

Supplemental Material

Division of Labour, Work-Life Conflict and Family Policy: Conclusions and Reflections

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1. Data and Methods

1.1. Data

We used data from 18 European countries gathered in the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2010. Round five of the ESS included the module Family, Work and Well-Being containing a wealth of information to analyse work-life conflict. The time of the survey is close to the severe economic crisis that broke out in 2008 but reached its peak between 2009 and 2010. The crisis affected all European countries, but to very different degrees. The countries examined in this study are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. To be comparable to our previous study applying different methods, we use the same countries (Ochsner & Szalma, 2017). They were selected according to data availability for the two ESS rounds fielding the Family, Work and Well-Being module (2004 and 2010). However, while Slovakia, France and Ukraine were fielding both rounds of the ESS, we did not include them in the analysis because of filter errors or different operationalisations of our key variables.

Since the focus of this research is on WLC of working couples, we included only those respondents who work and whose partner also works in a paid job. Note, however, that the ESS interviews only one member per household but the respondents are asked about their own as well as about their partner’s employment situation. Due to different retirement ages across countries, we limited our analysis to those workers who are aged between 18 and 60. The inclusion of people in retirement age but still in the labour market would bias our sample because they actively choose to work and, hence, their WLC is likely to be lower, leading to a self-selection bias. We included only employed persons because the effects of working conditions on WLC are likely to be different for the self-employed or those employed in family businesses. The total working sample size was 7,151 respondents of which 3,833 were women and 3,318 were men. The 18 countries contributed between 252 (Greece) and 683 respondents (Germany) to the pooled data set. In most countries, the number of respondents by gender was quite but not perfectly equal (46–64 per cent women).

Like any data set, the ESS is affected by item non-response. Because some of the main variables we used are part of the demographic background variables, the amount of missing values is slightly higher than usual in the ESS. The rate of total item-nonresponse amounts to 13 per cent (11 per cent among men and 14 per cent among women). This is well above the 5 per cent threshold that Little and Rubin (2003) advocate as a rule of thumb for using complete case analysis. The amount of missingness in the countries varies between two per cent (Norway, men) and 36 per cent (Ireland, women). In seven out of 36 countries per gender subgroups, more than 20 per cent of the respondents had at least one missing value in the variables of our model. Therefore, we applied multiple imputation (MI) in order to account for the uncertainty introduced in our analysis by item-nonresponse (see Schafer & Graham, 2002).

Because most of the variables in our model are ordinal variables, we multiply imputed the missing values by chained equations. We used the ice-framework in Stata 14 that allows for handling perfect prediction through the augmented regression algorithm (White, Royston & Wood, 2011, p. 394) as well as collinearity of predictor variables. We use ordinal logistic regression to impute ordinal variables and multinomial logistic regression to impute categorical variables. Variables with a seven-point scale or more were imputed using linear regression with predictive mean matching in order to preserve the observed values. We used $m = 55$ imputations, according to the procedure suggested by von Hippel (2018). For the analysis, we used the built-in procedure for analysing multiply imputed data in Stata 15 that implements the Rubin’s Rules to reflect the uncertainty introduced by the missingness of the data (Rubin, 1987, p. 21). We used all variables in the model including the dependent variable following the suggestions of White et al. (2011, p. 384), reminding the reader that the goal of MI is not to predict the “true” values of the missing values for the respondents but to find efficient and valid estimators and standard errors for the relationships between the variables of interest in the population. Since we suppose that there may be gender and country differences, we

54 imputed the missing data separately for country by gender, thus preserving the data structure (or in other words
55 modelling possible interactions of gender and country with the variables in the models; White et al., 2011, p. 386).

56 1.2. Measurement

57 Our measure of WLC is based on four single indicators of WLC. Respondents were asked:

58 How often do you

59 (1) ... keep worrying about work problems when not working?

60 (2) ...feel too tired after work to enjoy things one would like to do at home?

61 (3) ...find that your job prevents you from giving the time to partner or family?

62 (4) ...find that your partner or family gets fed up with the pressure of your job?

63 Each item is measured on a five-point scale where 1 means never and 5 means always. The measures are concerned
64 with the spill-over of stress from work into life, both in general and into family life (Gallie & Russel, 2009). We built an
65 additive index of all four items ranging from 0 to 16 (adding the four variables and subtracting 4 from the sum), where
66 0 indicates an absolute lack of work-life conflict and 16 represents the highest possible level of work-life conflict.

67 We operationalize the *quantity* of the working schedule by the amount of average working hours using the self-
68 reported information on how many hours the respondent and his or her partner, respectively, normally work a week,
69 including paid or non-paid overtime (as opposed to contracted hours). We measure the *quality* of the working
70 schedule using the level of unsocial working time of the respondents and their partners using three questions on the
71 frequency of (a) weekend work, (b) evening work and (c) overtime at short notice. The answer categories are situated
72 between 1 (never) and 5 (every week) for variable (a) and between 1 (never) and 7 (every day) for variables (b) and
73 (c). We formed an additive index of the variables' z-standardised values to account for the differences in the scales. A
74 higher value of the index represents a higher level of the unsocial time commitment.

75 We measure *time*-based work intensity by the agreement on a five-point Likert scale with the following statement: "I
76 never seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job". The *strain*-based side of the work intensity we
77 operationalise with the agreement to the statement: "My job requires that I work very hard". We collapsed and
78 reversed the scales in order to ease interpretation and to account for too small numbers in the extremes: 1 stands for
79 "disagree", 2 for "neither nor", and 3 for "agree". A third variable measures the flexibility in organising working time
80 ("I can decide the time I start and finish work") on a four-point scale from "not at all true" to "very true". These
81 variables are only available for the respondents and not for their partners.

82 In order to measure the direct effects of the crisis on the individual level, we use two variables, one on changes in the
83 *household* situation, the other on changes in the *job* situation. Changes in the *household* situation consists of an
84 additive index of three items asking the respondents whether they (1) had to withdraw savings or get into debt to
85 cover ordinary living expenses, (2) had to cut back expenses for holidays or household equipment or (3) had to manage
86 on a lower household income. All the three items are measured on a seven-point scale where 0 indicates that the
87 respondents have not experienced it at all and 6 means that the respondents have experienced it a great deal. To
88 measure whether a change occurred in the *job* situation, we created a dummy variable taking the value of one if at
89 least one of the following situations occurred: the respondent (1) had less security in the job, (2) had to take a
90 reduction in pay, (3) had to work shorter hours, or (4) had to do less interesting work. If the respondent experienced
91 no changes at all it takes the value of 0.

92 Furthermore, we included basic demographic and other sociological features as control variables, such as the
93 respondents' age, highest level of education, occupational situation, the presence of children in the household, and
94 the subjective level of income. Age is measured as a categorical variable: 18–29, 30–39, 40–49 and 50–60. The
95 educational level is measured based on ISCED codes by three categories: low, medium and high, where low means
96 lower secondary level, high means tertiary level and medium everything in between. The occupational situation is
97 measured by two variables. First, we created a simplified variable reducing the ISCO codes available in the ESS to three
98 categories: unskilled workers (elementary occupations, ISCO codes between 1000 and 4999); skilled workers (service
99 workers, craftworkers, skilled agricultural workers, ISCO codes 5000-8999); and managers (highly qualified
100 professionals, clerks and managers, ISCO codes above 9000); second, we use a dummy variable for respondents with
101 a fixed-term work contract. The presence of (at least) a child in the household has three values: 0 if the couple does
102 not have a child younger than 18 living with them, 1 if the couple has a child between 7 and 18 years old and 2 if the
103 couple has a child younger than 7 years old. Subjective income is measured by an item asking which description comes
104 closest to how the respondents feel about their household income nowadays: 1 means "living comfortably on present
105 income", 2 means "coping on present income", 3 means "finding it difficult on present income" and 4 means "finding

106 it very difficult on present income". We had to combine categories 3 and 4 because of too few cases in the 4th
107 category. We also inverted the scale for ease of interpretation. We decided to apply the subjective income instead of
108 the absolute income for the following reasons: People feeling rich (or feeling that they earn enough) are less likely to
109 experience stress and, hence, probably WLC. The absolute income does not tell whether and how much people
110 actually worry about their income. Furthermore, there are more missing values for the absolute than the subjective
111 income variable, and the absolute income is measured only as household income, making it difficult to compare across
112 different household sizes.

113 On the country level, welfare or family-policy regime types are a common scheme to analyse differences across
114 countries and policy contexts. However, there is no much agreement on regime types and countries' assignment to
115 the types. We present results grouping our countries according to regional groupings inspired by Sobotka (2013) that
116 takes into account major historical, demographic, economic, and geographic divisions across the continent. Policy-
117 based typologies, such as Esping-Andersen (1990) coincide largely with this regional grouping, making it difficult to
118 differentiate between policy and political history as influences. We use the following country-groups: Western
119 European: Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; Northern European: Denmark, Finland, Norway
120 and Sweden; Central European: Germany and Switzerland; Southern European: Greece, Portugal and Spain; Post-
121 Socialist Central European: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The Western European group often
122 coincides with a liberal family policy regime, the Northern European with the social-democratic, the Central European
123 coincides with the conservative, the Southern European with the familialistic and the Post-Socialist Central European
124 with the post-socialist regime type.

125 To investigate the effect of the economic crisis on WLC on the country level, we use the following economic indicators
126 for crisis: five-years growth of GDP per capita from 2005 to 2010 taken from Eurostat (2020), and the overall as well
127 as the gender-specific unemployment rate in 2010 taken from the OECD (2020).

128 *1.3. Statistical analysis*

129 To demonstrate how effect sizes differ between countries, we apply a twostep approach. We first calculate separate
130 OLS regressions for each country by gender. As our data is multiply imputed, we use the built-in procedure in Stata to
131 apply the Rubin's Rules (Rubin, 1987) to our estimation results to account for the insecurity in our estimates due to
132 missingness. As we use several ordinal variables and compare 18 countries across gender, the regression table is
133 comprehensive. To render our results more interpretable, we calculated elasticities and semi-elasticities and tested
134 each ordinal variable for overall significance. We then differentiated between four groups of effect sizes: (semi-
135)elasticities below 0.1, between 0.1 and 0.3, between 0.3 and 0.5 and greater than 0.5 and displayed the statistically
136 significant coefficients in a diagram. We present the full regression results in the supplemental material.

137 We present our results ordering the countries according to country groups that reflect at the same time geographical
138 and historical-political contexts that are often used in comparative research to identify different policy regimes.

139

Table A1. Regression table for women by country

	Western Europe				Northern Europe				Central Europe		Southern Europe			Post-Socialist Central Europe				
	BE	IE	NL	UK	DK	FI	NO	SE	CH	DE	ES	GR	PT	CZ	EE	HU	PL	SI
<i>Age</i>																		
30-39	0.49 (0.73)	-0.66 (0.72)	-0.10 (0.50)	-0.44 (0.62)	0.46 (0.88)	1.04+ (0.55)	0.48 (0.64)	-0.63 (0.68)	-0.16 (0.77)	0.12 (0.65)	-0.67 (0.68)	-0.13 (0.92)	0.86 (0.62)	-0.23 (0.56)	0.26 (0.71)	0.69 (0.73)	0.76 (0.63)	-0.28 (1.53)
40-49	0.70 (0.78)	0.32 (0.79)	0.08 (0.52)	0.42 (0.63)	1.10 (0.92)	0.94+ (0.55)	0.99 (0.70)	0.50 (0.65)	-0.01 (0.78)	0.02 (0.61)	-0.77 (0.72)	-0.80 (1.15)	1.06 (0.65)	0.58 (0.57)	1.12 (0.69)	0.19 (0.68)	0.97 (0.68)	-0.20 (1.46)
50-60	0.62 (0.72)	0.16 (0.82)	0.11 (0.56)	0.50 (0.64)	1.29 (0.93)	1.42* (0.60)	1.08 (0.66)	0.37 (0.65)	-0.20 (0.77)	0.23 (0.65)	0.05 (0.78)	1.27 (1.19)	1.15 (0.72)	0.17 (0.57)	0.78 (0.71)	0.20 (0.79)	1.05 (0.70)	0.33 (1.48)
<i>Children</i>																		
				*		*							**					
Child 7-18	-0.13 (0.59)	0.29 (0.65)	-0.04 (0.35)	1.45** (0.53)	-0.01 (0.53)	-0.73+ (0.40)	-0.21 (0.52)	-0.19 (0.42)	0.03 (0.63)	0.61 (0.40)	0.41 (0.53)	0.40 (0.80)	-0.57 (0.57)	0.13 (0.43)	0.41 (0.46)	-0.17 (0.50)	0.25 (0.53)	-0.04 (0.63)
Child 0-6	-0.06 (0.59)	0.64 (0.69)	0.01 (0.42)	1.19* (0.52)	0.57 (0.64)	0.52 (0.44)	0.37 (0.47)	0.32 (0.48)	0.35 (0.72)	0.87+ (0.51)	-0.14 (0.48)	0.65 (0.63)	1.34* (0.54)	0.60 (0.42)	0.49 (0.51)	-1.25* (0.62)	0.38 (0.55)	-0.11 (0.76)
<i>Subjective Income</i>																		
				**	*											+		
Low	-0.13 (0.65)	1.20 (0.78)	-0.09 (1.00)	1.09+ (0.58)	3.13+ (1.63)	0.75 (0.55)	0.95 (1.18)	-1.06 (1.03)	-0.37 (0.72)	-0.01 (0.49)	0.03 (0.70)	0.65 (0.57)	0.60 (0.51)	-0.12 (0.49)	0.63 (0.48)	1.05* (0.46)	0.72 (0.66)	0.43 (0.97)
High	-0.53 (0.44)	-0.40 (0.53)	0.15 (0.35)	-1.14** (0.42)	-0.90+ (0.49)	-0.28 (0.41)	-0.00 (0.34)	-0.46 (0.44)	-0.60 (0.54)	-0.43 (0.40)	-0.52 (0.45)	-0.54 (1.07)	0.28 (0.79)	-0.05 (0.47)	0.70 (0.47)	0.22 (0.78)	-0.72 (0.68)	1.14+ (0.58)
<i>Education</i>																		
		+		*														
Low	-0.24 (0.74)	0.28 (0.67)	-0.41 (0.44)	-1.14* (0.51)	0.33 (0.52)	-0.27 (0.72)	-0.54 (1.11)	-1.56+ (0.94)	0.34 (0.84)	0.73 (0.65)	-0.23 (0.57)	0.87 (0.84)	-0.43 (0.53)	1.98+ (1.13)	-0.07 (1.22)	-0.33 (1.04)	-1.09 (0.75)	-1.31+ (0.76)
High	0.21 (0.47)	1.48* (0.61)	0.23 (0.35)	-0.64 (0.45)	0.57 (0.48)	0.10 (0.42)	0.67+ (0.37)	0.14 (0.37)	0.84 (0.53)	-0.15 (0.37)	0.34 (0.52)	1.14* (0.56)	-0.03 (0.77)	0.57 (0.56)	0.65+ (0.35)	-0.46 (0.57)	-0.18 (0.54)	0.39 (0.58)
<i>Occupation</i>																		
			*							+				**				+
Skilled Worker	0.25 (0.73)	-0.04 (0.93)	1.77* (0.79)	0.06 (0.93)	1.05 (0.81)	0.18 (0.76)	1.41 (0.95)	0.57 (0.81)	1.62+ (0.98)	0.47 (0.61)	-0.41 (0.75)	-0.55 (0.95)	-0.38 (0.62)	1.47* (0.70)	0.90 (0.85)	0.39 (0.73)	-1.47* (0.68)	0.38 (0.88)
Manager	-0.01 (0.72)	0.30 (1.01)	1.79* (0.72)	0.57 (0.95)	1.00 (0.74)	0.14 (0.80)	0.91 (0.94)	0.21 (0.81)	1.84+ (0.93)	1.22* (0.55)	-0.27 (0.81)	-1.10 (0.87)	-0.63 (0.76)	2.32** (0.69)	1.07 (0.80)	1.17 (0.72)	-0.26 (0.75)	1.53 (0.93)
Fixed Term Contract	0.76 (0.67)	-0.15 (0.53)	0.21 (0.43)	0.54 (0.58)	-0.52 (0.52)	0.29 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	1.13+ (0.64)	-1.61+ (0.92)	0.97+ (0.52)	0.23 (0.53)	-0.16 (0.60)	0.11 (0.46)	1.67** (0.45)	0.05 (0.63)	0.40 (0.58)	-0.41 (0.58)	-0.46 (0.90)

<i>Work Hard</i>				*	*			+		*									
Disagree	-0.07 (0.62)	-1.02 (1.43)	-0.78+ (0.47)	0.75 (1.25)	-0.68 (0.53)	-0.79 (0.97)	-0.35 (0.61)	1.23+ (0.63)	-0.35 (0.62)	-1.01* (0.50)	-0.62 (0.74)	0.95 (1.29)	0.17 (1.39)	0.00 (0.51)	-0.64 (0.73)	1.70 (1.08)	-0.83 (0.73)	-0.12 (1.09)	
Agree	0.51 (0.49)	-0.48 (0.72)	-0.10 (0.40)	1.46* (0.60)	0.85* (0.43)	0.24 (0.43)	0.13 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.42)	-0.30 (0.55)	0.22 (0.38)	0.35 (0.46)	0.18 (0.66)	0.71 (0.50)	0.73+ (0.38)	0.44 (0.42)	0.34 (0.54)	0.30 (0.50)	0.69 (0.67)	
<i>Time Pressure</i>	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	*	*	**	**	+	*		*		**	
Disagree	-1.36** (0.50)	-1.91* (0.74)	-0.91* (0.39)	-1.32* (0.53)	-0.68 (0.62)	-0.55 (0.56)	-0.74 (0.46)	1.57** (0.48)	-0.04 (0.62)	-0.02 (0.40)	0.16 (0.54)	2.32** (0.74)	-0.30 (1.14)	-0.90* (0.39)	-0.54 (0.47)	-0.63 (0.49)	-0.45 (0.59)	-1.97** (0.69)	
Agree	0.67 (0.45)	0.23 (0.77)	0.53 (0.39)	0.31 (0.50)	1.01+ (0.56)	0.70 (0.55)	1.15** (0.38)	1.32** (0.41)	1.22* (0.57)	1.01* (0.43)	1.47** (0.50)	1.27* (0.58)	1.08* (0.47)	0.43 (0.50)	0.09 (0.45)	0.74 (0.56)	0.08 (0.68)	0.33 (0.59)	
<i>Flexibility</i>																			
A Little	0.53 (0.42)	0.55 (0.64)	-0.10 (0.37)	-0.38 (0.47)	0.15 (0.47)	-0.11 (0.43)	0.23 (0.43)	0.05 (0.44)	0.31 (0.68)	0.26 (0.46)	-0.66 (0.47)	0.88 (0.79)	0.29 (0.54)	-0.44 (0.42)	-0.46 (0.47)	-0.71 (0.52)	0.09 (0.54)	-0.35 (0.70)	
Quite	0.07 (0.58)	0.56 (1.01)	-0.58 (0.60)	0.10 (0.61)	0.51 (0.62)	-0.11 (0.51)	-0.16 (0.44)	0.73 (0.49)	0.55 (0.60)	-0.17 (0.45)	0.63 (0.78)	-0.36 (0.73)	3.16* (1.33)	-0.93 (0.87)	-0.30 (0.52)	-0.55 (1.06)	-0.81 (0.67)	0.31 (0.81)	
Very	-0.33 (0.54)	1.25 (1.04)	-0.57 (0.46)	0.30 (0.57)	0.06 (0.60)	-0.71 (0.54)	-0.40 (0.57)	0.38 (0.55)	-1.01 (0.72)	-0.61 (0.46)	-1.26 (0.82)	-1.93* (0.90)	0.48 (1.94)	-0.11 (0.74)	-0.07 (0.56)	0.52 (0.84)	-0.61 (0.68)	1.65 (1.13)	
Working Hours	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.11** (0.02)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.08** (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	
Working Hours Partner	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05+ (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	
Unsocial Time	0.20** (0.07)	0.35** (0.11)	0.23** (0.08)	0.34** (0.08)	0.25** (0.08)	0.30** (0.09)	0.32** (0.07)	0.35** (0.08)	0.37** (0.10)	0.19* (0.08)	0.37** (0.09)	0.17 (0.13)	0.19* (0.09)	0.24** (0.08)	0.38** (0.08)	0.60** (0.09)	0.42** (0.10)	0.61** (0.12)	
Unsocial Time Partner	-0.00 (0.09)	0.16 (0.11)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.07)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.12+ (0.07)	0.11 (0.08)	0.15 (0.11)	0.10 (0.09)	0.15+ (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.12 (0.12)	
Cut Household Budget	0.09+ (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.08+ (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11+ (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.11+ (0.06)	
Crisis at Job	0.62 (0.39)	0.79+ (0.48)	0.31 (0.29)	1.05** (0.39)	1.12** (0.37)	0.90* (0.35)	0.06 (0.30)	0.81* (0.34)	0.52 (0.47)	0.28 (0.32)	0.22 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.50)	0.33 (0.44)	0.04 (0.35)	0.72 (0.44)	1.10* (0.43)	0.72+ (0.41)	1.20* (0.54)	
Constant	2.62* (1.19)	1.46 (1.93)	1.40 (1.14)	0.40 (1.40)	0.80 (1.48)	1.16 (1.50)	1.28 (1.66)	3.41+ (1.83)	1.64 (1.73)	0.62 (1.14)	3.40* (1.62)	4.53* (2.25)	-1.80 (1.53)	2.57+ (1.52)	0.81 (1.61)	0.79 (1.41)	2.09 (1.70)	3.81 (2.54)	
R2	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.50	0.43	0.35	0.38	0.43	0.40	0.35	0.42	0.44	0.30	0.37	0.39	0.43	0.36	0.40	

Adj. R2	0.25	0.29	0.32	0.45	0.36	0.27	0.30	0.36	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.34	0.18	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.26	0.29
Observations	231	202	247	271	227	215	228	229	158	335	176	159	164	245	221	171	183	171

141 *Notes.* ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Coefficients in bold indicate significant differences from the men’s coefficient. Indications of statistical significance for the full categorical variables are indicated above
 142 the coefficients of its dummy variables.

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145 **Table A2.** Regression table for men by country

	Western Europe				Northern Europe				Central Europe		Southern Europe			Post-Socialist Central Europe					
	BE	IE	NL	UK	DK	FI	NO	SE	CH	DE	ES	GR	PT	CZ	EE	HU	PL	SI	
<i>Age</i>																			*
30-39	0.64 (0.84)	-0.30 (0.82)	0.61 (0.68)	-0.13 (0.57)	0.33 (0.87)	0.00 (0.60)	0.89+ (0.47)	-0.57 (0.77)	0.45 (0.71)	1.05+ (0.60)	-0.22 (0.79)	0.92 (2.37)	1.51 (1.47)	0.10 (0.59)	-0.77 (1.37)	1.20 (0.90)	1.29+ (0.68)	0.15 (1.27)	
40-49	0.25 (0.84)	-0.02 (0.90)	0.67 (0.71)	0.40 (0.56)	0.04 (0.84)	0.27 (0.61)	0.87+ (0.47)	-0.99 (0.82)	0.57 (0.70)	0.80 (0.59)	-0.60 (0.81)	0.99 (2.48)	1.43 (1.50)	0.89 (0.58)	-1.00 (1.31)	2.18* (0.87)	1.04 (0.76)	-0.90 (1.29)	
50-60	-0.16 (0.83)	0.92 (1.08)	0.70 (0.74)	0.50 (0.58)	0.44 (0.81)	-0.67 (0.62)	0.52 (0.49)	-0.95 (0.77)	0.03 (0.70)	1.32* (0.63)	-1.03 (0.86)	-0.05 (2.43)	0.96 (1.38)	0.32 (0.55)	-0.78 (1.27)	1.66+ (0.92)	1.28 (0.81)	-0.22 (1.34)	
<i>Children</i>																			
Child 7-18	0.45 (0.48)	0.10 (0.95)	0.20 (0.50)	0.23 (0.48)	0.09 (0.40)	0.15 (0.40)	0.32 (0.31)	0.19 (0.50)	0.15 (0.44)	0.43 (0.39)	0.44 (0.53)	0.69 (0.73)	-0.31 (0.75)	0.45 (0.41)	-0.04 (0.49)	0.34 (0.55)	0.36 (0.45)	-0.16 (0.71)	
Child 0-6	0.27 (0.54)	1.33 (0.81)	0.71 (0.50)	0.32 (0.49)	-0.10 (0.57)	-0.18 (0.50)	0.28 (0.35)	0.57 (0.52)	-0.75 (0.53)	-0.05 (0.43)	0.64 (0.51)	0.90 (0.85)	0.29 (0.76)	0.37 (0.46)	0.09 (0.62)	0.69 (0.64)	0.60 (0.54)	-0.03 (0.73)	
<i>Subjective Income</i>																			
Low	1.15* (0.55)	0.33 (1.09)	0.72 (0.97)	1.33 (0.86)	0.44 (1.72)	1.22 (0.81)	2.22** (0.84)	0.53 (1.57)	0.32 (0.59)	0.62 (0.62)	-0.05 (0.71)	1.33+ (0.71)	-0.19 (0.73)	0.14 (0.42)	0.05 (0.56)	0.04 (0.45)	1.15* (0.58)	1.99 (1.34)	
High	0.43 (0.49)	-0.23 (0.73)	-0.11 (0.49)	-0.22 (0.41)	-0.27 (0.52)	-0.14 (0.50)	-0.02 (0.33)	-0.78 (0.51)	-0.50 (0.46)	-0.10 (0.36)	-1.05* (0.51)	-1.08 (0.96)	-1.42 (1.02)	-0.66 (0.49)	0.86 (0.58)	-0.57 (0.83)	1.10+ (0.57)	0.18 (0.67)	
<i>Education</i>																			
Low	0.70 (0.55)	0.56 (0.85)	-1.14* (0.49)	-0.08 (0.46)	-0.96+ (0.52)	-0.97 (0.64)	-0.41 (0.47)	-0.17 (0.68)	-0.51 (0.61)	0.09 (0.51)	1.74** (0.58)	-0.45 (0.82)	-0.48 (0.75)	-0.02 (0.72)	0.63 (1.00)	-1.20 (1.64)	-1.03+ (0.58)	-1.11 (0.90)	
High	0.29 (0.45)	0.58 (0.80)	0.01 (0.41)	-0.00 (0.40)	0.26 (0.37)	-0.65 (0.44)	0.10 (0.30)	-0.16 (0.47)	0.89* (0.44)	-0.43 (0.44)	0.93+ (0.50)	0.07 (0.89)	-1.04 (0.88)	0.32 (0.50)	0.09 (0.57)	-0.01 (0.70)	-0.27 (0.55)	0.49 (0.84)	
<i>Occupation</i>																			
Skilled Worker	-0.19 (0.86)	-0.23 (0.81)	-1.50 (1.90)	0.38 (0.63)	-0.29 (0.64)	-0.18 (0.58)	0.56 (0.74)	-0.49 (2.32)	-0.21 (0.78)	0.00 (0.86)	-0.02 (0.75)	0.63 (1.18)	-0.32 (0.90)	0.19 (0.60)	1.01+ (0.53)	0.00 (1.35)	1.18 (1.00)	-0.17 (1.63)	
Manager	0.63 (0.87)	0.26 (0.90)	-1.10 (1.84)	1.76** (0.63)	-0.15 (0.65)	0.35 (0.59)	0.52 (0.76)	-0.73 (2.32)	0.18 (0.78)	0.45 (0.89)	1.08 (0.81)	-0.13 (1.22)	0.01 (1.06)	0.47 (0.63)	0.77 (0.72)	0.19 (1.37)	1.21 (1.10)	0.55 (1.72)	
Fixed Term Contract	1.41 (0.96)	-0.19 (0.71)	-0.25 (0.50)	0.09 (0.45)	-0.52 (0.64)	-0.15 (0.65)	-0.67 (0.54)	-0.20 (1.01)	0.91 (0.70)	0.28 (0.63)	0.13 (0.70)	-0.61 (0.70)	0.50 (0.81)	0.70 (0.55)	-0.54 (0.69)	0.14 (0.77)	0.20 (0.53)	2.00+ (1.05)	

<i>Work Hard</i>				**	*	+	*	+	*	*	*				+	*	**	
Disagree	-0.05 (0.59)	0.24 (1.55)	0.09 (0.64)	-1.23 (0.94)	-0.12 (0.50)	-0.45 (0.66)	0.10 (0.46)	0.82 (0.72)	0.32 (0.59)	-0.74 (0.64)	0.94 (1.10)	0.14 (1.08)	-0.93 (1.39)	-0.11 (0.56)	-1.61* (0.77)	-0.37 (0.81)	-1.01 (0.84)	0.10 (1.07)
Agree	0.68 (0.47)	0.81 (1.03)	0.60 (0.47)	0.98 (0.66)	1.07* (0.44)	0.64 (0.41)	0.80* (0.31)	1.06* (0.44)	1.17** (0.42)	0.52 (0.46)	1.72** (0.57)	1.39+ (0.82)	0.33 (0.88)	0.49 (0.37)	0.19 (0.41)	1.11+ (0.57)	1.35* (0.54)	1.27+ (0.72)
<i>Time Pressure</i>		**	+	+	**	**	**	+	*	+	**	*	+	*	**	**		
Disagree	-0.83 (0.56)	-1.05 (0.67)	0.00 (0.39)	-0.73 (0.48)	-0.93+ (0.51)	-0.42 (0.45)	-0.77* (0.34)	-0.67 (0.43)	-0.44 (0.51)	-0.11 (0.42)	-1.03+ (0.62)	-0.39 (0.83)	-0.07 (0.73)	-0.90** (0.34)	-0.88+ (0.50)	-1.21* (0.49)	-1.08* (0.47)	-2.24** (0.77)
Agree	1.01* (0.48)	0.61 (0.80)	1.02* (0.45)	0.94+ (0.50)	0.57 (0.43)	1.40** (0.42)	0.48 (0.31)	0.46 (0.47)	0.54 (0.41)	0.93* (0.41)	0.31 (0.53)	2.27** (0.81)	0.71 (0.60)	-0.08 (0.45)	0.08 (0.63)	-0.14 (0.55)	0.15 (0.53)	-0.33 (0.70)
<i>Flexibility</i>		*			+		*		+		**						+	
A Little	0.01 (0.48)	1.25+ (0.72)	-0.01 (0.50)	-0.51 (0.47)	0.82+ (0.45)	0.34 (0.44)	0.36 (0.38)	0.27 (0.56)	0.65 (0.50)	0.71+ (0.38)	0.19 (0.51)	-1.25 (0.95)	-0.30 (0.60)	0.71+ (0.39)	0.59 (0.63)	0.18 (0.59)	0.75 (0.47)	-0.30 (0.65)
Quite	-0.43 (0.45)	4.19** (1.42)	0.15 (0.40)	-0.92+ (0.48)	0.78+ (0.44)	-0.02 (0.44)	0.56 (0.37)	0.59 (0.58)	-0.36 (0.50)	0.31 (0.49)	-0.28 (0.57)	2.81** (0.89)	1.85 (1.13)	1.01 (0.67)	0.42 (0.54)	0.78 (0.81)	-0.00 (0.56)	1.68* (0.67)
Very	-0.22 (0.57)	1.85 (1.19)	0.47 (0.75)	-0.26 (0.54)	-0.16 (0.48)	-0.14 (0.48)	0.45 (0.42)	-0.89 (0.59)	0.53 (0.50)	-0.65 (0.61)	-0.89 (0.94)	4.00** (0.88)	0.88 (0.77)	0.78 (0.70)	0.76 (0.55)	1.65 (1.10)	0.22 (0.51)	0.08 (1.35)
Working Hours	0.03 (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.09* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04+ (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Working Hours Partner	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03+ (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03+ (0.01)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04+ (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Unsocial Time	0.21** (0.08)	0.19 (0.15)	0.19* (0.09)	0.20** (0.07)	0.31** (0.08)	0.28** (0.08)	0.33** (0.06)	0.40** (0.09)	0.13+ (0.07)	0.28** (0.08)	0.23* (0.10)	0.28* (0.13)	0.21+ (0.11)	0.42** (0.08)	0.35** (0.09)	0.27* (0.11)	0.33** (0.07)	0.22* (0.11)
Unsocial Time Partner	0.09 (0.09)	0.19 (0.14)	0.05 (0.10)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.21+ (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)	0.07 (0.14)	0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	0.02 (0.09)	0.06 (0.13)
Cut Household Budget	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.10)	0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.08* (0.04)	0.14** (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)	0.08+ (0.04)	-0.02 (0.07)
Crisis at Job	0.34 (0.37)	-0.25 (0.73)	0.50 (0.39)	0.91* (0.36)	0.62+ (0.33)	0.17 (0.33)	0.75* (0.29)	-0.01 (0.41)	0.82* (0.37)	0.78* (0.32)	-0.26 (0.51)	1.14+ (0.66)	0.46 (0.54)	0.59+ (0.33)	0.45 (0.65)	0.86+ (0.46)	-0.09 (0.44)	0.69 (0.53)
Constant	2.69* (1.28)	-2.29 (3.01)	2.90 (2.56)	2.56+ (1.33)	2.55+ (1.49)	2.51 (1.56)	-0.14 (1.30)	1.88 (3.04)	3.89* (1.70)	0.42 (1.34)	0.72 (1.67)	3.14 (3.54)	3.05 (1.88)	4.34** (1.34)	5.47* (2.15)	0.17 (2.07)	4.57* (1.88)	4.07 (2.63)
R2	0.37	0.37	0.27	0.40	0.42	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.31	0.30	0.44	0.54	0.22	0.32	0.44	0.38	0.50	0.42

Adj. R2	0.27	0.19	0.18	0.31	0.35	0.31	0.36	0.31	0.20	0.25	0.32	0.37	0.06	0.24	0.32	0.25	0.40	0.27
Observations	183	115	209	208	234	191	266	181	187	348	143	93	145	248	137	146	160	124

146 *Notes.* ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Coefficients in bold indicate significant differences (p<0.1) from the women’s coefficient (calculated only for the full categorical variables not each of its dummies).
 147 Indications of statistical significance for the full categorical variables are indicated above the coefficients of its dummy variables.