In a crisis situation it is precisely these "rules and duties" (and conventions, authorities) that become dubious, thereby making the political situation uncertain.[1]

The difference in the nature of uncertainty from that of indeterminacy can also be highlighted by the Knightian conceptual differentiation between risk and uncertainty familiar from economics. While risk is measurable and calculable (because conditions are known, as in the case of roulette or chess, or generally in game theory), uncertainty is not (because conditions are not known, and we cannot make predictions). Therefore, it is not only the higher intensity, but the different nature of contingency that differentiates crisis situations from normal states Uncertainty, rather than risk, characterizes crisis and extraordinary situations.

In section 3, drawing on Kari Palonen's work, we will try to relate the concept of contingency to that of agency. Thereafter (in section 4), relying on Palonen's differentiation between two types of contingency (Machiavellian and Weberian) we try to set up a two-dimensional theoretical framework for analyzing crisis situations and types of political action. The typology provides not only a useful analytical framework, but reveals the role of leadership in the case of endogenously created crises, which is neglected in the literature. We claim that crises and exceptional situations might be engendered endogenously, by political agency.

3. Palonen's Distinction: Background vs. Operative Contingency[2]

To establish a connection between contingency and political agency, we use a work by Kari Palonen (1998) as a point of departure. Palonen differentiates between the "Machiavellian Moment" (cf. Pocock, 1975) and what he calls the "Weberian Moment". His main argument, roughly summarized, is that while in the

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[1] This difference can be exemplified by two different uses of the same metaphor. In Michael Oakeshott's famous formulation, politicians "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" where the "enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel" (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 60). This can be taken as the general characterization of political activity that also applies in the normal state of politics. The other use can be taken as a paradigm of crisis: politicians in crisis resemble "river oarsmen who…suddenly find themselves called upon to navigate their boat in mid-ocean" (Tocqueville, 1896, p. 106).

[2] Our reading here relies heavily on Kari Palonen's distinction between Machiavelli and Weber, a distinction to be made clear at the end of this section. His reading, in our view, has great analytical merits, but *The Prince* can also be interpreted in a different way, i.e. as a work that supposes a more complex relationship between *fortuna* and *virtú* (see e.g. Pocock, 1975, pp. 156-182), or one that lays a greater emphasis on agency and character, and therefore rather stresses the similarities between the views of Machiavelli and Weber (see e.g. Philp, 2007, pp. 37-96). However, here our point of interest lies not in conceptual historical accuracy, but in analytical usefulness.

former contingency is mainly an external challenge for political action, in the latter it becomes its constitutive element. Here we try to summarize briefly the differences between these two "Moments" (see Table 1). These considerations will serve as the foundation of our typology concerning the relationship between political agency and crises.

(1) The background of political action in the Machiavellian Moment is uncertain. The main problem of *The Prince* is the retention of principalities newly acquired through the arms of others and through good fortune. As Machiavelli emphasizes, these cases are when the situation of the rulers is the most difficult, because they cannot rely on traditional legitimacy, only on the "two most inconstant and unstable things". The factors that would nudge uncertainty into indeterminacy are apparently missing. Contrary to that, the historical context of Weber's work is a marked by bureaucratization, which forms a stable background to political action, abating contingency by its rules and standard procedures.

(2) For Machiavelli, the main threat that political action must face is the desolation of *fortuna*, which is compared by him to "raging rivers" in Chapter 25 of *The Prince.* For Weber, the main problem consists not in taming the forces of *fortuna*, but in avoiding the "petrification" of bureaucratic structures. Put differently: his main concern is with the possibility of politics, not with that of order (Palonen, 2001). The difference between the two authors is aptly expressed by their uses of metaphors: while Machiavelli's prince has to erect "defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous" (Machiavelli, 2008, Chapter 25), Weber describes politics as a "strong and slow boring of hard boards" (Weber, 2001, p. 128). The latter in Palonen's interpretation means the opening up of new horizons for political action.

(3) The first, vital task for leaders follows from the above-mentioned features. For Machiavelli's prince, it is *mantenere lo stato*, that is, to maintain his power

and the present form of government. There is undeniably an element of innovation in the Machiavellian view: his image of the fox (Machiavelli, 2008, Chapter 18) implies that *fortuna* can not only be contained, but also utilized to a certain degree, but—at least in Palonen's interpretation—this is a secondary feature; the main concern is still with the exposedness to and the preponderance of *fortuna*. For Weber, the first task of a political leader is to create room for manoeuvre among bureaucratic constraints.

(4) It is worth mentioning that both views of political action can take pathological forms. For Machiavelli, *mantenere lo stato* without some higher aims that bring glory to the prince and benefit to his subjects is detestable (cf. Skinner, 2002, pp. 143-144). In the same vein, Weber is no advocate of adventurous politics that takes risks for their own sake. Although he is worried about the growth of bureaucratic influence, at the same time he also admits its importance as a stable background as far as the possibility of politics can be guaranteed.

(5) As we mentioned before, the main thesis of Palonen's book concerns the position switch of contingency. While in the Machiavellian Moment it is principally (despite the presence of the figure of the fox) external to political action, a challenge that has to be overcome, in the Weberian Moment it becomes an element of political action itself. Where the foremost danger is seen in the ravaging power of *fortuna* (a symbol of contingency), politics is logically directed *against* contingency. But in a bureaucratized world contingency is linked with freedom from the bureaucratic structure. Therefore, politicians act not against, but *through* contingency.

(6) As the last point implicates, contingency changes from a background condition (*fortuna*) into an operative element. This distinction between background and operative contingency will form the basis of our analytical typology of the relationship between political action and crisis presented in the next part.

Table 1. Comparison of the Machiavellian and the Weberian moment.

	Machiavellian Moment	**Weberian Moment**
Background of political action	Uncertain (newly acquired rule)	Stable (age of bureaucratization)
Main threat	External shocks (*fortuna*)	Stagnation, "petrification" of bureaucratic structures
Main task of the leader	Reduce contingency, assure security and order (metaphor: erecting "defences and barriers")	Create room for manoeuvre (metaphor: "boring of hard boards") through increasing contingency
Pathological form	Mere defence of the status quo	Constant subversion, irresponsible action that endangers the state
Connection between action and contingency	Acting against contingency (politics = *Spiel gegen die Kontingenz*)	Acting through contingency (politics = *Spiel durch die Kontingenz*)
Types of contingency	**Background contingency** (*Kontingenz des Handelns*)	**Operative contingency** (*Kontingenz im Handeln*)

4. An Analytical Typology and Empirical Examples

Up to this point, we have claimed that (1) a crisis situation is marked by the presence of a subtype of contingency: uncertainty; and (2) that contingency can be both the background condition and a constitutive element of political agency. In this section, first, we will set up an analytical typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis, thereby interrelating the two above-mentioned conceptual distinctions. Second, we will give empirical examples to make our typology more plausible. Our focus will be on the working of operative contingency through re-interpretation of a hitherto exogenous understanding of crisis (quadrant C) and through *endogenous* crisis-generation by creative political agency (quadrant D). Although there are no clear cases, we hope our examples will help to clarify the difference between operative and background contingency.

The conceptual analysis of contingency by Palonen provides an appropriate starting point to construct an analytical typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis. The two types of contingency form the two dimensions of the matrix in Table 2. As mentioned before, we assume—following Oakeshott—that there is contingency in *every* political situation. However, where both types of contingency are low, we can speak of a normal state of affairs (quadrant A). Here conventions (using the term in the broadest sense, including the usual procedures, behavioural patterns of politicians, the legal order etc.) are challenged neither by an exogenous shock nor by political agents. In the three other quadrants, the sum of the two types of contingency are higher; therefore in these cases we can speak of crisis situations.[3]

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[3] A clarifying note: for Weber, in contrast to the Kairos-thinkers, the distinction between normal and extraordinary situations is not an important one: political chances are ubiquitous. However, when Weber denies the importance of extraordinary situations, he speaks of them as *prerequisites* for political action; while in quadrant C and especially in quadrant D of our typology, crises or extraordinary situations are rather the *outcomes* of political action.

Table 2. Typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis.

	low	level of background contingency	*high*
low	**A - normal state of affairs** 1. no shock / crisis 2. contingency mainly indeterminacy 3. no exceptional time-stress for decisions and actions 4. no threat to norms, institutions, conventions 5. innovation is not needed 6. main goal of actors: to follow their aims within the given institutional framework		**B - crisis as exogenous shock** 1. crisis situation: exogenous shock 2. contingency mainly uncertainty 3. exceptional time-stress for decisions and actions 4. institutions are threatened, but they are defended through adjustment 5. innovation is not needed, conventional crisis management is applied 6. main goal of the actor: to immediately reduce the level of contingency, overcome exogenous shock
high (level of operative contingency)	**D - endogenously generated crisis** 1. crisis situation: endogenously generated crisis, no external shock 2. contingency mainly uncertainty, increased to a high level through agency 3. exceptional time-stress generated by deliberate actions 4. institutions are rebuilt or exchanged for new ones 5. innovation: questioning of conventions and conventional authorities 6. main goal of the actor: to widen her/his room for manoeuvre through increasing the level of contingency		**C - crisis re-defined** 1. crisis situation: exogenous shock and endogenous crisis-generation through reinterpretation 2. contingency mainly uncertainty 3. exceptional time-stress for decisions and actions 4. institutions are threatened, and they are restructured through deliberate action 5. innovative crisis-management: questioning of conventions and conventional authorities 6. main goal of the actor: to increase or maintain the level of contingency at a level manageable by herself/himself

A high level of *background contingency* is present in quadrants B and C. By background contingency we mean events that cast doubt on conventions and which are exogenous from the point of view of the political agent.[4] The best examples of exogenous shocks are a global economic crisis, a natural catastrophe, or a declaration of war by another country.

Sense- and meaning-making in crisis situations always have an important role. But when rules and norms are in doubt, the interpretation of the situation by political leaders gains extraordinary importance (cf. Boin et al., 2005, 2008; Hall, 1993), which enhances the role of leadership and political agency. When there is a crisis, leadership always has a choice, in an analytical sense, between attempting to read events within the frame of the existing paradigm, thus trying to reduce contingency immediately, and challenging them and presenting a new paradigm that offers a new meaning of what is going on. Therefore, quadrants B and C can be seen as two different strategies for "crisis exploitation" (Boin et al., 2008), articulated at the level of political theory. The main difference between our approach and previously cited literature on crisis management is that we take into account the possibility of political actors deliberately increasing the stakes (threat), contingency (uncertainty), and the state of emergency (urgency) in a crisis situation, for example through political actions or interpretation. We assume that the type of crisis mostly depends on interpretation, meaning-making, therefore a crisis triggered by an exogenous factor might be brought either into quadrant B or into quadrant C by political agency (redefinition). Endogenous crisis generation in quadrant D, however, is a case in which crisis is not just interpreted or re-defined, but invented.[5]

Unlike quadrants A and B, an elevated level of *operative contingency* is present in quadrants C and D. We speak of operative contingency when the political actor *deliberately* acts or speaks in such a way as to heighten the level of uncertainty, e.g. by questioning conventions or conventional authorities, the existing legal order, etc. The latter often entails a paradigm change (Hall, 1993; cf. Blyth, 2013)[6], i.e. a dramatic

change in policy-making, comparing to policy adjustment (change of settings) or policy reforms (change of instruments, institutions).

In what follows, each type of relationship between political agency and crisis will be explored and a few examples will be provided to highlight the main features thereof.

4.1. Quadrant A: Normal State of Affairs

Quadrant A represents the normal state of affairs, when both background and operative contingency is low, or "normal". No shock or crisis happens, there is no threat to institutions or conventions, and there is no exceptional time-pressure for decisions and actions in the political process. Government policies typically change only slowly and incrementally through adjustment to the policy line of the incumbents or as reactions to the changing circumstances of the given policy area. The changes in the political process are usually not evenly distributed, therefore even the "normal" level of contingency is not a constant, but a fluctuating phenomenon. For example, the democratic succession of rulers usually increases the level of contingency, because early, and even regular elections cause indeterminacy in domestic politics. However, it is within the "normal" level of contingency which prevails in the parliamentary form of government. In other words, "rules and duties", norms and convention are not usually under threat in these cases. Uncertainty is limited to the composition of the next parliament or government. Although there may be changes in public policies, so contingency may rise to a higher level compared to the periods between two elections, this is expected and accepted as "normal" and falls within the boundaries of the predictable way of policy change in parliamentary regimes. One example of the remarkable presence of contingency in the normal state of affairs is the French Fourth Republic up to the 1958 crisis.[7] In one of the most penetrating recent French histories Marcel Merle (1999, pp. 975-976.) argues that under this regime:

> "governmental instability did not always result in political instability….Governmental instabilities were mainly part of a relative continuity, almost making governmental crises into a means of governing."

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[4] Here, we stick once again to Palonen, adopting the viewpoint of "politics-as-activity" instead of "politics-as-sphere" (Palonen, 2003, 2014). Acts of other political actors and consequences of their acts are exogenous to a concrete political actor in an activity-view, while they would be endogenous within the "sphere of politics".

[5] Our approach can be considered as a constructivist viewpoint, which while not ruling out differences between types of crises concerning their interpretability, assumes that all of them can be shaped by interpretation to a certain degree.

[6] Drawing on Hall, by paradigm we mean an interpretative framework of policymaking. "Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be

used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing", states Hall (1993, p. 279.). Policy-paradigm is a *lense for perceiving problems*, a way of cognition of the world and an attitude to the potential modes of dealing with it. Hence, by paradigm change we mean the change of the hierarchy of overarching goals guiding policy.

[7] The First Republic in Italy (1948–1992) can be a similar example for contingency as normal state of affairs.

In his account, the collapse of the Fourth Republic was due not to the frequent governmental changes, but to the regime's inability to decide in colonial issues.

4.2. Quadrant B: Crisis as Exogenous Shock

In quadrant B of our crisis typology, the exogenous shock that seems to question standard practices and policies is managed by the conventional means of crisis management. The political aim is to reduce contingency immediately. This could seem paradoxical, though only at first sight: although exogenous shocks always seem to cast doubt on conventional authorities and/or standard policy-lines, the nature and the gravity of the crisis is not self-evident, but open to debate and contestation. Crisis managers in quadrant B interpret the crisis as an anomaly rather than a systemic problem, which justifies their reliance on conventional means of crisis management.

Exogenous shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks all demand that leaders act immediately. We provide examples of prime ministers who had to face an economic crisis, a terrorist attack, and a natural catasthrope, respectively.

The best example of the strategy of technocratic or "crisis-managing" governments (McDonell & Valbruzzi, 2014) is that of Mario Monti in Italy. Monti was asked to form a new government after Berlusconi's resignation on 12 November 2011. The ultimate purpose of Monti's technocratic government was to manage the Eurozone debt crisis in Italy. The main political parties in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies approved Monti's emergency austerity measures (increased taxes, labour market and pension reform) to steer Italy out of worsening economic conditions and to restore market confidence and financial stability. Although he promised to step down after the passing of the 2012 Budget, he launched a centrist and liberal party called Civic Choice to run for election.

Spanish Prime Minister Jose María Aznar and his ruling Popular Party (PP) were challenged immediately before national elections (14 March 2004) by a series of bomb explosions on four trains heading to one of Madrid's main stations which killed 192 people and wounded 1,430. Until 11 March the governing party had held a comfortable 5 percent lead in the polls over rivals. Although the response of government was quick enough, the government misinterpreted the crisis situation and lost the "meaning-making race". The ruling party blamed the Basque separatist movement, ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) for the terrorist attacks and, instead of facing the facts, doggedly kept to this narrative to the very end. The left-wing opposition Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) easily managed to replace the official storyline with its own version, in which the bomb attacks were regarded a "punishment" by Al-Qaeda for military involvement in the Iraq war

(even though the troops were sent on only a peace-keeping mission). After mass demonstrations with 11 million people (out of a population of 42 million) the PP lost the election (Olmeda, 2008).

4.3. Quadrant C: Crisis Re-Defined

In quadrant C, the levels of both the background contingency and the operational contingency are high. That means: the political actor responds to an external shock not by applying conventional countermeasures, but instead the incumbent may "raise the stakes", interpreting the current circumstances not as an anomaly but as a systemic failure. It is important to note that this means not merely the rhetorical device of emphasizing or exaggerating the gravity of the crisis. That approach is always followed by the reassurance that we know the way out of crisis—which means: the situation is a serious one, but still just an anomaly, which can be cured by the application of the appropriate, routine familiar medicine. Instead of this strategy, our politician in quadrant C (1) dramatizes the crisis in a more systematic way, and (2) couples this dramatization with the questioning of the prevailing *policy-paradigm* (Hall, 1993) or dominant *public philosophy, Zeitgeist* (Mehta, 2011) as well as the conventional authorities. To adopt a metaphor used earlier: while the politician in quadrant B resembles a captain of a ship trying to escape the stormy conditions as quickly as possible, those in quadrants C and D consider the possibility that a storm is not necessarily a bad condition from the viewpoint of the captain. In cases C and D leaders aim to create and/or maintain a high level of contingency, which can be mastered only by themselves (cf. Schabert, 1989).

We have two examples below for quadrant C: the change of the American foreign- and security policy doctrine triggered by the 9/11 crisis by President G. W. Bush and the unorthodox economic crisis-management of the extravagant Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán.

Our first example for quadrant C is the 9/11 attack, which shook the American nation and created a crisis atmosphere for years. The rally round the flag effect provided unprecedented support for G. W. Bush in his new, war president role (Eichenberg, Stoll, & Lebo, 2006; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003): he became temporarily charismatic (Greenstein, 2008). President Bush gave a determined policy-answer, by setting up new authorities and agencies (Department of Homeland Security) as well as by passing through new legislation (US Patriot Act) and by using Presidential War Power, based on Constitutional tradition but also legitimized by Congressional authorization acts. The 9/11 attack was conventionally interpreted as an exogenous challenge which caused a so-called "incomprehensible crisis" (Boin et al., 2008, p. 19.), and which provided the incumbent with a relatively wide space for political in-

terpretation and framing. The "War on Terror", and the "Axis of evil" were original frames for the Bush Doctrine, which turned out to be a new policy-paradigm—it introduced a new era in the American foreign- and security policy and in international relations. The new policy included the concept of pre-emptive strikes, unilateralism and democratic regime change, which has some antecedents in American exceptionalism (Nagan & Hammer, 2004). Bush transformed and extended his role as war president and turned it into an extensive executive unilateralism, using for example presidential signing statements extensively to suspend the application of Congressional laws in public administration (Galvin, 2009). The global "War on Terror" aimed to reduce background contingency. But the preventive military actions against terrorist suspects, the surveillance and detainment, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the replacement of a multilateral policy in international relations with unilateral US dominance (which caused a dissensus even within NATO) meant the increase of operative contingency in world politics. Bush continuously raised the stakes, but by 2005–2006 he lost support within Congress, was challenged by the Supreme Court, and for the last years of his presidency he became a lame duck.

Our second example is the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán's unorthodox financial policy from 2010 onwards. In contrast to the conventional crisis-management of his predecessor, Gordon Bajnai, Orbán provided an unorthodox policy to stabilize the budget and to finance the sovereign debt. After his party Fidesz achieved a landslide victory, gaining 53 % of the votes and more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the 2010 general elections, Orbán used the opportunity to radically re-interpret both the nature of crisis and the suitable crisis-management. He framed his parliamentary "supermajority" in a quasi-revolutionary context ("revolution in the polling-booths") and relying on it he launched a new regime. As newly elected Prime Minister, first he introduced a dramatic crisis narrative (e.g. he compared Hungary to Greece) and applied new, innovative instruments to respond to the crisis. Although Orbán kept the budget deficit below 3% of GDP, which was a requirement of the European Union, he challenged a few conventional policy measures and questioned conventional authorities. In one parliamentary speech he announced:

> "There is no one to copy, no example to follow. At this moment, there are no ready and useful textbooks, at best their contours are being sketched. The new recipes have to be invented by us, during our everyday struggles. It's a sweaty job."[8]

Orbán inserted the problem of budget deficit and indebtedness into a broader crisis narrative in an innovative way. In this narrative he combined first, the international financial crisis of 2008, second, the domestic political crisis triggered by the former socialist Prime Minister, Gyurcsány's Öszöd "lying speech" in 2006 (which was accompanied with enduring anti-government demonstrations and street violence), and third, the transformation in the world economy (globalized financial capitalism) and the decline of the European Union in a global context. Reframing the financial crisis from an exogenous to endogenous phenomenon, Orbán was able to instrumentalize the crisis to blame the left, the liberals, and international organizations like the IMF, and successfully legitimized the revolutionary measures he implemented after getting into power. Through his "freedom fight" Orbán refused to take new parts of the IMF credit line, and refused to accept the IMF and the EU advice on what fiscal and economic policy should be followed. Instead of reducing contingency through implementing the advised adjustment and policy-reforms accompanied by a new IMF loan, Orbán adopted a more risk-taking policy in financing sovereign debt. But this way, being freed from the control of international financial authorities (the IMF), Orbán gained a wider room for manoeuvre in domestic politics.[9] Orbán framed his endeavours to reclaim Hungary's sovereignty vis-a-vis multinational firms, international financial institutions and banks as well as institutions such as the IMF and the EU. Conflicts with such actors increased uncertainty further, and this was exacerbated by the opening to the East and to Russia, which was detrimental to relations with the USA, though it ensured political support from Hungarians with strong national feelings. However, deepening conflicts and increasing contingency by political agency was a *stratagem* to create advantages in domestic politics. Therefore instead of bringing back the *normalcy* of the pre-crisis era, Orbán applied extraordinary measures on a permanent base. Instead of applying pure policy-adjustment to restore the situation *ex ante*, he developed new policies but also a wider political paradigm[10] and successfully mobilized people to support it among the electorate. By and large, Orbán

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[8] Speech for Urgent and Topical Issues Debate, October 24th 2011. Retrieved from http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_

naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=122&p_felsz=10&p_szove g=v%E1ls%E1g&p_felszig=10

[9] His revolutionary measures included crisis taxes on sectors like banking, telecommunication, or commercial industry, or reducing utility prices, but also a massive state intervention even in market and property relations, changing the relation between state and society and drafting and voting on a constitution.

[10] Instead of policy-paradigm (Hall, 1993), which refers to a specific policy field, we can speak about an ideological or general *political* paradigm in Orbán's case, which includes the change in political thinking and philosophy of government in a more general sense.

can be regarded an example of a politician who played not only against (background) contingency, but through (operative) contingency at the same time. In his 2014 Tusványos speech Orbán revealed his attitude towards contingency (as evidence for his view, he both mentions external shocks and policy measures of his government):

> "we are living in a world in which anything can happen….It is practically impossible to forecast events precisely or within an insignificant margin of error."[11]

4.4. Quadrant D: Endogenously Generated Crisis

The situation presented by Quadrant D is reflected only occasionally in the literature. In fact, it is the least obvious or tangible case in our typology. In quadrant D there is no exogenous shock or external threat; the crisis is generated endogenously by political actors to broaden their room for manoeuvre. Uncertainty is increased to a high level through deliberate agency (operative contingency). There is an exceptional time-stress generated by deliberate actions as well. The main goal of the key actor through these innovative actions is to question conventions and conventional authorities. The aim is not simply politicking but to change the balance of power, undermine their rivals' structural position, rebuild institutions or exchange them for new ones (e.g. constitution-making, revolutionary changes). Two examples are provided below to highlight the main features of endogenously generated crises.

Our first example is the "constitutional game" played by French president Charles de Gaulle in 1962 (Gaffney, 2010, pp. 40-44). By this year he had solved the Algerian question (though with a policy switch, rather than the way he promised), and the rebellion of the army was also not an issue anymore. In terms of our categories: the elevated level of background contingency that brought de Gaulle to power in 1958 was gone, the normal state of affairs seemed to be returning. In this political environment, he began to "stir up the calm waters" around himself. Firstly, he alienated his pro-European political allies (the Christian democratic MRP party) with his provocative anti-European speech on 15 May. His motives were clear: de Gaulle had a different vision of the republic to both his allies and his opposition. As Gaffney puts it: "1962 was a dramatic showdown between de Gaulle wanting to reinforce personality politics and almost everyone else trying to dedramatize the republic" (Gaffney, 2010, pp.

42). His strategy was to "move away from some forms of support, to move towards new policy positions" (Gaffney, 2010, p. 41). The second step in this process was the announcement of a referendum on the direct election of the president. After every party apart from his own united and overturned de Gaulle's prime minister, he dissolved the National Assembly, and scheduled the new elections after the referendum. He approached the people in an unconstitutional manner: "There was no basis in his own constitution for what he was doing; what he was doing was asserting the centrality of his own action" (Gaffney, 2010, p. 42).[12] At the end, he clearly won his self-arranged showdown, triumphing both at the referendum and at the following elections. He successfully used operative contingency to ram through and solidify his political vision.

The second example for quadrant D is Viktor Orbán's constitution-making and constitutional policy in Hungary between 2010 and 2014, which is an illuminating case for *endogenous* crisis-generation. But what counts as extraordinary in constitutional politics? Constitution-making is extraordinary by definition, since it means changing the "rules of the game", when the usually invisible *pouvoir constituent* (constitution-making power), i.e. the political sovereign, comes to the fore to be activated (Ackerman, 1998). This exceptional power, however, is supposed to withdraw and give way to normal politics again, after it has done its work. Therefore, constitutional politics is also a form of extraordinary situations, like crisis, when the existing norms, institutions and rules are under threat, a high level of contingency is present, and therefore there is an urgency to re-establish stability according to the scheduled new order. However, the extraordinary qualities of constitution-making—threat, contingency and urgency—can be reduced to a minimum, if it is carried out by an inclusive political consensus of the major political actors, elite groups and other stakeholders.[13] This way, constitution-making can be tamed: contingency is reduced and it is pushed back to the world of normal politics, i.e. to quadrant A in our typology. The constitutional policy of Orbán, however, was far from this "domesticated", consensual version of policy-making. The unilateral constitutional changes and the accompanying legislation modified the balance of powers, curtailed the power of control institutions like the Constitutional Court and the ombudsman, weakened the independence of the judiciary and introduced a more majoritarian electoral system. It also changed the relation between state and society and weakened

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[11] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp. Retrieved from http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp

[12] This unconstitutional strategy clearly separates the case from quadrant A. De Gaulle's strategy clearly transgressed the normal state of affairs.

[13] A consensual constitution-making can be a long-lasting process, where there is time for deliberation and/or bargaining of the parties, in order to reduce contingency and threat.

the separation of Church and State. All of these changes, which were carried out in a style of emergency legislation, threatened the social and political status quo of post-communist politics, and questioned the conventions and conventional authorities of the post-1990 Hungarian regime. This constitutional revolution was neither the consequence of an external shock, nor that of a deep internal constitutional crisis. It was endogenously generated by Orbán's creative political leadership and framing of the situation. Through the policy of permanent constitutional amendments and legislative dumping Orbán kept the level of contingency high and widened his room for manoeuvre to such a great extent as was unprecedented in Hungary since the 1989–1990 democratic transition.

5. Conclusions

This paper aimed to investigate the relation between contingency and political agency. Institutions, including norms, conventions and even the *Zeitgeist* are usually regarded as constraints of agency. In crisis, however, institutions become malleable and may be shaped by political agency. What is an institutional constraint for most political actors is often formed and generated through operative contingency by political agency, as our examples for *endogenous* crisis-generation and the re-definition of the crisis confirmed. Contingency too can be both a problem to overcome or a means of political action. Why, in fact, do creative leaders increase contingency? As we have seen, to increase contingency might have strategic purposes, such as: to widen their room for manoeuvre; to question the prevailing *policy-paradigm* or dominant *public philosophy* and to offer a new paradigm of interpretation of the crisis; to de-legitimize or blame conventional authorities; to offer / apply a new kind of crisis-management; to restructure power relations.

The role of contingency depends on the abilities and goals of the political actor who faces the crisis situation (or creates one). Technocrats, like Monti, were trying to "erect defences and barriers" against *fortuna*, while the agency of de Gaulle or Orbán can rather be characterized as "boring the hard boards" of the institutional arrangement, economic conventions, and authorities. As we saw in their cases, political leaders can not only utilize the higher level of contingency to create a new arrangement (a new state of normalcy) shaped to their wants; they can also try to incorporate an elevated level of contingency into everyday politics, making the state of exception permanent.

This paper aimed to contribute to the field at two levels. On the theoretical one, two contributions can be emphasized. Firstly, we introduced a conceptual typology that offers an overview of the approaches dealing with the relationship between crisis and political agency. This typology in our view can to a certain ex-

tent alleviate the stark distinction between structure and agency through using the same concept (that of contingency) to describe both of them. Contingency, as we have seen, can be a constraining element of the structure that forces the politician to take a certain course of action (background contingency). But at the same time it can become operative, if the political actor wants and is able to take risk (Weber), or continually makes order and recreates chaos (Schabert, 1989). The views of Schabert and Weber point toward a "monist" understanding of political action, where contingency permeates everything and where it is both the barrier to and an element of agency. This view can be contrasted with the "dualist view", where structures and agency are starkly separated, and contingency is a feature of the structure, and the only task of political agency can be to abate it. Secondly, the aim of the typology was not just to add another theoretical perspective to the existing ones (it was not just an end in itself), but it also served as means to call attention to a potential relationship between agency and crisis that has been largely passed over by literature. This relationship is the most voluntaristic—and the "most clearly Weberian"—one, where there is no exogenous shock present, and leaders generate crisis situations themselves (quadrant D).

On the empirical level, two contributions can be mentioned again. Firstly, our typology seems to be useful in comparing different strategies of politicians in roughly similar settings. Monti and Orbán both had to tackle economic consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession, following from the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Although differences in the structural context could be important to different actor strategies, in this case, the difference between strategies is so profound that only structural factors could not account for it. While Orbán incorporated the economic problems into a wider civilisational crisis-narrative, thereby adding operative contingency to the shakiness of international economic background to legitimate extraordinary measures, Monti's strategy was to immediately reduce background contingency by applying to the conventional best practice of economic crisis management. The same can be said about the difference between the Bush and the Aznar case. While the former succeeded in widening his room for manoeuvre after the 9/11 attacks by introducing the "war on terror" narrative to legitimate the policy change initiated later, Aznar sticked to the conventional Spanish governmental reactions after a terrorist attack by blaming ETA to defend his political position in the Iraq war. This difference between situations meant serious consequences for leaders.

Secondly, by shortly analyzing the cases of de Gaulle and Orbán in quadrant D, we tried to highlight a specific type of voluntaristic crisis generation under democratic circumstances: that of the "constitutional

game". We should end with two further remarks on these cases. On the one hand, it could be an interesting task both for leadership studies and democratic theory to uncover further types of voluntaristic crisis generation in modern democracies. On the other hand, the differences between these "constitutional games" could also be worth further research. We touched only on one difference: while de Gaulle increased operative contingency only for a short period, to arrange a "showdown" with his political opponents and to introduce a new state of normalcy, Orbán tried to make the elevated level of contingency permanent, thereby converting the Hungarian constitutional settlement into some kind of a *perpetuum mobile*.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Review

Leadership in Precarious Contexts: Studying Political Leaders after the Global Financial Crisis

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Abstract
A series of crises and traumatic events, such as the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis, seem to have influenced the environment within which modern political leaders act. We explore the scholarly literature on political leadership and crisis since 2008 to evaluate what sorts of questions are being engaged, and identify some new lines of inquiry. We find several scholars are contributing much insight from the perspective of leadership and crisis management. Several analysts are investigating the politics of crisis from a decentralist perspective, focusing on local leadership in response to challenging events. As well, studying how citizens interpret, respond to, or resist leaders' signals is a developing area of inquiry. While our study reveals some debate about the nature of crisis, and whether the context has changed significantly, most of the scholarship reviewed here holds modern politicians face large challenges in exercising leadership within precarious contexts.

Issue
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1. Introduction

The last several years have witnessed a welcome resurgence in the analysis of political leaders and the exercise of leadership. From studies of governance occurring in small municipalities to agency analyses within supranational structures, many new works are reinvigorating this research area. The literature reaches back to the earliest period of recorded history because, since the beginnings of social life, people have taken leadership roles within groups. However, while the phenomenon of leadership always is present in societies, we know that how leaders lead is changeable. Our understanding of leadership and its evaluation necessarily is grounded in our times and our context. The socio-economic environment within which people lead is a prime determinant of how leaders must act to be effective, and how we adjudicate effective leadership.

This environment has been subject to several significant shocks and crisis events over the last fifteen years.

The leadership environment certainly was influenced by the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (GFC), where a complex interplay of lax financial policies and risky lending practices precipitated the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression. Economic growth declined sharply in many states; most governments were forced to take unusual actions to ensure credit liquidity, bolster trade and reassure nervous populations. Importantly, the GFC's effects have not been treated as an isolated set of incidents that were manageable at the margins of the world's political systems. Rather, this economic crisis is prominent among a series of many unfortunate events including terrorist attacks and natural disasters whose net effect seems to have pushed crisis management toward the top of leaders' agendas.

Along with the frequency of recent crisis events, modern political leaders also face several other destabilizing pressures. Massive technological change, the power of social media and the interconnectedness of globalizing markets likely exacerbate the challenge of managing instability. Precisely because political leadership sits at the heart of how we try to understand and explain the functioning of political systems, there seems to be a concerted effort toward exploring how political elites might exercise leadership in contexts marked by change and instability. This shift in scholarship is adding new information and understanding to an understudied area of leadership analysis: how leaders lead in crisis contexts. This burgeoning literature on political leadership draws from several areas of social science, strategic studies and management studies. Authors located in the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Germany, Sweden and other places have contributed some important studies within the last several years. However, the literature's development since the global financial crisis peaked in 2008 has not been seriously explored. So this paper aims to trace the development of the literature concerning political leadership and crisis in the post-GFC era, note its merits and limitations, and mark some of the more promising lines of inquiry.

2. Leadership in Precarious Contexts

In our introductory comments we touched on some of the key events that seem to have altered the context of modern political leadership and so shaped how it is being studied. It is worth briefly considering the literature's characteristics before proceeding to locate and explore the approaches under study here. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 there were not many mainstream political scientists who focused explicitly and consistently on understanding how politicians exercise leadership in contexts marked by instability, ambiguity or crisis. Following James McGregor Burns' approach in his foundational work, leadership often was considered as the consequence of an "array of political motives applied to a structure of political opportunity"(Burns, 1978, p. 105). Rare indeed were texts that studiously investigated how politicians operate in conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity. Unlike colleagues in political economy who consciously and methodically incorporated these elements into their models, most political scientists tended to consider how leaders led in stable, routinized environments (Knight, 1971; Mueller, 2001). Of course, a few works such as Graeme Allison's classic study *The Essence of Decision* probed how leaders and bureaucracies produce decisions within crisis contexts (Allison, 1971), and some analysts such as F.G. Bailey and Murray Edelman explored how leaders might bend informational ambiguity or situational uncertainty to their ends

(Bailey, 1988; Edelman, 1988). In analyses of individual leaders, a handful of scholars such as Alistair Cole and Robert Elgie carefully focused on how leaders approach decision-making in unstable environments or crisis periods (Cole, 1994; Elgie, 1993). Such studies, however, by far were the exception rather than the rule.

The fall of the World Trade Center Towers in 2001 was the first of a series of traumatic events that have occurred over the last fifteen years. In 2004 the Madrid train bombings were a particularly deadly attack that occurred mere days before general elections in Spain. Hurricane Katrina, the costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States, struck in the summer of 2005. It revealed governmental chaos and widespread disorganization in coordinating emergency response resources. In April of 2010, a volcano eruption in Iceland sent a giant ash cloud several miles into the atmosphere, crippling European aviation and stranding 10.5 million passengers (Kuipers & Boin, 2015, pp. 196-197). A massive earthquake and tsunami struck Japan in March of 2011, disabling one of the world's largest nuclear power stations and mobilizing deep public anxiety about nuclear power in many other states such as Germany and Italy. The Fukuyama Daiichi nuclear crisis focused the world's attention on key questions of governmental transparency, public accountability and emergency management capacity.

The brief review of several traumatic events that occurred since 2001 helps to explain why there is renewed interest in studying the role of governments in managing such crises and the responsibility of leaders to their publics. One of the main treatments exploring how leaders and public administrators ought to understand and manage crisis events was Arjen Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius' 2005 study, *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure* (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005). While administrative studies of emergency management measures was an established literature long before 9/11, Boin et al.'s book was among the first new treatments to connect this literature with the core questions of political leadership. Its basic argument—that crisis management had become a defining feature of contemporary governance—was taken up and explored in several later works such as *Governing After Crises: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning* (Boin, McConnell, & 't Hart, 2008).

The arrival of the global financial crisis and its aftershocks in the form of associated events like the 2008 riots in Greece and the 2009 Euro zone crisis simply further demonstrated that disorder seemed to be a hallmark of the new world order. The GFC began in 2006 with a decline in housing prices in several southern US states. Eventually the US mortgage market collapsed, along with sharp international declines in real estate valuation, firm failures, runs on banks and intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Iceland and

Ireland. Oliver Blanchard, an IMF economist, estimated that the total losses caused by the GFC exceed $4,700 billion (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013, p. 543).

The GFC had large negative effects on most western economies and its influence was broadly distributed across states and regimes. Part of the public's reaction to the GFC was found in the widespread perplexity that modern economic systems are so intertwined, and so vulnerable to relatively sudden dislocation. The recession initiated in 2008 proved to be a difficult period for governments to address in terms of how to reassure nervous publics, calm investors, encourage growth and moderate deficits. At the time of writing, many governments continue to hope the end of this period is at hand, as they search for a path toward economic stability. For scholars, the GFC provides an opportunity to examine whether and, if so, how analysts are approaching the role of crisis in the exercise of power. If we understand modern governance to take place in a perennially fraught environment (as some people do), then are we studying the interplay between political elites, their entourages, experts and citizens with respect to crisis management? If this is under consideration, how are we approaching crisis leadership?

3. The Study of Political Leadership and Crisis since 2008

To survey how political leadership is being studied since 2008, we identified recent work published from January of 2009 to December of 2015. In part owing to our mission to understand how the literature has developed over the last eight years or so, and because monographs can require much production time, the focus is on scholarly articles. We used two search methods in particular to identify suitable works. First we searched the Thomson Reuters *Web of Science* database. This database is particularly helpful because it concentrates on peer-reviewed scientific publications, and largely excludes single-authored books and edited essay collections. Indeed, its promoters claim it is the world's largest collection of research publications (Thomson Reuters, 2016). As well, we also searched the Google Scholar database, as it is a leading source for scholarly publication and captures some publications that are not collected by the *Web of Science.* There are a wide variety of studies within the general category of "leadership". However, many of these concern issues beyond our specific interests, such as studies measuring social relationships in music ensembles, or how to use literacy coaching to support inner city high school teachers. Using English-language parameters we narrowed our search and looked specifically for scholarly articles with the words "political leadership" and "crisis" as topics. This strategy generated the location of most of the texts under discussion below.

We then parsed the search results to identify the sorts of studies that are the focus of our attention. Because we wanted to consider political leadership, rather than other kinds, we concentrated on publications located within the social science areas of government and law, and within the core disciplinary journals. This search strategy identified 81 relevant articles. Because we're interested in the active scholarship concerning crisis leadership, we then excluded works shorter than ten pages in length, and some that clearly concerned other fields of inquiry such as health policy research. So we were left with 54 English-language journal articles concerning political leadership and crisis. A reviewer kindly directed out attention toward one additional study. We accessed this set of 55 papers and read them with view toward identifying some main approaches and common areas of interest. As a product of this additional scrutiny, the set of papers under study was further narrowed. Owing to the significant size of the literature and the balance of its content, below we discuss three distinct approaches to studying crisis leadership that are common ones within our literature collection, rather than creating an exhaustive accounting of all the individual works. Thus we examine 26 scholarly papers published in 25 journals from January of 2009 to December of 2015.

Our search suggests the subject of how political leaders engaged a specific crisis is a relatively common research focus. Since 2008, and in the context of the conclusion of the global financial crisis, researchers actively have been engaging crisis leadership. As stated above, in light of the many crises that have beset public leaders in recent years, we expected that there would be at least some minimal treatment of this topic in newly published research. Our group of studies may be divided further into three sorts: studies that approach crisis leadership from a centralist perspective; those that approach crisis leadership from a decentralist perspective; and those focusing on followership. We begin with a review of the first grouping of centralist approaches in part because it is by far the largest set of studies within our search results, and also because it provides a helpful contrast to the other groupings as discussed below.

3.1. Centralist Perspectives on Crisis Leadership: The Boin–'t Hart–McConnell School

Within our set of leadership studies we noticed that a significant number of authors adopted a centralist approach. This is to say that generally these authors examined crises at the national level, and by means of focusing on how leaders at the political center managed crises strategically. As mentioned above, the 2005 text by Arjen Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius was an important study. One of its most helpful insights is the overarching assertion that crises are political at heart (Boin et al., 2005, p. ix). For leadership

scholars, *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure* was innovative because it married some traditional, centralist perspectives found in the crisis management literature to some of the core questions within the political leadership literature. It bridged the two literatures, and revealed several ways in which the discussions of crisis management and effective public leadership could enrich each other. Our search for new works on crisis and political leadership uncovered several studies by some of these same authors. Owing to the role of Boin, 't Hart and McConnell in particular in terms of working as a team as well as in co-authoring with other colleagues, and in view of the scope of their contributions and their analytical consistency, here we refer to this scholarship cluster as the Boin–'t Hart–McConnell School.

Toward identifying the new work on crisis leadership that has appeared since the GFC, in January of 2009 an article titled "Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests" appeared in the *Journal of European Public Policy* (Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009). Boin, 't Hart and McConnell built on some earlier work on the framing of crises, and here approached crises as an exercise in blame management. They observed crises often produce change as a consequence of destabilizing power and authority relationships. However, it is difficult to predict with any certainty how changes will unfold. Relying on fifteen in-depth cases studies, the article attempted to formulate a theory of crisis exploitation, which is defined as the "purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies" (Boin et al., 2009, p. 83). The authors concluded that crisis exploitation strategies matter. Political incumbents are likely to survive the political game of crisis exploitation if they start out with a good stock of political capital, cogently communicate their framing of the crisis, have not held office for very long, and benefit from the perception that the cause of the crisis is exogenous. As well, they noted it may be advantageous to have an expert commission as the main locus of inquiry about the crisis (Boin et al., 2009, p. 100).

This line of inquiry was supplemented a year later with another study of the politics of blame. Boin, Preston, 't Hart, and McConnell noted much attention traditionally has been paid to the "acute response" phase of crises, where critical decisions are made and communicated to frightened publics (Boin, Preston, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2010, p. 706). However, the post-crisis phase, or the "crisis after the crisis", increasingly is marked by intense politicization. In a single-case study of the Hurricane Katrina crisis, Boin et al. (2010) took a new tack and focused on evaluating to what degree a politician's personal leadership style explains the outcomes of crisis-induced blame games. They concluded President George W. Bush's leadership style was ill fit-

ted to the sort of crisis he tried to manage. As well, his past decisions in the form of patronage appointments to key emergency management posts along with his proclivity to not change course despite political criticism all combined to exacerbate the public's perception of leadership failure (Boin et al., 2010, p. 720).

Alongside these analyses of blame shifting and crisis, another strand of research began to surface. Building on two articles in 2008 and 2009 co-authored with Mark Rhinard on the European Union's role in managing transboundary threats and building transnational crisis management capacity, Boin introduced a new sort of crisis (Boin & Rhinhard, 2008; Rhinhard & Boin, 2009). Crafted as the introduction to a special issue of the *Review of Policy Research*, Boin's essay is titled "The New World of Crises and Crisis Management: Implications for Policymaking and Research". He argued that the world of crises and disasters is shifting, and such change presented new challenges to political-administrative elites as well as researchers (Boin, 2009, p. 367). A sketch of a theoretical ideal-type of the modern crisis is presented.

This new type, which he termed a transboundary crisis, is founded upon the traditional notion of crisis and its three core concepts of threat, urgency and uncertainty. However, transboundary crises are different because they emanate from the "tightly woven web" of critical infrastructures that characterize modern society and they can easily cross geographical borders (Boin, 2009, p. 368). He suggested as well that transboundary crises also may jump across functional and productive systems, such as moving from the auto production system to the credit system, as well across time. Unlike normal crises which have clear beginning and end points, Boin argued these new types of crises cannot be pinpointed in time because their roots are found deep within social systems and their effects may not be perceived for several years. Owing to their quick mobility, systemic depth and geographical breadth, political authorities face many challenges in deciding who ought to take responsibility for these events and also in appreciating the significant damage potential such episodes represent (Boin, 2009, pp. 368-369).

This new thinking about the nature of transboundary crises was advanced in 2014 with the publication of an additional research paper. Arjen Boin, Mark Rhinard and Magnus Ekengren observed "the EU has modest but promising capacities to assist member states overwhelmed by disaster…But these capacities do not suffice in the face of transboundary crises: threats that cross geographical and policy borders within the Union" (Boin, Rhinard, & Ekengren, 2014, p. 131). Owing to its nature, transboundary crisis management requires international co-ordination and co-operation. However, they pointed out the European Union has limited capacities to facilitate a joint response to a transboundary threat confronting multiple member

states. They found the "EU is still far removed from acting in an autonomous fashion in response to transboundary crises", although any future crises likely will provide some impetus to move to a more integrated approach (Boin et al., 2014, p. 140). These analysts supported the EU's adoption of a more active and explicit role in establishing a vision and a widely supported plan for transboundary crisis management.

In a review article published in *Cooperation and Conflict*, Paul 't Hart and Bengt Sundelius similarly aimed to call attention to the modern leadership challenges of crisis management, particularly with respect to increasing EU capacity to act quickly and cohesively ('t Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Revisiting an agenda they proposed for European crisis management research and preparedness training a decade and a half earlier, they noted the "strategic use of fear has become part and parcel of our world" ('t Hart & Sundelius, 2013, p. 445). Drawing on several of Boin et al.'s observations about the nature of transboundary crises, 't Hart and Sundelius offered European leaders eight updated recommendations for strengthening modern crisis management efforts (Boin & Ekengren, 2009; Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinhard, 2013; Boin, 't Hart & McConnell, 2009). They noted that since their original agenda was formulated, international social science research on risk and crises has proliferated and so deepened governmental capacity in many states. However, they argued for more systematic study of EU crisis management practices, and more capacity to link and deploy experts and expertise to supply "instant" analytical support in times of great need ('t Hart & Sundelius, 2013, p. 457).

So, the development and enrichment of the transboundary crises concept has been an innovative, helpful contribution to thinking about crisis leadership. School members carefully have studied several key aspects of the EU's emergency response capacities in light of the new crisis context, argued for more expert analysis on how to manage modern crises, and for more institutionalization of response capacity and decision co-ordination across the member states. Moreover, they convincingly argued for more institutionalized connections between and among researchers, bureaucrats and political decision-makers toward increasing the EU's crisis management capacity. As 't Hart and Sundelius concluded, the foreseeable future "will require timely and strong political leadership to ensure European governments, European businesses and responsible European institutions will not be caught unprepared…This is not a call for one further instance of Brussels' usurping national sovereignty. It is about developing a flexible capacity for joint problem-solving in the face of common, trans-boundary risk and threat affecting all Member States" ('t Hart & Sundelius, 2013, p. 457).

In its scholarly publications since 2008, the School

has contributed in a few other areas to the study of crisis leadership. First, the evaluation of leaders has been engaged in three essays. The question of how to assess the exercise of leadership is one of the traditional narratives within the mainstream political leadership literature. However, though a risk management lens, the task takes on more complexity. In 2011 Paul 't Hart penned a short article on evaluating public leadership. He held "our expectations of leaders and leadership are embedded in our underlying ideas about good government" and these criteria have been subject to change in values, cultures and dominant coalitions ('t Hart, 2011, p. 324). For him, public leadership assessment rests on three discrete qualities that interrelate with each other: prudence, support and trustworthiness. 't Hart carefully connected good leadership to the community's need for safety and stability. He wrote that it "mobilizes collective wisdom, that elusive and intricate mix of analytical judgement, discernment, intuition and comprehension…Effective public leadership is about provoking, enabling, and protecting the work others need to do to enable the community as a whole to address their most significant challenges" ('t Hart, 2011, p. 326).

Two years later Arjen Boin, Sanneke Kuipers and Werner Overdijk published "Leadership in Times of Crisis: A Framework for Assessment" (Boin, Kuipers, & Overdijk, 2013). They referenced 't Hart's 2011 essay, and asked how can leadership performance during a crisis be reasonably assessed? In light of the argument that crises pose ever more difficult challenges for bureaucracies, and that modern governance structures and cultures are not well designed to cope with radically novel situations, they set out to delineate what crisis leaders ought to do (Boin et al., 2013, p. 87) They proceeded to itemize the ten key tasks crisis management leaders face, including early recognition of threats, sense-making, orchestrating vertical and horizontal co-ordination, rendering accountability and enhancing organizational resiliency. In 2015 Annika Brändström authored an analysis of "Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden". She examined ten crisis events in Sweden to evaluate ministerial survival, and drew from Boin et al.'s (2005, 2010) work on blame management during crisis to support her study (Brändström, 2015, p. 307). All three of these articles helpfully underscore that public evaluations of effective crisis leadership rest heavily on the expectations of citizens and communities; there is no independent measure for judging good crisis leadership. So one lesson to be drawn from these analyses is that polities ought to decide for themselves what sorts of normative behaviors or actions they desire on the part of crisis managers. In this way, then, leaders who manage crisis may be assessed more clearly, consistently and fairly, without necessarily lapsing into blame game politics or impressionistic judgments about performance.

A second area of research concerns information dissemination and crisis. Andrew Hindmoor and Allan McConnell focused analytic attention on why the warning signals of an impending financial crisis seemed to be ignored by political elites, treasury officials and financial regulators (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2013, 2015). They noted "in the crisis and disaster literature, it is well accepted that failure is not the product of a single, context-free phenomenon. Rather, failure is the product of multiple individual, institutional and societal factors that coalesce in pathological ways" (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015, p. 66). They explored the nature of institutional signaling and retrospective evaluation to conclude key decision-makers, leaders, financial regulators and bank executives failed to spot evidence of the impending financial crisis in the UK. So in fact it was not easy or possible to anticipate the crisis that unfolded.

In a similar vein is a 2012 contribution from this school that merits attention. Titled "Prime Ministerial Rhetoric and Recession Politics: Meaning Making in Economic Crisis Management", it focused on how the UK, Irish and Australian prime ministers tried to publicly explain, assess and account for the global financial crisis and its consequences. In many respects this study compares with other essays focusing on crisis leadership and blame shifting as mentioned above. At the same time, it is quite unique in several ways. For example, the authors pointed out that although rhetorical perspectives on political leadership have a "long and venerable tradition," and crisis rhetoric has been intensively studied in the American case, this is not true for parliamentary systems (Masters & 't Hart, 2012, p. 760). They concluded that, owing to systemic differences, prime ministers face more pressure to manage meaning and blame than their presidential counterparts. So, in the face of similar crisis conditions, leaders may face more complexity, or less, in responding to traumatic events owing to institutional factors. They suggested further comparative analysis will help to explain the mediating effects of institutional structures on leadership styles (Masters & 't Hart, 2012, p. 775). This is a superb study that, along with the others reviewed above, nicely demonstrates how this School's authors have taken up some of the traditional research questions in the field of political leadership and produced innovative, fresh thinking about modern crisis leadership.

The influence of the School extends well beyond its stable of active authors. The sort of analysis it undertakes, and its particular success in revisiting some core questions about the nature of leadership within the modern context and from the perspective of crisis management, has led a few other analysts to till this particularly fertile field of scholarship. For example, in their 2015 study of how European political leaders made sense of the Euro Crisis, Femke van Esch and Marij Swinkels examined whether incorporating leaders'

personality traits will increase understanding of how leaders interpreted the crisis context. This article adopted a deep textual analysis method to test its core hypothesis. Many of its key conceptualizations mirror those of the School, especially concerning what constitutes a crisis and why leaders engage in sense-making behavior (van Esch & Swinkels, 2015, p. 1214). The Boin–'t Hart–McConnell approach to studying modern crisis leadership has provided an intellectually rich and credible foundation upon which to establish new research initiatives in this field of study.

3.2. Decentralist Perspectives on Crisis Leadership

All of the articles discussed to this point are rather state-centric in their focus. This is to say that they share, as Daniel P. Aldrich put it, a "single-minded focus on the state and the market as the core mechanisms for developing both disaster-resistant societies and recovery schemes" (Aldrich, 2011, p. 61). Our search for new scholarly treatments of political leadership under crisis revealed several analyses that merit recognition for their decentralist perspective. In a *Policy and Politics* article titled "Local Government and Structural Crisis: An Interpretive Approach", Kevin Orr suggested many analysts (including those within the School) remain uninterested in the underlying causes of crises or the structural context in which they occur (Orr, 2009, p. 40). Orr pointed out that local government, although often ignored in crisis treatments, is an important site for exploring crisis as it is a part of government that is particularly exposed to direct expressions of crisis (Orr, 2009, p. 44).[1] He concluded that the UK case finds "leaders do not simply manage 'objective' crises, but may also choose to construct crises in order to pursue particular courses of action" (Orr, 2009, p. 52).

Orr's focus on crisis as a discourse that can be constructed and manipulated is similar to Benjamin Moffitt's treatise on "How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Populism". Moffitt held "crises are never 'neutral' phenomena but must be mediated and 'performed' by certain actors" (Moffitt, 2015, p. 190). Rather than being external to populism, crisis should be acknowledged as a feature that is internal to populism. So, in a sense, "if we do not have the performance of crisis, we do not have populism" (Moffitt, 2015, p. 191). The notion that leaders address crisis through the prism of institutionally- bounded performance is explored in John Gaffney's study of "Political Leadership and the Politics of Performance: France, Syria and the Chemical Weapons Crisis of 2013". Gaffney concluded that the institution of the French presidency obliges its incumbent to

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[1] For a clear and detailed account of the virtues of keeping crisis decision-making close to local authorities, see Shinoda (2013).

be "on stage" permanently (Gaffney, 2014, p. 223).

The Orr, Moffitt and Gaffney studies exemplify an approach to crisis and political leadership that moves beyond considering crises as rather unidimensional exogenous shocks that must be managed by experts and politicians. Rather from their particular vantage points they inquire into the structure, and the structuring, of crisis events. Each author suggests that crises can influence the distribution of resources and power, and so precarious leadership contexts may be understood to have a subtle utility. In engaging crises leaders can gain, or lose, resources. And so in focusing on the deeper meaning of crisis events and their role in structuring community power, these studies are similar to another category of approach that appeared in our search: the heresthetics of crisis leadership.

In their study titled "Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope", James H. Read and Ian Shapiro examined how leaders manage to resolve chronic community conflict in cases such as the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, and racial conflict in South Africa. These authors explored how leaders might undertake "strategically hopeful action" which is a certain kind of "calculated risk-taking in the face of imponderably complex circumstances" (Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 41). In their persuasive analysis of how leaders can initiate co-operation across divided communities, the authors referenced William Riker's work on heresthetics, or the "art of political manipulation" (Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 46). Their treatment emphasizes that routine leadership cannot resolve deep conflict because ordinary political incentives simply reinforce the status quo (Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 52).

Riker's heresthetic approach was employed by Tim Heppell to study David Cameron's Conservative party. He suggested particularly that it is the transformation of the Conservatives from a state of "'systemic crisis' to stalling the realignment of the left and establishing a realignment of the right" that merits investigation (Heppell, 2013, p. 264). In a careful account, Heppell aimed to reveal the logic of Cameron's coalition deal with the Liberal Democrats and his effort to reconstruct the political centre in the United Kingdom. The author concluded that "the concept of heresthetics reminds us that political agency matters. It directs us toward the idea that skillful political leaders can outmaneuver political adversaries, can redefine political situations, can reframe policy options, can manipulate agendas and can change the process through which political debates and decisions are undertaken (Heppell, 2013, p. 277). The Read and Shapiro study along with the Heppell analysis underscore that some kinds of crisis are not simply random, exogenous shocks. Crisis may originate in long simmering organizational fractures that foster deeply held animosities. Their resolution requires the skills of a master heresthetician to fundamentally change the underlying communal dy-

namics for the benefit of the group. Therefore certain contexts may indeed require a specific sort of extraordinary leadership that lies beyond the crisis-resolution capacities of the state, the market and the ordinary exercise of power.

3.3. Followership Studies

Our search of the scholarly literature published in the wake of the global financial crisis revealed another kind of focus for leadership scholars: followers. Here analysts represent a variety of approaches and address quite different conundrums, yet there is an interesting commonality in their focus. For example, in 2011 Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll inquired why the services directive proposed by Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein provoked such a backlash in France, as well as in Sweden, Belgium, Germany and Italy. They asserted their findings illustrate the importance of political leadership in institutional development, particularly vis-à-vis understanding resistance (Grossman & Woll, 2011, p. 346). Although France consistently has scored highest on economic fear measures since the early 2000s, they concluded the virulent reaction to the Bolkestein directive was rooted in a leadership crisis within the Socialist Party (Grossman & Woll, 2011, p. 360).

Geoffrey Evans and Kat Chzhen also focused on public reaction to the GFC and a decline in leader reputation to explain voters' defection from the British Labour party. After examining individual-level panel data to compare possible explanations, they concluded that, despite its magnitude and global significance, the 2008 financial crisis had a limited impact on the 2010 election in part because the event was not specific to Britain. So the attribution of responsibility could therefore be broadened (Evans & Chzhen, 2013, p. 9). Neil Robinson, in a paper titled "Russia's Response to Crisis: The Paradox of Success", underscored Russia's experience with the GFC was unusual: after the event's initial, deep impact the economy recovered relatively quickly. Russia did not plunge into recession for as long as some other countries. Echoing the Evans and Chzhen findings, Robinson noted extant treatments assume incumbent governments are less likely to be blamed by their citizenry when economic shocks are exogenous, as in the case of the GFC (Robinson, 2013, p. 451). However, in the Russian case, citizens perceived the economy was recovering without getting better even though economic growth returned in 2009. He found this view arose partly because the financial crisis was seen as a manifestation of deeper problems and that a recovery that failed to deal with these problems was perceived to lack worth (Robinson, 2013, p. 469). So, leaders' miscommunications and strategic errors worked to perpetuate citizens' sense of economic dislocation long after the recovery had begun.

These three studies helpfully signal how the literature is evolving. First, and importantly, all three clearly are concerned to understand and explain public views and reactions. This is a welcome and necessary counterweight to a strong tendency among leadership scholars to focus on the decision-makers and ignore followers (Kellerman, 2008). Second, these three studies share a common interest in exploring how citizens respond to change, whether change appears as a long-term political transformation or as an unpredictable but significant financial shock. There is great need for more understanding of followers' roles and responsibilities with respect to change and crisis leadership.

4. Discussion

So, in considering scholarly analyses of political leadership and crisis topics that have been published from 2009 to the end of 2015, we located a significant number of works that adopt a centralist perspective, and are associated with three scholars in particular: Arjen Boin, Paul 't Hart and Allan McConnell. We chose to group them into one category (the Boin–'t Hart–McConnell School) and reviewed the main areas of focus and some new lines of inquiry. As the relative size of the collection suggests, this is a burgeoning literature that is producing many new insights into public leadership in the modern crisis context. The School's common method of approaching the subject—as an exercise in crisis management—is helpful in terms of building a unified understanding across many sorts of cases and particular topics. At the same time the method is limited owing to its tendency to treat the crisis condition as an exogenous problem—with a clear beginning and ending—that central decision-makers must address. As well, the works reviewed here tend to place much more emphasis on the leaders and their strategic behavior rather than on the publics. This approach's strengths lie in its insight into analyzing how political leaders and decision makers ought to act once a crisis appears.

In contrast with this centralist approach, we discern a second grouping of studies that are common in their decentralist perspective. Kevin Orr's interpretive approach to local government and structural crisis highlights that many analyses of crisis leadership largely ignore the underlying causes of crises and the structural context in which they occur. Moreover, because local governments often are the first responders to many sorts of crisis, and because they are a usual contact point between the community and government, they offer an excellent locale for the study of crisis leadership. Benjamin Moffitt (2015) and John Gaffney's (2014) considerations of crisis performance nicely complement the articles by Tim Heppell (2013), and James Read and Ian Shapiro (2014), although this may not be apparent at first blush. The authors are common in their understanding of crises as social situations that are structured by the populations that participate in them. Leaders, as Read and Shapiro (2014) and Tim Heppell (2013) remind us, sometimes can exercise extraordinary agency and restructure a divided and difficult social environment toward the common good.

Our review reveals clear interest in studying how followers respond to crisis contexts, and how they interpret leaders' messaging and cues. The case of the French backlash to the Bolkestein directive underscores the pivotal role micro-institutional dynamics like internal party strife can play in large-scale change processes. It is interesting to note that Evans and Chzhen (2013) find the international significance of the 2008 financial crisis probably insulated politicians from electoral repercussions because responsibility for it could be attributed to events beyond Britain's borders. However, in the Russian case citizens remained critical of their leaders' economic management capacity long after the relatively mild effects of the recession dissipated. These studies aim in part to explain how followers react and respond to crisis contexts. They illustrate the complexity of crisis leadership and also the opportunity for further research into communication flows between leaders and the led. In their attention to citizens' responses and to probing the structural aspects of crises, these authors contribute rich and helpful insights, and it is instructive to reconsider the literature delineated in the first grouping in light of the complex issues raised by the authors in the second and third grouping.

Moving our focus from the narrow analysis of the three groupings discussed above toward a broader consideration of the 26 articles as a single body of work, we think it's helpful to point out there are several disagreements among the authors about the nature of crisis and the current political context. Concerning the nature of crisis, there are a variety of views. Many of the authors reviewed here consider crises simply as random, unpredictable events that are part and parcel of the normal socio-economic environment, and there is merit in this view. While there is no doubt that events of 9/11 were important, this was not the first time the United States experienced terrorism, nor was it the first time al-Qaeda attacks resulted in the death of Americans. Likewise, while the GFC had a tremendous impact on the global economy, so did the bursting of the "dot com bubble" in 2000 as well as the Asian, Russian and Mexican financial crises of the 1990s. Conducting crisis research based on the premise that each catastrophe intrinsically is novel certainly runs the risk of merely putting old wine in new bottles. At the same time, some scholars firmly engage the position that there are different kinds of crises and that new types of crises can develop. Moreover, a few advance the view that some sorts of crises may be more challenging than others to manage because they are more trenchant

(see for example Read & Shapiro, 2014) or owing to their unusual nature. The conceptualization of trans-boundary crisis is a good example of the latter approach (e.g. Boin & Rhinhard, 2008).

Within the body of work on crisis leadership, scholars disagree as well whether the political context has changed or remained the same. For many analysts, the larger environment within which leadership occurs is much the same as it was before 9/11. In other cases, scholars hold that the current context profoundly has changed. Owing in part to large-scale social, economic and technological change, modern political leaders operate in a different, less secure and less stable decision-making environment than their predecessors. In this view, incremental change and enduring institutional stability seem to be antiquated markers of an earlier period. As a consequence the necessity to engage in crisis management has become more central to leadership behavior, as many analysts within the School hold. For our part, we think such debate about the nature of modern crises, and the current context within which crisis leadership occurs, present exciting avenues for new investigations and necessary analysis.

As a final comment on the body of work we have reviewed here, although we located many excellent studies in the period under review that adopted a variety of methods and perspectives, we were surprised that one paradigm in particular largely has not been taken up by crisis leadership scholars: the VUCA approach. The notion of VUCA originally was introduced by the US Army War College to describe the world following the collapse of the Soviet Union: volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (Casey, 2014, p. 75). It was not until the 9/11 attacks that it gained attention for its utility in describing a new leadership environment. As Lawrence (2013) explains, the acronym captures fours aspects of the precarious contexts surrounding modern leaders. The "V" stands for volatility, which is understood to mean the nature, speed, volume and magnitude of unpredictable change. The "U" represents uncertainty. Uncertainty is a product of volatility, and it confounds efforts to make decisions, and accurately predict results. Within the VUCA acronym, "C" stands for complexity, and represents numerous causes and mitigating factors involved in a problem. Finally, the "A" indicates the ambiguity resulting from a lack of clarity about the meaning of an event which is held to be symptomatic of modern decision-making contexts (Lawrence, 2013, p. 6). Since its creation, several authors have written about VUCA from the perspective of business management, executive development and organizational management (for example Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2015). However, in our search at least, this approach has not yet been clearly adopted by leadership scholars. Given the leadership literature's well demonstrated capacity to borrow from other disciplines, it is somewhat surprising that the VUCA view remains rather undeveloped. This paradigm may be a useful one to pursue for those who hold we are in a new crisis context, particularly because it assumes the current political context represents a new, more precarious reality that is marked by endemic instability and the necessity for perennial crisis management on the part of elites.

5. Conclusion

Our understanding of leadership and its evaluation necessarily is grounded in our times and our social context. The resurgence of scholarly interest in studying political leadership is a welcome trend. However, the 9/11 attacks seemed to introduce a new precariousness into the modern leadership context, and the 2008 global financial crisis seemed to confirm that modern political leaders regularly face traumatic and destabilizing events, and are expected to manage them skillfully. To survey how political leadership is being studied since 2008, we identified recent work published from January of 2009 to December of 2015. We carefully examined 26 academic articles that focused on political leadership and crisis, and identified a significant amount of new scholarship in this area. The literature has been enriched by contributions from three leading scholars who, along with their associates, have contributed many excellent insights through studying traditional leadership questions via a crisis management perspective.

As well, there is a cluster of scholars whose work conceptualizes crises as complex, decentralized, multi-dimensional phenomena. Finally, our examination found promising new work on the response of followers to leaders' behaviors and signals. Understanding when and how followers accept, resist or misinterpret leaders' signals certainly is fundamental to the study of leadership. These analyses probe some of the opportunities for deep change that crises present, and demand. In the works reviewed here, analysts disagree about whether modern crises might be different than earlier ones, and whether the modern political environment has shifted fundamentally in the last fifteen years. At the same time, most of the scholarship affirms modern political leaders retain much capacity to respond to crises, manage their effects, demonstrate agency and adapt to new decision-making environments.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Political Leadership in Parliament: The Role of Select Committee Chairs in the UK House of Commons

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Abstract
Concepts of political leadership have been applied sparingly to parliaments, and not at all to the study of House of Commons select committees in the UK Parliament, where analysis has largely focused on their institutional capacity to scrutinise government and hold it to account. Yet examining these committees through a political leadership lens illuminates the complex role of committee chairs, a role which was significantly reshaped in 2010 with a shift to election of chairs by the whole House. This article analyses select committee chairs through the lens of political leadership, and draws on a series of interviews with chairs in order to delineate the nature of the political leadership they perform. It argues that, as chairs are now increasingly important parliamentary and policy actors, our understanding of them is significantly advanced by conceptualising their role as one of parliamentary political leadership, and that this in turn enriches our analytical toolkit when it comes to the study of parliaments.

1. Introduction

Political leadership analysis affords valuable insights into the key actors who have changed the trajectories of contemporary societies, and studies of US presidents and prime ministers in Westminster systems constitute particularly fertile fields for scholars to plough (for a sample see: Bennister, 2012; Blick & Jones, 2014; Foley, 2000; Greenstein, 1988, 2009; Heffernan, 2005; Hennessy, 2000; McKay, 2014; Neustadt, 1960, 1980; Weller, 2014). Parliament, by contrast, appears to offer a less compelling area of study from a leadership perspective, because, in party-dominated Westminster style systems, the dynamics and interactions that determine parliamentary outcomes are rarely easily distilled into explanations focused exclusively around individuals. However, leadership as a political function is not confined to executive politics, and is necessarily dispersed in

any system of democratic governance, yet parliamentary analyses of political leadership are in relatively short supply. While the definitive guide to the topic, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership* (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014a), includes four chapters on prime ministerial leadership, and six on forms of 'political leadership at work', it offers no perspective on parliamentary political leadership. Although leadership analyses have been applied to the arena of legislative politics (for a review, see Norton, 2012), and many studies have been conducted on US legislative leadership (e.g. Caro, 2002; Cooper & Brady, 1981; Herrnson, 1998; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Peabody, 1976, 1985; Peters, 1990; Smith, 2007; Smith & Deering, 1984; Strahan, 2007, 2011), the UK parliament has not been subject to any such exploration. Consequently, this article poses the following question: can concepts of political leadership be usefully applied to the analysis of the UK Parliament?

Recent institutional developments at Westminster make this question especially compelling. The House of Commons departmental select committee system has become the key vehicle through which in-depth, non-legislative executive scrutiny is delivered by MPs. The system's scrutiny capacity has recently expanded, particularly through the role of the committee chairs, who have, since 2010, been directly elected by the whole House, and who thus now possess a range of democratic resources which they did not previously enjoy. As membership of Commons select committees is restricted to backbench MPs, they offer a valuable opportunity to examine whether political leadership is a useful conceptual lens through which to analyse the activities of the chairs who sit at their apex, and thus whether political leadership can be observed in the House of Commons beyond that exercised by the parliamentary party leaderships. This article consequently breaks new ground by analysing the UK Parliament's House of Commons select committees through the lens of political leadership.

The article proceeds in three parts. It begins by exploring relevant insights from the political leadership literature, particularly debates about leadership and followership, and concepts of collaborative leadership. The article then sketches the institutional context in which select committees and their chairs operate, and the implications for a conceptualisation of chairs in terms of political leadership. Finally, the article analyses interview data gathered from select committee chairs between 2011–2012, which explicitly probes the beliefs and understandings of chairs about their role and the extent to which it is one which encompasses leadership. The article advances two key arguments: first, that the political leadership approach is of significant conceptual value for the analysis of House of Commons select committees; and, second, that those who are actually 'doing' leadership can provide us with extraordinarily useful insights into everyday leadership practices, which in turn expands our understanding of what political leadership entails for those charged with performing it.

2. Political Leadership: Concepts and Themes

Leadership research seeks to answer two key questions which are central to this article: what is leadership, and how do we know it when we see it? (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014b, p. 3). If leadership involves someone influencing a group of individuals to achieve a common goal (Northouse, 2010, p. 3), then this raises questions about the method of influence, how common goals are defined, and how consent both constrains and animates leadership across the diverse democratic platforms through which it is exercised, including the parliamentary committee platform which forms the focus of this inquiry. Political and organizational cultures are

consequently crucial to understanding the operation and consequences of leadership. Burns (1978, p. 425) defines leadership as 'the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realise goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers.' This definition advances understanding in two key ways: first, by qualifying 'leader-centric' accounts which focus largely on the actions of individuals in leadership positions; and, second, by drawing into the analysis those whom leaders seek to lead as well as the context in which such leadership occurs. We need to understand not just the motivations of leaders, but the motivations of those who follow, which is highly significant for the questions explored in this article. Political leaders derive their authority not just from the democratic procedural arrangements through which they ascend to the top of organizational structures, but also from the 'processual' mechanisms through which leaders engage in exchange relationships with other actors (Hartley & Benington, 2011, p. 207), and the degree of trust placed in leaders by followers delimits the bounds of democratic political leadership (Ruscio, 2004), which necessarily springs from consent (Kane & Patapan, 2012). Two interrelated themes thus frame the parliamentary analysis pursued here: first, the distinctions between and debates about leadership and followership; and, second, the concept of collaborative leadership and the centrality of soft and smart power to its effectiveness.

2.1. Leadership and Followership

Contemporary scholarship explores leadership 'as an interactive process between leaders and followers; institutions and the rules of the game; and the broader historical context' (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014b, p. 6). Leadership is not simply a matter of 'a leader acting and a group of followers responding in a mechanical way', but is instead a highly complex social process in which the organizational cultural context is fundamental in shaping interactions (Alvesson, 2011, p. 152). It is impossible to understand leaders without understanding those they seek to lead, and the environment in which such leadership occurs, and follower-centric approaches to leadership analysis have largely eschewed individualistic and 'heroic' approaches (Meindl, 1990, 1995). If the term 'followership' is controversial, such controversy is itself emblematic of the need to understand leaders and followers in relation to each other, and to their organizational and social environments. Successful leaders are those who 'succeed in appealing to, embodying or modifying the social identities of their followers' (Rhodes & 't Hart. 2014b, p. 6). Crucially, as leadership involves 'leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the

motivations…*of both leaders and followers*', the 'genius of leadership' therefore involves drawing actors together 'in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose' (Burns, 1978, p. 19).

Yet, the terms 'leaders' and 'followers' have different meanings in different contexts, and organizational culture will significantly determine whether actors even acknowledge them as meaningful to their regular interactions. While in some organizations, the leader/follower distinction will be clear and accepted terminology, in others these definitions and their applicability will be open to debate. In particular, the identity, motivations and values of so-called followers will shape leader-follower relations, hence why it is crucial to analyse the 'proverbial 'other side' of the leadership coin' (Bligh, 2011, p. 426). Context will at least in part determine whether actors in a political organization are agreeable to the leader-follower distinction, not least because those who are already members of the political elite may balk at the notion of contexts in which they are defined as followers.

Yet although there is debate about the use of the term 'follower' (Burns, 2005; Rost, 2008), the term is not in itself necessarily derogatory. Baker (2007) demonstrates that both leaders and followers are roles rather than individual characteristics; that followers are active rather than passive; and that leaders and followers share common purposes rather than the former imposing purpose on the latter. Similarly, work on relational leadership theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006), leadership complexity theory (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007), and distributed leadership (Gronn, 2002) have sought to treat leadership as an 'interactive dynamic relationship between organizational actors from which adaptive outcomes emerge' and which emphasize the importance of 'interdependence, coordination and…reciprocal influence' (Bligh, 2011, p. 427). Followership research has demonstrated that it has multiple meanings, and that followers construct those meanings not just in relation to their own individual perceptions, but also in relation to their organizational context and to the leaders with whom they interact (Carsten, Uhl-Bein, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010). Heifetz, Grashow and Linksy's (2009) analysis of adaptive leadership is particularly useful in understanding group dynamics and the crucial leadership skill of empowering groups to deal with issues and challenges in relation to the group's context, rather than the leader simply dictating action from above ('t Hart, 2014, p. 105). These insights allow us to conceive of leadership and followership as necessarily imbued with 'multiple, shifting, contradictory and ambiguous identities' (Collinson, 2005, p. 1436) which reflect the dynamics of the organizational terrain in which they operate. Finally, the idea of leadership as a distributed resource which is shared with followers is crucial to understanding its conceptual utility in the specific parliamentary context which forms the analytical focus of this article.

2.2. Collaborative Leadership and Leadership Resources

To the extent that modern democratic governance takes place through 'leadership constellations' (Hendriks & Karsten, 2014, p. 52) and networks of interdependent actors (Rhodes, 1997), and to the extent that the complexity of modern societies compels the rejection of institutionalised hierarchy and the embrace of collaborative governance ('t Hart, 2014, p. 88), then effective political leadership consequently requires negotiation with stakeholders, and the capability to bind stakeholders together through various interaction processes in the pursuit of common endeavours (Klijn, 2014, p. 404). Goal alignments between leaders and followers arise only through complex interaction processes designed to manage actors' strategic behaviours (Klijn, 2014, p. 406). Iterative collaboration is therefore fundamental for democratic governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008), and successful political leaders facilitate collaboration between participants through processes of negotiation and, crucially, by securing agreement about the end goals of collaboration. Collaborative leadership thus involves relationship-building between actors who may otherwise have no obvious motivation to work together, and, because leaders must mobilise actors, they must also understand 'other actors' perceptions and desires about the problems and the solutions' which they are tackling (Klijn, 2014, p. 408). These key insights from collaborative leadership approaches are fundamental in framing our analysis of the political leadership that can be observed inside Commons select committees, a point upon which we will expand shortly.

Collaborative leadership approaches sketch the type of political leadership that is likely to be found inside parliamentary committee environments, and consequently also point to the sort of leadership tools that we might observe in use. Here, Nye's (2008) distinctions between 'soft', 'hard' and 'smart' power are useful in mapping the resources that are available to select committee chairs, and the skills they are required to deploy. Soft power involves emotional intelligence in order to manage relationships, strong communication skills across different audiences, and the ability to articulate a vision which is attractive to diverse stakeholders while still advancing group goals. Hard power involves organisational skills and the management of information flows, as well as the more Machiavellian skills of strategic negotiation and bargaining. Smart power involves combining soft and hard power resources, in order to understand how changing institutional environments affect the group, to capitalise on emerging trends, and to adjust leadership style in relation to the needs of followers (Nye, 2008, p. 83). As Blondel (2014, p. 714) notes, smart power also involves leaders being prepared 'to examine the views of others' and 'rethink and assess what is being proposed as

a result of objections raised'. Smart leadership therefore involves persuasion but also compromise. This is of crucial significance in understanding the extent to which political leadership is a meaningful category in the analysis of parliamentary select committees.

The political leadership literature therefore offers key analytical angles that can help us understand the role, capacity and action of parliamentary committee chairs. These actors have not yet been examined from a political leadership perspective, yet debates about leadership and followership, the dynamics of collaborative leadership, and the soft, hard and smart power resources which are available to leadership actors all provide valuable analytical leverage. The next section explores the House of Commons select committee context in order to demonstrate this analytical utility and the extent to which committee chairs can be considered as political leaders.

3. House of Commons Select Committees: Political Leadership Context and Contingencies

In the UK's asymmetrical political system, the resources of the executive significantly outstrip those of parliament and the MPs tasked with holding government to account (Judge, 1993; Norton, 2013). Committee-based infrastructure is designed as a partial remedy to this power asymmetry. It imbues groups of MPs with the capacity to pursue executive scrutiny away from the floor of the chamber in a way that both dampens MPs' partisan instincts and enhances their interrogatory capacity vis-à-vis executive actors. House of Commons departmental select committees shadow government departments, investigate departmental policy, administration and expenditure, and examine the work of associated agencies and public bodies. These committees are largely viewed as making a positive contribution to government scrutiny, albeit with qualifications (e.g. Drewry, 1985; Giddings, 1985, 1994; Hindmoor, Larkin, & Kennon, 2009; Judge, 1992; Russell & Benton, 2011). They inquire into policy issues, take evidence from a range of actors and stakeholders including government ministers, and publish recommendations for policy and operational improvement, many of which are adopted by government (Russell & Benton, 2011). Through their inquiries, select committees provide a public arena, or 'theatre of action' (Uhr & Wanna, 2000), through which government actors may be interrogated, evidence presented and queried, and arguments articulated regarding the focus and impact of public policy and executive decision making. The Liaison Committee, the committee on which all select committee chairs sit, contributes to this work by taking evidence on a regular basis from the prime minister, which constitutes a significant innovation in parliamentary committee scrutiny (Kelso, Bennister, & Larkin, in press). Select committees have also become

increasingly visible actors in the news media, because committees' cross-party character and in-depth investigatory approaches are perceived to render critical inquiry conclusions relatively authoritative. There are four key points to delineate in terms of the operation and organisation of select committees that together demonstrate the value of the political leadership analytical lens sketched above.

First, the development and evolution of the select committee system since its creation in 1979 has imbued the chair role with the potential for political leadership and parliamentary authority. Organisational reforms have progressively delimited the ability of frontbench party business managers and whips to determine committee memberships and thus constrain capacity for action. In 2001, government backbench MPs refused to authorise the slate of new committee members in protest against what was perceived to be the malign influence of party whips in the membership selection process, which prompted internal party changes to membership nomination procedures (Kelso, 2003, 2009a). In 2009, those in favour of a more vigorous select committee system capitalised on the tumult caused by the MPs expenses scandal to successfully secure an overhaul of committee membership processes (Kelso, 2009b; Russell, 2011). Since 2010, select committees have been appointed under rules which involve the entire House of Commons electing MPs to the select committee chairs. MPs run for election for the chair positions available to their party (the number of chairs assigned to parties is in proportion to seat share), and must attract support from across the parties to get onto the ballot. With committee chairs no longer arguably in the gift of the party whips, and with MPs compelled to secure cross-party support in order to be elected to the chair, this development in select committee organization has had clear consequences for the perceived legitimacy of chairs and also for their agency and capacity for action. To the extent that chairs can utilise the political capital derived from their electoral legitimacy for particular political and/or organizational ends, and can use it in a way which advances committee goals and shapes the behaviour of other committee members, then leadership of some form is in evidence. If select committee chairs are imbued with authority and leadership potential because of their direct election by MPs, then the key question is how that potential is actually used. To what extent is the enhanced political capital of chairship being converted into the powerful political currency of leadership?

Second, the operational context in which chairs function demonstrates the necessity of effective leadership. Select committees have formal powers to call witnesses to give evidence, and to request information and documents from relevant stakeholders in order to run their inquiries. They produce inquiry reports which detail what the committee discovered, the conclusions

it drew, and the recommendations it makes to specific policy actors. These activities require coordination from the chair, but the role extends beyond simple process management. Chairs must secure agreement from members about committee policy agendas, inquiry focus, and report arguments, none of which would otherwise spring organically from a group of MPs from different political parties. The process management of select committee work is only meaningful if the committee has already agreed on its goals. While the generic goal is that of executive scrutiny, the specific goals will vary from inquiry to inquiry, and chairs must be skilled at navigating the competing goals of MPs from different parties in relation to different topics of policy inquiry. This work necessarily involves collaborative political leadership, because the institutional committee context and the nature of committee membership means that chairs cannot adopt command-and-control approaches to agenda setting and inquiry goal-identification and expect members to go along with it. Goal alignments (Klijn, 2014) and iterative collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008) amongst members are essential, and both depend on at least a minimal level of relationship-building amongst individuals from different party backgrounds in order to enable participants to understand issues from the perspective of others (Klijn, 2014, p. 408). This is a function that only committee chairs are institutionally positioned to perform.

Third, while select committees are cross-party, this does not make them non-party. Chairs must navigate the party loyalties and preferences of members in a way that maintains committee consensus while still facilitating the expression of divergent views from members about the need to be critical of government. This is a crucial point, because select committees reflect party seat share, and therefore have an in-build government majority. Although their cross-party membership means that select committees generally focus on the operational detail of policy when they examine divisive matters, the question of whether and how to criticise government policy and decision making will naturally present challenges for committee MPs. Select committee scrutiny of government, and its policies and decision making, can only be maximized if members operate mostly consensually for most of the time. Consequently, MPs on the government side may be hesitant about endorsing strenuous critiques, while opposition MPs may seek just the kind of full-throated savaging that is likely to make the committee majority balk. While a degree of partisan self-constraint amongst members is likely, given the fundamental task of the select committee system, whoever sits in the committee chair must nevertheless ensure that consensual working is achieved amid these competing objectives, because otherwise the purpose of the select committee is defeated. It is in managing the potentially conflicting demands of committee MPs, and in forging

agreed goals from a mix of competing individual motivations, that the chair role transcends administrative coordination and becomes a vehicle for collaborative political leadership. Chairs must navigate the partisan instincts of committee MPs, ensure committee minorities are not routinely thwarted, and avoid offending MPs' highly independent and fiercely autonomous sensibilities. Collaborative leadership is clearly essential for generating the consensual outputs which underpin committee contributions to democratic governance, and requires chairs to deploy a mix of soft, hard and smart skills in order to both agree and secure committee goals.

Fourth, and emerging from the previous points, the leader/follower dynamic is highly germane in the select committee context. The committee chair is integral to a select committee 'team' that is 'composed of members who are interdependent, who share common goals, and who must coordinate their activities to accomplish these goals' (Kogler-Hill, 2010, p. 241). The institutional position of select committees as consensual groups embedded in an inherently partisan organizational environment requires the deft navigation of the parameters of followership inside the select committee environment. In fact, the parliamentary arena is a remarkably useful place to probe what followership actually means in the context of democratic collaborative governance amongst elites. Members' party loyalty will largely take precedence over the strategic goals of the committee, and chairs must operate with a situational 'mental model' which is sensitive to the 'contingencies that define the larger context of team action' (Kogler-Hill, 2010, p. 243). If 'organizational cultures provide actors with sets of beliefs about the nature and role of leadership' (Rhodes & 't Hart, 2014b, p. 6), then effective chairs are those who understand the constraints on, and limits to, a committee's scrutiny capacity as defined both by the specific parliamentary context and the broader political environment in which the committee operates. Organizational culture is paramount, and leadership requires a willingness not only to acknowledge the limitations created by that culture but also to generate adaptive responses to it (Shein, 1992, p. 2), and to the various motivations of committee members, in order to advance committee goals. Select committee chairs are therefore 'interactive leaders' (Burns, 1978, p. 15). Furthermore, leadership is necessarily distributed and shared, because committee chairs operate in a context in which group members already enjoy an elite status, and in which the cross-party organizational dynamic renders notions of 'followership' difficult to sustain.

To summarise, the increasing importance of select committees and their scrutiny work to effective parliamentary functioning, the institutionally elevated position of committee chairs as a consequence of House of Commons election, and the complexities of committee operation all demonstrate the requirement for in-

tentional political leadership inside select committees. The tensions inherent in leadership and followership are directly relevant to select committee environments where members are highly autonomous political elites, while the concept of collaborative leadership usefully frames the type of leadership that chairs might pursue in order to secure member support of committee goals. The value of the political leadership perspective is borne out in interviews conducted with select committee chairs, as the next section demonstrates.

4. Perceptions of Leadership amongst Committee Chairs

What do chairs themselves think about their committee roles? What are their beliefs and understandings about their work, about their relationships with other committee members, and about the strategies they adopt in order to discharge committee tasks? Do chairs see their role as one of leadership? These questions framed a series of interviews conducted with select committee chairs, during 2011–2012. There were eight interviews in total, which included chairs from all three of the UK parliamentary parties which were assigned chair positions in the 2010 parliament (Conservative (2), Liberal Democrat (2), and Labour (4)), in which the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats ran a coalition government, and Labour was the official opposition party. The findings from the interviews are explored in the context of the key themes of collaborative leadership, leadership and followership, and in the context of the leadership resources deployed by chairs in relation to Nye's (2008) soft, hard and smart power categories.

4.1. Collaborative Leadership and Committee Practice

The interview evidence strongly suggests that the concept of collaborative leadership is highly applicable to the select committee context, and recognisable in the actions of chairs. One committee chair perfectly expressed the need for collaborative leadership when she remarked, 'So, you are looking to see how we turn a group of disparate, strong-willed individuals into a pack animal?' (interview, July 6, 2011). Her view was that most 'outsiders' failed to understand this essential metamorphosis which had to happen for committees to work even at a minimal level, and that relationship building amongst members was crucial. This necessarily took time, and did not just 'magically occur' at the start of a new parliament, but she insisted that 'they *do* start to hunt as a pack, despite the fact that they're from different political perspectives—it *does* happen.' The extent to which this transformation occurred was due, in her view, in no small part to the leadership capacity and activity of the chair in deliberately 'breaking down that resistance'. In order to do this, a range of leadership resources must be deployed, and it was

those of Nye's (2008) soft and smart variety which featured most prominently in chair responses.

For example, this same chair explained that a key step towards achieving this 'breaking down of resistance' involved the committee travelling overseas on a fact-finding trip as part of an inquiry launched early in the new parliament. 'Those who went on that trip', she argued, 'came back as a more coherent group' (interview, July 6, 2011). And not all trips had to be exotic: this chair also noted the utility of UK-based fact-finding trips, and meetings with members of the public away from Westminster, as key to building a 'team ethos' around a policy focus and dampening partisan instincts. In fact, several chairs reported the usefulness of away days and trips out of Westminster for building collegiality amongst committee members who might otherwise regard one another's motivations warily. Being removed from the physical environment of Westminster, with its oppositional politics and oppositional spaces, and traveling and eating together for sustained periods of time, enabled MPs to share their common interests in terms of the policy focus of the committee. Astute committee chairs used these opportunities as key leadership tools to help build the collegiality that was required for their committees to function effectively. These trips may have been organised for instrumental inquiry purposes, but they also enabled chairs to deploy the soft skills required for relationship building.

Clearly, fact-finding trips go only so far, and much rests on the chair's capacity to foster and sustain collegiality in the longer term. One chair explained that, 'one of the skills that a chair needs is an ability to operate in a collegiate manner, because select committee reports are pretty useless if they are divided' (interview, July 4, 2011). He argued that chairs were required to understand 'that there are some political boundaries you will not be able to cross' when it comes to shifting the political positions of both government and opposition MPs on committees, and that chairs had to handle the processes of compromise. These skills were particularly crucial for report drafting, which the interviewees identified as a key moment in the work of a committee. Inquiry reports are the most important outputs generated by committees, and the main vehicle through which they articulate arguments about government policy, decision making, and administration. It is essential that committees produce consensus reports, because split committees with majority and minority reports are entirely at odds with the purpose of the system. Engineering consensus at the point of report drafting, in terms of agreeing the line of argument and the nature of any criticisms dispensed, is therefore crucial. Consequently, chair leadership involved not only the soft skill of accurately identifying when members had reached the boundaries of consensus; it also involved the hard power of bargaining with members in order to identify the optimum compromise

arrangement which still enabled the production of robust inquiry reports.

On this point, an opposition party chair spoke at length about her role in facilitating compromise through negotiation, noting that it was important for her to spot partisan clashes in advance of committee meetings, and to work out 'what the lines might be as to how far you can push, and who will accept what, in terms of getting the compromise' (interview, July 6, 2011). Crucially, her strategy eschewed dealing with conflict through private meetings:

> 'I don't want the committee to think that I'm setting up cabals…because if I start to do that, *they* would start to do that…I'm trying to build a cohesive group of people who will come up with sensible suggestions that government might enact. And if I start playing one off against the other…well, the last thing I would want to do is to undermine that sense of the collective.' (interview, July 6, 2011)

Compromise was instead engineered in full committee where everyone could have their say. For example, one chair explained the need to ensure that any MPs who 'have expressed doubts…have the opportunity to explore those doubts as part of the investigatory process' (interview, July 4, 2011). Particularly notable is that most chairs reported using the skills of the committee clerks to help produce report language that all members could live with. Thus, compromises often involved the use of what one chair described as 'carefully chosen language' to ensure that the final committee reports did not 'simply provoke' controversy (interview, December 4, 2012), but constructively identified key failings in policy, decision making or implementation in a manner that respected the consensual committee style. Chairs consequently lead not by individual heroic efforts in brokering agreements, but by making the entire committee responsible for securing consensus and drawing on all skill sets available to maximise success, including those of committee clerks who typically have far more experience of the practicalities of report drafting than do committee members. Clearly, collaborative and dispersed leadership is in evidence. Thus, although committee chairs are elected, their democratic legitimacy does not allow them to impose solutions on divided committees, precisely because of the followership dynamics mapped earlier. Instead, chairs are compelled to draw on a range of institutional resources, and soft, hard and smart power strategies, in order to secure successful outcomes.

There are additional contingencies, one of which is that challenges associated with committee leadership differ depending on whether the chair is a member of the party of government or opposition. An opposition party chair explained that his role was different to that of a government party chair:

> 'where it's much easier [for the chair] to carry his own point of view, because he's always got a majority. Again though, he's got to handle dealing with the minority, and making sure that he gets buy-in from there. I've got a slightly different problem, in that the minority are more likely to share my view on a Political-with-a-capital-P issue, but I've got to get buy-in from the majority …So there are different skills required in trying to maintain the momentum of the team.' (interview, July 4, 2011)

Similarly, while chairs may be highly active when it comes to private committee meetings where inquiry reports are being agreed, their activism may be less noticeable during committee oral evidence sessions. One chair explained that the allocation of questions for such sessions will be determined in advance, and that while his role involved asking the opening set of questions, thereafter he viewed his role as:

> 'to try to keep us to time, which is sometimes difficult; to keep to the strategy; and when somebody has a smart idea, to make sure they catch my eye and they interject…So once the system is rolling, the most successful session is, in a sense, the one where I am totally quiet, because it's all gone to plan and the right information has come out.' (interview, July 4, 2011)

In this conception of leadership, attention is not primarily focused on the chair at all, at least not during evidence sessions, where the chair acts largely as a facilitator and enabler for other committee members. That does not mean the role is marginal. This chair was clear that 'the one thing you cannot do as chair is busk, and when you go the meetings, you've got to know what's going on' (interview, July 4, 2011). The chair's ability to focus and 'allocate attention purposefully' ('t Hart, 2014, p. 40) is regarded as a key leadership skill (Goleman, 2013), and is thus essential for the committee's strategic success and the delivery of inquiry goals.

4.2. Defining and Contesting Leadership and Followership in Select Committees

While this article argues that political leadership is clearly identifiable in the actions and strategies of select committee chairs, a key question posed by the research was whether chairs themselves would describe what they do as leadership. The interviewees expressed differing opinions on this point, which offer compelling insights into the chair role specifically and the contingencies of political leadership generally, but also into the beliefs of actors about whether 'leadership' was an appropriate way to describe what they do. One chair was clear that:

'It *is* a leadership role. It's similar to the skipper of any team. You've got to keep people focused on the job in hand, occasionally deal with details that prohibit them [being involved]…and just make sure that all of them have got the opportunity to engage fully.' (interview, July 4, 2011, interviewee's emphasis)

Another chair agreed that 'there *is* a leadership role' (interviewee's emphasis), and connected this not only to the broad programme of work undertaken by a committee, but also to the chair role in terms of managing the inquiry report-writing process, media relationships, and interactions with external stakeholders, 'where you *do* lead in those senses' (interview, December 4, 2012). One chair explained his committee chair role in terms of 'providing leadership in the committee, and to be the external face of the committee', emphasising the public visibility that he believed committee members accepted, and in some cases expected, as a fundamental aspect of the role (interview, July 12, 2012). Nye's (2008) soft power of communication is thus a vital part of the chair leadership toolkit: the chair is the public face of the committee, particularly in the news media, and must be able effectively to articulate the arguments made by the committee in inquiry reports.

The election of committee chairs was also identified as a key resource which imbued chairs with leadership potential. For example, one chair agreed that he acted in a leadership capacity, and explained that this capacity 'has got nothing to do with my status, seniority, age or anything else…I have been elected to do the job, I'm paid to do the job…and I give more of my time and my commitment than any other committee member as a consequence' (interview, July 12, 2012).

Yet, elected status was nevertheless contingent. Another seasoned chair reflected that:

'I wouldn't put a label around my neck saying 'I am the leader', because they [the committee members] might feel you need taking down a peg in that case.' (interview, July 14, 2011)

Thus, leadership is not to be brandished, even when one is elected. Yet, this same chair continued:

'But it is a leadership role. And actually committee members do look at you in that way, and expect you to show leadership to them. They will come with different and often conflicting ideas, and as with any leader, although it might not have been my first thought, my sense is that we will go with that if there's enough support and interest. But at other times, you might need to make the committee realise that there's something they've got to do which shouldn't be neglected, and that's a leader-

ship role. They [the committee members] also expect you to fight on their behalf.' (interview, July 14, 2011)

One chair gave a particularly insightful description of her chair role, and its dynamic dependence on the rest of the committee membership, when she explained that:

'I'm a leader, but I'm very conscious that I'm in the hands of the committee, and I have to keep their confidence, and have their agreement on what I'm doing, or we would have a very divided committee, and that would damage it's work.' (interview, June 20, 2011)

It may seem obvious enough that leaders can only lead if they have the support of those with whom they work, but the broader partisan political context in which select committees operate makes this especially salient. This same chair gave an example from an inquiry during which she had been highly critical of a government minister, and where 'the committee supported me in that criticism' (interview, June 20, 2011). She reported bringing the committee together for the purpose of securing their agreement in advance of issuing her highly critical comments, precisely *because* she needed the committee to maintain a position of consensus for her criticism as chair to have any value. As a member of the opposition party, she explained, it was especially important for her to ensure that the governing party MPs on the committee would agree to this course of action. In this instance, as in so many others affecting select committee work, consensus is king, actors are interdependent, and collaborative and adaptive political leadership is key.

One chair from the government side explained that, when he originally sought election to his committee chair, he made it clear to MPs:

'that I wasn't interested in being a chair that simply sat on the side-lines and offered some kind of running commentary. What I wanted to do was to engage the select committee, real time, in the policy making process.' (interview, May 24, 2011)

He believed that direct election had helped him fulfil his more expansive role for the chair, but was nonetheless hesitant about describing himself as a 'leader', offering the word 'catalyst' instead (interview, May 24, 2011). When pressed on why 'leader' was an unsuitable term, he responded that, 'it implies that others are followers, and that's not necessarily how Members of Parliament like to see themselves.' This captures the dilemmas at the heart of the leader-follower debate, and the frequent unease surrounding the applicability of the notion of followership as an essential compo-

nent of leadership in the world of political elites. And this view was not isolated. Another chair similarly rejected the idea that she was a leader of her committee, saying she 'would rather be the facilitator…than leader' (interview, July 6, 2011). Yet her description of her role mirrored that of another chair who fully accepted the leadership label, even down to the detail of explaining that a good committee chair doing a good job tends not to be noticed by their members during inquiry sessions. Similarly, she argued that the extent to which the chair could 'set the tone' of a committee, and 'encourage everyone to contribute' was the determining factor 'in whether you've got a functioning select committee or a dysfunctional one' (interview, July 6, 2011). The fact that two senior committee chairs could both use such similar language to describe the role and importance of the chair, but then take differing views on whether that role constitutes leadership, reveals much about the nature of interactions inside select committee environments, the particular political context of committees, and also hesitation over whether MPs might conceptualise committee chair roles given that their primary leadership touchstones will be those at the top of their own parliamentary parties.

5. Conclusions: Parliamentary Committee Leadership in Perspective

House of Commons select committee chairs are increasingly important actors in the successful delivery of parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. They are pivotal in enabling committees to function effectively, and in facilitating an environment where collegiate working can result in consensus report production in the context of a broader institutional setting where adversarial parliamentary politics are the defining feature of the party battle. In exploring the leadership dynamics of the select committee chair role, this article advances both our conceptualisations of these particular political actors and our understanding of the everyday leadership practices they deploy. The collaborative leadership frame and the chair interviews together illustrate just how complex the chair role is, as evidenced by the range of leadership tools and resources which chairs develop and deploy in order to manage that complexity. The interviews also provide compelling empirical evidence of the tensions inherent in leadership-followership dynamics in contemporary political contexts. Some concluding remarks usefully illuminate the landscape for future research.

First, the shift inside the House of Commons towards elected select committee chairs has facilitated their emergence as significant and resourceful parliamentary actors. With their connective tissue to the party business managers largely severed, at least as far as their institutional positioning is concerned, chairs evidently now utilise their democratic legitimacy not just as a scrutiny tool, but also as a leadership resource. They are empowered in ways they never were before, and this makes the analysis of their roles all the richer. There is valuable work to be done in analysing how this role continues to change in the future.

Second, chairs are ultimately responsible for making their committees function as effective scrutiny vehicles. This means they must foster collegiality amongst MPs who naturally bring different party perspectives to bear on committee policy inquiries, and may be serving on the committee for many different reasons, not all of which will involve notions of advancing the public good through parliamentary scrutiny. That committees comprise elite politicians with different views on the committee's rightful focus (in terms of policy orientation, evidence base, approach to ministerial questioning, etc.) and also with different motivations for involvement (political advancement, policy advocacy, back-bench 'make-work', etc.), consequently involves chairs exhibiting a range of leadership skills and strategies in order to advance committee goals. Exploring how chairs perform these tasks and successfully (or unsuccessfully) deliver useful scrutiny outputs provides a compelling insight into how actors operate in complex institutional contexts where actors possess competing loyalties. Crucially, it also affords an insight into how those actors behave as leaders in an environment where all MPs on a committee are already members of the political elite, and already acknowledge political (party) leadership through other channels.

Third, this work maps new terrain by analysing parliament from a fresh perspective. While questions about internal organization and processes, legislative management, scrutiny and oversight capacity, executive-legislative relations, and so on, are all obviously important avenues for exploration, this article provides a new lens on their analysis by employing ideas about political leadership in the parliamentary context. Applying this perspective to the role of select committee chair, a crucially positioned institutional actor, not only helps us better understand how these committees are organized and function, but also begins the process of mapping what it means to be a parliamentary political leader outside the framework of parliamentary party leadership. Conceiving of select committee chairs as political leaders inside parliament can thus reposition our understanding of chairs while also providing empirical insights that enrich our academic perspectives on contemporary political leadership. In particular, the specific features of select committee membership afford opportunities to explore the contested and controversial idea of followership, which the interview evidence presented here demonstrates is a slippery concept when applied to political elites in these parliamentary committee contexts.

Finally, the article shows that leadership analyses can go beyond studies of presidents, prime ministers,

and party leaders, in order to examine more lowly political figures who may not automatically spring to mind in the context of political leadership, but who are nonetheless performing important leadership roles in a system of dispersed democratic governance. Future development of these concepts and ideas can therefore expand our understanding of what political leadership is and does, the diverse institutional contexts in which we find it, and how actors themselves understand leadership and practice it in their everyday political life.

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Article

Leadership and Behavior in Humanitarian and Development Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations

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Abstract
Does leadership matter in the governance of civil society organizations? In particular, do the CEOs of humanitarian and development NGOs exhibit different leadership styles and perceive their work environments in different ways as the literature suggests. To explore this question we interviewed 96 CEOs—32 from humanitarian NGOs and 64 from development NGOs. In the process we found support for the descriptions of the leadership of these two types of organizations extant in the research and practitioner literatures. Those in charge of humanitarian NGOs were more likely to challenge the constraints in their environments, to be interested in influencing what was happening, to want to affect outcomes, and to be focused on addressing the needs of those in the communities facing the crisis, disaster, or emergency. They viewed themselves as having short time in which to respond and chose to communicate and act informally as well as to only collaborate with other organizations if pushed. Providing direct aid and service were high priorities as was advocacy to secure the funding necessary for completing their task. In contrast, CEOs leading development NGOs focused more on respecting and working within the constraints of their positions, being adaptable and flexible in working on having an impact—in effect, being interested in building coalitions and achieving consensus as well as indulging in compromise with the intent of solving the endemic problems that they were there to address. They had a longer time perspective than their humanitarian counterparts and were willing to work within fairly hierarchical structures as well as with a variety of types of collaborators to reach their goals.

Keywords
humanitarian relief; international development; leadership; leadership style; non-governmental organizations

1. Introduction

Does leadership matter in the governance of civil society organizations? For all the practitioner story telling and scholarly case studies that exist in the literature, little effort has gone into systematically exploring how leadership might matter in understanding the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the challenges that face civil society. To begin to remedy this situation, the present study explores what leaders of humanitarian relief and international development NGOs are like and how they perceive their governance challenges. How do CEOs of these two types of NGOs view the world and their organizations' place in it? We chose these two types of NGOs because of the growing attempts in these two communities to "bridge the gap between emergency humanitarian aid and long-term development aid that is essential to help people survive disasters and get back on the path to self-reliance and dignity" (Gabaudan, 2012, p. 1).

In the past decade there has been increasing examination of the "numerous conceptual, architectural, and political divides that prevent effective linkages between humanitarian and development aid" (Bennett, 2015, p.1)[1]. As crises and disasters have become more complex and costly as well as persistent, emergency aid is needed to begin with but is soon followed by the cry for longer term solutions that often call into question the behavior of the humanitarian organizations already involved. Consider such disasters and crises as what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, as an outgrowth of the Syrian civil war, to the "boat people" in the Mediterranean, and as a result of the Haiti earthquake as well as the zika virus and ebola outbreaks. Is it feasible to "create a shared space where both humanitarian and development actors can co-exist and apply different approaches and tools to address the range of problems that protracted crises entail" (Bennett, 2015, p. 1)? To answer this question, we need to know more about the leadership of these two types of NGOs. Indeed, the question postulates that the leaders of these two types of organizations deal with problems using different approaches and tools. Supposedly humanitarian relief organizations have a short-term focus on saving lives and providing goods and services allowing those involved to deal with the immediate aftermath of a disaster or crisis. They are responding to the event and the people affected by the event. They are not responsible for dealing with the underlying causes of what is happening and they do not have to interact with government officials in the process, particularly if such government officials are part of the problem. In contrast, development organizations are focused on dealing with the underlying problems be they poverty alleviation, post-conflict reconstruction, or institution building. And these organizations have to work with the local and national governments and citizens in accomplishing such goals.

The leadership literature would suggest that the leaders of humanitarian-focused NGOs would be interested in gaining as much control over the situations in which they find themselves as possible, given that they are risking their own security in the process (Bass & Bass, 2008; Elgie, 2015; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987; 't Hart, 2014). Moreover, we have learned in crisis situations there is contraction of authority to the top—to that leadership able to deal with the situation and meet the needs of the people and communities in the throes of the disaster (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005). There is need for a quick decision and flexibility in responding to whatever situations should arise. Indeed, there is not time to build consensus or do the work entailed in developing collaboration. As Knox Clarke (2013, pp. 18-19) has observed, with time of the es-

sence "relatively autocratic decision making is most appropriate". Taking the initiative and being entrepreneurial are traits to be prized. As a head of a humanitarian organization is quoted as saying: "My greatest advantage was that I did not come from a bureaucracy" (Knox Clarke, 2013, p. 20)—such structures in a humanitarian setting are considered an anathema to initiative-taking and 'free thinking'.

Development-focused NGOs, in contrast, are built around compromise and consensus. At its most fundamental, development involves reducing material want and enhancing people's ability to live a life they consider good and to do so for the broadest range of a population. It is a long-term process and often includes community organizing, poverty reduction strategies, and new forms of microfinance (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). In essence, the ultimate goal of development-oriented NGOs is to put themselves out of business in a particular setting—to facilitate marginalized groups gaining self sufficiency. Building collaborations and empowering others becomes the 'name of the game'. Such efforts are time consuming and generally depend on the receptivity of others. Leadership is viewed as a partnership with stakeholders, as shared, allowing for more diversity of views and perspectives, interest in confronting disagreements, and the building of consensus. Leaders in such settings operate "primarily as facilitators", focusing on group process and insuring participation and accountability (Knox Clarke, 2013, p. 66).

These views of the leadership styles envisioned for those leading humanitarian NGOs and those in charge of development NGOs are in stark contrast with one another. Do leaders in these two sectors, in fact, exhibit such different orientations to their work? Do they perceive their work environments as being as different as the literature suggests? In what follows, we will explore this question based on interviews with 96 CEOs of transnational NGOs engaged in humanitarian relief and international development. We are interested in gaining their perspectives on their leadership styles and their definitions of the environments in which they work.

2. Method

This study attempts to move beyond more traditional research on transnational NGOs which has generally centered around a particular sector, organization, or issue campaign, often involving case studies or small focus groups composed of organizational leaders. The data here come from face-to-face, in-depth interviews with 96 CEOs of transnational NGOs working on either humanitarian relief or international development issues with operations in multiple countries. The interviews were conducted as part of a National Science Foundation study (Grant No. SES-0527679) that focused on understanding the governance and leadership of transnational NGOs. The interviews lasted on aver-

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[1] See also the Humanitarian Policy Group (2016); Knox Clarke (2013); and Lewis and Kanji (2009).

age an hour and a half and focused on the challenges these leaders saw their organizations as facing in a globalizing world. All participants were guaranteed confidentiality and interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed after the fact. For a description of the study in more detail, see Transnational NGO Initiative (2010). The term "transnational" connotes that an organization has sustained relations with other societal actors that cross borders and boundaries.

It is important to note that the particular NGOs and CEOs in the study were selected from the Charity Navigator[2] database and from among organizations with activities in multiple countries. The particular sample that was selected was from the resulting set of NGOs and was chosen so as to be representative of these organizations with regard to sector, size, and fiscal health. The Charity Navigator database was used because it offers a structured comparison of transnationally engaged NGOs across a variety of sectors along with size, efficiency, and capacity indicators for each. This selection procedure resulted in 32 transnational NGOs doing humanitarian work and 64 engaged in development. All these transnational NGOs were registered in the US so as to gain Internal Revenue Service 501(c)3 tax exempt status and access to US government funding such as from USAID as well as charitable donations from US citizens and foundations.

The humanitarian organizations in this study focused on crises and disasters and immediate aid. Many had relief in their names. The development organizations focused on endemic problems like hunger, poverty, gender, education, environment, and health issues. The interview protocol asked questions about personal and organizational attributes; organizational goals, strategies, and activities; organizational effectiveness focused around particular incidents where the CEOs viewed their organization had been effective; communication concerns; networks and partnerships; and leadership and professional engagement.

The interview protocols were content analyzed using ATLAS.ti, a software system that facilitates finding common themes in such material (see ATLAS.ti, 2016). The interview protocols were also content analyzed using the Leadership Trait Analysis software located on the Profiler Plus platform (see Social Science Automation, 2016). Whereas ATLAS.ti assists researchers in finding common themes in the material, the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) assesses interview protocols for indications of seven traits frequently associated with leaders and leadership in the research literature. With ATLAS.ti, we were interested in how the CEOs described their organizations, the functions they viewed their organization as serving, their assessments of the organization's effectiveness and accountability as well

as their discussions regarding collaboration and partnerships (Transnational NGO Initiative, 2010). In the current study, we were interested in four of the LTA traits: ability to control events, need for power, sensitivity to contextual information, and focus on solving problems versus insuring the inclusiveness of others (see Hermann, 2005, 2009).

In both types of content analysis, an assumption is made that the more frequently leaders use certain words and phrases in their interview responses, the more salient such content is to them. Of interest is how much the CEOs focus on a particular idea and description with regard to ATLAS.ti. In LTA, we are interested in the percentage of time leaders could use certain words and phrases that they, indeed, do. The use of computer software reduced coder bias and insured consistency in the coding.

3. Results and Analysis

3.1. Leadership Style

Leadership style gives us hints regarding how leaders of transnational NGOs are likely to interact with stakeholders, donors, and those around them—how they are likely to structure the decision-making process, from whom they will seek advice, and the kinds of contexts they are likely to prefer (e.g., Kille, 2006; Kowert, 2002; Lecy, Mitchell, & Schmitz, 2012; Mitchell, 2005). In other words, leadership style suggests how important it is to leaders to exert control and influence over the environments in which they find themselves and the constraints that those environments pose as opposed to being responsive to the situation and working with the demands of stakeholders and donors. We focus here on four aspects of leadership style. Data for all four were available as a result of the LTA content analysis of our interviews with the CEOs.

The first aspect is often referred to as locus of control or belief in one's ability to control what happens. How much control do leaders perceive they have over the situations in which they find themselves; how likely is it that individuals and organizations can influence what happens? Based on the theoretical work of Rotter (1993), his locus of control personality inventory, and extended research using the inventory, the focus of the LTA content analysis is on verbs or action words. An assumption is made that when leaders take responsibility for planning or initiating an action, they believe that they have some control over what happens. The focus here is on actions proposed or taken by the CEO or his/her organization as discussed in the interview. The score on this trait is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicated that the speaker or the organization he/she leads took responsibility for planning or initiating an action. The overall score is the average percentage across the interview-

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[2] For this database and its rationale, see Charity Navigator (2016).

ee's answers to the questions raised in the interview.

The second aspect of leadership style that we examined is the need for power. As Winter (2005a) has observed, this is the desire to influence or have an impact on other persons or groups. Is the speaker attempting with the proposed action to establish, maintain, or restore his/her influence. As with the previous trait, coding for need for power and influence focuses on verbs. Is the speaker attempting with this proposed action to establish, maintain, or restore his or her power? Some of the conditions where need for power is scored are when the speaker (1) proposes or engages in a strong, forceful action such as a verbal threat, an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited; (3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another person or group; (4) tries to persuade or argue with someone else so long as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to impress or gain fame with an action; and (6) is concerned with his or her reputation or position. Once again the focus is on verbs or actions proposed or taken by the leader or a group with whom he or she identifies. A score is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker—or a group with whom the speaker identifies—has engaged in one of these behaviors. The overall score for any leader is the average percentage across the interviewee's answers to the questions in the interview.

The third aspect of leadership style studied here explores how sensitive to contextual information the leader is. Does the leader have a sense of what needs doing in the context or is he/she interested in understanding the nature of the situation before acting? This trait builds on the work of Suedfeld (see Suedfeld, Guttieri, & Tetlock, 2005) on integrative complexity. We are interested here in the leader's use of conditional words and phrases versus those that are more black and white in nature. Consider the difference between such words as 'approximately', 'for example', 'possibly', 'it depends' and words like 'absolutely', 'all', 'certainty', 'irreversible'. Dictionaries of such words have been developed based on thesauruses from around the world. Scores on this trait are the percentage of conditional words to the total number of conditional plus absolute words in a particular interview response. The overall score for any leader is

the average percentage across the interviewee's answers to the questions in the interview.

The fourth aspect of leadership style focuses on how much a particular leader focuses on solving problems versus on developing collaborative relationships in a group or organizational setting. This distinction forms the basis for Fiedler's Least Preferred Coworker Scale and his contingency model of leadership which explores in what contexts leaders interested in solving problems are more effective and in which those interested in collaboration and inclusiveness are more effective (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). Here again the focus in LTA is on words. Consider, for example, words such as 'accomplishment', 'plan', proposal', and 'recommendation' which are more focused on problem solving and accomplishing the task at hand. In contrast, words such as 'consensus building', 'negotiation', 'identity', 'concern', and 'colleagues' are more focused on building relationships and inclusiveness. The score for this aspect of style is determined by calculating the percentage of words focused on problem solving relative to the total number of problem-solving versus relationship-building words in a particular interview response. The overall score is the average percentage across all interview responses.

3.1.1. Ability to Control What Happens

Table 1 shows the results of the LTA analysis for the CEOs of humanitarian and development organizations regarding their perception of their ability to control what happens. Scores were divided at the median to determine what was low and what high. Those CEOs who had a score at the median were categorized so as to make the N in each category as close to 50% of the total as feasible. The data in Table 1 indicate that there is a significant relationship between sector and the CEOs perception regarding control. CEOs of humanitarian NGOs are more focused on controlling what happens while those in development NGOs are relatively low in this concern.

The literature suggests that leaders who believe that they can influence what happens are generally more interested and active in the decision-making process (see, e.g., Hermann, 2014; Hermann & Gerard, 2009; Keller, 2005; Kille, 2006). They want to maintain control over both decision making and implementation

Table 1. Sectoral focus regarding interest in controlling what happens.

Leadership Trait	Humanitarian NGOs	Development NGOs	Total
Low Interest in Controlling What Happens	9 (28%)	42 (66%)	51
High Interest in Controlling What Happens	23 (72%)	22 (34%)	45
Total	32	64	96

Note: X^2 = 12; df = 1; p = .001; median LTA score on this trait for the sample of 96 was .35.

to insure that things happen. In many instances, just like the people they are helping, their lives, too, are often on the line. Moreover, as in any crisis situation, they are accountable for what happens as the citizenry turns to them for help. There is not time to involve many others; the short decision time requires action. Taking the initiative and being entrepreneurial must be built into the situation if anything is going to happen.

In contrast, leaders who are low in belief that they can control what happens, like the development CEOs, tend to be more reactive to situations, more willing to empower others to participate. Indeed, they are comfortable working in situations where they can foster collaboration; they have no desire to be in control nor do they see the benefit in it. They are interested in partnerships where all are held accountable and rise or fall together. Such leaders want to participate and lead in contexts where they perceive there is at least a 50% chance of success. The data show a match to the differences in behavior that the literature suggests exist in these two NGO sectors.

3.1.2. Need for Power

Table 2 shows the results of the LTA analysis for the CEOs of humanitarian and development organizations regarding their need or desire for power and influence. Scores on this trait were divided at the median to determine what was low and what high. Those CEOs who had a score that fell on the median were categorized so as to make the N in each category as close to 50% of the total as feasible. The data in Table 2 show that the CEOs of humanitarian and development NGOs are mirror images of one another when it comes to need for power. This relationship approaches significance. CEOs of humanitarian NGOs are roughly 60–40 more likely to have a high need for power while CEOs of development NGOs are roughly 60–40 likely to be low in need for power.

The literature suggests that leaders with a high need for power—like the majority of the humanitarian CEOs—work to facilitate having power and influence in their environments and to appear a winner (e.g., Winter, 2005a, 2005b, 2010). They are good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will work to achieve their goals. Indeed, they can be highly skillful in behind the scenes negotiations. Moreover, they are generally daring and charming—the charismatic leader. But such

leaders are likely to set up rules to ensure conformity to their ideas—rules that can change abruptly if the leader's goals or interests change. Indeed, leaders high in need for power often test the limits before adhering to a course of action, bartering and bargaining up until the last moment in order to see what is possible and what the consequences will be of pushing further toward their goals. These leaders are more skillful in such negotiations when they can interact directly with those involved; without face-to-face interaction, such leaders can misjudge the assumptions the other party is making and how far they are willing to go.

When need for power is low, as it tends to be for the majority of the development CEOs studied here, leaders have less need to be in charge; they can be one among several who have influence. It is perfectly okay with them that others receive credit for what happens. Indeed, empowering others is important for such a leader. These leaders are willing to sacrifice their own interests for those of the group since in their view what is good for the group is, in truth, good for them. In effect, they become agents for the group, representing the group's needs and interests in policymaking. And, in turn, such leaders share responsibility and accountability with other members of the "team" for what happens.

3.1.3. Sensitivity to Contextual Information

Table 3 shows the results of the LTA analysis for the CEOs of humanitarian and development organizations for sensitivity to contextual information. Scores on this trait were divided at the median to determine what was low and what high. And, as before, those CEOs who had a score that fell on the median were categorized so as to make the N in each category as close to 50% of the total as feasible. The data in Table 3 show that CEOs in the humanitarian sector are a little more likely to be sensitive to contextual information than those in the development sector but the relationship is not significant. This leadership trait does not differentiate between the two types of CEOs.

3.1.4. Orientation to Stakeholders

Table 4 shows the results of the LTA analysis for the CEOs of humanitarian and development organizations regarding their orientation to their stakeholders. Are they

Table 2. Sectoral need for power.

Leadership Trait	Humanitarian NGOs	Development NGOs	Total
Low Need for Power	13 (41%)	38 (59%)	51
High Need for Power	19 (59%)	26 (41%)	45
Total	32	64	96

Note: X^2 = 3.01; df = 1; p = .08; median LTA score on this trait for the sample of 96 was .25.

Table 3. Sectoral sensitivity to contextual information.

Leadership Trait	Humanitarian NGOs	Development NGOs	Total
Low Sensitivity to Contextual Information	13 (41%)	33 (52%)	46
High Sensitivity to Contextual Information	19 (59%)	31 (49%)	50
Total	32	64	96

Note: X^2 = 1.02; df = 1; p = .31; median LTA score on this trait for the sample of 96 was .69.

Table 4. Sectoral orientation to stakeholders.

Leadership Trait	Humanitarian NGOs	Development NGOs	Total
Focus on Stakeholders Concerns	18 (56%)	25 (39%)	43
Focus on Solving Problems for Stakeholders	14 (44%)	39 (61%)	53
Total	32	64	96

Note: X^2 = 2.55; df = 1; p = .11; median LTA score on this trait for the sample of 96 was .72.

more focused on solving the problems facing such stakeholders or are they more interested in insuring that their stakeholders' concerns are taken into consideration in what happens? Scores on this trait were divided at the median to determine who showed evidence of a focus on problem solving and who on stakeholder concerns. Those CEOs who had a score that fell on the median were categorized so as to make the N in each category as close to 50% of the total as feasible.

The data in Table 4 approach significance and suggest that while the CEOs of humanitarian organizations are about equally split in their focus on stakeholder concerns and solving problems, the CEOs of development NGOs are more likely to be oriented toward solving the problems of their stakeholders. The literature on this aspect of leadership style suggests that for leaders who emphasize the problem, moving a set of stakeholders toward a goal is their principal purpose for being in the setting whereas for those who emphasize the concerns of stakeholders, establishing and maintaining relationships as well as keeping the loyalty and morale of those stakeholders high are the central functions of leadership (see, e.g., Bass & Bass, 2008; 't Hart, 2014; Hermann, 2014). It appears that the CEOs of humanitarian NGOs are almost as likely to be focused on the morale of those in their care as solving the problems that gave rise to the crisis or disaster in the first place. That is not the case for CEOs of development NGOs. They are almost two-thirds as likely to focus on problem solving as relationships with stakeholders. Given the types of problems development organizations tackle, such an approach may make sense. But to solve such problems, they are going to have to enlist the aid and trust of the stakeholders which does not seem their first concern. Perhaps without a plan of action, it is impossible to bring the stakeholders along.

3.2. CEO Background

What else can we learn about the leaders of humanitarian and development organizations from their responses regarding the challenges that they face? Are the differences described in the NGO literature regarding these two types of organizations evident in the leaders who run them? For this analysis we are going to examine the leadership style variable that differentiated them most clearly, that of belief in their ability to control what happens. Examining *only* those CEOs high in this belief for the humanitarian relief organizations (N = 23) and *only* those low in this belief for the development organizations (N = 42), it is possible to explore what is associated with each of these leadership styles—the differences in background among the leaders, how they perceive their organizations to operate, and the challenges they believe they face. We will start this analysis by examining their backgrounds, notably experience and education.

Table 5 shows background factors for the CEOs low and high in belief that they can control what happens, who represent the leadership of development and humanitarian relief organizations respectively. Interestingly, there was no real difference between the CEOs of organizations from these two sectors with regard to experience. Roughly 50% were in their first ten years as leader of the organization. Knox Clarke (2013) has commented about the high burn out rate in those leading humanitarian organizations. And, yet, the data show that around 40% of the leaders in both sectors have been in their positions for more than a decade.

There is a significant relationship between level of education and belief in control. Although there is close to a 50-50 distribution of CEOs with a college degree versus having an additional professional degree among those leading humanitarian organizations, almost

three-quarters of those leading development organizations had advanced degrees. Do the problems being dealt with by CEOs in the development sector require more education; do these organizations attract persons with more education; or do those involved in the development sector return for more education in order to try to better understand endemic problems? These are questions worthy of further study. We do know that the CEOs whose data are reflected in Table 5 from both types of NGOs came to their positions from other civil society organizations or from the public sector (around 70% for each group) and were brought into the organi-

zation to lead it rather than rising to their positions from within (some 85% for each group). These data suggest that those selected as CEOs came with an already formed belief regarding how much control was necessary in the particular setting rather than gaining it after they arrived in their leadership position.

3.3. Perceptions Regarding Organizational Structure and Function

Although Table 6 indicates that development-focused and humanitarian-oriented NGOs are about equally

Table 5. Leadership style and background.

Background Variable	Low Interest in Controlling What Happens (Development NGOs) (N = 42)	High Interest in Controlling What Happens (Humanitarian NGOs) (N = 23)	Chi-Square	Level of Significance
Experience				
1 to 10 Years as CEO	59%	55%	0.11	0.75
More Than 10 Years as CEO	41%	45%		
Education				
Bachelor's Degree	29%	52%	3.56	0.05
Master's Degree or More	71%	48%		

Table 6. Perceptions of organizational structure and function.

Organizational Variable	Low Interest in Controlling What Happens (Development NGOs) (N = 42)	High Interest in Controlling What Happens (Humanitarian NGOs) (N = 23)	Chi-Square	Level of Significance
Provide Direct Aid & Services				
Not a Goal	24%	17%	3.85	0.13
Primary Goal	76%	74%		
Secondary Goal	0%	9%		
Engage in Advocacy				
Not a Goal	52%	52%	8.36	0.02
Primary Goal	0%	17%		
Secondary Goal	48%	31%		
Securing Funding Is Obstacle to Achieving Goals				
No	36%	4%	7.88	0.01
Yes	64%	96%		
Time Frame for Action				
Short-Term	25%	69%	11.72	0.003
Long-Term	33%	26%		
Both	42%	5%		
Preferred Form of Communication in Organization				
Informal	23%	56%	6.55	0.04
Somewhat Formal	37%	33%		
Primarily Formal	40%	11%		
Way Communication Flows in Organization				
Primarily Non-Hierarchical	17%	59%	8.43	0.004
Primarily Hierarchical	83%	41%		

likely to see providing direct aid and services as a major goal of their organizations, there do appear to be some significant differences in perceived function and structure between the CEOs of these two types of NGOs.

Interestingly a little over one-half of the CEOs of both types of organizations do not view advocacy as a goal on which they are focused. For 17%, however, of the humanitarian CEOs interested in controlling what happens, it is a primary goal. Such behavior may be a need because both types of NGOs view securing funding as an obstacle to achieving their goals, but humanitarian organizations view finding funding as an even more severe obstacle than do those running development organizations. Almost all of the CEOs of humanitarian NGOs viewed securing funding as an obstacle whereas only two-thirds of those heading up development NGOs viewed it as such. Securing funding for emergency operations may be a cause for frustration but wanting to be able to control what happens may make problems surrounding finding funding even more frustrating, particularly since some funding is needed up front to get relief aid started.

Part of the frustration of the humanitarian CEOs may come from the short time that they perceive they have in which to engage in action. Over two-thirds of the CEOs of humanitarian NGOs with their interest in controlling what happens perceived their time frame for action was short. Such was not the case for those in charge of development NGOs. Some 77% of them viewed the time frame as long-term or a combination of short and long-term depending on the nature of the particular situation. The latter group has less interest in controlling what happens and, perhaps, more opportunity to be flexible in the situation than those operating in a crisis, disaster, or emergency setting.

Not only did the CEOs of humanitarian NGOs believe themselves operating under a short-term time frame, they prefer to do so informally and to be part of

organizations that are primarily non-hierarchical in nature. In their minds, it is easier to control and exert influence over what is happening if communication is kept informal and those necessarily part of decision making are easily interacted with so that problems can be met quickly and decisively in situations that are constantly changing. The CEOs leading development NGOs prefer more formal methods of communication as well as to operate in hierarchical organizations. In such organizations not believing that one has to control over what happens may pay off—it may facilitate participating on teams and building the kinds of collaborations often demanded in working in development-focused settings.

At issue here is whether CEOs with the particular predispositions identified here were hired because their leadership styles were a fit to the organizational culture or the CEOs sought out the organizations that matched their styles. In the political arena, researchers have found that leaders opt to run for positions that are compatible with their ways of exercising leadership and that they have more appeal to constituents with similar preferences for a particular leadership style (for a review, see Hermann, 2014).

3.4. Perceptions Regarding Collaboration

In the course of the interviews with the CEOs, they were asked to talk about collaboration and with whom they were likely to collaborate. Table 7 presents the results for the CEOs from humanitarian relief organizations who were interested in controlling what happens and those leading development organizations with a predisposition to work within the system as leaders, not having to be in control of what happened.

Interestingly, for all but other NGOs, 50% or more of the CEOs leading humanitarian NGOs did not view these other types of organizations as worthy collaborators—that is, a majority or more were not inclined to

Table 7. Views regarding with whom to collaborate.

Parties with Whom to Collaborate	Low Interest in Controlling What Happens (Development NGOs) (N = 42)	High Interest in Controlling What Happens (Humanitarian NGOs) (N = 23)	Chi-Square	Level of Significance
International Organizations				
No	50%	91%	11.09	0.001
Yes	50%	9%		
Corporations				
No	33%	57%	8.29	0.07
Yes	67%	43%		
Governments				
No	40%	57%	1.54	0.22
Yes	60%	43%		
Other NGOs				
No	17%	26%	0.82	0.36
Yes	83%	74%		

collaborate with international organizations (IOs), corporations, or governments. Indeed, they often talked about such collaborations as being forced upon them and as a constraint they tried hard to avoid rather than welcome. Such collaborations were viewed as hindering rather than helping them achieve their goals. This view was almost 100% for collaboration with IOs who bore the brunt of this concern for the humanitarian relief CEOs. They perceived that they were often forced to collaborate with IOs when such organizations were put in charge of coordinating international activities. In these leaders' minds, with such coordination, they had less control than usual over what was happening which affected their ability to do their tasks in a timely fashion.

The exact opposite was the case for the CEOs of development NGOs who appear to have welcomed collaboration. Fifty percent or more viewed their organizations as being quite willing to collaborate with and across these various types of institutions and as benefiting from such collaborations. The smallest percentage—right at 50%—occurred for IOs. These CEOs wondered how an organization could call itself effective in the development arena without collaborating across the institutions also involved in development. To achieve one's goals meant engaging the resources of these other types of institutions and building partnerships with them.

4. Conclusions

This paper began by asking if leadership mattered in the governance of civil society organizations. In particular, we were interested in the leaders of two different types of organizations which the literature suggests exhibit different leadership styles and perceive their work environments in very different ways. Indeed, there is growing interest in "bridging the gap" between these two communities: those organizations engaged in humanitarian relief and those organizations tackling the endemic problems involved in international development. We were interested in studying if the leadership styles envisioned in the literature for those leading humanitarian NGOs and those in charge of development NGOs were as starkly different as the literature portrayed them. To explore this question we talked with 96 CEOs representing these organizations—32 leading humanitarian-oriented NGOs and 64 leaders of development-focused NGOs. We systematically interviewed these leaders to learn more about what they were like and their views of their organizations' challenges. In the process we promised the leaders anonymity so we cannot indicate the particular leaders interviewed nor the organizations they represented. Suffice it to say examples of what we mean by humanitarian NGOs are organizations like Doctors without Borders, CARE, and Oxfam; examples of development NGOs are such organizations as Save the Children, Plan,

and Mercy Corps. And we found a match between what we learned through our interview study and the descriptions of these two types of organizations in the extant research and practitioner literatures.

Those in charge of humanitarian NGOs were more likely to challenge the constraints in their environments, in effect, to be interested in controlling what was happening, to want to influence the outcome, and to be focused on addressing the needs of those facing the crisis, disaster, or emergency. They viewed themselves as having a short time in which to respond and, thus, chose to communicate and act informally as well as to only collaborate with other organizations if pushed. Providing direct aid and service were high priorities as was advocacy to secure the funding necessary for completing their task. In contrast, CEOs leading development-oriented NGOs focused more on respecting and working within the constraints of their positions and the settings in which they found themselves—in effect, being interested in building coalitions and consensus as well as indulging in compromise with the intent of solving the endemic problems that they were there to address. They had a longer term time perspective than their humanitarian counterparts and were willing to work within fairly hierarchical structures as well as with a variety of types of collaborators to reach their goals.

Considering the contexts in which these two types of organization operate, this difference in style seems almost self-evident. In fact, in the interviews the CEOs of humanitarian NGOs talked about usually being the first on the ground in crisis situations, engaging quickly in organizing the setting in order to help those affected. They generally were looking for immediate impact and for asserting control over what is often a chaotic environment. The very term 'development', however, suggests being in for the long-term, as those leading development NGOs argued, and working within the environment on the ground to help those involved to both define what they want to see happen and to work toward such goals. When they find themselves in the same setting, the CEOs of these two types of organizations often see themselves as working at cross purposes, although—as we just learned—three-quarters of them view collaboration with other NGOs as relevant to achieving their missions

There is an increasing cry from those monitoring the humanitarian and development sectors for leaders to bridge the gap between short-term emergency aid and long-term development aid to help "people survive disasters and get back on the path to self–reliance and dignity" (Gabaudan, 2012, p. 1; see also Bennett, 2015; Knox Clarke, 2013). We wondered if the two groups of leaders that we did not focus on in this study might be helpful in bridging this gap. The 9 (or 28%) of those leading humanitarian NGOs who were low in their interest in controlling what happens and the 22 (or 34%) of those

heading development NGOs who were just the opposite—interested in controlling what happens. Each of these groups was deviant from the norm for the kind of NGO that they led. These are the leaders that we did not look at in examining background, perceptions of structure and function, or interest in collaboration.

An examination of their interviews and organizational missions suggests that these CEOs already are involved in playing a bridging role. The nine CEOs leading humanitarian NGOs with low interest in controlling what happens appear to be part of organizations that identify areas where development is needed through providing relief in crisis and disaster situations. In contrast, the 22 CEOs heading up development NGOs with high interest in controlling what happens assist in crises in areas in which they already are doing development work. As a result, the nine leading humanitarian organizations plan to spend time in the area once the immediate crisis is attended to and are interested in continued interaction and in building collaborations—in working with the development NGOs. And the 22 CEOs leading development organizations feel the need to get out in front in crisis situations to insure their ongoing efforts at development do not get compromised during the emergency. Both sets of leaders are interested in working with the leaders of the other type of organization and show evidence of the leadership style more prominent in that other kind of NGO. They have reason to act as facilitators between the two types of organizations as their leadership styles 'match' those of the CEOs in the opposite sector.

In essence, leadership does appear to matter in the governance of civil society organizations. At least CEOs of humanitarian and development NGOs perceive some differences in their work environments and show evidence of different leadership styles. But we have just started to systematically study such leaders. There is more to do including exploring if CEOs with deviant leadership styles, as we observed here, can facilitate bridging the gap between the two roles often present in crisis situations, that of dealing with the immediate situation and that of working on underlying problems.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Article

Cursus Honorum: Personal Background, Careers and Experience of Political Leaders in Democracy and Dictatorship—New Data and Analyses

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Abstract
Politics in democracy and dictatorship is markedly different; democracy and dictatorship are also associated with distinct policy outcomes. Do political regimes also select different leaders, i.e., do democratic leaders have distinct personal backgrounds to those of their peers in dictatorships, do they tend to hold different prior careers and posts while climbing the "greasy pole" of politics? The aim of this paper is to introduce the new data on leaders' careers in democracy and dictatorship and compare their personal background, experience in politics, careers and significant posts prior to their tenure, and details about their time in office, *inter alia*. In general, democratic leaders differ from nondemocratic ones in terms of their educational, social and career background. The paper also finds significant differences among leaders in different nondemocratic regimes, and suggests possible venues for further research.

Keywords
comparative democratisation; democracy and dictatorship; new dataset; personal background; political leaders

Issue
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1. Introduction

Scholars have long investigated the effects of democratic and nondemocratic institutions on leaders' behaviour in office, the probability of and manner of exit from that office, particularly during and after military conflict (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; Goemans, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Weeks, 2012). Such studies have often relied on the pioneering data set on political leaders, *Archigos*, that included general details about leaders' time in office, exit and fate (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). Alongside research that looked at the effects of institutions on leaders, studies equally exist that examine the effects of leaders and their personal traits. Because such studies require more detailed information about leaders' personal background which is not covered by the *Archigos*, the majority of scholars have to undergo their own significant data-collection efforts pertaining to some aspect

of leaders' personal background and traits. As a result, the new wave of leadership studies in political science and economics is extremely data-intensive (e.g., Alexiadou, 2015; Baturo, 2014; Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Byman & Pollack, 2001; Colgan, 2013; Dreher, Lein, Lamla, & Somogyi, 2009; Hayo & Neumeier, 2014; Horowitz & Stam, 2014; McDermott, 2007). While several new cross-national data sets have emerged that are able to account for various aspects of leaders' background and traits (e.g., Dreher et al., 2009; Ellis, Horowitz & Stam, 2015; Gerring, Oncel, Morrison, & Keefer, 2014; Ludwig, 2002), the majority of leadership studies focus, and provide data on, very specific aspects of leaders' personal background (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Byman & Pollack, 2001; Horowitz & Stam, 2014); many only cover particular geographic regions or political regimes, e.g., only democracies or presidential regimes (e.g., Alexiadou, 2015; Baturo, 2014; Pérez-Liñán, 2009).

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces

new cross-national data that makes a significant contribution to our knowledge about leaders, in particular providing very detailed information about their careers, experience, and prior posts. Second, it provides detailed comparisons of leaders in democracy and dictatorship, as well as of leaders across different nondemocratic regimes. The title of the new data set, *Cursus Honorum*, i.e., career ladder in Latin, is chosen partly to honour the groundbreaking *Archigos* dataset on political leaders developed by Goemans et al. (2009) in which *Archigos* is the Greek term for ruler. However, the term *Cursus Honorum*, apart from its similar connotations to antiquity, also neatly describes the key aspects of the data that distinguish it from other data sources on political leaders. In particular, *Cursus Honorum* accounts for various aspects of political careers of leaders over long periods of time prior to assuming political office and even after.[1] The data set includes certain biographical details about leaders, their background, education, and professional experiences that the existing datasets on national political leaders also include albeit often for different country samples or other time periods (e.g., Alexiadou, 2015; Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Dreher et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2015; Ludwig, 2002). The *Cursus Honorum*, however, offers much more detailed data on educational attainment, prior political posts and political experience, details about time in office and post-tenure occupations. Also, the data set extends the coverage from 2004—the *Archigos* covers until the end of 2004—to 2010.

The second aim is to compare the backgrounds and careers of political leaders in democracy and dictatorship. The systematic analysis of leaders' distinct careers and traits will enhance our understanding of elite politics and recruitment and how distinct political regimes operate. Therefore, having introduced the new data in the section below, the section that follows compares leaders in democracy and dictatorship in terms of their general and family background, education, prior careers and posts, as well as experience. In brief, democratic leaders are better educated, more likely to have law and economics degrees, and tend to hold more significant political posts prior to office. I also examine leaders across different nondemocratic regimes and find that leaders in military regimes are more likely to have middle-class family backgrounds than those in

other regime types. At the same time, leaders in party regimes, in terms of their careers and experience, have more in common with democratic leaders than with other dictators. In the final section, I briefly review the scholarship on leaders and discuss possible empirical applications of the new data including the analyses of linkages between particular careers and policies in office or the effects of political experience on policy-making and survival in office, among other things.

2. An Overview of the *Cursus Honorum* Data

In addition to the *Archigos* data (Goemans et al., 2009) discussed above, other datasets about political leaders exist and will almost certainly appear in the future.[2] Dreher et al. (2009), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) and Ellis et al. (2015) also collected data on various aspects of the personal background of political leaders. Ellis et al. (2015) focus mainly on military aspects of the personal background of leaders from 1875–2004, however, their data also include other important aspects such as leaders' family and educational details. In turn, Dreher et al. (2009) examine the impact of the individual background of 500 political leaders from 73 countries on economic reform from 1970—2002.[3] Likewise, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) include variables on the educational attainment of leaders from 1872–2004, following the eight-way classification of Ludwig (2002). In turn, Gerring et al. (2014) cover not only contemporaneous leaders but also those in the top echelon of political elites.

Inevitably, the *Cursus Honorum* data set introduced herein shares several indicators with existing datasets. However, the *Cursus Honorum* offers new variables, especially those related to specific details of leaders' political career paths. The data include more than 50 various indicators pertaining to personal background, such as previous career and significant posts prior to assuming office, number of years in formal politics, educational background, whether they were ever jailed, the military rank of current or former military officers, indicators pertaining to their time in office and entry and exit from that office, as well as post-leadership career. Several variables from the data set first appeared

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[1] Goodman (1997, p. 23) refers to *cursus honorum* as "the rigid hierarchy of the *cursus honorum*, the steps by which a man advanced to the peak of a political career, the consulship, or, for a select few, appointment as one of the two censors." Furthermore, *cursus honorum* continued even after the Romans attained the supreme magistracies: "The true glory of senatorial life, then, lay in the magistracies for which senators alone were eligible….[T]he proconsulship of Asia or Africa retained the highest esteem and became the acme of the senatorial *cursus*. By tradition, only the most senior ex-consuls were nominated for Africa and Asia" (Goodman, 1997, p. 168).

[2] Arguably, with a notable exception of a cross-national study by Bienen and van de Walle (1991) or several studies of personal characteristics, recruitment and careers of political elites in Western democracies (Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Putnam, 1973), the majority of earlier studies generally did not rely on, nor introduce new empirical data about leaders (e.g., Blondel, 1987).

[3] It appears that political scientists and economists study similar phenomena in isolation: Dreher et al. (2009, p. 171) acknowledged that they collated the list of leaders independently without prior knowledge of the existing *Archigos* dataset which has long been a standard in political science (Goemans et al., 2009).

in Baturo (2014). The *Cursus Honorum* data set covers 1,501 political leaders in office from the 1960–2010 period, including interim leaders, in all countries (except small island nations), in democratic and non-democratic regimes.[4]

In general, *Cursus Honorum* variables may be divided into several groups, as seen from Table 1. First, the data include general information about leaders such as the name of the effective chief political executive and time in office.[5] Likewise, the data include common

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[4] The *Cursus Honorum* data were mainly collected from 2009–10 (updated in 2012–14), apart from *Archigos* at that time I was not familiar with the existing large-n datasets on rulers' personal background. The sources used include country political histories, leaders' biographies, reference works, government websites, newspaper archives, book references, such as Bienen and van de Walle (1991) or Lentz (1994), as well as web references, such as www.rulers.org, www.worldstatesmen.com, Zarate (2011). For example, political biographies of Swiss leaders were sourced from *Historical Dictionary*, http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/. The indicators vary in their reliability, e.g., political career or prior political post are generally reliable because such facts are usually reported by the majority of bibliographic sources and are not subject to interpretation. In case of other variables, such as number of years in formal politics, a certain degree of subjectivity is unavoidable.

[5] If the same individual assumes office again in non-consecutive

country identifiers and leaders' age.[6] Rulers' names and identifiers correspond to those in the *Archigos* data (Goemans et al., 2009), with additions from 2005–10 and revisions whenever required, e.g., leaders of São Tomé e Príncipe, for instance, who were not included in the *Archigos*.

In addition, the data include several indicators of general family background. *Political family* accounts for whether a leader is a member of a prominent political family or dynasty—for example, the Gandhis in India, where members of the leader's family have occupied the highest national political posts in the past—whenever possible to ascertain. There is also an indicator for whether leaders were known to have been in jail any time prior to assuming office, excluding short detentions for minor misdemeanours, e.g., violations of public peace.

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terms, e.g., Kérékou of Benin in 1972–91 and in 1996–2006, such a ruler is included as, e.g., "Kérékou" and as "Kérékou 2". Correspondingly, several indicator variables are adjusted, e.g., years in formal politics for Kérékou 2 (Kérékou in 1996–2006) additionally include his years as president in 1972–91. Another indicator exists that identifies the same individual as one ruler.

[6] Age is available for all rulers but Bonifacio Ondó Edu of Equatorial Guinea (1963–68) who is reported to have been born in 1920s by two sources, coded as 1925 (middle year for that decade) in the data.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	N
General Indicators:					
Age at entry into office	53.282	10.649	17	85	1500
Age at exit from office	58.694	11.039	19	90	1500
Tenure in office, years	5.488	7.048	0.003	51.836	1501
Gender	0.033	0.180	0	1	1501
Political family	0.148	0.355	0	1	1497
Family background, lower	0.219	0.413	0	1	1501
Family background, middle	0.570	0.495	0	1	1501
Family background, upper	0.211	0.408	0	1	1501
Ever been imprisoned	0.149	0.356	0	1	1495
Revolutionary or opposition[1]	0.181	0.385	0	1	1495
Education variables:					
Education, detail (description)	–	–	–	–	1260
3rd-level education	0.815	0.389	0	1	1501
PhD degree	0.130	0.336	0	1	1487
3rd level education abroad	0.360	0.480	0	1	1463
Soviet education	0.027	0.162	0	1	1485
Education, categories:[2]*					1260
Law	0.278	0.448	0	1	1501
No 3rd-level education	0.185	0.389	0	1	1501
Economics	0.126	0.332	0	1	1501
Military and staff colleges	0.117	0.322	0	1	1501
Humanities	0.083	0.276	0	1	1501
Engineering	0.065	0.247	0	1	1501
Political science	0.043	0.202	0	1	1501

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	N
Medicine	0.030	0.171	0	1	1501
Science, various	0.019	0.138	0	1	1501
Degree, unknown	0.015	0.123	0	1	1501
Theology	0.013	0.115	0	1	1501
Agriculture or agronomy	0.013	0.112	0	1	1501
Marxist philosophy, i.e., party school	0.009	0.096	0	1	1501
Prior career variables:					
Years in formal politics	12.211	10.793	0	52	1490
Years, including in civil service	15.663	11.782	0	52	1488
Career, detail (description)	–	–	–	–	1500
Post-career, detail (description)	–	–	–	–	1171
Prior career, categories:*					1500
Legislative/party career	0.467	0.499	0	1	1500
Career in military/security	0.179	0.384	0	1	1500
Civil servant or diplomat	0.063	0.244	0	1	1500
Minister, various	0.060	0.238	0	1	1500
Academic career	0.051	0.219	0	1	1500
Ruler's relative	0.047	0.211	0	1	1500
Businessman	0.025	0.157	0	1	1500
Rebel or revolutionary	0.023	0.151	0	1	1500
Governor or mayor	0.019	0.138	0	1	1500
Mayor of capital city	0.019	0.138	0	1	1500
Judiciary	0.017	0.131	0	1	1500
Trade unionist	0.011	0.106	0	1	1500
Prior significant post, categories:[3]*					1459
PM (earlier)	0.063	0.243	0	1	1459
Minister, foreign affairs	0.037	0.189	0	1	1459
Minister, finance	0.036	0.187	0	1	1459
Vice-president	0.034	0.180	0	1	1459
House speaker	0.030	0.171	0	1	1459
Minister, defence	0.025	0.157	0	1	1459
Chief of general (army) staff	0.023	0.151	0	1	1459
Politburo member	0.015	0.122	0	1	1459
Military background variables:					
Military rank (description)	–	–	–	–	336
Military rank (NATO equivalent)	–	–	–	–	336
Top NATO rank	–	–	–	–	336
Variables in relation to the time in office:					
Political outsider	0.101	0.301	0	1	1500
Father of the nation	0.067	0.251	0	1	1501
Collective leadership	0.055	0.227	0	1	1501
Leader's political party (description)	–	–	–	–	1339
Communist (extreme left) party	0.065	0.246	0	1	1420
Entry type, categories:*					1501
Election	0.398	0.490	0	1	1501
Selected in parliament	0.207	0.405	0	1	1501
Coup	0.123	0.328	0	1	1501
Interim	0.097	0.296	0	1	1501
Selection, various	0.091	0.288	0	1	1501
Civil war or revolt	0.025	0.155	0	1	1501
Constitutional succession	0.019	0.138	0	1	1501
Royal succession	0.019	0.138	0	1	1501
Dedazo	0.011	0.103	0	1	1501

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	N
Foreign installed	0.010	0.099	0	1	1501
Post-career, categories (description)	--	--	--	--	1171
Exit type, categories:					1501
Step down/resign	0.327	0.469	0	1	1501
Term limits	0.166	0.372	0	1	1501
Coup	0.138	0.345	0	1	1501
Lost elections	0.133	0.340	0	1	1501
In office	0.111	0.315	0	1	1501
Died in office	0.062	0.241	0	1	1501
Civil war or revolt	0.035	0.185	0	1	1501
Killed	0.019	0.135	0	1	1501
Replaced by foreign powers	0.009	0.093	0	1	1501

Note: *Some leaders receive education in more than one discipline, serve in more than one significant post, or have more than one prior career. In such cases, there is an accompanying variable with additional categories included. [1] Involved in a revolutionary movement or opposition in a prior non-democratic regime, or in an anti-colonial struggle. [2] Most significant categories are included, i.e., psychology or pedagogy are omitted from the table. [3] Several prior posts are displayed only, there exist more categories.

The data also account for the family background of leaders, whether they come from upper, middle, or working/lower-middle class families. In some cases family class origins are difficult to ascertain, however.[7] For example, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the colonial period, the meaning of family class background is very different from what is understood by class in industrialised nations. Therefore, whenever possible, equivalent class categories were gauged in the context of social hierarchy, e.g., the family of the village chief or that of the missioners was assigned into the "middle" category. Altogether, 22 per cent of leaders have a working or lower-middle class family background, 21 per cent hail from upper-class origins, and the majority, 57 per cent, are from the middle ranks.

The second group of indicators is related to leaders' education. *Education, detail (description)* includes the raw data on leaders' education: detailed in 48 categories, e.g., classics; liberal arts (others); business administration; military academy, West Point; military academy, Saint-Cyr; military academy, Sandhurst; military academy, others, and so on. Altogether, 82 per cent of leaders have completed third-level (university or equivalent) education. The education of military officers is coded as third-level education only if such officers attended undergraduate degree-granting institutions, such as Saint-Cyr, the Soviet third-level military schools (following the late 1950s transition from two-year (non-third-level) military schools into four-year higher education institutions. In turn, *Education, detail*

(description) is aggregated into *Education, categories* with fifteen categories: 28 per cent of leaders received a law education, 13 per cent—economics or related discipline, 12 per cent—graduated from military and military staff institutions, and so on.

There is also a *Ph.D.* indicator whenever a leader holds a doctorate, excluding honorary doctorates, e.g., Alberto Fujimori of Peru does not hold a Ph.D. despite being a university academic prior to presidency, only an honorary Ph.D., therefore Fujimori is coded as not having a doctorate. There are also several indicators related to whether leaders received their education abroad. Three per cent of non-Soviet leaders received their university education, fully or partly, in the USSR or a Soviet satellite country during the Cold War. If leaders received more than one third-level education in different fields, their second education is also included in a second, additional *Education, categories* variable, e.g., Ramalho Eanes (1976–86) of Portugal received a third-level military, and later, legal, degree. Both types are accounted for.

The third group of indicators covers various aspects of rulers' prior careers. *Career, detail (description)* provides the raw description. *Prior career, categories* gives 16 categories for a primary career before office: academic, businessman, career in military/security, civil servant or diplomat, governor or mayor, international development or the EU, journalist, judiciary, lawyer, legislative/party career, mayor of capital city, ministerial appointments, priest, rebel or career revolutionary, ruler's relative, trade unionist. Because some careers are difficult to categorise in one category, *Prior career 2* accounts for their second significant career, if there is any. Altogether, 47 per cent of leaders have mainly legislative or political party careers, 18 per cent have a career in military or security apparatus, and six per cent are former civil servants or diplomats.

There are also two variables for the length of politi-

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[7] Also, in 17 per cent of observations (253 leaders out of 1,501) bibliographic sources do not disclose family social origins or father's profession explicitly and therefore family status was imputed based on other available information about leaders' younger years. There is an auxiliary indicator to mark these observations so they can be recoded as missing instead.

cal experience prior to assuming the highest political office. Years in formal politics account for years in official politics, such as being a member of parliament, cabinet minister, province governor or city mayor, or member of a sub-national parliament, while the second indicator additionally accounts for any political activity including party membership, working in civil service, or colonial administration. Furthermore, *Prior significant post, categories* variable provides additional details of political experience such as significant political posts occupied prior to assuming office, e.g., those of finance minister, defence minister, membership of the politburo, or head of royal military household, etc. Altogether, there are three separate significant post variables, with some leaders assigned only one significant prior post if they only had one. From these data it is possible to ascertain not only the ruler's prior career path but also the degree of affinity with previous rulers, e.g., whether the current leader is a close relative of the previous one, or a designated successor.

The fourth group includes details regarding whether a leader is a career military officer or a former military officer, excluding leaders who underwent mandatory military training or military draft in the past. The data also include indicators for the highest military rank obtained by rulers prior to assuming office, as well as their highest rank in the national military at the time.[8] Another group of indicators relates to what happens to leaders after leaving office. *Post-career, categories* assigns former leaders' pursuits into several categories, such as ambassador, arrested and/or imprisoned, business, civil servant, died/incapacitated in office, exile, cabinet minister, non-profit or academic, and so on. The post-tenure categories may also be desegregated and aggregated into a smaller or larger number of categories. In turn, the final group of variables includes various details pertaining to leaders' time in office, or the type of entry and exit from office, e.g., constitutional succession, term limits, or a coup. Also, 7 per cent of leaders are *Fathers of the nation*, 6 per cent rule under collective leadership, 7 per cent are from the Communist, Marxist or any other extreme-left party family, among other things.

3. Leaders and their Careers in Democracy and Dictatorship

The democratic form of government is lauded for various positive policy outcomes, e.g., higher education spending (Stasavage, 2005), better healthcare (Kudamatsu, 2012), more effective control of corruption, albeit only after a long history of democracy

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[8] Where a ruler is a retired officer at the time of assuming office, the rank at the time of retirement is used, whenever such data are available. Ranks bestowed on leaders while in office are not counted, only those received prior.

(Treisman, 2000), and steadier economic growth rates (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000), among other things. Democracy also attracts better educated, and therefore generally better—because the superior education of leaders arguably signals their honesty and competence—political leaders (Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011). The difference between leaders in democracy and dictatorship does not have to be confined to educational attainment, however. Rulers may vary in terms of the type of education, family background, typical career paths and length thereof, and the significant political posts they are expected to attain on their way to the highest office, among other things. In turn, a better understanding of leaders' distinct careers and traits may improve our knowledge of elite politics and recruitment across different political regimes.

In this section I demonstrate how the *Cursus Honorum* data can be employed to investigate whether democracy and dictatorship are associated with "different" leaders. Because the primary aim of this paper is to introduce and discuss the data, I forsake a more detailed discussion as to why political regimes may elevate and "select" as their leaders those individuals who share particular background traits. Instead, I rely on previous scholarship that examined the selection of leaders in comparative context (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Dreher et al., 2009; Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Pérez-Liñán, 2009). Based on this literature, the expectation is that democracies are more likely to feature leaders with a better education (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011), legal background, education in law and economics (e.g., Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972), and to have longer political careers and experience (e.g., Linz, 1994). In contrast, leaders in non-democracies are more likely to have lower education (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011), military background (e.g., Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Svolik, 2012), shorter political careers, and less experience (e.g., Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Ludwig, 2002).

For the sake of comparison, leaders in democracies are those who enter office in a year when their country has a *Polity2* score of +6 and above, and leaders in dictatorships are those who enter when the *Polity2* score is lower than +6. Several countries not covered by Marshall and Jaggers (2011) are coded as democracies if they are categorised as "Free" by the Freedom House however, for example, Barbados, Bahamas and Iceland.

Differences in personal background are presented in several graphs. The background categories are sorted by the magnitude of differences between leaders in two political regimes. In other words, democratic and nondemocratic leaders are most different in terms of categories at the top of each figure, and they are the most similar at the bottom. Figure 1 displays differences in general and family background, in per cent.

The results indicate that democracies and dictatorships have a similar percentage of leaders who are political outsiders, were imprisoned in the past, or hail from prominent political families, as these categories are at the bottom of Figure 1. Non-democratic leaders are four years younger than their democratic counterparts, at 51 years when they enter office. The biggest difference, however, is in terms of middle-class family background: 63 per cent of leaders in democracies are middle-class as opposed to 51 per cent in non-democracies. Also, 25 per cent of rulers in dictatorships spring from a lower class background versus 19 per cent in democracies.

Figure 2 displays differences in leaders' education. Earlier studies found the predominance of former law-yers in democracies (Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972). As expected therefore, there are more lawyers among democrats, and more leaders with education in military and staff colleges exist among dictators. Likewise, 28 per cent of rulers in non-democracies—versus only 10 per cent in democracies—have no college education. In democracies, 18 per cent hold degrees in economics, 17 per cent have Ph.D. degrees and 10 per cent hold undergraduate degrees in humanities—versus only 7, 8 and 6 per cent respectively in dictatorships. However, democratic leaders are, broadly speaking, not that different in terms of whether they received their educa-

tion abroad in general (33 v. 39 per cent), or in the countries of the Soviet block in particular. There are only 40 rulers with Soviet education altogether, e.g., Bachelet of Chile who studied medicine in the GDR, or Dos Santos of Angola with a Soviet engineering degree.[9]

In general, democratic leaders do seem to have a better education overall, in line with previous findings in Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) who also stipulated that the improved education of leaders was related to their competence and public-spiritedness. This argu-ment is debatable, however, as in former or current authoritarian regimes where formal education lacks in civic classes and democratic learning, better education may equally indoctrinate (Klingemann, 1966). Also, Carnes and Lupu (2015, p. 47) find that university-educated leaders do not perform any better—i.e., do not govern during periods of higher economic growth, do not pass more legislative bills, are no less corrupt.

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[9] Leaders in the (former) USSR or Soviet satellite countries who received their education in their home countries during the Cold war are not included in the Soviet education category, i.e., Soviet education must be received abroad. An East European leader with an education in the USSR is regarded to have re-ceived a Soviet education as opposed to a leader who received it in his own East European country during the Cold war.

Figure 1. General background of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and dic-tatorship with particular traits. However, *Age at entry* includes the average values instead of percentage. Categories are sorted by differences between leaders who enter office in more and less democratic regimes as explained in text.

Figure 2. Education of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and dictatorship with particular educational background. Selected categories are displayed only (e.g., theology, agronomy and other infrequent categories are omitted). All categories are the field of study except *Education abroad*, *Soviet education*, and *Ph.D.* which can be in any field. Categories are sorted by differences between leaders who enter office in more and less democratic regimes.

We can also compare leaders' prior careers and the posts they tend to occupy prior to tenure in the highest office. In Figure 3, 65 per cent of leaders (the bar is truncated in the interest of visibility) in democracies and 28 per cent in non-democracies have predominantly legislative or party careers. However, 34 per cent in dictatorships—versus only 3 per cent in democracies—come from military or security career paths. Even excluding leaders in military regimes, 21 per cent of rulers in monarchies, party and personal regimes have a military career background. Indeed, many non-democratic leaders wear the uniform to exert political control over their militaries (Svolik, 2012, p. 11).

The *Cursus Honorum* data also allow us to compare leaders in terms of the length of their political careers, whether in formal politics or in politics in general. The second category, years in politics prior to assuming the highest political office, additionally includes years in civil service and any politics-related activity from the time of joining the party or movement, for instance. As can be seen from Figure 3, democratic leaders enjoy lengthier political careers, whether in formal politics or in general: on average they clock 16 and 19 years versus those in non-democracies who manage 9 and 12

years, respectively. However, many leaders in dictatorships are perhaps more connected: 8 per cent are relatives of the previous ruler, albeit many of them—but not all—are found in monarchies, as expected.

From the data, we can also compare various ways under which leaders may assume, or lose, their office. Figure 4 shows that the majority of leaders in democracies assume office via regular means, either as a result of election—57 per cent—or selection in parliament—35 per cent. By contrast, only 22 and 6 per cent of leaders in dictatorships assume office as a result of elections or within the legislature. Instead, 25 per cent come to power through a coup and 18 per cent are selected, i.e., chosen by members of the military junta, at politburo meetings, etc.[10] Leaders can also assume office as the result of royal succession in monarchies; as a

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[10] In cases where it is difficult to assign a single category to the type of entry, two categories may be assigned, e.g., a ruler can enter through the process of a constitutional succession and a coup at the same time. Consider Arosemena Monroy (1961–63) of Ecuador who participated in the rebellion against his president (Lentz, 1994, p. 238). After a coup, Monroy, as vice president, assumed presidential office (hence the entry is categorised as *constitutional succession* and *coup*).

Figure 3. Prior career and posts of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and dictatorship with particular career and professional traits, except for *Years in formal politics* and *Years, including in civil service* that report the average values instead. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Categories are sorted by differences between leaders who enter in more and less democratic regimes.

result of the explicit choice of the preceding ruler, *dedazo*, e.g., Mexico prior to 2000 (this category can be collapsed together with *selection*); they can be installed by, or enter office with the significant assistance of, a foreign power (e.g., Babrak Karmal in 1979, Mohammad Najibullah in 1986 and Hamid Karzai in 2001—all in Afghanistan). Every tenth leader in the data is designated as interim. Such leaders enter office typically following the death, incapacity or resignation of the preceding leader and remain in that office for a short duration, usually less than a year,

and resign afterwards.[11]

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[11] For example, the Senate speaker of Gabon, Rogombé, assumed the office of interim head of state for four months after President Bongo died in 2009 only to return to her previous post in the Senate when the new ruler was sworn in. Likewise, some military leaders are also considered interim whenever they, shortly after assuming power, declare that democratic elections are to be held and then exclude themselves from such elections (e.g., General Abraham of Haiti in 1990). In monarchies, a regent who serves shorter than one year is also regarded as interim.

Entry

Exit

Figure 4. Entry and exit in democracy and dictatorship. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders who enter or exit office in democracy and dictatorship under each category. Categories are mutually exclusive and are sorted by differences between leaders who enter in more and less democratic regimes.

The majority of democratic leaders also leave office in a regular manner: 39 per cent resign even though they could have remained in politics, 22 per cent comply with term limits, and 22 per cent lose election and leave. In contrast, politics in dictatorships is more violent: 28 per cent lose office in a coup, 7 per cent as a result of revolt or civil war and 3 per cent are killed (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). Nine per cent die in office.[12] Still, many nondemocratic leaders leave office in a regular manner: 10 per cent comply with term limits (Baturo, 2014), 25 per cent resign peacefully, and 3 per cent lose elections. Also, excluding leaders who die in office or are forced into exile or are imprisoned, overall half of former rulers remain in politics while on average 8 per cent turn to business, 10 per cent primarily engage in non-governmental and charitable activities or turn to academic work, and 7 per cent are civil servants, e.g., ambassadors.

Until now, I have relied on descriptive statistics to explore the main differences between leaders in democracies and dictatorships. Political regimes are more likely to "select" as their leaders those individuals who share particular background traits, e.g., former or current military officers in dictatorships or former solicitors in democracies. However, apart from political regimes other factors may equally influence the selection of leaders. For example, different ruling coalitions may face different security environments when choosing their leaders so that at the time of war or insurgency military officers are elevated.[13] Similarly, economic crises, regime institutionalisation, country governability may equally matter in leader selection.

As a simple test to account for possible omitted factors, I specify several models to predict whether leaders with specific traits enter office. The independent variables are *Polity2* and *Regime durability* to account for democracy and regime strength (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011), *Cold war* dummy, *War*—for an armed conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), *GDP per capita (log)*—all with the values for the first year in office, and the *Economic growth* in a year prior to assuming office (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2012). Since the data set includes more than 50 indicators, I choose six dependent variables that appear to differentiate democrats and dictators, as seen from Figures 1 to 3: *Family background, middle, Revolutionary background, Law degree, Economics, Military career, Years in politics (in general)*. Probit models are fitted to predict all but *Years in politics* where the Poisson regression is used; models use robust standard errors clus-

tered by country.

Table 2, columns 1–6 display the results. In brief, leaders with a revolutionary background are more likely to emerge in less durable—or new—regimes, more democratic regimes are more likely to select more experienced leaders, leaders with law and economics degrees, while non-democratic ones promote those with military careers. There are also more leaders with backgrounds in economics after the end of the Cold war. There is no systematic evidence that military conflict or economic crises tend to elevate leaders with specific traits, however. Also, *Family status* is too idiosyncratic to be explained by the chosen predictors.

In general, democratic leaders do appear to be more experienced: they serve longer in various political posts, are more likely to occupy significant posts in the past. Do leaders across different nondemocratic regimes also differ in terms of their background, experience, and traits? The section that follows briefly compares leaders across dictatorships.

4. Leaders and their Careers in Dictatorships

In a path-setting study of non-democratic regimes, Geddes (1999) argued that significant differences among dictatorships can be explained by the strength of autonomous political institutions and by different incentive structures in personal, party, and military dictatorships. Scholars find that single-party regimes are generally most durable (Gandhi, 2008). One of the reasons behind their resilience is that political elites in such regimes are all co-opted under one umbrella organisation—single party, and all have a vested interest in regime continuity. Lower-ranked officials first perform a lengthy and costly service for the party while climbing the career ladder, later capitalising on their prior career when they reach the higher levels of party hierarchy (Svolik, 2012, pp. 168-169). Similarly, in democratic polities it is very unusual to climb to the summit of power without progressing through a number of steps in the political career (Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972). Likewise, in more institutionalised non-democratic regimes, e.g., USSR or contemporary China, the careers of future leaders span decades in the lower offices. We should expect, therefore, that political leaders in party regimes will have more political experience than those in personal regimes, and certainly more than those in military administrations.

Even though leaders in nondemocratic regimes primarily choose policies that prolong their survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Tullock, 1987), dictators' motives may be more complicated. Some leaders may also aim to maximise their personal consumption (Wintrobe, 1998, p. 79). It is conceivable that the observed heterogeneity among dictators, with some being more benevolent and others—kleptocratic, may in part be driven by their diverse backgrounds. For

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[12] In the majority of cases this category is a death in office, with few exceptions being whenever a leader was so severely incapacitated that he could not continue in office, e.g., Ariel Sharon of Israel in 2006.

[13] I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

Table 2. Leaders and their background in democracy and dictatorship.

|	All Countries:						Dictatorships:					
	(1) Family, middle	(2) Rev. or opposition	(3) Law	(4) Economics	(5) Military career	(6) Years in politics	(7) Family, middle	(8) Rev. or opposition	(9) Law	(10) Military career	(11) No 2	(12) Years in politics
Polity2	0.010	0.020	0.055***	0.042***	-0.107***	0.037***						
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)						
Cold war	0.025	-0.057	0.409***	-0.459***	0.348**	0.128**	0.077	-0.366**	0.163	0.579**	-0.205	-0.153
	(0.081)	(0.136)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.128)	(0.049)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.246)	(0.195)	(0.205)	(0.128)
War	-0.048	0.408+	-0.139	0.055	0.064	0.000	0.064	0.757***	-0.053	-0.251	-0.347	-0.071
	(0.116)	(0.218)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.077)	(0.182)	(0.198)	(0.168)	(0.165)	(0.218)	(0.113)
Income pc (log)	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000+	0.000	-0.000	-0.000+	0.000	-0.000**	-0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Econ. growth $_{,\ t-1}$	-0.003	0.003	-0.005	0.002	0.004	0.009+	-0.008	0.010	0.001	0.000	0.026**	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Regime durability	-0.002	-0.010**	0.001	-0.001	-0.010+	0.001	0.002	-0.010	0.008	-0.006	0.009	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Military regime							0.587**	-0.810**	-0.284	0.768***	-0.497**	-0.426**
							(0.208)	(0.278)	(0.244)	(0.222)	(0.246)	(0.206)
Monarchy							-1.227**	–	-0.602	-1.465**	–	-0.824+
							(0.586)		(0.647)	(0.648)		(0.468)
Single party							0.190	0.588**	0.062	-0.421	0.234	0.349**
							(0.251)	(0.269)	(0.234)	(0.258)	(0.226)	(0.170)
Constant	0.230**	-0.910***	-1.049***	-1.172***	-0.619***	2.365***	-0.147	-0.650**	-1.085***	-0.022	-0.744**	2.212***
	(0.098)	(0.170)	(0.104)	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.073)	(0.222)	(0.249)	(0.242)	(0.216)	(0.244)	(0.160)
N	1187	1182	1187	1187	1186	1177	346	333	346	345	333	345
N of countries	145	145	145	145	145	145	95	88	95	95	88	95
χ^2	2.638	33.404	60.387	78.628	172.491	103.283	24.717	68.203	5.030	61.894	28.282	75.819

Notes: Columns 1–5 and 7–11 report the results of probit regression models with the dependent variables indicated in the top row; columns 6 and 12 are Poisson regression models with the count of years in politics, including in civil service, as the dependent variable. All variables are for the year of entry in office, *Economic growth* is for the year preceding entry into office. *Monarchy* predicts failure perfectly and is therefore omitted in Models 8 and 11. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

instance, Brazilian military leaders from 1964–85 who arguably opted for economic development over personal enrichment were different from rulers in other military regimes in that they all came from secure wealthy and middle-class backgrounds, many receiving an excellent education in the War College (Skidmore, 1988). Admittedly, it is equally possible that the personal background of dictators is unrelated to their behaviour in office. With the assistance of the new data, this question can be addressed empirically. As a first test, in this section I only compare whether different types of dictatorships are associated with different types of dictators. Leaders of military, monarchies, single-party, personal nondemocratic regimes are assigned into four different types using the data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012). Regimes are categorised for the first year in office of each ruler.

Because almost all leaders of military regimes have undertaken a military education, Figure 5 only compares education background of leaders in personal and party dictatorships instead. The differences in educational backgrounds among party rulers and personal rulers are not significant: every third leader has no university education in both regime types, 15 and 18 per cent in personal and party regimes have a law background, while the differences in terms of other categories are small. The only difference that stands out is that 18 per cent of leaders in personal regimes have undergone military education as opposed to 10 per cent only of those in party regimes. In turn, Figure 6 charts differences in career paths in more and less institutionalised dictatorships, i.e., in party and personal rulerships. As expected, the main difference is that personal rulers are more likely to have careers in military and security, while the experience of party leaders lies within the party or legislature.

Comparative scholarship has found that personalist regimes are markedly different from other nondemocratic regimes (e.g., Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008). The descriptive statistics displayed in Figures 5 and 6 suggest that differences in the educational and professional profiles of party rulers and personal dictators are not dramatic. It is therefore very likely that personal dictatorships stand out because of the relative lack of constraints on their rulers—relative to other regime types—not because of differences in rulers' traits.

Figure 5. Are personalist dictators different from party rulers? Educational background. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders under each category in different regimes, only the most numerous categories are included.

Figure 6. Are personalist dictators different from party rulers? Career background. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders under each category in different regimes, only the most numerous categories are included.

What is noticeable, however, is that dictators in different regime types may be "recruited" from different family class backgrounds. Figure 7 compares the family backgrounds of rulers in military, party, and personal dictatorships. Monarchies are omitted since their rulers come from upper family background by definition. The differences are quite stark: 67 per cent of leaders in military regimes hail from a middle-class family background, as opposed to 46 and 42 per cent only in party and personal dictatorships respectively. There are also only 17 per cent of military rulers with lower class backgrounds, as opposed to 38 and 41 per cent in other regime types. These differences are also statistically significant based on the chi-square test of association. Does this finding go beyond the question of selection effect of different regimes, i.e., does family background also matter for policy outcomes? We know that the socioeconomic family background of democratic leaders affect their economic policy preferences (Hayo & Neumeier, 2014). In a study that examines presidents, Baturo (2014) shows that calculations to remain in office depend on, *inter alia*, personal concerns over future immunity and status. Further studies may also examine if military leaders with more secure family backgrounds are associated with different policies or whether such leaders are more inclined to retire to a life of comparable status as opposed to clinging onto office.

We can also compare leaders' experience. Figure 8 charts political experience in different dictatorships. It turns out that rulers of party regimes must indeed climb the "greasy pole" the longest: their average time in formal politics is 12 years (17 years in politics in total), as opposed to six years (9 years total) in personal regimes, and only four years (6 altogether) in military juntas. The median length of experience is 2–3 years shorter than the average length across all four regime types. In the section that follows, I discuss whether political experience matters and suggest possible venues for future research.

Earlier I compared democratic and less democratic leaders using regression models. Similarly, we can compare across non-democratic regimes only. The sole difference is that instead of *Polity 2*, models 7–12 in Table 2 include three regime types as independent variables with *Personalist regime* as the baseline omitted category. Also, instead of *Economics* degree that is uncommon in dictatorships, I predict whether particular dictatorships are more likely to be governed by former *"No 2s"*, i.e., prime-ministers, vice-presidents, other officials ranked second formally (e.g., party's second secretary in party regimes).

The results displayed in Table 2 indicate that leaders of military regimes are more likely to share the middle-class family background, (not surprisingly) have

prior military career, be less experienced and not come from "No 2" positions. In turn, leaders of party regimes are more likely to participate in revolutionary movements and have more years of experience in politics. In general, more durable regimes with more developed economies are also more likely to have more experienced leaders, while "No 2s" are more likely to assume office at a time of economic growth. Overall, I interpret the results to indicate that more institutionalised dictatorships "select" more experienced leaders.

The *Cursus Honorum* data also include indicators for the highest military ranks attained prior to assuming office. Additionally, the ranks are "normalised" as NATO military ranks, i.e., the equivalent of the highest obtained rank, according to the NATO classification, from OR-4 to OF-10, where OF-1 to OF-5 are the ranks from lieutenant to colonel; OF-6 is brigadier general (generally, any 1-star general, including major-generals and rear-admirals); OF-7 is any 2-star general or admiral, can be also called division general, or lieutenant (2-star) general, or brigadier-general (Argentina) or major

(2-star) general in some militaries; OF-8 is division (3-star) general, or lieutenant (3-star) general, or colonel-general (3-star);[14] OF-9 is any 4-star general, usually army general or in some cases lieutenant-general;[15] OF-10 is a field marshall or a 5-star general. Finally, while there is no NATO classification on the further ranks, two generalissimo in the dataset, Franco of Spain and Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan, are entered as OF-11.

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[14] As OF-6, brigadier general (1-star general) is generally equivalent to major-general (1-star general). Lieutenant-general (3-star general) in most militaries is categorised as OF-8, however, OF-8 is equivalent to colonel-general in the USSR and its satellites prior to 1989 (where lieutenant-general is a 2-star general instead). Since 1943, colonel-generals in USSR have worn three stars, so Pettibone (2009, p. 905) compares this rank to the US lieutenant general.

[15] Similar adjustments are made for other nations, for instance, lieutenant-general is the highest obtainable rank in the Argentine military, therefore it is categorised as OF-9.

Figure 7. Family background of dictators. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders under each category of family class background. Monarchy is omitted as almost all monarchs are in the upper class category.

Figure 8. Political experience in dictatorship. Note: Vertical axis indicates years of experience prior to assuming office. The white line in the middle is the median number of years in each category.

Figure 9. Military ranks of leaders in military and personal dictatorships. Note: Military ranks at the time of assuming office or retirement from the military, if prior to assuming office. Where leaders obtain a higher military rank while in office, such ranks are ignored. Categories report percentage of current or former military officers with particular ranks who assume office in two regime types. OF-1 to OF-10 are standardised NATO ranks.

By way of illustration, Figure 9 displays differences in the military ranks of leaders in military and personal dictatorships at the time of assuming office. It gives evidence that in the majority of military regimes, it is close to impossible for those in lower ranks to seize power. Altogether, only 30 per cent of leaders in military regimes hold the rank of colonel or below, in contrast to 63 per cent of such leaders who hold ranks in personal regimes. Therefore, only 37 per cent of leaders with military ranks in personal regimes are generals at the time of assuming office, in contrast to 70 per cent in military regimes. Figure 9 indicates that elite coalitions that seize power to establish military regimes, or military leaders who succeed in office in already existing military regimes typically come from more institutionalised and hierarchical military organisations. In military regimes, those officers from the highest ranks become political leaders while lower-ranked officers remain subordinates. In contrast, in less centralised militaries even lower-ranking officers have a chance at seizing power and becoming "military strongmen" themselves (Geddes, 1999; Weeks, 2012). For example, the military junta that overthrew President Mamadou Tandja of Niger in 2010 was headed by a mere platoon commander, Major Salou Djibo who was apparently outranked by several officers.[16]

5. Conclusion: The *Cursus Honorum* and the Study of Political Leaders

While studies exist that examined whether leaders in democracies and dictatorships have different personal and educational backgrounds (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Dreher et al., 2009; Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Pérez-Liñán, 2009), there are no systematic studies that examined leaders' careers and background across different types of dictatorships. This paper begins to fill the gap. Overall, leaders in party regimes, in terms of their careers and experience, have more in common with democratic leaders than with other dictators. Does political experience matter? While longer political careers in party dictatorships are determined by the hierarchical assignment of service and benefit (Svolik, 2012, p. 168), such longer political socialisation may in turn influence leaders' ability to work through existing rules and procedures and make policy compromises, which in turn may influence the observed policy outcomes in single-party regimes. Also, Bienen and van de Walle (1991, pp. 51-52) acknowledge that leadership skills and ability to survive in office become evident only once leaders assume power, so that those leaders who survive lengthy periods in office can be attributed such skills ad hoc. One possible venue for future research is to examine whether lengthier political experience, or other

background traits and prior careers, contribute to the explanation of political survival in dictatorships. Likewise, we do not know whether dictators who succeed in overtaking their regimes and turning them into their own personal autocracies (Svolik, 2012, p. 56) all share particular leadership skills that may be related to their life experiences and background, or whether their success is driven by idiosyncratic factors. While the examination of leaders' effects is beyond the scope of this paper, further research may turn to the *Cursus Honorum* to study whether leaders' traits matter.

Even though studies exist that attempt to trace observable policy outcomes to leaders' background attributes and life experiences (Besley, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2011; Dreher et al., 2009; Hayo & Neumeier, 2014; Horowitz & Stam, 2014), the effects of leaders' personal traits are however difficult to identify and separate from those of the effects of office occupied by such leaders, of their regimes, or overall context. As Blondel (1987, pp. 4-5) has remarked, "the impact of leaders depends on the environment…some have even said that leaders are prisoners of that environment, in that they can do only what the environment 'allows' them to do." The first hurdle in examining leaders' effects therefore is to distinguish between leaders' own effects and those of the offices they occupy (Baturo & Elkink, 2014). Leaders' commands and policy preferences have also to be transmitted to, and implemented by their followers (Baturo & Mikhaylov, 2013). Scholars must equally account for context, as crises and other events may dictate what leaders respond to, while customary practices dictate whether or not leaders should intervene at all (Blondel, 1987, p. 7). As an illustration, the lack of positive effects on the economy by leaders with a superior economics education may not necessarily render such leaders incompetent or their education unimportant; it may simply imply that they cannot, or decide not, to intervene in the economy.

In practice, scholars are more confident when they focus on policies and behaviours where leaders' own personal impact may be separated from that of other players or from the overall context, as opposed to outcomes largely determined by the environment, where the implementation of leaders' preferences may be impossible or outside of their control, such as inflation. Instead, for example, Horowitz and Stam (2014) examine the influence of leaders' personal traits on the likelihood of conflict initiation, while Baturo (2014) focuses on leaders' compliance with term limits. Indeed, while the vagaries of the economy are largely outside of their control, many leaders—especially those in dictatorships—have more personal leverage over the direction of foreign policy, including war declaration; they also decide personally whether or not to prolong their time in office.

Overall, in non-democratic regimes, and especially in more personalised regimes, rulers typically have more policy discretion and fewer institutional con-

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[16] See Nossiter (2010).

straints. All things being equal, in less institutionalised settings with fewer veto players, i.e., dictatorships, the personal effects of leaders therefore should be easier to identify from those of other actors and contexts. Many comparativists find that personal dictatorships differ from party and military regimes in terms of their policies (e.g., Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008). As briefly discussed in the previous section, Figures 5–6 do not display dramatic differences between party and personal rulers. Still, the lack of average differences across regime types does not render leaders' traits unimportant. For instance, among dictatorships, personalist regimes experience the highest degree of policy volatility (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). Such observed volatility may be driven not only by the absence of constraints but also by a more pronounced random element, i.e., by within-regime type differences among different personal dictators in terms of their policy preferences and competence.

With the assistance of the *Cursus Honorum*, future studies may include such factors in their explanation. While there may be a debate as to whether leaders matter or if their effects may be identified at all, e.g., whether better education of leaders indeed accounts for policy competence (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011), or not (e.g., Carnes & Lupu, 2015), the data on leaders' educational attainment is necessary in order to have such a debate in the first place. This paper introduced the new and detailed data about personal characteristics and careers of political leaders. Other scholars may build on this data to study leadership. For instance, the data may be used to better understand the democratic breakdown or "revolving door" problem. Baturo (2014, pp. 187-211) examined compliance of presidents with term limits and found that while certain details, such as military background, being the father of a newly-independent nation or political outsider are associated with non-compliance, the effects of personal traits are inconsistent once regime selection effects are accounted for. Likewise, Baturo (in press) studied whether the availability of career options in retirement strengthened the rotation in office norm, while Baturo and Mikhaylov (2016) analysed whether the business careers of former leaders raise any concerns over democratic accountability.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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