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Immigration from the Migrants' Perspective

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and Dina Maskileyson

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Editorial

Immigration from the Immigrants' Perspective: Analyzing Survey Data Collected among Immigrants and Host Society Members

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Abstract

Immigration has been one of the most crucial global phenomena, changing the fabric of many societies, and a topic of substantial research. Much of this research has focused on how the host society views immigrants and immigration, or on the societal factors influencing the latter. The goal of this thematic issue is to present different studies focusing on various aspects of immigration from a perspective that has not been often viewed under the magnifying glass so far, but which is of major importance: looking at immigration from the immigrants' point of view.

Keywords

adaptation; attitudes toward immigration; community; immigrants' reception; integration; migrants' perspective; perceived health; well-being

Issue

This editorial is part of the issue "Immigration from the Migrants' Perspective" edited by Alice Ramos (Institute of Social Sciences, Portugal), Eldad Davidov (University of Cologne, Germany/University of Zurich, Switzerland), Peter Schmidt (University of Giessen, Germany), Marta Vilar Rosales (Institute of Social Sciences, Portugal) and Dina Maskileyson (University of Cologne, Germany).

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Immigration has been one of the most crucial global phenomena changing the fabric of many societies, and a topic of substantial research. Much of this research has focused on how the host society views immigrants and immigration or on the societal factors influencing immigration. The goal of this thematic issue is to present different studies focusing on various aspects of immigration from a perspective that has not been often viewed under the magnifying glass so far, but which is of major importance: looking at immigration from the immigrants' point of view.

Natives' attitudes toward immigration have been thoroughly analyzed in the literature using survey data.

A multitude of articles contributing to the study of citizens' attitudes and opinions about immigrants and immigration policies, including their determinants and consequents, have been published based on survey data, for example, from the European Social Survey (Heath et al., 2019) or other international large-scale surveys. Indeed, opposition of members of the host society to immigration, their perceptions of threat due to immigrants and immigration, or preferences regarding immigration and integration policies, are just some of the topics that have been addressed from the perspective of the host society members (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). However, and in spite of the consider-

able number of qualitative, ethnography-based research projects focusing on the point of view of immigrants, we lack extensive survey-based work on immigrants' experience of immigration and their opinions or attitudes about immigration. Indeed, little is known about immigrants' own experience of immigration, about how immigrant populations and communities evaluate the arrival of other immigrants into the country, their political interests, their health or well-being, or their contact with natives. In reality, immigrants may possess multiple identities: On the one hand, they are conceived of as immigrants from the point of view of natives; on the other hand, they are in the process of integrating into the host society themselves, they may experience difficulties associated with immigration, and may in turn be threatened by new immigrants. This thematic issue includes studies that analyze, in a theory-driven way and using survey data, such various aspects of immigrants' experience in the host society, like political interest and participation (Hochman & García-Albacete, 2019), attitudes toward other immigrants (Becker, 2019), well-being (Sarrasin, Green, Potarca, Bolzman, & Kuhn, 2019), perceived health (Maskileyson, Semyonov, & Davidov, 2019), contact with natives (Bohrer, Friehs, Schmidt, & Weick, 2019), or adaptation and integration into the host society (Rodríguez-Puertas & Ainz, 2019). These questions are focused on in these studies from a comparative or longitudinal perspective.

The first article, by Hochman and García-Albacete (2019), studies whether—and to what extent—youth with and without an immigration background engage with politics by looking at differences in political interest among immigrants, their offspring, and natives. Indeed, political interest is considered an important aspect of immigrants' integration into the host society. The authors focus on four European countries, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, using data from the CILS4EU project (N = 11,747 respondents). Relying on social identity theory, they expect a link with national identification and political interest. Their findings show that respondents with an immigration background who also have a strong national identification with their host country are more likely to report political interest than natives. By way of contrast, respondents with an immigration background, who have a low national identification, are less likely to report political interest than natives. While national identification was of little importance for political interest of young people in Sweden, it was significant in Germany.

Becker (2019) investigates whether there are any differences in attitudes toward immigration between immigrants and natives. The author used pooled data from the 2008–2016 rounds of the American General Social Survey. The subsample included 7,362 respondents, 2,811 of whom had a migration background of the first, second, or third generation. Relying on social distance and contact theory, the study demonstrated that first-generation immigrants had, as expected, more fa-

vorable attitudes toward immigration compared to those without a migration background. However, the attitudes of second- and third-generation immigrants did not differ significantly from those of natives.

Sarrasin et al. (2019) combine two explanations for the native–immigrant gap in well-being. The first suggests that low parental well-being is transmitted to their offspring, thus deteriorating offspring's well-being. The second suggests that immigrants suffer from a higher economic pressure which is in turn transmitted to their offspring and lowers offspring's well-being. The study employs data from the Swiss Household Panel (N = 1,354) to examine the extent to which immigrant background and economic pressures relate to well-being of adolescents and young adults through the negative affect experienced by their mothers and fathers. The findings demonstrated that young people with foreign roots were more likely to live in a household that experienced economic pressures, which, in turn, was related to impaired parental well-being which was then in turn related to an impaired own well-being. An immigration background, economic pressures, and parental well-being were all related to young people's negative affect.

Maskileyson et al. (2019) examine whether the "healthy immigrant effect" thesis observed in the American context prevails also in the West European context. According to the healthy immigrant effect, immigrants are expected to be healthier than the native population. This effect has been observed repeatedly in immigration countries like the USA, Canada, or Australia. Four countries were analyzed—Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands—using the Gender and Generations Survey (Austria N = 3,892, France N = 8,731, Germany N = 8,052, and the Netherlands N = 7,219). Unlike previous findings, in these European countries, immigrants reported worse health than natives, thus, not lending support to the effect. The study tries to suggest several explanations for the findings in the specific West European context.

Bohrer et al. (2019) explore whether, and to what extent, contact between native East and West Germans and foreigners has changed in the last four decades, employing ALLBUS data collected between 1980 and 2016. The authors evidence a large increase in contact over these 36 years. Furthermore, the study also employs four waves of the GESIS access panel data collected between 2015 and 2016 in Germany to test the contact theory and examine whether and to what extent positive contact with immigrants is linked with more positive attitudes toward immigrants (or vice versa) among German respondents. Although there was some evidence for such a link in the data, the effects were much smaller than in other previous cross-sectional studies, and they were also mixed, depending on the method of analysis used.

Finally, Rodríguez-Puertas and Ainz (2019) conduct in-depth interviews with young Spanish migrants and analyze data obtained from these interviews and from discussion groups to understand the migration process and

sociocultural integration of those migrants in their host countries. They describe and explain changes in their perceptions of both their home and host societies. We hope that the thematic issue and the studies included in it further contribute to a better understanding of immigrants' experience in contemporary societies.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Political Interest among European Youth with and without an Immigrant Background

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Abstract

Our article investigates political engagement among youth with and without an immigration background. Tapping to current debates on intergenerational assimilation processes in Europe, we look at differences in levels of political interest between immigrants, children of immigrants and natives. In particular, we argue that such differences are a function of respondents' identification with the receiving society. We predict that among respondents with an immigrant background higher levels of national identification will be positively correlated with political interest. Among natives, political interest will not depend on levels of national identification. These expectations reflect the ideas of the social identity perspective according to which group identification increases adherence to group norms and adherence to norms is stronger among individuals who suffer from identity uncertainty. We test our model in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, using data from the CILS4EU project. Our findings indicate that interest in the politics of the survey country differs between respondents with and without an immigrant background. Respondents with an immigrant background who also have a strong national identification are more likely to report a political interest than natives. Respondents with an immigrant background who have a low national identification, are less likely to report a political interest than natives. The findings also reveal that political discussions at home and associationism positively predict political interest whereas girls show significantly lower odds to be politically interested.

Keywords

assimilation; CILS4EU project; immigrant background; national identification; political interest; youth

Issue

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1. Introduction

Political interest indicates "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity" (van Deth, 1990, p. 278). It is often understood as one of the main determinants of political participation (Milbrath, 1965, p. 40; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995, p. 334), also for young people (García-Albacete, 2014), and as a prerequisite for an active and democratic citizenry (i.e., van Deth & Elff, 2004, p. 478). Whether young people de-

velop political interest or not is particularly critical for their future as active (or inactive) citizens. Political interest has been found to develop during young adulthood, particularly during the so-called "formative years" (Kinder & Sears, 1985; Verba et al., 1995) and to be remarkably stable over the lifespan (Neundorff, Smets, & García-Albacete, 2013). For that reason, adolescence and young adulthood are key periods to study political interest. Corroborating the relevance of this period, previous research indicates that individuals who develop

a taste for politics in adolescence will be more politically engaged in adulthood (Greco Morasso, 2012; Prior, 2010). Active political engagement, at the same time, can be understood as an important civic norm in democracy and a central quality of citizens' ideal of "good citizen" (van Deth, 2009).

Despite its relevance as an indication of social integration and a future active citizenry, the development of interest in politics among young people with an immigrant background has rarely been examined. One exception in this regard is the PIDOP project, in which Kim and Amnâ (2015) for example, compared Iraqi and Kurdish immigrants and natives in Sweden. Using a small and non-random sample ($N = 538$) of young adults aged 16 to 26 years, the authors find no differences between the two immigrant groups and the natives (Kim & Amnâ, 2015, p. 257). Fernandes-Jesus, Malafaia, Ribeiro, and Menezes (2015) compared Portuguese natives and Brazilian and Angolan immigrants in Portugal. With a slightly larger yet non-random sample, they report that Portuguese youth shows a significantly higher interest in politics compared with the two migrant groups.

In the current study, we too focus on political interest. Complementing existing work, we investigate the emergence of interest in the politics of the "receiving" country in particular and estimate differences between natives and immigrants as well as differences between natives and children of immigrants, thus exploring political assimilation trends. Following Alba and Nee (1997) we define assimilation as "the decline and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (Alba & Nee, 1997, p. 863). In addition, we test whether differences in political interest are moderated by levels of national identification.

In our investigation, we also control for respondents' friendship and language preferences as well as additional factors associated with immigrants' assimilation. Following political behavior theories, we further include several predictors of political interest in the analysis. Parental transmission, that is, the frequency of political talk within the family while an individual was a child, has been repeatedly found to be among the most important predictors of political interest (Neundorff et al., 2013; Prior, 2010; Terriquez & Kwon, 2015). Parents influence their children's political engagement both through their social status, and their interest, engagement and participation style (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). Jennings et al. (2009) further show that growing up in a politicized family, in which politics is often discussed, is also a good predictor of an early development of political interest as well as other political orientations. Not only the parents but also peers, the school, and other institutions contribute to the political engagement of youth (Quintelier, 2015). The contribution of peers to political engagement is particularly large among young people who have not developed a political interest at home (García-Albacete, 2013; Neundorff, Niemi, & Smets, 2016).

The relationship between national identification and political interest has thus far gained surprisingly limited attention from immigration research (Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2017). One reason for this lacuna is surely the fact that the causal relations between the two concepts are difficult to disentangle. In this article, we do not attempt to solve this debate. Relying on the Social Identity Theory (SIT), we maintain instead that identification shapes political interest and not the other way around. Specifically, we contend that national identification shapes the probabilities of immigrants and children of immigrants to express interest in politics and moderates the effect of having an immigrant background on political interest. Analytically, we are however unable to exclude the possibility of reversed causality.

Our study makes the following contributions: (1) we investigate differences between natives and immigrants, as well as between natives and children of immigrants, utilizing data from four different European countries. Pooling these countries together we have sufficient data to estimate logistic regression models for this purpose, with a wide set of control variables; (2) to avoid mixing interest in the politics of the receiving society with interest in the politics of a respective country of origin, we focus specifically on the former; (3) referring to the SIT we propose a mechanism that may clarify the emergence of differences in political interest between natives, immigrants and children of immigrants. Specifically, we test for a moderation of national identification in the relations between immigrant status and political interest.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Political Engagement: An Intergenerational Assimilation Process?

Since very early on, researchers maintained that assimilation is an intergenerational process (e.g., Gans, 1979; Liberson, 1973). However, while some scholars maintain that assimilation increases over generations (Alba & Nee, 1997; Gans, 1992), others are of the opinion that this is not necessarily the case (e.g., Zhou, 1997). Indeed, proponents of the segmented assimilation theory in North America showed that children of immigrants are unable to narrow the structural gap with peers who are not children of immigrants. They also report that in some immigrant groups, the offspring often hold on to their cultural heritage and ethnic identification (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Studies on assimilation in Europe to the most part failed to indicate a process of segmented assimilation and seem to support the idea that assimilation intensifies over generations (see, e.g., Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Hochman, 2010; Kalter, 2018).

In line with the classic assimilation theory, previous studies report that among immigrants, the longer they stay in the receiving society, the stronger is their political engagement (Bass & Casper, 2001; Messina, 2006;

White, Nevitte, Blais, Fournier, & Gidengil, 2006). Looking at electoral behavior, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) find a similar pattern, with the exception of Latinos, in most other migrant minorities in the USA comparing immigrants and immigrant descendants. Bevelander and Pendakur (2011) report the same for Sweden. Lien (2004) also studied generational differences in voting participation among immigrant minorities in the US. She reports an altogether different picture according to which being foreign-born is not associated with lower voting probabilities among registered (eligible) individuals. However, the need for registering is a known source of inequality in elections, which would point to the role of resources (and not motivations) in casting a vote. These and other studies stress differences not only between individuals with an immigrant background and without, but also between immigrants and immigrant offspring or children of immigrants (e.g., Monforte & Morales, 2018). In our own study we thus look at three groups: natives (individuals without an immigrant background), immigrants (who are foreign-born), and children of immigrants.

2.2. National Identification as a Key Factor for Young Immigrants' Political Assimilation

National identification is a form of social identification that is identification with a specific social group. According to the SIT, individuals identify with a social group to secure a positive self-concept (e.g., Tajfel, 1974). Social identity is based on processes of self-categorization, evaluation, and identification. Our interest in national identification derives not only from its importance as a meaningful dimension of assimilation. Identification processes have generally been known to intensify in adolescence (e.g., Erikson, 1968). In this period, individuals are more engaged in reflections on who they are, which in turn helps them realize their agency as individuals, and develop tools to cope in the social world (Phinney, 1990; Schwartz, Coté, & Jensen Arnett, 2005).

The social identity perspective maintains that ingroup-identification increases individuals' motivation to act in the name of this group (Huddy, 2001; Turner, 1999). The self-categorization theory specifically stresses that self-categorization involves the comparison of the self to the prototype of the respective ingroup and accentuates perceived prototypical similarity between self and ingroup, which prescribes the behavior of the groups' members (Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995). Accordingly, Simon and Klandermans (2001) stress that collective identification is associated with self-stereotyping and conformity processes. Identification with any social group is therefore associated with higher congruence with its norms, orientations, values and beliefs (Klandermans, 2014). In the context of political interest, we thus assume that stronger national identification implies a stronger need to adhere to the group's norms (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Interest in the politics of the na-

tional group can be understood as a demonstration of such compliance and adherence.

Interestingly, Hogg et al. (1995) maintain that the need to comply with the ingroup's norms depends on how prototypical and uncertain individuals feel about their membership in that ingroup (see also Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). Given their position in-between the heritage and the receiving society, individuals with an immigrant background (hereafter IIBs) are likely to feel more uncertain about their membership in the national majority compared with natives. For this reason, we predict that IIBs will be more interested in the politics of their receiving society the stronger their national identification is. This idea echoes the work of Simon et al. (1998) who maintain that political participation is sometimes used to fulfil identity needs (see also Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008). In light of these theoretical considerations, in what follows we will test the following hypotheses:

H1: Immigrants will show a lower interest in politics compared with natives;

H2: Children of immigrants will show lower interest in politics compared with natives, however, differences between these groups will be smaller compared to the difference found between immigrants and natives;

H3: Among IIBs, the stronger they identify with the survey country, the more likely they will be to be interested in this country's politics.

3. Data, Variables, Analysis

We use data from the CILS4EU project (Kalter et al., 2017) collected eight to nine years ago. On the one hand, this data may be somewhat outdated. On the other hand, we are unaware of more recent publicly available data which focuses on young IIBs in Europe from a cross-national perspective that has a similar quality and asks directly about interest in the politics of the receiving society. Most of the variables we use were collected during the second wave of the project (2011–2012) when the mean age of the respondents was about 16 (standard deviation 0.66). In addition, we reach back to the first wave (2010 and 2011) to include respondents' subjective perceptions of discrimination and their country of origin. We also use parents' information for some robustness checks, as described below. The dependent variable in our analysis is *interest in the politics of the survey country*, measured as: 1 "quite a lot, a lot, or very much interested" and 0 "a little, very little, or not at all interested." We recoded the original 5 points scale of this variable because it was skewed with about 55% of the respondents reporting being very little or not at all interested or a little interested.

This standard indicator of political interest used in surveys has been criticized for imposing a specific view

of what politics is, mainly related to the electoral process and representative institutions, and therefore for being biased towards adults (i.e., O’Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, & McDonagh, 2003) and towards men’s interest (Ferrín, Fraile, García-Albacete, & Gómez, 2019). The result being that it would underestimate young people’s and women’s interest in politics. Unfortunately, such criticisms, mainly qualitative, have not yet resulted in methodological proposals that are used in standard surveys to better measure young people’s political interest. Notwithstanding these measurement issues, political interest has been found to be a good predictor of political participation for both young people and for adults (García-Albacete, 2014) and has provided a reliable measure of future political engagement over time and across countries. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that it performs worse for some groups among young people than for others.

Our interest lies mainly in the independent variable *immigrant status* (native, immigrant, and child of immigrant[s]) and *national identification*, as well as the interaction between these two variables. *Immigrant status* is measured based on the generated generation variable included in the CILS4EU data (Dollmann, Jacob, & Kalter, 2014). We transformed this generated variable to include three groups: immigrants are respondents who reported to be foreign-born; children of immigrants are respondents whose parents (at least one) are foreign-born; and finally, the rest of the respondents, including respondents with one or more foreign-born grandparents, were classified as natives (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We also tested an alternative model in which grandchildren of at least two foreign-born grandparents were coded together with children of immigrants. The results (presented in Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix) show that the main findings are robust. In any case, the number of third-generation immigrants in the sample was very small ranging between 6% in England and 2% in the Netherlands.

National identification was measured with the question of how strongly respondents feel English, German, Dutch or Swedish, respectively. Answers ranged from 1 “not at all strongly” to 4 “very strongly.” Due to the skewness of this variables’ distribution, we grouped the first and second response categories of this variable together. In measuring national identification in this manner, we deviate from previous studies that maintained that political engagement of immigrants depends on their ethnic as well as national identification, and not only the latter (e.g., Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013). We decided to focus on this form of identification because we think it is national and not ethnic identification that may increase respondents’ interest in the political sphere of their society and engage in it. Empirically, the CILS4EU data asks respondents whether they identify with the survey country and whether they identify with a different group in two separate items. Although one could construct an inte-

grated measure from these items, this measure does not fully capture the notion of dual identity. We thus chose to estimate the effect of ethnic identification which correlates negatively with national identification (Pearson’s $r = -0.45$) independently. Ethnic identification is measured by items asking respondents whether or not they identify with a group other than their survey country, and if so, to what extent. We combined these two items into one scale ranging from 0 “does not identify with an additional group” to 3 “identify very strongly with another group.”

In addition to ethnic identification, we include in our models several control variables. In terms of assimilation related predictors, we first control for *perceived discrimination*, measured with a variable asking “How often do you feel discriminated against or treated unfairly?” in four different scenarios (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We recoded the sum of the reports across all contexts into two categories: Either respondents never felt discriminated against or they did. We measure friendship patterns by comparing respondents reporting that at least half of their friends are of the respective “other” group to those who reported a smaller share of native friends, or alternatively friends with an immigrant background. Language preferences are measured with a battery asking the respondents what second language they speak in different social contexts (see Table A1), if at all. We used the sum index of the frequency of use across the three contexts. Respondents reporting not to use a second language were coded 0. Nationality has three categories 0 “only survey country nationality,” 1 “only origin country nationality” and 2 “both.” In Sweden, none of the respondents reported holding a dual citizenship. To account for the country of origin of the respondents we constructed a regional origin variable in which we grouped countries from substantively meaningful regions together that represent the main regions from which immigrants in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden arrived. All countries have, for example, a large share of “Western” mainly European immigrants. However, while in England Asian immigrants are a relatively large group, in the Netherlands it is the Antilleans. Both Germany and the Netherlands have a large Turkish community (see Table A3 in the Appendix).

In addition to the assimilation-related control variables, we include further variables in the model that were previously shown to be associated with political interest. First, we included a measure for respondents’ social activities (participation in associations or clubs) that have a positive effect on political interest and political participation (Verba et al., 1995). Attendance of religious activities serves as an additional proxy for social activities. Second, we control the reported frequency of talking about politics at home as a measure of parental influence that has a large effect on the early development of political interest (for a review see Jennings et al., 2009). Finally, we include respondents’ sex because girls have been found to report being less interested in politics than

boys already at an early age (Greenstein, 1965; van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar 2011).

The CILS4EU project also collected information from the respondents' parents. This information is however not complete. Due to a large number of missing cases, we decided to exclude parental information from our main analysis. Still, we corroborated the robustness of our results by replicating our models including parental education (whether they have an university degree) and mothers' national identification (the results are available in Table A4 in the Appendix).

Before we test the hypotheses listed above, we would like to shortly describe the composition of the

sample (the same information is presented in Table A2 in the Appendix only for IIB). The description is based on the weighted sample (N = 11,747) after listwise deletion of the missing cases (percentage missing among the independent variables ranged between 0.5% and 7%; the depended variable suffered from about 14.5% missing cases). As indicated in Table 1, in all four countries natives comprise the largest share among the respondents followed by children of immigrants. In England and the Netherlands, immigrants make some 3% to 9% of the sample. The share of respondents with a very strong national identification is rather high across all countries and that of ethnic identification much lower. Interest in poli-

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample in the analysis with weights. Source: CILS4EU data.

	England	Germany	The Netherlands	Sweden
Political interest (original scale)	2.0 (1.1)	2.8 (1.1)	2.2 (0.99)	2.1 (1.1)
% Strong political interest	25.1%	65.3%	40.9%	32.3%
Immigrant status:				
Native	74.9%	76%	85.6%	72.4%
Immigrant	9%	4.4%	3.2%	7.1%
Child of immigrant(s)	15.9%	19.6%	11.2%	20.4%
% Very strong national identification	52.5%	61.4%	58.2%	64.5%
% Very strong ethnic identification	7.5%	7.9%	5.8%	7.3%
Use of second language	0.7 (1.7)	0.9 (1.9)	0.8 (1.9)	0.9 (1.9)
Nationality:				
Only of survey country	85.7%	87.1%	95.8%	96.1%
Only of other country	5.1%	6.3%	3.1%	3.9%
Survey country and other	9.2%	6.6%	1.1%	
Mixed friendships:				
No	80.7%	79.5%	88%	77.3%
Yes	19.3%	20.5%	12%	22.7%
Discrimination:				
No	39.6%	33.7%	72.6%	56.9%
Yes	60.4%	66.3%	27.4%	43%
Talk to parents about politics	2.8 (1.2)	2.9 (1.1)	2.9 (1.2)	2.7 (1.1)
Associationism	2.8 (1.4)	3.2 (1.3)	3.5 (1.1)	3.1 (1.4)
Religious activities:				
Less than once a month	81.6%	80.8%	90.1%	90.65%
At least once a month	18.4%	19.2%	9.9%	9.4%
Gender:				
Male	48%	49%	48.7%	49.9%
Female	52%	51%	51.3%	50.1%
Region of origin:				
Africa and Middle East	5.1%	7.3%	3.5%	7.9%
Asia	12.7%	2.3%	3.9%	4%
Latin America and Caribbean	2.6%	1.2%	3%	1.9%
Europe and North America	4.6%	13.2%	4%	13.7%
Survey country	75%	76%	85.6%	72.4%
N	2,562	2,638	3,008	3,539

tics is highest in Germany with 65% of the sample interested in politics and lowest in England with about 25% of the sample.

To put these findings into context we also looked into several indexes comparing the four countries both in terms of their integration policies and in terms of political engagement. In terms of integration policy, the MIPEX index data from 2012 (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015) indicate that the countries are rather similar to each other. Germany, the Netherlands and England range between 64 (in NL) and 57 (in the UK) points in their integration policy index and Sweden has a higher value of 80 points. This data is in line with Joppke's observation that since the mid-2000s European integration policies are converging (Joppke, 2007). In terms of political engagement, norms are different across countries, for instance, electoral turnout is highest in Sweden followed by the Netherlands, Germany, and England (for the years 2009 and 2010, as well as 2013 to 2015; International IDEA, 2019). As indicated in the European Social Survey data (European Social Survey, 2014) Political interest differs across countries also, with the highest level in Germany, and then Sweden, and the Netherlands. The English show significantly lower levels of political interest (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).

In what follows we present the results of several logistic regression models we estimated in order to test the hypotheses above. Across all models, we pooled the data from the four countries together and included dummy variables to be able to estimate country-effects. We also calculate clustered standard errors because of the clustering of individuals in countries, schools, and classes. We use Sweden, which has a somewhat higher score on the integration policy index, as the reference point.

Model 1 in Table 1 serves to test the main relations between immigrant status and interest in the politics of the receiving society. Model 2 in the same Table also includes national identification to test whether this variable significantly predicts political interest. This is a precondition for the next model presented in Figure 1 where we test our third hypothesis about the moderation of national identification in the relationship tested in model 1. This model was also estimated with the control variables namely friendship and language preferences, ethnic identification, nationality, region of origin, and discrimination perception as well as political socialization at home, associationism and gender as can be seen in Table A5 in the Appendix. Model 3 in Table 1 tests the robustness of the findings from model 1 after adding the same control variables.

4. Findings

Table 2 presents the results of the logit estimation models in the form of odds ratios. In model 1, which only includes the variable immigrant status, we see no significant differences in the odds of immigrants and of natives to be politically interested. Thus, our first hypoth-

esis that immigrants will show a lower interest in politics compared with natives finds no empirical support at this stage. To that, results imply that immigrants and children of immigrants show higher and not lower odds than natives to be interested in the politics of the survey country. Our second hypothesis, that differences found between immigrants and natives will be larger than those found between children of immigrants and natives was also not corroborated. Specifically, the results indicate that it is the children of immigrants who significantly differ from natives in their political interest and not the immigrants. Model 1 also conveys that English respondents' odds to be politically interested are lower than Swedish respondents' odds, whereas German respondents' odds to be politically interested are nearly 4 times larger than those of respondents in Sweden. Among respondents in the Netherlands, their odds to be politically interested are 1.49 as large as those of respondents in Sweden. In model 2 we included our second variable of interest, namely national identification, which, as expected, positively predicts interest in the politics of the receiving society among the respondents.

Our third hypothesis is the most relevant theoretically. We expect that the odds of IIBs to be politically interested will increase as a function of their national identification (H3). Testing this last expectation requires adding an interaction term between national identification and immigrant status to the models presented above (see Table A5 in the Appendix for detailed results). We tested the interaction both in the simplest model (model 2 in Table 2) and in the model with all control variables (model 3 in Table 2). Figure 1 shows the results for the simpler model which, as we show in the Appendix (Table A5) did not change much with the inclusion of the control variables. The findings show that in line with our hypothesis, national identification moderates the relation between immigrant status and political interest. Specifically, Figure 1 shows that among IIBs the probability to be interested in the politics of the receiving country increases as national identification becomes stronger. The effect is particularly large for immigrant respondents for which the probability to be interested in politics doubles, increasing from 38% for those with not a very strong national identification to 62% for those that identify very strongly (see Figure 1). Among children of immigrants, the larger difference in the probability to be politically interested is found between those who do not identify nationally at all or not very strongly (38%) and those who identify somewhat strongly (55%). Corroborating the uncertainty hypothesis, we do not see the same effect among natives who, we contend, are unlikely to suffer from uncertainty in their national group membership.

We also tested these results using a formal (lincom) test (Buis, 2010) which showed that children of immigrants who identified "somewhat strongly" were 1.5 times more likely to be interested in the politics of the receiving society compared to those who did not identify nationally (or identified "not at all strongly"). Among

Table 2. Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in politics of the survey country (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Immigrant	1.11 (0.16)	1.25 (0.18)	0.79 (0.20)
Child of immigrant(s)	1.21** (0.11)	1.29*** (0.12)	0.73 (0.14)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)		1.40** (0.19)	1.25 (0.18)
National identification (very strongly)		1.47*** (0.19)	1.33** (0.19)
England	0.71*** (0.05)	0.71*** (0.06)	0.58*** (0.06)
Germany	3.97*** (0.31)	4.04*** (0.31)	4.40*** (0.40)
The Netherlands	1.49*** (0.14)	1.49*** (0.14)	1.38*** (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)			1.02 (0.18)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly			1.25 (0.27)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly			1.17 (0.21)
Girl			0.55*** (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other			0.79 (0.15)
Citizenship = only other country			0.80 (0.15)
Political discussion at home			2.28*** (0.09)
Mixed friendships			1.43** (0.21)
Use of second language			1.00 (0.03)
Associationism			1.08** (0.03)
Religious activities			1.22*** (0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often			1.00 (0.01)
Africa and the Middle East			1.81*** (0.33)
Asia			1.75*** (0.34)
Latin America and the Caribbean			1.27 (0.36)
Constant	0.45*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.02*** (0.01)
Observations	11,747	11,747	11,747
AIC	1150879	1148772	962484.7
Log pseudolikelihood	-575433.36	-574377.87	-481219.35

Notes: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.




Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of being interested in the politics of the survey country according to strength of national identification and immigrant status. Note: Estimates based on model 1 in Table A5 in the Appendix. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

immigrants, the difference was at 0.87. To the contrary, immigrants who identified “very strongly” with their respective survey country were 2.14 times more likely to be interested in its politics compared to immigrants with low or no national identification at all, whereas this difference was at 1.31 for children of immigrants. Due to the relatively similar integration policies in the four countries under scrutiny, we have not developed hypotheses regarding possible country differences in the interaction between national identification and immigrant status. Results from country-specific estimations of the interaction effect (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) indicate however that the moderation effect of national identification on the probabilities of IIBs and natives to be politically interested differs across the countries, in particular among children of immigrants, and natives. The one common trend is that among immigrants the probability to be politically interested increases with levels of national identification.

Before we move on the conclusions section, we would like to point out a few additional results from model 3 in Table 2 (and model 2 in Table A5 in the Appendix). We will not describe all results in detail here, but a few of the findings do deserve our attention. The first noteworthy finding in model 3 is the change in the direction of the immigrant status coefficients which are, however, not statistically significant at the 0.10 level (they are, in model 2 in Table A5). Regarding our second main variable of interest, national identification, the results confirm again that a stronger national identification

implies higher levels of political interest. The country differences observed in models 1 and 2 hold also in model 3.

In line with previous research, model 3 shows that respondents whose parents discuss politics at home have twice the odds to be politically interested than respondents whose parents do not talk about politics at home. We also see that boys have twice the odds that girls do to be politically interested. Associationism and religious activities also increase the odds of being interested in the politics of the survey country. Similarly, respondents with mixed friendships have higher odds to be politically interested than respondents with homogeneous friendship ties. We understand this result in line with the positive effect of heterogeneous networks (Granovetter, 1973). Other assimilation-related predictors were less relevant for the respondents’ interest in the receiving society’s politics. Finally, model 3 conveys that among respondents from African, Middle Eastern, and Asian origin, the odds to be interested in the politics of the receiving-country are higher than among natives and individuals with a European origin. Table A6 in the Appendix show the same models for IIB only, where one can also see that differences in political interest between immigrants and children of immigrants are not statistically significant.

5. Conclusions and Outlook

As diversity in European societies rises, understanding whether and how new immigrant groups and their descendants assimilate becomes increasingly relevant.

Within this context, we focus our attention on the issue of political interest, a key determinant of political assimilation, which until now remained understudied. We investigate political interest among youth in four European immigrant-receiving countries. Our focus on youth allows us to learn about the emergence of political interest, which according to the literature develops in adolescence. In particular, we look into the relations between political interest and national identification, another personality element that develops during this stage in the life-course, among individuals with and without an immigrant background. We first investigated whether interest in the politics of the receiving society differs between natives, children of immigrants and immigrants. Second, we tested whether such differences can be explained by differential levels of national identification. The assumption here was that due to their identity uncertainty, IIBs will show higher political interest as their national identification becomes stronger.

As mentioned elsewhere in the article, we did not attempt to solve the causal debate regarding the relations between national identification and political interest. Instead, we used data from the second wave of the CILS4EU to investigate the relations between assimilation and interest in the politics of the survey country, assuming that national identification is an important predictor of it. Interest in the politics of the receiving country was only measured twice in the CILS4EU project cross-nationally, limiting our possibilities to measure its long-term relationship with national identification. An obvious extension of this project is thus to use the longitudinal version of the CILS4EU in Germany, where the question was included in further waves. Furthermore, a question could be raised as to the potential of class or school-level information that is available in the CILS4EU data, of which we made no use. Regarding the sample, it is important to note that the data covers a highly selective set of countries in Europe which warns caution regarding generalizing the conclusions to other countries. Future research should thus try to include more countries and consider macro-level mechanisms to account for differences between them.

Notwithstanding its limitations, the current study is a first and necessary step that provides important insights into immigrants' political assimilation. The findings presented above indicate first that national identification, defined as a sense of attachment to the in-group, is an important mechanism that positively contributes to political interest among youth in Europe. Given that democracies require, by definition, citizens' political participation, and that political interest is a prerequisite of such participation, our findings indicate that European democracies would be smart in exploring potential ways to increase national identification among young persons. After all, whether they develop political interest—or not—at an early age will determine their future participatory behavior and among others their electoral turn-out.

Second, our findings show that the relevance of national identification for political interest differs between natives and IIBs. Two issues arise from this result: first, considering the importance of developing national identification among young people, this finding speaks for the fact that nations compete with a long list of other social groups with which youth, and particularly native youth identifies. Thus, the task of increasing this identification among them should not be underestimated. Second, considering the stronger association between national identification and political interest among immigrants, we believe this finding supports previous indications for the assimilation of immigrants in European societies. Moreover, it shows how the attachment of immigrants to the receiving society increases their chances to be interested in its politics. This finding thus indicates that national identification of immigrants holds an important key for sustaining democracy in more than one way. By increasing national identification among immigrants, and to some extent also children of immigrants, receiving societies in Europe may foster their political participation and increase democratization in their highly diversified societies. Moreover, by providing immigrants the opportunity to raise their voice in politics, democracies can become more equalitarian. Hochman (2011) finds in this context that party identification increases the odds of IIBs in Germany to report intentions of naturalization.

Finally, the country-differences we observe in our data remain to be explained. Although this is a goal that goes beyond the scope of this article, our first interpretation refers to the important role of the prestige of political interest as a norm of citizenship in each country on the one hand, and the openness of the political system to immigrants in terms of assimilation on the other. While national identification matters little for the political interest of young people in Sweden, it matters significantly in Germany. In addition, in Germany political interest is relatively high. The combination of both factors could explain why in Germany those immigrants or children of immigrants that are politically interested are the ones motivated due to their positive identification with the country and their willingness to assimilate. This is a speculation that requires further analysis and provides a future venue for research.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Appendix
Table A1. List of variables and how they were measured.

Variable	Original item	Final measure
Political interest	How interested are you in survey country's politics? (1) very much (5) very little or not at all	(0) Not interested (1) Interested
Immigrant status	Generated CILS4EU variable	(1) Immigrants (2) Children of immigrants (0) Other and native
National identification	How strongly do you feel [survey country member] (1) very strongly to (5) not at all strongly	(1) not at all, not strongly (2) Fairly strongly (3) very strongly
Ethnic identification	How strongly do you feel you belong to [group 1] (1) very strongly to (5) not at all strongly	(1) not at all, not strongly (2) Fairly strongly (3) very strongly
Friendship patterns	Thinking now about all of your friends. How many of them have a [survey country] background	(0) half or more of friends same group (1) half or more of friends other group
Language preferences	Is there a language other than <survey country language> spoken at your home? In this language, how often do you: Talk to your family, watch TV, talk to your friends	Sum scale among those who reported "yes" to other language spoken at home
Subjective discrimination (Round 1)	How often feel discriminated against or treated unfairly/ In the last 12 month felt discriminated in: school; trains/buses/trams/subways; shops/stores/cafés/restaurants/ nightclubs;by police or security guards (1) always to (4) never	(0) never felt discriminated (1) Felt discriminated rarely or more often
Nationality (Round 1)	What is your nationality (which country is your passport from)? If you have more than one nationality, please tick all that apply (1) Only survey country, (2) survey country and other, (3) only other	Same as original item
Political discussions at home	In general, how often does/do one or both of your parents do the following things with you? talk to you about political and social issues (1) every day to (5) never	Same as original item
Associationism	In your spare time how often spend time in a sports/music/drama/other club (1) every day to (5) never	Same as original item
Religious participation	How often do you visit a religious meeting place (e.g., a church, mosque, synagogue or temple)? (1) never to (5) every day	Same as original item
Girl	Are you a boy or a girl (1) and (2) respectively	(0) boy (1) girl
Region of origin	Generated SILC4EU variable	Africa and Middle-East; Asia; South America and the Carribean; Europe North-America and Oceania; Survey country

Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the sample in the analysis with weights (immigrants and children of immigrants only).

	England	Germany	The Netherlands	Sweden
Political interest (original scale)	2.1 (1.1)	2.7 (1.2)	2.6 (1.0)	2.2 (1.1)
% Strong political interest	29.7%	60.6%	62.3%	40.2%
Immigrant status:				
Immigrant	36.2%	18.3%	22.3%	25.8%
Child of immigrant	63.8%	81.7%	77.7%	74.2%
% Very strong National identification	28%	31.9%	21.9%	26.8%
% Very strong Ethnic identification	23.6%	26.9%	26.6%	22.7%
Use of second language	2.4 (2.6)	3.4 (2.6)	2.6 (2.7)	3.0 (2.6)
Nationality:				
Only of survey country	47.7%	49.8%	73.4%	85.8%
Only of other country	17.2%	22.9%	19.3%	14.2%
Survey country and other	35.1%	27.3%	7.3%	—
Mixed friendships:				
No	29.9%	23%	20.5%	24%
Yes	70.1%	77%	79.5%	76%
% experienced discrimination	61.1%	61.5%	36.2%	44.6%
Talk to parents about politics	2.9 (1.2)	2.8 (1.2)	3.0 (1.2)	2.8 (1.2)
Associationism	2.8 (1.3)	3.0 (1.4)	3.1 (1.4)	2.9 (1.4)
Religious participation:				
Less than once a month	63.3%	71.6%	77.5%	85.3%
At least once a month	36.7%	28.4%	22.5%	14.7%
Gender:				
Boy	47.7%	44.9%	44.7%	50.6%
Girl	52.3%	55.1%	55.3%	49.4%
Country of origin:				
Africa and the Middle East	20.38%	30.6%	24.4%	28.6%
Asia	50.8%	9.5%	27.4%	14.6%
South America and the Caribbean	10.5%	5%	20.5%	7%
Europe and north America	18.3%	54.8%	27.7%	49.7%
N	993	1113	850	1481

Source: CILS4EU

Table A3. Code for country of origin.

	England	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Africa and Middle East (+Turkey)	Nigeria, West Africa, East Africa Other Africa	North Africa, Lebanon Other Africa	Morocco Africa	North Africa, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran East Africa, Somalia Other Africa
Asia	South Asia, East Asia Pakistan, India, Bangladesh other Asia	South Asia, West Asia other Asia	South Asia, Indonesia West Asia other Asia	South Asia, Southeast Asia West Asia other Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean	Latin America and the Caribbean, Caribbean	Latin America and the Caribbean	Latin America and the Caribbean, Surinam, Antilleans	Latin America and the Caribbean
Europe, North America and Oceania	North America and Oceania East Europe South Europe Italy, Greece Other Europe, Ireland	North America and Oceania East Europe, FSU, Poland, Former Yugoslavia South Europe,	North America and Oceania South Europe	North America and Oceania East Europe east Europe, Former Yugoslavia, Poland South Europe Finland, Denmark, Norway
Missing	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Survey country	Survey country	Survey country	Survey country	Survey country

Table A4. Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in politics of the survey country with parental information (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Immigrant	0.33** (0.15)	0.36** (0.16)	0.35** (0.16)
Child of immigrant(s)	0.38** (0.15)	0.39** (0.15)	0.40** (0.16)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)	0.98 (0.26)	0.98 (0.25)	0.96 (0.25)
National identification (strongly)	1.15 (0.29)	1.12 (0.27)	1.12 (0.28)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly	2.24* (1.07)	2.12 (0.99)	2.21* (1.05)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly	2.57* (1.37)	2.48* (1.30)	2.53* (1.34)
Child of immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly	2.62** (1.04)	2.53** (1.00)	2.57** (1.02)
Child of immigrant * national identification very strongly	1.84 (0.73)	1.85 (0.73)	1.82 (0.72)
England	0.64*** (0.09)	0.64*** (0.09)	0.66*** (0.09)
Germany	4.65*** (0.52)	4.31*** (0.47)	4.82*** (0.57)
the Netherlands	1.54*** (0.21)	1.34** (0.17)	1.59*** (0.22)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)	0.94 (0.21)	0.95 (0.21)	0.94 (0.20)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly	1.22 (0.33)	1.20 (0.33)	1.21 (0.33)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly	1.09 (0.26)	1.09 (0.26)	1.08 (0.25)
Girl	0.48*** (0.05)	0.49*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other	0.76 (0.18)	0.78 (0.19)	0.77 (0.19)
Citizenship = only other country	0.84 (0.23)	0.84 (0.23)	0.86 (0.24)
Political discussion at home	2.17*** (0.10)	2.23*** (0.10)	2.18*** (0.10)
Mixed friendships	1.38* (0.26)	1.41* (0.27)	1.39* (0.27)
Use of second language	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)
Associationism	1.02 (0.04)	1.04 (0.04)	1.02 (0.04)
Religious activities	1.25*** (0.07)	1.25*** (0.07)	1.24*** (0.07)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often	0.91 (0.10)	0.91 (0.10)	0.91 (0.10)
Africa and Middle East	1.38 (0.32)	1.43 (0.32)	1.41 (0.32)
Asia	2.10** (0.61)	2.09** (0.61)	2.01** (0.58)
Latin America and Caribbean	0.93 (0.34)	1.00 (0.38)	0.93 (0.34)

Table A4. (Cont.) Odds ratios (robust SE) from the pooled logit model predicting the probabilities to report interest in politics of the survey country with parental information (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
National identification mother somewhat strongly		1.12 (0.19)	1.14 (0.19)
National identification mother very strongly		1.19 (0.21)	1.25 (0.22)
Parents academics	1.42*** (0.17)		1.44*** (0.18)
Constant	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Observations	7,700	7,700	7,700
AIC	678831.7	680908.6	678364.9
Log pseudolikelihood	-339387.83	-340425.32	-339152.44

Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents with interaction effects (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2
Immigrant	0.77 (0.24)	0.50* (0.19)
Child of immigrant(s)	0.78 (0.19)	0.45*** (0.13)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)	0.99 (0.20)	0.88 (0.18)
National identification (strongly)	1.11 (0.21)	1.00 (0.19)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly	1.63 (0.61)	1.75 (0.64)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly	2.83*** (1.12)	2.34** (1.00)
Child of immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly	2.11*** (0.59)	2.19** (0.67)
Child of immigrant * national identification very strongly	1.46 (0.41)	1.56 (0.50)
England	0.72*** (0.06)	0.58*** (0.06)
Germany	4.09*** (0.32)	4.43*** (0.40)
the Netherlands	1.50*** (0.14)	1.38*** (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)		1.03 (0.18)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly		1.23 (0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly		1.16 (0.21)
Girl		0.55*** (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other		0.82 (0.15)
Citizenship = only other country		0.84 (0.16)

Table A5. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents with interaction effects (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2
Political discussion at home		2.28*** (0.09)
Mixed friendships		1.36** (0.20)
Use of second language		0.10 (0.03)
Associationism		1.08** (0.03)
Religious activities		1.23*** (0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often		1.00 (0.09)
Africa and Middle East		1.81*** (0.33)
Asia		1.68*** (0.33)
Latin America and Caribbean		1.231 (0.35)
Constant	0.42*** (0.08)	0.03*** (0.01)
Observations	11,747	11,747
AIC	1146178	960698.1
Log pseudolikelihood	-573077.17	-480322.03

Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among individuals with an immigrant background (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Immigrant	0.87 (0.13)	0.94 (0.14)	1.06 (0.17)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)		1.63*** (0.26)	1.60*** (0.28)
National identification (strongly)		1.64*** (0.28)	1.46* (0.30)
England	0.64*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.07)
Germany	2.26*** (0.28)	2.36*** (0.30)	2.55*** (0.39)
the Netherlands	2.45*** (0.47)	2.34*** (0.45)	2.12*** (0.44)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)			1.09 (0.20)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly			0.82 (0.22)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly			0.90 (0.16)
Girl			0.58*** (0.08)
Citizenship = survey country and other			1.06 (0.20)

Table A6. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among individuals with an immigrant background (weighted sample, listwise deletion). Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Citizenship = only other country			1.08 (0.20)
Political discussion at home			1.88*** (0.10)
Mixed friendships			1.62*** (0.25)
Use of second language			1.00 (0.03)
Associationism			1.06 (0.05)
Religious activities			1.30*** (0.08)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often			0.95 (0.12)
Africa and Middle East			1.70*** (0.29)
Asia			1.58** (0.31)
Latin America and Caribbean			1.06 (0.30)
Constant	0.70*** (0.06)	0.47*** (0.07)	0.03*** (0.01)
Observations	4,437	4,437	4,437
AIC	273654.9	271637.5	235569.9
Log pseudolikelihood	-136822.47	-135811.74	-117762.97

Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A7. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alternative immigrant status coding. source: CILS4EU; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Immigrants	1.11 (0.16)	1.27 (0.19)	0.83 (0.22)
Immigrant offspring	1.22** (0.10)	1.30*** (0.11)	0.77 (0.16)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)		1.39** (0.19)	1.23 (0.18)
National identification (strongly)		1.48*** (0.20)	1.33** (0.19)
England	0.71*** (0.06)	0.72*** (0.06)	0.58*** (0.06)
Germany	4.00*** (0.31)	4.07*** (0.32)	4.46*** (0.40)
the Netherlands	1.49*** (0.14)	1.49*** (0.14)	1.38*** (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)			1.05 (0.19)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly			1.22 (0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly			1.16 (0.21)

Table A7. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alternative immigrant status coding. source: CILS4EU; own analysis.

	M1	M2	M3
Girl			0.54*** (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other			0.78 (0.14)
Citizenship = only other country			0.78 (0.15)
Political discussion at home			2.27*** (0.09)
Mixed friendships			1.44** (0.22)
Use of second language			1.00 (0.03)
Associationism			1.08** (0.03)
Religious activities			1.22*** (0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often			1.01 (0.09)
Africa and Middle East			1.78*** (0.31)
Asia			1.75*** (0.32)
Latin America and Caribbean			1.23 (0.32)
Constant	0.45*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.02*** (0.01)
Observations	11,612	11,612	11,612
AIC	1136762	1134558	951725.8
Log pseudolikelihood	-568375.05	-567270.92	-475839.89

Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table A8. Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alternative immigrant status coding. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2
Immigrants	0.75 (0.24)	0.50* (0.20)
Immigrant offspring	0.76 (0.19)	0.47** (0.15)
National identification (somewhat strongly, ref: not at all/not very)	0.94 (0.20)	0.85 (0.19)
National identification (strongly)	1.07 (0.22)	0.97 (0.20)
Immigrant * national identification somewhat strongly	1.71 (0.66)	1.79 (0.67)
Immigrant * national identification very strongly	2.92*** (1.18)	2.37** (1.03)
Immigrant offspring * national identification somewhat strongly	2.11*** (0.60)	2.06** (0.63)
Immigrant offspring * national identification very strongly	1.56 (0.44)	1.61 (0.50)

Table A8. (Cont.) Odds ratio (SE) predicting political interest among respondents (weighted sample, listwise deletion) with alternative immigrant status coding. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

	M1	M2
England	0.72*** (0.06)	0.58*** (0.06)
Germany	4.12*** (0.32)	4.47*** (0.41)
the Netherlands	1.50*** (0.14)	1.38*** (0.15)
No ethnic identification (ref: identify very strongly)		1.07 (0.19)
Ethnic identification: not at all/not very strongly		1.19 (0.26)
Ethnic identification somewhat strongly		1.15 (0.20)
Girl		0.54*** (0.05)
Citizenship = survey country and other		0.81 (0.15)
Citizenship = only other country		0.83 (0.16)
Political discussion at home		2.26*** (0.09)
Mixed friendships		1.38** (0.21)
Use of second language		1.00 (0.03)
Associationism		1.08** (0.03)
Religious activities		1.23*** (0.05)
Felt discriminated rarely or more often		1.01 (0.09)
Africa and Middle East		1.77*** (0.31)
Asia		1.69*** (0.31)
Latin America and Caribbean		1.21 (0.32)
Constant	0.43*** (0.09)	0.03*** (0.01)
Observations	11,612	11,612
AIC	1132060	950205.9
Log pseudolikelihood	-566018.23	-475075.93

Note: Robust se (eform) in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.




Figure A1. Politically interested respondents in survey country (percentage). Comparison of political interest between European Social Survey data from 2012 and the CILS4EU data; own analysis. Note: In the ESS the United Kingdom is studied and not England.




Figure A2. Predicted probabilities of being interested in the politics of the survey country according to strength of national identification and immigrant status. Source: CILS4EU data; own analysis.

Article

The Influence of a Migration Background on Attitudes Towards Immigration

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Abstract

Migration is an ever-increasing phenomenon that is unfailingly the topic of public discourse. Recently, empirical interest has expanded to include the study of attitudes towards immigration. However, the focus usually lies on the opinion of natives, that is, persons without a migration background. This is unfortunate, because in many countries the proportion of people with a migration background is quite high, and many of them hold the citizenship of the receiving country. I expect individuals with a migration background to have more favourable attitudes towards immigration than the general population because they can identify more strongly with other immigrants due to their own migration history. Furthermore, I expect this difference to decrease with each subsequent migrant generation, with earlier generations holding more positive attitudes than later generations. For the analyses, I pooled data from the 2008–2016 rounds of the American General Social Survey. The subsample used included 7,362 respondents, 2,811 of whom had a migration background. Moreover, the data set allowed the differentiation of three generations of migrants. The results support the theoretical expectations. Persons with a migration background had more favourable attitudes towards immigration compared to those without a migration background. However, a closer look revealed that this is the case only for first-generation immigrants. The attitudes of second- and third-generation immigrants differed from each other on the 5% level, but the attitudes of neither group differed from that of the general population when the migrants' regional origins were controlled for.

Keywords

attitudes towards immigration; immigration; migrant generation; American General Social Survey

Issue

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1. Introduction

Due to the conflicts and economic struggles in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and the subsequent migration waves to Europe and the US, the topic of immigration has become increasingly important in recent years. Besides discussing the actual migration, the issue of immigration attitudes and opinions in the receiving countries is often covered by the media. Here, the focus usually lies on showcasing the opinions of natives.

Reports on the immigration attitudes of persons with a migration background can rarely be found, even though in many countries (like the US) the share of people with a migration background in the population is quite high. For instance, 24% of the US population were either born outside the US or have at least one parent who was (Trevelyan et al., 2016). Furthermore, those with a migration background are not just an important part of the society, they comprise a significant group of voters who can have an impact on election outcomes and legislation.

In countries in which citizenship is granted to all those born within the country (i.e., second and later generations), such as the US, this is especially relevant because the share of voters with a migration background is likely to be comparatively high.

In the following I will examine whether and to what extent attitudes towards immigration are different between natives and individuals with a migration background in the US context. By using data from the American General Social Survey (GSS; Smith, Davern, Freese, & Hout, 2018) it will be possible to test whether the opinion on immigration differs between persons with and without a migration background, and if it is relevant whether people have a first-, second- or third-generation migration background. Before the analyses can be executed, some theoretical background on the existing literature and theories will be given and concrete expectations on the results will be framed.

2. Literature

Most research on immigration attitudes focuses on the majority population, that is, natives who do not have a migration background. Besides that, there is a less known line of research in the US exploring minorities and immigrants' attitudes towards this issue. Research combining these two positions, and therefore allowing a comparison of the attitudes of those with and without a migration background, is however scarce. This is especially true for research on differences among migrant generations. Therefore, in order to give an overview, studies analysing the attitudes of minorities and migrants towards immigration as well as research on the majority population, which somewhat includes migrants' attitudes towards immigration, are evaluated in the following. Additionally, first insight on generational differences will be discussed, before highlighting the scientific contributions of this article.

Research has so far shown that immigrants' attitudes towards other minorities varied with the groups that were considered, with more positive attitudes being displayed towards each other by those sharing the same religion and having more contact (Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014). Since this study's sample only included respondents with a migration background, it is unclear to what extent the respondents differed in their opinion from the native majority of the population. An earlier study by Berry and Kalin (1995), in contrast, was able to reveal such differences in Canada between those belonging to a majority and those belonging to a minority. They showed that minority members, in comparison to the French-Canadian majority, felt more comfortable in interacting with other ethnicities. Further, those belonging to a minority had significantly more favourable attitudes towards a diverse and multicultural nation and were more tolerant towards other ethnicities. However, no question on the attitude towards immigration per se was asked in the survey.

Additionally, there have been studies specifically exploring minorities' attitudes towards immigration. This is especially true for the US. Whereas Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) focused on self-identified Hispanics, Diamond (1998) was more interested in the attitudes of African Americans. The latter identified an overall trend across 14 different studies using African-American heritage as a control variable: In comparison to white US citizens, African Americans were less likely to be against immigration. Due to their sample being restricted to Hispanics, Hood et al. (1997) were not able to make similar comparisons. However, being able to make such comparisons with the attitudes of the majority of the population is an important aspect in trying to understand and explain the attitudes of subgroups towards immigration. Only when this comparison is possible, can conclusions be drawn about the differences and similarities of the groups concerning their attitudes towards immigration.

Likewise, when looking at immigrants' rather than minorities' attitudes towards immigration, this problem persists. Many researchers were exclusively interested in the attitudes of people with migration backgrounds and hence chose data sets which did not include respondents without migration backgrounds or with migration backgrounds removed by several generations, as it is the case for most US citizens. Studies focusing on immigrants' attitudes while allowing the comparison with the majority are scarce. One approach in this direction was done by Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle (1997) who compared Mexican-American and Anglo-American attitudes towards various immigration policies. They found that Anglo Americans showed significantly stronger support for more restrictive immigration policies. In a descriptive comparison of the attitudes towards allowing more legal immigrants into the US, few differences were found between the two groups. A more recent comparison between the majority population, described as persons born to two US-born parents, and persons born to at least one foreign-born parent, came to similar conclusions (Buckler, Swatt, & Salinas, 2009). Those who belonged to the majority of the population were more likely to support stricter immigration policies and border protection efforts. Again, however, there was no multivariate analyses comparing the immigration attitudes. In Europe, even less research has been conducted on this issue. As part of their research on immigrants' attitudes towards immigration, Just and Anderson (2015) made a brief comparison between foreign- and native-born respondents in 18 European countries. They found that foreign-born respondents showed significantly more positive attitudes towards immigration compared to native-born respondents.

Another way to approach the topic is to look at existing studies trying to explain attitudes towards immigration in general rather than immigrants' attitudes and their difference to the general population specifically. Many researchers investigating the influence of per-

sonal characteristics and traits on immigration attitudes included *inter alia* variables on the respondents' heritage or migration background (Bridges & Mateut, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Since most of these researchers did not discuss the effects of these variables directly, information must be gleaned by a close inspection of their models and tables. For instance, in their assessment of attitudes towards immigration of migrants of a different and of the same race, Bridges and Mateut (2014) showed that those classified as foreign were significantly less likely to be opposed to immigration. Similarly, Hainmueller and Hiscox's (2007) as well as O'Rourke and Sinnott's (2006) results indicated that those who were born in the country of data collection were significantly less likely to take a pro-immigration stance compared to those born elsewhere. The same was true for those whose parents were born in the interview country as reflected in the significantly higher probability of these persons to endorse a substantial reduction in the number of immigrants in comparison to those with parents born abroad (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Also, having parents with a foreign citizenship significantly increased respondents' likelihood to be pro-immigration (Mayda, 2006).

Overall, it appears that in studies focusing on the comparison of immigrants' and non-immigrants' attitudes towards immigration as well as in studies focusing on the majority population, those with some form of migration background had significantly more positive attitudes towards immigration policies and immigration than those without a migration background (Bridges & Mateut, 2014; Buckler et al., 2009; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Just & Anderson, 2015; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006).

While similar conclusions can be drawn from the presented studies, it should be noted that each of them operationalized the concept "migration background" differently. While some researchers controlled for migration backgrounds by simply excluding all participants who were born outside the country of interest (Mayda, 2006), others opted to include variables assessing the birth place of the respondents or their ancestors (e.g., Bridges & Mateut, 2014; Buckler et al., 2009; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). The simplest form was to include the respondent's birthplace (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). This made it possible to compare first-generation migrants with the rest of the population. An alternative was the inclusion of the birthplace of the respondent's parents (Buckler et al., 2009; Mayda, 2006) as well as a single variable covering both birthplace aspects simultaneously (Bridges & Mateut, 2014). Neither of them allowed a comparison between different generations of migrants. A comparison of multiple generations of migrants with each other as well as with persons without a migration background requires separate variables for the different generations' birth places to be included into the analyses.

Only one of the above-mentioned studies allowed such comparisons: O'Rourke and Sinnott's (2006) results suggest that those who are native born to native-born parents were most likely to report anti-immigrant attitudes, followed by those who could be described as second-generation migrants. Respondents with a first-generation migration background reported the most positive attitude towards immigration. In addition to O'Rourke and Sinnott's (2006) study, other studies utilising migrant-exclusive data sets can be employed to further explore the differences between the generations. Among Latino immigrants, for example, Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) found that those belonging to the second generation as well as those belonging to later generations were significantly less likely to report a pro-immigration attitude and had less favourable attitudes towards allowing more legal immigrants into the US, compared to first-generation Latino immigrants. On the other hand, in his descriptive analyses of Latino attitudes, Suro (2005) showed that whereas first-generation Latinos were more likely to think that immigrants strengthen the country, there were only few differences in the generations' opinions about whether the amount of legal immigration from Latin America should be reduced or increased. Similarly, when comparing first- and second-generation Mexican Americans with Mexican Americans whose families have been in the country for more generations, Polinard, Wrinkle, and de la Garza (1984) found no significant differences in their attitudes towards the rate of immigration as well as other aspects of immigration. The sample for this study, however, was not nationally representative, rather it was comprised of Mexican Americans from Texas, with a large share of the respondents living along the Mexican border. The high concentration of immigrants in this area might have increased respondents' perceived competition for resources (Hood et al., 1997). As suggested in a large body of literature on intergroup conflict, this perceived threat can be used as an explanation for negative attitudes towards outgroup members (Blalock, 1967; Campbell, 1967; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), such as new or potential immigrants (Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009; Quillian, 1995). Hence, the conclusion drawn from studies conducted in specific regions of the US might not be transferable to generational differences within the population of the entire country. In summary, the currently existing literature does not draw a clear picture as to whether later generations of migrants have less favourable attitudes towards immigration in comparison to those whose families immigrated more recently. Studies with broader, nationally representative samples, including respondents with various migration backgrounds and from different origins would be necessary to focus on these questions in detail.

Notwithstanding these findings, it is apparent that there is very limited research on the comparison of migrants' and non-migrants' attitudes towards immigration. First insights concerning this effect had to be gath-

ered from studies that either did not focus on attitudes towards immigration or did only include migration aspects as control variables into their analyses. The goal of this study is to bring the comparison of migrants' and non-migrants' attitudes towards immigration into focus. In addition, this article will continue the line of work on the attitudes of the different migrant generations. Here, an approach similar to that utilised by O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) will be followed. In contrast to their work and similar studies on immigrant specific data sets, however, the following study actively differentiates three generations of migrants from the rest of the population. By examining and comparing the attitudes of the different generations, a closer look at the assimilation of attitudes towards immigrants and the differences among generations as well as between them and the general population will be possible.

3. Theory

Reviewing the literature, I find two theories providing an underlying rationale as to why attitudes towards immigration may differ between a country's native citizens and their counterparts with a migration background: the concept of social distance and the contact theory.

First, social distance is seen as a subjective measure describing the "degrees of understanding and intimacy" (Park, 1924, p. 339) between persons as well as between social groups. It is often measured as the willingness to engage with persons from specific social groups at various levels of intimacy (Bogardus, 1925, 1967; Hindriks et al., 2014). The higher the willingness to engage, the lower the social distance. Within social groups the willingness to engage is usually high; hence, the perceived social distance is low. However, as social distance towards a group increases, the uncertainty that comes with the engagement increases as well due to the decrease in knowledge that individuals have about the other person and his or her group (Hill, 1984; Maddux, Scheiber, & Bass, 1982). This uncertainty leads to more difficult interactions as well as to the reinforcement and amplification of existing prejudices (Hill, 1984; Maddux et al., 1982). Hence, people generally have a more positive attitude towards those individuals whom they perceive less social distance towards, in other words, persons who are similar to themselves, and they prefer interacting and engaging with them rather than with more socially distant others (Hill, 1984).

It is likely that persons with a migration background show a greater understanding for new immigrants and immigration in general, because they experienced the same themselves or have ancestors who experienced immigration. Therefore, these individuals are expected to perceive a smaller social distance between themselves and new or potential immigrants. The social distance between those without a migration background and new immigrants on the other hand is expected to be larger. Hence, those with a migration background are

expected to have a more positive attitude towards immigration than those without a migration background (Hypothesis 1).

But not all migrant generations are expected to perceive the same social distance to new or potential immigrants. Those who migrated themselves most likely feel that they belong to the same social group (Constantinou & Harvey, 1985; Masuda, Hasegawa, & Matsumoto, 1973; Masuda, Matsumoto, & Meredith, 1970) and possibly perceive the lowest social distance. This group of individuals can relate best to the potential immigrants because they experienced the same situation themselves. In comparison, second- or third-generation migrants did not have the experience themselves and therefore possibly perceive a larger social distance. Especially third-generation migrants, who do not even hear tales of migration recounted by their parents, is expected to show less understanding towards new migrants. Therefore, of the three generations examined here, they are expected to perceive the largest social distance towards immigrants. In conclusion, individuals with a first-generation migration background are expected to have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than individuals with a second- or third-generation background (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, individuals with a second-generation migration background are expected to have more positive attitudes towards immigration than third-generation migrants (Hypothesis 3). In other words, the attitudes towards immigration become less positive with the increasing time span since the own family's migration experience.

Second, the contact theory should also be taken into consideration when trying to explain differences in immigration attitudes of those with and without a migration background. It assumes that interaction between two people or two social groups is necessary in order to dissolve group barriers existing between them (Allport, 1954). Through contact, people start seeing each other as individuals with unique characteristics rather than as simple representatives of a uniform group (Brewer & Miller, 1984). This individualisation also leads to a decrease in discrimination and stereotypes as well as to more positive attitudes towards each other and each other's groups (Brewer & Miller, 1984). However, contact alone is not sufficient to develop a positive attitude towards a group (Amir, 1969). Rather, certain characteristics of the contact situation influence the potential positive change (Brewer & Miller, 1984). The main situation characteristics assumed to increase the positive attitude are a similar social status of the persons involved, a collective goal or cooperative interdependence, the possibility to refute existing stereotypes, direct personal contact, as well as the presence of egalitarian norms (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Cook, 1978).

Existing research supports the assumptions made by the contact theory (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and has shown that people who live in mixed neighbourhoods as well as people who have immigrants in their

social network have more positive attitudes towards immigration (Hayes & Dowds, 2006; Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014; Quillian, 1995). Since many families with migration backgrounds live in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods (Musterd, 2005; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009), and generally migrants tend to have other migrants in their direct social network (Lubbers, Molina, & McCarty, 2007), it can be expected that people with a migration background have more regular contact with new immigrants. Individuals without a migration background, on the other hand, tend to live in neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by natives (Musterd, 2005; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009) and to have fewer inter-ethnic friendships and contacts with immigrants (Lancee & Hartung, 2012; Martinović, 2013). This is especially relevant because contact with immigrants in the neighbourhood and within one's direct social network probably meets the requirements for a positive attitude change. For that reason, the contact theory supports the earlier presented notion that those with a migration background are likely to have a more positive attitude towards immigration than those without (Hypothesis 1).

One can also assume that not all generations of migrants will have the same amount of contact with new immigrants. While first-generation migrants might have difficulties getting in contact with non-migrants because of language barriers, second-generation migrants, even though raised in the neighbourhoods their parents live in, should have relatively more contact to natives because they have lived their entire lives in the host country and have grown up learning the native language. Existing research supports this assumption, showing that second-generation migrants tend to have more native friends than first-generation migrants (Martinović, 2013) and are more likely to live in less segregated neighbourhoods (Denton & Massey, 1988; Freeman, 2000). Because of their relatively increased contact with natives, they probably have less contact with new immigrants. This could be especially true for third-generation migrants. Therefore, the contact theory supports the idea that later generations of migrants will have less positive attitudes towards immigration than earlier generations (Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3). Hence, the contact theory endorses the expectations held for the results by the social distance concept, not only when it comes to the effect of a migration background in general, but also with respect to the effects of the different generations. Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses.

4. Data and Variables

The analyses presented in this article utilise pooled data from the 2008 to 2016 biennial rounds of the GSS, collected mostly via personal interviews by the independent research organisation NORC at the University of Chicago (Smith et al., 2018). The data set, a nationally representative sample of 11,446 respondents, was chosen as it contains information on the respondents' attitude towards immigration and all information necessary to identify three different generations of migrants. However, since 35% of respondents did not answer the attitude question, the following analyses will all use the subsample of 7,362 respondents between the ages of 18 and 88 who provided an answer to this question. While the respondents participating in the 2010 round were slightly more likely to answer the question, there are no systematic differences in the socio-demographic characteristics between those who answered the question and those who did not.

To measure the *attitude* towards immigration (dependent variable), a well-established question used by several other researchers in the past (e.g., Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006) was applied: Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be: (1) increased a lot, (2) increased a little, (3) remain the same, (4) reduced a little, or (5) reduced a lot. A higher response on this question indicated a less positive attitude towards immigration. Additionally, robustness checks with different groupings of the five categories were run, all yielding very similar results to the ones presented below.

The general *migration background* was defined as a binary variable, which had the value 1 if the respondent had a migration background and the value 0 otherwise. Only respondents classified as first-, second- or third-generation migrants according to the definitions below were coded as having a migration background. Migrants of later generations could not be identified in the data set and were therefore coded as members of the reference category "without a migration background." Additionally, I created a binary variable for each of the three migrant generation. It scored the value 1 if the respondent belonged to the specific generation and the value 0 otherwise.

A *first-generation* migrant was defined by being born outside of the US and having both parents also born abroad. This definition is in line with classifications used

Table 1. Summary of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1	Individuals with a migration background have more positive attitudes towards immigration compared to those without a migration background.
Hypothesis 2	Individuals with a first-generation migration background have more positive attitudes towards immigration than individuals with a second- or third-generation migration background.
Hypothesis 3	Individuals with a second-generation migration background have more positive attitudes towards immigration than third-generation migrants.

by many other researchers (e.g., Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010). The demarcation of the second generation, however, is not so unambiguous. While researchers agree that being born in the host country is a necessary requirement (Algan et al., 2010; Bauer & Riphahn, 2007; Jensen & Chitose, 1994), there is a disagreement as to whether both parents (Algan et al., 2010; Dustmann, Frattini, & Lanzara, 2012) or only one parent (Alba, Logan, Lutz, & Stults, 2002; Bauer & Riphahn, 2007; Jensen & Chitose, 1994) has to be born abroad in order to be classified as a second-generation migrant. The latter, slightly more common approach is the one applied here. Only those who were born within the US and have at least one parent who was born outside the US were categorised as *second-generation* migrants. As there has only been limited research on third-generation migrants, a common definition remains to be determined. But researchers agree that in order to be a *third-generation* migrant, both parents as well as the respondent him- or herself need to be born in the host country (so in this case within the US), and the grandparents need to be born abroad (e.g., Alba et al., 2002; Hammarstedt, 2009). The number of grandparents born outside the host country necessary is again debatable. Alba et al. (2002) as well as Hammarstedt (2009) declared one foreign-born grandparent to be sufficient for this classification. This definition is also used here, as it guarantees that, by the definition presented above, at least one parent is a second-generation migrant.

Besides the migration background, another migration-related aspect was operationalised: the origin. It is possible that migrants with different roots have different opinions on immigration. Here *North American*, *European*, *African*, *Asian*, and *Spanish-speaking South and Middle American* roots were distinguished and integrated as binary variables (details reported in Table A1 in the Appendix). Respondents with a migration background which could not be attributed to any of these groups formed the "*Other Origin*" category. Respondents without a migration background, as described above, were coded 0 on all origin variables even though they might have foreign roots when looking more than three generations back. Because some of the origin categories are underrepresented there will be analyses with and without them.

In addition to the variables linked to the migration background, further variables, such as personal characteristics and socio-economic background, were included. One factor which has repeatedly been associated with attitudes towards immigration is age, with older people showing more negative attitudes (Bridges & Mateut, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Therefore, *age* in years was included into the analyses as well as gender, whose effects are disputed (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Here, the binary variable *male*, equalling 1 for males and 0 for females, was used. Also, a binary variable describing the respondents' race was included, since previous research

indicated that race might influence the attitude towards immigration (Diamond, 1998). This effect was captured by the variable *non-white*, which equalled 1 for respondents identifying as a race other than white and 0 for respondents identifying as white. Another important aspect to include was the respondents' education, since a positive effect of education on pro-immigrant attitudes has been found by various researchers (e.g., Bridges & Mateut, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hindriks et al., 2014). *Education* was measured by the highest year of school completed. This included completed years of college and university. Also related to the concept of income and work, labour force status was considered. Even though unemployment did not have a significant effect in other studies (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006), binary variables measuring the participation in the labour force were included. Respondents who were temporarily not working or unemployed were defined as *unemployed* (1) while all others were assigned the value 0. Similarly, binary variables for *inactive* (in education, retired, and homemakers) respondents and for respondents coded as "*other labour force status*" in the GSS were included. The reference category persisted of those who reported a part- or full-time employment status. Class could not be included into the analyses due to the fact that those inactive in the labour market largely displayed missings on the class variables. However, additional analyses on a subsample of the employed and unemployed respondents showed similar results to those presented below when including class in the form of ISCO-08 coding. Detailed information on these analyses can be obtained from the author upon request.

Lastly, four binary variables indicating the year of data collection (2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016) were added to the analyses. In each case, the respondents who participated in the respective year received a score of 1, while all other respondents were assigned the value 0. The reference category will be all respondents who participated in 2008. Including these variables will ensure that time trends as well as potential political changes are accounted for.

Detailed information on all variables, their operationalisation as well as some descriptive statistics can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix.

5. Results

The average respondent was 47.94 years old and completed 13.60 years of education. With 55%, the slight majority was female. Three-quarters of the respondents identified as white. Besides that, most respondents ($n = 4,358$) were working part- or full-time. A migration background was reported by 38% of respondents of which the majority was classified as third-generation migrants. Almost half of those with a migration background named a European country as their place of origin (48%).

Analyses revealed that 24% of respondents indicated support of the notion that immigration to the US should

be reduced “a lot,” 23% thought it should be reduced “a little” and the category endorsed most often (38%) was the “remain the same” category. Only 10% of respondents thought that immigration should be increased “a little” and even fewer (5%) that it should be increased “a lot.”

Figure 1 indicates that there are substantial differences in the attitudes towards immigration between respondents with and without a migration background as well as between the different migrant generations. Out of the respondents without a migration background 27% shared the notion that immigration should be “reduced a lot.” This response was given by approximately the same number of third-generation migrants (25%), but only 6% of first-generation migrants. Generally, it appears that with each successive generation, the attitude towards immigration became increasingly less positive (i.e., more negative), with the attitude of the third generation approaching that of respondents with no migration background.

In order to test whether and to what extent these differences are significant and hold after controlling for aspects of the migration history as well as socio-economic factors, I applied ordered logit regressions across four models. Detailed information regarding each models’ sample composition in relation to the respondents’ migration background can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix.

Model 1 describes the influence of the general migration background on the attitudes towards immigration under the consideration of all socio-demographic variables and year dummies described above. The migration background had a significant negative effect, indicating that those with a migration background were less likely to think that immigration into the US should be reduced “a lot” and were more likely to support the notion that immigration should be increased “a lot.” Whereas gender and labour force status had no significant effects, the likelihood for negative attitudes towards immigration in-

creased with age and decreased with education and the identification as non-white. Additionally, a time trend towards more positive attitudes was found.

In Model 2, I substituted the general migration background for the specific origins of the migrants, this allowed for the different ethnic groups of migrants to be compared to those without a migration background. The results indicate that migrants, regardless of origin, were less likely to support the view that immigration should be reduced “a lot.” This being said, there were significant differences among the views of those with a migration background: Those of North American and African origin showed the most positive attitude towards immigration while those of European origin show the least positive. Concerning the socio-demographic variables as well as the years of data collection, the results appear to be similar to those found for Model 1.

Overall, these results support Hypothesis 1, indicating that individuals with a migration background have more positive attitudes towards immigration compared to their counterparts without a migration background. When comparing the two models, both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) support the model differentiating between the migrants’ ethnic groups (Model 2) over the model without the origin aspects (Model 1).

The next step was to analyse and compare the effects of the different migration generations on the attitude towards immigration. Here, I estimated a model similar to Model 1, exchanging the general migration background for the three generation variables (Model 3). Additionally, I ran a model in which both the three generations as well as the various origins were considered (Model 4).

In Model 3, all three migrant generations exerted a significant effect on the attitude towards immigration, showing that all three generations had more favourable attitudes towards immigration than those without a migration background. However, t-tests comparing the co-




Figure 1. Attitudes towards immigration by migrant generation in percentage points.

Table 2. Ordered logit models with general migration background and separate migration generations.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Migration Background	-0.58*** (-12.84)			
First-generation			-1.28*** (-17.55)	-0.72* (-2.34)
Second-generation			-0.50*** (-6.39)	-0.01 (-0.03)
Third-generation			-0.20*** (-3.39)	0.21 (0.73)
North American		-1.25*** (-13.81)		-0.95*** (-3.07)
European		-0.27*** (-4.55)		-0.32 (-1.08)
African		-1.32*** (-5.87)		-0.86* (-2.30)
Asian		-0.88*** (-6.78)		-0.42 (-1.29)
Spanish-speaking South and Middle American		-0.97*** (-7.51)		-0.52 (-1.60)
Other Origin		-0.55** (-3.18)		-0.25 (-0.74)
Age	0.01*** (8.32)	0.01*** (6.31)	0.01*** (7.51)	0.01*** (6.70)
Male	-0.06 (-1.42)	-0.06 (-1.38)	-0.07 (-1.51)	-0.07 (-1.48)
Non-White	-0.59*** (-11.29)	-0.42*** (-7.24)	-0.42*** (-7.76)	-0.40*** (-6.78)
Education	-0.08*** (-10.27)	-0.09*** (-11.38)	-0.09*** (-11.77)	-0.10*** (-12.11)
Unemployed	0.06 (0.68)	-0.01 (-0.08)	0.02 (0.18)	-0.02 (-0.26)
Inactive	-0.09 (-1.64)	-0.09 (-1.66)	-0.10 (-1.90)	-0.10 (-1.89)
Other Labour Force Status	0.20 (1.42)	0.10 (0.74)	0.13 (0.96)	0.05 (0.38)
2010	-0.21** (-2.89)	-0.21** (-2.82)	-0.23** (-3.12)	-0.22** (-3.00)
2012	-0.28*** (-3.77)	-0.27*** (-3.60)	-0.29*** (-3.89)	-0.28*** (-3.62)
2014	-0.35*** (-4.97)	-0.32*** (-4.40)	-0.35*** (-5.00)	-0.33*** (-4.53)
2016	-0.51*** (-7.51)	-0.48*** (-6.93)	-0.52*** (-7.55)	-0.49*** (-7.02)
Number of observations	6949	6662	6921	6640
Log likelihood	-9623.84	-9157.54	-9504.28	-9083.79
AIC	19279.68	18357.08	19044.56	18215.57
BIC	19389.22	18499.97	19167.72	18378.79
Chi value: t-test first and second generation			64.27***	48.86***
Chi value: t-test second and third generation			10.85***	4.90*
Chi value: t-test first and third generation			154.59***	80.57***

Notes: *t* statistics in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

efficients revealed that the effects differed significantly in strength. The more generations ago the family came to the US, the more likely the claim that immigration to the US should be reduced “a lot” is supported. These findings support Hypotheses 2 and 3.

However, when additionally introducing the origin variables into the analyses (Model 4), the results changed. Whereas in comparison to those without a migration background, first-generation migrants still had a lower probability of expressing that immigration into the United States should be reduced “a lot,” the effect for the second and third generation appeared to be no longer significant, indicating that second- and third-generation migrants do not differ from the general population in their attitudes towards immigration.

The coefficient comparison for Model 4 again revealed that the effect for the first generation was significantly more negative than the effects for the second and third generation. Further, and only at the 5% level, it appeared that the coefficient for the second generation was more negative than the one for the third generation. The latter being the only migration aspect throughout the analyses indicating that those with a migration background could have more negative attitudes than the general population. While the difference between the two coefficients appeared to be significant, it has to be kept in mind that neither of the two generations differed significantly from those without a migration background.

Interestingly, the results also revealed that those with a North American or African migration background were significantly less likely to support the strong reduction of immigration. All other origins did not have a significant effect on the attitude when simultaneously controlling for the migrant generation. Concerning all other control variables, similar effects to those in Model 1 and Model 2 were found in both models analysing migrant generations.

Both the AIC and the BIC endorse the usage of the full Model 4 over the restricted Model 3. The results support both Hypothesis 2, postulating that first-generation migrants have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than second- and third-generation migrants, and Hypothesis 3, which expected respondents with a second-generation migration background to have more positive attitudes towards immigration than those with a third-generation background. However, even though Hypothesis 3 did find empirical support, it is important to point out that neither second- nor third-generation migrants differed from the general population in their attitudes when control variables for the migrants’ origins were included in the analyses.

6. Conclusion

The literature review and the theories suggested that migrants’ attitudes towards immigration can be expected to be more positive than the attitudes toward immigration of the general population. Further, they led to the

expectation that later generations of migrants will have less positive attitudes towards immigration than earlier generations. The analyses revealed strong support for Hypothesis 1, showing that respondents with a migration background, no matter their origin, were more likely to favour increasing the number of migrants into the US. Similarly, Hypothesis 2 found corroboration. Individuals belonging to the first generation showed more positive attitudes towards immigration in comparison to second- and third-generation migrants. The results further revealed that the attitudes of second-generation migrants were more positive than the attitudes of the third generation. It should be noted, however, that under the consideration of migrants’ origins, neither of the two generations differed significantly from those without a migration background. This might be because second- and third-generation migrants are well integrated into the society and, hence, have adopted the natives’ attitudes and values.

One aspect that was not considered in the present study but could still be of great relevance is whether and to what extent respondents have contact to persons with migration backgrounds. As the contact theory describes, interaction with members of a certain group should, under the right situational conditions, positively influence the attitude towards this group (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Therefore, the inclusion of a variable measuring the contact to migrants could show whether the attitude differences between individuals with and without a migration background and the different generations could partly or maybe even fully be attributed to the contact. Due to considerable limitations of the present data, however, such an approach was not possible here.

Besides the contact to migrants, the definition of the migration background and specifically of the different generations might influence the results as well. Here, the most common operationalisations were used, but other definitions could be justified as well. Especially for the third generation, little research exists, and multiple different definitions are conceivable. Future studies could examine in what way the different definitions influence the results, as it is possible that more restrictive definitions, for example, requiring more than one parent or grandparent to be born abroad, lead to stronger effects. Such an enquiry was beyond the scope of this article.

Not only would it be interesting to test different operationalisations of the migrant generations, the choice of the dependent variable should also be discussed. The analyses presented here measured attitudes towards immigration by asking respondents for their views on the number of immigrants that should be allowed to enter the country. This question is highly related to immigration policy. Attitudes towards immigration, however, are multi-faceted, covering much more than policy aspects alone. Hence, other questions and measurements, such as whether immigrants make countries more liveable (European Social Survey, 2018) or whether the respondents feel their culture or society is threatened by immi-

gration (de Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp, & Monden, 2010; ISSP Research Group, 2015), could be used as well.

In conclusion, there are still many unresolved difficulties in researching immigrants' attitudes towards immigration which require further attention. Yet despite the many aspects future research needs to consider, the migration background seems to be a relevant characteristic when explaining immigration attitudes: Having a migration background influences the formation of positive attitudes towards other immigrants. Therefore, migrants' opinions on immigration should not be disregarded but rather taken into account, particularly in countries with a high share of people with migration backgrounds.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Appendix

Table A1. Details on the family origin.

Region (used in the analyses)	Categories in the GSS
North American	French Canada, Other Canada, Mexico
European	Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England & Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Belgium, Other European
African	Africa
Asian	China, Japan, Philippines, India, Other Asian
Spanish-speaking South and Middle American	Puerto Rico, West Indies, Other Spanish
Other Origin	Arabic, Non-Spanish West Indies, Other

Table A2. Variables used in the analyses and descriptive statistics.

Variable	Operationalisation	Min	Max	M	SD	Further Information; Percentages
Dependent Variable						
Attitude	5 categories from increase immigration to America a lot to reduce immigration a lot	1	5	3.51	1.10	1. Increased a lot: 5% 2. Increased a little: 10% 3. Remain the same: 38% 4. Reduced a little: 23 % 5. Reduced a lot: 24 %
Migration History						
Migration Background	= 1 if first-, second- or third-generation = 1; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.40	0.49	In total: 2,811 In percentage of the sample: 38%
First-generation	= 1 if respondent and both parents were born outside the US; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.11	0.32	In total: 835 In percentage of the sample: 11% In percentage of those with migration background: 30%
Second-generation	= 1 if respondent was born in US and at least one parent was born outside the US; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.09	0.29	In total: 672 In percentage of the sample: 9% In percentage of those with migration background: 24%
Third-generation	= 1 if respondent and both parents were born in the US and at least one grandparent outside the US; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.19	0.39	In total: 1,304 In percentage of the sample: 18% In percentage of those with migration background: 46%
Family Origin (further details see Appendix A1)						
North American	= 1 if migration background and North American family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.07	0.26	In total: 497 In percentage of the sample: 7% In percentage of those with migration background: 18%
European	= 1 if migration background and European family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.20	0.40	In total: 1,347 In percentage of the sample: 18% In percentage of those with migration background: 48%

Table A2. (Cont.) Variables used in the analyses and descriptive statistics.

Variable	Operationalisation	Min	Max	M	SD	Further Information; Percentages
African	= 1 if migration background and African family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.01	0.10	In total: 76 In percentage of the sample: 1% In percentage of those with migration background: 3%
Asian	= 1 if migration background and Asian family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.03	0.18	In total: 231 In percentage of the sample: 3% In percentage of those with migration background: 8%
Spanish-speaking South and Middle American	= 1 if migration background and Spanish Speaking South- or Middle-American family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.03	0.18	In total: 217 In percentage of the sample: 3% In percentage of those with migration background: 8%
Other Origin	= 1 if migration background and "other" family origin; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.02	0.13	In total: 111 In percentage of the sample: 2% In percentage of those with migration background: 4%
Socio-economic Background						
Age	In years	18	88	47.94	17.32	
Male	= 1 if male; 0 if female	0	1	0.45	0.50	In total: 3,323 In percentage of the sample: 45%
Non-White	= 1 if identifies as a race other than white; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.25	0.43	In total: 1,841 In percentage of the sample: 25%
Education	= highest year of school completed	0	20	13.60	2.98	
Unemployed	= 1 if temporarily not working or unemployed; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.07	0.25	In total: 503 In percentage of the sample: 7%
Inactive	= 1 if retired, housekeeping or currently in education; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.31	0.46	In total: 2,283 In percentage of the sample: 31%
Other Labour Force Status	= 1 if labour force status is coded as other in GSS; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.29	0.17	In total: 212 In percentage of the sample: 3%
Year of Data Collection						
2010	= 1 if respondent participated in 2010; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.19	0.39	In total: 1,381 In percentage of the sample: 19%
2012	= 1 if respondent participated in 2012; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.17	0.38	In total: 1,255 In percentage of the sample: 17%
2014	= 1 if respondent participated in 2014; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.22	0.41	In total: 1,611 In percentage of the sample: 22%
2016	= 1 if respondent participated in 2016; 0 otherwise	0	1	0.25	0.43	In total: 1,829 In percentage of the sample: 25%

Table A3. Compositions of the samples used in the four models.

Migration status	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
No migration background	4,155	4,155	4,155	4,155
First-generation	830	809	822	801
Second-generation	670	606	650	592
Third-generation	1,294	1,092	1,294	1,092
Total	6,949	6,662	6,921	6,640

Article

Feeling Blue by Extension: Intrafamily Transmission and Economic Pressures Explain the Native-Immigrant Gap in Well-Being among Youth in Switzerland

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Abstract

Several factors explain the native-immigrant gap in well-being frequently found among adolescents and young adults. First, discrimination and integration challenges impact the psychological health of immigrants of all ages. Though rarely studied, low parental well-being is transmitted thereby also deteriorating youth well-being. Second, individuals with an immigrant background generally endure economic pressures to a greater extent than natives, which impact children through a lower parental well-being independently of origins. These factors—intrafamily transmission of negative affect and economic pressures—have been mostly studied separately (and only rarely for the former). Combining the two, the present study uses Swiss Household Panel data to examine the extent to which immigrant background and economic pressures relate to well-being of adolescents and young adults through the negative affect experienced by their mothers and fathers. In Switzerland, young people with an immigrant background—both immigrants and dual citizens—reported being more anxious, sad and depressed than natives. Path models showed that young people with foreign roots were more likely to live in a household that experienced economic pressures, which, in turn, related to impaired parental (mothers and fathers alike) well-being and finally their own. An immigrant background, economic pressures and parental well-being were also independently related to young people’s negative affect, highlighting the complexity of the factors underlying the well-known immigrant–native gap in well-being.

Keywords

economic pressure; health; immigration; parental transmission; Swiss Household Panel; well-being

Issue

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1. Introduction

1.1. *The Immigrant–Native Gap in Subjective Well-Being*

Compared to national citizens with no foreign roots (hereafter, natives), individuals with an immigrant background in Europe have been repeatedly found to report poorer subjective well-being; that is, they tend to express less positive (e.g., happiness, elation, contentment) and more negative (e.g., sadness, depression, anxiety) affects (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Indeed, recent cross-national studies showed that immigrants are less satisfied with life (Arpino & de Valk, 2018; Heizmann & Böhnke, 2019) and express more depressive symptoms than natives (Levecque & van Rossem, 2015; Missinne & Bracke, 2012; for supporting single-country evidence see, for instance, Bengi-Arslan, Verhulst, van der Ende, & Erol, 1997; Levecque, Lodewyckx, & Bracke, 2009). These studies further revealed that the gap in subjective well-being is wider when comparing natives and first-generation immigrants, compared to second-generation immigrants. Thus, individuals with a longer history or stronger ties with the receiving country appear to fare better in terms of well-being, which echoes a meta-analysis showing positive links between biculturalism, and psychological and socio-cultural adjustment (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). It is likely that more recent immigrants experience higher levels of discrimination and face greater integration challenges (e.g., Ford, 2011; Havekes, Uunk, & Gijssberts, 2011), which are known to partly explain the immigrant–native gap in subjective well-being (e.g., Oppedal, Røysamb, & Sam, 2004; Özbek, Bongers, Lobbestaël, & van Nieuwenhuizen, 2015; Schunck, Reiss, & Razum, 2015). Lower social capital (e.g., less opportunities for meeting friends and participating in social activities on a regular basis) also explains why first-generation immigrants report lower subjective well-being than second-generation immigrants and natives (Arpino & de Valk, 2018).

The immigrant–native gap in subjective well-being has been observed across all age categories, including early stages of life (for a review see Stevens & Vollebergh, 2008). Thus, adolescents and young adults with an immigrant background suffer from a double disadvantage: Not only are they likely to suffer from discrimination and integration challenges themselves, but they may also have to navigate early transitions into adulthood—e.g., finding their first job, finding their (first) partner—with the support of parents who do not have the same resources and social capital as native parents. Generally, parents' psychological health impacts the well-being of offspring. A meta-analysis revealed that the presence of psychological issues in mothers (vs. in fathers) had a slightly greater impact on their children's negative affect (e.g., depressed mood, anxiety), especially among young children (Connell & Goodman, 2002; see also Pilowsky et al., 2014). More specifically regarding minority families, previous studies looking at the US showed that be-

longing to a racial minority group affects the well-being of children and adolescents, not only directly but also indirectly, through a lower parental well-being (Anderson et al., 2015; Hou, Kim, Hazen, & Benner, 2017). Despite the established relationships between the mental health of parents and their offspring, few studies—and to our knowledge none in Europe—have examined the extent to which the emotional well-being of adolescents and young people with an immigrant background is related to that of their parents (e.g., among Latinos in the US, see Aisenberg, Trickett, Mennen, Saltzman, & Zayas, 2007; for immigrants in Israel, see Walsh, Harel-Fisch, & Fogel-Grinvald, 2010).

Uniting research on both the immigrant–native gap in subjective well-being and parental transmission of mental health issues, we expect that the lower subjective well-being (e.g., higher levels of negative affects such as anxiety and sadness) reported by adolescents and young adults in families with an immigrant background (compared to native families) is partly due to their parents' low well-being. Findings of previous studies suggest that the gap should be wider among individuals with a more recent immigration history or weaker ties with the receiving country. Yet immigrant background is intertwined with socioeconomic status. As described in the next section, economic hardships and pressure indeed impact children's well-being through the well-being of their parents, independently of individuals' national origin (e.g., Conger & Conger, 2002).

1.2. *The Interplay between Immigrant Background and Socio-Economic Status*

The Family Stress Model (FSM; Conger & Conger, 2002; Conger, Conger, & Martin, 2010) has been developed to explain how economic hardship and pressures lead to child and adolescent maladjustment through parents' psychological distress and interparental relationship issues. According to the model, research should take into account both objective socio-economic indicators (e.g., being below the poverty line) and “day-to-day strains and hassles that unstable economic conditions create for families such as difficulty paying bills or being unable to purchase basic necessities” (Masarik & Conger, 2017, p. 86). Economic pressures have been found to relate to a greater distress among parents (e.g., Landers-Potts et al., 2015; Ponnet, 2014). Lower parental subjective well-being then impairs the well-being of children (Zhang, 2014) and adolescents (White, Liu, Nair, & Tein, 2015) through disruptions in parenting (e.g., an increase in harshness and/or a decrease in warmth). Economic pressures and parental distress have long term impacts: When experienced during childhood, they have long lasting effects on individuals' well-being throughout both adolescence (Sobolewski & Amato, 2005) and adulthood (Kavanaugh, Nepl, & Melby, 2018).

While the FSM was developed to account for the effect of economic pressures on children's and adolescents'

well-being, its reasoning “also applies to various environmental stressors” (Masarik & Conger, 2017, p. 85). Therefore, the present research investigates how having an immigrant background and enduring economic pressures jointly affect the well-being of adolescents and young adults. Indeed, low socio-economic status constitutes an additional explanation of the immigrant-native gap in subjective well-being, on top of discrimination and integration challenges. A large-scale study conducted in the Netherlands for instance showed that lower life satisfaction reported by respondents of Turkish and Moroccan origin (aged between 14 and 45) was almost fully explained by economic pressures and a low level of social capital (de Vroome & Hooghe, 2014; for a similar study including several European countries see also de Vroome & Hooghe, 2015). Thus, it is likely that, within families with an immigrant background, economic pressures generate negative affect among parents, which further relates to impaired well-being among their children. We test this indirect route from immigrant background to well-being. While immigration may result in having a lower socio-economic status than natives, the two factors may also interact. In a study conducted among Latino children in the US, the highest levels of internalizing disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression etc.) were indeed found among those whose parents reported immigration-related stress (e.g., discrimination) and economic pressures (Mendoza, Dmitrieva, Perreira, Hurwich-Reiss, & Watamura, 2017). For this reason, the interaction between immigrant background and living in a household with a lower socio-economic status will be explored, too. The possible relationships between having an immigrant background, experiencing economic pressures and the subjective well-being of parents and their offspring are summarized in Figure 1.

2. The Present Study

The hypotheses developed in the present article were tested in Switzerland, a country with one of the highest proportion of immigrants in Europe. In 2018, 25.1% of the resident population did not possess Swiss citizenship (Swiss Federal Statistical Office [SFSO], 2019b), which is partly explained by restrictive naturalization policies (Helbling, 2010). Most immigrants come from Western and Southern Europe (the most represented national groups are Italians, Germans, Portuguese and

French). According to a recent representative Swiss survey (SFSO, 2019a), 24% of the population declared having suffered from discrimination during the previous five years. The majority of the cases (58%) was related to respondents’ nationality. Some groups appear to be less tolerated, such as immigrants from Muslim countries, Africa and Former Yugoslavia (Rapp, 2015; Stolz, 2005). Overall, immigrants are more likely to be poor than Swiss citizens (8.5% vs. 7%). The proportion rises to 9.4% for first-generation immigrants, while second-generation immigrants (4.6%) fare better than national citizens (SFSO, 2019f). Finally, the employment rate of natives and individuals with an immigrant background varies across genders. First-generation immigrant men are more likely to be employed (90.1%) than second-generation immigrants (86.7%) and natives (88.1%). By way of contrast, the employment share of native women (81.8%) is higher than that of first (74.7%) and second-generation (80.9%) immigrant women. When immigrants work, they work longer hours (SFSO, 2019e; note that these statistics do not concern asylum seekers and refugees).

Immigrants’ health has been found to be worse in Switzerland and other European assimilationist countries than in countries endorsing multicultural policies (Malmusi, 2015). Analyzing a set of Swiss laws and practices, from the wearing of Islamic veils by school teachers to TV programs, Giugni and Passy (2004, p. 62) indeed found that “the general policy is one of denial of the difference of ethnic groups in favour of allegiance to the norms and values of the host society.” In addition, as in other European countries, first-generation immigrants in Switzerland report worse general health than national citizens (79.6% declared being in good health vs. 84.9% of Swiss citizens). The best health was reported by immigrants’ children, or the so-called “second generation” (88.5%; SFSO, 2019c). Similarly, dual citizens (at birth or naturalized early in life) reported better health than immigrants or those who obtained the national citizenship later in life (Potarca & Bernardi, 2018). The pattern is slightly different when looking at immigrants’ subjective well-being. Among individuals aged 65 or more from Spain, Portugal and Italy, Bolzman and Vagni (2018) found that both immigrants and naturalized immigrants have a poorer psychological health than Swiss natives. Echoing these results, a greater proportion of foreign (44.5%) and Swiss born (41.6%) immigrants compared to Swiss citizens born in the country (32.8%) report feeling




Figure 1. Hypothesized direct and indirect relationships between living in a family with an immigrant background and adolescents’ and young adults’ own subjective well-being (indicated as SWB).

lonely (SFSO, 2019d). A community survey conducted in the canton of Zurich among adolescents however found that immigrants reported being depressed and anxious to a greater extent than both natives and dual citizens (no difference between the two groups; Steinhausen, Bearth-Carrari, & Metzke, 2009). Studies based on nationally representative data have yet to be conducted to investigate the factors underlying the subjective well-being of adolescents and young adults with and without an immigrant background.

3. Method

3.1. Data

Analyses were carried out on the most recent available wave of the Swiss household Panel (Wave 17, from fieldwork done between September 2017 and March 2018). Data of the standard sample were complemented with an additional sample for the canton of Vaud (13.22% of the final sample), which overrepresented low-income households. This is all the more important since immigrants, and in particular those in precarious economic conditions, usually tend to be underrepresented in Swiss large-scale surveys (Laganà, Elcheroth, Penic, Kleiner, & Fasel, 2013). Using data from a household panel gives a unique insight on intra-family dynamics, since both parents and children were invited to report their subjective well-being.

3.2. Sample

We selected data from young people aged from 15 to 30 ($M = 19.97$, $SD = 3.67$), who lived with at least one of their parents and who filled the individual questionnaire ($N = 1'354$; 51.40% female). About two thirds of the sample (66.99%) had only Swiss citizenship, 26.81% were dual citizens and 6.20% were foreigners (subsamples' descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1). The most represented countries of origin were Italy ($N = 112$), France ($N = 80$), Germany ($N = 39$), former Yugoslavian countries and Albania (together, $N = 33$) and Portugal ($N = 25$). The great majority of respondents was born

in Switzerland (93.94%) and had as first language the dominant language in the linguistic region of residence (94.39%). Three quarters of the sample (76.41%) reported being students.

Around three quarters of the respondents lived with both their parents (76.22%), while 19.05% lived with their mother only and 4.73% lived with their father only. Altogether, data were available for 897 mothers (67.89% Swiss, 20.51% dual citizens, and 11.59% foreigners) and 774 fathers (70.80% Swiss, 16.02% dual citizens, and 13.18% foreigners). Most mothers reported working part-time (64.96%), while 12.83% worked full time and 22.21% reported another occupation. Differences were found according to mothers' origins. Immigrant mothers (19.23%) or with dual citizenship (19.13%) were more likely to work full time than native mothers (9.85%), while a greater percentage of the latter worked part time (69.95%; immigrants: 44.23%, dual citizens: 60.11%). By way of contrast, most fathers reported working full-time (73.95%). This rate was higher for natives (80.29%) and dual citizens (84.68%) than for immigrant fathers (69.91%). 44.15% mothers and 57.75% fathers had a high school or higher diploma respectively. Again, this share varied across groups. Both mothers (58.15%) and fathers (64.52%) with dual citizenship had at least a high school diploma than natives (mothers: 40.89%, fathers: 59.49%) and immigrants (mothers: 38.46%, fathers: 40.20%). Finally, a minority of households (11.51%) were below the poverty line (i.e., their disposable income was below 60% of the median value; note that missing income values were imputed). Economic pressures (measured with low satisfaction with household income; from 0 = completely satisfied to 10 = not at all satisfied) were on average low ($M = 2.84$, $SD = 2.24$).

3.3. Scores of Subjective Well-Being

Respondents' subjective well-being was measured with two items:

1. How frequently do you experience the following emotions, if 0 means "never" and 10 "always"? (1) sadness and (2) anxiety;

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the three subsamples (means and standard deviations are provided for continuous variables).

	Natives	First-generation	Second-generation
Age	19.99 (3.67)	19.85 (3.58)	20.27 (4.08)
% female	50.06%	54.27%	53.57%
% born in Switzerland	98.79%	89.53%	60.71%
% dominant local language	97.46%	92.01%	71.43%
% in education	75.39%	80.11%	71.43%
% below poverty line	11.14%	9.64%	33.33%
% live with both parents	78.50%	68.87%	83.33%
Negative affect (SWB)	2.71 (1.53)	3.36 (1.68)	3.47 (2.01)

Note: SWB stands for subjective well-being.

- Do you often have negative feelings such as having the blues, being desperate, suffering from anxiety or depression, if 0 means “never” and 10 “always”? ($\alpha = .74$; $M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.64$).

The same items were used to estimate mothers’ ($\alpha = .78$; $M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.80$) and fathers’ ($\alpha = .77$; $M = 2.63$, $SD = 1.65$) subjective well-being.

3.4. Analytical Strategy

Multilevel path models accounting for adolescents and young adults being nested within households were performed with Mplus 8.3. Indeed, a significant portion of the variance of respondents’ subjective well-being (31.9%; $\sigma^2_{\text{household}} = 0.86$, $SE = 0.15$, $p < .001$) was due to the household structure of the data, which calls for multilevel analyses. Because around a quarter of the respondents lived with one parent only, separate models were performed for mothers and fathers. Respondents’ citizenship status (Swiss vs. dual citizen; Swiss vs. foreigner) was used as proxy for “household with an immigrant background.” However, a share of respondents did not report the same citizenship status (e.g., they are dual citizens and their parent is a foreigner) as their mother (18.61%) or father (30.58%). To ensure that mixed households did not stand out, whether young people shared or not a citizenship status with their parent was entered as a control variable in the model (along with its interaction with respondents’ citizenship status). Also note that, while previous research on immigrants’ well-being has typically compared individuals having migrated to the receiving country (first generation) to those born there (second generation; e.g., Arpino & de Valk, 2018; Levecque & van Rossem, 2015; Missinne & Bracke, 2012), the very low proportion of respondents born abroad did

not allow to use such a distinction in the current study. However, in a country where naturalization is a long and complicated process, dual citizenship can be considered an indicator of stronger ties with the host country.

Based on the FSM, low satisfaction with the household income was used as a measure of economic pressures and set as a predictor of parental well-being. Being below the poverty line, a measure of economic hardships, was treated as a control variable. Other control variables included: respondents’ age, gender (1 = female), and occupation (1 = in education); parental occupation (mother: working full-time vs. part-time and working full-time vs. other; father: working full-time vs. other), educational attainment (both parents: 1 = high school diploma or higher), and presence of the other parent in the household. Both indirect and direct paths from nationality status to young people’s subjective well-being were estimated (see Figure 1).

4. Results

Results are presented in Table 2 (mothers) and Table 3 (fathers). Preliminary (and unrepresented) analyses showed that interactions between respondents’ and parents’ citizenship status, or citizenship status and economic pressures, had no significant impact. For this reason, these interaction terms were not included in the final models. Both final models were found to fit the data adequately (mothers: $\chi^2(6) = 14.86$, $p = .02$, $CFI = .977$, $RMSEA = .03$; fathers: $\chi^2(6) = 8.09$, $p = .23$, $CFI = .993$, $RMSEA = .02$; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Most results are similar when considering maternal and paternal variables.

In line with previous research, young immigrants reported lower well-being than Swiss natives of the same age group (see first section, or the first column of both Table 2 and Table 3). The native-immigrant gap emerged

Table 2. Results of path model (respondents and their mothers).

	SWB		Parental SWB		Economic pressures	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Swiss vs.						
Foreigners	0.45***	0.12	0.44**	0.16	0.77***	0.18
Dual citizens	0.54*	0.24	0.28	0.27	1.04**	0.31
Same citizenship as parent	-0.09	0.14	-0.17	0.21	-0.30	0.22
Age	0.03*	0.01				
Female	0.86***	0.09				
In education	0.31**	0.12				
Economic pressures	0.06*	0.02	0.21***	0.04		
Below poverty	0.12	0.17	0.25	0.26	1.65***	0.31
Parental SWB	0.16***	0.03				
Other parent in HH	-0.13	0.13	-0.08	0.17	-0.10***	0.19
Full time vs.						
Part time	0.10	0.16	-0.18	0.21	-0.05	0.21
Other occupation	0.17	0.18	-0.06	0.25	0.74**	0.26
Parental education	0.01	0.10	-0.03	0.13	-0.49***	0.15

Notes: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$; SWB stands for subjective well-being, HH for household.

Table 3. Results of path model (respondents and their fathers).

	SWB		Parental SWB		Economic pressures	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Swiss vs.						
Foreigners	0.37***	0.13	0.48*	0.20	0.68**	0.24
Dual citizens	0.29	0.24	1.04***	0.24	0.86*	0.35
Same citizenship as parent	-0.16	0.14	-0.10	0.21	-0.42	0.27
Age	0.04**	0.01				
Female	0.87***	0.09				
In education	0.33**	0.12				
Economic pressures	0.07	0.03	0.16***	0.04		
Below poverty	0.08	0.18	0.31	0.27	1.82***	0.36
Parental SWB	0.19***	0.04				
Other parent in HH	-0.27	0.23	0.09	0.27	-0.28	0.36
Full time vs. other	-0.08	0.12	0.07	0.17	-0.09	0.18
Parental education	0.02	0.10	-0.17	0.14	-0.67***	0.17

Notes: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$; SWB stands for subjective well-being, HH for household.

even when parental well-being, economic pressures and control variables were considered, which suggests that intrafamily dynamics and economics did not fully explain the lower well-being expressed by immigrants. The difference between Swiss natives and dual citizens was significant only in the model including variables from the mothers' side. In both cases however, females, older respondents and those still in education reported a lower well-being. In addition, despite not directly hypothesizing the interaction between gender and origins, additional analyses revealed that the gender gap in subjective well-being was wider among dual citizens and immigrants (although present in all groups), but this only in the model including mothers (results available upon request).

Turning to parental well-being (see second column of both Table 1 and Table 2), parents of young immigrants were found to report more negative affect than parents of young natives. As explained above, this result emerged no matter whether the parents shared their children's citizenship status or not. The difference between dual citizens and Swiss natives was significant only when fathers were considered. No other variable (with the exception of economic pressures) had any significant effect on parental well-being. Importantly and as hypothesized in the present study, the lower the parental well-being (mothers and fathers alike), the lower children's well-being (see Tables 2 and 3, third section of first column).

The role of economic pressures is now examined. Economic pressures were higher in households below the poverty line, when the father was not present, when the mother did not work ('other occupation' category), and when mothers and fathers had no high school diploma. Compared to native families, households in which young people with an immigrant background lived (both immigrants and dual citizens) were characterized by higher economic pressures. In line with findings from

the FSM, economic pressures impacted the well-being of both parents and their children.

Finally, indirect paths of the model (see Figure 1) from respondents' citizenship status to their reported well-being were examined. Considering either parents' well-being, the full FSM (i.e., immigrant background → economic pressures → parental well-being → young people's well-being) was found to be significant (immigrants vs. Swiss natives: $b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.03$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .003$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.02$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .03$; dual citizens vs. Swiss natives: $b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.04$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .009$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.03$, $SE = 0.01$, $p = .05$). It is thus (at least partially) through economic pressures and low parental well-being that young people with an immigrant background experienced more negative affect than native youth. However, economic pressures also impacted directly (i.e., not through a low parental well-being) the well-being of young people with an immigrant background more than natives (immigrants vs. Swiss natives: $b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.05$, $SE = 0.02$, $p = .02$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.05$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .06$; dual citizens vs. Swiss natives: $b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.06$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .04$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.06$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .06$; note that the effects were only marginally significant in the model including paternal variables, which had a slightly lower sample size). Finally, the gap between young immigrants and Swiss natives was also directly (i.e., *not* through economic pressures) explained by a low parental well-being ($b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.07$, $SE = 0.03$, $p = .02$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.09$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .03$), while the gap between dual citizens and Swiss natives was significant in the case of the fathers only ($b_{\text{mothers}} = 0.05$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .30$; $b_{\text{fathers}} = 0.19$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .002$).

5. Conclusion

Taking advantage of a panel survey that contained self-reported measures of well-being for two generations,

the present study examined the extent to which immigrant background and economic pressures affected the well-being of adolescents and young adults in Switzerland through the negative affects experienced by their parents. Confirming previous research on the topic (e.g., Levecque & van Rossem, 2015; Missinne & Bracke, 2012), in the Swiss context too adolescents and young adults with an immigrant background—both foreigners and dual citizens—reported being more anxious, sad and depressed than natives. Path models showed that young people with foreign roots were more likely to live in a household that experienced economic pressures, which, in a turn, impacted their parents' (mothers and fathers alike) well-being and their own. Having an immigrant background, experiencing economic pressures, and parents' well-being were also found to independently affect young people's negative affects.

5.1. *The Two Routes to Immigrants' Lower Well-Being*

Adolescents and young people who have an immigrant background suffer from a double burden: On the one hand, as individuals with foreign roots, they are likely to have first-hand experiences of discrimination (that impact individuals' well-being to a greater extent than simply knowing that one's group is discriminated against; see Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014); on the other hand, very likely their own parents have also personally suffered from discrimination. While unfortunately the survey used did not contain measures of perceived discrimination, the results of the present study suggest this double disadvantage. First, even when economic variables, parental well-being, and other factors known to impact individuals' well-being were taken into account, a gap in anxiety, sadness and depression between immigrant and native young people remained. This hints to possible personal experiences of discrimination and issues with integration. The fact that we did not find a significant interaction with the parents' citizenship status further suggests that young people's own citizenship status explains part of their well-being (for instance, natives with an immigrant or dual citizen parent did not appear to differ in well-being from a native with native parents). This pattern appeared in a survey where most respondents with an immigrant background came from countries neighboring Switzerland: They, or their (grand)parents, most likely immigrated voluntarily (unlike refugees for instance). We can thus assume that the gap should be even greater if immigrant groups that usually face stronger discrimination (such as those from more geographically distant and culturally different countries, e.g., Rapp, 2015; Stolz, 2005) were surveyed.

Findings regarding parents' well-being also support the assumption that the worse psychological health often reported by immigrants and dual citizens is not entirely due to poorer economic circumstances (e.g., on the role played by discrimination see Schunck et al., 2015), even though a lower satisfaction with the household fi-

ancial situation (and other vulnerability related factors on the mother's side) did predict a lower parental well-being. Still our results indicate that economic conditions are an integral part of the story, and that any study on the native-immigrant gap should include measures of economic hardships and pressures. While second generation immigrants are less likely to be poor than natives (SFSO, 2019f), a low satisfaction with the household income was found in the present study to partly explain, beyond being above vs. below the poverty line, why young people with an immigrant background (the great majority of them being born in Switzerland) report a lower well-being than natives. Both immigrants and dual citizens appeared to be affected. Within families with foreign roots, economic pressures had a double impact: directly on the well-being of the young people, but also through their parents. This result highlights the role played by economic pressures (day-to-day hassles), which, according to the FSM, have to be distinguished from economic hardships (i.e., being poor). All in all, these findings highlight the complexity of the factors underlying the well-known immigrant-native gap in well-being and psychological health.

5.2. *Maternal and Paternal Influences*

Maternal psychological health issues are generally found to have a slightly greater impact on young children's internalizing symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depression), which is explained by mothers spending on average more time with babies and toddlers (for a meta-analysis see Connell & Goodman, 2002). This should be even more marked in countries such as Switzerland where there is no paternity leave, and where most women switch to part-time work after the birth of the first child (le Goff & Levy, 2016). The results of the present study, however, showed that maternal and paternal (low levels of) well-being had an equally strong impact on adolescents and young adults (independently of their origins). The next step in future research should be to investigate how the well-being of parents of young people with an immigrant background interact, since research on within-family transmission of psychological health issues have shown that having both parents with poor mental health is an aggravating factor (e.g., Kahn, Brandt, & Whitaker, 2004; Meadows, McLanahan, & Brooks-Gunn, 2007).

Differences between mothers and fathers did emerge in the factors underlying economic pressures, though. While in both cases lower educational achievements were related to a lower satisfaction with household income, other factors appeared to make mothers more vulnerable: not being in employment (which was the case for hardly any father) and when the father did not live in the household. In Switzerland there are few work-family reconciliation policies and mothers generally work part time, which makes lone mothers with no or low employment particularly vulnerable. Also using data from the Swiss Household data, Struffolino, Bernardi,

and Voorpostel (2016) showed that lone mothers suffer from poorer health than partnered mothers, a tendency which is aggravated in the case of low employment. Altogether, this suggests that lone mothers with an immigrant background cumulate disadvantages that are likely to affect the well-being of their children.

Confirming previous research conducted in Europe, the present study showed that adolescents and young adults with an immigrant background report lower well-being than native young people of the same age. A lower well-being at early stages of life can have life-long consequences, for example through lower educational achievement. Low well-being in middle school has for instance been related to lower attendance and low grades over time (Suldo, Thalji, & Ferron, 2011). Policies that prevent children with an immigrant background from cumulating spiraling disadvantages from early in life should thus be implemented.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

In Search of the Healthy Immigrant Effect in Four West European Countries

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Abstract

The present research examines whether the ‘healthy immigrant effect’ thesis observed in the American context prevails also in the West European context. According to this thesis, immigrants are likely to be healthier than comparable native-born. Data for the analysis are obtained from the Generations and Gender Survey for the following countries: Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Ordered logit regression models are estimated to compare the health of immigrants with the native-born population. The findings reveal that in all countries, immigrants tend to report poorer health than comparable third generation native-born Europeans, and that health disparities between second and third generation are smaller than health disparities between first-generation members and native-born regardless of second- or third-generation membership. The findings in the West-European countries do not lend support to the healthy immigrant effect. We attribute the differences between the United States and the West European countries to differential selection processes and differences in healthcare policies.

Keywords

comparative health; generation studies; healthy immigrant effect; immigrants; United States; Western Europe

Issue

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1. Introduction

Scholars have long observed that immigrants in the United States and in other traditional immigrant societies (i.e., Canada and Australia) tend to be healthier than comparable native-born populations (Cunningham, Ruben, & Narayan, 2008; Goldman et al., 2014; McDonald & Kennedy, 2004). Immigrants’ health advantage is most evident shortly after arrival, but the health of immigrants tends to converge with that of the native-born with the passage of time (McDonald & Kennedy, 2004; Ronellenfitsch & Razum, 2004). The health of chil-

dren of immigrants (i.e., second generation) is likely to be poorer than that of the first-generation and to converge with that of the third generation (and beyond) the native-born (Singh & Siahpush, 2002). The patterns of health disparities that were observed in the United States (and other immigrant societies such as Australia and Canada) are referred to in the literature as ‘the healthy immigrant effect’ (or ‘the Hispanic paradox’ in the case of Mexican immigrants; Kennedy, McDonald, & Biddle, 2006). Surprisingly, however, whereas the literature on the healthy immigrant effect in the United States has become substantial, relatively little is known

on health disparities between immigrants and natives in Europe (for notable exceptions see Darmon & Khlal, 2001; Razum, Zeeb, Akgün, & Yilmaz, 1998). Indeed, it is not clear from previous studies whether the differences across nations are a result of nation-specific characteristics (of the host country or the country of origin). For example, it is not clear whether and to what extent differences between the context of country of origin and the context of country of destination (e.g., level of economic resources and accessibility to quality healthcare services) affects the size of the disparities between immigrants and the native-born. Using data from four national samples, we aim to evaluate whether the healthy immigrant effect that has been observed in the United States prevails in four Western European countries, Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, or whether it is dependent on the unique conditions associated with differences between country of origin and country of destination.

2. Previous Research

2.1. Explaining the Healthy Immigrant Effect

Two alternative—but by no means contradictory—explanations have been advanced in the literature for understanding why first-generation immigrants tend to be healthier than the native-born population. The first focuses on positive self-selection of immigrants. According to the ‘selection hypothesis,’ the health advantage of first-generation immigrants is attributed to positive health selection whereby healthier (vs. unhealthy) chose to migrate. Therefore, immigrants are likely to be, on average, healthier than the population of the country of origin and often healthier than the population of the host country (e.g., Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, & Smith, 2004; Martinez, Aguayo-Tellez, & Rangel-Gonzalez, 2015).

The positive health selection hypothesis was repeatedly supported in the context of American society by a large number of studies for various groups of immigrants. For example, positive health selection (according to which immigrants are healthier than comparable native-born) was observed for Hispanics (e.g., Martinez et al., 2015), for Asians and Pacific Islanders (e.g., Frisbie, Cho, & Hummer, 2001), and for immigrants from the former Soviet Union (Mehta & Elo, 2012). Likewise, Singh and Siahpush (2002) found that risk for all causes of mortality and specific causes of mortality, morbidity, and health problems is lower among immigrants (belonging to various ethnic groups) than among comparable native-born citizens. Akresh and Frank (2008) found that self-reported health is higher among immigrants than among the native-born both in the United States and in country of origin (except for the case of refugees).

The second explanation for the better health of immigrants that was advanced in the literature is known as the ‘salmon bias’ effect (e.g., Abraído-Lanza, Dohrenwend, Ng-Mak, & Turner, 1999; Lu & Qin, 2014; Martinez et al.,

2015). This explanation should not be viewed as contradictory to the ‘positive health selection hypothesis’ but rather as complementary. The logic embodied in the salmon bias thesis contends that immigrants with poorer health are more likely than healthy immigrants to return to country of origin. It should be noted, however, that the body of research that examined the salmon bias effect is much smaller than the research on the positive selection effect. In addition, the body of research on salmon bias effect has focused almost exclusively on Latino immigrants in the United States (Palloni & Arias, 2004) mostly due to difficulties in tracking returning immigrants and in obtaining high quality reliable data in a wide-ranging number of countries. It should be noted, however, that most studies on the issue have provided, in one way or another, some support for the salmon effect (Riosmena, Wong, & Palloni, 2013; Turra & Elo, 2008).

Recently, in a systematic and detailed analysis of data on Mexican returnee migrants between 2005 and 2012, Arenas, Goldman, Pebley, and Teruel (2015) found that health of returnee immigrants is significantly poorer than that of stayers even after controlling for a variety of potential covariates including demographic characteristics, economic status, family ties, and characteristics of origin and destination. Yet despite the general support for the salmon-bias hypothesis, several researchers have questioned its impact on the overall better health of immigrants. For example, it was argued that the salmon bias cannot account for the lower mortality rates among Cubans and Puerto Ricans in the United States (Abraído-Lanza et al., 1999) or Turks and other international immigrants in Germany (Razum et al., 1998; Wallace & Kulu, 2014).

The evidence for the impact of generational status on health among immigrants and their offspring is quite limited, mostly due to the small number of studies on the topic (Acevedo-Garcia, Bates, Osypuk, & McArdle, 2010). The few existing studies, however, reveal meaningful differences between first- and second-generation immigrants (Guendelman & Abrams, 1995; Guendelman, Gould, Hudes, & Eskenazi, 1990). These studies show that first-generation (foreign-born) immigrants, despite the deterioration in their general health prospects over time, still enjoy better health than native-born populations (Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2010). The second generation (native-born offspring of immigrants) and the 1.5-generation (foreign-born immigrants who migrated to the host country at a young age) are more likely to narrow the health-gap with the native population (i.e., third generation native-born children of native-born parents; see Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2010). For example, Guendelman et al., (1990) observed generational differences in low birthweight among women of Mexican origin with first-generation having a much smaller rate of low birthweight than second-generation immigrants. In another study, Guendelman and Abrams (1995) pointed out that as compared to the second

generation, first-generation Mexican women stand a markedly lower risk of eating poor dietary food. The nutrient intake of second-generation women resembles that of white non-Hispanic women. Apparently, the few studies, particularly in the United States, that compared the first and second generation suggest that health of first-generation immigrants tends to be better than that of second-generation immigrants and of that of other native-born populations.

2.2. Immigration and Health Outside the United States

The overwhelming majority of research on the healthy immigrant effect has focused on American society. Yet the few studies that focused health disparities between immigrants and native-born population in traditional immigrant societies other than the United States (i.e., Canada and Australia) lend general support to the healthy immigrant effect thesis. For example, researchers observed that recently arrived immigrants in Canada and Australia are less likely to be diagnosed with chronic conditions than comparable native-born citizens (Biddle, Kennedy, & McDonald, 2007; McDonald & Kennedy, 2004). They also observed that health disparities between the immigrant and the native-born populations tend to decline with the passage of time in the host country (Biddle et al., 2007; McDonald & Kennedy, 2004). Indeed, patterns of health disparities that were detected in Canada and Australia are highly similar to those observed in the United States and in line with the healthy immigrant effect thesis.

Additional support for the positive health selection of immigrants was recently provided by Kennedy, Kidd, McDonald, and Biddle (2015) who utilized data from four major immigrant recipient countries: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The researchers compared the health of immigrants with that of their compatriots who have no intention to immigrate. The findings revealed that the health of immigrants was better than that of those who stayed in the home country. Indeed, the body of research on the topic lends firm support to the positive health selection thesis revealing that when compared to native-born citizens, first-generation immigrants not only have substantially lower risks of smoking, drinking, obesity, hypertension, and chronic diseases but also a lower risk of mortality from almost all causes of death (Kennedy et al., 2015).

In Israel, however, where immigration (of Jewish people) is not restricted and where the criterion for admission is based on ancestry (and not on other criteria such as age, professional skills, or health), the findings differ sharply from those reported in the United States, Canada, or Australia. Research on recent immigrants in Israel refer to the 'sick immigrant effect' and reveal that illnesses, such as ischemic heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, chronic diseases, limiting symptoms, and self-reported (poor) health are significantly more abundant among immigrants than among comparable native-

born Israelis (e.g., Constant, García-Muñoz, Neuman, & Neuman, 2015). Indeed, these findings suggest that immigration policies as well as restrictions and regulations associated with immigration policies might affect selection of immigrants into host societies and their health.

2.3. Immigration and Health in European Countries

The body of research on health disparities between immigrants and the native-born population in European societies has also grown in recent years. The findings reported by studies in various European societies, however, are neither uniform nor conclusive and at times even contradictory (e.g., Boulogne, Jouglu, Breem, Kunst, & Rey, 2012; Darmon & Khlat, 2001; Guendelman et al., 1990; Razum & Rohrmann, 2002). In some European countries, immigrants were found to be healthier than the native-born but in others the native-born were found to be healthier than immigrants. More specifically, in France, for example, researchers detected the healthy immigrant effect (e.g., Boulogne et al., 2012; Darmon & Khlat, 2001; Guendelman et al., 1990) while observing lower mortality rates and a higher life expectancy among groups of foreign-born as compared to the native-born population. In Germany, a longitudinal study by Elkeles and Seifert (1996) revealed that the foreign-born population reported lower rates of chronic illness and long-term health problems than the working-age German population. Likewise, Razum and Rohrmann (2002) and Razum et al. (1998) reported a lower mortality risk and better health among immigrants of Mediterranean origins and among Turks as compared to native-born Germans. However, Ronellenfitsch and Razum (2004), who relied on health satisfaction as an indicator of health, found that young immigrants from Eastern Europe, despite their initial health advantage (compared to older immigrants and native-born Germans), have a high risk of deteriorating health (despite the improvement in socioeconomic status over the years). The results observed in Austria (Sardadvar, 2015) indicate that the health of immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia (and to a lesser extent from new member states of the EU or other parts of the world) is poorer than the health of native-born Austrians even after controlling for differences in socioeconomic status.

There are several plausible explanations as to why the findings for European countries may differ from the findings for the United States or from other traditional immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia. First, the healthcare system in the United States is much more expensive and less accessible than the health systems of most West European countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2016). Consequently, the average health of Europeans is considerably higher than the average health of US-Americans (Maskileyson, 2014; Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, & Maskileyson, 2013), and immigrants to European countries are less likely to be concerned with

health constraints when considering migration. Second, the visa policy in the United States is much more restrictive and the refusal rate for initial applications is higher as compared to Western Europe (OECD, 2019). Health criteria for admission of (documented) immigrants to the United States are much more rigid and restrictive than health criteria for admission to Western Europe. Regardless of their immigrant category, authorized immigrants are selected for entry into the United States based on their health conditions (CDC, 2014). In other words, different health considerations operate in the selection process of immigrants to the United States as compared to West European countries. Moreover, immigrants to Western Europe originate from countries that are substantially different from the countries of origin of immigrants to the United States (OECD, 2019). Whereas in the United States the main countries of immigrants' origin are Mexico (25%), India (6%), China (5%), in the four Western European countries under study, these are other European countries, Turkey, or Maghreb countries. Specifically, in the Netherlands, the main countries of birth of the immigrants are Turkey (9%), Suriname (8%), and Morocco (8%); in Germany these are Poland (13%), Turkey (10%), and Russia (8%); in Austria these are Germany (13%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10%), and Turkey (9%); and in France the countries are Algeria (17%), Morocco (12%), and Portugal (8%; OECD, 2019). In addition, the vast majority of the immigrants in the United States consists of family reunification immigrants (72.9%), whereas only 5.8% are labor migrants and 13% humanitarian migrants (OECD, 2019). In the four European countries in this study, the large share of the immigrant population consists of immigrants benefitting from free mobility (e.g., 61.4% in the Netherlands, 58.8% in Germany). That is to say, in contrast to the United States, in Europe, immigrants enjoy extensive rights to free movement. Comparatively, a much lower share of immigrants in Western Europe immigrate due to family reunification reasons (e.g., 13.4% in Germany, and only 9.7% in Austria). The share of labor migrants in these four countries ranges from 5.1% (in Austria) to 12.7% (in the Netherlands), a proportion that is, on average, higher than in the United States (OECD, 2019).

In the present article we address the following two major questions: First, whether and to what extent do patterns of health disparity between immigrants and the native-born population vary by generational status (first, second, and third and higher generations)? Second, whether and to what extent do economic conditions in the country of origin affect health disparities between immigrants and the native-born population? In the current study, due to data limitations, we examine subjective health disparities between natives and immigrants. Subjective health has been shown to be a powerful predictor of life expectancy and to correlate positively with objective health (Williams, Pham-Kanter, & Leitsch, 2009). In terms of these questions, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: We expect first-generation immigrants to have comparable or worse subjective health than second- and third-generation immigrants in the four West European countries under the study.

Hypothesis 2: We expect economic conditions in the immigrant's country of origin to affect the subjective health between immigrants and natives. Specifically, with better economic conditions in country of origin, smaller subjective health disparities are expected between immigrants and native-born citizens. Immigrants who arrived from countries with better economic conditions are expected to display better subjective health levels as compared to immigrants from countries with worse economic conditions.

3. Data, Variables, and Method

3.1. Data

Data for the analysis were obtained from wave 1 of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGG) collected in 2002–2009 (United Nations, 2005). The GGS (n.d.) database represents a three-wave panel study conducted at three-year time intervals across 19 developed countries. The GGS contains information about a range of issues including fertility decision making, combining employment and parenthood, intergenerational solidarity, retirement, migration, and health. The target population in a country is the resident non-institutionalized population aged 18 to 79 years at the time of the first wave. A probability sampling procedure was applied in all countries. The exact method used was allowed to vary across countries based on the availability and cost-effectiveness of different sampling frames (for details about sampling strategy in each country, see Fokkema, Kveder, Hiekel, Emery, & Liefbroer, 2016). We restricted the analysis to countries with at least 300 first-generation immigrants aged 26 years and older (in Austria, the maximum age of the collected data is 45). The four countries included in the study that met the criteria are Austria (3,892), France (8,731), Germany (8,052), and the Netherlands (7,219). The total number of cases for the analysis amount to 27,894 individuals.

The response rates in four selected countries were as follows: Austria—64.6%, Germany—55.4%, the Netherlands—44.6%, and France—66.8% (Fokkema et al., 2016). Higher non-response rate in the Netherlands might be partly explained by the fact that the Dutch GGS was conceived as a multi-person survey, and some respondents may have refused cooperation in advance because they did not want to involve multiple family members (Fokkema et al., 2016). Generally, however, the response rates in the GGS are found to be comparable to those in other cross-national surveys (Fokkema et al., 2016).

3.2. Variables

The dependent variable used in the analysis is respondents' self-reported perceived general health. The original variable included five categories. Due to the very small number of cases in the categories 'bad' and 'very bad' they were combined into one category 'fair health and below.' Health status was recoded into three ordinal categories: 'very good health,' 'good health,' and 'fair health and below.' We rely on a single indicator of subjective health because no objective measures of health were available in the data set. It should be noted, however, that a series of studies have repeatedly demonstrated that subjective and objective indicators of health are highly interrelated and that subjective indicators of health can be viewed as valid and reliable measures of health status (Ferraro & Farmer, 1999; Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; Østbye et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2009).

To capture differences in generational and nativity status, we included a set of dummy variables classifying respondents according to place of birth of both respondents and their parents: *First-generation* pertains to immigrants not born in the country (hereafter FG); *second-generation* pertains to individuals who were born in the country but with at least one parent who is a foreign-born (hereafter SG). *Third generation and beyond* and *native-born* include individuals born in the country with both parents born in the country (hereafter TG). In the multivariate analysis, TG serves as a benchmark category. Notably, data on *the years since migration* variable were not available for the Netherlands. Therefore, to maintain comparability of the models across countries, we did not include it in the analysis of the other three countries. It should be noted, however, that the present analysis is not concerned with testing 'bad assimilation,' but with differences in subjective health across natives and different generations of immigrants. A robustness test of the models in the three countries, Austria, France, and Germany, which included the number of years since migration in the models provided similar results and can be obtained from the first author upon request.

A series of sociodemographic variables are used as control variables. Three levels of educational achievement were distinguished using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012), and a dummy variable was created for distinguishing between *secondary education not completed* (hereinafter, low education) and *academic education* (hereinafter, high education). The second variable, *intermediate education* (completed secondary or post-secondary non-academic), is the comparison group. The control variables that are relevant for health include: *age of respondent* (in years), *gender* (male = 1 vs. female = 0), *labor force status* (with dummy variables indicating whether unemployed = 1, professional, technician or manager = 1; clerk; blue-collar worker = 1 vs. not in the labor force = 0), *household size* (number of persons), *marital status* (married = 1 vs.

never married, divorced and widowed = 0), and *area of residence* (urban area = 1 vs. peripheral and rural areas = 0). Previous studies have shown that health is worse among older, less educated, unemployed, not married, and non-urban individuals and persons of lower socioeconomic standing (Eikemo, Bambra, Joyce, & Dahl, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2013). To capture contextual differences stemming from socioeconomic conditions in the country of origin, we used each country's PPP-adjusted gross national income (GNI) per capita of 2014 measured in rank points given by the World Bank (with higher values of GNI implying a higher rank; for more information see World Bank Group, 2014). See Table A1 in the Annex for a complete list of variable names and measurements.

3.3. Method

The analysis is organized as follows. First, we provide descriptive statistics characterizing patterns of immigrant subjective health disparities across generations by country of destination. Second, we conduct multivariate ordered logit regression analysis to examine whether health disparities hold when taking into consideration variations in socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents and as well as socioeconomic status of countries of origin (as measured by GNI). This part of the analysis is divided into two subsections: (1) country-specific ordered regression models predicting reported health by country of destination; and (2) ordered regression predicting good general health status by pooling the four countries into one pooled sample. The ordered logit regression model predicts the odds of being in good health as a function of individual-level characteristics plus GNI of country origin characteristics. The model can be represented by the following equation:

$$\ln \left[\frac{p(y \leq j)}{p(y > j)} \right] = \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_k X_k \text{ for } j = 1 \text{ to } j = j - 1$$

Where $\ln [p(y \leq j)/p(y > j)]$ is the natural logarithm of the probability of belonging to a certain category (j) or lower category of health status, divided by the probability of belonging to the higher category of health status. In other words, it is the natural logarithm of the probability that person has very good health, as opposed to the probability that he/she does not have good health. α_j β_{0j} is the intercept, whereas X_k are independent variables representing personal characteristics. β_k β_{Aj} are the vectors of the coefficients.

In model 1, health is taken as a function of FG and SG (as compared to TG) plus age. In model 2, we include a set of sociodemographic attributes as control variables on health. The GNI of immigrant's country of origin was introduced into model 3 as an indicator of economic and social conditions to which immigrants were exposed when growing up. The GNI of immigrant's country of origin was included in this model as an interaction term to estimate the impact of country of origin on health

disparities between FG and the native-born population (both SG and TG). GNI of country of birth was centered around the sample mean to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between country of origin and FG. To provide further affirmation of the country-specific findings, we conducted an additional analysis with all four countries pooled into one data set.

4. Analysis and Findings

Figure 1 displays the health differences of the population by generation and by country. The data reveal both cross-country variations and similarities. Generally speaking, subjective health is highest in the Netherlands where over 80% of TG reported good health. In Austria, the high level of good health (90% among TG) might reflect the young age of the Austrian sample (the upper age limit to participate in the GGS in Austria is 45 years). France and Germany are characterized by lower levels of good health in comparison to both the Netherlands and Austria. In all countries, except for Germany, the proportion of FG immigrants who report good health is lower than the proportions reported by SG or TG. In Germany, FG is more likely to report good health than TG native Germans and SG reports similar health to TG native-born.

The findings reveal that patterns of health disparities between FG and TG in France, Austria, and the Netherlands are not in line with expectations derived from the healthy immigrant effect thesis and are drastically different from the pattern observed in the United States: In the three countries, health of FG immigrants is poorer than that of TG. Only in Germany do FG immigrants report better health than TG (but this is a result of age differentials, as will be shown later). The findings with regard to SG are less consistent. In Germany and Austria, subjective health of SG seems to converge with that of TG, but in France SG reported better health than

TG, and in the Netherlands SG reported poorer subjective health than TG.

The four national samples differ not only in subjective health but also in sociodemographic characteristics. Table 1 displays characteristics of the population by generation and by country. FG immigrants are, on average, considerably younger than TG in Germany and the Netherlands but similar in age to TG in France and Austria. In all countries, TG natives are least likely to be unemployed while FG immigrants are most likely to be unemployed. Likewise, in all countries, FG immigrants are overrepresented in the low educational category as compared to both the SG and TG. However, in France, the proportion of FG who attained academic education is considerably lower than that of TG. By way of comparison, in all countries except Germany, SG has the highest proportion of persons with academic education. In addition, immigrants are more likely to reside in urban areas (except in the Netherlands) and to have larger families.

Although interesting, it is not clear whether differences in reported health across generations can be attributed to differences in sociodemographic attributes of individuals. Thus, in Table 2 we estimate a series of country-specific ordered regression equations predicting reported health. The data in Equation 1 (Table 2) reveal that, in all countries, net of age, health reported by first-generation immigrants is significantly lower than that of TG, as evidenced by the negative coefficient of the FG. In France, the Netherlands, and Austria, the negative coefficient of FG (observed in Equation 1) remains negative and statistically significant in models 2 and 3 (which include sociodemographic controls). In Germany, the FG coefficient is reduced to the level of statistical insignificance. This finding implies that in Germany, unlike the other countries, health differences between FG and TG Germans can be fully attributed to age and socioeconomic differences between the groups.




Figure 1. Percentage of individuals reporting to have good and very good general health by generation and by country.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics by country of destination and generation, 26 years of age and older.

Variables	Germany			France			Netherlands			Austria		
	First generation	Second generation	Third generation and above	First generation	Second generation	Third generation and above	First generation	Second generation	Third generation and above	First generation	Second generation	Third generation and above
Good and very good general health, %	74.10	71.40	71.40	65.70	77.90	72.70	73.30	77.70	80.80	83.50	90.30	90.30
Age of respondent, mean (SD)*	43.97 (12.37)	44.44 (13.33)	51.20 (14.55)	51.10 (13.69)	45.23 (14.49)	50.29 (14.85)	43.44 (12.32)	49.00 (15.21)	49.18 (14.32)	36.37 (5.76)	36.66 (5.74)	36.45 (6.03)
Male, %	53.10	50.60	48.30	55.50	47.70	46.00	50.00	50.00	45.60	44.90	44.00	47.80
Lower education, %	32.80	13.30	11.70	46.50	28.40	33.60	42.80	32.80	36.40	22.90	12.30	7.10
Academic education, %	13.70	24.40	24.90	25.30	32.00	24.80	31.50	34.40	33.60	18.70	25.60	21.40
Unemployed, %	11.90	13.70	6.70	10.70	8.80	5.30	8.70	4.30	2.50	6.90	2.20	2.70
Professionals, technicians, and managers, %	2.00	11.30	11.20	16.20	30.70	23.30	26.90	34.10	37.60	24.70	46.20	39.30
Clerks, %	17.20	31.60	30.30	7.60	13.70	13.70	12.30	11.90	11.20	20.50	27.10	26.00
Blue collar occupations, %	42.60	17.80	13.00	23.30	18.20	18.50	16.90	8.90	9.10	29.70	19.10	24.10
Household size including respondent, mean (SD)	3.32 (1.45)	2.62 (1.30)	2.44 (1.24)	3.01 (1.56)	2.73 (1.40)	2.58 (1.26)	3.05 (1.70)	2.33 (1.28)	2.57 (1.37)	3.24 (1.40)	2.94 (1.38)	3.05 (1.40)
Married, %	80.90	60.00	64.00	67.60	51.80	59.80	60.40	52.60	62.20	62.90	56.30	46.50
Lives in urban area, %	41.20	44.30	41.40	63.30	64.80	67.80	71.00	57.30	43.80	80.80	78.00	53.70
GNI rank of country of birth (higher value indicates higher rank), mean (SD)	141.67 (11.39)	–	–	140.26 (24.17)	–	–	127.25 (44.85)	–	–	125.35 (41.08)	–	–
GNI rank of country of destination (higher value indicates higher rank), mean (SD)	185.00 (0.00)	185.00 (0.00)	185.00 (0.00)	172.00 (0.00)	172.00 (0.00)	172.00 (0.00)	186.00 (0.00)	186.00 (0.00)	186.00 (0.00)	182.00 (0.00)	182.00 (0.00)	182.00 (0.00)
Observations (not weighted)	417	448	7,187	990	907	6,834	387	308	6,524	669	290	2,933

Notes: Mean coefficients; SD in parentheses; cases are weighted according to country-specific population weight; * In Austria, the maximum age of respondents is 46 years.

Table 2. Ordered regression predicting good general health status by country of destination (dependent variable is *self-perceived health*, 1–3, 3 = very good health).

Variables	Germany			France			Netherlands			Austria		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Generation^a												
First-generation (= 1)	-0.376** (0.092)	-0.121 (0.098)	0.086 (0.117)	-0.252** (0.061)	-0.185** (0.063)	-0.154* (0.064)	-0.602** (0.102)	-0.462** (0.104)	-0.410** (0.105)	-0.595** (0.077)	-0.467** (0.083)	-0.457** (0.084)
Second-generation (= 1)	-0.305** (0.094)	-0.243* (0.096)	-0.241* (0.096)	-0.046 (0.067)	-0.038 (0.067)	-0.036 (0.067)	-0.189 (0.114)	-0.151 (0.115)	-0.152 (0.115)	-0.159 (0.121)	-0.179 (0.124)	-0.180 (0.124)
Age	-0.068** (0.002)	-0.061** (0.002)	-0.061** (0.002)	-0.050** (0.001)	-0.033** (0.002)	-0.033** (0.002)	-0.031** (0.002)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.072** (0.005)	-0.079** (0.006)	-0.079** (0.006)
Male ^b (= 1)	–	-0.055 (0.047)	-0.059 (0.047)	–	0.155** (0.043)	0.153** (0.043)	–	0.153** (0.049)	0.166** (0.049)	–	0.161* (0.068)	0.165* (0.068)
Education^c												
Lower education (= 1)	–	-0.555** (0.072)	-0.583** (0.073)	–	-0.363** (0.051)	-0.362** (0.051)	–	-0.278** (0.059)	-0.269** (0.059)	–	-0.390** (0.107)	-0.377** (0.108)
Academic education (= 1)	–	0.386** (0.056)	0.394** (0.056)	–	0.434** (0.059)	0.427** (0.059)	–	0.206** (0.060)	0.208** (0.060)	–	0.064 (0.083)	0.061 (0.083)
Labor force status^d												
Unemployed (= 1)	–	-0.389** (0.096)	-0.388** (0.096)	–	-0.129 (0.098)	-0.134 (0.098)	–	-0.069 (0.143)	-0.038 (0.144)	–	-0.738** (0.197)	-0.738** (0.197)
Professionals, technicians, and managers (= 1)	–	0.454** (0.086)	0.447** (0.086)	–	0.672** (0.072)	0.678** (0.073)	–	0.700** (0.068)	0.693** (0.068)	–	0.432** (0.121)	0.425** (0.121)
Clerks (= 1)	–	0.334** (0.065)	0.334** (0.065)	–	0.499** (0.079)	0.499** (0.079)	–	0.583** (0.083)	0.583** (0.083)	–	0.105 (0.122)	0.101 (0.122)
Blue collar (= 1)	–	0.271** (0.079)	0.268** (0.079)	–	0.392** (0.072)	0.402** (0.072)	–	0.569** (0.092)	0.564** (0.092)	–	0.054 (0.125)	0.055 (0.125)
Household size	–	0.013 (0.022)	0.008 (0.022)	–	0.014 (0.019)	0.011 (0.019)	–	0.038 (0.021)	0.044* (0.021)	–	0.010 (0.027)	0.010 (0.027)
Married ^e (= 1)	–	0.011 (0.056)	0.012 (0.056)	–	0.119* (0.048)	0.122* (0.048)	–	0.254** (0.058)	0.253** (0.058)	–	0.216** (0.076)	0.221** (0.076)
Lives in urban area ^f (= 1)	–	0.129** (0.045)	0.120** (0.045)	–	0.094* (0.044)	0.098* (0.044)	–	-0.095* (0.047)	-0.089 (0.047)	–	-0.056 (0.069)	-0.050 (0.069)
GNI rank: country of birth (centered)*Generation 1	–	–	-0.026** (0.008)	–	–	-0.005* (0.002)	–	–	0.008** (0.002)	–	–	0.002 (0.002)

Table 2. (Cont.) Ordered regression predicting good general health status by country of destination (dependent variable is *self-perceived health*, 1–3, 3 = very good health).

Variables	Germany			France			Netherlands			Austria		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Constant ^g												
Bad Health	–4.585** (0.098)	–3.991** (0.157)	–4.016** (0.158)	–3.600** (0.084)	–2.255** (0.153)	–2.251** (0.153)	–3.001** (0.090)	–1.695** (0.150)	–1.684** (0.150)	–4.935** (0.211)	–4.873** (0.246)	–4.873** (0.246)
Good Health	–1.905** (0.083)	–1.234** (0.150)	–1.256** (0.150)	–1.233** (0.074)	0.217 (0.151)	0.222 (0.151)	–0.514** (0.081)	0.896** (0.149)	0.911** (0.149)	–2.849** (0.200)	–2.733** (0.237)	–2.732** (0.237)
Observations (non-weighted)	7,988	7,859	7,859	8,731	8,731	8,731	7,207	7,205	7,205	3,892	3,877	3,877
Pseudo R-squared	0.108	0.125	0.126	0.0672	0.0924	0.0927	0.0264	0.0507	0.0516	0.0318	0.0469	0.0471

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; two-tailed test; cases are weighted according to country-specific population weight; comparison categories: ^a Third generation and above = 0; ^b Female = 0; ^c Middle education = 0; ^d Not in the labor force = 0; ^e Not married = 0; ^f Lives in rural area = 0; ^g Very good health = 3.

The reported health of SG does not differ significantly from that reported by TG in all countries, with the exception of Germany. For this country, the negative and significant coefficient for second generation (in all equations) implies that, other things being equal, self-reported health of SG (those born and raised in Germany) is substantially lower than the self-reported health of TG. Apparently, when taking sociodemographic differences between sub-populations into consideration, the health reported by immigrants is significantly lower than the health reported by comparable natives.

Consistent with previous studies, the data show that health tends to decline with age and to rise with education and to be higher among married persons and lower among the unemployed and among those who are not economically active. Interestingly, the effect of gender on health is not consistent across countries. Whereas in Germany males are less likely to report good health, in France and in Austria males report better health than females, and in the Netherlands there are no health differences between the genders.

The GNI of immigrant's country of origin was introduced into model 3 as an indicator of economic conditions to which immigrants were exposed when growing up. It was included in the equation as an interaction term to estimate the impact of country of origin on health disparities between FG and the native-born population (both SG and TG). In Austria, GNI does not exert any net effect on health disparities. In the Netherlands, immigrants' health is likely to increase (or health disparities to decrease) with GNI of country of origin, but in Germany and France, health of FG (as compared to native-born) tends to decrease with GNI of country of origin (as evidenced by the negative coefficients). The differential effects of GNI of country of origin on health disparities between immigrants and native-born might be attributed to qualitative differences between countries that are not captured by GNI, especially differential compositions of the immigrant populations across countries (e.g., Russians and Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, Surinamese in the Netherlands, and Balkans and Turks in Austria). The differential effects of GNI across countries could also reflect variations in in country healthcare systems.

To provide further verification of the country-specific findings, we conducted an additional analysis with all four countries pooled into one data set. The pooled data analysis (results displayed in Table 3) corroborates the findings obtained in the country-specific analysis. The data suggest, rather clearly, that across the four countries, FG immigrants are less likely to report good health than TG natives. This is clearly evident by the negative coefficient for FG ($b = -0.349$). The data also show that reported good health among sons and daughters of immigrants (SG) is lower than TG even after taking sociodemographic differences (as indicated by the negative coefficient b for SG) into consideration. The data further reveal that health of all residents tends to rise with eco-

nomical conditions of the host country. The positive and significant effect of GNI of the host country ($b = 0.006$ in models 3 and 4) indicates that, other things being equal, health of all residents (both natives and immigrants) tends to rise with economic resources of the host country (which might be an indicator of quality of health-care services and facilities).

5. Discussion and Conclusion

We embarked on this research in order to examine whether the positive healthy immigrant effect that has been repeatedly observed in the American context (as well as in traditional immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia) prevails in the context of Western European countries. Specifically, we were interested in determining if immigrants to Western Europe are healthier than the comparable native-born populations or, in other words, if they are positively selected on the basis of health. We focused in our study on subjective rather than objective health. Analysis of data from four West European countries (i.e., Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Austria) unequivocally revealed that in all countries the subjective health reported by FG immigrants is significantly lower than the subjective health of the comparable native-born populations. Indeed, this finding contradicts the pattern observed in the United States and is an antithesis to the healthy immigrant effect hypothesis.

The multivariate analysis further reveals, in three of the four countries, that the health of sons and daughters of immigrants (i.e., SG who were born and raised in Europe) is better than the health of the comparable FG immigrants. However, health of the SG is still not as good as that of comparable TG native-born (those natives those natives with very distant or no immigration background). In other words, the subjective health of the offspring of immigrants is higher than that of their parents but still lower than TG natives. Apparently, West European host societies are likely to provide conditions that support attainment of good health for all residents (including the immigrant population but especially that of the native-born populations). The impact of economic resources of the country on health is manifested through the positive impact of GNI of the host country on health of all residents (both immigrants and natives). This finding is consistent with a large number of studies that repeatedly observed that health of the population tends to increase with country's economic resources (Semyonov et al., 2013; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2008). That is, rich countries are more likely to provide their populations with health services, medical facilities, and advanced treatment that improve the health of the population.

Curiously, whereas economic conditions in the host country affect the health of all persons residing in the country, whether immigrants or native-born, the economic conditions in an immigrant's country of origin (as captured by GNI of country of origin) do not exert any

Table 3. Ordered regression predicting good general subjective health status, pooled model (dependent variable is *self-perceived health*, 1–3, 3 = ‘very good health’).

VARIABLES	(1)	(1a)	(2)	(2a)	(3)	(4)
Generation ^a:						
First generation (= 1)	–0.349** (0.039)	–0.419** (0.039)	–0.235** (0.040)	–0.310** (0.040)	–0.226** (0.040)	–0.227** (0.040)
Second generation (= 1)	–0.156** (0.045)	–0.124** (0.045)	–0.133** (0.045)	–0.107* (0.046)	–0.118** (0.046)	–0.118** (0.046)
Age	–0.055** (0.001)	–0.050** (0.001)	–0.044** (0.001)	–0.039** (0.001)	–0.043** (0.001)	–0.043** (0.001)
Male ^b (= 1)	–	–	0.121** (0.024)	0.129** (0.024)	0.120** (0.024)	0.120** (0.024)
Education ^c:						
Lower education (= 1)	–	–	–0.284** (0.030)	–0.320** (0.032)	–0.276** (0.030)	–0.275** (0.030)
Academic education (= 1)	–	–	0.234** (0.030)	0.292** (0.030)	0.234** (0.030)	0.234** (0.030)
Labor force status ^d:						
Unemployed (= 1)	–	–	–0.393** (0.057)	–0.289** (0.058)	–0.388** (0.057)	–0.387** (0.057)
Professionals, technicians, and managers (= 1)	–	–	0.609** (0.038)	0.521** (0.039)	0.610** (0.038)	0.609** (0.038)
Clerks (= 1)	–	–	0.378** (0.038)	0.422** (0.039)	0.375** (0.038)	0.375** (0.038)
Blue collar (= 1)	–	–	0.290** (0.041)	0.302** (0.041)	0.299** (0.041)	0.298** (0.041)
Household size	–	–	0.028** (0.011)	0.018 (0.011)	0.030** (0.011)	0.031** (0.011)
Married ^e (= 1)	–	–	0.096** (0.028)	0.137** (0.028)	0.092** (0.028)	0.092** (0.028)
Lives in urban area ^f (= 1)	–	–	0.032 (0.023)	0.010 (0.024)	0.047* (0.024)	0.048* (0.024)
GNI rank: country of destination	–	–	–	–	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
GNI rank: country of birth (centered) * Generation 1	–	–	–	–	–	0.001 (0.001)
Country of destination ^g:						
France (= 1)	–	0.104** (0.030)	–	0.157** (0.032)	–	–
Netherlands (= 1)	–	0.331** (0.031)	–	0.353** (0.034)	–	–
Austria (= 1)	–	0.813** (0.040)	–	0.829** (0.041)	–	–
Constant ^h:						
Bad Health	–3.987** (0.048)	–3.548** (0.053)	–3.038** (0.080)	–2.594** (0.083)	–1.901** (0.375)	–1.884** (0.375)
Good Health	–1.579** (0.041)	–1.109** (0.048)	–0.554** (0.078)	–0.081 (0.082)	0.583 (0.374)	0.600 (0.375)
Observations (non-weighted)	27,818	27,672	27,818	27,672	27,672	27,672
Pseudo R-squared	0.0972	0.131	0.103	0.137	0.132	0.132

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; two-tailed test; cases are weighted according to country-specific population weight; comparison categories: ^a Third generation and above = 0; ^b Female = 0; ^c Middle education = 0; ^d Not in the labor force = 0; ^e Not married = 0; ^f Lives in rural area = 0; ^g Germany = 0; ^h Very good health = 3.

systematic impact on the size of the health disparities between immigrants and natives. In the Netherlands, immigrants' subjective health tends to increase with GNI of country of origin but the health of immigrants from advanced economies to France and Germany tends to be lower. Yet in Austria, the GNI of country of origin has no impact on health of immigrants. This is probably due to differential selection systems that operate in the sorting process of immigrants from a specific country of origin into a specific country of destination. Indeed, the selection process is influenced by the unique conditions associated with both country of origin and country of destination. Furthermore, the insignificant effect of the GNI of the country of origin on the subjective health of FG immigrants may also be attributed to the fact that most immigrants originated from poor countries, where better GNI values do not necessarily correspond in a systematic way with better health services. In addition, many of FG immigrants have lived for quite a long period of time in the countries of destination, and the current GNI of country of origin may not necessarily correspond with the GNI level at the time they had immigrated. Indeed, it is possible that in addition to 'healthy immigrants,' some immigrants are attracted to the good and accessible healthcare system in Western Europe, while some may arrive as refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, not only differences in patterns of positive health selection but also patterns of negative migration or return migration (i.e., salmon-bias effect) may differ considerably between the United States and West European countries.

In sum, the findings reported here reveal that the patterns of health disparities between immigrants and native-born in the four West European countries differ dramatically from those observed in the United States. Contrary to theoretical expectations (as derived from the healthy immigrant thesis), in all four countries immigrants are not healthier than the native-born populations. In fact, other things being equal, immigrants report lower subjective health than the native-born population in all four European countries. The difference can be attributed, first and foremost, to differences in immigrants' admission policies and differences in healthcare policies between the United States and Western Europe. The United States (and other traditional immigrant societies such as Canada and Australia) utilizes health status as one of the major criteria for (legal) admission of immigrants to the country (much more so than in Western Europe). In addition, in the United States, healthcare services are much more expensive and less accessible than the care facilities in most West European countries. Therefore, health considerations and health criteria play a much greater role in positive self-selection and in admission of immigrants into the United States than in Europe. The accessible health services in Europe may also result in healthier domestic populations (considerably healthier than the American population; Maskileyson, 2014). As a result, whereas an av-

erage immigrant in Europe is not healthier than the comparable average native-born European, the average immigrant to the United States is healthier than the average native-born American. It is possible, of course, that health disparities between immigrants and native-born Europeans would further increase due to the recent influx of refugees to Europe and the associated change in the composition of the foreign-born population; a possibility with implications that should be taken into consideration not only in future studies but also by policy makers.

Although this research has succeeded in achieving its aims, several limitations need to be borne in mind when interpreting our findings. First, whereas subjective health measures are good predictors of life expectancy and correlate with objective health measures, it remains to be answered whether and to what extent findings in these countries remain similar when objective health measures are used. Second, it is unclear whether the observed differences in self-perceived health within and across countries reflect true differences or whether they merely reflect cultural bias in the measures (Snowden, 2003). Indeed, most measures of health assessment have been initially developed and tested on samples comprised largely of culturally homogeneous groups (e.g., European-American populations with native English-speaking abilities). Consequently, subjective health questions translated into various languages may not be understood in the same way when applied to different cultures (Teresi, 2006). Specifically, measurement nonequivalence might lead to biased conclusions about similarities and differences in health measures of different groups within and across countries. Several recent studies demonstrated that evidence of the cultural equivalence of health-related measures is sparse (Grol-Prokopczyk, Verdes-Tennant, McEniry, & Ispány, 2015; Hardy, Acciai, & Reyes, 2014). Although subjective measures may generate a problem of comparability across countries (see Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014), using three broad categories of subjective health as done in the current study was likely to reduce this problem. In addition, since we have only a single measured indicator of health, we could not test its comparability across groups and countries. Third, the reason for migration can be another factor that has a differential impact of immigrants' health. Several studies confirm that forced migrants represent a disadvantaged group, not only in comparison to the native-born population, but also in comparison to other economic and non-economic immigrants (Hugo, Abbasi-Shavazi, & Kraly, 2017). Indeed, refugees tend to have less command of the local language, less educational experience, less access to family support, and poorer mental and physical health (Hugo et al., 2017). Unfortunately, individual-level indicators on refugee status were not available in the present data to examine the issue. Nevertheless, it should be noted that only about 1% of the FG and SG immigrants in the sample under study were from countries

with highly oppressive regimes (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan). In future research we would like to see the further examination of the reason for migration and the impact of refugee status on health. Likewise, we do hope that future investigations would benefit from the use of longitudinal and panel data analysis, and of multiple measures of subjective and objective health, in studying health disparities between native-born and immigrants in a comparable way. Despite the limitations of the data, however, the findings of the present research do underscore the importance of the host country and its unique context in the study of health disparities between immigrants and the native-born population across countries.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Annex
Table A1. Measurement and response categories of variables.

Variable	Measurement	Responses Range	
		Min	Max
General health status	Fair, bad, very bad = 1; Good = 2; Very good = 3	1	3
Generation	First generation = 1; Second generation = 1; Third generation and above = 0	0	1
Gender	Male = 1; Female = 0	0	1
Age of respondent	In years	26	82
Education	Lower education = 1; Academic education = 1; Middle education = 0	0	1
Labor force status	Unemployed = 1; Professionals, technicians, and managers = 1; Clerks = 1; Blue collar occupations = 1; Not in the labor force = 0	0	1
Household size including respondent	Number of persons	1	13
Marital status	Married = 1; Not married = 0	0	1
Area of living	Lives in urban area = 1; Lives in rural area = 0	0	1
Gross national income per capita, PPP, ranking of country of birth (World Bank Group, 2014)	In rank points, higher value indicates higher rank	1	200
Gross national income per capita, PPP, ranking of country of destination (World Bank Group, 2014)	In rank points, higher value indicates higher rank	172	186

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Article

Contacts between Natives and Migrants in Germany: Perceptions of the Native Population since 1980 and an Examination of the Contact Hypotheses

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Abstract

For decades, migration to Germany has been a relevant social phenomenon resulting in an increasing share of foreigners and Germans with migration background in the German populace. Additionally, since 2015, Germany has experienced a substantial increase in the immigration of people seeking refuge and asylum from civil war, economic and environmental catastrophes, and other adverse living conditions. These developments can be assumed to have led to an increase in intergroup contact between Germans and foreigners. We investigate this phenomenon in a multifaceted fashion by combining a social indicator and monitoring approach using repeated cross-sections over time with a new panel approach using a short-time panel to study causal relations. As a first step, we descriptively analyze the development of intergroup contact experiences of the German population with foreigners in various areas of life using data from the ALLBUS survey collected over 36 years between 1980 and 2016. Specifically, we detail the diverging contact experiences of participants with and without migration background as well as participants in the former Eastern and Western part of Germany. In a second step, based on Allport's intergroup contact theory that contact with outgroup members may improve attitudes towards these outgroups and other related findings, we examine the longitudinal processes between positive intergroup contact with foreigners and attitudes towards foreigners using four waves of the GESIS Panel collected over approximately one and a half years. We apply special rigor to these analyses by differentiating stable differences in intergroup contact experiences and attitudes between participants from within-person processes and discussing the implications of this differentiation.

Keywords

ALLBUS; foreigners; Germany; intergroup contact theory; migrant background; migration

Issue

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1. Introduction

Migration has been a constant topic of importance in the Federal Republic of Germany. With the onset of the

1950s, the influx of members of the German minority in other countries migrating back to Germany predominantly from Central and Eastern European countries began. This influx was comprised of descendants of emi-

grated Germans that had preserved the German culture and language after the Second World War and had dealt with hindrances and displacement. From 1950 to 2017, more than 4.5 million of these ethnic Germans migrated back to Germany, the majority doing so between 1985 and 2004 (Göttsche, 2018).

Since 1955, immigrants labelled as guest workers came to Western Germany in increasing numbers and from different countries (Alba, Schmidt, & Wasmer, 2003). For a long time, the official position of German governments had been that these guest workers would not stay in Germany permanently, as Germany was not regarded as an immigration country. Finally, in 2000, the law was changed and children born from non-German citizens became German by birth, but they had to decide at the age of 21 whether they wanted to hold the German citizenship or to hold the citizenship of the country of origin of their parents.

Due to the turbulent nature of countries with civil war, difficult economic situations, and vitriolic political circumstances, the number of displaced individuals heading to Europe in seek of refuge and asylum has risen dramatically since 2015. With millions of refugees having sought refuge in countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, and Jordan (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016)—and with no clear consensus being found among EU countries as to how to distribute the refugees fairly throughout Europe—the German government decided on a short-term strategy to deal with this crisis by opening their borders in 2015. According to the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees; 2019a), as a consequence, well over a million refugees came to Germany in the following years after this landmark decision, mostly being greeted with a positive reception from the German populace. However, political parties such as the Alternative for Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria came forward with warnings that such an influx of refugees threatened the safety of the Western lifestyle, particularly due to the increase in Muslims. This stance was furthered due to incidents such as the string of sexual assaults on New Year's Eve 2015–2016 in Cologne and terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State terrorists disguised as refugees.

To make matters more complex, the integration of migrants in Germany has been a persistent societal challenge (Alba et al., 2003; Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Heath et al., 2019), being characterized through legal frameworks, the social climate (Green, Visintin, & Sarrasin, 2018; Hadler & Flesken, 2018), and the experience of the majority population with migrants and vice versa (Kühnel & Leibold, 2000). However, one should not forget the role individual factors (e.g., demographic characteristics, prejudice, authoritarianism, social networks, racism) play in this process as well (Pfenning, 2019; Schmidt & Weick, 2017; Sola, 2018). Nonetheless, integration remains a process that happens largely through the interactions of members of different groups, or the

simple fact that Germans get into contact with migrants. Examining the effect of intergroup contact on attitudes towards the outgroup, as well as attitudes on contact, has a long tradition in the social sciences; however, the study into this could be improved with modern methodologies and a focus on how individuals with migrant backgrounds experience intergroup contact (if at all) with said groups.

Consequently, this article seeks to expand upon past research, which had used only cross-sectional data or short-time panels with small samples, by first examining where persons with German citizenship with varying migrant backgrounds might experience intergroup contact with foreigners living in Germany, and by examining how much contact these individuals have had over a time period of 20 years with migrants in various areas of life. Furthermore, this article will also shed light on the dispositions of the German majority towards foreigners as a minority group and the perception of intergroup contact between them. For this analysis, time-series data from 1980–2016 exists that allows for the examination of long-term social change.

Additionally, we will use large-scale short-time panel data to examine the interrelations of intergroup contact experiences and outgroup attitudes. This investigation will be advanced through the use of a newly proposed random-intercept-cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM; Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015), which allows for examining both the within-person effects and the between-person effects of intergroup contact and attitudes. Furthermore, it grants the opportunity for a comparison with the conventional CLPM to find differences between the models and their results.

In the following section, we first give a short overview of the theoretical state of the art and empirical research in this area. Then, in Study 1 (Section 3), we use data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) from 1980 to 2016 to examine the major differentiations between East and West Germany, the German and immigrant population, time points, and domains of contacts (GESIS, 2019a). Subsequently, we present the methods and the design of Study 2 (Section 4) employing data from the GESIS Panel and the comparison of classical autoregressive cross-lagged models with the newly proposed random-intercept CLPM differentiating between—and within—person effects. Finally, we summarize the results and present some conclusions.

2. Theory and Empirical Research

According to the contact hypothesis, association with individuals from other social groups tends to improve positions on, and respect for, said groups (Williams, 1947). Since its inception, the meaning of this hypothesis has been clarified by a number of works; in particular, Allport (1954) postulates that prejudice, when not deeply ingrained in the character structure, could be decreased through positive contacts between majority and minority groups. This hypothesis has been extensively supported by authors such as Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)

through meta-analysis; however, previous studies have also found that positive attitudes can facilitate positive experiences (Mallett, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008; Wagner, Schmidt, & Kauff, 2019).

As an extension of these hypotheses, the prejudice hypothesis holds that individuals with strong prejudice towards other groups attempt to avoid contact with said minority groups (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & Christ, 2011). Such an outcome, however, does not account for extreme cases of prejudice that potentially lead to aggressive actions against minorities and migrants. As previous research has found, individuals with strong prejudices experience contact with minorities and migrants as negative and are therefore prone to perceive further experiences as negative in turn (Schmidt, Weick, & Gloris, 2019).

With this focus on prejudice and contact, understanding the opinion of majority groups on minorities being present in their society becomes paramount. As previously studied in Germany, the perception of Germans towards the threat of migrants and minorities affecting culture and economy is particularly important when considering the evaluations that members of the majority group give foreigners (Schmidt & Weick, 2017). This is furthered by the majority's considerations of how Germany should handle the influx of specific immigrant groups (Schmidt & Weick, 2017). However, this focus examines the majority's contact with foreigners residing in Germany, but does not consider the intricacies of contacts with said foreigners among individuals with migrant backgrounds themselves. Since efforts have been made in previous research to examine the differences between Eastern and Western Germany with focus being placed on contact with migrants (see Jäckle & König, 2018; Wagner, van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 2003), this article will examine this as well to include an extensive picture of migrant contact throughout Germany.

3. Study 1

3.1. Data and Methods

In our first study examining the descriptive statistics of the German population, data from the ALLBUS was used (GESIS, 2019a). ALLBUS is a repeated cross-sectional survey that is generally performed every two years (Koch & Wasmer, 2004). For the purposes of this study, cumulative data from 1980–2016 was used to focus on questions regarding personal contact with specific migrant groups among those with both no migrant background and those that either were born outside of Germany or have direct relatives (e.g., parents or grandparents) that migrated to Germany. Comparisons of East and West Germany were also made.

3.2. Variables

In order to examine the experiences of respondents, questions were taken from the ALLBUS data that asked

respondents about their personal contact with foreigners living in Germany, specifically with regard to which area of life these contacts occurred (family, workplace, neighborhood, and circle of friends/acquaintances). The questions asked “Do you have any personal contact with foreigners living in Germany? Specifically...” with the follow-up being “...in your own family or close family circle?,” “...at work?,” “...in your neighborhood?,” and “...among your other friends and acquaintances?” respectively. Further questions regarding the country of origin of the respondent, their parents, and their grandparents were used to create specific migrant background cohorts. Due to the “country of origin” questions having first been asked in 1996 and only every ten years thereafter, only the data from 1996, 2006, and 2016 was used when analyzing them. For the analysis of East and West differences, data was used starting from 1980 for West Germany and 1994 for East Germany.

The composition of the German population with regard to its immigration status can only be restrictedly captured with the available surveys, even though such surveys allow for a meaningful look into contact between Germans and migrants. The ALLBUS data consistently asked respondents whether or not they held a German citizenship. Other nationalities are sadly not represented well enough in the data to allow for separate analysis. Having said this, there are three ALLBUS surveys—namely those aforementioned surveys from 1996, 2006, and 2016—that included country of origin questions for the respondent, their parents, and their grandparents. With these questions it is then possible to analyze how the number of individuals with migration backgrounds has changed over this 20-year timespan and, in particular, how contact frequencies between Germans without migrant backgrounds and foreigners have developed as well.

3.3. Results

Table 1 highlights the proportion of respondents in the ALLBUS data with migrant backgrounds, whether being migrants themselves or being the children/grandchildren of migrants. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents with no migrant background, while higher for those with a German citizenship, decreased slowly between 1996 and 2006, but starkly dropped heading into the next decade (62.1% to 55.3% for all respondents and 66.8% to 58.8% for German citizens between 2006 and 2016). This decrease was accompanied with a moderate drop in those with a migrant background themselves; however, this was also complemented with an increase in those with either parental or grandparental migrant backgrounds. In other words, roughly 45% of all respondents had some level of migrant background in 2016, while the same was true for only 41.2% of those with German citizenship. In both cases, the amount of individuals with some level of migrant background has increased by approximately 10% over the two decades.

Table 1. Proportion of respondents in the ALLBUS data with German citizenship and immigration background (in percent). Source: GESIS (2019a).

Respondents	1996	2006	2016
All respondents			
All respondents with German citizenship	92.9	92.3	92.9
Respondent with German citizenship (Western German States)	91.3	90.9	91.9
Respondent with German citizenship (Eastern German States)	99.7	98.4	97.6
All respondents			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	64.7	62.1	55.3
Respondent not born in Germany	17.1	18.6	15.3
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	12.0	13.3	17.7
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	6.3	6.1	11.7
Respondents with German citizenship			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	69.1	66.8	58.8
Respondent not born in Germany	11.4	12.3	9.9
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	12.8	14.3	18.8
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	6.7	6.6	12.5

Notes: Database from ALLBUS 1980–2016 (cumulative; weighted): 1996-respondents with German citizenship = 3,304, respondents without = 189; in 2006, respondents with German citizenship = 3,193 respondents without = 210; in 2016, respondents with German citizenship = 3,271, respondents without = 179.

Drastic differences between the East and the West appear even six years after German reunification when nationality is considered. There was only an infinitesimal share (0.3%) of respondents from the East German states that were not German citizens; this was due in part to the fact that immigration from other countries was rather rare in the former German Democratic Republic. Even in 2016, a considerably lower proportion of foreigners were to be found in the East compared to the West.

Table 2 highlights the personal contact respondents had with foreigners residing in Germany based on their own migrant background. Except for those who experienced contact with foreigners in the family and had grandparents with migrant backgrounds between 2006 and 2016, every other group showed an increase in personal contact with foreigners over time. This could be interpreted as evidence of the increasing prevalence of foreigners across all areas of life—which would be conceivable with the increase in the immigrant population in Germany (see Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2019b)—but what is glaring is the contrast between those with migrant background and those without. In particular, and while not surprising, the 2016 data highlights that the respondents with migrant background had more contact with foreigners in their family than any other group (49.2% compared to 23.7% for no migrant background, 32.7% for parents, and 26% for grandparents). While not as exaggerated, this effect is also visible for neighborhood contacts (57.4% for respondents with migrant background, 47.7% for parents, 51.4% for grandparents, and a meager 38% for those without migrant background). In both of these cases, these effects were shown to have developed over the past two decades, with the severity of the difference

growing over time. However, this does not pertain to circle of friends/acquaintances, with all groups boasting percentages over 50%. Workplace contact has also been on the rise with 52.7% of autochthonous German respondents having had contact and more than 50% for all other groups; this has steadily increased for those with migrant backgrounds and has exponentially increased for natives.

Table 3 focuses on the percentage of respondents in Eastern and Western Germany that had personal contact with foreigners over time. It is important to note that no data was collected in Eastern Germany before the reunification. At initial glance, the most striking finding here is that the frequency of personal contact in all four areas of life has substantially increased over time. There are, however, significant differences in overall contact with foreigners between East and West Germany. Through comprehensive inspection, with all four areas of life being considered, more than 80% of Western Germans and 60% of Eastern Germans had some contact with foreigners in 2016. As a means of comparison, these percentages were closer to 67% for West Germans and 25% for East Germans in 1994. This can partially be explained by the low numbers of immigrants in Eastern Germany, both historically and today. According to the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), when not including Berlin, only about 5.8% of foreigners residing in Germany live in the Eastern German States as of 2018 (self-calculated; see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019). This was even more dramatic in 2005, with only 3.6% of all foreigners residing in East Germany (self-calculated; see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019).

Interestingly, contact in the workplace and among friends was shown to occur rather often, with just over 60% of West Germans and more than a third of East

Table 2. Percentage of respondents that had personal contact with foreigners residing in Germany in various areas of life. Source: GESIS (2019a).

Respondents	1996	2006	2016
Family			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	14.7	21.2	23.7
Respondent not born in Germany	24.9	46.4	49.2
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	18.8	29.3	32.7
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	17.0	29.4	26.0
Workplace			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	39.0	41.2	52.7
Respondent not born in Germany	28.4	42.0	60.2
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	41.9	47.7	56.5
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	51.4	58.4	67.1
Neighborhood			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	30.2	35.3	43.3
Respondent not born in Germany	29.1	47.1	57.4
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	32.3	40.9	47.7
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	40.4	43.4	51.4
Circle of Friends and Acquaintances			
Respondent born in Germany, no migrant background	42.1	45.1	55.7
Respondent not born in Germany	37.2	56.6	63.3
Parent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	50.7	53.4	60.3
Grandparent(s) of respondent not born in Germany	57.7	61.5	70.8

Note: Database from ALLBUS 1980–2016 (cumulative; weighted).

Table 3. Personal contact with foreigners residing in Germany in various areas of life (in percent). Source: GESIS (2019a).

Statistical Territory	Year	Family	Work	Neighborhood	Friends
Western German States	1980	5.3	22.9	19.7	14.7
	1984	6.3	25.5	22.5	22.3
	1988	7.3	23.6	27.6	24.6
	1990	10.9	34.4	27.6	31.2
	1994	16.4	41.8	31.8	43.0
	1996	19.1	45.4	37.2	50.8
	2000	22.3	41.6	38.0	50.1
	2002	29.2	52.9	43.3	60.8
	2006	28.8	48.6	44.3	54.4
	2010	27.4	51.0	46.4	57.8
	2012	34.9	62.1	50.8	67.3
	2016	31.1	60.7	52.3	64.7
	Eastern German States (Former East Germany)	1994	4.6	12.7	4.4
1996		6.0	13.9	7.1	15.7
2000		9.0	18.3	12.2	18.1
2002		14.4	24.9	13.2	29.1
2006		11.8	21.5	11.8	24.2
2010		12.6	23.8	13.1	28.1
	2012	16.7	32.8	18.2	36.2
	2016	13.9	35.1	19.9	33.7

Notes: Database from ALLBUS 1980–2016 (cumulative); only German respondents. Personal contact questions were not given a structured rhythm of inclusion in the ALLBUS questionnaire until 1996, when it was decided to collect the questions three times every decade (every 2nd, 6th, and 10th year). Data was not collected in East Germany before reunification.

Germans claiming to have had contact with immigrants at the workplace in 2016. Since the mid-1990s, there has also been a noticeable increase in contact in the family and neighborhood. In West Germany, it was reported in 1994 that 16.4% of respondents had contact in their family. In 2012, this number had jumped up to nearly 35%. During that same time in East Germany, these numbers jumped from 4.6% to 16.7% respectively. It should be noted here that these numbers did sink slightly in 2016; however, this does not take away from the overall development of contact that occurred over the past three decades and does not diminish the predominantly unbounded growth in contact across all areas of life in West Germany.

The time series document a large social change in the life of the German population in the last decade. Not only has the composition of the society changed through migration, but also the everyday encounters with people from other nations has generally become normal. With such developments in contact between native Germans and foreigners, the question of how these contacts are perceived becomes essential to understanding the relationships between natives and foreigners in Germany. Once these relationships are better understood, the effects of such contact can be explored with regards to outgroup attitudes.

4. Study 2

4.1. Data and Methods

For this study, data from the GESIS Panel (GESIS, 2019b; Wagner et al., 2014), a probability-based mixed-mode access panel, was used to examine the existence and frequency of positive contact between autochthonous German respondents and foreigners and its effect on outgroup attitudes. While analyses of longitudinal intergroup contact processes for German participants with diverging migration backgrounds would have been especially desirable, the nature of the GESIS Panel, being a general population survey, did not allow such analyses, as the number of cases would have been too small for the presented study. That being said, data from 673 German respondents without migration background over four

waves (Spring 2016, Autumn 2016, Spring 2017, and Autumn 2017) was used. In accordance with the work of Hamaker et al. (2015), a RI-CLPM was used alongside a CLPM in order to compare the results.

4.2. Variables

Two questions regarding the valuation of foreigners were selected: “How would you assess foreigners in Germany overall?” and “How would you describe your feelings towards foreigners in Germany in general?” Both questions used a five-point scale for answers, ranging from 1 “very negative,” to 5 “very positive.” Furthermore, two items were used that asked specifics on positive contact experiences with foreigners in Germany: “How frequently do you have positive or good contact with foreigners in your neighborhood?” and “How frequently do you have positive or good contact with refugees at your place of employment or apprenticeship?” A four-point scale was used for answering (1 “never,” 2 “rarely,” 3 “sometimes,” and 4 “frequently”). It should be noted that the given dataset also included indicators of negative intergroup contact experiences in the said contexts. However, to increase comparability with the ALLBUS data, we only examined the effects of positive contact (as non-specified contact usually shows similar results as specifically positive contact does; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

4.3. Results

The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis of the GESIS Panel are reported in Table 4 for all four waves of measurement. The attitudes and evaluations towards foreigners were relatively neutral in the Spring of 2016 (attitude: 3.12; overall evaluation: 3.15) and remain remarkably stable over the entire period. As previous research has found, those respondents that had neutral stances on foreigners in T1 recorded a relatively high stability in T4 (Schmidt et al., 2019). This high stability was also found among respondents that held negative views towards foreigners between T1 and T4, but not among those with positive stances at T1 (Schmidt et al., 2019). Positive contact experiences with foreigners also remained remarkably stable over time.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics on positive and negative intergroup contact and attitudes for foreigners for all four waves of the GESIS Panel. Source: GESIS (2019b).

Item	T1		T2		T3		T4	
	M	s ²	M	s ²	M	s ²	M	s ²
Positive contact neighborhood	2.41	1.05	2.35	1.12	2.48	1.07	2.47	0.99
Positive contact workplace	2.59	1.42	2.56	1.43	2.68	1.40	2.61	1.37
Attitude	3.12	0.59	3.15	0.44	3.11	0.48	3.07	0.46
Overall evaluation	3.15	0.59	3.13	0.46	3.07	0.46	3.07	0.43

Notes: Database from GESIS Panel; German participants without migration background (N = 673). M = mean value, s² = variance. Scale for contact experiences: 1 “never,” 2 “rarely,” 3 “sometimes,” 4 “often”; scale for attitudes and evaluations: 1 “very negative,” 2 “negative,” 3 “neutral,” 4 “positive,” 5 “very positive.”

Based on these descriptive findings, a CLPM was analyzed to examine the effect of positive intergroup contact experiences on attitudes towards foreigners as well as reversed effects from attitudes to positive intergroup contact experiences in German adults (for all model specifications, please see model specifications of the baseline CLPM in the Annex). In this model, autoregressive paths (i.e., the influence of one construct at a previous wave of measurement on a later wave of measurement) as well as cross-lagged paths (i.e., the influence of one construct at a previous wave of measurement on another construct at a later wave of measurement) were included to ensure a causal interpretation of the effect of a predictor variable (e.g., intergroup contact) on a criterion variable (e.g., attitudes; Granger, 1969; Little, 2013).

All four waves of measurement available were used and the sample was defined as German participants without migration background to ensure that indeed intergroup contact was modelled. The measurement models contain latent variables measured by two indicators each for positive intergroup contact and attitudes (see Table 4). To ensure equal meaning of the latent variables over time, longitudinal metric measurement invariance (Little, 2013) was introduced, which did not substantially impair model fit (all model fit information can be found in Table A1 in the Annex). Additionally, restrictions of stationarity (i.e., longitudinal effects constrained to be equal over time; Cole & Maxwell, 2003) were tested for, but could not be supported. As a consequence, we assume that the processes between the different waves of measurement vary substantially as a function of time and cannot be uniformly described.

The resulting model is displayed in Figure 1 as a simplified graph. It shows quite high stability coefficients for both intergroup contact and attitudes over time. This implies that, for example, Germans with a high level of positive intergroup contact experiences at one time point also show high levels of positive intergroup contact expe-

riences in subsequent waves of measurement, and that participants with little positive intergroup contact experiences also have low rates of positive intergroup contact experiences at later waves. The respective standardized stability coefficients vary between .821 and .953 for positive intergroup contact, and between .762 and .849 for attitudes.

Surprisingly, and contrary to the literature, the cross-lagged effects indicate that positive intergroup contact with foreigners predicts attitudes towards them at later waves only to a very small and non-significant extent, while simultaneously controlling for the stability of attitudes. The standardized cross-lagged effects vary between .016 and .069. Thus, we could find no empirical support for the contact hypothesis. The effect of attitudes predicting future positive contact effects over and above the stability of intergroup contact could equally not be observed. The standardized coefficients varied between .034 and .103. Adadis and Willoughby (2015) showed that effect sizes in panel studies are often much smaller than effect sizes in cross-sectional studies. Furthermore, they argued that the criteria for effect sizes for cross-sectional data should not be applied to panel data. The reason is that, in panel data, only the effect within the measured time period is grasped as the former state of the variables is controlled. Therefore, much lower effect sizes should be accepted if they were at least significant, which is not the case for the model at hand.

This surprising lack of cross-lagged effects might well be explained by the very high stability coefficients, which explain up to 90% of all observed variation and which literally leave very little variance in positive intergroup contact experiences and attitudes towards foreigners to be explained. The variance in attitudes was quite low to start with, as can be seen in Table 4. Another explanation might be the use of the quite indistinct outgroup description of “foreigners,” which might refer to different nationalities, migration motives, and times of pres-

Model Fit: $\chi^2(92) = 139.224, p = .001$; RMSEA: .028 [.018, .037], CFI: .989, SRMR: .39




Figure 1. Conventional CLPM for foreigners. Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are reported. The model is simplified and depicts only the structural relations of interest, omitting the underlying measurement model and covariations between constructs at the same timepoint. Significant paths are depicted darker. *** $p < .001$.

ence (Asbrock, Lemmer, Becker, Koller, & Wagner, 2014; Schmidt et al., 2019).

Recently, CLPMs as described above have been criticized due to their inability to differentiate between within-person processes and between-person differences (Hamaker et al., 2015). This refers to the fact that longitudinal data demonstrate a hierarchical structure in which multiple waves of measurements are nested within the individual survey participants. Consequently, two sources of variation may partly or fully drive the effects produced by CLPMs: On the one hand, there might be differences between participants which are stable over time and thus introduce rank-order like differences between participants (e.g., influenced by personality traits, intergroup contact opportunity structure, intergroup ideologies, demographic characteristics). In the following, these effects will be referred to as between-person differences. On the other hand, participants might experience variation in positive and negative intergroup contact experiences and attitudes over time, and thus might situationally deviate from their usual level (i.e., the stable difference compared to other participants). For this reason, these deviations will be labelled within-person processes here.

Ignoring these different sources of variation in statistical models might lead to seriously biased results, as simulation studies and data re-analyses in other fields demonstrated (Hamaker et al., 2015; Kühnel & Mays, 2018; Masselink et al., 2018). Additionally, exploring these differences appears to be quite relevant from a theoretical perspective: Though neither the original Allport text nor subsequent literature precisely defines whether the intergroup contact hypothesis refers to the within-person or between-person level, implicit assumptions, e.g., in intergroup contact interventions (Lemmer & Wagner, 2015), refer to processes and changes hap-

pening within individuals, i.e., within-person processes (Curran & Bauer, 2011). Consequently, the CLPM is re-specified as a RI-CLPM (Hamaker et al., 2015) to explore the impact of stable between-person differences and to identify which of the autoregressive and cross-lagged processes identified by the CLPM hold on a purely within-person processes level. This model completely separates the observed variation in stable between-person difference factors (one per construct) and distinct time-specific situational within-person processes. The stability and cross-lagged coefficients that typically define a CLPM are specified on the level of within-person processes, and thus indicate only changes within individuals over time. The model specifications of longitudinal metric measurement invariance and non-stationarity described above still hold. Further information about the RI-CLPM can be found in Hamaker et al. (2015).

Figure 2 displays the effects of the RI-CLPM for foreigners. The conventional CLPM and the RI-CLPM are nested, and thus can be directly compared. This comparison indicated a substantially better model fit—and thus a better representation of the empirical variance-covariance-matrix—of the RI-CLPM (please see also Table A1 in the Annex). Thus, the RI-CLPM in Figure 2 should be preferred. The two green constructs on the left-hand side represent the between-person difference factors, which can be understood as stable rank-order differences between participants in positive intergroup contact experiences and attitudes over the entire measurement period. These latent constructs correlate with each other, whereby stable differences in positive intergroup contact experiences correlate positively but non-significantly with stable differences in attitudes. The direction of this effect corresponds to the theoretical predictions of the intergroup contact hypothesis. On the right-hand side, the blue-grey constructs describe the

Model Fit: $\chi^2(89) = 78.837, p = .771$; RMSEA: .000 [.000, .015], CFI: 1.000, SRMR: .035




Figure 2. RI-CLPM for foreigners. Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are reported. The model is simplified and depicts only the structural relations of interest, omitting the underlying measurement model and covariations between constructs at the same timepoint. Green ellipses describe stable between-person differences, while blue-grey ellipses describe situational within-person processes. Significant paths are depicted darker. * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$.

within-person processes over time and can be directly compared to the results displayed in Figure 1. In the within-person model, most stability coefficients are reduced in their standardized coefficients and become nonsignificant. This applies to all stability coefficients of attitudes, and one stability coefficient of intergroup contact. The remainder of stability coefficients is not substantially changed. The same applies to the cross-lagged coefficients, which remain non-significant and very small in size. These findings might be explained by the distribution of variance from the latent intergroup contact—and attitude factors into within-person and between-person variation. As indicated by the squared standardized factor loadings, for positive intergroup contact, more variance was allocated on the within-person level (58.83%–62.73%) than on the between-person level (37.33%–41.09%). For attitudes towards foreigners, substantially more variance was given at the between-person level (56.55%–80.64%) than on the within-person level (19.36%–43.43%). This might be an indication of the role of stable characteristics, such as right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance orientation (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), in predicting outgroup attitudes.

5. Conclusion

The present article aimed at exploring the frequency and effect of intergroup contact between natives and migrants in Germany. This was done, on the one hand, through a descriptive analysis of intergroup contact frequencies as assessed by the ALLBUS data among those with various, if any, migrant background and the inherent East–West differences. On the other hand, this aim was achieved by depicting longitudinal intergroup contact processes of Germans with foreigners using four waves of the GESIS Panel. As has been evidenced, the increase in contact with foreigners living in Germany as well as the number of individuals with migrant background is an important aspect of modern research into immigration, integration, and outgroup attitudes. Further research should examine the intricacies of which micro-level factors predispose individuals to more positive contacts in the first place. This could be furthered by the examination of previous research to see if the usage of CLPMs has led to a misinterpretation of the contact/evaluation relationship.

The findings of both the conventional CLPM and the RI-CLPM are highly informative: Both fail to indicate any cross-lagged effect of positive intergroup contact on outgroup attitudes or vice versa. This finding might be due to the limited variation found in the GESIS Panel data. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the high importance of the examination of longitudinal data, which present a stricter test of the contact hypothesis and the underlying causality. Also, our findings give some indication that stable between-person differences might play an important role in explaining outgroup attitudes and intergroup contact.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Annex
Model Specifications of the Baseline CLPM

- Latent constructs of positive intergroup contact and attitudes were modelled for all four waves separately using the two indicators described in Table 4 of the main text. For factor identification, factor loadings of the first items were fixed to 1.
- Two indicator-specific factors (one for positive intergroup contact, one for attitudes) were introduced for the items with the freely-estimated factor-loading in order to model the methods-specific variance created by the repeated application of the same items. These indicator-specific factors loaded only on the second item per construct in all four waves with a factor loading fixed to 1. These factors were not allowed to covary with the substantial construct factors or with each other.

Table A1. Model fit indices of the (RI-)CLPM reported in 4.2.

Model	AIC	χ^2	df	p	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR	$\Delta\chi^2_{MLR}$	df	p
GESIS Panel, Subsample "Refugees"										
Baseline CLPM	18630.201	135.412	86	.0005	.029	.989	.037	/	/	/
Metric MI	18621.471	139.224	92	.0011	.028	.989	.039	3.357	6	.763
Stability Stationarity	18632.851	155.794	96	.0001	.030	.987	.051	14.380	4	.006
RI-CLPM	18561.923	78.837	89	.7711	.000	1.000	.035	37.354	3	< .001

Notes: The MLR χ^2 — difference test accounts for the impact of uni- and multivariate non-normality. The comparisons of the χ^2 — difference test were as followed: Metric MI model vs. Baseline CLPM, Stability Stationarity vs. Baseline CLPM, and RI-CLPM vs. Metric MI model.

Article

Nostalgic, Converted, or Cosmopolitan: Typology of Young Spanish Migrants

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Abstract

The high unemployment rate that is affecting Spain in recent years, along with the consolidation of labour market insecurity, have generated great changes in social behaviour, with a prominent tendency for young people to leave the country. With the aim of understanding, from the point of view of these new migrants, how their migration processes and sociocultural integration in their host countries are, this article follows the procedures of the Grounded Theory to analyse the discourses obtained through a discussion group and 41 in-depth interviews with young Spanish migrants while they were living abroad, during the period 2010–2015. The strength of this research lies in its construction of an empirical model consisting of three procedural categories: nostalgic adaptation, converted adaptation and cosmopolitan adaptation. These categories allow us to explain how the perception of young people about their home and host societies changes, as well as how their sociocultural adaptation to the new context is affected by the conducts and behaviours inherent to said perception.

Keywords

adaptation; migration processes; sociocultural integration; Spanish emigration; young migrants

Issue

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1. Introduction

The great, global, economic crisis that arose in the sphere of international finance in 2008 has damaged several spheres of the young Spaniards’ social reality (mainly their working environment), thus aggravating even more their already delicate conditions and pushing them to a situation of chronic insecurity and unemployment. This decline in social conditions and quality of life for young people has greatly transformed their social patterns, especially with the emergence of a migration trend affecting mostly those with a higher level of education (Domínguez-Mujica, Díaz-Hernández, & Parreño-

Castellano, 2016). This trend is reflected in recent years in the sharp increase in Spanish youth (16–34 years old) emigration, which reached significant numbers during the period 2010–2015 (see Figure 1).

As reflected in Figure 1, this dramatic context pushed thousands of young people to emigrate seeking to overcome the unstable environment to which they were doomed in Spain, where they adapted their vital projects to insecure jobs and ways of life, unable to achieve a consolidated professional identity which allowed them to pursue their own life projects (Bessant, Farthing, & Watts, 2017; Standing, 2013). This way, during the most critical years of the economic recession, this new




Figure 1. Spanish youth (16–34 years old) emigration during the period 2005–2017. Compiled by the authors based on data from the Residential Variation Statistics of the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE, 2017).

Spanish emigration—also known as neo-Hispanic migration (Domingo, Sabater, & Ortega, 2014)—was consolidated and reached very high figures. Although this migration trend decreased a bit from 2015 on, said decrease was more apparent than real and the trend reached again high figures in 2017, as shown in the graph. However, unlike what occurred in the past, current Spanish migration is mainly composed of young people with higher education (Santos, 2013). This could be explained by the obsolete Spanish productive framework, with its excessive emphasis on sectors such as tourism and construction, meagre investment in research, development, innovation and cutting-edge technology, ineffective industry positioning, and a large increase in job insecurity—which was already critical in past decades but right now is largely normalised as an inherent component of the Spanish labour market (Pochmann, 2011). Thus, all these dramatic aspects affecting young people have become essential explanatory factors in the new Spanish emigration.

One of the aspects of young migration is the effect that it causes in their protagonists’ identity and perception. This way, given the growing interdependence and how easy it is to communicate in global society, these ‘new migrants’ participate in a plurality of social spaces: they are in contact, via Internet, with family, friends, fellow compatriot migrants, young people from other countries, natives from the host country, etc. All of that affects their perceptions, fears and hopes, since there is a confrontation between their previous social experience and the new reality they face in the multiple contexts they access after emigrating. This makes them develop various adaptation processes which are constructed, deconstructed or reconstructed depending on their interaction with their new social spaces and the new obstacles they face. These processes are very recent, hence the need for new explanatory models allowing to recognise and explain them, which is the primary goal of this research.

2. Theoretical Framework

In order to explain how coming into contact with the host society transforms the perception and behaviour of young migrants, we followed the principles of the bidimensional models of acculturation, especially Berry’s (1997) model. This model explains the acculturation process based on (1) whether the immigrants consider to be of value maintaining their cultural heritage in the new society, and (2) whether they consider the new cultural patterns so important as to adopt them. Thus, the positive or negative answer to those two independent dimensions gives four possible acculturation strategies: integration (maintain and adopt), assimilation (not maintaining but adopting), separation (maintaining but not adopting) and marginalisation (neither maintaining nor adopting). Besides, it is also worth mentioning the Relative Acculturation Extended Model (RAEM; Navas & Rojas, 2010; Rania, Reborá, Migliorini, & Navas, 2019; Zarsa & Sobrino, 2007), which improves the scope of Berry’s by considering that: (1) the acculturation process affects both the immigrants and the natives of the host society; (2) it depends on the country of origin; (3) it is influenced by psychosocial and sociodemographic variables; (4) it presents a real and an ideal plane of acculturation; and, most important of all, (5) there is no one single acculturation strategy, but they depend on the various domains in which the interaction takes place (family relationships, religious beliefs and customs, work relationships, etc.), so different options can be preferred and adopted at the same time.

Besides the aforementioned acculturation models, another extremely relevant concept for explaining the changes that young migrants’ identities and perceptions undergo during their migration processes is that of transnational social spaces (Pries, 1998). Thus, based on this concept, the understanding of the migration process as a phenomenon leading migrants to a complete assim-

ilation and/or acculturation, is overcome. Said concept highlights that the migrants develop their perceptions in open, heterogeneous, hybrid spaces in which individual and group identities are composed of several segments such as local identity, ethnic identity, national identity, or cosmopolitan identity (Pries, 1998, p. 118).

3. Methodology

3.1. Participants

With the aim of understanding migration processes and the adaptation of young Spaniards that emigrated during the period 2010–2015, we carried out 41 in-depth interviews to young Spanish migrants whose ages ranged from 18 to 35. They all had university degrees and arrived in their host countries during the period above mentioned (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, we established a discussion group. This way, we aimed at establishing a significant profile of young, qualified Spaniards living abroad, focusing more on the possession of a degree than on the job carried out, so we would not exclude such important profiles as the ones of the people that have lost social and financial status.

3.2. Procedure

The program Skype was used for the first 31 interviews, since the interviewees were living outside Spain (in Uzbekistan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, etc.). These interviews were recorded using Call Graph and transcribed word by word for later analysis. The 10 latter interviews (along with the discussion group) were done in person at the Alberto Hurtado University of Chile, in a room accommodated for that purpose, during a research stay carried out between March and June 2016. We made contact with the participants through some platforms for young emigrated Spaniards, such as Marea Granate. We used as well the so-called snowball sampling approach, in which we asked the interviewees to help us identifying other possible participants with characteristics which could be relevant for our research (Noy, 2008; Valles, 2003).

3.3. Data Analysis

We analysed the data using the Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), a method that offers several procedures very useful for ordering information and developing analytic categories which reveal the most relevant patterns in the data. We used the program Atlas.Ti6 for the creation and management of several codes to which we applied the constant comparative method, which consists in searching similarities and differences between the events within the data (Carrero, Soriano, & Trinidad, 2012). This way, we established three procedural categories which, like the RAEM (Navas & Rojas, 2010) and the concept of transnational social spaces devel-

oped by Pries (1998), allowed us to explain the changes that occurred in the perception and subjectivities of those young migrants: converted adaptation (exaltation of the 'here and now'), nostalgic adaptation (exaltation of the 'there and then') and cosmopolitan adaptation (in which the cultural patterns from their country of origin are mixed together with those of the new society). For more details on the explanatory power of this three-dimensional model, see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.

4. Results

4.1. Construction of Young Migrants' Subjectivities

The vital spaces that young migrants perceive during the process of adapting to the host society are not static, but they are defined and redefined depending on the socio-cultural situations the migrants experience throughout the various stages of the migration cycle. This way, several ways of experiencing the migration processes take place, and the subjectivities are developed and modified depending on how the conflicts between the expectations the migrants cherish at the beginning and what they really experience later are resolved. Other factors are the socioeconomic status achieved, the language barrier, or how the host society sees them.

In this regard, their perception ranges from emphasising the present (converted adaptation) to emphasising the past (nostalgic adaptation), with a possible representation halfway between the past they lived in and the present they are living at the moment. The latter scenario could result either in the adoption of acculturation strategies where assimilation prevails or in the use of strategies with a mix of assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation. This is due to the emergence of several spaces linked to the migration process (communication with peer groups from their country of origin via the ICTs, connection with peer groups from their host country, relationship with the family, etc.), where the young emigrant may adopt various strategies and behaviours (and maybe reach a cosmopolitan adaptation).

4.2. Frustration and Pessimism within the Spanish Context: Emergence of Converted Subjectivities

Before setting off the migration process, young people were influenced in Spain by a context of pessimism marked by unemployment, political corruption and the lack of a future. Thus, this nefarious context fostered the development of converted subjectivities among them, a phobia of their home environment, characterised by a hatred for the Spanish society, which they identify to corruption, insecurity, frustration and uncertainty. This way, they see their space of origin as a 'no-place' for socially or professionally developing themselves. This makes them to establish the discourse that not setting off the migration process or coming back home would be a failure, a

Table 1. Profiles of the interviewees.

Gender	Age	Academic degree	Profession	Host country	Months abroad
Male	35	Mining Engineering	Sales manager	Uzbekistan	73
Female	31	Master of Pharmacy	Pharmacy manager	United Kingdom	49
Male	25	Civil Engineering	Construction manager	Switzerland	15
Female	29	Master of Art History	Researcher	Japan	25
Female	32	Master of Pedagogy	Language teacher	United Kingdom	36
Female	30	Market Research and Techniques	Business analyst	United Kingdom	32
Male	35	Master of Economic Sciences	Country manager	Uzbekistan	35
Female	26	Bachelor of Social Work	Dishwasher	United Kingdom	17
Male	31	Master of Pharmacy	Stockman	United Kingdom	25
Female	31	Master of Laws	Cook	Finland	35
Male	32	Bachelor of Business Sciences	Travel agent	Hungary	14
Female	28	Master of Sociology	Cake Shop saleswoman	United Kingdom	60
Female	25	Master of Anthropology	Cleaner	Germany	27
Female	27	Architecture	Architect	Austria	38
Male	28	Master of Philosophy	Cook	Finland	19
Male	27	Master of Economic Sciences	Accountant	United Kingdom	37
Female	35	Building Engineering	Building inspector	U.S.A.	24
Male	35	PhD in Biology	Researcher	Bolivia	14
Female	33	Industrial Engineering	Researcher	Germany	19
Female	25	Bachelor of Sociology	Cleaner	France	21
Male	34	Master of Political Sciences	Professor	France	37
Female	26	Bachelor of Pedagogy	Professor	Germany	36
Female	33	Master of Psychology	Human Resources manager	United Kingdom	26
Female	29	Master of Laws	Cleaner	Germany	48
Female	30	Master of Psychology	Researcher	United Kingdom	36
Female	32	Master of Sociology	Sociologist	United Kingdom	49
Male	29	Architecture	Professor	Finland	60
Male	35	Building Engineering	Construction manager	United Kingdom	38
Male	27	Bachelor of Social Work	Social worker	Germany	27
Male	35	Industrial Engineering	Project engineer	Germany	50
Male	31	Building Engineering	Architect	U.S.A.	38
Female	30	Master of Geology	Hydrogeologist	Chile	49
Male	29	Architecture	Project technician	Chile	27
Male	31	Bachelor of Social Work	Social worker	Chile	25
Female	29	Master of Psychology	Researcher	Chile	12
Female	32	Master of Sociology	Social worker	Chile	14
Male	27	Master of Economic Sciences	Entrepreneur	Chile	35
Female	29	Master of Geology	Geologist	Chile	40
Female	29	Master of Pedagogy	Professor	Chile	16
Male	30	Master of Sociology	Researcher	Chile	14
Male	31	Architecture	Project manager	Chile	22

Table 2. Profiles of the participants in the discussion group.

Gender	Age	Academic degree	Profession	Host country	Months abroad
Female	25	Master of Laws	Social assistance worker	Chile	14
Female	34	Master of Laws	Lawyer	Chile	25
Male	33	Master of History	Chief of social services	Chile	59
Female	29	Master of Geography	Social worker	Chile	34
Female	32	Master of Psychology	Professor	Chile	31
Male	30	Architecture	Construction manager	Chile	42
Male	28	Architecture	Professor	Chile	51

renunciation of the vital possibilities that, in their opinion, leaving the Spanish environment gives them, as explained by the emigrants themselves:

I made the decision of leaving Spain because I was in a terrible psychological state, I was depressed, it was impossible for me to find a job and become independent. So, the idea of emigrating grew stronger, until I had no choice but to leave. (Graduate in Sociology, United Kingdom)

The financial situation in Spain was awful for everybody, it was impossible to find a job, I realised I had no future, I was fed up, it was a very frustrating environment. (Graduate in Psychology, United Kingdom)

This subjectivity of repulsion towards the country of origin is common among young people even before they are determined to emigrate, and its emergence and later consolidation is due to the insecurity environment they interact with. As a result, the search for a stable vital project and becoming independent from the family by getting a stable job become the main factors for setting off the migration process:

Every Spaniard I meet has a university degree, too, and they all have emigrated for the same reasons as I did: because, back in Spain, they were unable to find a job that fulfilled some minimum requirements to make a living. All of us want that, achieving some stability in our lives. (Graduate in Business Sciences, Hungary)

These migration factors are also strengthened by the expectations the migrants got in their society of origin, usually related to labour improvements such as better working conditions and higher salaries than those in Spain. Said expectations emerge in the collective imagination of young people through their interaction with other emigrants and the distorted information given by the mass media (Torres, 2014). Thus, the experience of other migrants, sometimes exaggerated as a defensive mechanism—in order to hide the loss of social status in the host country—and the insufficient information on the true conditions of migrants in their host countries shown by the media—with Germany and United Kingdom as archetypes of ‘havens’ for qualified young people—make the expectations put in the migration project to be very high:

After reading the information given in some forums and watching Spanish television, I had a very good impression of Germany but, when you live here, you realise that it’s not as good as they say. People think that it’s easy to find a good job and make money fast, but it’s just crazy coming here empty-handed just because of what you hear from outside. (Industrial engineer, Germany)

This way, the subjectivity acquired in the Spanish context makes young people to idealise the future even without a first-hand experience, making it a utopia and turning the present into a dystopia they must flee from.

4.3. Longing for the ‘There and Then’: From Converted to Nostalgic Subjectivities

Once the arrival in the host country takes place, the reconstruction process of the migrants’ perceptions and subjectivities, as well as that of the discourses they are based on, begins. This way, a converted subjectivity may evolve to a nostalgic one as a result of young migrants coming into conflict with the new cultural and/or socio-economic circumstances they find in the host country. Thus, said circumstances, along with the more or less shocking experiences they entail, tend to make young people to perceive themselves as divided between two worlds: the original and the new one, full of obstacles and troubles. This often makes them to long for the environment of security inherent to the family and primary social ties that they lost when they left their country. This way, a nostalgic perception, in which the near past (the ‘there and then’) is emphasised as a way of protecting oneself from the adaptive stress produced by the arrival at a new society, is developed:

Back in Spain, I had a very large group of friends. I miss my previous social life. Just after arriving here I was aware of all that I had left behind: friends, family....It’s hard for me to live without them. Now, in retrospect, I see all that I have lost. (Civil engineer, Switzerland)

As explained by Trigo (2000), what happens here is that migrants, after experiencing the loss of the place left behind, tend to bond with the host society trying not to assimilate to it, but identifying themselves with the community of origin, which they idealise and begin to miss. This way, a profound alteration of the social and individual affinities of the young emigrants takes place, faced as they are with barriers such as social exclusion, the clash with the new culture, or not speaking the language. This usually means that, despite the distance, at the beginning of the migration process, in their minds they remain attached to their origins, which is why they try to create and reproduce, in their new environment, an immediate context similar to the one they felt forced to abandon:

Here in Uzbekistan we have created a group of Spanish emigrants for doing cultural activities, having Spanish meals, watching movies, celebrating typical Spanish festivities....It truly helps us to feel at home and preserve our traditions, so that our children can know them. (Mining engineer, Uzbekistan)

As shown in that speech marked by nostalgic subjectivity, the young migrant tends to identify with other emigrated Spaniards who would conform to the endogroup.

The acculturation strategy is not to adopt the customs of the majority, host society, but to look for protection in that endogroup, in which they try to preserve Spanish traditions (they opt for the ‘separation’ acculturation strategy). According to Entrena-Durán (2012), it is a process within the symbolic-cultural dimension, in which young migrants tend to reproduce, in a new environment, the customs typical of the Spanish way of life, thus taking place a re-territorialisation of said customs.

One of the reasons that favour the development of these nostalgic subjectivities involving refuge among fellow emigrated Spaniards would be social marginalisation by the natives of the new society, which is frequently due to difficulties learning the new language:

I have felt rejected for being an immigrant, for example when I wanted to present a complaint in a shop. When they notice you speak in a different dialect, there’s always the one that says, ‘more and more Spaniards keep coming here, more foreigners, this is no longer what it used to be.’ These situations make you think about a lot of things. (Graduated in Anthropology, Germany)

These obstacles are frequent at the beginning of the migration process and during the first stage of the adaptation to the new society, where the majority culture, through continuous contact, both directly and indirectly, causes changes in the original cultural patterns of young migrants (at the same time that the migrants influence the natives), thus setting off different acculturation strategies. The clash with these initial barriers will be essential in the reconstruction of the young emigrants’ perceptions and, likewise, will condition the possible return to Spain.

4.4. Reinforcement of Nostalgic Subjectivities and Its Effect on the Possibility of Returning Home

All emigrants ‘reinvent’ themselves throughout the migration cycle depending on the circumstances surrounding their arrival, on the conflict between what they expected before leaving Spain and the context they actually found in their host countries, as well as on how they perceive said new context. This adaptation process is essential for the development of previous subjectivities and the possibility of returning home. There is a range of contextual factors affecting young migrants’ perceptions and subjectivities that, unless they are overcome during the adaptation stage, may result in the development of a great exaltation of the past (nostalgic adaptation) and going back to Spain. Some factors worth mentioning are: getting an under-qualified job, thus suffering a decrease in social status; not succeeding in learning the language; problems adapting to the climatic conditions in the host country; or perceiving discrimination by the host society.

Working for a long period in an under-qualified, underpaid job means that the decision to emigrate has led

to a degradation of status. This causes an internal grief derived from the conflict between the hopes they cherished before leaving Spain and what the migrant actually experiences in the host country, which in turn tends to increase nostalgic subjectivity and, therefore, the idealisation of the ‘there and then’ as a defensive mechanism against the frustration caused by the new environment.

Likewise, the language barrier, as we have previously discussed, is a great obstacle for social insertion due to the exclusion it causes. The process of adapting to the new society implies appropriate language skills, which help reducing the inclination towards nostalgic subjectivity and exaltation of the past, that is to say, it helps avoiding the tendency to construct a safe environment with primary links with an endogroup consisting basically of other emigrated Spaniards. Conversely, not overcoming the language barrier often entails a consolidation of nostalgic behaviours and discourses (nostalgic adaptation).

Another aspect hindering proper adaptation is climate, an element which is primarily noted by those that have emigrated to cold, cloudy environments such as Finland. Such climate may affect those migrants’ emotional and psychological state, given that they come from the sunny environment of Spain:

Winter here is long and hard, and lots of people get depressed. Winter normally lasts for eight months of near absolute darkness; you may not see the sun for weeks, which is very hard; it affects you psychologically so much. (Graduate in Laws, Finland)

Finally, another of the main elements affecting the subjectivity of young emigrants (along with the quality of the work found and how it affects social status), is the image that the host country has of Spain. Thus, if that image is negative, it causes young migrants to have difficulties when it comes to perceiving and presenting themselves in the new environment (Goffman, 1959). The sum of these factors may lead to an extreme nostalgic subjectivity, which may in turn favour returning home, since this discourse mythicises the previous life in Spain, thus idealizing the possible return.

4.5. Maladjustment to the Society of Origin: Idealisation of the ‘Here and Now’ or Mutation to Cosmopolitan Subjectivity

The process of acceptance, confrontation and overcoming the obstacles typical of the first stages implied that the young people we interviewed experienced a maladjustment to their society of origin more easily. This entails an alteration in the cultural referents nurturing the subjectivity itself, which is restructured and relocated in the new migratory space. This process may reach its maximum level after the migrant has experienced a long stage (6 to 7 years) in the host country. This stage may lead to a high degree of disconnection with Spanish way of life and cultural patterns so much so that, when emi-

grants return occasionally, they use to feel confused and out of place:

When I have returned to Spain, I have felt strange in my own country, as an immigrant, you know? I had a strange feeling and was all the time saying things like ‘ow, I want to go home, people here speak so loud, why do I have to hear what my neighbours say?’ I felt very German, you know? (Graduate in Anthropology, Germany)

In this process, something we have called ‘cosmopolitan adaptation’ in the present article, may develop. This is characterised by presenting a subjectivity that is formed not only by the origin-host belonging dichotomy, but also by the diverse spaces in which the emigrants’ relational everyday life takes place (relationship with family and friends living in Spain via Internet, with other migrants, with compatriots, with natives of the host country, etc.). In this case, we would be before what the RAEM (Navas & Rojas, 2010) explains as the use of different acculturation strategies depending on the space in which the interaction takes place. This causes that, sometimes, migrants don’t perceive themselves as belonging to just one place, but to multiple spaces:

When you live in countries like United Kingdom, for example, all the friends you make over the years are from many other countries, with a lot of cultural variety, and you end up adapting to almost everyone. Then you influence those people and they influence you; your identity ends up becoming something global and cosmopolitan. (Graduate in Pedagogy, United Kingdom)

This way, a new subjectivity emerges, characterised by a deterritorialisation not only geographical, but also mental, and by the shaping of a new referential imaginary. According to that imaginary, the migrants see themselves as somewhat that simultaneously forms part of two realities: that of their country of origin and that of the new life scenario of the host country, which is perceived as more open and cosmopolitan, in that it has many different social spaces with which it is possible to identify (Appadurai, 1996; Tomlinson, 1999). This causes, with some frequency, a sense of perplexity and what may be considered an identity crisis:

Sometimes you wonder where you really are from, and you realise that you are neither from one place nor another, and also that you don’t know where you will be tomorrow. (Graduate in Philosophy, Finland)

This extract of an interview shows a sense of loss of roots, of not being linked in identity or culture to any specific place, of not having a definite space-time coordinate. This favours a situation very apt for the development of a sense of normative disorientation and/or a lack

of solid behavioural references. However, when this feeling is successfully overcome, cosmopolitan behaviours and subjectivities are more reinforced. Another aspect of the migrant’s subjectivity is ‘short-term living,’ something that is undoubtedly closely related to the fact that the migrant has abandoned the more or less stable and predictable daily social environment configured by his family and friends, as well as with the aforementioned feeling of lack of solid references that said abandonment has intensified:

Nowadays there is no long-term future, I have learned to think in the short term. I will never know if I’m going to be here for two years, five years, ten years....I do not know. What I do know is that I don’t want to stay in London my whole life, I know that for sure. (Graduate in Sociology, United Kingdom)

One cannot affirm that a long stage in the host country inevitably leads to this ‘migrant subjectivity,’ since certain aspects may favour a strategy of adaptation to the host society through an idealisation of the present, thus generating a more converse perception (phobia towards the origins). This may happen in those—generally scarce—cases in which, after having emigrated, there is a significant improvement in socioeconomic status, which means that some of the migrants affected by said improvement tend to set themselves apart from their situation of origin or that of their Spanish compatriots, upon noticing the worse socio-economic position of many of the latter in the host society:

I’ve been here so long and I’m so British, I do not like to get along with Spaniards; they’re lazy, they’re content to be here washing dishes; that way it’s hard to get where I have managed to be. (Graduate in Pharmacy, United Kingdom)

In this discourse an attitude similar to that of the ‘syndrome of the new rich’ (Veredas, 1999) is observed. That is, in those cases in which the emigrants achieve in the host country a social status in line with their level of education, a transformation in their system of values and their self-perception may occur, so that they may end up highlighting the qualities of the new social class to which they belong after their job advancement.

However, something both the converse subjectivity and what we have called cosmopolitan subjectivity share is that they have been configured after a long period living in the host society, which has favoured a process of maladjustment to the Spanish culture and has eliminated almost all possibility of return from the discourses constructed by migrants presenting one of those identities:

There is a limit; the Spaniard who has consecutively spent more than six or seven years abroad, six years in a row, six or seven, for that Spaniard it’s already difficult, that one Spaniard stays there; that’s what

happened to me; you form a family and you have no choice but to stay. (Graduate in History, Chile)

Thus, confronting and overcoming the obstacles typical of the early stages of the migration process as well as the first cultural conflict after arriving in the host country entails a process of maladjustment to the way of life typical of the society of origin, which in turn use to make the migration a 'no-return' one.

5. Conclusion

During the migration process, young people confront various situations that affect their perceptions and adaptation strategies. The idea of emigrating emerges in an adverse context that hampers the development of a stable life project, a context in which youth emigration becomes part of the social imaginary as a way of escaping from the tragic effects of the economic crisis. Interactions with this scenario foster a subjectivity fuelled by a converted discourse (hatred for the Spanish environment), especially if someone lacks two elements essential for the transition to adult life: a life project of their own and a stable job as a means for carrying out said project. Thus, these two factors become the main elements that explain recent migrations of qualified people.

Subsequently, once the contact with the new culture takes place, said converted subjectivity begins to be reconstructed, mainly due to the loss of primary social referents and relationships (peer group, family) and to the difficulty to overcome migration obstacles (language barrier, cultural shock, discrimination, etc.). This prompts emigrants to redirect their perception towards nostalgia as a way of searching for a social environment similar to that left behind. Overcoming said migration obstacles will be key for the reconstruction of the subjectivities and the possible return. That way, failure would entail an extreme longing that would increase the possibility of returning home (nostalgic adaptation), whereas success would lead to a process of maladjustment to the way of life in the society of origin.

This process would begin after a long period living in the host society, which would cause a continuous maladjustment to Spanish culture, thus emerging an identity crisis due to having a lot of new social referents and spaces to identify with (attainment of the cosmopolitan and/or migrant subjectivity). In this stage, the subjectivity may be redefined depending on the social prestige achieved in the host society. Thus, obtaining a job in line with the emigrant's qualification (fulfilled migratory expectations) and with a high salary could favour converted adaptation as a defence of the new social position achieved and as a way of identifying with (or comparing to) the new culture. We cannot forget that these adaptation strategies and/or subjectivity redefinition are not typologies which remain constant through time, but they are constantly reconstructed because of the social inter-

action that takes place in the contexts typical of the migration process.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Appendix
Table A1. Young migrants' typology.

	Converted adaptation (focus on the 'here and now')	Nostalgic adaptation (focus on the 'there and then')	Cosmopolitan adaptation: Between two worlds
Discourses supporting the different subjectivities	Young people who assimilate the predominant culture of discomfort and frustration of the current Spanish context. They embrace the negative values of their discourses and take the social discomfort they perceive to an extreme	Young people halfway between two realities. Even though they are physically abroad, they are still psychologically rooted in their origins. They present a critical attitude towards the Spanish context although they don't channel it in the form of a phobia, but they show nostalgia for some aspects of the Spanish culture.	Young people living in the host country for a long time, which makes them feel between two realities. They show some tie to their country of origin, but feel uncomfortable when they return due to the maladjustment process they have undergone.
Modification of identity loyalties	They identify with the outgroup composed of the natives of the host country. They are distant to the ingroup of their original Spanish society. In their discourses, they try to see themselves as citizens of the host country.	They identify to the ingroup composed of other Spanish emigrants. It's a defence against the great obstacles they find when integrating themselves into the new society.	They use to identify to people from other countries who share some characteristics with them and face similar obstacles: young people with a high education level who have emigrated looking for jobs that match said education level.
Adaptation to host country	Their adaptation strategy is trying to avoid contact with other Spanish emigrants within their peer group while trying to quickly adapt to local customs.	They use to adopt a 'separation' acculturation strategy. Their peer group use to be composed of other Spanish emigrants. They try to keep and reproduce the Spanish customs within said group.	A hybrid and heterogeneous perception has been developed in their subjectivities, so they use to show some empathy for other cultures. Their peer group use to be composed of other Spanish emigrants, as well as of young people from other countries and from the host country.
Perception of the possible return	The idea of the no-return is present in the discourse of this group, since for them, going back to Spain is having failed in their intention of developing a stable life project in the host country.	For this group of young people, returning is essential, since they keep strong ties to their country of origin. They think of returning very frequently, although they use to postpone that project due mainly to the context of economic crisis that is affecting Spain.	This group does not see the return as something definitive. They have lived a long time outside their country of origin, so they are maladjusted to that way of life. Thus, when they return from time to time, they feel disoriented and don't find their own space.

Table A2. Modification of subjectivities throughout the different stages of the migration process.

Emergence of the migration discourse	Arrival to the host country: Dealing with migration barriers	Maladjustment to origin: reinforcement of converted subjectivity or mutation into hybrid subjectivity
Context		
<p>The dishearting context of the Spanish society, marked by unemployment, job insecurity and political corruption, has lead young people to pessimism and frustration due to their inability to achieve stable life projects. This makes them to see emigrating as the way of escaping an adverse and hostile environment.</p>	<p>The initial clash with the host society makes young immigrants to feel between two worlds. Although they are not physically in Spain, they remain mentally attached to their spaces of origin. Thus, they try to find and reproduce an immediate environment similar to the one the left behind.</p>	<p>After a long stage in the host society (approximately 5–6 years), a process of maladjustment to the origins begins. This makes an inner conflict emerge in the heart of the immigrant. This may lead to a reinforcement of the converted attitude (not coming to terms with the past) or into a hybrid subjectivity (acceptance of all the times and spaces of the migration process). In both cases, a maladjustment to the Spanish way of life occurs.</p>
Reconstruction of the migrants' subjectivities		
<p>Young people develop a converted discourse (exaltation of the present). They feel phobia or hatred towards Spain since they perceive a lack of future and an inability to establish a stable life project. Moreover, expectations over the migration increase during this stage due to the distorted information given by the media and to conversations with other migrants.</p>	<p>In this case, young people redefine their converted attitude into nostalgic subjectivity. This is due to the emergence of obstacles typical of the first stages of the migration process (language barrier, cultural shock, feeling lonely). This causes a loss of the previous comfort zone, with family, constant social relations, and surely being aware of their vital spaces. All of this causes uncertainty for the modification of various social referents.</p>	<p>In this case, young people redefine their converted attitude into nostalgic subjectivity. This is due to the emergence of obstacles typical of the first stages of the migration process (language barrier, cultural shock, feeling lonely). This causes a loss of the previous comfort zone, with family, constant social relations, and surely being aware of their vital spaces. All of this causes uncertainty for the modification of various social referents.</p>
Influence on the possible return to Spain		
<p>During this stage of the migration process, young people see the return to Spain as failure in developing stable life project.</p>	<p>One of two possible scenarios may occur: either the development of extreme nostalgic subjectivity leading to returning to Spain, or successfully overcoming the migratory obstacles and starting the maladjustment to the society of origin.</p>	<p>During the last stage of the migration process, a definitive return to the homeland is not considered, due to the maladjustment to the Spanish way of life as well as to the emergence of key factors for the no-return, such as achieving a stable job, having a partner or starting a family.</p>

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