Special Issue

Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion

Editors
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Special Issue: Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion

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Editorial

Introduction to the Special Issue “Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion”

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Issue

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This Special Issue on “Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion”, reports recent cutting edge research into the complex nature of migrant youth settlement in multicultural émigré societies. Drawing on multidisciplinary research, it explores the latest intersecting theories on cultural diversity, intercultural relations and multiculturalism in the context of globalised cities where access to and sharing of public spaces is becoming a highly contested issue.

The articles contained in this volume are based on empirical findings from recent research into migrant youth and everyday multiculturalism, providing nuanced analyses of multifaceted connections, practices and adaptations. They incorporate both local approaches to social inclusion of young migrants in culturally diverse social milieus, as well as global insights into their transnational practices and movements, and the ways these connections impact upon notions of identity and local attachment. As much of young peoples’ local and transnational networking occurs online, some of the articles also examine the way in which young migrants use social media to engage with one another and also with broader social issues. This Special Issue has, thereby, been conceived to generate new understandings into the ways young people, migrant communities, agencies and policymakers can better address the challenges of social inclusion and active citizenship in multicultural societies.

Young people are increasingly seen as the central protagonists in debates about social inclusion as they “have been the focus of both hopes and fears” regarding the future of culturally and religiously diverse societies (Butcher & Harris, 2010, p. 578). When addressing issues of social inclusion and participation, the existing literature reveals two common perceptions of youth (Lentini, Halafoff, & Ogru, 2009, p. 5): first, young people are seen as potential threats to social harmony, yet at the same time the public is worried about their life and employment prospects. Bessant (2003, p. 88) similarly argues that young people are seen as the cause, the victims and also the potential solution of many social problems. Butcher and Harris (2010, p. 449) also note that: “Youth are often simultaneously imagined as at the vanguard of new forms of multicultural nation-building and social cohesion, and as those most inclined towards regressive nationalism, fundamentalism and racism”.

These multiple, and often conflicting, views of youth are prevalent in discourses of social inclusion and active citizenship in multicultural societies.

Indeed, and particularly since the 2005 London bombings, when young people of migrant backgrounds were suddenly seen as both an increased source of risk, and as being at risk of processes of radicalisation, Australian federal and state governments introduced a suite of policies, and programs supposedly aimed at assisting migrant and refugee youth with issues of settlement and belonging. Research demonstrates, however, that youth in general, and particularly migrant
Youth still face many barriers in relation to social, educational, economic and political participation (Black, Walsh, & Taylor, 2011). With regards to social participation, racism is an ongoing issue in Australia, and is often fuelled by media misrepresentation of youth from minority ethnic backgrounds, particularly Muslim and African youth. These young people are often depicted as deviant and as presenting a threat to society (Francis & Cornfoot, 2007, p. 25; Lentini et al., 2009, pp. 3-7; Mansouri, Jenkins, & Walsh, 2012).

A lack of proficiency in English language skills can also restrict many aspects of participation for newly arrived young migrants and international students in society (Matthews, 2008; Cranitch, 2010). Research demonstrates that the level of support provided by families, friends, schools, adult mentors and community and government organisations, plays a considerable role in determining the ultimate types and levels of participation among young migrants in social and political affairs (McDonald, Gifford, Webster, Wiseman, & Casey, 2008, pp. 26-27). Social networks, which have the potential to provide a kind of intercultural glue, can similarly have a significant impact on successful resettlement of young migrants (Mansouri, Skrbis, Francis, & Guerra, 2013; McDonald et al., 2008, pp. 26-27).

Sports and recreation activities are other crucial social inclusion strategies that can assist in combatting racism, acquiring language and forming social connections. Yet cultural and economic barriers can also restrict migrant youth participation in these types of activities (Francis & Cornfoot, 2007, p. 32).

Another ongoing issue is that most programs and policies, aimed to assist migrant youth with social inclusion are determined by adults (Harris, 2010, pp. 584-586; Harris & Wyn, 2009, p. 329). Yet, spaces for meaningful political participation by youth should ideally include input from the young people themselves at the level of design and ongoing management. These spaces are increasingly likely to be virtual, as young people are advanced users of online media who regularly connect with various virtual communities to express their opinions and conduct political debates (Harris, 2010, pp. 580-582).

These societal, intergenerational and socioeconomic factors are all critical in shaping the ways in which migrant youth understand, negotiate and ultimately shape everyday encounters in multicultural societies. The articles included in this Special Issue engage with the above themes and further contribute to developing a greater understanding of the many challenges that young migrants and refugees face when settling in a new society, as well as their strategies for coping with this transition.

Andrew Jakubowicz, Jock Collins, Carol Reid and Wafa Chafic argue that the moral panic over the participation of minority youth obscures the underlying issues facing young migrants. These issues include: a changing economic climate that impacts on employment; geographical segregation of cultural groups; closer diasporic linkages enabled by increased communication and mobility; and conflicting theoretical accounts of the effects of diversity on social inclusion. They recommend that policies aimed at assisting youth must address these deeper factors of exclusion, and that negative perceptions of migrant youth as ‘threats or victims’ need to be countered by providing greater opportunities for migrant youth representation and participation in varied forms of media.

Luidmila Kirpitchenko and Fethi Mansouri’s article focuses on migrant youth’s motives for, as well as perceived barriers to, their social engagement. The authors discuss the findings of an extensive study of young people of African, Arabic-speaking and Pacific Islander backgrounds in Melbourne and Brisbane, which positions young migrant people as active agents of social inclusion, rather than as passive recipients of government support.

Along similar lines and based on the same extensive research, Fethi Mansouri and Masa Mikola focus on migrant youth from Muslim and Arabic-speaking backgrounds and investigate how they negotiate cross-cultural engagements and tensions between family, community and the greater society. They suggest that governmental interpretations of citizenship are limited and that these migrant youth experience citizenship as a circular and contested journey.

Ameera Karimshah, Melinda Chiment and Zlatko Skrbis challenge common misconceptions and fears around Mosques, which are often envisaged as places that are conservative, gender-exclusive and socially restrictive. Instead they examine how Mosques serve as centrepieces of social networking, reflexivity and participation for young Muslims in Brisbane.

While much research on young people and social inclusion, including this volume, has largely focused on Muslim, Arabic-speaking and African communities, Danny Ben-Moshe and Anna Halaoff’s article explores manifestations of anti-semitism as experienced by Jewish students in Canberra. They describe the negative effects that this discrimination has had on these children and young people, and suggest possible ways to counter these prejudices through antiracism education, and education about diverse religions and beliefs more broadly.

Moving to a more positive dimension of migrant youth social engagement, Amelia Johns, Michele Grossman and Kevin McDonald explore the impact of sport-based youth mentoring schemes on developing resilience toward violent extremism. Their article focuses on a sport-based programme for Muslim young men, aimed at facilitating wellbeing and social inclusion, which was developed by the Australian Rules Football League’s (AFL) Western Bulldogs Football Club, in association with the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police and a local City Council. The authors discuss the
benefits and challenges of researching whether sport-
ing programmes can contribute to advancing social in-
clusion and building resilience against processes of rad-
icalisation. In so doing they examine the role of social
networks, bridging capital and the importance of
breaking down negative perceptions and barriers be-
 tween young Muslims, local communities and govern-
ment agencies, in fostering resilient communities.

Finally, Amelia Johns examines how Muslim young
people’s social networking can create new spaces of civ-
ic engagement and political participation. She investi-
gates online interactions between young Muslims, and
between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, which she ar-
gues can counter the marginalisation of Muslim voices
and challenge negative perspectives of Muslims and Is-
lam in the public sphere. Johns’ research also challenges
social and political policy constructions of citizenship,
social inclusion and participation, asserting that young
Muslims perform citizenship and exercise their rights
online in ways that are more personal and expressive.

Many of these articles purposefully include the
voices of culturally and religiously diverse young peo-
ple, and focus on the issues they have raised and the
solutions they have proposed to these problems. As
many of the authors have described, in order for refu-
gee and migrant youth to feel more included in the so-
cieties in which they live, and the world which we all
inhabit, their voices should be more actively listened to
and not merely heard. In other words, migrant and refu-
gee youth must be engaged at all levels of social poli-
cy and political negotiation as empowered individuals
capable of effecting positive change for themselves,
their ethnic communities and the broader society at
large (Mansouri et al., 2013).

There is no shortage of research on some of these
important issues, yet there remains a strong resistance
within social policy circles to examine underlying caus-
es of grievances, and to address endemic structural
barriers to migrant youth participation in society. There
is also a great need to develop youth-led educational
initiatives aimed at increasing intercultural and interre-
ligious understanding in order to counter narrow and
negative stereotypes of refugee and migrant young
people and their communities. We hope that this vol-
ume can further stimulate debate on these critical is-
 sues and we thank all of the young participants in these
studies, and the authors of these articles, for sharing
their insights with us and the Journal’s readership.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Minority Youth and Social Transformation in Australia: Identities, Belonging and Cultural Capital

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Abstract

Increasingly minority youth, especially from Muslim backgrounds, have been seen in Australian public policy and the media as potentially disruptive and transgressive. In some European societies similar young people have been portrayed as living in parallel and disconnected social spaces, self-segregated from interaction with the wider community. Yet Australian ethnic minority youth do not fulfil either of these stereotypes. Rather, despite their often regular experiences of racism or discrimination, they continue to assert a strong identification with and belonging to Australian society, albeit the society that marginalizes and denigrates their cultural capital. In particular it is the neighbourhood and the locality that provides the bridge between their home cultures and the broader world, contributing to a range of positive aspirations and fluid identities.

Keywords

belonging; cultural capital; migrant youth; participation; racism; space

Issue

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1. Immigration and Social Transformation:
An Introduction

Since the beginning of this century immigration to Australia has accelerated, accompanied by a major rise in shorter-stay residents such as contract workers and international students. As immigration has once more burgeoned, so the youth component of the immigrant population (born overseas and born locally of overseas born parents) has also expanded (Collins, 2013). This paper asks: what does the expanding presence of minority youth mean for the social transformation of Australian society? As analysts such as Anita Harris (2010) have argued, public policy is increasingly perturbed by the apparent growing marginalisation of minority youth from mainstream culture, yet the public conversation about these concerns fails to recognise either the super-globalisation that has transformed national boundaries, or the densification of diasporic communities that globalisation has thus enabled. Our research on minority youth reported and discussed in this paper, explores to what extent minority youth are indeed “marginalised”, and what the implications may be of their relationship to questions of identity and belonging. We ask whether the social transformations that are discernable are producing marginalisation, and if
they are, are these tensions productive of positive social transformations leading to new forms of inclusion and belonging, even if they are no longer codified in some archaic, unitary and undifferentiated idea of the nation?

We begin by setting the context, then we explore what we mean by social transformation, and then we proceed to identify and investigate the place of minority youth in the processes we examine. Finally we assess the implications for public policy of the situations we report.

Australia has been a society formed by immigration since its first invasion and settlement by Europeans in the late eighteenth century, so that much of its history has been concerned with government control over the makeup of its population. Australia had a culturally diverse population in the nineteenth century; the original Indigenous population encompassed many hundreds of nations, while the gold rushes in particular drew tens of thousands of fortune-seekers including significant numbers of Chinese and other Asians. Much of this non-European immigrant diversity was stalled by the White Australia immigration restriction policies introduced after Federation in 1901, while Indigenous populations also fell under the impact of introduced diseases, frontier violence and the loss of land. For three generations after the foundation of the Commonwealth, national policy focussed on building a population by excluding “non-White” immigration and expelling non-White settlers, while assimilating the surviving Indigenous peoples. After World War II, national policy expanded its search for immigrants to non-British parts of Europe, while retaining barriers to non-White entry. In a short period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s however, governments of both conservative and Labor orientation opened up immigration to new populations from across the world (Jakubowicz, 2009).

From about 1970 onwards migration included new intakes of Muslims in what had been in the past an overwhelming European Christian immigration intake; it also began to include significant numbers of both Christians and non-Christians from Indo-China and China, and from the Middle East. Later it would also draw in people from many African countries, both Christian and Muslim, so that by Census Day 2011 Australia was no longer recognisable in its ethno-cultural diversity as the country it had been two generations before (DIAC 2013; Ho & Jakubowicz, 2013). Importantly the diversity of Australian society means that the huge concentrations of particular immigrant groups in specific localities that characterise many European countries and have been linked to the “failure of multiculturalism” (Jakubowicz, 2013; Meer & Modood, 2011; Modood, 2012) are not part of the Australian urban scene. Nevertheless long-entrenched structures of racial exclusion and hierarchies continue, especially in some areas of major cities, driven in part by regular moral panics over threats to the social order that these immigrants and their children might represent (Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007; Markus, 2014).

These increasingly diverse diaspora communities are one of the local consequences of well-recognised global processes of “social transformation”, especially those accelerated by neo-liberal economic development on the one hand, and major local conflicts in source countries on the other (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014). Today the newest waves of arrivals enter Australia in very different circumstances and encounter a very different economic dynamic to those that greeted the first generation of post-White Australia immigration after the 1970s (Collins, 1991; Jakubowicz, 2009). The social transformation now underway in Australia plays a key role in generating the opportunities and constraints that young people from newer immigrant groups experience, often in ways not previously considered by public policy. Specifically the neo-liberal driver behind social transformation (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014) appears to generate specific challenges for minority youth in relation to their familial and socially-acquired cultural capital (Shah, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010) including its value to them for gaining access to the wider opportunities of a multicultural society such as Australia.

Four factors are important in positioning the debate about immigrant youth in contemporary Australia. Given that our interest is in how youth from immigrant communities perceive and are perceived by Australian society, we wish to outline these factors and then explore how they interrelate.

First the economic restructuring that has characterised the decades after 1983 with the floating of the Australian dollar, deregulation of finance and reduction of tariff protection, has further integrated Australia’s economy into that of the wider region and internationally. As a consequence many industries that sought to recruit lower skilled migrant labour in the past, have now either heavily upgraded the technologies they use and thus the skill base of the workforce they require, or have failed and closed in increasingly competitive business environments (as has the motor vehicle manufacturing industry over 2013 and 2014) (Collins, 2013). For immigrant families, especially those with a fairly low skill base (including some refugee communities) (Refugee Council of Australia, 2011) the loss of employment by the first “father” and “mother” generation has seriously disrupted family life (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2007). Lack of employment opportunity has become an increasingly vital factor in the public activities of “second (or even third) generation” youth, feeding drivers that push some young people into the informal or “black” economy (Abdelkerim & Grace, 2012). Education institutions have become front-line agencies in managing the impact of this changing political economy on the life chances and public attitudes of young people (Liddy, 2012).
Second, cities such as Sydney, Perth and Melbourne have become geographically segmented, where some localities can draw on industries that are more closely tied to the economic opportunities of an increasing globalised market, while others are more locally constrained, offering fewer possibilities for growth. Moreover in these cities three in five of people are either first or second-generation immigrants (born overseas or parent born overseas); overall some 43 per cent of Australia’s population is “immigrant” in that sense (Ho & Jakubowicz, 2013). Yet unlike many European cities most neighbourhoods in Australia’s cities are diverse rather than monocultural; it is difficult therefore to speak of them as “ethnic ghettos” specific to any particular ethnic or immigrant group. It is exactly the diversity of locality, however, that makes attitudes to the local area among young second generation women and men such a useful barometer of their identification with Australian society more broadly.

Third as globalisation has provided increasing opportunities for travel to homeland societies, and technology has opened up instantaneous communication between homelands and Australia, the time space barriers that used to press so heavily on earlier generations of immigrants in relation to sustaining diasporic links have effectively been relegated to history. Globalisation has therefore greatly problematized the ‘national’ in Australia, enabling diasporic identities to be easily accessed and sustained (Collins et al., 2012). For youth from minority immigrant communities (short-handed here as “minority youth”) their sense of personal status and identity has to continually negotiate their changing perceptions of their parental homeland societies and culture, their own identification with Australia, and their perception of how they are perceived in Australia by others from outside their communities. Identity is thus a contingent framework (Colic-Peisker & Walker, 2003) rather than a fixed state, and its expression can vary considerably, responding to personal, communal, societal and global conflicts (McLeod & Yates, 1999).

Fourth, the cultural capital of minority youth has become an increasing controversial framework for analysis of their experiences (Jakubowicz, 2011). The use of cultural (Wimmer, 2007) and social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Bassani, 2007) as conceptual lenses through which the aspirations and experiences of immigrant youth can be interpreted has become an important avenue for research. Schaefer-McDaniel (2004) in her review of social capital has argued that for youth three dimensions are crucial: their social networks, interactions and sociability; their levels of trust and reciprocity in peer and community relations; and their sense of belonging and attachment to place (as discussed by Hill & Bessant, 1999). Modood and his colleagues in the UK (Shah, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010) have taken the concept of cultural capital, as initially proposed by Bourdieu (2010), and argued that cultural capital should not be separated from its close links to socioeconomic class factors and personal economic capital. Even so, they suggest that class per se does not provide a sufficient framework for analysis without the insights provided through a more anthropological and political inflection drawn from specific cultural analyses. Thus their elaboration of “ethnic (cultural and social) capital” helpfully extends how we might explore and interpret the lived experiences of immigrant youth, within the framework of structural constraints and cultural hierarchies that they encounter in a multicultural society like Australia—with its continuing racialised patterns of advantage and disadvantage. A tension has been identified between in-group focussed “bonding” social capital, and other-group linking “bridging” social capital in diverse multicultural neighbourhoods. Diversity, it has been argued (e.g., Putnam, 2002) reduces inter-ethnic trust, tending to reinforce bonding relationships at the expense of bridging, potentially fragmenting localities into pockets of bonded monocultures that interact but do not integrate. These worries can be key contributors to moral panics over the local presence of minority youth.

2. Who Are Immigrant Youth?

The most recent Australian Census (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) demonstrates the rapidly changing makeup of immigrant minority youth. For our purposes we are setting the parameters of this group by their regions of birth, their non-European origins, and the presence among them of significant Muslim groups. These parameters derive from their fairly low position on an ethnic ladder of status that places European-Australians at the top, and non-Europeans further down the list. The hierarchy is compounded by class factors, partly reflected in the occupations of their parents, and partly for older youth, in their own occupations or lack of them. Intergenerational social mobility, a key goal of many migrants, further confuses the ethnicity/class interaction (Redmond, Wong, Bradbury, & Katz, 2014). Finally, while religious identity is not a defining characteristic of minority status, and does not point to class position or to educational attainment, the stereotyping of Muslims has been one of the more controversial aspects of their marginalisation in public discourse. In addition to the overseas born, minority youth also encompasses many young people born in Australia of immigrant parents, who fit the concept of “visible minority”. The continuity between Australian born and immigrant lies most often in their shared experiences of racism, discrimination and disadvantage (Collins et al., 2012).

In a population of 21.5 million, there were 1.4 million young people aged 15–19, and 1.46 million aged 20 to 24 at the 2011 Census. Together they comprise
some 13 per cent of the population. Young people born outside Australia made up 13 per cent of 15–19 year olds, and 22 per cent of 20–24 year olds. Non-Europeans made up some 115,000 of the 15–19 year olds (about 2/3 of the overseas born), and about 265,000 of the 20–24 year olds (some 77 per cent of the overseas born). The largest overseas born groups are those from North and East Asia (about 24 per cent), South East Asia (20 per cent), Oceania (17 per cent) South and Central Asia (16 per cent), North West Europe (14 per cent), Sub Saharan Africa (7.5 per cent) and North Africa and the Middle East (6.7 per cent). Of those born overseas the largest group (35 per cent) comes from South and Central Asia (especially Pakistan and Afghanistan), then North Africa and the Middle East (30 per cent) (especially Somalia, Lebanon and Iraq), followed by South East Asia (11 per cent) and sub-Saharan Africa (8 per cent). Muslim youth make up about 3 per cent of the whole youth cohort in Australia, perhaps surprisingly low given the level of critical attention focused on young Muslims, especially males. Muslim young people born in Australia represent the single largest country of origin (45%), and are increasingly of Australian-born parents. As indicated by the Census (ABS, 2011) however, the cultural diversity among Muslims is great, with over 60 different national origins identifiable.

3. What Our Research Reveals About Immigrant Youth: Key Parameters

We turn now to examine how these four parameters are extended when applied to two commissioned research projects on immigrant youth. Our projects were initiated by government bodies during the period of a national Labor Government between 2007 and 2011, and were carried out for the federal bureaucracy of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. In each case the research was framed by a wider public debate, each with their own element of moral panic, about the integration of immigrant youth, their identification with Australian social values as expressed by key elites and reinforced in the media, and concerns expressed by the communities from which they came about stereotyping, marginalisation and social exclusion (Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007).

The first survey was of 340 youth—144 males and 195 females—aged from 14 to 17 years living in Western and South-Western Sydney (Collins, Reid, Fabiansson, & Healey, 2010). Stratified sampling was employed to ensure that at least 80 per cent of respondents were first or second generation male or female youth from a wide range of minority backgrounds, with minority defined as being of a culturally and linguistically diverse background (CALD). We refer to this as the 2007 CALD study (“CY”). The majority of youth surveyed—75 per cent of males and 61 per cent of females—were second generation immigrants that is, born in Australia but with one or both parents born overseas. The largest group of mothers was born in Tonga (25.6 per cent) followed by Korea (11.2 per cent), Lebanon (10.8 per cent) and Sudan (10.5 per cent). The largest group of fathers was also born in Tonga (24.5 per cent), followed by Korea (11.3 per cent) Sudan (10.9 per cent) and Lebanon (10.6 per cent). Others were born in New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, China and England. Only 4.3 per cent of the mothers and 4.4 per cent of the fathers were born in Australia.

The second survey of 332 young male and female Muslim Australians conducted at the Muslim Eid Festival and Fair in Sydney in 2010. This survey differed from the one above in that it also included informants aged 15 to 25: 165 informants were aged under 18 and 167 aged between 18 and 25. We refer to this as the 2010 Muslim Youth study (“MY”). Like CY, the majority (73 per cent of the respondents aged 15–25 years) were second generation immigrants born in Australia. First generation informants were mostly born in Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon, although respondents were also drawn from another 26 birthplaces reflecting the great diversity of the Australian Muslim community. The overwhelming majority (94 per cent) of respondents were Australian citizens.

The methodology employed for both surveys drew on a multi-entry snowball sample, rather than a random sample. This method allowed us to use pre-existing networks of trusted relationships. These two surveys provide some insight into immigrant youth in contemporary Australian society in general, and into aspects related to their social capital and social relationships and their subjective take on matters related to identities and belonging in particular. The four parameters allowed an examination of how different elements of the lives of our research subjects were interconnected.

4. Employment Opportunities

Conservative and Labor Governments in Australia have enthusiastically embraced the globalisation agendas of deregulation of finance, reduction of tariff levels and the privatisation of public sector assets and institutions. This has had a profound impact on the Australian economy in general, and the Australian labour market in particular, with secondary industries like manufacturing continuing to decline as tariff protection has been reduced or eliminated, while services sector jobs continue to increase. At the same time Australian immigration policy has been fine-tuned to embrace the globalisation agenda (Collins, 2013; Jakubowicz, 2013). There are a number of interrelated developments. Immigration intakes have reached record levels, despite the Global Finance Crisis (Collins, 2008). While the UK and New Zealand remain the major source countries for Australian immigration, intakes from Asia, Africa
and the Middle East have increased considerably in the past decade while skilled and highly qualified permanent and temporary immigrants are prioritized over permanent family and humanitarian entrants, though most skilled immigrants bring family dependents with them. A significant proportion of those arriving in Australia under the Refugee and Humanitarian Program are young people, with 59 per cent of new entrants arriving in the five years between July 2005 and June 2010 aged under 25 years on arrival, and 31 per cent aged between 12 and 25 (Refugee Council of Australia, 2011).

Employment is a key factor in successful immigrant settlement and on the socioeconomic outcomes for first and second generation immigrants, including those whose parents arrived in Australia some decades ago. Employment opportunities for minority immigrants, including young people, have been shaped by the restructuring of the Australian economy that has accompanied globalisation. Changing patterns of labour market segmentation in Australia show that CALD immigrants with tertiary education and skills in the services sector tend to get good jobs and incomes while other CALD immigrants with lower levels of educational achievement—including many Muslim immigrants— are concentrated in jobs in the declining manufacturing sector or lower level jobs in the services sector (Foroutan, 2008). On average, unemployment rates for immigrants are only slightly higher than non-immigrants (Australian Productivity Commission, 2006), although immigrant minorities experienced larger increases in unemployment in the economic downturn following the Global Financial Crisis (Hugo, 2011b; Collins, 2011). But averages conceal a variety of different immigrant labour market experiences for CALD immigrants. More disaggregated analysis by ancestry (a proxy for ethnicity), generation, religion or by category of immigrant entry reveals significant variation about the mean in terms of unemployment rates for immigrants. For example, 2006 Australian Census data reveals that first and second generation immigrants of Lebanese/Middle Eastern ancestry, or Vietnamese and North African ancestry, had rates of unemployment two-to-three times higher than average. Twenty-two per cent of the Vietnamese second generation and 15 per cent of the North African/Middle East second generation were unemployed at a time when the Australian economy was generally regarded as fully employed with average national unemployment rates between 5–6 per cent (Collins, 2011). Muslim immigrants also suffer significantly higher unemployment rates than others, with prejudice and discrimination as key factors (Lovatt et al., 2011). Refugees are the most disadvantaged cohort of immigrant arrivals and face the greatest settlement difficulties in Australia: one-third of refugee-humanitarian entrant settlers remain unemployed after three years of settlement in Australia (Hugo, 2011a, p. 104). Moreover a 2014 study of locality-linked youth employment demonstrated that youth unemployment in regions of high minority residence could be as much as three times as high as the national average, and twice as high as youth unemployment in general (though lower than rural rates). Discussing the implications of global economic restructuring the Report argued that “the global financial crisis has had a scarring impact on the job prospects of Australia’s young people” (Brotherhood of St Laurence, 2014; Kwek, 2013).

Educational outcomes for CALD immigrant youth are also uneven. Youth from families of professional and highly skilled immigrant parents—such as skilled immigrants from China and India and Korea, the largest countries of skilled CALD immigrant arrivals—have strong educational achievement in Australian schools. On the other hand, first generation youth from families where the parents have lower educational qualifications and second generation youth whose parents arrived in earlier decades when there was less priority given to skilled immigration intakes have relatively poor educational outcomes in Australian schools (Redmond et al., 2014). This uneven educational performance of CALD youth in Australia reinforces the patterns of labour market segmentation and the uneven labour market outcomes of CALD youth. Young people from refugee families have relatively poor employment and educational outcomes compared to other CALD youth and to Australian youth as a whole (Abdelkerim & Grace, 2012).

Minority youth bear many of the costs of Australia’s globalisation and neo-liberal economic agendas. As such employment opportunities decline, higher levels of more technically advanced skills are required, and school and other public education systems suffer under government funding cuts, and there is a “flight” of middle class children to private (fee-paying) schools associated with religious or cultural communities (Redmond et al., 2014).

5. Urban Segregation

Most Australian immigrants settle in the large Australian cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and Adelaide (Hugo, 2011b; Hugo, Feist, & Tan, 2013). But immigrant settlement is not evenly distributed within these cities, particularly for CALD immigrant minorities. This is particularly evident in Sydney and Melbourne, Australia’s largest cities where over half of all Australia’s immigrants settle. CALD immigrants are concentrated in the western and south-western suburbs of Sydney and the western suburbs of Melbourne; however specific ethnicities never approach a majority of the immigrant population (Islam is not classed as an ethnicity, but rather as a faith community).

Not surprisingly then Muslim immigrants also concentrate in these areas. According to the 2006 Census nearly half (47.3 per cent) of Muslims in Australian...
lived in Sydney, while just under a third (30.3 per cent) lived in Melbourne (DIAC, 2007, p. 6). By 2006 seven out of the top ten Australian suburbs of Muslim immigrant settlement were in Western and South-Western Sydney: Auburn, in Sydney’s western suburbs, was the most Muslim Australian suburb, with 24.8 per cent of the population reporting that Islam was their religion, followed by Bankstown (15.2 per cent) and Canterbury (13.7 per cent) (DIAC, 2007, p. 7). Patterns of immigrant settlement are changing as newly-arrived professional and tertiary educated immigrants move to wealthier suburbs, such as Chatswood in Sydney’s North Shore for Chinese immigrants and inner north-west suburbs of Strathfield and Eastwood for the Sydney Korean population. At the 2013 election the ten federal electorates with the highest proportion of Muslims were in western Sydney or Melbourne, and the top five Vietnamese seats were in the same areas; they were all held by the Labor Party until the election. The Chinese population was more dispersed across geography and evinced a wider partisan representation (Mumble Census Gallery, 2013).

Urban unemployment rates in Australia reflect the cultural geography of Australian cities. These western suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne are the areas where the manufacturing industry is located, and so exhibit high unemployment rates. For example, in 2013 while Sydney’s Northern Beaches and Eastern Suburbs had unemployment rates of 2.1 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively, Fairfield—Liverpool—perhaps the densest area of minority immigrant settlement in Australia—experienced an unemployment rate of 7.1 per cent. Similarly, Melbourne’s Outer Western area had unemployment rates of 7.1 per cent while in North Western Melbourne the unemployment rate was 9.4 per cent. Broadmeadows, a Melbourne western suburb with a very high CALD and Muslim population, is set to experience much higher unemployment rates as the Australian car industry closes down. Unemployment rates are higher for youth than adults. When viewed through the lens of cultural geography, it is clear that minority youth who live in areas such as western Sydney have very high unemployment rates. In May 2012, for example, when the overall unemployment rate for Western Sydney was 5.5 per cent, for youth it was 17.9 per cent, with youth in Fairfield Liverpool experiencing much higher unemployment (Montoya, 2012). Muslim unemployment rates are more than double the average (Masanauskas, 2012).

Immigrant settlement patterns suggest that while new immigrants concentrate in areas such as the western suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, immigrant ghettos do not emerge. As Hugo (2011a, p. 24) put it: “A distinctive characteristic of Australia’s largest cities compared with some other world cities, however, is that while there are suburbs with high proportions of foreign-born residents, these concentrations are not dominated by a single birthplace group”. This fact has important implications for issues related to the social cohesion of minority youth in Australia and to their sense of belonging. The riots involving immigrant minority youth in the UK (Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham in 2002) and France (Paris in 2005) occurred in places with much greater concentration of immigrant youth from a particular ethnic or religious background (Collins & Reid, 2009). The Cantel Report (Cantel, 2004) into the Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham riots identified the “depth of polarisation” between white and minority youth in Britain, leading them to live disconnected “parallel lives”. Our reports on research with immigrant youth living in the suburbs of Western and South Western Sydney demonstrate that the population is very diverse in terms of ethnic, cultural, religious and social class, cosmopolitan or multicultural rather than monocultural immigrant ghettos.

6. Global Versus Local

As globalisation increases the immigrant youth populations of all western nations, there has been a growing anxiety about the extent that these immigrant youth will identify with the nation and contribute to nation-building and social cohesion in coming decades. These concerns about the national identity of immigrants and the extent to which they will buy into and identify with their new nation is not recent phenomena and can be traced to the first years of the post-war Australian immigration program (Kabir, 2008). Yet the recent anxiety about minority immigrant youth—particularly those of Muslim faith—are sharpened in the post-9/11 environment, by the Cronulla beach riot, the Sydney gang rape involving Muslim Lebanese youth, the Bali bombings, the arrest of Muslim men in Sydney and Melbourne for terrorist activities and, more recently, the involvement of Australian youth of Muslim background fighting in the conflict in Syria (Jakubowicz, 2009). These anxieties are generally framed around a homogenized and stereotypical racialised construction of minority immigrant cultures and the Muslim religion as being anti-Western, criminal and hostile to and separate from—rather than integrated into and contributing to building—the Australian nation (Kabir, 2008). Given the limitations of social mobility pathways (e.g. well-paying jobs with promotional prospects) for some immigrant minority youth, their integration rather than their marginalisation and exclusion into Australian society in part depends on how their identities are validated as stakeholders in the society.

As Tabar, Noble and Poynting (2003) point out in their research on Australians of a Lebanese background, “identities are not simply symbolic entities through which we represent ourselves and others, but embodies practices of identification and adaptation deploying particular kinds of resources which we position ourselves in diverse social domains”. The inform-
ants in the 2007 CY study were asked to describe their national identity. Two thirds of the young people surveyed were born in Australia yet only slightly more than one in three of the respondents identified as “Australian”. The rest gave a wide range of identities mostly related to the country of origin of their parents. This supports the argument that minority youth in Sydney have diverse, fluid and multiple identities. Butcher and Thomas (2003) who also interviewed young people in western Sydney, found that they forged hybrid identities that incorporate their migrant identities with elements of “being Australian”.

A slightly different but related question about whether the informants in the 2007 CY survey felt Australian all the time, often, sometimes or rarely, found that about half of the respondents “felt Australian” (48.5 per cent) all the time or often. Two in three young people reported to “often feeling good about living in Australia” and another one in four young people reported to “sometimes feeling good about living in Australia” while a fifth of the young people did not really feel “Australian” at all. Despite this finding most (two in three respondents) liked living in their Sydney suburb and felt that they belonged in and had ownership of their local neighbourhoods. On the other hand, one in three males and one in four females “rarely” or “never” felt ownership of their local area.

The youth surveyed demonstrated strong aspirations and a confidence about their future in Australia. Only a few of the youths expressed pessimism about their chances of achieving their preferred occupation in the future. When asked to nominate their most important values, friendship, honesty, trust, family, respect and loyalty were the most frequently mentioned.

The Muslim youth survey (2010 MY) inquired into many of the issues explored in the earlier survey, including subjective assessments of identity and belonging. Most of the young Muslim Australians—82 per cent of young Muslim women and 78 per cent of young Muslim men feeling—felt good about living in Australia. One in three (37 per cent) of Muslim youth surveyed self-identified as “Australian” while a similar number (37 per cent) gave their identity as “Australian Muslim”. Another one in five (19 per cent) responded that they were of hybrid identity, a combination of Australian with some other ethnicity or nationality. In other words, the vast majority of Muslim youth (93 per cent) surveyed used the identifier “Australian” in part or whole of their identity. When compared to the 2007 CY survey reported above, the youth in the 2010 MY survey was more likely to identify as Australian. One explanation for this may be that the experience of the Sydney Cronulla beach riots of December 2005 resonated more in the 2007 survey than the 2010 survey. Another relevant factor to consider is that the Muslim youth survey also included those aged between 18–25 years. Even so, Muslim youth continue then to identify as Australian, belying the fear expressed by some that non-Christian immigrant youth represent a threat to Australian social cohesion (Kabir, 2008).

7. Cultural and Social Capital

A key aspect of minority immigrant youth integration relates to the extent to which they are socially included in their neighbourhood and, by extension, their nation. In the UK the Cantel Report suggested that immigrant youth were disconnected from other British youth: they lived parallel rather than interrelated lives. At a neighbourhood level the social relations between minority immigrant youth and others and their level of social interconnectedness and trust with other youth and adults is thus an important area of investigation. The two Sydney surveys canvassed responses to a wide range of questions designed to gain information about the lives of these immigrant youth, their friendship networks, values, aspirations, identities and belonging. In the 2007 CALD youth survey most young people surveyed reported that they had multicultural social networks and lived lives connected to youth of other ethnic, cultural or religious background. The survey provides strong evidence that social cohesion represents the norm for inter-ethnic youth relations in Sydney’s western and south-western suburbs. The young people who identified as “Anglo”—the largest group in the sample—stated that in descending order their friends came from Australia (the majority), followed by Tonga, Lebanon, parts of Asia, as well as China and Korea. The second largest group was from New Zealand. The majority of their friends were Tongan, Asian and Islander. The Sudanese had the majority of their friends among Australians and among other Sudanese, but also among the Lebanese and Indian youth.

The 2010 MY survey also explored the friendship networks of Muslim youth in Sydney. The vast majority (80 per cent) of respondents reported that they had non-Muslim friends. Only 16 per cent of the youth surveyed had only Muslim friends, with Muslim youth aged under 18 twice as likely to report that all of their friends are Muslim as Muslim youth aged over 18. On the other hand, two in three (64 per cent) surveyed reported that most of their friends were Muslim, while 16 per cent reported that some of their friends were Muslim. Finally, questions about the values and beliefs that the Muslim youth held to be important were asked. Two in three replied that honesty and religious practices were most important. More than half of the respondents also listed responsibility, tolerance and respect for other people, politeness and neatness and patience as key values of the Muslim home. Other important values were hard work, independence, obedience, leadership and imagination. Clearly these are values that are consistent with “Australian values”, and they challenge arguments that present Islam as a...
threat to the Australian way of life.

Discrimination is an issue of key concern to Australia’s Muslim communities’ post 9/11. We thus asked the Muslim youth surveyed about their experiences of discrimination at school and in the public domain. Just over one half of respondents (55 per cent) had never experienced discrimination at school, while 11 per cent reported one incidence of discrimination. 30 per cent reported that they had experienced discrimination a few times and 4 per cent reported that they had experienced discrimination often. While two in three Muslim youth who attend Muslim schools had never experienced discrimination at school, one in two who attended non-Muslim schools had never experienced discrimination at school. Experiences of discrimination at school increased with the age of the respondent. This issue was not explored in the 2007 survey.

Muslim youth experiences of discrimination in the public domain were also explored. Only a minority of respondents (28 per cent) reported that they had never experienced discrimination in public. Most of those Muslim youth surveyed reported experiencing discrimination once (19 per cent) or a few times (45 per cent). When the gender dimension is explored, slightly more young Muslim women reported experiencing discrimination in public than young Muslim men, though gender differences do not appear to be significantly different in this regards. Responses to women who wear the hijab are a key factor here.

8. Marginalisation, Inclusion, Transformation and Public Policy

While immigrant youth make up about one in five of the youth population, in parts of Australian cities where their communities are concentrated, seven in ten of overseas born youth are not of European origin. Two in five of North African and Middle East youth, and a quarter of South and Central Asian youth are Muslim (ABS, 2011). Thus in a comparatively short period, working class urban minority youth, once thought of as being predominantly from southern European origins, are now far more likely to have African, Middle Eastern or South Asian cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, urban minority youth also increasingly come from middle class and professional immigrant families of Chinese, Korean or Indian cultural backgrounds (Collins, 2013). What then are the implications of our research about their identities and experiences for both scholarly questions about approaches to analysing “minority”/“majority” relations, and policy questions about appropriate strategies for government and civil society programs?

We have argued that the public moral panic over identification and participation of minority youth obscures four more deeply rooted factors, namely:

- rapidly changing economic circumstances and the impact of these changes on labour market demand and skill availability;
- geographical segregation and the differentiation in opportunity that such segregation intensifies;
- enlivening of diasporic linkages to countries of origin through the ease of communication and travel together undermining the “tyranny of distance”; and
- widely divergent assessments of the value of the cultural and social capital minority youth inherit, reproduce and create.

In a multicultural society there can be no single “culture”; but rather a complex intertwining of cultural fragments “sewn together” from time- and place-inflected life ecologies. These fragments, of different weights, draw in dominant culture expectations and resources, ethnocultural familial experiences, intergenerational peer group cultures, and global youth cultural ideas and desires. On reflection, these fragments are integrated into personal narratives that call up a hybrid identity, in which young people talk about the situational and contextual bases for expressing one aspect of their identity over others.

Given the changing economic context, overlaid with cultural power hierarchies and public discourses that regularly problematize the presence of minority youth, one of the most important parameters of social transformation will be the possibilities associated with stable, satisfying and reasonably-remunerated employment. We can see in the current recalibration of labour markets, that younger people with limited or inflexible labour market skills will experience greater difficulty in securing work. Compounded by discrimination in the labour market and stigmatisation in the discourses of the wider media, finding worthwhile job opportunities presents its own set of very real challenges.

The cultural geography of Australian cities has not created the mono- or bi-cultural urban enclaves that produced the “parallel lives” of minority youth in Britain. The multicultural neighbourhoods of Australian cities allow for more cosmopolitan international and friendship networks to develop. Nevertheless evidence persists of the reinforcing processes of marginalisation, in which racism plays a rather too important role. Our research shows that minority youth do identify with their neighbourhoods and localities, feeling that they have a stake in the local turf, yet a minority are less comfortable even in the spaces in which they live compared with young people of Australian majority heritage.

Possibly the most challenging aspect of the social transformations in which minority youth are entwined relate to their sense of personal value and worth. Given that identity builds through praxis, this is to say the performance and production of self in a complex and resistant world, every component plays a contributing role. Minority youth draw on cultural capital that they
possess (from the sources discussed above) and in the process utilise and contribute to the building of social capital. It is apparent from the findings that there is evidence for “bridging social capital”, and that “bonding social capital” is quite well developed in comparison to relations they have into wider institutions and across into other social groups. This is not unusual for minority immigrant communities experiencing significant levels of discrimination, racism and various forms of inequality. Their capacity to enter into wider social and economic relations will therefore depend heavily on the success they have in gaining educational and training qualifications. The minority of minority youth who do not succeed in the educational system (and the majority clearly are able to gain social mobility in the generation after their parents’ arrival) are confronted by labour markets far less interested in unskilled school leavers.

The public policy implications of this research also require us to link together the four critical components. Social inclusion will depend on awareness and careful appreciation of local economic environments and the sorts of skills that are increasingly required. Urban regional employment and educational intelligence strategies across three levels of government, incorporating civil society and business organisations should plan to integrate technology and employment forecasting, with flexible forms of educational delivery at school, in technical and further education (TAFE), and in more specialised professional areas. Unfortunately national policy priorities have moved away from concerns that would directly address the employment/social inclusion nexus (the Coalition government has abandoned the former government’s social inclusion strategy and the Board that managed it, while state governments are reducing funding to the TAFE sectors in New South Wales and Victoria). Moreover the national government has argued that the market should determine the survival of businesses, and those that are not viable in a free market should be permitted to disintegrate. The most significant concentrations of most vulnerable minority youth live in regions where “old industry” is most prevalent, and they are therefore most likely to experience the closure of industries that in the past offered significant employment to their parents and elder siblings. Industry redeployment strategies should therefore include those “not yet” in the workforce as an element in any equation.

Even though Australia is a multicultural society, many public narratives of contemporary life tend to portray minority youth as antagonistic to the core values of society. Yet our findings demonstrate that on many counts minority youth hold very strongly to what might be seen as core Australian values, especially values associated with more conservative faith communities. Moreover, they have strong aspirations and see a very strong and positive future for themselves in Australia in the coming decades.

While the public policy implications require more attention than can be given here, two cultural policy trajectories need to be reinforced. First sustained work is needed with the media by government and civil society to reduce the negative and stereotypical representation of minorities as threats or victims. The media will need to take greater responsibility for opening opportunities for the representation of and participation of minority youth as the subjects in their own and wider Australian narratives, from advertising to drama, from news and current affairs, to comedy and melodrama. Where this proves effective it can increase the confidence and therefore the participation of minority youth, while also reducing the apprehension expressed by older Australian communities about newer and unfamiliar arrivals. There is also a clear need to strengthen anti-racist discrimination institutions, policies and practices in Australia, though the current trend is strongly in the opposite direction.

Finally a wider societal conversation needs to emerge that can discuss what it means to have a multicultural society that reduces the salience of ethnicity as a barrier to mobility and participation, while supporting the development of cultural expressions that bridge between Australia’s many cultural communities, however “novel” they may appear to “old Australia”. The social transformations sweeping through Australia as a consequence of global, national and regional changes will carry serious consequences for cohesion and inclusion. Recognition of the dangers and the identification of the opportunities may ensure that their impact leads to greater future economic prosperity, mobility and socio-cultural integration.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Social Engagement among Migrant Youth: Attitudes and Meanings

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Abstract
This article explores migrant young people’s engagement, participation and involvement in socially meaningful activities, events and experiences. This type of social participation is approached in the social inclusion literature using the notions of social capital and active citizenship (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000). A key objective, therefore, is to explore the attitudes, values and perceptions associated with social participation for young people. They include the meanings that social engagement has for migrant young people, along with drivers and inhibitions to active participation. The article focuses on both the motives for being actively engaged as well as perceived barriers to social engagement. It is based on a large study conducted among migrant young people of African, Arabic-speaking and Pacific Islander backgrounds in Melbourne and Brisbane, and presents both quantitative and qualitative (discursive) snapshots from the overall findings, based on interviews and focus groups. While many studies have centred on the management of migration and migrants, this article draws attention to the individuals’ active position in negotiating, interpreting and appropriating the conditions of social inclusion. Accounting for the multidimensional and multilayered nature of social inclusion, the paper highlights the heuristic role of social engagement in fostering the feelings of belonging and personal growth for migrant youth.

Keywords
active citizenship; belonging; civic engagement; intercultural relations; migrant youth; motivations for participation; social capital; social networks

Issue
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1. Introduction
In recent scholarship on ethnicity and migration, there has been renewed interest in the notions of social inclusion, social engagement and social cohesion, perceived as an alternative to the previously dominant focus on social conflict and related notions of racism, discrimination, marginalisation and alienation. Both terms, social inclusion and social exclusion, first began to enter public discourse in France in the 1970s. The terms spread to the rest of Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, becoming a particular policy concern of the UK Government in 1997 (Saunders, 2005). Their entry into Australian public discourse has been recent by comparison. With the election of the Labor Government in November 2007, addressing social issues via social inclusion initiatives promised to play a prominent role in public policy development in Australia (Gray & Hayes, 2008). It is notable that the terms social inclusion and social exclusion were used in the social sciences scholarship to expand the discussion beyond poverty and economic disadvantage by accounting for the complex relations between the individual and the society (Fangen, 2010). One of the pioneers of this focus in the
social sciences was Room (2004) who conceptualised social exclusion as a multi-dimensional form of disadvantage, which included aspects of material and non-material exclusion.

Room and others have been central to the development of a new “social exclusion” perspective, which is designed to account for the heterogeneous, multicultural and complex reality of contemporary social relations. This new perspective stresses a variety of socio-demographic and socio-cultural variables that contribute to social exclusion, and looks at their complex interaction instead of focusing on separate demographic variables like education and income. Hunter (2009) introduced the notion of “cumulative or circular causation” in explaining the cycles of social exclusion, as interrelationships between the various dimensions of disadvantage (employment, income, education) are complex and tend to be mutually reinforcing. In the last two decades, social exclusion discourses have moved beyond recognition of “class” as the primary driver of disadvantage, with ethnicity and migration status becoming “totally new focuses in the research on social exclusion” (Fangen, 2010, p. 134). Modood’s (2013) work is an example of this interactionist perspective, which focuses on the intersectionality of variables such as ethnicity, gender and class background to explain social exclusion.

As a companion concept to analyses of social exclusion, “social inclusion” proved to be a fertile platform for addressing diverse issues related to social inequality. Social inclusion effectively acquired various terms and interpretations. For example, Ulf Hedetoft (2013, p. 1) suggests in the inaugural editorial article of this Journal that social inclusion includes such notions as “social inclusiveness, cultural cohesion, communal values, a shared identity, mutual recognition, respectful dialogue, peaceful interaction, policies of integration”. Another example for analysing the complexities of social inclusion is suggested by Freiler (2002) who identified five critical dimensions of social inclusion that are particularly relevant to migrant youth. They include: valued recognition, human development, involvement and engagement, proximity, and material wellbeing.

Acknowledging the multidimensional and multilayered nature of social inclusion this article seeks to highlight the role of social engagement in fostering feelings of belonging and personal growth for migrant young people. First, the paper reviews theoretical considerations describing the notions of social engagement and social capital and how they are of special relevance to migrant youth. Second, it discusses the motivating aspects of social engagement and looks at the incentives which underlie young people’s increased engagement, including resultant feelings of belonging, security, community, and support; as well as getting service or help; meeting people with similar interests and backgrounds; and building friendships. The article concludes with an analysis of meanings attached to civic participation and social engagement among migrant youth, including feelings of empowerment, identity building, abilities to defend human rights, promote social justice and social equality, and opportunities for personal development.

2. Social Engagement and Migrant Youth

The notion of social capital, broadly defined as available social networks, has a strong scholarly tradition (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000). This paper takes into account the fundamental premise of the social capital literature, namely, that strong engagement in societal networks generally correlates positively with a range of favourable social, health and attitudinal outcomes (Vyncke et al., 2013; Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 2000; Putnam, 2007). As the literature shows, migrant experiences in general are fluid since migrants resettling in a new country have to establish new social ties by taking part in the social networks of a new country. The identities of migrant young people are particularly fluid, owing to their life stage; adolescents in the process of formation are foremost susceptible to the influences of their networks. Kroger (2004, p. 208) has analysed five theoretical streams in studies of adolescence and youth that identify adolescence as a “time of heightened activity for most in the loss and creation of new balances”. For the current generation of young people, and migrant youth in particular, these ordinary negotiations of identity are more challenging, as young people have grown up in the period when neoliberal policies tied to individualisation, accompanied by a retreat from multiculturalism, have become pronounced at the political level and echoed in everyday media discourse (Portes, 1998; Harris, 2013). In these political conditions, young migrant people represent an optimal group for exploring the impact of the practices of social engagement on their wellbeing and sense of belonging.

Younger people are in a particularly vulnerable position because not all social networks have a positive effect and some may have a distinctly negative impact. Some negative consequences of social capital may include “exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward levelling norms” (Portes, 1998, p. 15). Of foremost concern to Australian public policy makers are “situations in which group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society” (Portes, 1998, p. 17). Especially following the 2005 Cronulla riots in Australia, young migrant groups have been linked to socially divergent behaviour and marginalised activities. As Harris (2013, p. 3) points out: “Youth-driven civil unrest, terrorist attacks and the visibility of large and youthful immigrant population in global cities have become constructed as
interrelated problems that call into question the sustainability of diversity and the future of the nation as we know it”.

This paper is interested in exploring culture-specific networks that provide an important and positive resource in negotiating adjustment to a new country, particularly in the settlement stage (Hagan, 1998; Colic-Peisker, 2005), while acknowledging that their effect may also be negative if networks become too restrictive and lead to ghettoization (Hardwick, 2003) or the promotion of radical agendas (Tilly, 2007). The current generation of multicultural youth have been particularly subjected to problematizing and marginalizing discourses by the majority culture (Triandafyllidou, 2006). For example, migrant youth in Australia have been described as “prone to inter-ethnic conflict, lacking intercultural awareness, in need of values education, dissociated from participatory life and disruptive to community harmony” (Harris, 2013, p. 141). In addition, young migrant people have become a “target of anxiety about national security, social cohesion and the future of culturally diverse nations” (Harris, 2013, p. 141).

Despite the abundance of literature on social capital and social networks, there is a dearth of sociologically informed understanding on the significance of social networks for fostering feelings of belonging and personal growth for migrant youth. Active positions of migrant youth in negotiating social engagement and participation have rarely become a focus of the research. Harris (2013, p. 5) writes that young migrant people “are rarely seen as civic actors, creative agents or multicultural citizens in their own right, and the complex realities of their everyday experiences of living in multicultural environments have been over-looked”. This paper endeavours to respond to this call and examine active stances, self-perceptions and attitudes that young people associate with participating and belonging to social networks. In approaching migrant youth as active creative agents, this article finds very relevant the term “self-Actualizing Citizens”, which was coined by Bennett (2003). Self-actualising citizens describe people who are actively and “self-reflexively” involved in personally meaningful and shifting social networks.

3. Methodology

The paper is based on both statistical and narrative research findings of a large study conducted among migrant youth in 2011–2012. Migrant youth were selected among three broadly clustered ethno-cultural groups: Arabic-speaking, Pacific Islander and African. These groups were chosen for participation because they are arguably among the most vulnerable and marginalised in Australia. Their vulnerability has been seen in recent high-profile cases linking them to the manifestations of prejudice, stigmatisation, racism, public disorder and inter-communal conflict. A quantitative survey included 484 young people, aged 15 to 23, in Brisbane and Melbourne, Australia. Young people included in the project had varying lengths of Australian residency and migration pathways, spoke a variety of languages and had varying levels of intergroup and intragroup social participation. See Table 1 below for a summary of the main demographic characteristics of the survey sample.

Table 1. Survey Sample at a Glance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Groups</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Three Top Countries of Birth</th>
<th>Length of Residence in Australia</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>African</strong></td>
<td>15–17 y/o: 42.2%</td>
<td>Male: 49.4% Female: 50.6%</td>
<td>Sudan: 46% Ethiopia: 14.3% Kenya: 6.6%</td>
<td>&lt;5 yrs: 50.6% 6–10 yrs: 34.9% 11+ yrs: 9.0% Australian born: 3.0%</td>
<td>Christian: 74.9% Muslim: 15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18+: 56.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific Islanders</strong></td>
<td>15–17 y/o: 46.4%</td>
<td>Male: 42.4% Female: 57.6%</td>
<td>New Zealand: 42.4% Australia: 40.4% Samoa: 9.8%</td>
<td>&lt;5 yrs: 15.9% 6–10 yrs: 15.2% 11+ yrs: 27.2% Australian born: 39.7%</td>
<td>Christian: 94.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18+: 53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arabic-speaking</strong></td>
<td>15–17 y/o: 39.4%</td>
<td>Male: 47.9% Female: 52.1%</td>
<td>Australia: 50.6% Iraq: 22.9% Lebanon: 6.6%</td>
<td>&lt;5 yrs: 20.0% 6–10 yrs: 15.2% 11+ yrs: 12.7% Australian born: 50.3%</td>
<td>Muslim: 64.5% Christian: 32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18+: 60.6%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the help of the partner multicultural community organisations, fifty-seven interviews were conducted in Melbourne and forty-six interviews in Brisbane. Across both sites, there was a fairly even distribution of each ethno-cultural participant group. In addition, approximately thirty individuals (from all three participant groups) joined focus groups organised in two cities in 2011.


Young people were surveyed about the positive outcomes of having social connections with people (e.g., family, friends, neighbours, groups and associations). After analysing multiple responses, three categories were created that were coded as follows: (1) feelings of security, community, support; (2) getting a specific service or help; (3) meeting people with similar interests and backgrounds and creating friendships.

4.1. Feelings of Security, Community, Support and Getting Help

Connections with people provided “feelings of security, community, support” — it was a particularly popular response, with 68.9 per cent of Africans, 72.8 per cent of Pacific Islanders; and 63.3 per cent of Arabic-speakers selecting this option. When answers were compared within two age groups—15–17 y/o and 18 years and over—stronger support for experiencing feelings of security, community, support were found among the older group for Africans (70.5 per cent versus 65.7 per cent for the younger group) and Arabic-speakers (67.3 per cent vs. 56.9 per cent), but Pacific Islanders reported the opposite. Thus, among Pacific Islanders, 75.7 per cent of the younger group (15–17 y/o) and 70.0 per cent of those who were 18 y/o and over said “yes”. Gender did not have a profound effect on the responses to the question on perceiving “feelings of security, community, support” in all there groups. Within the African group, 73.8 per cent of females responded “yes” compared to 63.9 per cent of males. Among Pacific Islanders, 71.3 per cent females and 75.0 per cent males, and among the Arabic-speakers 60.9 per cent females and 65.8 per cent males agreed with this option.

Participants were asked whether they think they “get help to get things done” from the “different types of connections” they have with people. Negative responses to this question predominated among all three groups, thus 53.9 per cent of Africans and 50.3 per cent of Pacific Islanders said “no”. The largest divergence however was reported among Arabic-speakers with 36.7 per cent saying “yes” and 63.3 per cent saying “no”. A related option of getting a “specific service or help out of the connections” generated even more modest support: 18 per cent of African youth, 20.5 per cent of Arabic-speakers and 24.5 per cent Pacific Island young people confirmed that they received a specific service or help through their networks. Difference between genders was noted in all three groups in how much they thought that connections that they formed with people (their networks) can provide support or a specific help to them. In the African group, 21.4 per cent of females (compared to 14.5 per cent of males) and in the Pacific Island group, 29.7 per cent of females (compared to 20.7 per cent of males) were more likely to feel that they have received help. In the Arabic-speaking group, however, it was males (25.3 per cent) who perceived that they were more likely to have received service or help out of connections than females (16.1 per cent).

4.2. Building Friendships, Meeting People with Similar Interests, Backgrounds

Building “friendship” was a main desired goal of social connections for young respondents, with three out of four people of the overall sample selecting this option. Preference for gaining “friendship” (75.2 per cent) as a result of connections with people was followed by a “feeling of security” (68.2 per cent), and “meeting people with similar interests and backgrounds” (49.4 per cent). This latter option was more important for Pacific Islanders (62.9 per cent) than it was for the other two groups. All these elements of belonging were more keenly felt among the male participants across all three groups.

In the Pacific Island group, engagement in social networks was closely tied to young people’s feelings of belonging within and beyond their own ethnic group. At various times, interviewees cited both desires for outward engagement (with others of non-Pacific Island backgrounds) and engagement with those from shared cultural backgrounds as a means to foster feelings of belonging across contexts. A female, 18, from Brisbane said:

“It’s that sense of belonging that makes you want to go back to those groups and form those groups. Everyone has that sort of intrinsic feeling to belong to a group of people that are there to support you and to go through life with you and the challenges and to help you out.

For the African group, the impact of network engagement on a sense of belonging was multi-dimensional and shaped by the network member composition. Interviews reveal that some young people embraced associations with other Africans while others rejected them entirely. As most African interviewees were relatively recent arrivals, networks were often composed of other refugees from similar backgrounds. These highly homogenous networks appeared to foster a
strong sense of intra-group, ethnic belonging amongst interviewees. A female from Brisbane observed: “When I hear them speaking Ugandan I get a big smile, like 'oh my God, someone like me'. It feels so good”. Thematic analysis indicates that the conflicting feelings were tied to fluctuating perceptions of intra- and inter-group belonging, specifically to perceptions of being “Australian” and living the “Australian way of life” (Melbourne Focus Group).

For those interviewees who participated in more ethnically or culturally diverse networks, the sense of belonging was linked with perceptions of being Australian. It meant that the more diverse their networks were, the more “happy” or “lucky” they perceived themselves to be. A female, 16, from Melbourne explained:

“If I’m with my country people I don’t feel very good or happy because we speak the same language, but if I’m with other people [...] people that come from different country, I feel good, happy to be with them [...] I’m not really good when I’m with my own people. I can’t be really happy.

This participant along with the next spoke of their desire to be included in the heterogeneous social networks of a new country and the importance of this inclusion for their experiences and feelings of belonging. Another participant described how lucky he felt having “white friends” (people outside of his immediate circle) while being still new to the country:

“I feel like I’ve been really lucky coz when I speak with […] the African guys, some of them were born here and they are 20–19 (years old). […] They say they don’t have white friends. That shocks me. [...] And when they see that all my friends are all white, they say to me ‘How you go with that?’ ‘Were you born here?’ ‘Did you go to high school here?’ and I say ‘No, I’ve been here for 15 months’. (Male, 20, Melbourne)

Similarly to African and Pacific Island interviewees, the Arabic-speaking group also experienced context specific types and levels of belonging. Within the Melbourne sample, Australian born interviewees or those with longer settlement duration were typically more engaged across diverse cultural and ethnic groupings and felt belonging both within and beyond their ethnic communities. For the recent arrivals and younger Arabic-speaking interviewees, engagement in family- or ethnico-specific networks appeared to be the context in which their belonging was sought and cultivated. A female, 16, from Melbourne said she felt more understood within her cultural group: “Because it effects, because they are from the same culture, so my family, and some of my friends, so they understand me more”.

Another female, 16, from Melbourne described her bond with her family: “I feel like they like me, I like to always be with them. Yeah, like I belong to somewhere”.

Arabic-speaking participants negotiated their sense of belonging across multiple places, ethnicities and cultures on a daily basis. Sometimes they felt a sense of attachment to their multicultural or hybrid selves and expressed support for heterogeneous, multicultural Australia. At other times, sense of belonging was closely tied to one of the elements of their identity. Among the Muslim interviewees in Brisbane, formal and informal networks centred almost exclusively on the mosque. As such, the belonging which network participation fostered was tied to being a Muslim. Amongst the Arabic-speaking interviewees, there was a strong sense that negotiating Australian belonging or identity for the Muslims, Arabs, and Middle Easterners was a daily task and one that was informed, but yet also changed, according to socio-cultural contexts.

Belonging within and across different networks was impacted by gender, religious affiliation and time lived in Australia. In the survey, 47.6 per cent of Arabic-speaking participants said that they had someone to rely on as a result of their network involvement. This increased with the length of residency in Australia: 42.4 per cent of those that were newly arrived; 44 per cent of those that had lived in Australia for 6–10 years; 52.4 per cent of those that had lived in Australia for 11 or more years; and 51.2 per cent of those that were born in Australia had someone to rely on as a result of their networks. Younger Arabic-speaking participants were more inclined to build friendships with people who are involved in their social networks. Making friends was an important outcome of network engagement for 81.5 per cent of aged 15–17, and 69.3 per cent of those aged 18 and over. Females (77.0 per cent) were more likely to have made friends through their networks than males (70.9 per cent).

4.3. Intersections of Formal and Informal Networks

Interviews and focus groups revealed that the involvement of young people in social networks across the three groups is characterized by a strong degree of intersection, mutual enforcement and cross-pollination between their formal and informal social networks. This interconnectedness was most apparent within the Pacific Islander youth group. Interviewees consistently reported a blending of different networks, from formal to informal and vice versa. For most interviewees, while network involvement was expansive, network members were predominantly limited to other Pacific Islanders. The researchers came across an interesting cross-cultural hip hop choir in Melbourne’s West (Massive), in which a considerable number of Pacific Islanders were involved. The group is not limited to Pacific Islanders, but includes a range of young people.
whose “sense of place” is an important element of their everyday lives and creative outlet. As one participant explained:

A large number of kids are coming together to rehearse. It’s a good example how some of our Pacific Islander leaders have stepped up and motivated everyone. And it hasn’t been a massive campaign or anything like that. It’s just people knowing that it’s the place to be and respecting each other. […] They promote respect for each other […] (Pacific Islander Focus Group, Melbourne)

Among the Pacific Islanders group, parents or other family members often cooperate in the formal networks, thus adding an informal level of interaction to their involvement in formal networks. For instance, a case of interviewees’ involvement in a cross-sectional initiative called Pacific Pathways (Melbourne) presents a bridge between two types of networks and brings out the dialogical nature in young people’s network participation. The reasons for a blurring divide between formal and informal networks may also be found in a set of different traditions, habits, and culturally and/or religiously based practices. Moreover, blending of the roles of the community leaders, religious leaders, family members and friends, was also noticeable. Overall, the Pacific Islander group presents distinctively rich material in terms of crossovers of formal and informal network activities for young people.

For African youth, the interconnectedness of networks was less prominent though still strongly noticeable. With the majority of African interviewees being relatively recent humanitarian arrivals, there was a strong dependence on service providers not only for practical settlement assistance, but also for network building. Several interviewees noted that it was through their formal involvement with service providers, that their informal networks (mainly friendships) were developed. As a young male from Brisbane explained:

Most of us we either play sports, we are good at it. Then we get into it and then be friends from there. Or music, you do the music then make friends together. Like you can’t just go talk because you don’t speak the language. So you have sports and music first, then making friends. Without having talking, it’s through doing.

In an interview with a young African male who came to Australia on his own (without any family members) and spent the first seven months in an immigration detention, there was a noticeable transition from formal to informal type of networks even though they involved the same people. One of the interviewee’s first contacts in Australia were people visiting immigration detention casually, but they were at first still perceived as more formal then informal connections. Later on, some of these visitors and volunteers became “good friends”. A male from Melbourne called this circle of people his “family” as they helped him the most when settling in the new environment: “They helped me to learn English coz I didn’t know even like job or study […] So I just got information, coz everything is new. Everything is new for me. The system is new, CentreLink, school, everything. Even crossing the road, everything is so different”.

For the Muslim sub-group within the broader Arab-speaking youth group, interviewees in Melbourne tended to participate in the activities targeted for all Arabs, rather than only for Muslims, as one participant explained:

The activities that I wouldn’t join are […] the Islamic activities […]. Although it’s my religion, but I just wouldn’t join it. I would join Arab activities […] anything to do with Arab, because it’s general, it’s all religions. But Muslim […] I don’t know what information they’re going to give me. I wouldn’t join a special religious activity, something to do with religion […].

Another participant said: “Islamic society unfortunately represents Muslims born in Australia, I don’t feel like they represent me who came later […]”. A third participant added: “So you just feel more out of place, because you are meant to relate to them, but you go there and you can’t relate […]” (Arabic-Speaking Focus Group, Melbourne).

In Brisbane, on the other hand, mosques served as a central venue for participants for creating formal and informal networks. Within the Muslim group, only one person mentioned non-mosque related networks (university and career related); for the vast majority of interviewees, all networks (even when raising money for nationwide initiatives, such as Cancer Cure) were organized and facilitated through mosques. When describing his experience in charitable activity, one male interviewee from Brisbane explained: “I’ve been part of the Muslim community and been called upon to join, so I did”. Or, with regards to religious practices, a female from Brisbane said: “Normally I come here twice a week because on Fridays I come for Qur’an and on Sundays I come for Arabic. Then some people come on Saturdays and Fridays. Some people just come on Fridays”.

In Melbourne, religious activities generally did not get such a strong support among interviewees and focus group participants who identified with either Christian or Muslim religions. Except of one interviewee who was teaching in an Islamic Sunday school, religion did not play a significant role in the networking or network participation. This interviewee engaged in a range
of other social activities; but the majority of these were not connected to religion. This does not mean, however, that religion was not important to the personal lives of people who participated in this study. There was consistent support for going to church, mosque or another place of worship among all groups. Survey data showed that in Melbourne, 37.9 per cent of Africans, 44.4 per cent of Pacific Islanders, and 35.6 per cent of Arabic-speakers liked to go to places of worship. Their church or mosque attendance however was a more personal initiative or connected to their extended families. As a male participant in Melbourne explained: “That’s where I can see all my relatives, and the people that I know [...]. And where I practice my culture”. In most cases, church attendance did not extend to youth groups or associations that would be specifically tied to religious organizations. A female interviewee in Melbourne said: “Yeah my church has a youth group. [...] Usually their things are on a Saturday or a Sunday. I work Saturday and Sunday so it’s too hard for me. So I’ll just go whenever they have something”.

Network change over time was mostly reported by African youth, the majority of whom had recently migrated on a humanitarian visa (both UNHCR and family sponsorships) and had very limited knowledge of English. Many African interviewees experienced diverse pre-migration situations, including protracted refugee camp stays, and therefore had significant settlement challenges. Consequently, much of early network involvement was limited to opportunities offered through service providers and family members (if available) and typically consisted of engagement with other African refugees. A female participant in Brisbane admitted: “You only keep to the people you know. I’m like you African, I’m African, you know like we should have that connection”.

Indeed, qualitative analysis suggested a strong relationship between the period of settlement and the types of formal and informal networks in which young African’s participated. A male interviewee in Brisbane said:

When I first got here, it was just me with Dinka people. Then the longer I am here, I slowly move out. The longer you’re here, the more relaxed you get. But when you get here, you only be with the people that you are new with. You tend to stick with the people that you have common grounds with.

This excerpt illustrates that, as the duration of respondents’ settlement increased, with arguably concurrent improvements in English language and settlement navigation competency, the types of networks in which young Africans participated underwent some positive transitions. Along with these improvements, interviewees also reported an increased mobility by using public transport, which enabled them to participate in non-local as well as local networks. African young people reported gradual changes in the types of their networks. Despite this, many interviewees sustained engagement with earlier networks, including service provider networks.

Research data suggest that there are a number of factors impacting on network participation for African young people. They include: duration of settlement in the country, proficiency in English, and institutional competency. Most of the interviewees created social connections in the early periods following their arrival and many sustained engagement with early networks, including service provider networks. For some African young people networks changed drastically and this fact suggests the important role of period of settlement in the country as well as level of proficiency in English.

5. Meanings of Social Engagement for Young People

Although many programs exist for promoting social engagement of youth, the meanings of everyday intercultural interactions of young people are rarely examined and young people’s interpretations of social engagement rarely become a focus for research. This research has specifically sought to probe the views of migrant young people as active agents of social engagement, rather than passive recipients of social initiatives and programs. Participants’ motivations and the meanings attached to social engagement are at the centre of this research. Interviewees from all three communities expressed a clear desire for cross-cultural engagement, even if their current networks were predominantly ethno-specific. Among Africans and Pacific Islanders the interest in cross-cultural engagement was higher, with 55.4 per cent and 55.0 per cent saying “yes” and a further 37.3 per cent and 38.4 per cent saying “sometimes” in response to a statement “I like to be involved in activities happening outside of my family/ethnic group”. Among Arabic-speaking youth the interest was lower, with only 34.3 per cent responding “yes” and 47.6 per cent responding “sometimes”. Overall, there was a strong interest in reaching beyond their ethnic or religious communities and creating cross-cultural connections.

5.1. Cross-Cultural Interactions and Identity Building

Motivations for cross-cultural engagement and intercultural interactions somewhat differed for the groups surveyed. For Pacific Islander interviewees in particular, desire for cross-cultural engagement was often a reaction against perceived homogeneity or insularity of the formal and informal networks in which they were engaged, which were overwhelmingly composed of fellow Pacific Islander youth. Several young people re-
ported that parents were not necessarily encouraging of cross-group interactions. Discussing a desire for multicultural network participation, one female interviewee from Brisbane noted: “We need to interact. If they [parents] listen to youth, get the opinion from youth—that will mean more interactions with different cultures”.

Pacific Islander interviewees also appeared curious about the goings-on within different cultures. When asked about why they craved cross-cultural engagement, one male interviewee from Brisbane explained: “Getting exposure to each other’s different backgrounds [...] you know, food, music, just knowing about each other’s different cultural backgrounds”. Another female Pacific Islander interviewee from Melbourne mentioned how the sole exposure to cultural diversity makes one appreciate it and “become more multicultural”:

I think if we had stayed in New Zealand, I would’ve only been hanging out with my kind of people—Pacific Islanders, [...] but we came here. With Melbourne being a multicultural city, I’ve learnt about different cultures, and gained understanding about them, and I think that’s made me a better person.

An African Focus Group participant explained her initial decision to volunteer outside of her ethno-cultural group with the fact that she wanted to reach out to the broader community and create cross-cultural linkages:

In order to get other people interested in your cause you need to get up, because you all know that [...] 9/11 [...] the African community [...] yes we’re black and were in refugee camps and hunger and starvation [...] but you need to let other people outside see that and personalise and humanise that experience.

A female participant of the Arabic-Speaking Focus Group was very supportive of the opportunities for these communities to have cross-cultural interactions:

I think it’s a good idea to bring groups and communities together to achieve something. And it’s always interesting, because you find the solutions together. You have the same problems and the same issues that you go through and you wouldn’t think that.

Every ethno-cultural group included in this survey tended to have different perceptions of the intercultural processes contributing to their identity-building. For African interviewees, participation in multicultural networks appeared to represent a type of cultural competency, as though, the more multicultural their networks, the more strongly they felt that they belonged in Australia. For the Arabic-speaking youth, participation in cross-cultural networks appeared less urgent, particularly in Brisbane. Several interviewees mentioned that cross-cultural engagement was perhaps a good way for others to learn about their culture, religion, etc., and a way to minimize or counter stereotypes and misconceptions. One interviewee reported engagement in cross-cultural networks through raising money for the aftermath of the Brisbane floods. Another male interviewee from Brisbane suggested: “I was thinking we could invite other religions to come and see each other, like for example invite churches to our mosque, like just to talk”. Within the Melbourne sample, some interviewees appeared to participate in cross-cultural networks as a way to distance themselves for singularly “Muslim” or “Arab” networks. For some interviewees in this group, participation in multicultural, non-religious affiliated networks was perceived as important.

5.2. Personal Development and Individual Responsibility

Many participants perceived social connections and networks as contributing to their personal development. They also spoke about individual responsibility and initiative as the necessary components of successful engagement. An African participant of the focus group remarked: “I was the only black person doing at the University doing education. And [...] you have to jump on that opportunity and use it. How did Obama become a president?” He then went on:

If you’re a young person you have an opportunity to educate yourself, to get somewhere. Then you’ll recognise all these advantages that are out there [...] If you’re a smart person, you’ll improve your life. In the life of my parents and of my community as a whole, I have to be a leader, be out there, talk about issues and do what I can do. And it’s up to us.

Another African participant shared her thoughts on individual responsibility and self-motivation:

Most of young people complain and they do nothing about it, thinking that someone else will do things for you. And it’s about the time to prove yourself [...] And also changing yourself [...] you tune to the levels that could be a way of doing things. And this will help you.

An Australian-born 21 year-old female who identifies herself as a Palestinian, and whose family lives in Jordan, after mentioning her fears of facing discriminatory remarks at work, told us that it is nevertheless her responsibility to learn how to react to them in a positive way:
I could help myself by being more confident and more upfront without thinking ‘what if they?’ Just [...] don’t think ‘it’s going to be annoying here’ [...] because you’re going to find that everywhere [...] even if I wasn’t wearing a scarf, I’m going to have people that don’t like me anyway. So through my Islam I’ll show them a good character of what we actually are, so they don’t go thinking other things, so through my good character I’ll show them: ‘I am like you’.

These extended quotes above provide good examples of perceptions and attitudes that young people demonstrate in taking responsibility for actively constructing their identity and building positive cultural values and expectations. These participants all shared a sense of active engagement, or “agency”, in constructing, negotiating and interpreting intercultural encounters.

5.3. Sense of Empowerment

Some participants saw their participation in the social networks as contributing to their sense of empowerment. An African youth explained that she had volunteered both within and outside her ethno-cultural group for over three years now. She viewed her continued participation in the matters of her community with a feeling of personal achievement:

When you wait around and say something, people will see potential in you. [...] People have to see what you do. People have to see how you are fond of things [...]. And you have to prove yourself to the community [...]. And the community has high expectations, especially the African community. (African Focus Group)

Similarly, a female Arabic-speaking participant described her volunteering experiences with a sense of accomplishment and personal growth:

I used to work in the community and I used to feel happier, because you feel like you achieved something. I used to work for a radio and I could deliver something, say something, people call and they say... oh, you have really good... or oh I like the music.

She also explained that her motivation is coming from within, since there is little support from her family or friends:

I don’t find so much support from friends [...]. They are like: ‘Why do you care about other people so much? Worry about your own problems’. [...] Friends [...] they don’t want you to do that. [...] You need to believe in what you’re doing. You need to satisfy your own self.

A sense of self-empowerment as well as a sense of active agency have been evident in these personal reflections.

6. Conclusion

This article explored social engagement by positioning young migrant people as active agents of social inclusion, rather than as passive recipients of a variety of government programs and initiatives. This research examined young migrant people’s attitudes, values and perceptions associated with involvement in social networks; and the diverse ways young people negotiate social inclusion in their everyday lives. In doing so, it explored the meanings that social engagement carries for the migrant youth, along with the driving forces and inhibitions to participation. The findings suggest a view of the “self-Actualizing Citizen”, which describes “self-actualizing” or “self-reflexive” involvement in personally meaningful and shifting social networks (Bennett, 2003).

This research provided evidence for approaching and conceptualising the social inclusion agenda as a positive shift from a previously prominent conflict perspective, also described as a “tolerance model” which highlighted poverty, unemployment and marginalised moral attitudes of migrant youth (Mansouri & Lobo, 2011, p. 6). While within the “tolerance model” migrant youth tended to be negatively portrayed as “passive subjects” in need of being “managed and disciplined” (Mansouri & Lobo, 2011, p. 6), the social inclusion model highlights a holistic approach to integration. This paper contributes to portraying social inclusion as a “transformative idea” that has a potential for challenging and redefining the society we live in (Levitas, 2003). What needs to be redefined is the society’s approach to diversity and the social inclusion model calls for a “valuing of diversity, not just the recognition of diversity and difference. It recognizes that diversity and difference do possess their own worth—and are not challenges to be overcome” (Harvey, 2003).

This article’s focus on “transformative” potential of social inclusion is also helpful in redefining an idea of mutuality of inclusion, or what Parekh (2006) calls a “dialogical form” of integration. The social inclusion model recognises that belonging and identity can be seen as mutually interactive phenomena that are both socially managed and personally negotiated (Caxa & Berman, 2010). While many studies have centred on the management of migration and migrants, this article draws attention to the individuals’ active role in negotiating, interpreting and appropriating the conditions of social inclusion. Accounting for the multidimensional and multilayered nature of social inclusion, the paper highlighted the heuristic role of social engagement in fostering the feelings of belonging and personal growth for migrant youth.
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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

References


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Crossing Boundaries: Acts of Citizenship among Migrant Youth in Melbourne

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Abstract

This paper focuses on how migrant youth in Melbourne with experience of direct or indirect migration negotiate cross-cultural engagements and tensions between family, community and the greater society in which they are supposed to participate as political subjects. It examines whether the meaning and interpretation of citizenship in Australia allows migrant youth to act as full and active citizens with all the contradictions and difficulties inherent in acting as “a bridge between two worlds”. By voicing the personalised journeys of young people dealing with uneasy questions of displacement, identity and belonging, this paper examines the complex ways through which migrant youth negotiate and in some cases bridge intercultural tensions within a multicultural society.

Keywords

belonging; citizenship; multicultural youth; participation; social networks

Issue

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1. Introduction

A number of policy initiatives in Australia have sought to improve the societal conditions of young people in general and migrant youth in particular. This can be seen in a number of recent reports by Government agencies that all focus on young people, including: “Investing in Australia’s young people” (Australian Office for Youth, 2009); the “State of Australia’s Young People” (Muir et al., 2009); the “National Strategy for Young Australians” (Australian Government, 2010); or the “Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians” (MCEETYA, 2008). Furthermore, the Australian Youth Forum was established in 2008, while the Victorian Government launched the “Youth Statement: Engage, Involve, Create” initiative in 2012. There are also numerous local and regional youth strategies. These strategies, as well as other so-called early intervention programs, suggest that many young people are “at risk”, that they are “disengaged”, that they need to “engage” in education or employment, be “involved” in their communities and decision-making processes and “create” change, enterprise and culture (Victorian Government, 2012). Migrant and refugee youth have been included in these strategies through an emphasis on promoting cultural diversity, tolerance, anti-discrimination and anti-racism measures. Nevertheless, a coherent national strategy pertaining directly to migrant youth is yet to be established, ignoring repeated calls by experts and service providers working with this demographic group. This, despite the fact that migrant youth have been positioned as “one of the assets” of multiculturalism (Centre for Multicultural Youth, 2012) and their social integration as well as their symbolic incorporation...
into the host society have been cited as key indicators of their wellbeing (Sampson & Gifford, 2010; Wyn & Woodman, 2006).

The article focuses on migrant youth who are loosely defined as either African or Arabic-speaking and who are living in Melbourne. As the most recent Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data (2011) show, Melbourne is a relatively “young” city with 40 per cent of its population 29 years of age or younger, among them 12.2 per cent are between the ages of 15–24 (Muir et al., 2009). Furthermore, 36.7 per cent of the population of Greater Melbourne were born overseas, and there are more Melburnians with both parents born overseas than those whose parents were born in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). But the traditional migration that has shaped Melbourne and Australia for many decades has witnessed a demographic shift in more recent times with the arrival of African entrants, most of whom are from war-torn countries in the Horn of Africa region. This new cohort of migrants has posed new challenges for youth programs and settlement service providers; particularly during their early stages of settlement in Australia.

Against this highly diverse cultural setting, this paper examines the networking practices of migrant youth: the way they create and sustain connections between their homes/families/communities on the one hand, and the socio-political sphere of Australian multicultural society, as articulated through policies, on the other. It examines empirically and conceptually specific ways through which migrant youth become “everyday makers” (Bang, 2005) and “actors of citizenship” (Isin, 2009; Isin & Nielsen, 2008).

2. Youth Participation and Citizenship

In the Australian context, following a classic liberal view of citizenship most readily represented by T. H. Marshall (1950), the concept of participation most often relates to the idea that one needs to be involved in the workforce to become an active citizen (Colic-Peisker, 2009) and that one’s participation is a reflection of democratic practice (Bessant, 2004). When translated to the context of youth participation, policy documents often focus on youth’s transition from adolescence into adulthood, as this is assumed to be the time when young people’s capacities can be enhanced by their participation in broader society, in their transition towards “full” and active citizenship.

There has been an increase in the number of youth participation programs in Australia, using either youth development or youth involvement approaches2. Both approaches encourage positive engagement between young people and institutions on all levels of governance. But whilst youth development approaches have been utilised in Australia predominantly at the federal level and have focussed on nurturing key skills and competencies in particular during transitional periods, youth involvement approaches have been more focussed on local, state and community levels, and emphasise links between individuals, their active participation and broader social outcomes.

Even though youth participation approaches promote principles of equality, justice and young people’s rights to participate (Bessant, 2004), in practice they still tend to regard individuals as “consumers in informing program or policy development” (Bell, Vromen, & Collin, 2008, p. 33) and their involvement in participatory projects only rarely influences actual public decision-making (Kirby & Bryson, 2002). What is also not often acknowledged in youth participation and citizenship programmes is that even though political participation for young people is possible and should be encouraged, there are still structural limitations that they face in achieving what is considered full citizenship. For instance, young people under 18 are unable to vote in Australia, their freedom of speech and movement is often limited in public spaces, and the law permits age discrimination in the labour market, which means that people under 18 can be paid lower wages and work in more precarious conditions (Bessant, 2004, pp. 393-397). There is also little consistency in the ways in which participation is understood among academic and policy literature (Bell et al., 2008; Matthews, Limb, & Taylor, 1998/1999). This has, as Bell et al. argue, “serious implications for the subsequent recognition of young people’s capacity or entitlement to shape policy outcomes that will affect their everyday lives” (Bell et al., 2008, p. 29).

Naturally, participation programmes give more attention to those young people who are interested in being actively engaged in formal institutions, and not to those who oppose the idea of formal participation, even though the latter may still engage in self-organised groups and activities. It should be noted here that formal participation relates to the nature of engagement rather than the activity itself. To this end, many African youth have engaged in music and sporting activities accessed formally through local agencies and clubs. But irrespective of the modality of access, youth participation programmes focus on positive relationships, not negative responses to the institutions and policies in place. Young people who voice their opinions against with certain distinguishable characteristics. A special category of culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) youth is often incorporated into these programs, and such categories, though sometimes useful, are often vague in their generalisation of a vast array of people which can render such a category diffuse.

1 In Australia, young people aged 12 to 24 represent nearly 20 per cent of the Australian population and 28 per cent of all households contain a young person.
2 In both of these approaches, youth is regarded as an entity

their treatment by authorities or disagree with existing laws and regulations, such as being regularly stopped and searched by police (Smith & Reside, 2010), do not get much coverage in representative case studies of youth programmes. Besides, young people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds are most often seen in youth participation and engagement programs as a homogenous group that share universal youth participation opportunities. Their different experiences of exclusion and disadvantage which, as some critics argue, “should shape targeted youth participation strategies” (Bell et al., 2008), are not always taken into account.

Furthermore, youth participation approaches commonly used in Government programmes aimed at strengthening political participation understate the fact that the arena of the “political participation” is utilised by a diverse group of migrant youth in a much broader manner than it is acknowledged in traditional participatory theories based on representative democracy concepts (Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Verba & Nie, 1972). Whereas representative democracy concepts rely on classic indicators of political involvement, such as voting, signing petitions, sending letters to politicians, attending meetings, etc., they do not look at other types of non-institutionalised involvement. They overlook the fact that young people’s political involvement and participation does not happen exclusively within the framework of formalised institutions, be they supported by the community or the Government (Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010). Young people participate and engage in different ways to adults (Vinken, 2005), in ways that differ from conventional political participation (Dalton, 2006, p. 64).

Inherent to this is a challenge and a problem in the way we, as a society, understand and define what falls under the umbrella of the “political”. Political acts are often concerned with seeking to change public views and policies (Vromen, 2003, p. 86). This idea, however, of “being political” is normally reduced to one becoming a “member of a party, union or campaign for institutionalised arenas”; “making a donation, volunteering time, boycotting products, attending rallies” are in this context not regarded as political acts (Vromen, 2003, p. 86). Young people, including young migrants, participate in an environment that is increasingly susceptible to engagement in new social movements and alternative avenues of protest politics (Norris, 2002). In this context, young people’s acts such as self-mobilisation, protest and voluntary community engagement should be seen as demands for recognition, which require modification of the ideas about who are political agents and what constitutes active participation.

Relying on this critical context, Isin and Nielsen (2008, p. 39) talk about “acts of citizenship” which they define as “(t)hose acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle”. These sites can exist outside of formal institutions and can be decided on an individual, ad hoc and project basis, revealing the spontaneous, everyday character of many of these acts (Bang, 2005).

Against this theoretical discussion, political participation and social engagement of migrant youth are defined as complex processes which advocate for a more profound and realistic recognition of the fluid processes, recognising the significance of the roles youth play in bridging cultural and ethnic divides. Not only youth’s involvement in their communities and decision-making processes, but their creation of their own ways of political participation is regarded as a vital act of citizenship, integral to the opening up of a necessary bilateral dialogue between both diverse ethnic communities as well as Australian society in general (such exchange is often sadly lacking). Young migrants’ ability to actively disrupt this dominant, one-way, discourse is of critical importance. This is especially the case as such dominant discourses often position them as indebted and in need of assimilation and immersion whilst denying their agentive voice in the ongoing conversation about national identity.


In their critique of Robert Putnam’s theory (2000)—about weakening social ties, and the consequent eroding of trust between people and political authorities, resulting in poorer political participation outcomes that can be increased only by involvement in voluntary organisations—Henrik Bang and Eva Sørensen (1999) argue that Putnam’s theory is empirically flawed, because it prevents us from analysing “central aspects of societal life today” by separating social and political capital. They introduce a concept that, as they contend, contradicts Putnam’s theory—a concept of the “everyday maker”—which “represents a new form of political engagement, which attempts to combine individuality and commonality in new relations of self- and co-governance” (Bang & Sørensen, 1999, p. 325). Everyday makers are “those who consider politics as lived experience” (Bang, 2009, p. 119), among them many young people, who are “project-oriented” and “do not feel defined by the state” (Bang, 2005, p. 167). They can be mobilized if “governance initiatives can open up political spaces for young people to organize around and articulate the issues that concern them” (Marsh, O’Toole, & Jones, 2007). New generations have the capacity to invent new forms of citizenship (Vinken, 2005, pp. 148-149). As much as the reasons for their involvement in activities, networks and projects rest in the idea that “it is for a good cause”, young people get
involved also because “you get something out of it yourself”. As Bang (2005, p. 169) explains:

(e)veryday makers consider their lay knowledge embodied in their activities. They do not separate knowledge and practice, which is why they insist on deciding themselves where to ‘hit’ and when to ‘run’, whether alone or in cooperation with others.

Participation of “everyday makers” needs to be motivated by significant personal outcomes. In this way, they are personally engaged, but they may be seen also as individualistic, atomised and market-oriented.

“Active citizenship” approaches often neglect that citizenship is not only about social practices and norms, but also about meanings and identities. People need to feel a certain sense of belonging in order to be “good”, “active” citizens. Youth participation programs are often “problem-oriented”, focusing on the periods of transition when young people are presumably most often at risk of disengagement. They do not acknowledge plurality of forms of engagement among migrant youth or their motivations for engagement. As Isin (2000, p. 5) contends, being politically engaged in a globalized, intersectional and stratified world may reveal loyalties not only to the government in the classical normative sense, but to different political communities, governing bodies and domains, such as the workplace, shopping mall and Internet. These can all signify fields of struggle; “an arena in which relations linking individuals to their wider community, social and political contexts are continually discussed, reworked and contested” (Hall, Williamson, & Coffey, 2000). Additional layers of citizenship participation (Yuval Davis, 1997, 2007) can become embodied in more local contexts, such as local arts or human rights groups, or ethnic community organisations and family networks (Desforges, Jones, & Woods, 2005), or they are rescaled upwards above the nation-state and in the process become more transnational or global.

4. Methodology and Research Sample

The paper draws on a small section of a large pool of data gathered as a part of an Australian Research Council Linkage research project which examined social networks, issues of belonging and active citizenship among migrant youth in Melbourne and Brisbane (2009–2012). Data used in this paper has been gathered in two focus groups organised in October 2011 with fifteen migrant youth in Melbourne.

The young people in the two focus groups were born overseas, they were 18 to 23 years of age, and were classified as either of African heritage or of Arabic-speaking background. Both focus groups were internally diverse with a range of age distribution, different countries of origin and variant period of settlement. Participants who indicated religious affiliations were mostly Christian or Muslim. There was a slight over-representation of female participants. The African participants were relatively recent arrivals and mostly former refugees originating from Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. This contrasts with the Arabic-speaking group which included mainly Iraqi youth. The focus groups were organised in the context of a “Young Leaders Forum” event, where recruited participants were expected to discuss their views of effective leadership, role-modelling and issues affecting their respective communities. They discussed these issues with service providers and academics involved in the project, and they received certificates for participation at the conclusion of the forum. Two successful and active young leaders in Victoria, involved in advocacy and consultancy as well as global leadership programs, cross-cultural relations and volunteering were invited to participate at the forum as guest speakers. Young people who were involved in focus group discussions had for the most part already well-formed views on participation, representation and community work in Australia and were willing to exchange these views. A majority of participants felt that they play an important role in highlighting youth issues and challenges as experienced in their particular communities. Young people in Arabic-speaking and African focus groups were interested in the concept of leadership and thought of it as an important quality to have as a young person in Australia.

Though in some cases problematic, the deployment of the group categories (Arabic-speaking, African) in the design of the project, nevertheless offered pathways to the creation of discursive spaces and provided context for arguments and counter-arguments about media generated stereotypes and essentialised identities. What was observed throughout the discussions was that limitations of categories, including ethnic and/or linguistic backgrounds, have practical consequences for many young people, even if these categories denote abstract constructions.

Some participants openly contested the idea of fixed categories. Yet, when they were asked to join one of the discussion groups they decided to self-select and participate in the relevant group with relative ease. The focus groups were followed by a general discussion which reflected differences in experiences already pointed out in the focus groups. Most of the participants in the focus groups have been living in Melbourne for 5–10 years, and none were born in Australia. Most of the participants were active in mainstream as well as community specific activities. Their family circumstances were various: some arrived in Australia speaking overlapped as with the case of some participants from the Horn of Africa who also spoke Arabic.

3 In some cases, the two categories of African and Arabic-speaking overlapped as with the case of some participants from the Horn of Africa who also spoke Arabic.
as a part of the Australian humanitarian and refugee program with both or one of their parents, while others came to Australia with other relatives or as unaccompanied minors. Some African participants settled in Australia after spending considerable periods of time in refugee camps outside of their country of birth, as is the case with Sudanese youth for instance who spent several years in Egypt before arriving in Australia. Participants in focus groups lived in different parts of Melbourne and most of them highly valued formal education and were enrolled in tertiary education institutions.

5. “Stepping Out” and “Tuning” Oneself

Overall, the participants in the focus groups indicated a desire to network cross-culturally and outside of their immediate, culturally specific environments. They strongly expressed, in various ways, the desire to “step out” of their familiar and familial environments and to be involved in a wider globally-oriented space; or as one participant in the focus group put it “to tune yourself” to the world you live in is a necessary path towards constructive dialogues.

Focus group participants manifested their participation in the wider political sphere in various ways. Some of them were members of youth-based and youth-run organisations and networks (for instance, Western Young People’s Independent Network, Ethnic Youth Council or the Multicultural Advocacy Network), some were involved in producing media content (for instance for 3ZZZ community radio or social media sites), and some were involved in community events, local councils, music (especially hip hop) and similar cultural activities. Their sites of citizenship activities included also educational institutions, especially the university. One participant spoke about his role as a student of social work as he had deliberately chosen to study for a social work degree in the hope of contributing to positive social change among migrant youth.

The desire to network and influence public opinion that young people referred to in the focus groups was accompanied by a strong sense of place and location (being of Ghanaian, Somali, Oromo, Iraqi background, but living in Australia), which was often their immediate response to feelings of displacement and dislocation. Location and place, in this sense, were derived from the respondents’ culturally specific identities. Their desires and acts of “stepping out” depended on the extent to which they were ready to embrace difference, and on their willingness to be identified as “different”, not only in terms of culture, language or accent or religion, but also in terms of their unique life experiences and their consequent world views.

Harmonious and sometimes antagonistic relationships between openness for difference and pursuit of recognition unveiled their struggles for belonging in multicultural Australia. One point of a discussion in the African focus group centred on a tendency to “tailor the culture” of migrants in Australia. As one of the participants explained:

We have to make our culture as barbaric or as acceptable for them to fit into their own perception of who we are and for me I always have to tailor my identity. It’s a conscious decision. Like with the question of where I’m from. I try to project or…they’re trying to gain a level of understanding where I’m from. And I’m Oromo and no African even knows where that is. And that’s fine, I accept that. […] And, another thing is…As Muslims we tailor our names to people. It’s very hard for people to say ‘kha’, that throaty, disgusting, flaming sound, so Khamal becomes Jimmy, Ali becomes Al…just to fit into their own linguistic understanding of who we are.

Such realisations and challenges drove many young migrants to form groups, get exposed and seek recognition for their own ethno-specific voices. They refused to remain fixed in their roles as contributors of these voices by challenging traditional forms of ethnic representation in Australia, composed of elected community representatives voicing concerns of their entire communities. Rather, they adopted flexible approaches to their participation, as well as representation. They were involved in community events, but they were also participating in school activities, faith-based groups and choirs, they were forming music and dance groups, or played soccer. Some of them participated also in more traditional forms of ethnic community engagement, for instance in local or national boards and councils (multicultural, ethnic or youth-based) or in national youth leadership programmes. These various activities were interconnected and could exist simultaneously; they did not cancel each other out.

Participation and leadership, in particular among African youth, were conditioned by the constant need to “prove yourself”. Individual struggles were resonant through group affiliations and a notion of resilience that “no matter what you went through or what your educational background is, you can actually do it”. The acts of “tuning oneself” were based on these feelings of proving oneself within the Australian society as well as within their own communities:

And it’s about the time to prove yourself. Sometimes there are opportunities out there that come out of your bad situation. For example, I’m here today, I went to the University and I’m working (…) So we need to look at that…And also, looking at that and getting opportunity through that and also changing yourself and tune…Like in the music, you tune to the levels. That could be a way of doing things.

One participant recalled an event that happened in the
school that can be interpreted as an act of “tuning”:

I remember once, in year 12 we had this...for English you had to give a presentation and I remember one of the students came up and talked about the Iraqi war and...he was just telling terrible things about Baghdad...And, I could have screamed and yelled at him, but what I did was that I changed my presentation...I didn’t talk about this was right this was wrong, but I talked about it from the perspective of a young Iraqi person, when I was a child and what Baghdad meant to me and what it is now and how I could no longer relate to this place because of what happened. So, a lot of people were crying and thanked me and said look we didn’t know about this and now we know so much.

This can be, in fact, interpreted as a political act performed by an “everyday maker”. The process of “stepping out” and “tuning oneself” to the new environment was not aimed at integration or adaptation as such, but on identifying gaps and voids in the shared national space, and opportunities for a dialogue based on these gaps and voids.

6. Bringing Things “Back Home”

Even though we may see participation, engagement and integration as processes controlled by a certain political formation (nation-state, local government area, region, etc.) aiming for a coherent, harmonious community, these processes are not and should not be understood in a linear way. Nor do the acts of “stepping out” and “tuning” represent final “products” of the integration process. Most young people in the study felt that they needed to bring things they learned “back home”.

I’ve done them both (community and outside work) concurrently, but when I started, I started outside. What I did when I came here was that I went to a youth group, after three years when I was here I became a member of the youth group that wasn’t specific African (...) and three years later, I start getting into the community.

Participants in the focus groups who “stepped out” and engaged with the cross-cultural sphere outside, often experienced barriers when attempting to return “back home”. When engaging with the community by expressing their own points of view, some young people experienced a feeling of hopelessness:

A couple of years ago I could say to you it’s about setting example to people in the community by saying...I’m at Uni, I don’t do things that we are traditionally meant to do, but I’m still having such a good life, I could have a really good future and sort of encourage them to do that. But now I think...I romanticised it two years ago. Because no, in reality no, no one will do that and you will end up alone.

The feeling of needing to “prove yourself” reappeared in the process of “returning back” to the family or the community:

People have to see what you do. People have to see how you are fond of things. For those who came here with their parents, it’s a different story. You have to prove to your parents, so that they trust what you’re doing. If you have no parents, you have your community. And you have to prove yourself to the community. And the community, it has high expectations, especially the African community...

High expectations and intergenerational conflicts that young people faced when trying to reconnect with their families and communities do not only reflect the assumed “fixed” nature of families or communities, but the fact that Governments, programmes and services do not recognise the fluid and circular dynamics of participation. Even when young people participate in broader social activities their participation does not necessarily extend back into familial contexts. Yet intergenerational conflict is driven by different expectations in relation to issues of cultural maintenance and transmission as well as family expectations in relation to educational and employment outcomes.

Against the background of the National Youth Strategy, young people identified family units as critical to their health and wellbeing and supporting families was seen as beneficial for young people and the broader society (Australian Government, 2010, p. 10). “Supporting young Australians within their families” also became one of the “priority areas for action” in the Strategy. However, programs aimed at connecting the participation of young people with their families holistically are yet to be designed. Perspectives of young people included in the National Strategy included calls for recognition of differences in opportunities they have and disadvantages they face. Even though programmes focus on “disadvantaged” or “at risk” youth, the explanations of what this means for young people as well as a broader social context are absent.

The data from focus group discussions in this paper reveal a deep cynicism and much criticism of banal calls for participation, often promoted in a predominantly linear and unilateral way. There is little understanding in national agendas such as those focused on social inclusion and multiculturalism and promoted through Government programs, of how migrant youth negotiate the pressures of engagement with the dominant culture on one hand, and their families and local communities on the other. Migrant youth often form a tenuous bridge between two worlds underpinned by
an inherent tension that is at once insoluble, yet is also, by its nature, a cause for constructive dialogues. And it is through such tensions and conversations that the essence of active citizenship is played out within forms of a performative multiculturalism not constrained by the rhetoric of Governmental policy. As active participation in civic life is linked strongly to citizenship in the literature, this phenomenon shows the limits of the current institutional one-dimensional understanding of citizenship participation.

Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) suggests that focussing on the public sphere as the only site where citizenship is performed (Turner, 1990; Jayasuria, 1990; Pateman, 1989) is problematic. She proposes to differentiate between three distinct spheres: state, civil society and the domain of the family, kinship and other primary relationships. Therefore, any comparative theory of citizenship “must include an examination of the individual autonomy allowed to citizens (of different gender, ethnicity, region, class, stage in the life cycle, etc.) vis-à-vis their families, civil society organizations and state agencies” (Yuval Davis, 1997, p. 15). Not only do Government youth services have much to offer; they often work best when they transcend the rigid discursive forms—in which they are confined, so that the youth are given the space of agency to engage with their adopted culture, but also to create a feedback loop between this burgeoning identity and their heritage culture as embedded in their home-life.

Family and community networks are places of comfort, but also places of tensions. The circular process of stepping out, tuning and returning back home is reflective of young people’s identities and struggles to belong, and this is an inherently challenging process. For migrant youth in this study, negotiations of belonging were often related to ongoing challenges in positioning oneself vis-à-vis the local and global environments simultaneously. To this end, some (see, e.g., Anthias, 2006) have called for studying positionality rather than identity, because positionality allows one to understand “the lived practices in which identification is practiced and performed”. Positionality also addresses the intersubjective, organisational and representational conditions for the existence of identity (Anthias, 2001, p. 635). One of the participants eloquently expressed this link drawing on his experience:

To me to live in Australia is to live in two worlds. I give Australia fifty per cent and I give my community fifty per cent. I do this because I know I will not get accepted in Australia hundred per cent. It doesn’t matter what you do or what you achieve. So, what I do, it’s a balance, you know. When I’m with an Australian, I know how I will act and when I am with my people, I know how I will act.

Such tensions sometimes reflect the performative elements within one situation which cannot be entirely erased or translated into another, which means that the smooth transitions between the two are often impossible. The “slippages” in presentation, where “the management of strategies of identity” (Butcher, 2004, p. 226) do not go exactly according to the plan, is where the tensions are created. Yet, these tensions also represent situations where young people begin to form and develop their own agency, negotiate difficulties of belonging constructively and position themselves as genuine “actors of citizenship”.

7. Conclusion

The desire of migrant youth to step out of their family environments and/or their communities is often coupled with their willingness to embrace their newly adopted “homeland”/place of residence; to be open to engage with the society in which their identity and independence are developing, without necessarily rejecting their cultural heritage. On the contrary, they often wish to transfer their knowledge and to “prove themselves” to their families and communities and in the process, return back home. Showing a different self to the family and the community is accompanied by personal projects of belonging, which permeate migration and settlement, not to mention growing up. Despite this, such personal belonging projects are often fraught with feelings of marginalisation, as this paper shows in the context of African and Arabic-speaking youth in Melbourne. In many cases these feelings are accentuated by structural socioeconomic disadvantages linked to their families, though also rendered even more complex due to the provoked sense of belonging to two-worlds, and equally to none.

As claimants of citizenship, migrant youth often refer to multiculturalism as their space of belonging (Pardy & Lee, 2011, pp. 300, 305). They act from the internal boundaries of the nation, traverse cultural and social spaces, and balance between their positions. For many young people, multicultural space is not only a space between two worlds; it permeates all spheres of their lives including engagement with the state, civil society as well as family networks. To be an active citizen in the multicultural nation means not only to be strategic in dealing with cultural transactions and being well-positioned in the hybrid space (Noble, Poynting, & Tabar, 1999); it also requires involvement in family and community spheres. As an active community member, one needs to be present in a variety of spheres.

Comparing multicultural contexts, speaking out and challenging mainstream ideas about families and communities is indeed to act politically, since acting politically is “to express an identity that is both prescribed and subjectively felt” (McNevin, 2011, p. 15). Migrant youth who assert their voices on their own accord through different avenues (social media, specific
civil society association, or leisure activity) redefine also what it means to be “Australian”. By organising open public discussions, leadership programmes, workshops, forums etc. they are not focusing on their sense of exclusion, but claiming and legitimising their feeling of inclusion and belonging. Their “stepping out”, in this context, means legitimising their position “within”.

This type of agency enables migrant youth to become political agents, instead of being patronised, overlooked, and ultimately disempowered. If this agency is not recognized, the voice of migrant youth is not only subjugated; but their reality as political agents able to adjust, challenge and engender different layers of citizenship will not be recognized. Migrant youth not only have the potential to contribute to, but also to broaden the discursive scope of Australian identity, belonging and the role of the citizen as a political agent of change.

In this way, migrant youth also contest and challenge the nature and the content of national identity. They understand that every concept of community, especially if it relates to regulative political community, includes by default exclusion and that “people who are constructed to be members of other ethnic, racial and national groups, are not considered ‘to belong’ to the nation-state community, even if formally they are entitled to” (Yuval Davis, 2007, p. 563). They criticize the dominant patterns of exclusion and challenge the view which accepts rather than unsettles the traditional understanding of citizenship. They can challenge some of the traditional views about “active citizenship” by developing reflexive, “project-oriented identities” to signal their presence. They are “doing citizenship” and performing “acts of citizenship” in a manner that is focused on and driven by their individual subjective positions.

The common thread linking migrant youth in their pursuit of social integration is that they all struggle, not first and foremost against something, but within something: within the socio-political system, within the city, within schools and within neighbourhoods. In other words, even though they are positioned within a specific context; they end up oscillating between internal and external spheres within their communities. Belonging to either of the spheres is filled with moral ramifications, as “debt” is incurred towards their families and communities as well as towards their host societies, and needs to be repaid in exchange for the gift of social life (Hage, 2002, pp. 201-205). As Ghassan Hage (2002, p. 204) contends, feelings of indebtedness become most prominent with migration when one leaves the society that offered him or her social life in return for his or her loyalty. But these feelings are not restricted to one communal formation; debt can be incurred also in a society one migrates to. This, as Hage argues, complicates the situation where “while participation in the host community can be seen as repayment of the debt of belonging to it, the same participation can accentuate feelings of guilt towards the original community” (Hage, 2002, p. 204). Such situation creates a complicated and jumbled situation for migrant youth who are often endowed with the family expectation to deliver promises of a better future in the country of settlement, as well as act as good “guests” and “good citizens” in the country of arrival.

National policies of youth engagement in Victoria and Australia focus on engendering the ability for young people to “step out” of their immediate environments and “engage, create” and “get involved”. But such policies generally neglect the capacity of migrant youth to “complete” their “acts of citizenship” by a desire to “bring things back home”. Citizenship should not be viewed as a linear, but a circular and contested journey. Indeed, there are many young people who do not desire to be involved in community activities at all. They do not participate in social forums and are not members of organised groups aimed at initiating conversations with “the mainstream”. In policy terms, they may be seen as in “need of guidance and control” (Vromen & Collin, 2010, p. 98), even in need of being assisted in their decision to “step out”. The findings of this study, however, would suggest that the success of future policy-making is to recognize the wide spectrum of social and political engagement including the deliberate decision of some young people to resist altogether such activities.

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Conflict of interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

References


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Abstract
Much of the existing public discourse surrounding Muslim youth in Western societies is framed through a simplistic and static understanding of the role of the Mosque in their everyday life. Mosques are often seen as places for the development of Muslim conservatism where membership is gender and ethno-specific and activities are socially restrictive (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007, p. 195; Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 237). This contributes to an ongoing public preoccupation with the idea that it is necessary to integrate Muslim youth into “mainstream society” as a counter measure to anti-social behaviour and attributed outcomes (i.e. terrorism). This paper, building on the work of Dialmy (2007, p. 70) and Jamal (2005, p. 523), offers an account of how young Muslims network and socialise around the Mosque in Brisbane, Australia. We show that contrary to popular public conception, the role of the Mosque in the lives of Muslim youth is multifaceted and serves as the centrepiece from which the majority of socialisation, across variety formal and informal networks, occurs. This paper also explores the reasons underpinning Muslim youth’s social participation, emphasizing the socio-cultural factors (both within and beyond the place of worship) that facilitate and hinder participation across a range of social settings. We argue that discussions on Muslim youth and social engagement must be positioned within an informed understanding of the nuanced role of the Mosque in the generation of social networks within Western contexts.

Keywords
belonging; homophily; mosque; Muslim; social networks; youth

1. Introduction
The past three decades has seen a steady rise of Islamophobia in Australia and around the world (Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 237; Dialmy, 2007, p. 70; Spalek & Imtoual, 2007, p. 190; Sirin & Katsiaficas, 2010, p. 1530). In Australia this sentiment has been fuelled by factors such as the Gulf Wars, the rise of “Middle Eastern crime gangs”, media representations of illegal immigrants and the ongoing “war on terror” (Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 238, Kabir, 2005, p. 245). As such, research pertaining to young Muslims in Western contexts has typically been framed within, or in response to, this discourse (Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007, p. 565; Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 237; Mansouri & Wood, 2008, p. 9). This is particularly the case following the events of 9/11, when government policy began to emphasise group accountability; and monitoring of the social activities of certain groups (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007, 2008, p. 189). This has resulted in an abundance of policies aimed at cultivating social cohesion, the prevention of marginalization and associated negative
outcomes (e.g. anti-social behaviour, terrorism). These policies have targeted certain ethnic groups; with a particular interest in Muslim youth both in Australia and internationally (DIAAC, 2012; UK Department of Communities and Local Government, 2012). In addition, media outlets continue to present an often negatively biased view of the Muslim communities in Western contexts (Byng, 2010, p. 109; Saeed, 2007, p. 443).

The importance of religious institutions in the reception and resettlement of migrants is not limited to Muslims. Indeed, Wilson (2011, p. 549) illustrates how Christian groups use the concept of faith-based hospitality to challenge public discourse and provide services to asylum seekers in Australia, while Foley and Hoge (2007, p. 24) assess the role of religious institutions in promoting civic engagement among recent immigrants to the US. Both studies found that for migrants, membership in a place of worship not only serves religious needs but plays an important role in providing social connections in an unfamiliar environment. Furthermore, as our research will demonstrate, the role of the place of worship in providing social connections for migrants extends beyond the first generation. For both first and second generation Muslim youth in Brisbane involved in this research, the mosque permeates all aspects of young people’s social lives.

Inherent within dominant conceptualizations of Muslim youth and social engagement, is a characteristically static understanding of how and why young people form networks. Unfortunately, the dominant narratives that shape public perceptions are often the result of an emphasis on extreme cases. An insularity of networks, gender and ethno-specific exclusivity, poor levels of civic engagement and political mobilization are typically underscored in these cases (see, for example, Jasser, 2011; O’Duffy, 2008). Arguably, these simplistic understandings of youth engagement, particularly in the mosque, fuel ongoing preoccupations with negative stereotypes about Muslim youth and perpetuate public misconceptions about the Muslim community more broadly. The data presented herein, illustrate the effects of wider public discourse on social engagement among Muslim youth.

Despite this often simplistic understanding of Muslim youth and social networks, emerging research from scholars such as Dialmy (2007, p. 71), Modood and Ahmad (2007, p. 190) and Annette (2011, p. 391), offer a different perspective on ways in which young Muslims network and socialize within predominantly Western contexts. This paper further explores the reasons for engagement, emphasizing the socio-cultural factors (both within and beyond the place of worship) which facilitate and/or hinder participation for Muslim youth across a range of settings. Our paper focuses on young people’s participation in the mosque and we argue that discussions pertaining to Muslim youth and their social participation must be positioned within an informed understanding of how social and practical contexts impact the type and extent of network involvement. The mosque continues to be an important organisational entity within the Muslim community, specifically in secular societies (Dialmy, 2007, p. 73). Indeed, as illustrated in the findings presented below, and contrary to dominant public perception, the role of the mosque is multifaceted and ultimately serves as the centrepiece from which the majority of socialisation, across formal and informal networks occurs.

2. Conceptual Framework

Conceptually, our interrogation of networking among Muslim youth will be discussed using the framework of homophily and heterophily. The principle of homophily, also known as the “like me” hypothesis (Laumann, 1966, p. 40), states that social interactions and subsequent network formation are more likely to occur between those individuals who share socio-demographic, behavioural and interpersonal characteristics than between those who do not (Lazerfeld & Merton, 1954, p. 55). The principle of homophily initially emerged as an extension from the classical work of Homans (1951, p. 108) on relationship dynamics within small primate groups. Through observation, Homans discovered that the more time the members of these primate groups spent with one another, the more sentiment they shared. Likewise, the more sentiment they shared, the more time they spent together. As these reciprocal processes increased in frequency, so too did the members’ tendency to engage in collective, mutually benefiting activities (Homans, 1951, p. 108; Homans, 1961, p. 191). This process has been labelled the “sentiment-interaction” hypothesis.

Since the classical work of Homans, the principle of homophily has been used to explain a range of social phenomena from internet usage (see Steffes & Burgee, 2009, p. 43) to peer bullying (see Dijkstra, Lindenberg, & Veenstra, 2007, p. 1377). Yet, regardless of the specific social phenomena to which the principle of homophily is applied, the core thesis remains. That is, similarity breeds connection. Recent research consistently confirms this, identifying age (Kiesner, Poulin, & Nicotra, 2003, p. 1341; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) and gender (Hodgkin, 2008, p. 306; McCabe, 1998) as highly salient types of homophilous interactions. Above all else however, race and ethnicity continue to constitute the most prevalent types of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 424; Mollica, Gray, & Trevino, 2003), constituting the largest divide between people’s social networks (see Ibarra, 1995, p. 675; Kalmijn, 1998, p. 406; Newman & Dale, 2007, p. 82). For young people from migrant backgrounds homophilous interactions are prevalent, particularly considering the common geographic concentration of migrant groups (Portes & Zhou, 1993, p. 80) combined
with the impact of exclusionary practices or negative discourses perpetuated from the dominant host country population.

Given the above, one would expect young Muslims in Brisbane with close geographic proximity, frequency of interaction through religious practices, and exposure to negative public discourse, to form and engage in highly homophilous networks. Indeed, it is this assumption which arguably fuels much of the anxiety surrounding Muslim youth. Yet, our findings reveal that while young people’s networks are homophilous, network formation and engagement does not fully play out in the way one might expect. In fact, despite common assumptions of the role of the mosque in creating and shaping homogenous membership, Muslim youth engage in a range of activities within the context of the mosque and affiliated networks. This finding challenges our understanding of the impact of homophilous network engagement broadly and the impact for Muslim youth, specifically.

Using the principle of homophily to frame analysis and discussion, this paper will explore the ways Muslim youth engage within and around their place of worship. Specifically, we examine both the types of formal and informal networks in which youth are involved as well the intrinsic and extrinsic factors that shape network choices. Following a description of research methods, we will progress a discussion of the role of culture in religious participation for Muslim youth in Brisbane. We offer an account of the networks of young people, particularly the positioning of the mosque as a centrepiece from which young people’s networks emerge. Subsequently, through an analysis of the barriers to external participation for young people, we suggest that experiences with implicit and explicit racism and discrimination reinforce the role of the mosque for young people in hostile social climates. Lastly, we examine young people’s perceptions of existing network limits.

3. Research Methods

The data presented herein are derived from the Australian Research Council Linkage project “Social Networks, Belonging and Active Citizenship among Migrant Youth in Australia”. The project, sought to investigate the extent to which young people from diverse backgrounds participate in formal and informal networks to develop a sense of belonging in Australia. Research sites included Melbourne and Brisbane and data collection consisted of surveys, qualitative interviews and focus groups with city-specific service providers. Findings in this paper were limited to in-depth interviews with thirteen first- and second-generation Arabic-speaking young people in Brisbane, aged 15–23. Of these, 11 participants identified as Muslim and two identified as Christian. As this paper is specifically focused on the role of the mosque, these two participants were excluded in the discussion below. Of the 11 Muslim participants, three were born in Australia and the remaining eight had lived in Australia for 8 years or more. It should also be noted that two of the participants had lived in Canada before migrating to Australia. The participants came from a variety of cultural backgrounds including, Egyptian, Lebanese and Iraqi.

Interviewees were recruited via snowball sampling and interviews were conducted by research assistants who themselves identified as Muslim and were actively involved in the Muslim community in Brisbane. Throughout interviews, young people were asked to reflect on the extent of their involvement in formal (e.g. school, religious, government) and informal (e.g. peer groups, social media, informal activities) networks in Australia, with an emphasis on locally-based networks. Subsequently, participants were asked questions to elucidate the relationship between involvement in said networks and feelings of inter- and intra-group belonging. This component touched on issues of alignment of values, the implications for network choices, intergenerational and “community” issues, etc. Lastly, participants were asked to reflect on the practical underpinnings for network choices, primarily the ease in which they negotiate different social settings. This last component raised issues such as location of networks and knowledge of different social gatherings.

4. The Role of Culture in Religious Participation

As mentioned above, participants in this project all identified as Arabic-speaking. While there are no statistics on mosque participation in Australia, statistics from the US show that in the Muslim community Arabic-speaking migrants have the third highest level of mosque participation and are more politically active and have greater group consciousness as a result of this participation (Jamal, 2005, p. 524; Bagby, Perl, & Froebel, 2001, p. 29). Given that recent political attention has focused on religion rather than ethnicity, the mosque plays a key role in collectivising and highlighting the common struggles of all Muslims in mainstream society (Modood & Ahmad, 2007). Indeed, studies from the UK (Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 199) and the US (Naber & Arbor, 2005, p. 479) have shown that young migrants are increasingly giving salience to religion rather than ethnicity as a form of collective identity. Participants in this project also saw themselves primarily as Muslim, identifying more strongly with Islam then with their cultural background. This is exemplified by one participant below:

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1 ARC LP0989182, Mansouri, F., Skribis, Z., Guerra, C. (Centre for Multicultural Youth), and Francis, S. (The Australian Red Cross). This project focuses on youth from three Australian migrant communities at the centre of recent debates about migrant integration, intercultural conflict and social cohesion: African, Arabic-speaking and Pacific-Islander.
For me, it doesn’t really matter where I come from; it’s what my religion is [...] (Female, Age 21)

In all conversations about networks, participants referred more often to religion than culture and sometimes used the two interchangeably. When asked if culture influenced her network involvement one participant explained:

I think so, yes. Because my culture is linked in with Islam because obviously I think Arabs and so on. (Female, Age 20)

For participants, both formal and informal networks were identified as Islamic or Muslim. Although there were some informal cultural groups, these too were composed of only Muslims. This is consistent with previous research that illustrates how Muslims in the west, specifically youth, often take on a more universalist orientation toward Islam (Dialmy, 2007, p. 73) as they lose their connection with their homeland or the homeland of their parents. Creating an identity around religion rather than ethnicity allows young people to belong to a community without the restraints of physical space. Furthermore, the boundaries of religious identity are much more clear-cut and pervasive in comparison to ever changing and mixing ethnic boundaries (Jacobson, 2010, p. 240).

5. How and Why Young Muslims Formed Networks

Although the participants in this research were involved in a number of different types of networks, these networks were largely homophilous: members shared similar socio-economic, religious and ethnic characteristics. There was also much interlinking between formal and informal networks. Participants interacted with people from their formal networks outside of these groups and some became involved with formal groups through their informal networks. Again, despite the range of networks and activities in which young people were involved, the networks were arguably homophilous, generating bonding social capital for network members. Our research suggests that one reason driving the formation and engagement in homophilous networks for Muslim youth is the significant role of the mosque in generating networks.

The young people involved in this research reported that the mosque was a place where both formal and informal networks are established and negotiated. This is consistent with previous research confirming that while in predominantly Muslim countries it is sufficient for the mosque to serve simply as a place of worship; this role alone is insufficient to the needs of migrant communities in secular societies (Dialmy, 2007, p. 73). Participation in the place of worship has instead become a means for the individual to affirm their identity within the host society through socialisation (Dialmy, 2007, p. 73). With the exception of professional and educational institutions, the majority of activities that the participants were involved in were religiously affiliated, generated by and sustained through engagement with their place of worship. These networks, the way they were formed, maintained and interlinked are discussed below.

All participants involved in this research actively participated in mosque activities. Yet, the frequency of attendance and the type of engagement varied with age. The school-aged participants attended religious classes at the mosque two to three times per week. These classes included, but were not limited to, Qur’an reading, Arabic lessons and Islamic history. In addition to learning, the young people also saw these classes as an opportunity to socialise with their existing friends and to make new ones. This was particularly true and important for recent migrants, for whom involvement in these activities provided an inclusive space where new relationships could be cultivated. The pattern of mosque engagement differed for the older participants who attended the mosque primarily for prayers, lectures and social events such as fundraisers. While some events were organized specifically to encourage participation by young people, others were targeted towards the wider community. The mosque was seen as something all Muslims have in common, a place where Muslims were welcome. As one participant described:

The mosque is a common trait a [...] common place that we all go to. (Male, Age 23)

For participants in this research, the mosque was a unifying space which facilitated the forming of other networks. Indeed, socialisation was not limited to those activities which occurred within the mosque. For example, friendship networks were often facilitated by mosque attendance. One participant spoke about meeting his friends at the mosque every week for Friday prayers and then collectively going out for lunch afterward. There was no need to invite anyone or discuss the location of these lunches beforehand because mosque attendance was assumed and a mutual decision could be made on the day. The participants were also involved in a number of formal activities in which religious affiliation played an important role in determining participation. This included Muslim student associations, youth groups, advocacy groups, charities and women’s groups. The composition of these groups was entirely Muslim and often initiated by youth. The frequency of participation in these groups varied, some participated occasionally when there was a special event and others participated regularly, by attending meetings and helping to run the organisation. Despite the variations between these groups and their activities, they shared a common feature: they have arisen
from within the mosque context.

This research suggests that a range of practical and social factors influenced young people’s engagement which was both internally and externally derived: that is, some factors came from both within their own group as well as a response to mainstream influences. Practical reasons included convenience and ease of access. As one participant explained:

Well the mosque I go to is my local mosque so I go there because it’s close and because everyone—a lot of people I know live in this area and we all just go to that mosque. (Male, Age 23)

In many ways, this research confirms findings from the broader homophily literature regarding the role of geography in shaping people’s networks. For young Muslims in Brisbane, spatial proximity of mosque-related networks was an influential factor in the frequency of young people’s meetings.

The mosque also played an important role in the decision to join networks in non-religious settings. For many participants, mosque was seen as a centrepiece for outward engagement in a non-religious setting. This was illustrated by one participant who was an active member of a political party and explained his reasons for joining as follows:

[...] a political network who shares a lot of the same views as us originally in the past, with helping us to build a mosque. So I definitely affiliate myself with them. I got involved with them and I helped them out. (Male, Age 21)

Another example was in places such as school and university, participants tended to seek out other Muslims to interact with. Their ability to group themselves with other Muslims was seen positively as they felt the interaction was easier, due to shared values and norms as well as a mutual understanding of the expectations for engagement. In describing this dynamic, one participant said:

Like going out with some of your non-Muslim friends to clubs or when they get together and drink and stuff. You never really feel comfortable going or it’s not the same as you would feel with your own group of friends. (Male, Age 21)

As illustrated in our findings, the mosque, while highly homophilous, served as a facilitator of a range of other networks for young Muslims in Brisbane. From engagement and connections within the mosque, young people formed political, extra-curricular and school-related networks. In many ways, this finding challenges dominant assumptions of the mosque as an anti-social space and reveals that the mosque plays a central role in facilitating young people’s engagement in a variety of formal and informal networks.

As a reaction to wider Australian culture and influence, participants described feeling a sense of security fostered through their homophilous networks. For some, interacting with other Muslims ensured, not only that they would not have to explain their religious-based practices but also would not be influenced or pressured into doing anything that is un-Islamic. This perceived sense of security had a gendered element as well. For female participants, the need for this kind of security appeared to be more prevalent and urgent. This stemmed from both their personal desire to ensure a positive influence from their networks as well as a way to alleviate parental concerns thus allowing them more freedoms. This is illustrated by one participant who explained:

Yes, if there’s a group that’s Muslim and they’re mostly girls, then it would encourage us more to be a part of them, because the thing is we would assume that they would stay away from haram. (Female, Age 20) (Anything that is forbidden in Islam is haram)

As described in the preceding section, young people in this research face numerous internal and intragroup factors which influence their participation in largely homophilous networks. The following section explores networks formation and engagement from a different perspective, analysing the external and inter-groups factors which underpin and influence young people’s network choices. As will be discussed, for many young people influence from within their community as well as external exclusionary practices and exposure to racism and discrimination creates a further reliance on the mosque to meet young people’s social needs.

6. The Effect of Racism and Discrimination on Network Choices

While young Muslims participated in a range of activities and networks, these networks themselves were overwhelmingly homophilous. As described above, there were a variety of internal reasons for engagement in homophilous networks. There was also some evidence, however, that network preferences and practices were compounded by broader exclusionary forces and mechanisms, often functioning as actual and perceived barriers to external social participation.

In this case there were comparatively more social barriers than practical, although some practical barriers did exist. The most common social barrier identified by participants was instances of explicit and implicit racism and discrimination. Barriers to participation were also linked to internal pressures from within their own communities. The section below will examine these two instances more closely.
Specific incidences of racism and discrimination mostly involve being singled out based on appearance and ethnicity. Our research shows that this occurred across a range of settings and in various ways. Some participants reported the immediate distance and exclusion that they felt by being asked the question “where are you from?” According to participants, this made them feel as though being judged as “unAustralian” based on their appearance. Other incidences of racism and discrimination involved being singled out in a group based on appearance and ethnicity. This is exemplified in the following quote:

Yeah, because nearly every girl I know that wears a headscarf has had racism and it would be a lie, if I said it wouldn’t affect you because it does. You feel like what if it happens again or whatever, do you know? (Female, Age 18)

Incidences of racism were not always explicit or limited to verbal abuse. Participants described it as the way someone looked at them or a feeling they got. One participant describes having this kind of tension with his volleyball coach:

Nothing direct, like name calling or group labelling, nothing direct. But there was always that feeling that there was prejudice and a bit of, I don’t know, yeah, you never felt—I never felt accepted with that guy. There was always something different between me and the other players in the team. (Male, Age 21)

Findings from our research indicate that young people’s experience with implicit and explicit discrimination and/or racism led to further dependence on the mosque and affiliated networks as a means to cope with said experiences and also fulfil social needs in the face of wider social exclusion. Again, while for many young people, exclusive engagement in mosque-related activities was driven by intrinsic and intra-groups forces, for others, engagement was reinforced by exposure to racism and a need to avoid potentially hostile social spaces.

Research participants also indicated that they faced several internal barriers to external participation. For example, they discussed elements of their religion that limited their interactions with heterophilous networks. As one young woman described:

At uni obviously I have friends and they’re not Muslim obviously, but they might invite me over to places which I don’t go because there’s alcohol, or there’s partying or whatever, so that affects how much I interact with them and who I’m interacting with. So I can have uni colleagues, but I wouldn’t take it any further. Even at school it was like that. (Female, Age 21)

Amongst the female, participant’s gender was an issue that magnified and compounded some of the other barriers described above. They felt that their differences were more obvious because their hijab and were more prone to racism and discrimination.

Sometimes you get looks you know, what she’s wearing [...]. (Female, Age 15)

The female research participants also felt that their families and communities were more protective of them and therefore placed more barriers in front of them especially when it came to interacting with the opposite sex.

Yes if there’s guys there can’t really join it. [...] Religious reasons [...] religious and cultural reasons, [yeah just] expected not to do it. (Female, Age 16)

As described above, for young women in our research, the ability to join wider social networks was further restricted due to gender-specific considerations. For some, the decision to engage exclusively in female Muslim networks was a personal choice. That is, young women made the choice to limit networks as a way to reduce uncertainties and risks associated with non-Muslim youth. For others, network choices were influenced, or controlled, by parents or members of the Muslim community.

Participants in this group experienced notably fewer practical barriers than social. The practical barrier most mentioned was unfamiliarity or lack of knowledge of social networks. One participant said:

More so the unfamiliarity with the group. Yeah, I like to go to things where I kind of know my way around and know the people involved. If it’s something new or something I don’t know anything about, then yeah, I feel a bit uncomfortable and wouldn’t be too fond of joining up a group if like that. (Male, Age 21)

Other barriers that were mentioned include distance, lack of time and/or money and language problems. However these were only mentioned by one or two participants.

Findings demonstrate that social and practical barriers to wider social participation, as experienced by young people, had a significant impact on their desire and ability to expand their social networks. Incidences of racism and discrimination and uncertainties regarding social expectations and norms challenged young people’s sense of belonging within non-mosque related networks. As a result, young people restricted their exposure to and participation in non-Muslim networks as a defence mechanism and relied more heavily upon their existing networks to meet their social and emo-
tional needs. Again, while this reinforced engagement in mosque-related networks, the networks themselves, as described above, were quite diverse.

7. Limits to Networking

Although the networks facilitated by and through the mosque provided the participants with a safe and comfortable environment for them to be involved in, participants also described several limits that it imposed. Accordingly, certain activities were not actively encouraged. For example, access to the arts was limited within the Muslim community in Brisbane, with hardly any related activities being advertised or encouraged through the mosque or other religiously affiliated networks. As one young woman stated:

Yeah, because in the Muslim community, unfortunately they don’t have a lot of attention towards arts and crafts and arts and music. I think it’s because they really focus on, my kids have to be lawyers, they have to be engineers, they have to be—you know, all that really high expectations, like with professions. To the extent that they actually forget the artistic side of the child that actually the child can have, which can be really positive. (Female, Age 23)

Sporting activities for young girls is another example of an activity that was not encouraged or supported by the mosque. While many male participants were involved in both formal and informal sporting activities, for girls, sporting activities were limited to the informal realm. This was partly due to the lack of organized teams within their existing networks and partly due to an inability to participate in mainstream teams due to clothing requirements. In describing his sister’s situation one participant explained:

My sister was a tennis player but because the Australian Tennis Federation says you gotta stick to a particular clothing attire, so she couldn’t wear the scarf and girls aren’t meant to wear pants. (Male, Age 21)

These limits were not seen as overly problematic given that the majority of the needs were met through the mosque and affiliated organisations. For most Muslim youth, networks were seen as an effective way of meeting their needs albeit with room for diversification.

8. Discussion and Conclusion

Findings from this research demonstrate the significant role of the mosque in the lives of Muslim youth in Brisbane. In line with previous research (Dialmy, 2007, p. 73; Modood & Ahmad, 2007, p. 194, Annette, 2011, p. 391), the mosque served not only as a religious institution but as a centrepiece for socialisation and the creation and maintenance of other networks. Participants in this project were involved in a variety of activities that were largely made up of other Muslims and had stemmed from existing networks within the mosque. This was arguably a result of both practical and social factors related to ease of access and shared understandings. It provided young people with a sense of security, in that they did not have to defend their religion or explain their practices. Furthermore they were not at risk of being pressured or influenced to do anything that was un-Islamic. These mosque-affiliated networks played a critical role in meeting the social and emotional needs of participants but were not without their shortfalls. Certain activities that were desirable to the young people were not readily available to them due to their perceived inability to outwardly engage. Additionally, many activities that were not organized or supported by the mosque or other religiously affiliated organizations were not easily accessible to the young people. Muslim young people in this research also experienced high levels of racism and discrimination which inhibited their desire to network outwardly.

As a result of the many social and practical factors which influence network involvement and the significant role of the mosque in serving as the centrepiece from which social networks emerged, the networks in which young Muslims engaged are highly homophilous. Indeed, as illustrated by our findings, for young people in Brisbane the mosque is an institution that facilitates homophilous networks both formally and informally. Young people’s networks were highly homophilous with regards to geographic proximity of members, ethnicity, kin ties, inter-personal and behavioural characteristics. Indeed, as illustrated through the experiences of Muslim youth in Brisbane, we see that the role of the mosque is multifaceted, ultimately serving as the centrepiece from which the majority of socialisation, across formal and informal networks occurs. Additionally, and contrary to popular discourse, these homophilous networks did not produce a homogenous community or engender anti-social sentiment but rather enabled young people to engage in a variety of social and civic activities. In fact, our findings demonstrate that mosque is a reflective space that catered for a variety of interests and generated a diversity of networks. In exploring the way in which young people negotiated their networks and thought about the spaces in which they lived, this paper has sought to challenge the stereotypes about young Muslims and the role of the mosque in their everyday lives.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

References


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Antisemitism and Jewish Children and Youth in Australia’s Capital Territory Schools

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Abstract

Issues pertaining to religion and Australian schools have generated a significant amount of controversy and scholarly attention in recent years, and much of the attention in the religion and schools debate has focused on Muslim and non-religious children’s experiences (Erebus International, 2006; Halafoff, 2013). This article, by contrast, explores the manifestations of antisemitism as experienced by Jewish children and youth in Canberra schools. It considers the characteristics of antisemitism; when and why it occurs; its impact on the Jewish children and young people; and also the responses to it by them, the schools and the Jewish community. Based on focus groups with the Jewish students and their parents, the study reveals that antisemitism is common in Canberra schools, as almost all Jewish children and youth in this study have experienced it. The findings from this study suggest that there is a need for more anti-racism education. Specifically there is an urgent need for educational intervention about antisemitism, alongside education about religions and beliefs in general, to counter antisemitism more effectively and religious discrimination more broadly in Australian schools.

Keywords

anti-racism; anti-Semitism; Australia; children; education; interfaith; Jewish; religion; schools; social inclusion; youth

Issue

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1. Introduction

The special edition of this Journal explores theories of cultural diversity and multiculturalism in globalised cities, applied to migrant youth in particular. This article considers these issues in the context of the experiences of intercultural relations and social inclusion of Jewish children and youth at schools in the city of Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The article specifically explores varied experiences of everyday antisemitism among Jewish youth and the reported responses to such incidents by individuals, schools and communities.

2. Schools, Intercultural Relations, Social Inclusion and Antisemitism

As émigré countries, such as Australia, are shifting from being majority Christian to increasingly religiously (including no-religion) diverse societies (Halafoff, 2010), this has resulted in a re-thinking of the place of religion in the late modern public sphere and of what constitutes a secular society. These developments have led scholars to devise new frameworks for managing (Bouma, 1995; Bouma, 1999) or governing (Bader, 2007) religious diversity and to a series of debates centred on a number of controversial issues including the appro-
propriate relationship of religions to government institutions, including state schools.

Culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse (CRALD) communities, and Australian scholars, have made numerous requests for education about religions and beliefs (ERB) to be included in government schools from Kindergarten to Year 12 (Bouma, Pickering, Halafoff, & Dellal, 2007, pp. 78-79; Lentini, Halafoff, & Ogru, 2009, p. 7; Bouma, Cahill, Dellal, & Zwartz, 2011, pp. 58-59, 80). Australia’s government schools, however, are yet to provide comprehensive ERB programs to their students, other than in Year 11 and Year 12, despite the fact that educational programs about diverse religions have long been taught in the UK, Scandinavia and, more recently in Québec schools (Russell, 1974; MELS, 2005; Halafoff, 2012). In contrast, some Australian faith-based schools, particularly Catholic and Islamic schools, have been praised for conducting programs to promote religious literacy and interreligious understanding among diverse faith communities (Erebus International, 2006, pp. vi-vii; Bouma et al., 2007, p. 79). Indeed, following calls for Ethics education to be included in New South Wales and Victoria in 2009, broad based support has been growing for a more inclusive model of diverse worldviews (including religious and non-religious perspectives) education, taught by qualified educators, within the new National Curriculum (Halafoff, 2011, 2012).

The introduction of a National Curriculum is a highly significant development as Australian State governments have traditionally been responsible for education. Given that the “need to nurture an appreciation of and respect for social, cultural and religious diversity” has been highlighted within the “Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians” (MCEECDA, 2008, p. 4), the introduction of a National Curriculum creates an opportunity to review the way that Australian young people learn about religions at school. Optimistically, The Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), which is developing the new National Curriculum, has identified opportunities for teaching about diverse religions and beliefs in the Curriculum’s learning areas of History and Civics and Citizenship, and in general capabilities and cross-curriculum priorities such as Intercultural Understanding and Ethical Behaviour. Yet, there is still a pressing need to develop appropriate resources and to provide adequate teacher education to enable the delivery of this cross-curriculum approach to religions and beliefs education for Australian schools (Halafoff, 2011, 2012).

Concerns have also been raised that exclusionary and divisive discourses, promoting Christian values over and above the values of other faith traditions, can undermine processes of social inclusion as they may lead young people from non-Christian communities to feel alienated from mainstream society. These types of discourses can also legitimise racial and religious vilification in host communities, as was the case in the 2005 riots at Cronulla beach in Sydney (Halafoff, 2006). Conversely, countering violent extremism (CVE) experts have argued that promoting religious literacy, interreligious understanding and affirming Australia as a multi-faith, rather than an exclusively Christian, society is likely to minimise the risk of alienation and increase the sense of belonging among non-Christian youth and communities more generally (Halafoff, 2006; Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009, pp. 924-927).

Despite recent calls for more research (Erebus International, 2006, pp. vii, 109; Cahill, Bouma, Dellal, & Leahy, 2004, p. 126; Byrne, 2007, pp. 21, 74), a comprehensive study investigating existing levels of prejudice and religious and interreligious literacy among students in primary and secondary schools is yet to be conducted in Australia. Research into the efficacy of interreligious programs, in Australia, is currently slim and there is an urgent need for further scholarship in this field (Halafoff, 2010, p. 149). Moreover, as many interreligious educational programs have targeted immigrant communities, particularly Muslim communities in recent years (Erebus International, 2006, pp. xii-xiii), it is important to assess whether it is indeed immigrant communities that are most in need of interreligious education, given that host communities have generated the bulk of the acts of discrimination and violence towards Australian Muslims (Lentini et al., 2009, p. 7) and possibly other religious minorities including Jews (Jones, 2012).

Focusing on this last group, manifestations of antisemitism in schools have become an issue of global concern for Jewish communities. According to a 2012 survey of over 5000 self-identifying Jews in eight EU Member States undertaken by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 66 per cent of respondents deemed antisemitism to be a problem, and 76 per cent felt the problem had got worse in their countries over the past five years (Bader, 2007). Indeed the problem has become so great in France that there has been a major spike in Jewish students being taken out of government schools and enrolled in private schools (Australian Jewish News, 2013, p. 21). In 2007 an OSCE-Yad Vashem joint report “Addressing Antisemitism”, noted that antisemitism has recently come to the fore in educational settings. Based on an assessment of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2006 annual report on hate crimes in the OSCE region, the OSCE-Yad Vashem (2007, p. 3) report found that:

The number of attacks against Jewish schools increased in many countries while Jewish pupils were assaulted, harassed, and injured in growing numbers on their ways to and from school in the classroom, including by their classmates. Educators report that the term ‘Jew’ has become a popular swearword among youngsters. Rather than being confined to extremist circles, antisemitism is thus increasingly being mainstreamed. In this context,
the conflict in the Middle East is often used as a justification for the expression of antisemitism at the very centre of society.

In terms of responding to antisemitism, the OSCE-Yad Vashem (2007, pp. 5-6) report noted that this is a multi-disciplinary task, which can be approached through many subjects such as civics education, literature, art, history and others, as either an entire course or a focussed lesson. The report stated that “regardless of the circumstance, a careful approach to the matter is important. Pedagogical methods should incorporate the need for both Holocaust education and for educational tools to raise awareness of anti-Semitism” (OSCE-Yad Vashem, 2007, p. 5). Antisemitism can also be approached as an example of racism and discrimination related to human rights in school curricula.

Specifically, the OSCE-Yad Vashem (2007, p. 14) report provided learning goals and methodological principles and strategies for teaching about antisemitism, noting that “responses to antisemitism tend to be particularly effective if teachers are familiar with the history of the Jewish people and anti-Semitism”.

As this report shows, the management of religious diversity in schools must take place in the broader policy context of social inclusion. Developed by New Labour in the UK in the 1990s, and subsequently adopted by multiple governments in Europe and elsewhere, including Australia in 2009, social inclusion has been defined in Australian policy as follows:

The Government defines an inclusive society as one in which every individual has the capabilities, opportunities and resources to participate in the economy and their community, taking responsibility for their own lives. (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010)

This article asks whether antisemitism, as a form of discrimination, undermines the social inclusion agenda; leading to the social exclusion of Jewish youth and their families?

3. Antisemitism: Definitions and Manifestations in Australia

There is no one absolute definition of antisemitism, but one widely accepted definition is offered by the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism (CFCA, 2013):

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.

In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’. It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Antisemitism is widely recognised as manifesting in different forms. These include: religious antisemitism which is the oldest type of antisemitism and is Christian-based but also existed in a pre-Christian pagan form; racial antisemitism in the form of Nazism which regards Jews as a race that is inherently inferior, evil and beyond salvation; and political antisemitism also known as the new-antisemitism or Judeophobia which is often manifest in the form of anti-Zionism with its double standards, demonization and delegitimization of the State of Israel and which is widespread in the Arab and Islamic world and beyond (Cohn-Sherbok, 2002), although the claim that denial of Israel’s legitimacy is antisemitic is not universally accepted (Klug, 2003). While these forms of antisemitism are different they all regard the Jews as collectively causing harm to non-Jewish people or states (Markus & Taft, 2011).

A common characteristic to the different forms of antisemitism are various myths about Jews that have led to stereotypes, such as Jews are rich, tight with money and powerful. These images are negative in nature and thus reinforce prejudicial notions of Jews that are then manifest in the various forms of antisemitism. Antisemitism can take many forms including: stereotyping, social exclusion, physical assaults, written and verbal vilification, perpetuating myths, invoking ancient hatreds, accusing Jews of evil wrongdoing, denial of rights, including the right to self-determination in the national homeland Israel. For the purposes of this research, all these forms of antisemitism are considered.

Antisemitism was one of the areas of focus in the Gen08 study of Australian Jewry, which is the most comprehensive survey ever undertaken of the Australian Jewish community. According to a Gen08 report, “antisemitism is an issue of major concern for the Jewish community of Australia—as it has been since 1945, and before” (Markus & Taft, 2011, p. 2). Of the Gen08 respondents 58 per cent stated that they had “personally experienced or witnessed antisemitism in Australia”, the majority of these (71 per cent) were in the 18-24 age group. Almost all of the young adults who participated in the Gen08 focus groups had encountered covert and overt antisemitism, with most cases being covert such as jokes involving Jewish stereotypes (Markus & Taft, 2011, p. 3). While the Gen08 survey was comprehensive it included neither those under 18 nor those in the ACT, so the research in this paper extends the Gen08 findings to this cohort.
4. Canberra’s Demography, Multiculturalism, and Its Jewish Community

The Australian capital Canberra is home to around 347,000 people and rates highly on a range of measures maintained by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. In 2010 Canberrans had the highest rate of post-school qualifications and labour force participation in Australia, the longest life expectancy in the nation and the highest average weekly earnings (ABS, n.d.). From this data it is clear that Canberra is a highly educated and prosperous community. This is important in understanding that the antisemitism discussed below is not arising from a community beset by social disadvantage.

Canberra is also a diverse community. Canberrans come from over 200 different countries, with approximately 22 per cent of the ACT population born overseas. Approximately 60 per cent of Canberrans identify as having a religious affiliation. In 2011, 7 per cent of ACT usual residents identified with a religion other than Christianity. The most common were Buddhism (2.6 per cent), Islam (2.1 per cent), and Hinduism (1.7 per cent). A further 29 per cent of ACT residents reported that they had no religion (ABS, 2013, p. 8).

In the 2011 census 776 ACT residents nominated their religion as Judaism (J-Wire, 2014). Most originate in other cities (Canberra Jewish Community, n.d.). One growth factor for the Canberra Jewish community is the steady arrival of Israeli immigrants. The Jewish community is dispersed across Canberra and Jewish children and youth attend a large and diverse number of government and private schools in the ACT (Ben-Moshe, 2011).

5. The Research Sample, Questions and Findings

The participants in the research upon which this article is based were students enrolled in the Jewish community’s Sunday school program and their parents. The sample is not representative of the Jewish community, however the sample size constitutes a large percentage of Jewish children and young people in Canberra. Of the fourteen parents, six were Israeli, representing this new migrant population.

Focus groups were conducted on the morning of 6 November 2011 with the two Sunday school’s oldest groups, years 2/3 with the participation of 8 of the 9 enrolled pupils, and years 4-6 with 8 of the 12 enrolled pupils. Their students attend a wide range of private, government, Catholic and Anglican schools during the week. The Jewish community wrote to all parents advising them of the research and encouraged them and their children to participate in the respective focus groups. Both focus groups had a mix of genders and lasted about an hour each. The School obtained consent from the parents of each child who participated in the focus groups. The focus groups were facilitated by their regular teacher to ensure the children were familiar with the person they were discussing this sensitive subject with.

Three qualifications need to be made about the sample. First, it is important to note that the participants are those who identify with and are actively involved in the Jewish community. How antisemitism affects those who do not identify remains unknown. Second, the oldest child to participate in the survey was 14 years old. Anecdotally several people mentioned that antisemitism becomes more of an issue for those in high school, particularly when it is more politically related to events to do with Israel but no empirical data was gathered to explore this in detail. Finally, there is also a Canberra Hebrew School group of Israeli children, but their schedule did not allow for participation in the research. Given that these children are more likely to look and sound Other, and be more directly connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be interesting to know about the nature and extent of their experience of antisemitism.

5.1. Findings from the Children and Youth Focus Groups

The focus group participants were asked a series of qualitative semi-structured questions about antisemitism, including if they had experienced antisemitism and if so, the frequency and nature of antisemitism that occurred i.e. verbal or physical attack, the place where the antisemitism took place e.g. classroom, playground, and their reactions to the antisemitism, how it made them feel and what, if anything, they did about it.

5.1.1. The Extent and Experience of Antisemitism

For the eight children aged 9–11 only two expressed what could be described as serious and ongoing vilification and victimisation at school, with one student saying “it’s really bad, I don’t know why they do it, it makes me feel bad”.

While not every participant in both groups reported that they had experienced antisemitism, this fact did not mean fear of antisemitism was absent in their lives. This was evidenced by a telling comment from a 12–14 year old who said they had not experienced any antisemitism but they only told those they trusted that they were Jewish. Another student in this focus group similarly said there were no incidences of antisemitism they could think of, but when other students started to describe antisemitic encounters they had, they commented, “I went to assembly and some kids told me to sit in a particular seat and when I got there, there was a sign that said ‘Jew’ on it”.

The majority of antisemitic incidents were of a verbal nature and confined to the school grounds. As such, several Jewish pupils did not take them too seriously and seemed to take them in their stride, so to speak, as part of the antics of the school environment. As one participant in the 12–14 year old focus group said,
“They don’t mean anything by calling you a Jew. It’s like calling you gay. It’s just something they say”. This acceptance of everyday prejudice, against both Jews and homosexual people is, however, troubling.

The antisemitism which did occur reflected deep-seated stereotypes of Jews, with several students confirming that they had comments directed at them like “don’t be a Jew”, as they were targeted with the inective of the Jewish obsession with money. Indeed, reference to Jews and money and the related envy about Jewish Bar and Bat-Mitzvahs (coming of age religious ceremonies that are also celebrated with parties) at the age of 12 for girls and 13 for boys, was very common. One child reported comments such as, “they threw down some money and I picked it up and they said I passed the Jew test”.

In the worst antisemitic incident conveyed in the focus group, a student in the 12–14 year old cohort was repeatedly told that the Nazis were going to come and finish the job they had started. The student also explained how this was followed up by a swastika being drawn on their classroom wall. The recounting of this incident triggered another 12–14 year old to report leaving their classroom briefly and then returning to their desk to find a Swastika drawn on it. While these were the only two incidents relating to Nazi references amongst all fourteen focus group participants, the invoking of the Nazi imagery and its intimidating effect is a cause for serious concern.

5.1.2. The Religious Dimension of Antisemitism

The antisemitism that was described by the children and young people, in addition to being based on stereotypes about Jews and money, was frequently based on religious ignorance, insensitively and intolerance. This came to fore in religious education issues in general and at Christmas time in particular.

One 9–11 year old participant described being at a party where they were offered pizza, which they declined because it had ham on, and the child whose party it was responded, “if you are Jewish it’s stupid, be a Catholic”. The Jewish child confided in the focus group “it made me feel upset. I haven’t told anyone”. Another 9–11 year old focus group participant reported another child saying, “why can’t you tell your parents you don’t want to be Jewish”. This Jewish child explained in the focus group “it does get annoying being teased but I want to be Jewish”. Several children told how they were asked why they didn’t go to church. It is of course possible for questions about why Jews do not attend church to be asked out of genuine curiosity, but according to the focus group participants in their case they were asked with malicious intent. As such they were intended to make the Jewish child feel like an outsider who was unwelcome and did not fit in because they did not attend church.

This combination of ignorance, insensitivity and intolerance seems to be particularly pronounced at Christmas time, as many of the Jewish children reported being teased for not celebrating Christmas. Indicative comments were those relayed by a 9–11 year old who said he was told, “you are so unlucky you can’t celebrate Christmas”. The prejudice and ignorance of non-Jewish school children is reinforced by school policy. As one 9–11 year old put it, “we learn about Christmas but not Chanukah...why only Christmas? Christians are not the only religion in the world”.

Christmas appears to be time of heightened anxiety for Jewish pupils, as several children from the 9–11 year old focus group reported non-Jewish children being “annoyed” at their Jewish peers for having an eight day holiday, Chanukah, around the time of Christmas. The same child from the 9–11 year old focus group quoted above also added: “They went on and on and it made me feel annoyed”. Some of the Jewish pupils were clearly intimated by the nature and extent of questioning about why they did not celebrate Christmas and instead celebrated an eight day holiday.

The religious dimension of antisemitism, the ancient antisemitic canards about Jews killing Jesus, and denying his status as G-d1, were also surprisingly common. Sometimes this was expressed in a hateful way and other times naively, with pupils simply asking “but Jesus is G-d so why don’t you believe in him”. The way this quote was shared in the focus group suggests the intent was not to be antisemitic, but the focus group participant who conveyed this experience made clear that it made them feel questioned, doubted and wrong, contributing to their sense of otherness and exclusion. The detrimental effect of this is compounded by the fact that, as is discussed below, the schools seem unaware or uninterested in their occurrence and impact.

Insensitivity and ignorance was manifest by both schools and their pupils in relation to Jewish religious and cultural needs, particularly dietary requirements. Indeed, the Jewish children found themselves to be constantly on the defensive explaining why they don’t eat pork. For the most part such comments were based on curiosity by other children, but the insensitivity of schools on this issue made the Jewish pupils feel intimidated, constantly having to explain if not rationalise their behaviour; so while the intent may not have been antisemitic, by being forced to defend their religious practices these focus group participants felt the legitimacy of their practices were questioned rather than accepted. One child in the 9–11 year old focus group reported being on school camp where pork was being served. When he explained to the cook that he could not eat it and was asked why and he explained he was

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1 Jews are prohibited for writing in full the name G-d, so the custom is to write it with a hyphen, or to use other terms such as “Yahweh”. 

Jewish the cook said: “Well that’s stupid. You should just eat it”. Several students in the 12–14 year age group complained that there were halal and other options on school forms but not kosher.

5.1.3. School Attitudes

Significantly, religious ignorance, insensitivity and intolerance were expressed not only by pupils but also the schools themselves. What can be described as religious insensitivity at best, and outright discrimination and intimidation at worse, was manifest in several ways relating to religious studies. One student in the 12–14 year old focus group described a lesson where they had to write G-d’s name so he wrote “YAHWEH” because Jews are forbidden to write the name of G-d in full. Their teacher asked why they could not write the word, and when the pupil explained that this was not permissible to Jews, the teacher told him to “just write it anyway”. This pupil was thus forced by a school authority to engage in an act even though he made clear it was against his Jewish faith. Forcing a Jew to act in contravention to their beliefs is a long-term manifestation of antisemitism, and whatever its motives its impact and experience is often felt to be discriminatory.

The problem of disregarding Jewish religious rites was particularly pronounced in relation to attending chapel. One participant in the 12–14 year old group explained how they are forced to go to chapel and as the teacher knew they were Jewish they walked up and down the aisle close to the pupil to make sure they were participating in the service.

In another case, an Orthodox Jewish student refused to go to chapel at all because, according to Jewish law, it is forbidden to enter a church while Christian prayers are taking place. The school’s reaction was to effectively punish the pupil by forcing them to sit in the detention room while chapel was taking place and the school worked out how to handle the situation. Only after the pupil’s outraged parents threatened legal action was worked out how to handle the situation. Only after the pupil explained that this was not permissible to Jews, the teacher told him to “just write it anyway”. This pupil was thus forced by a school authority to engage in an act even though he made clear it was against his Jewish faith. Forcing a Jew to act in contravention to their beliefs is a long-term manifestation of antisemitism, and whatever its motives its impact and experience is often felt to be discriminatory.

Not all schools, however, were ignorant, insensitive and intolerant to the needs of their Jewish students. Yet sometimes the efforts of schools to be inclusive, while well-intentioned, made matters worse. For example, several children reported being suddenly called on by the teacher knew they were Jewish they walked up and down the aisle close to the pupil to make sure they were participating in the service.

In another case, an Orthodox Jewish student refused to go to chapel at all because, according to Jewish law, it is forbidden to enter a church while Christian prayers are taking place. The school’s reaction was to effectively punish the pupil by forcing them to sit in the detention room while chapel was taking place and the school worked out how to handle the situation. Only after the pupil’s outraged parents threatened legal action was the child reluctantly given an exemption from chapel.

5.1.4. Children’s Responses

Part of the problem in dealing with antisemitism in schools is that the Jewish children are not reporting it when it occurs to either their schools or their parents. This was the case for almost all the focus group participants. In relation to reporting incidents to schools one 9–11 year old despondently reflected, “I don’t know how it would help”. Another 9–11 year old expressed the dilemma of reporting, saying “sometimes teachers are nice and you get called a teacher’s pet and kids start being mean to you”.

The scenario of not telling parents about the antisemitic incidents is predicated on two factors. One, the ubiquitous feeling amongst the focus group participants that there is nothing the parents can do, and secondly that the parents reaction and subsequent intervention with the school will cause the child more problems. As one 9–11 year old surmised:

I didn’t tell mum as she’ll want to be make a big deal of it and I don’t want to be embarrassed. I’m already not popular (at school) and I don’t want to get into trouble and or get others in trouble. I feel it will get worse if I say something.

While there clearly were multiple individual incidents of antisemitism occurring in schools, there were no concerted antisemitic campaigns as such. It must also be noted that overall there was a high level of acceptance of the Jewish children, or in the words of a 9–11 year old, “all the people at my school don’t mind me being Jewish”.

While school administrators were generally not seen as being sympathetic to the needs of the Jewish students, some teachers were noted for being caring and concerned. Examples of such behaviour by teachers included intervening in playground incidents when antisemitic incidents occurred and checking if food being offered at the school was kosher.

Examples were also cited of some good practice in terms of religious and intercultural education. This was the case with a 9–11 year old who described how at the time when the school was engaged in Christmas celebrations the pupil took the initiative of sharing the Jewish Chanukah tradition of bringing in chocolate money for everyone to eat “and everyone liked it”. When initiative is taken by the schools to enhance education and understanding about Judaism it can have a positive effect. This was evidenced by a 12–14 year old who stated that “my teacher made me talk about Judaism (in religious education) and my class seemed interested”. One 9–11 year old also described how their class watched a film about Anne Frank and afterwards “all my friends hugged me and I asked why and they said it could have been you”.

5.2. The Parental Focus Group

The parents of the Senior and Youth classes were invited to participate in a focus group about antisemitism as ex-
experienced by children in Canberra. The School predicted that “about six” parents may participate. However, fourteen chose to do so; this high level of participation is indicative of the concern about antisemitism that these parents expressed in the focus group itself. The parents inevitably had a more sophisticated understanding than their children about the forms antisemitism can take and the negative impact it can have. The focus group lasted for an hour and a half and also took place in the Sunday school on 6 November 2011. There were seven men and seven women in the focus group. Of the participants, three were married couples.

There was a strong sense amongst all the parents that their children were exposed to antisemitism at school. The parents’ concern was understandably about the impact this had on their children. One parent said they had “no doubt their child was affected” and the fact that their child did not discuss it with them confirmed for them that their child had an issue of concern they were hiding from them. While the parents mostly recognised that their children could navigate the antisemitism in schools, they expressed concern that their children felt they had to hide or downplay their Jewish identity.

Concomitantly, there was genuine and widespread concern about their children being excluded because they were Jewish, although they noted that while they were excluded from some social groups in the school they were welcomed into others. Parents also stated that the sense of isolation children felt was more pronounced at Christmas time, which reinforced the religious ignorance and intolerance discussed above.

It is clear that ignorance, rather than malice, is often the cause of discrimination and social exclusion felt by the Jewish school children. Perhaps the most glaring example of a comment meant in a positive way, yet which was an expression of classical antisemitism, was conveyed by a parent who described how when their child arrived at their new school the teacher welcomed them by stating:

Just like Germans killed Jews in the Holocaust and you don’t blame today’s Germans, although Jews killed Jesus we don’t blame you.

While physical incidents of antisemitic abuse only occurred on one occasion, there was a general feeling that the overall environment was unsafe and, unless something was done about it, verbal abuse could degenerate into physical violence.

Parents also reported antisemitic incidents tied in with the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and as such were manifestations of “new antisemitism”. The parent of a high school student said her child is often confronted about “Israeli oppression of the Palestinians and it’s hard for her to deal with that”. Another participant reported the physical assault of their nephew in a school incident with a Muslim child in connection to the Middle East conflict. Unlike secondary school, there was no evidence of the new antisemitism in primary school. This suggests that this additional form of antisemitism may occur as the youth become more politically conscious in their secondary school years.

The parents themselves admitted to not knowing how best to respond to the antisemitism. Acknowledging that some schools and teachers tried to engage the Jewish students on Jewish subject matter, parents generally felt it was neither right nor fair to place this onus on Jewish children to play a role in educating their peers and the school about Judaism. They also appreciated that their children did not want them to get involved in trying to fix their problems. This only added to distress experienced by parents concerned about their children experiencing antisemitism.

6. Analysis and Discussion

A number of key themes and findings emerge from this research. Paradoxically, the social inclusion and social exclusion of Jewish students is occurring simultaneously in Canberra. As a result of malicious antisemitism and unknowingly offensive myths and stereotypes Jewish youth were experiencing social exclusion. The psychological impact of suddenly being excluded from a community from which these students thought they were an accepted part should not be underestimated. Simultaneously there is a proactive process of social inclusion occurring in response to this social exclusion, initiated by the children and young people themselves, and by some teachers and schools.

The most common form of antisemitism that occurred was faith-based and as such was often expressed in the articulation of ancient stereotypes that in many instances were negative in nature. Founded on and manifested through insensitivity, ignorance and intolerance on the part of pupils, teachers and schools, this was especially pronounced at Christmas time, which is a particularly stressful time for Jewish children attending school in Canberra. The Territory’s schools, while nominally pursuing multiculturalism, are insensitive to the religious and cultural needs of the Jewish pupils.

Age-old negative stereotypes about Jews remain deeply entrenched in the mindset of primary and middle school year children in Canberra and are being expressed freely and regularly to the small number of Jewish children attending Canberra schools. Consequently, there was a disturbingly resigned acceptance by the children that antisemitism happens and you just put up with it.

Importantly, even though all the Jewish children who participated in the focus group experienced antisemitism in schools, they all had many non-Jewish friends who rejected antisemitism and facilitated social inclusion. This was a factor that they all found heartening.
The fact that the Jewish community in Canberra is small in number, with the children often being the only Jewish child in their year level or school, meant the onus was on them to represent Judaism, and many did so with pride. Examples included standing up in class to explain a Jewish festival, wearing a Star of David around their neck or in one case, a boy boldly walking into school wearing a skull cap. The Jewish identity of these children appeared to be stronger as a response to the antisemitism. Conversely, some Jewish children and young people did not feel comfortable about publicly having to explain or display their faith and culture. Nor did their parents think it should be up to them to educate the school community about Judaism.

Clearly the impact of the antisemitism on the children and how they deal with it varies considerably according to each student’s disposition. Some children and youth are more vulnerable than others. While bullying is clearly a concern for all children who are its victims, antisemitism adds another layer of impact to Jewish children being bullied.

The distress experienced by the children placed a stress on their parents who struggled to find the means to address this problem. Virtually all of the children declined to report on the antisemitism to either their schools or their parents. There was unanimity amongst all the children that this would be a bad idea because the school wouldn’t understand or do anything about it, their parents would get involved and that would be “embarrassing” and make the situation worse.

The research also reflects how children’s experiences can negatively impact on the social inclusion of parents. The focus group discussion with the parents of Jewish school children reveals that the social exclusion and antisemitism experienced by their children heightens their own sense of being outsiders, which is particularly pronounced for recent Israeli migrants. This is compounded when their own interventions with school the school authorities are unsuccessful. While the law provides some protection for Jewish parents and their children, in practical terms it is not a viable option for many parents to pursue legal recourse. While one parent in the focus group did pursue anti-discrimination legal action, they worked in law so had the skill set and means to do so.

It is clear given the problem of antisemitic social exclusion outlined in this article that proactive measures are required for intercultural relations and social inclusion to be advanced in Canberra schools. There is an urgent need for all schools, primary and secondary, and government and private, to take steps to prevent and handle manifestations of intended and unintended antisemitism. This needs to include the entire school community of pupils, teachers and administrators.

In particular, there is an enhanced need for diversity training and education about Jewish beliefs and practices. Teacher education about Judaism is clearly required. How teachers understand and deal with issues of cultural diversity is something that must be addressed through teacher education so that the teacher is equipped once they are in the classroom.

There is also a need for school administrators and teachers to be aware not only of Jewish cultural practices, for example in relation to going to chapel, but also their legal rights on these matters. Moreover, schools also need to urgently review and establish their policies for handling complaints of antisemitism. They may wish to consider, for example, having a system of referral to the Jewish community or one of its agencies and partnerships that could be operational in these situations. There is no doubt that the development of such polices and practice, and overcoming the problem of antisemitism in the school sector, will benefit from schools engaging with the Jewish community. Given the strong Christian dimension to the expressions of antisemitism, and the Christian faith-based nature of several schools that Jewish children attend in Canberra, addressing the problem of antisemitism in schools will also be advanced by the wider Church leadership being involved in partnerships with the Jewish community.

Finally, this article illustrates how racism, discrimination and stereotyping contribute to social exclusion. This clearly undermines intercultural relations and suggests that further advances in multiculturalism are required if social inclusion is to be experienced by youth in Canberra schools. This will entail addressing frameworks for managing and governing religious diversity in schools including education about diverse religions and beliefs in general, and education about non-Christian communities in particular.

7. Conclusion

The findings reported in this article suggest that the experience of Jewish pupils at school in Canberra is similar to that experienced by the much wider sample from the Gen08 study (Markus & Taft, 2011), with significant covert antisemitism such as stereotyping jokes being common. Indeed, as with the data collected for the Executive Council of Australian Jewry Anti-Semitism Annual Report (Cohn-Sherbok, 2002), this hatred is more manifest in verbal and written form rather than violent attacks. The incidents directed at Jewish children that are occurring in Canberra clearly fall within the internationally accepted definitions of antisemitism. While the scale may appear slight, the impact on the victims and the community is significant. It contributes to high degrees of social exclusion of the Jewish students, and the schools are failing to appreciate the nature and impact of this antisemitism. Furthermore, the schools while nominally pursuing multiculturalism are insensitive to the religious and cultural needs of the Jewish pupils.

The research findings presented in this article indi-
cate that cultural diversity is not deeply entrenched as a lived experienced in Canberra. The nature of the ACT community, with high levels of education and employment, makes surprise and concern about the antisemitism all the more pronounced.

Antisemitism in schools cannot be considered in isolation and schools cannot fix this problem in isolation. An all of community approach is required if this problem is to be overcome, with the schools working actively with Jewish communities, Christian communities and other religious communities and interfaith organisations in their area.

School policy and procedure for dealing with this issue is required as a matter of urgency. In its absence, Jewish children are being socially excluded for no other reason other than the fact that they are Jewish. A coherent schools strategy is required to address this, as opposed to current ad hoc measures.

There are, however, several reasons for optimism. While some children confront the antisemitism, other non-Jewish children find the antisemitism offensive and include the Jewish children as their friends. Further, since much of the antisemitism reported in the study is based on ignorance rather than hatred means it can be addressed through education.

Given religions’ ambivalent roles in creating and ameliorating social problems (Beckford, 1990; Appleby, 2000), it is the responsibility of the state to guard against exclusive religious narratives, and religious vilification, including antisemitism, which are capable of perpetuating prejudices and inspiring conflicts. It is also vital that no one religion should be given a privileged status within a government education system, instead, a critical education about diverse religions and beliefs can assist in advancing cosmopolitan principles, such as advancing equal rights and respect for diversity and common law, and thereby enable processes of social inclusion and countering extremism within school communities and in broader society (Halafoff, 2010, pp. 41-42). The new National Curriculum provides an opportunity to address these issues.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

“More Than a Game”: The Impact of Sport-Based Youth Mentoring Schemes on Developing Resilience toward Violent Extremism

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Abstract

This paper draws upon the findings of an evaluation of “More than a Game”, a sport-focused youth mentoring program in Melbourne, Australia that aimed to develop a community-based resilience model using team-based sports to address issues of identity, belonging, and cultural isolation amongst young Muslim men in order to counter forms of violent extremism. In this essay we focus specifically on whether the intense embodied encounters and emotions experienced in team sports can help break down barriers of cultural and religious difference between young people and facilitate experiences of resilience, mutual respect, trust, social inclusion and belonging. Whilst the project findings are directly relevant to the domain of countering violent extremism, they also contribute to a growing body of literature which considers the relationship between team-based sport, cross-cultural engagement and the development of social resilience, inclusion and belonging in other domains of youth engagement and community-building.

Keywords

AFL; belonging; community resilience; countering violent extremism; counterterrorism; football; Muslim Australians; social inclusion; social networks; sport; violence reduction

Issue

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1. Introduction

Enhancing community resilience is now a high priority in Australia and internationally in national security and counter-terrorism policy. As part of its counterterrorism strategy, for example, the Canadian government emphasises the open, diverse and inclusive nature of Canadian society and seeks to foster a greater sense of belonging among its citizens (Government of Canada, 2011). Similarly, the Australian government seeks to bolster resilience to terrorism not only through security and law enforcement responses, but also the adoption of broader strategies that seek to enhance social inclusion and social cohesion. In emphasising “Australia’s history of inclusion, multiculturalism and respect for cultural diversity” the government hopes to tap into the “emotional landscapes of communities” as a significant component of counterterrorism study, policy and practice (Spalek, 2012). Thus a key premise for research and policy-making in the CVE (countering vio-
gent extremist) context is that strengthening community resilience “in line with the goals of a democratic civil society” can help individuals and communities avoid turning to extremist ideology and activity to satisfy a range of social and emotional needs (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011).

Engaging young people in activities such as sport has been embraced by some CVE practitioners and government agencies as a central means of developing locally based programs that contribute to community resilience, enhance civic participation of socially marginalised youth, and weaken the likelihood of young people becoming involved in groups engaged in violent extremism (CVE, n.d.). These policies are supported by research that links targeted sport programmes to the development of “pro-social” behaviours and strategies which deal with emotions, fears and grievances that may otherwise escalate into anti-social and violent behaviours (Cale & Harris, 2005; Coalter, 2008, 2013; Hall, 2011; Moreau et al., 2014; Morris, Sallybanks, & Willis, 2004). In particular, research has found that participation in team sports develops “protective factors” that build self-confidence, communication skills, self-discipline, trust, reciprocity and conflict resolution skills (Hall, 2011; Moreau et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2004) and facilitate the expansion of social networks and participation (Bai- ley, 2005; Coalter, 2013; Tonts, 2005), and intercultural engagement (Nathan et al., 2013; Spaaij, 2014). All of these are regarded as central to developing feelings of membership and belonging to the local community.

Moreover, there has been a growing interest in sport as a setting where young men in particular can express themselves and engage with others through bodily practices and encounters deemed as less threatening ways of developing pro-social behaviours and openness towards others than verbal, cognitive and reflexive approaches (Hall, 2011; Moreau et al., 2014; Nathan et al., 2013). In this vein, Spaaij (2014) considers how bodily practices associated with sport open up “liminal moments” in which forms of “solidarity or communitas can take hold” which transgress or dissolve social norms and boundaries. To this, Hall (2011) and Moreau et al. (2014) add the extent to which sport acts as a form of “managed risk-taking” in which bodily experiences and expressions which involve some degree of physical risk can encourage interpersonal confidence, trust, camaraderie and care amongst teammates, acting as a “driving force for social cohesion”.

In evaluating the efficacy of targeted sport programmes for building personal and community resilience, we analyse here the key findings of a project exploring the impacts of “More Than a Game”, a sport-based programme developed by the Australian Rules Football League’s (AFL) Western Bulldogs Football Club, in association with the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police and Hobson’s Bay City Council (McDonald, Grossman, & Johns, 2012). This year-long program engaged young Muslim men in Melbourne’s western suburbs through a local Islamic society. The program used team based sport to deliver a range of activities intended to develop personal wellbeing and pro-social skills, and facilitate a greater sense of social inclusion and community belonging for Muslim youth. Specifically, these were oriented toward developing young role models and leaders in the community; enhancing greater understanding of the Muslim community by the broader Australian community; and fostering greater intercultural contact and understanding between participants and other cultural groups.

Although we include some of the general findings from the evaluation of the “More than a Game” program, in this paper we are particularly interested in addressing the question of whether the intense experiences and emotions experienced in team sports break down barriers of social difference and facilitate experiences of mutual respect and trust, social inclusion, belonging and resilience, all of which are relevant to the domain of countering violent extremism.

2. Violent Extremism, Social Cohesion and Community Resilience

2.1. Community Resilience

Resilience—the ability to withstand or recover from disaster, crisis or trauma for both individuals and communities—has become a key concept in understanding and responding to the conditions that underpin violent extremism in an Australian policy context. For example, the government’s most recent Counter-Terrorism White Paper (Government of Australia, 2010) clearly signals that strengthening communities to support values of social inclusion and cultural and religious diversity is vital to increasing forms of civic participation and attachment to community, thereby enhancing resilience toward narratives and ideologies that promote violence. This policy framework recognises, first, that communities and community partners are often best placed to recognise and support individuals who are at risk of marginalisation, or who might be attracted to the use of violence to achieve political, social or ideological goals. Second, it emphasises that government agencies are most effective when they support communities to harness their existing capacity to deter individuals from pathways into violent extremism, rather than approaching ethnically and religiously diverse communities from a deficit viewpoint.

The literature on community resilience emphasises two major themes. The first is the importance of neighbourhood networks and social relationships. Community solidarity is enhanced when individuals feel themselves to be embedded in a web of social networks and relationships perceived to be loving, supportive and available in times of need. Informal networks forged...
with neighbours, family and friends provide a variety of types of social support that can be mobilised in times of stress and uncertainty. But informal social connections are most productive when accompanied by more formal networks that individuals have with groups and organisations. These formal or institutional networks create structured relationships that encompass professional, social, economic, and health-related participation (Sherrieb, 2010).

The second theme stressed in the literature, which is inherent in these social networks and relationships, is the element of reciprocity and trust. Reciprocity and trust are central to building and sustaining community competence and resilience. Reciprocity can take various forms, but at the community level it is not so much an exchange of what Marshall Sahlins (2004) calls “balanced reciprocity”—the symmetrical, immediate or near-term exchange or expectation of like for like—but closer to the notion of “generalised reciprocity”—a pro-social mechanism wherein an individual provides a service or contribution in the general expectation that this kindness may (but need not be) be returned at some undefined point in the future (Onyx & Bullen, 2000; Welch et al., 2005).

The reciprocal responsibilities of community members to each other are closely related to the theme of trust. Trust entails “a willingness to take risks in a social context based on a sense of confidence that others will respond as expected and will act in mutually supportive ways” (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). Welch et al. (2005) contend that what they call “social trust”, the mutually shared expectation that people will engage in “reciprocally beneficial behaviour in their interactions with others”, is an important component of a healthy community and society.

Trust is a particularly important dynamic in the context of multicultural communities, where the balance between a range of both complementary and competing cultural traditions, on the one hand, and sense of belonging, participation and rights through shared social spaces and institutions, on the other, is continuously renegotiated. Despite the valid criticisms that have been made of mainstream multicultural policies and rhetoric that regard cultural diversity as a problem to be “tolerated” or “managed”, and see culturally diverse communities as somehow being “maladaptive” to Western cultural norms (Hage, 2003, 2012; Harris, 2012), there is, in the resilience literature, an underlying recognition that diversity is often a key attribute of healthy communities and societies and a front-line defence against forms of violent extremism. This includes acknowledgement that communities do not necessarily have to be homogeneous to demonstrate or build resilience. On the contrary, they can be quite diverse, as long as there is a shared emotional connection, predicated on “the sharing of positively valued experiences and stories” (Sonn & Fisher, 1998) and common commitments to dignity. Shared community narratives that build a sense of solidarity and cohesion can produce positive experiences of belonging and of individual and collective identity.

Thus, to be most effective, community resilience also requires extra-local ties that go beyond one’s immediate community. The ties that friends, family or close social groups share with one another, referred to in the literature as “bonding social capital” (Putnam, 2000) provide emotional and functional support to members, but they can have a negative impact on communities when they are fostered at the expense of external connections with other community groups or members (Tolsma & Zavallos, 2009). Without extra-local ties and networks, or “bridging capital”, a community runs the risk of missing out on the knowledge, resources and skills available in other networks. Forging relationships with people in alternative social networks who have access to different resources not available in one’s immediate social circle is essential in helping people “get ahead in life”. These relationships also expose people to difference, thereby broadening an individual’s identity and enhancing their capacity to work, live and socialise with others (Magis, 2010).

2.2. Cultural Resilience

“Cultural resilience” considers the role that cultural background plays in determining the ability of individuals and communities to be resilient in the face of adversity. For Caroline Clauss-Ehlers, the term describes the degree to which the strengths of one’s culture promote the development of coping (Clauss-Ehlers, 2008). A culturally focused resilience model involves “a dynamic, interactive process in which the individual negotiates stress through a combination of character traits, cultural background, cultural values, and facilitating factors in the sociocultural environment” (Clauss-Ehlers, 2008).

A prerequisite for resilience in culturally diverse community settings is thus familiarity with one’s own cultural traditions in addition to knowing the culture where one is living (Gunnestad, 2006). In understanding their way of “coping and hoping, surviving and thriving”, it is important to consider how culturally and linguistically diverse groups navigate the cultural understandings and assumptions of both their countries of origin and domicile (Ungar, 2006). People who master the rules and norms of their new culture without abandoning their own language, values and social support are more resilient than those who tenaciously maintain their own culture at the expense of adjusting to their new environment. They are also more resilient than those who forego their own culture and assimilate with the host society (Ungar, 2006). If, as a growing body of literature indicates, the combination of both valuing one’s culture as well as learning about the culture of

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the new system produces greater resilience and adaptive capacities, serious problems can arise when a majority tries to acculturate a minority to the mainstream by taking away or not recognising important parts of the minority culture. In terms of resilience, if you take the culture from a people, you take their identity, and hence their strength—their resilience capital. If people are stripped of what gives them strength they become vulnerable because “they do not automatically gain those cultural strengths that the majority has acquired over generations” (Gunnestad, 2006).

Research investigating the negative consequences that result from the loss of core cultural identities through oppressive socio-political practices has found that these include self-hatred, the internalisation of negative group identities and low self-esteem (Sonn & Fisher, 1998). When members of minority groups internalise the negative images projected onto them by the dominant group they become their own oppressors. Culture is thus a resource in resilience. For minorities and immigrant groups true biculturalism could be the best way of coping and, indeed, many studies suggest that bicultural individuals are at a lower risk of substance abuse, school difficulties, family conflicts and other maladaptive behaviours (Gunnestad, 2006). In other words, immigrants who participate in the larger community, while also maintaining their native heritage (i.e. bicultural integration), “tend to exhibit lower levels of distress” (Castro & Murray, 2009).

As Tolsma and Zevallos (2009) suggest however, community resilience can be adversely affected if close intra-community ties are fostered at the expense of inter-community connections with other groups and with mainstream society. This can lead to feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement among minority groups. This is particularly problematic when much recent terrorism research indicates that engagement in terrorist activities is usually preceded by alienated individuals withdrawing from the larger community in search of a “spiritual home in the company of small collectives of similarly angry individuals” (Pickering, Wright-Neville, & McCulloch, 2007).

2.3. Resilience as Process: The Dialectics of Coping and Vulnerability

As Cathryn Hunter suggests, resilience cannot be manifested without the presence of both adaptive functioning and exposure to risk or adversity (Hunter, 2012). Resilience thus makes sense primarily in the context of vulnerability. According to Bean et al., the constitutive rhetoric of resilience relies on the existence of vulnerability as a dialectical partner (Bean, Keränen, & Durfy, 2011). Understanding vulnerability and resilience as two sides of the same coin means acknowledging that resilience is neither entirely personal nor strictly social, but an interactive and iterative combination of the two. It is a quality of the environment as much as the individual. For Ungar, it is the complex entanglements between “individuals and their social ecologies [that] will determine the degree of positive outcomes experienced” (Ungar, 2006). Thinking about resilience as context-dependent is important because research that is too trait-based or actor-centred risks ignoring any structural or institutional forces. As Clauss-Ehlers notes, “the problem with the trait-based approach is that it leaves resilience way too much up to the individual” (2008). Further, recent literature suggests that resilience is not an inherent trait that an individual either possesses or does not, but is something that can be developed (Hunter, 2012). Resilience involves behaviours, thoughts and actions that can be learned and operationalised by anyone, and as a potential response to trauma “is not the exclusive property of any nation or group” (Bean et al., 2011).

Resilience is thus a heterogeneous, multidimensional process that involves individual, family and community-level risk and protective factors. In addition, far from being static, resilience can wax and wane during the course of one’s life. As Rutter emphasises, “resilience cannot be seen as fixed attributes of the individual. If circumstances change, the risk alters” (Rutter, 1987).

3. Sport and Its Role in the Development of Pro-Social Behaviour, Social Inclusion, Violence Reduction and Community Resilience

Accordingly, our primary focus here is the extent to which involvement in team sports may offer a key site in which to negotiate intra- and inter-community forms of resilience and shared vulnerability based on intercultural understandings of embodiment, shared purpose and achievement, and the management of conflict and pressure. All of these features are relevant to the domain of countering violent extremism, yet little evidence exists of how this works in practice through programs embracing sporting activity as the primary vehicle for embodied, intersubjective engagement with sociocultural otherness and reciprocity.

Although a large body of literature has examined the benefits of team based sport in addressing psycho-social behaviours and forms of social exclusion leading to antisocial and violent behaviour (Coakley, 2011; Coalter, 2008, 2013; Sandford, Duncombe, & Armour, 2008) there has been very little reference in the CVE literature to the role that sport might play in shaping “alternative pathways” and identifications for youth at risk of becoming involved in forms of violent extremism, despite the prevalence of sport based youth mentoring programs funded by CVE schemes. In part, this may be attributed to the policy emphasis on steering young people away from identification with political ideologies and beliefs that may promote violent action.
leading sport to be identified more as a “hook”, which is combined with counter-narrative approaches that promote values of cultural and religious diversity, civil society and democracy. As researchers have noted, these approaches tend to prioritise the cognitive and reflexive aspects of processes leading to violent extremism, obscuring the emotional, embodied and affective aspects of small group dynamics that are a part of the matrices of factors that make violent extremist networks appealing to young men (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).

Another explanation for the dearth of research on the utility of sport based programs for CVE might relate to the conceptual and methodological problems associated with measuring the impact of sports on crime prevention and violence reduction more broadly. Bailey (2005) and Coalter (2009, 2013) for example, relate this issue to the lack of rigorous evaluation of sport-based programs and their social impacts. Coalter, for example, acknowledges that there are “major and often inherent methodological difficulties in measuring the impact of programs” (Coalter, 2013), which he relates to a growing understanding that sports are “sites for socialisation experiences, not the causes of socialisation experiences” (Coakley, 2011). This tends to place the focus back on the process of participating, rather than on the role of sport as such.

And yet, despite these well documented limitations there is an emerging focus in the sport and resilience literature on the significance and social impact of phenomenological, bodily practices and forms of emotional expression grounded in the sporting context. For example, in emerging research conducted by Hall (2011), Moreau et al. (2014) and Spaaajj (2014), it was found that young people participating in sport programmes experienced strong feelings of inter- and intra-group responsibility, care and camaraderie, enhanced interpersonal confidence, freedom to challenge social habits and boundaries, and enhanced feelings of belonging through embodied and emotional experiences associated with being actively involved in a sporting competition and part of a team environment. For example, in Hall’s study into the experiences of adolescent males engaged in team sports, participants reported “feeling good” about “pulling together”, “pushing through pain” and earning respect of teammates in the physical contest (Hall, 2011). They also pointed out that by developing self-discipline through bodily practices and training, they had an increased sense of control and confidence which transferred into other endeavours and activities away from the sporting arena.

Although Hall puts these experiences into a larger social context—in which community recognition of individual and team performance, the learning of life skills in a social environment and encounters with role models (i.e. coaching staff) played a significant role to growing self-confidence and capacity to push past personal limitations—there is a space provided for examining embodied and emotional encounters within this social frame. In particular, Hall relates some of the “good feelings” and lessening of fear experienced by participants directly to the role of ‘risk’ in embodied sporting encounters. For participants, feelings of risk and enjoyment were conveyed through descriptions of “the rush of pulling off a big tackle”, for example. Sharing risks and caring for teammates also engendered strong bonding experiences and feelings of belonging (Hall, 2011). All of these bodily practices and experiences forge a direct connection, in Hall’s account, to concepts of resilience.

These findings correspond with a more recent study examining the impacts of a sport based programme for ‘troubled youth’ in Canada (Moreau et al., 2014). First, in evaluating the impact of the program the researchers highlight some of the failings of youth sporting programmes. In particular they cite problems that some marginalised youth have with institutional settings and approaches, and also narrative style therapeutic approaches that favour verbal, cognitive and reflexive processes. In addressing these issues the researchers highlight literature supporting the positive effect of recreational and sporting activities that use non-verbal strategies as a less threatening tool for pro-social development, community and social inclusion.

This is reflected in the findings of the evaluation that identified the impacts of the program. These were categorised into primary, secondary and tertiary impacts. In the primary category participants identified that sport offered them a chance to develop self-confidence through pursuing a regular sporting practice, broaden their social networks, meet new people and develop a sense of belonging (Moreau et al., 2014). This was related to feelings that arose where participants felt a “strong resonance between their own experience and others”. In the secondary category, participants note that sport offers them a context of “spontaneous exchanges” with others, “[...] that allow gestures of camaraderie to take place”. These experiences also engender feelings of responsibility toward others, the establishment of “team spirit” and “mutual trust”. Moreover, these experiences “serve to dispel fears... bringing a team spirit experienced as caring and protective by members” (Moreau et al., 2014).

In the tertiary category, the research findings reflect Hall’s understanding that shared experiences of risk (either of injury or failure) act as a “driving force for social cohesion” promoting a strong sense of unity and belonging. This view is tempered, however, by Hall’s description of sport being a form of “managed risk”, implying that although risky behaviours themselves are enjoyable forms of social learning for young males (Hall, 2011), that such activities may lead to negative outcomes without strong rules and boundaries being imposed on conduct. Moreau et al. (2014) make
this link more explicit, arguing that the role of coaches and trainers is important in the sense that they provide a “constructive contextuality” whereby the benefits of the competitive sporting context can only build feelings of “belonging and personal value” when an atmosphere of “trust, solidarity and reciprocity” within the group is encouraged.

Spaaij (2014) brings these social bonding outcomes of participating in team sport together with an understanding that these forms of “bonding” capital can also engender “bridging” capital. He examines this in relation to refugee and immigrant young people’s participation in team sports, and the development of strong feelings of belonging and active membership in the community that are engendered by refugee young people playing with young people from other cultural groups. Spaaij uses the concept of “risk” and “boundary work” to understand what kinds of belonging are fostered for vulnerable young people through participation in sport. In conclusion, he argues that the sport field is a site where the boundary processes involved in negotiations of identity and belonging are situational and fluid, enabling some social boundaries to be “shifted and crossed, while others and preserved and created” (2014, pp. 6-7), once again highlighting the importance of the social atmosphere created in which embodied expressions and encounters take place.

The following discussion relates the thematic review of the CVE, community resilience and sport and resilience literature to some of the key findings from the “More Than a Game” evaluation in order consider how these may help identify what we can learn from such programs and what insights may be provided around both the possibilities and limits of using team sport as a vehicle for building a sense of resilience, social justice and social inclusion. Specifically, we use these findings to investigate the role that team-based sport, which develops a range of embodied, affective and also cognitive capacities, might play in providing an “alternative model of human hardiness” (Scheper-Hughes, 2008) that encompasses the feelings, emotions and embodied experiences of young people.

4. The “More than a Game” Program

“More than a Game” was a 12 month sport based youth mentoring program that involved 60 young men, aged 15–25, predominantly of Lebanese cultural background, recruited from the Newport Islamic Society of Melbourne. The program was developed and implemented by the Western Bulldogs Football Club in association with government and community partners, including the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police and leaders from the Newport Islamic Society, with funding provided by the Attorney General’s Department “Building Community Resilience” (BCR) grant.

A range of Australian Rules football-related activities were delivered over the duration of the program, including a “Peace Dialogue” delivered by the AFL Peace Team1 and a “Football for Harmony” Clinic, where participants assisted Western Bulldogs staff in delivering a football clinic to multi-faith schoolchildren from across Melbourne. A range of football skills sessions were also conducted. These activities culminated in two teams being selected to participate in the Unity Cup, a joint initiative between Australian Federal Police, the AFL and participating AFL clubs, conducted annually since 2008 to promote greater social cohesion and harmony by using team sports to break down cultural, racial and religious stereotypes and barriers. In particular, this event showcased the unexpected emergence of the MUJU peace team, an initiative which began with a conversation between Maher, a young Lebanese Muslim participant in the “More than a Game” program, and Aaron, a Jewish student from Bialik College,2 a Melbourne independent Jewish high school, both of whom had met during the Peace Dialogue and decided to organise an inter-faith exhibition match between two mixed teams of Jewish and Muslim players (McDonald et al., 2012). Following the success of the practice match, the MUJU team was formed by Muslim and Jewish players from local communities and invited to participate in the Unity Cup.

The program also delivered a range of other sporting activities. These included a cricket match, horse-riding, surfing, a multi-sport day and a ropes course. Non-sports-focused activities centred primarily around mentoring activities delivered jointly by Western Bulldogs staff, Victoria Police and Australian Federal Police members. The focus of youth mentoring activities was based around improving social skills and youth leadership capacity. There were also several police-led workshops around conflict resolution, the role of police in the community, cyber-bullying and counter-terrorism, as well as a three-day youth leadership camp in a bush setting. The primary focus of the program, however, was using sport as a medium to promote proactive life values and social skills in a way that was based more on participation in enjoyable, peer-focused activities rather than on top-down forms of learning and mentoring.

We used a mixed method post-evaluation approach to measure the impact and effectiveness of “More than a Game” as a model for enhancing resilience toward violent extremism, social inclusion and belonging for program participants and also the broader Newport Islamic community. This meant that the data was collected with participants and stakeholders upon the completion of the program, although researcher partic-

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1 The AFL peace team is a joint Israeli-Palestinian football team established in 2008 to participate in the AFL International Cup.
2 Pseudonyms are used here and below for all program participants.
Participant-observation was also conducted during the second half of the program. Qualitative research methods (semi-structured interviews and focus groups) were the primary method used to explore participant, stakeholder and parent views of participants’ personal development through the program. This was combined with a lesser focus on quantitative data collection (exit surveys), which were used to provide an anonymous measure to compare with qualitative responses. The data was collected from three target groups including program participants (n = 21), program facilitators (n = 8) and students from Bialik College who also participated in the Peace Team dialogue and Unity Cup (n = 10). Thematic analysis was used to code qualitative responses and to identify common patterns (Hall, 2011, p. 70) in the way that participants and stakeholders described their experiences of the program; particularly the impact that their involvement in team-based sport had on their “attitudes and behaviours in relation to sense of belonging, cross-cultural engagement, and beliefs about violence as a means of solving problems or addressing grievances” (McDonald et al., 2012).

5. ‘Playing By the Rules’

The first theme to emerge from the survey and focus group data was the shared experience that participants had of sport as “a level playing field where people of all cultural backgrounds were bound by the same rules and expectations” (McDonald et al., 2012). For participants, this understanding meant that they could feel free to engage in forms of knowledge-sharing and social and physical interactions with young people from different cultural backgrounds, even with groups that they shared a historically conflict-ridden relationship with, knowing that these interactions were bounded and rule governed.

In particular, this was reflected in participant responses to training and playing football as a part of the MUUJ football team, which comprised equal numbers of Jewish players and Muslim players:

Last year we played at Whitten Oval footy ground, and it’s not a Jewish ground, it’s not a Muslim ground, it’s a footy ground that has its own rules and regulations. It was neutral.

This sense that the football ground was a neutral territory where rules that ‘applied to everyone’ governed participation was seen as highly significant to participants, affording them a “practical and powerful experience of lived justice” (McDonald et al., 2012). This recognition of the importance of the ‘rules’ in providing a structured space of interaction between players is also reflected in the literature on sport, risk and resilience (Hall, 2011; Moreau et al., 2014) whereby the risky aspect of inter-group conflict and tension are understood to be transformed on the sporting field through sharing a common goal. In particular this is linked to a sense of respecting the rules of the game, including a sense of fairness and respect for “others”, which is nurtured during the intense social and embodied interactions shared on the football field. In discussing the ethical implications of this, Debra Shogan (2007) has argued that participation in sport is based on a shared agreement to play by the rules in order to test team and individual skill. This agreement, in turn, promotes ethical and moral development as participants learn to curb their impulses for the good of the game. This theme was expressed by a number of participants in the program, including one who described his own experience of personal development through sport in the following way:

It teaches discipline because you have to go by the rules. And there are consequences if you break the rules.

The same participant links this with a kind of freedom that comes from being part of something beyond the immediate (ethno-religious) community:

It’s like you’re doing something just for the sake of the game and that’s a good thing. It cuts down all cultures and allows you to focus on sport, to enjoy yourself and to be yourself. That’s it.

In particular, this participant identifies the discipline that comes from playing by the rules with the development of respect for teammates and opponents, regardless of cultural background. Eassom (1998) argues that this experience is not limited to the sporting field but also provides a guide for interactions with others in everyday life. According to Eassom, rules provide boundaries and contexts within which action makes sense. This provides important cues and lessons for understanding how other life endeavours are similarly constrained. As one participant puts it, the experience of communicating with teammates and developing skills like teamwork crossed the boundaries of the sporting context to provide important lessons for life more generally:

Yes, being part of a team I’ve developed skills like communication, teamwork [...]. And you use that in the outside world. You talk to people, you communicate, you get their point of view, you try to create conversation and break down barriers.

The experience of “breaking down barriers” of racial, cultural and religious difference was significant to many participants. This was particularly related to new forms of awareness and knowledge that were instigated by experiences of playing sport alongside Jewish
teammates, demonstrating that social functions and roles can, under certain circumstances, become more important than social identities, transcending other kinds of group boundaries and divisions:

To be honest I think that there is no such thing as Jewish footballers. You start playing with them and form good relationships and the team was like a big family. I'll shepherd you, you block for me...We broke down barriers like that.

Responses such as these were also reflected in the survey data, particularly in relation to self-identified changes in initial attitude towards a number of different cultural groups following involvement in “More than a Game” (McDonald et al., 2012). Responses indicated that, out of the 21 program participants who participated in the evaluation, most indicated a more positive attitude toward a range of cultural groups following participation in the program, particularly toward Jewish cultural background youth (67 per cent improved attitude, see Table 1). When asked to reflect on the reasons for these changes, participants spoke about lack of contact with these groups prior to the program, which allowed the harbouring of negative stereotypes on both sides. Upon meeting and engaging with Jewish players in a physical sporting context, however, perceived cultural differences were set aside, became less important or were actively challenged and revised, leading some respondents to claim “we have many of the same perspectives and deal with critical situations in the same way”, “they are good friends” and “we’re all human, we all deserve equal rights appreciation and acceptance”.

Sport was not the only vehicle for promoting these values, however. Many of these responses were also informed by participation in ‘off-field’ mentoring activities which worked in parallel with sport based activities to promote values of interfaith and intercultural harmony by developing participants’ communication skills and work-shopping some of the positive effects of engaging in dialogue instead of violence. Yet the focus on team-based sport was identified by participants and stakeholders as being critical to these values being fully embraced. This was particularly noted in relation to the emphasis on co-operation, sense of responsibility to others, and trusting teammates not to let you down, thereby forestalling sense of vulnerability or being on your own. As one stakeholder observed:

And you only really get the opportunities to do this in a team environment, especially with sport where you have to rely on other people. You kick them the ball, you trust that they’re going to mark it; you trust that they’re going to kick it back to you. It’s about communicating with them. You start talking about teamwork and having a shared goal, a shared purpose. Now, all these other things like having a broader view and opportunity, the vehicle for that is actually doing things together that give you an outcome.

Again, this focus on “doing things together” highlights some of the practical, social and embodied dimensions of team sport which can break down barriers of difference through the sharing of experiences of work, sacrifice, disappointment and success in a team environment. In this sense, the social bonding function of team sport is identified by participants as providing a space beyond the constraints of community, where other cultural groups can be safely encountered, stereotypes can be challenged and friendships formed.

This experience of feeling liberated and “free” through encountering others in a safe environment is well supported in the literature, with Hall (2011) in particular finding that participation in sport encouraged young people to feel less fearful and to increase levels of “interpersonal confidence, that is, the self-assuredness to meet new people”. In particular, by exposing young people to “unknown social situations” sport was found to improve young people’s ability to “develop confidence in building relationships” which was also identified as a key ingredient for developing resilience and strengthening the capacity to cope with adverse life circumstances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Group</th>
<th>Average Initial Response</th>
<th>Average Post Response</th>
<th>Average Degree of Change</th>
<th>% of respondents who improved in attitudes</th>
<th>% of respondent who worsened in attitudes</th>
<th>% of respondents who did not change attitudes</th>
<th>Missing (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish-Australian</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian-Australian</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-Australian</td>
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<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.88</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal-Australian</td>
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<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Discipline and Self-Control

The literature investigating sport and its relationship with community resilience-building has frequently considered the link between participation in sport and violence prevention (Bailey, 2005; Coalter, 2008; Sandford et al., 2008), particularly in light of social policies that positively correlate sport with individual and community health and wellbeing, changes in youth attitudes towards crime and violent behaviour, and the development of a greater sense of social inclusion and social cohesiveness.

These processes are reflected in the experiences of “More than a Game” participants, with the physical and mental discipline learned through training and adhering to the rules of the game being identified by several participants as helping them to manage conflicts that may lead to violence on and off the field. Specifically, the regularity and discipline of training, and the negative consequences associated with “breaking the rules”, were singled out as experiences that had positive benefits in terms of controlling impulses that may lead to violence:

Participant One:
It’s a routine and routine develops discipline...Like the fact that you have to go to training twice a week and if you miss out on one training session you miss out on the match. Things like that, you have to keep your word and keep to the game to develop all of these qualities that are not useful on the pitch but also outside in society.
Participant Two:
The more disciplined you are the easier you are to control...the easier it is to control yourself. Because you’re always going to get things thrown at you, so the more you can let go, the easier it is to control and I think that’s what a lot of people would do. Instead of taking insults to heart, you get so used to it that you just brush them off.

In particular, the latter statement emphasises that one of the main triggers for violence on the sporting field (also reflecting experiences that can lead to violence in a broader social context) is the use of verbal insults based on racial, ethnic or religious stereotypes designed to provoke a player to lose control and become unfocused on play or even violent. By being disciplined and focused on the team, this participant suggests that personal insults can be ignored, and resilience developed to the extent that ‘brushing them off’ becomes second nature.

The theme of “rules” and how they are applied in the context of a game also raised some dilemmas for participants, with one participant observing that sometimes breaking the rules, particularly in terms of engaging in violent conflict, was also in “the spirit of the game”:

When a brawl happens in a game, it’s obviously the spirit of the game. No matter what you can’t always keep positive. And in the end, in some games, a fight is going to happen no matter what.

This response points to the difficulty of assuming that sport, as a “rule governed” activity, always produces ethical and non-violent responses in players. In some cases players can also feel a social responsibility to “back up” teammates, leading to violent confrontation. As one participant explained, “you need to defend your teammates”. This can sometimes mean engaging in violence to back up your peers even when you are not personally inclined toward violent conflict, a sentiment that other research has shown is prevalent amongst young men beyond the sporting field (Grossman & Sharples, 2010) and which can lead rapidly to the escalation of conflict.

As Hall (2011) and Moreau et al. (2014) stress, it is these differences in approaches to one’s responsibility to teammates that makes the role of the coach as mentor so important in nurturing values of respect, fairness and sportsmanship in young players. This theme was also conveyed by participants in the program, for whom the coach was a figure who either ‘embodied’ the rules of the game or ‘failed to live up to the rules’ (McDonald et al., 2012), as illustrated in one participant’s experience of club football:

Participant: In one club that I played at [...] I was there for a year and I wasn’t respected by the coach or the players so I had to leave at mid-year.
Interviewer: Do you know why you weren’t respected?
Participant: I don’t know. I just know that I didn’t like it. Every week, week in, week out, you could sense the tension [...]. Maybe it was just the culture of the second team [...]. The coach wasn’t exactly best friends [...]. He used to pick on people himself, so that set the tone.

The result of poor coaching is here defined by the failure to live up to the code of fairness enshrined in the rules of the game, which would have encouraged the player to feel confident and develop respectful attitudes to the coach, himself and others. Certainly the feeling of social exclusion and non-belonging the player feels is evident in his decision to leave the club. By contrast, good coaching was identified by both participants and stakeholders in “More than a Game” as being critical to fostering a sense of trust, rapport and respect between players and coach. One participant identified the key role that the coach has in mediating attitudes toward resolving conflicts:

Stakeholder:
You go and see the coach, someone who can ver-
balise [your concerns] for you [rather than using physical means to resolve conflicts], a third party who can de-escalate for you. In a team sport that’s your coach, or your runner.

In the context of the “More than a Game” program, participants highlighted the positive relationship they developed with the coach (a serving Victoria Police member) as being an important and enjoyable part of the program. One participant attributed the respect participants had for the coach to the care and effort he put into developing players’ understanding of their role in the team, and in developing a team ethos that was respectful and inclusive of all players:

Participant:
Yeah, it was virtually [name], he really got into it. Like providing a proper structure for our footy game. Other teams would just run out but [name] got a board and showed us, ‘you there, you there’. We had jumper presentations at the start, and like, I was the captain of the mixed team so I had to present the jumpers to the Jewish team. That was [name]’s initiative. He really got into it. It was really good.

These experiences support a common theme to emerge in the literature on sport participation, youth and community resilience, which highlights the importance of the coach as a “significant” and “respected” adult who is able to provide support and mentoring to young people beyond the family and immediate community context. In this vein, Henley (2010) proposes that engagement with teachers, coaches, mentors and peers in youth programs aimed at developing resilience can extend social networks of trust and protection. There is an added dimension to this statement, however, that has particular relevance to the earlier discussion of embodiment and boundary-work, with the ritual of the jumper presentation (players on the MUJU team had their own jumper created as a part of the program, with the Western Bulldogs colours) making a great impression on players. As highlighted here, the jumper presentation enabled the players to symbolically embody the merging of identities (Muslim and Jewish) in the team, and to consolidate this unity by playing together and supporting one another on the field. If the “rules” of the game enabled players to feel a sense of “lived justice”, this ceremony, performed on the sporting ground before the Grand Final, enabled participants to experience a sense of “lived reconciliation”, symbolised by the donning of the jumpers and the infusion of this “spirit” into the “team spirit” and by extension the “spirit of the game” (Moreau et al., 2014).

Stakeholders in the program particularly focused on the benefits of team-based sport in providing an environment for broadening and strengthening relationships of respect and trust between young people from different cultural groups as well as between young people, police and other community leaders. In particular, one of the by-products of using team based sport which was found to be particularly valuable was the role team sport has in countering feelings of alienation and strengthening feelings of belonging to the broader community and society by promoting an understanding that there is a role for everyone in the team:

Stakeholder:
People who lean towards extremism and things like that might be a bit isolated in their community and a bit vulnerable. I felt that being in a program like this, specifically for males and revolving around AFL football, it gave everybody a chance to belong and feel like they were a part of this group.

Participant Four: One thing I noticed in splitting up the teams in the Unity Cup into the Muslim and Jewish team some people were sad because they wanted to be in the Jewish team and lose to a Jewish-Muslim team [...]. Basically loyalty to the
community meant that some people didn’t want to play in the Jewish (mixed) team. Because they wanted to stay with the full Lebanese team.

Interviewer: Who did you think you were letting down?
Participant Four: My mates, people from the town, community, family.

In this sense, the participant speaks about the strong bonding capital and feelings of cultural pride that participants felt towards their peers and their community, which was understood to be at stake through their participation in the MUJU team. Another participant added, however, that this initial reaction was resolved and bridging capital developed over the course of the Unity Cup, so that bonds developed across differences of religion, class and ethnicity and forged an even stronger team identity in the end. This was seen as a factor in the capacity of MUJU—a new team playing in the Unity Cup for the first time—to win the tournament:

Participant One: But they still did a good job of being loyal when they played on the MUJU team. They backed up each other. Like they didn’t say we’re Lebanese and we’ll just stick with each other. They played as a whole team. And they actually won! Being different cultures and different races, and all that, it just builds a bond. If you get to understand each other the bonds are going to be even stronger than it would be if you were all the same. The chemistry would just be...too strong to be broken. Just like the bond of being a team, being united, not letting differences get ahead of you.

This demonstrates the embodied sense of identity and belonging that playing on a team encourages, with bonding forms of capital associated with playing with members of the same community being broadened by the bridging capital yielded through playing alongside different cultural groups.

The ripple effect of bridging capital extending out to the broader circles of family and community was highlighted by stakeholders and parents as they reflected on their own personal transformations during the program. Their sense of new connections and understandings aligned with the key program aim to counter vulnerability to violent extremism by strengthening and extending community wide relations of trust and reciprocity through grassroots programs:

Stakeholder: I think that engaging with these communities; certainly engaging with the Islamic community has been very empowering for everyone [...]. I’ve grown up in a very multicultural community and I feel in tune to cultural diversity, yet when some of the young men who would be involved in the [program] and a couple of the leaders [came over], my [female] colleague was there with me that day and she went to shake hands and they basically said, ‘We don’t want to shake your hand’. Just something as small as that helps us to make our organisation more culturally aware as well, to realise where the boundaries are and also the opportunities—and I think that says a lot about resilience.

Mother: For myself and my son, I thought it was an eye opener and a heart opener, especially with the Jewish, when they were involved. As parents, when they said a Jewish and Muslim team together, I thought ‘oh no’, are they going to be together or separate. And when they were mixed I was happy [...]. I enjoyed every minute and my son enjoyed the experience. And he takes the experience for a lifetime.

8. Discussion: Beyond “The Game”

The investigation of “More than a Game”’s impacts and meanings for participants and stakeholders was intended to consider what benefits team-sports-based models of youth engagement and mentoring might have beyond the obvious benefits of sport as an activity which enhances personal health, fitness and well-being. In particular, the project sought to understand what benefits sport participation might have for participants and the broader community in terms of transforming attitudes and behaviours related to sense of belonging, interaction with people from different cultural backgrounds and the use of violence as a means to resolve problems, all of which are relevant to strategies aimed at countering violent extremism.

As with all studies of this nature, there were limitations in terms of measuring the precise impact of the program on participants’ experiences of personal change, particularly given that the evaluation was commissioned mid-way through the program and therefore did not collect pre- and post-evaluation data from participants. Instead, a mixed method post-evaluation model was utilised. Other limitations relate to the social desirability effect of participants “wanting to please interviewers” in their responses, potentially skewing recollections of their experiences; although this was countered through the collection of anonymous survey data which supported some of the findings that emerged in the focus groups and interviews, particularly related to changes in attitudes toward different cultural groups. A further challenge lies in understanding the impact, if any, that these personal transformations might have on community resilience, given the difficulty of scaling the findings of small group evaluations up to a community level. More specifically in regard to the aims of CVE strategies, stakeholders also pointed to the underlying methodological
problem of trying to establish a link between sport-based mentoring programs and the prevention of violent extremism given that, as one stakeholder said, “you can’t measure what hasn’t happened” (McDonald et al., 2012). This limitation is also identified in arenas other than engagement through sport (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).

Despite these limitations, however, the project findings provide strong qualitative evidence that participation in sport-based programs such as “More than a Game” can make a significant contribution to young people’s feelings of confidence and self-esteem in relation to negotiating cultural difference and cultural stereotypes, particularly in terms of recognising and developing skills related to physical ability, intercultural communication, teamwork and leadership. In particular, the experience of playing on the MUJU team was identified by participants as being a “life-changing” experience which facilitated friendships with a new cultural group that participants had clear stereotypes about but little to no contact with previously, so that stereotypes “on both sides” were broken down and challenged. This underlines the role that sport plays in facilitating social interaction amongst a diverse range of groups in a manner which strengthens and expands young people’s social networks. These experiences indicate that sport can be a powerful facilitator of sense of belonging, which encourages young people to engage in relations of reciprocity, trust and shared vulnerability with groups where social and cultural differences may previously have led to conflict, while also providing them with “a means of recognition, reward and being valued by their community” (Hall, 2011).

Another key finding from the evaluation was the perception that the discipline learned through sport-based practice encouraged participants to develop self-control in situations where conflict may arise. Participants particularly understood discipline to be a key component to resolving conflict without resorting to physical violence. This was also identified as an attribute that carried over from the sporting field into other life situations. Whilst this finding is well-supported in the literature linking sport to the development of resilience, it also contributes to our understanding of the way that the embodied, affective and social dimensions of sport shape changes in attitude and behaviour, particularly insofar as the shared experiences of camaraderie derived from playing on the same team was seen to create bonds that could break down social barriers.

A particularly significant finding for the “building community resilience” focus of the program was the development of “bridging” capital and the breaking down of stereotypes and barriers between participants, stakeholders, local communities and government agencies. This was identified by both stakeholders and participants as a beneficial outcome of the program, which led to new opportunities for cross-cultural understanding, trust and knowledge sharing. In particular, stakeholders identified sport as a model which enabled them to build strong, sustainable and ongoing relationships with youth whom they otherwise may only have contact with through official forms of contact, such as through law enforcement.

These findings, and their implications, are consistent with the literature linking sport-based programs to the development of resilience and the strengthening of cross cultural awareness in young people and communities. In particular these benefits are seen to develop from the increased participation of at-risk youth in community based activities that develop a sense of civic engagement and responsibility to the wider community through participation in structured recreational activities, amongst them team sports. However, our findings illuminate under-researched elements of how the embodied, affective and social dimensions of team-based sport can produce different experiences of attachment and connection between teammates that do not arise exclusively from a cognitive basis but which nonetheless can be experienced as a powerful force for transcending barriers of racial, cultural and religious difference. Less clear from these findings is the impact that such embodied experiences of belonging to a team might have in creating “alternative pathways” for young people at risk of becoming involved in forms of violent extremism. The discussion here provides a platform for further investigating the potential of using sport as a vehicle to counter violent extremism in the community.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Review

Muslim Young People Online: “Acts of Citizenship” in Socially Networked Spaces

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Abstract
This paper reviews the current literature regarding Muslim young people’s online social networking and participatory practices with the aim of examining whether these practices open up new spaces of civic engagement and political participation. The paper focuses on the experiences of young Muslims living in western societies, where, since September 11, the ability to assert claims as citizens in the public arena has diminished. The paper draws upon Isin & Nielsen’s (2008) “acts of citizenship” to define the online practices of many Muslim youth, for whom the internet provides a space where new performances of citizenship are enacted outside of formal citizenship rights and spaces of participation. These “acts” are evaluated in light of theories which articulate the changing nature of publics and the public sphere in a digital era. The paper will use this conceptual framework in conjunction with the literature review to explore whether virtual, online spaces offer young Muslims an opportunity to create a more inclusive discursive space to interact with co-citizens, engage with social and political issues and assert their citizen rights than is otherwise afforded by formal political structures; a need highlighted by policies which target minority Muslim young people for greater civic participation but which do not reflect the interests and values of Muslim young people.

Keywords
citizenship; civic engagement; Muslim young people; participatory practice; social media

Issue
This review is part of the special issue “Migrant Youth, Intercultural Relations and the Challenges of Social Inclusion”, edited by Professor Fethi Mansouri (Deakin University, Australia) and Dr. Anna Halafoff (Deakin University, Australia).

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1. Introduction

Muslim young peoples’ internet use has become a focus in Australia, with a range of policies and associated research—notably focused around “social cohesion” and “social inclusion” initiatives (DIMIA, 2006; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010b; Collins et al., 2011; Al-Momani, Dados, Maddox, & Wise, 2010), digital citizenship and participation (Harris & Roose, 2013; Hopkins & Dolik, 2009) and counter-terrorism (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010b)—bringing attention to the online practices of young Muslims in terms that highlight opportunities for civic participation and risks to social cohesion. Given this dual policy focus, it is important to think about the different knowledge being produced, and the way such knowledge shapes and constrains the ability of young Muslims to participate in the civic and political life of western societies on their own terms, and in ways which facilitate meaningful experiences of citizenship and social inclusion.

Addressing these issues requires paying close attention to the gaps that exist between policies which identify young Muslims as “objects of public anxiety...whose citizenship and expressions of civic commitment must be carefully managed and monitored” (Harris & Roose, 2013) and the often under-explored “acts of citizenship” (Isin & Neilsen, 2008) that occur in the everyday, unmanaged interactions of Muslim young people in online spaces. These practices are defined using Isin...
and Neilsen’s concept “acts of citizenship”, reflecting the ways in which the internet, and social media in particular, have enabled young Muslims to break with normative accounts of citizenship that identify citizenship as a set of rights, obligations, norms and practices which serve to integrate actors into the nation-state (Marshall, 1973; Schudson, 1999). By focusing instead on citizenship as “acts” or performances that create new local and global “scenes” in which individuals and groups can “act and react with others”, assert rights and make claims that produce them as citizens (Isin & Neilsen, 2008, p. 39), we are able to gain new insight into the way Muslim young people use the internet to open up boundaries of participation, and negotiate their identities and civic commitments in ways that subvert and transform existing political orders and structures.

This corresponds with work being done in the Youth Studies and Media and Communication fields, where definitions of citizenship are being broadened in accordance with young people’s use of internet and social media to forge new social connections and engage with “civic life” (Harris & Roose, 2013; Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011; Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010; Vromen, 2011; Vinken, 2007; Collin, 2008). Of particular significance are theories of participation. These align with civic republican traditions, which outline citizenship as more than legal status and obligations to the state, but also centres on the development of the civic virtues of “good citizens who act on behalf of others” (Turner & Isin, 2002, p. 19). Collin writes that this communitarian aspect of citizenship has once more become a focus of policies aimed at promoting “active citizenship” among migrant young people, despite the broader shift of governments toward more individualised, neoliberal structures of governance (Collin, 2008, p. 530). In this frame, activities which are understood to foster “good citizenship” continue to conform to older models of civic participation, i.e., becoming involved with “organised groups, from civic clubs to political parties […] and generally engaging in public life out of a sense of personal duty” (Bennet et al., 2011, p. 838).

Countering these trends, Harris and Roose draw upon scholarship which redefines civic engagement as activities oriented toward “the public good, regardless of its form of expression or the domain in which such action takes place” (Harris & Roose, 2013, p. 2). They join a chorus of scholars who convey an evolving understanding of what constitutes civic participation, bringing attention to new styles of self-presentation and “everyday” cultures of engagement arising from internet and social media use (Jenkins, 2006; Bennett et al., 2011; Harris at al., 2010; Boyd, 2007; Harris, 2013; Vromen, 2011; Vinken, 2007; Bang, 2004; Collin, 2008; Dahlgren, 2000). For example, Bang regards the forms of “speaking out” enacted on social media as acts that produce “citizens as everyday-makers” (2005), whilst Bennett’s description of “self-actualising citizenship” emphasises a shift “away from taking cues as members of groups or out of regard for public authorities (opinion leaders, public officials and journalists) […] toward looser personal engagement with peer networks that pool (crowd source) information and organise civic action using social technologies that maximise individual expression” (Bennett et al., 2011, p. 839).

The importance of new media to rethinking what counts as meaningful citizenship is clear in these accounts. Harris et al. (2010) further relate these developments to the changing nature of the public sphere in the digital era, thus acknowledging the importance of public sphere theories to understanding citizenship rights as communication rights (Hartley, 2010, p. 241). In particular, they speak of the role that new media technologies play in shaping new sites “where they could connect with their peers and build networks, if not a community, of both local and distant others” (Harris et al., 2010, p. 26). The latter observation is crucial to the “acts of citizenship” examined in this paper, which, by being enacted in networked, online spaces, enable facilitation of and participation in political communication that transcends the boundaries of national community. Further, the overlap of emerging theories of citizenship and participation in “transnational” or “virtual public spheres” (El-Nawawy, 2010) provide fertile ground for re-examining minority Muslim young people’s civic and political practices—particularly given their perceived exclusion from formal spaces of public deliberation and political engagement since 9/11 (Mansouri & Marotta, 2012).

2. Policies Addressing Muslim Young People’s Internet Use

In the Australian policy context, two dominant narratives frame Muslim young people’s internet use. On the one hand a “securitization” narrative has been applied to these practices since 9/11, responding to fears that alienated Muslim youth may become recruited into forms of violent extremism through participation in online networks (see Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010a). This is supported by international reports and research which highlight the risk of young Muslims living in the West becoming influenced by online jihadist networks (Bunt, 2009; Sageman, 2008; Home Office, UK, 2004).

This narrative dovetails with a competing set of discourses highlighting the potential of online participatory practices to facilitate greater social inclusion and social connectedness for marginalised youth (Harris, 2013; Harris et al., 2010; Mansouri, 2009; Hopkins & Dolik, 2009; Penman & Turnbull, 2012). In these discourses the internet is viewed as a dynamic space of communication allowing minoritised youth to actively negotiate their identity and social connections outside

of reductive and often hostile mainstream media frames. As Harris and Roose argue, paying attention to these new styles of engagement is important, given that a “picture of ‘civics deficit’ at times panic regarding disengagement endures” in policies targeting Muslim youth (Harris & Roose, 2013, p. 3).

In writing about Muslim civic engagement, Harris is particularly critical of policies that have sought to increase participation for young Muslims in a manner that excludes the “voices” of Muslim youth themselves. For example, Harris criticises the “National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security” (DIMIA, 2006), arguing that, apart from this policy explicitly “targeting Muslim communities for intervention and engagement” (Harris, 2008, p. 31) thus adding to the stigma already felt by Muslim young people, it also rests upon a conservative understanding of what citizenship and participation is by framing these practices as activities that should foster integration into a community of “shared values”; a belief that research shows is not capturing the voices and experiences of minority Muslim young people.

The Federal Labor Government (2007–2012) adjusted this policy to a “social inclusion” agenda in 2010 (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010b), emphasising a less ends-oriented approach that respected diversity and valued participation in terms of benefits for disadvantaged individuals and communities (Penman & Turnbull, 2012). Despite some positive reception however, the policy continued to be criticised for constructing minority communities as groups to be integrated into a more or less stable community of shared values, excluding any recognition of the role that minority youth can play in shaping the values of a multicultural polity that is dynamic and changing (see Ang, Brand, Noble, & Sternberg, 2006; Mansouri, 2009; Harris, 2013; Harris & Roose, 2013). In particular, the 2008 Muslim Youth Summits report and a number of other reports responding to the “National Action Plan” demonstrated a particular concern with the civic engagement of young Muslim men (Jacubowicz, 2009; Harris & Roose 2013).

The social cohesion/inclusion agenda also failed to mention the role of religion in constructing the “shared values” of the nation, despite singling out Muslim young people on the basis of their faith and assumed challenges of integration. This reflects the broader tone of multicultural and social inclusion policies targeted at migrant youth, which tend to conform to a secular vision of the types of cultural diversity that are acceptable and those that are seen to threaten social cohesion (Modood, Triandafyllidou, & Zapata-Barrero, 2005; Akbarzadeh & Roose, 2014). More recently, the return of the Tony Abbot led Coalition Government has brought these debates full circle, with the disbandment of the Social Inclusion Unit (http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au).

The following sections address these tensions between policy and youth-led practices by reviewing the available literature and providing directions for future research. In the first instance the paper reviews emerging research on youth and digital citizenship and relates the findings to theoretical concepts underpinning “acts of citizenship” and new imaginaries of the “virtual” of “transnational” public sphere (El-Nawawy, 2010; Fraser, 2007). The focus will then shift to identify recurring themes which arise in research on Muslim young people’s internet use by focusing on two case studies that illustrate the use of social media platforms and web forums to engage and build communities, and perform civic identity around particular issues. This will serve as the basis for exploring the potential and limitations of using Isin and Neilsen’s “acts of citizenship” to describe the performative, creative and dynamic ways Muslim young people negotiate their religious, cultural, political and civic identity online (van Zoonen, Visa, & Mihelj, 2010).

3. Youth, Online Media Participation and “Acts of Citizenship”

In youth policy (Harris et al., 2010; Harris, 2013; Mansouri, 2009; Hopkins & Dolik, 2009) and Media and Communication research (Burgess & Green, 2009; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Penman & Turnbull, 2012) there has been a growing focus on the relationship between internet use and civics education, particularly in light of evidence that young people are withdrawing from formal political membership and participation, and turning to online forms of communication to perform their rights and responsibilities as citizens (Putnam, 2000; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Harris et al., 2010). This is reflected in Australian youth policy frameworks with most state governments and youth focused NGOs having “integrated the internet into their policies and strategies for youth engagement” (Collin, 2008, p. 527).

There are a number of reasons for this trend. Social theorists have highlighted the impact of detraditionalisation, globalisation and individualization on young people’s withdrawal from state-based political institutions and relationships (Bauman, 2001; Beck, 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Youth and cultural researchers, in turn, have debated whether the shift towards online socialisation and participation, particularly around consumer and lifestyle interests, contributes to a general “civics deficit” or promotes new ways of being political and participating in public life (Harris et al., 2010, p. 12; Hartley, 2010). In problematizing normative accounts of citizenship, a recent Australian study reported that the notion of a “bounded, stable” community of shared values has been replaced with a reality in which young people participate in a range of “partial, multiple and unconventional civic identifica-
tions” (Harris et al., 2010, p. 579). These are enacted across physical and virtual spaces, and bridge local and transnational networks of connections.

This finding is supported by international scholarship highlighting the failure of conventional politics to accommodate the voices and interests of young people. Coleman and Rowe (2005) point out that young people’s preference for “youth-created content” does not align with the desire of traditional political and civic institutions to control channels of communication (see also Bennett et al., 2011; Jenkins, 2006). Hartley underlines this disconnect with reference to the move of young people’s civic participation away from “rights, duties, conduct, allegiance, obligation, powers and protection” (Hartley, 2010, p. 234) to a form of “self-organising, user-created, ludic association, modelled by online social networks” (2010, p. 233).

Social networking sites and other online, participatory platforms have been a focus for research exploring youth civic engagement and political action. Boyd (2007) writes that social networking sites offer a place for young people to “write themselves and their communities into being” (2007, p. 14) suggesting that young people have a desire for public engagement (p. 21) but have limited opportunities to have their opinions heard and valued in formal spaces of participation. Harris (2008, p. 489) also explores the articulation of a “public self”—a key understanding of democratic participation—and points to the possibility that young people are using digital, networked media to experiment with forms of public self-making that subvert dominant norms of representation, participation and citizen formation.

Historically, the concept of the public sphere has been central to debates regarding modern democracy and “participatory citizenship” (Salvatore, 2013) following the publication of Jurgen Habermas’ Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989). Habermas linked structural changes relating to the emergence of mass communication systems (especially national press and broadcasting) in the 19th century with a theory of communicative action that envisioned the mobilization of public opinion as a political force. Theorising these changes, Habermas conceptualised a normative theory of democracy and citizen engagement, where citizens’ personal interests could, through public debate and deliberation, be transformed into a rational consensus on matters of the public good. This vision of “publicness”, imagined as co-extensive with a national sphere of communication, naturalized connections between ideas of “the public” and the citizenry of a democratic Westphalian state to the extent that access and participation in the public sphere is now conceived as a fundamental right of citizenship and a critical marker of democracy and social inclusion (Fraser, 2007, pp. 9-10; Aly, 2012).

Despite this, several critiques have been made of the “public sphere” model. Most often these have problematized the class bias and Eurocentric focus of the Habermasian public sphere (Salvatore, 2013; Fraser, 2007) whose democratic potential rests on an idea of universal and equal access, despite it predominantly being an arena for debate between elite members of society. As “feminists, multiculturals and anti-racists” have argued this model fails to recognize “the existence of systemic obstacles that deprive some who are nominally members of the public of the capacity to participate on par with others, as full partners in public debate” (Fraser, 2007, p. 11).

The Habermasian model has also been criticized for the implicit understanding that the democratic potential of the public sphere can only be realized where there is a single, shared medium of communication (Fraser, 2007, p. 10). Whilst still underpinning conceptions of citizenship and “participatory democracy” this vision does not correlate with the new “transnational” or “virtual” public spheres being theorized in the digital era. Fraser claims that the online discursive arenas where people communicate and deliberate about political matters today “overflow the bounds of both nations and states”, meaning that “often too, their communications are neither addressed to a Westphalian state nor relayed through national media” (2007, p. 14). “Transnational” or “virtual” public spheres therefore problematize the normative concept of the public sphere and the styles and behaviours of citizenship and political engagement supported by it.

And yet, it has also been argued that it is precisely this ambivalence that vitalizes the internet as a space where new emancipatory possibilities of political engagement and citizenship may be imagined and theorised. For example, Fraser has recently evaluated the usefulness of the concept of “transnational public spheres” in terms of the possibilities it envisions for democracy (2007). She argues that one principle that may in fact be strengthened by the affordances of the web is the “all affected principle”. In normative models of the public sphere this principle refers to the capacity of all members of the national community to be able to participate freely and on equal terms in processes of opinion formation. Given the failure of nationally controlled communications infrastructure to fulfill this principle, Fraser regards transnational public spheres as spaces that provide fresh opportunities for all citizens to be heard, particularly in an era of global communications where parity of participation does not just refer to the national context, but acknowledges that issues that affect people’s lives are now are increasingly structured by global movements and social issues (Fraser, 2007, p. 22).

In line with this, Papacharissi argues that the internet has revived the concept of the public sphere by expanding spaces of political deliberation and participation, in the process creating new “avenues for expression”
which promote “citizen activity” (2002, p. 10). Chouliaraki (2010) adds that new media technologies invent “novel discourses of counter-institutional sub-version and collective activism” (2010, p. 227; see also Burgess & Green, 2009). In particular, by expanding grammars of publicity and civic action to include online practices such as “blogging or jamming”, citizenship is being reimagined and infused with a new “ethics of witnessing and politics of care” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 228).

Unsurprisingly, given the nature of the exclusion of Minority Muslim citizens from national public spheres since 9/11, theories of the “Virtual Islamic Public sphere” are at the vanguard of efforts to reimagine the public sphere and its critical and democratic value (Bunt, 2009 El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2009; Mandaville, 1999; Eickelman & Anderson, 2003), and yet the application of public sphere theory to these formations continue to be regarded as problematic, if not empty, given that “the very purpose of public sphere theory is to explore the ways in which political authority can be made accountable to a democratically generated public opinion” (Crack, 2007, p. 348). Therefore the absence of a clearly defined addressee for online public interactions and claim-making contributes to the ambiguity of the “virtual public sphere” as a space for new performances of citizenship.

This discussion opens up some important points of connection to Isin and Nielsens’ conceptualisation of “acts of citizenship”, which represent a theoretical and empirical departure from normative citizenship theories and debate. By theorising “acts of citizenship” the authors call for critical attention to be focused on moments of “rupture” when political “acts” break away from routines, rules, habitual behaviours, practices and/or orders, and where “regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2). By making “acts” the object of investigation, the givenness and durability of orders that citizenship practices are usually embedded in (primarily nation-states) are precisely brought into question.

Isin and Nielsens identify several key ideas as important to theorising “acts of citizenship”. In this paper they are also recognised as providing new insights into understanding Muslim youth citizenships which are enacted online, particularly as these expressions arise from conditions of exclusion of young Muslim voices from national, mainstream political debate (Aly, 2012, p. 169). First, mirroring work being done in Media and Communications research, Isin argues that the structural shift away from national communications infrastructure toward global, online communication creates new “sites and scales” of struggle where “specific claims or counter-claims are made about rights, responsibilities, identity, recognition and redistribution”. Isin regards the networked, virtual spaces opened up online as providing new platforms for subjects to “enact themselves as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities)” in a way which disrupts orders of claim-making embedded in the nation-state (Isin, 2008, p. 39).

In elaborating on the types of citizenships and citizens the use of these technologies may produce, in his later work Isin (2012) discusses the internet as a medium which reorients narratives of “we, the people” whereby citizenship status and practice is embedded in the nation-state, toward “we, the connected” referring to the globally “networked” society opened up by the internet and New Media (Isin, 2012). Whilst Isin regards “we, the connected” as a grand narrative in itself, which has implications for the way individuals are governed, he draws upon the example of “global or transnational activism” (Isin, 2012, p. 73) to point to the possibilities the internet opens up for new ways of acting and being recognized as a citizen, beyond geographical and cultural boundaries.

Isin acknowledges, however, that, by viewing citizenship as “acts” or performances that create new “sites and scales” of political struggle, one of the most fundamental principles of “participatory citizenship” is problematized—that is the question of who is the addressee of such claims, and to whom these “acts” are answerable. This relates us back once more to the problem Fraser poses when she argues that whilst “virtual public spheres” open up new forums for expressing rights outside of the nation-state system, they do so without a clearly defined addressee/authority capable of responding to such claims.

Van Zoonen et al. elaborate on this problem in their exploration of young Muslims “performed citizenship” on YouTube (van Zoonen et al., 2010). Van Zoonen et al. describe the activities of Dutch Muslims, as well as Muslims and non-Muslims around the world, who participated in blogging, “jamming” and posting user-created videos and comments to YouTube in protest against Dutch parliamentarian, Geert Wilders, and his publication of anti-Islam video Fitna. As van Zoonen et al. articulate, despite the impassioned “acts” of “jamming” and commenting on offensive video content, whether or not such “acts” constitute performances of citizenship is problematized by the lack of a clearly defined addressee or audience. Van Zoonen et al. argue that this presents an issue as there is no guarantee that such acts produce any form of meaningful exchange and answerability.

Yet, the authors address these criticisms by calling for citizenship to be viewed as “acts” or performances that should be considered meaningful in terms of what they achieve “not only for a possible audience but also for the speakers themselves” (van Zoonen et al., 2010, p. 252).

This connects with Isin and Nielsen’s reference to Bakhtin’s “two-sided answerability” (Isin & Nielsen,
In this sense “acts of citizenship” represent rituals of performance that break away from “everyday habits as well as broader institutional patterns” (Morrison, 2008, p. 289) to create new political subjectivities that are not necessarily oriented toward anything other than justice and Being (Isin, 2008, p. 39).

These arguments raise legitimate questions as to how citizenship can or should be defined in an era where social connections and networks are stretched across local and global spaces, and where online “participatory practices” blur the boundaries between popular forms of youth culture and media production and more civic, ethical or politically oriented activities. Indeed it is these transformations that have led youth and citizenship scholars to argue that narrow definitions of citizenship, which summon individuals to realize their “duty” to a common, shared purpose embedded in the nation-state, have been surpassed by newer, more relevant forms of digital citizenship (Hartley, 2013).

In the next section I will review a sample of the current literature focusing on Muslim young people’s online participation to evaluate whether these practices cultivate new expressions of citizenship and public identity. As a thorough and full review is beyond the scope of this paper, however, I will limit the review to a brief survey of literature describing the emerging “virtual Islamic public sphere” coupled with a more in-depth analysis of two empirical case studies (van Zooven et al., 2010; Harris & Roose, 2013) which highlight the potential and limitations of the internet and social media sites for producing “acts of citizenship” among minority Muslim young people.

4. Muslim Young People Online: A View from the “Virtual Muslim Public Sphere”

The focus of recent scholarship on young Muslims’ online “participatory practices” has identified the internet as a popular venue for Muslims “to build networks, form and maintain relationships and spread and consume news in an alternative Islamo-public sphere” (Bahfen, 2008, p. 2; see also Bunt, 2009; El-Nawawy, 2010; Brouwer, 2004; Aly, 2012). Scholars focused on Muslim internet use make the claim that, since 9/11 the internet has become an “alternative discursive space” and place of “sanctuary” (Aly, 2012, p. 168) for minority Muslims living in Western societies, opening up a space where they are “free” to assert their religious and cultural identity and engage in democratic dialogue beyond frequently hostile mainstream media portrayals of their communities. As Aly argues, by participating in online forums such as “Aussie Muslims” and “Muslim Village”, where discussions range from religious issues to issues of national significance, young Australian Muslims are claiming a “fundamental right of citizenship”, which is otherwise denied them in the national public sphere.

Whilst Aly and Bahfen speak predominantly of the emergence of online Muslim publics forged by a shared sense of injustice at the treatment of Muslims in western media, Brouwer (2004), Bunt (2009), Eickelman and Anderson (2003) El-Nawawy (2010) and Mandaville (1999) highlight the potential that online platforms have for giving voice to a range of interpretations and views of Islam, empowering young Muslims to “take religion more into their own hands and to create a new form of imagined community” (Brouwer, 2004, p. 47).

Eickelman and Anderson claim that the advent of the internet has refashioned Muslim communities around the world, creating “new public venues and identities”, with “even local disputes [taking] on transnational dimensions” (Brouwer, 2004, p. 48). Brouwer further claims that the medium of the internet has been significant for minority Muslim youth for whom older generational response to issues of how to “lead a Muslim life in a non-Muslim country” are being contested and transformed in the new discursive (and visual) arenas opening up online. This is supported by Mandaville (1999) who argues that the engagement of Muslim young people on “hybrid discursive spaces like the internet” (1999, p. 23) has produced powerful Muslim minority voices which are active in contesting religious authority and integrating Islam’s narrative and rituals with western social norms and lifestyle. These findings highlight the changing nature of the “public
sphere” in a digital era, which has implications for the way Muslims engage in the public domain and give an account of themselves as citizens.

And yet, while scholars such as Bunt, El-Nawawy, Eickelmann and Anderson, and Mandaville tend to focus on the creation of a new Islamic public sphere online that mirrors some of the normative characteristics of the Habermasian public sphere—i.e. where critical dialogue is understood to result in consensus on matters of the “common good” (al-maslaha al-amma), constructing a more or less unified virtual ummah (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2009)—other scholars have argued that broader participation in online participatory platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and personal blogs have facilitated connections between Muslims and non-Muslims both within national contexts and around the world. These connections forge new patterns of solidarity, identification and “performances of citizenship” that cut across membership of nation-states and religious community, whilst not signalling an exit from these frames (Pickerill, 2009; van Zoonen et al., 2010; Eckert & Chadha, 2013).

In this vein Eckert and Chadha (2013) argue that the blogging activities of Muslim minorities in Germany do not refer so much to the creation of a singular virtual public sphere, but that they align more closely with Fraser’s concept of counter-publics (1990). Fraser used the concept of “counter-publics” (1990) to account for the activities of subaltern and subnational groups that, owing to their exclusion from dominant public discourses, created alternative discursive spaces where they were free to contest and correct dominant narratives and representations. Eckert and Chadha use this concept to describe the discursive practices of German bloggers who were found to use blogs as a platform to “redefine their identities, interests and needs” and to engage in “agitational activities directed at wider publics” (Eckert & Chadha, 2013, p. 930). In this sense there is a clear emphasis to “avoid being an ‘enclave’, to use Squires (2002) term, and instead to reach out beyond ‘other Germans’ in order to engage, influence and shape mainstream discourses (Eckert & Chadha, 2013, p. 937).

The Arab Spring uprisings and the use of social media tools to mobilise global and local public dissent against corrupt and authoritarian state regimes (on platforms not controlled by the state) have further highlighted the democratic potential of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Indeed, the force of movements such as the Arab spring have demonstrated the power of the internet to generate new political and civic action, which has the potential to reshape political structures, social identities and whole societies—not only in the countries where these movements are born, but around the world.

The connection between the Arab spring and new performances of online citizenship has been highlighted in Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr’s book “Wired Civi-

zension: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East” (2013). Herrera and Sakr use the “Arab spring” to describe how Arab and Muslim youth in the Middle East are using the web to learn and exercise citizenship, transforming their relationship to the state and political institutions by providing alternative platforms for experimenting with civic and political identities and commitments. In particular, the authors suggest that young people’s engagement with online media is producing different citizenship dispositions to older generations through expanded opportunities for networking with young people around the world, and from different cultural and religious backgrounds, leading to new “associations amongst strangers” (Hartley, 2010).

This revised vision of the public sphere and “participatory citizenship” inspired by the Arab Spring is also analysed by Salvatore (2013), who argues that the way Muslim young people and intellectuals in Tunisia, Egypt and across the Middle East used social media platforms (blogs, SNS’s and Facebook pages) in the Arab Spring has inspired young Muslims around the world, having implications that stretch well beyond the “dismantling” and “reshaping” of Middle Eastern public theatres.

In describing the novel discursive practices and registers of activism documented in the Arab Spring, Salvatore uses the case of Egyptian bloggers and Facebook activists, primarily “Facebook Girl” (2008) and “We Are all Khaled Said” (2011), to highlight the emergence of new forms of online activism which draw together “global” and “local” networks in order to mobilise dissent against state authorities. Salvatore regards these “acts” as having created a new language of “public-ness” and social connection for Egyptian youth, which has vitalized the democratic process within and beyond Egypt. An example of this is the activities of Egyptian bloggers whose use of a language combining “colloquial forms of speech in Arabic, sometimes paired with local versions of a ‘global’ type of internet English” demonstrated a departure from the language of the “official” Egyptian public arena, enabling activists to reach out beyond even “Pan-Arab” audiences to address Western, English speaking Muslim and non-Muslim publics.

Further, the circulation of visual media documenting abuses by the regime, accompanied by the vernacular, at times “vulgar” language of blog posts created a discursive and emotional register that served to refashion civic commitments to Egypt and Egyptian society in a way that bridged the social divide between Islamist and more secular oriented groups (Salvatore, 2013, p. 221). The key point here is that the normative, deliberative style of the Habermasian public sphere was not entirely absent but was transformed by new registers of discursive expression associated with DIY blogging culture, breaking through the “crust” of normative political, religious and civic associations, nourishing a surprising inclusiveness and plurality of political, religious and cultural voices.
5. Performing Muslim Identity: Intersections of Religion, Gender and National Identity in Web Forums, Blogs and Social Networking Sites

Beyond discussions of the “virtual public sphere”, literature on the uses of the internet and social networking sites by Muslim young people also highlights the growing importance of open platforms such as Facebook and YouTube in facilitating new religious, cultural and national performances of identity. In particular the concept of “performativity” (Butler 1990) is critical to analysing “acts of citizenship”, as they are produced through social networking practices and “DIY online culture” (Jenkins, 2006; Harris, 2008).

Van Zoonen et al. explore this in relation to video and text based responses to the release of anti-Islam video Fitna by Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders (van Zoonen et al., 2010). The video led Muslims in the Netherlands and around the world to engage in street protests and other forms of deliberative and passionate protest through mainstream political and public channels. Beyond these, however, “ordinary citizens” used the internet to engage with the debate by uploading “thousands of videos” to YouTube and posting comments. In describing these acts as “performances of citizenship” van Zoonen et al. argue that YouTube provides a platform for an open exchange of views between Muslims and non-Muslims both within the Netherlands and at a global level. Van Zoonen et al. point out that, as Fitna claimed that Muslims can never be citizens of a contemporary democratic society, the upload of videos offered an opportunity for both Dutch Muslims and minority Muslims from around the world to “insert themselves as citizens within both a national context and debate, and within global controversies around Islam, and moreover as legitimate interpreters of their own religion” (2010, p. 252). Van Zoonen et al. frame these performances as “acts of citizenship”, whereby:

Through making and uploading a video, posters performed an act or practice which constituted them as a part of this placeless public. Even if no-one is paying attention to this performance, the first relevance is nevertheless for the actor him or herself, who takes him or herself seriously as a stakeholder in a controversy that is otherwise played out on the distant stages of the mass media. (van Zoonen et al., 2010, p. 252)

Moreover, in exploring what “new modes of citizenship practice” emerge through uploading and commenting on videos, van Zoonen et al. do not just describe the way these “acts” disrupt nationally prescribed understandings of citizenship, they also point to the emergence of new “political and religious selves”. For example, they refer to a v-log uploaded by a young male from the Muslim American Association, who positions himself in the debate as an American Muslim and a citizen of “humanity”. In the video he uses humour and self-parody to address the audience, pointing to the different modes of address that gain public attention in social media:

Hi, I am not a terrorist or a date merchant, I don’t live in a tent or keep my wife zipped up in it everyday...

The video disarms Fitna’s assault on the rights of Muslims through the performance of a religious and political self which entertains and plays around the boundaries of cultural difference to subvert dominant stereotypes. As van Zoonen et al. note, the tone shifts half-way through toward an “emotional praise of Islam” where the cultural achievements of Islam are highlighted. Finally the speaker declares himself an American citizen and a Muslim. Thus, the video offers “a perfect example of the performance of a religious self that also articulates a democratic and inclusive political self” (van Zoonen et al., 2010, p. 258).

The mix of humour and more religious modes of address is also important as it forges new forms of “associative agency” or “public-ness” between Muslim and non-Muslim audiences through a language that is common to YouTube as a discursive space. As Hartley claims the concept of “play”, which is associated with DIY/online media practice, is the very stage for this performed citizenship (Hartley, 2010, p. 241). This is also demonstrated in the case of anti-Fitna protest through the prevalence of “sorry” or “jamming” videos uploaded by non-Muslim Dutch citizens in support of their Muslim co-citizens (van Zoonen et al., 2010, p. 255). Van Zoonen et al. regard these expressions as clear examples of “acts of citizenship” insofar as they use the specific affordances of the web to disrupt the viewability of the Fitna video, and to apologise to a global Muslim audience, thus reimagining the boundaries of civic responsibility and obligation.

Whilst van Zoonen et al. use the case of the global Fitna controversy to demonstrate the way in which national, exclusionary practices generate new performances of transnational citizenship, counter-publics and online activism, other scholars have identified Facebook and web forums as sites where religious and civic community, experience, and identity are being re-fashioned at a much more grassroots and “everyday” scale.

One such study is Harris & Roose’ “DIY Citizenship amongst Young Muslims: Experiences of the ‘Ordinary’” (2013) in which they examine more “ordinary” styles of online civic and political engagement amongst minority Muslim young people in Australia. In defining what they mean by “ordinary” the authors use the same definition that Isin and Neilsen call for by focusing less
on the minority status and identities of young Muslim people, and more on the “ordinary” civic practices they engage in, including their use of social media platforms, to perform a range of tasks consistent with theories of DIY or “self-actualising” citizenship (Bennett, 2003; Harris et al., 2010).

Specifically the authors argue that the “ordinary” online activities and expressions of Muslim young people in these sites reflected a desire to develop one’s own political and civic self, guided by a “religion-inflected moral citizenship” (Harris & Roose, 2013, p. 8). For example of the young people surveyed in the study, 65 per cent said they expressed their views on political and social issues through media engagement, particularly social media, with 60 per cent saying that they had participated in an online forum or written a blog.

In describing the types of issues and interests that were frequently discussed in these forums, participants identified a mix of political and religious topics, including: “Islam and politics”, “feminism, a woman’s place in Islam” as well as “everyday stuff” (Harris & Roose, 2013, p. 9). Other participants described involvement in media and cultural production online, including writing a blog, which was identified as a platform for “getting your voice heard out there” (p. 10). For many young women writing a blog about ‘hijabi fashion’ was an empowering experience. This specifically highlights the overlap between popular culture, creative endeavours and political expression, with Roose and Harris identifying these sites as “an important way to have a different public voice cutting across heated debates driven by Australian politicians and media about Islamic dress” (p. 10).

For many of the young people interviewed, the importance of these platforms and forums was the opportunity that these spaces provided, not only to express their views in a “safe and supportive” public forum, and to be heard by other Muslims, but also to widen social networks and encourage interaction and dialogue with non-Muslims. As one participant said of his Facebook use, it was important to him: “To let people know that we’re there and we’re not letting them think they have control”.

In evaluating the importance of these online spaces for enabling new acts or performances of citizenship for Muslim minority young people, Harris and Roose particularly highlight the role of religion in shaping and enabling the creation of a civic identity and forms of civic participation in social media and online forums. As the researchers argue, it is particularly the DIY styles of citizenship associated with internet use and social media that enable young Muslims to “make particular civic meanings of religious and cultural affiliations in ways that are not captured by conventional frameworks” (Harris & Roose, 2013, p. 14). Thus, in the project of “making themselves” online, away from formal structures and guides, the authors argue that Muslim young people are mixing and matching religious and civic responsibilities in a manner that enhances rather than reduces civic engagement; a situation that requires policy-makers to reconsider how they define civic engagement to include a range of cultural, religious, popular, mediated and everyday resources which are being used by Muslim young people to refresh normative conceptions of “active citizenship” (Harris & Roose, 2013, pp. 14-15).

6. Discussion

This review has provided some insights into the potential that Muslim young people’s online practices open up for new experiences of social connection, citizenship, collective agency and social inclusion which traverse state, geographic and cultural boundaries. In particular, the examples cited highlight the potential for new media technologies to open up positive spaces of interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and global publics, thus countering the marginalization of Muslim voices and perspectives in western, national public spheres.

Isin and Nielsen’s concept “acts of citizenship” has been applied to the themes and findings emerging from the review to evaluate the extent to which these online practices shape the creation of new acts or performances of citizenship, or whether they merely repeat existing, habitual or normative claims to justice, citizenship and rights. The paper explored these tensions with reference to a number of themes. First the paper analysed the ways in which new media has facilitated a generational shift in young people’s construction of themselves as moral, ethical and political subjects, and also in terms of how they “perform” citizenship. This was reflected in research analysing a qualitative shift from “dutiful” models of citizenship toward more personal, expressive styles of online, DIY citizenship (Hartley, 2010; Bennett et al., 2011; Harris, 2008; Harris et al., 2010; Vromen, 2011; Coleman, 2008), which traverse the nation as a bounded community, opening up new democratic spaces for public expression and the claiming of rights (van Zoonen et al., 2010; Isin, 2012). This is particularly significant for Muslim minority young people living in Western societies (Bahfen, 2008; Brouwer, 2004) where marginalization of Islam in the national public sphere has meant that social media has become a powerful medium for facilitating new connections which extend beyond the national and local to include global connections and claim making practices.

These new spaces and styles of citizenship are discussed in relation to young people’s engagement with blogs, social networking sites (Harris, 2008; Boyd, 2007; Vinken, 2007), and video-sharing sites such as YouTube (van Zoonen et al., 2010), which provide new discursive and “networked” spaces for young people to engage with co-citizens, form opinions and make claims in a
way that bypass normative conceptions of the public sphere. Thus, Media and communication scholars and political scientists have stressed that young Muslims are using online “participatory platforms” to shape new public spheres and forms of collective agency (Herrera, 2013; Salvatore, 2013; El-Nawawy, 2010; Bunt 2009).

Significantly, these new virtual public forums are understood by van Zoonen et al. (2010) and Harris & Roose (2013) to open up a space for new performances of Muslim identity which integrate religious narratives and practices with democratic and civic aspirations. In particular van Zoonen considers the focus on “performativity” in Isin and Neilsen to be essential to understanding how the internet and new media technologies revitalize citizenship realizing the creative and multiple ways that people connect with others online, construct their identity, engage in debates of a civic or political nature and also construct their own “imagined communities” where their claims have meaning.

In exploring what these renegotiated understandings of the public sphere, civic engagement and recognition mean for “citizenship” and social inclusion, the articles and case studies presented demonstrate that it not only possible but essential that we think about Muslim young people’s online “participatory practices” outside of the reductive frames of social policies, which tend to view these practices either in terms of “risk” or normative (dutiful) models of citizenship. As van Zoonen et al. claim, by focusing instead on what online participation “does” in terms of enabling new performances of religious, civic and political selves to be publicly staged, it becomes possible to think about digital platforms as spaces where the democratic right for citizens to speak and be heard are being forged for a new generation of Muslim young people.

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