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Editor

Gary Bouma

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Editorial

Religious Diversity and the Challenge of Social Inclusion

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Abstract
As societies have become religiously diverse in ways and extents not familiar in the recent histories of most, the issues of how to include this diversity and how to manage it, that is, questions about how to be a religiously diverse society have come to the fore. As a result religion has become part of the social policy conversation in new ways. It has also occasioned new thinking about religions, their forms and the complexity of ways they are negotiated by adherents and the ways they are related to society, the state and each other. This issue of *Social Inclusion* explores these issues of social inclusion in both particular settings and in cross-national comparative studies by presenting research and critical thought on this critical issue facing every society today.

Keywords
interreligious relations; multiculturalism; religion; religions and violence; religious diversity; social cohesion; social control; social inclusion; social policy

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion", edited by Gary Bouma (Monash University, Australia).

Religion is back on the agenda in ways that were not predicted by Western social science. The news is full of reports of the role of religion in social conflict, politics, and social policy issues. In the West the resurgence of religion can be traced to the return to politics of conservative Protestant groups and to the increase in religious diversity occasioned by migration. Globalisation, particularly in the form of migration which has brought religious diversity to the lived experience of almost every society in the world. Finally, the end of the cold war brought an end to strict anti-religious secularism in communist countries resulting in a resurgence of religion. The theme uniting these resurgences is religious diversity.

As societies have become religiously diverse in ways and extents not familiar in the recent histories of most, the issues of how to include this diversity and how to manage it, that is, questions about how to be a religiously diverse society have come to the fore. As a result religion has become part of the social policy conversation in new ways. It has also occasioned new thinking about religions, their forms and the complexity of ways they are negotiated by adherents and the ways they are related to society, the state and each other. This issue of *Social Inclusion* explores these issues of social inclusion in both particular settings and in cross-national comparative studies by presenting research and critical thought on this critical issue facing every society today.

Social inclusion refers to the processes, structures and policies instituted by a society to promote the degree of social cohesion required to be sufficiently productive to achieve sustainability. Each society does this but often in quite different ways. Some see control and the enforcement of a dominant ideology as critical, others see the release of creative energies enabled by greater freedom to be the best way. There are other mixed modes and may be ways yet to be described.

Religious diversity has been seen to challenge social cohesion both in classical sociology emerging in a Europe redolent with memories of violent conflict among religious groups and the violent imposition of religious

order. Maintaining religious homogeneity is not an option for most societies today. There is no single answer to the social inclusion of many religions. Moreover, as religion continues to be or re-enters the field of social policy it does so in four basic ways – as an object of policy, as a source of policy, as an implementer of policy and as a critic of policy. There is also a complexity of ways religions relate to each other, to the state and to adherents. The articles in this issue provide insight into this diversity and some integrating approaches that can be tested as more research is done in this area.

Articles providing a theoretical perspective on religious diversity and social inclusion include Beaman who uses specific examples of judicial review of religious rights using insights of Derridas to identify 'national values' which when deployed through law, policy and public discourse, have exclusionary effects rather than working to social inclusion. Sajoo explores the issue of extremisms and inclusion in both Muslim majority countries and in the West. He notes the failure of secularist political ideologies to motivate inclusion. Rather, he argues that 'pluralisms that draw on theologies of inclusion, beyond mere accommodation or tolerance, offer the prospect of bridging modernist divides toward a richer civic identity'. In arguing that 'the aspiration here is to mobilize religious affiliation as a contributor to civic ethics' Sajoo opens the way to consider the role of religions in producing social cohesion, rather than being passive units managed by outside forces.

Several articles examine particular processes of inclusion or exclusion. Boucher and Kucinskas report on the ways religious students face forms of exclusion in secular collegiate environments raising a less often examined form of interreligious relations, those between religious and non-religious groups. Jackson provides a valuable overview of the complex diversity of approaches to teaching about religions in schools in Europe much of which has inclusion as one goal.

A rich diversity of articles describe religious diversity and social inclusion in particular countries or societies. Pratt provides a social history of the emergence of policies of mutual respect among diverse religious groups in New Zealand giving not only a valuable case history, but also evidence that many of the issues faced today have been with us for some time. The complexities of religious diversity in Latin America are helpfully discussed by Zavala-Pelayo and Góngora-Mera in an attempt to correct the misconceptions of many existing approaches to studying religious life in Latin America. Nollert and Sheikhzadegan explore different forms of inclusion and participation among religious groups in Switzerland. The Australian case is described by Lynch through the lens of an exploration of the role of Catholics in social policy debates. Ricucci raises the importance of examining changes in diversity within religious communities by demonstrating ways Catholic migrant youth to Italy negotiate their settlement and religious identity. Lisovskaya describes the situation in post-Soviet Russia opening a fascinating case of a state moving from enforced irreligion to enforced education about religions. Šehagić examines the case of the consequences of religious conflict in Bosnia and the role of identities in attempts to re-establish social inclusion. These case studies provide no foundation for easy generalisation and stand resolutely in the face of attempts to transport a 'success' from one society to another. The global is transformed in the local.

The temptation to draw themes and conclusions from these essays is as seductive as it is impossible. The reader will be informed of a wealth of diversity in the forms, shapes and management of religious diversity. Different challenges from specific rituals or beliefs are further complicated by very different roles played by the state. The experience of diversity differs between highly local relationships to changes in the ways societies see themselves.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Living Together v. Living Well Together: A Normative Examination of the *SAS* Case

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Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights decision in *SAS* from France illustrates how a policy and national mantra that ostensibly aims to enhance inclusiveness, 'living together', is legally deployed in a manner that may have the opposite effect. In essence, despite acknowledging the sincerity of SAS's religious practice of wearing the niqab, and her agency in making the decision to do so, the Court focuses on radicalism and women's oppression amongst Muslims. Taking the notion of living together as the beginning point, the paper explores the normative assumptions underlying this notion as illustrated in the judgment of the Court. An alternative approach, drawing on the work of Derrida for the notion of 'living well together' will be proposed and its implications for social inclusion explicated. The paper's aim is to move beyond the specific example of *SAS* and France to argue that the *SAS* pattern of identifying particular values as 'national values', the deployment of those values through law, policy and public discourse, and their exclusionary effects is playing out in a number of Western democracies, including Canada, the country with which the author is most familiar. Because of this widespread dissemination of values and their framing as representative of who 'we' are, there is a pressing need to consider the potentially alienating effects of a specific manifestation of 'living together' and an alternative model of 'living well together'.

Keywords
citizenship, Derrida, identity, niqab, religion, *SAS v France*, values, *vivre ensemble*, women

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion", edited by Gary Bouma (Monash University, Australia).

1. Introduction

The *SAS v France*[1] decision by the European Court of Human Rights is one of many high profile cases involving Muslim women and their dress.[2] To describe the preoccupation with Muslim women's dress as 'Western' would unduly simplify a complex issue: the 'veil' has been a site of contention in Canada, France, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Malaysia (among others) and it has been the object of extensive academic analysis.[3] I admit to being both weary and wary of hijab/niqab conversations, but the *SAS* case raises a key issue in the conceptualization of religion by law, which is shared in some measure by social science: there is a deep divide between religion as it is imagined and religion as it is practiced. Moreover, both realms are con-

[1] *SAS v France*, [2014] ECHR 695.

[2] See Chaib and Brems (2013) for a discussion of procedural justice, European face veil bans, and the *SAS v France* case. See also Martínez-Torrón (2014) for a thorough discussion of religious pluralism and the European Court of Human Rights.

[3] See, for example, Abu-Odeh (1993), Alvi, Hoodfar, & McDonough (2003), Bakht (2012), Beaman (2013), Bracke and Fadil (2012), Dot-Pouillard (2007), Fadil (2011), Fournier and Amiraux (2013), Hoodfar (1997), Jouili (2011), and Lewis (2011).

cerned, at some level, with the idea that we must 'live together' in shared space and that there must be rules for doing so. Living together, though, has become a code through which religious minorities are expected to comply with 'our values'. Narrowly conceptualized, there is little room for negotiation or flexibility, but rather, a rigid portrayal of who 'we' are and what 'our' values include. Though social scientific research suggests that there is widespread sharing of values across a broad spectrum of differences (see Woodhead, 2009), including religious difference, living together, or, *vivre ensemble*, is often used in a manner that excludes religious minorities. In *SAS*, the government argued, and the Court eventually agreed, that the legislation banning face covering "was a question of responding to a practice that the State deemed incompatible, in French society, with the ground rules of social communication and more broadly the requirements of 'living together'" (para. 57).

I begin by describing three broad themes or contexts within which this analysis of *SAS* is situated. The first is the body of literature broadly focused on the theme of lived religion. Americans Robert Orsi (2005) and Meredith McGuire (2008) have both worked extensively on this theme, attempting to map varieties of religious practice that take place within or related to organized religion as well as those that are outside of it. McGuire's work is especially important because she has taken up the gendered nature of scholarly definitions of religion and what counts as religion. In particular, she has responded to Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton's (1985) valourization of a particular kind of religion over what they famously described as "Sheilaism" in *Habits of the Heart*, challenging the gendered assumptions Bellah et al. make and noting that "Because Bellah's team focused their interviews on respondents' beliefs and commitments, expressed in response to very narrowly focused interview prompts, they did not learn much more about the nature of Sheila's religious experiences or her actual spiritual practices (if any)" (McGuire, 2008, p. 152).

The focus on lived religion has more recently turned to religion in everyday life, or the everyday practice of religion. This body of research captures the nuance and ebb and flow of religion in day-to-day life. It reveals a wide range of practices, but also the inextricable links between multiple vectors of influence (community, life events, institutional pressures) and bases of decision-making around religious practice and belief. Dessing, Jeldtoft, Nielsen and Woodhead's (2013) *Everyday Lived Islam in Europe* shifts attention from integration and the normative intricacies of 'accommodation' to the ways that Muslims live everyday life at home, school, in relation to health care needs, and so on.

In their study of café culture and Muslim leisure in Beirut, Lebanon, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) outline three rubrics of morality amongst participants: religious, social, and political-sectarian. These rubrics do not always align perfectly, they argue, and there is a constant navigation of them through leisure choices. They found that participants understood that the rules of the moral systems in which they live are flexible and open to interpretation (2013, p. 18).[4] In describing their research in a particularly religiously conservative area of the city (Dahiya), Deeb and Harb describe the café scene:

> "Partly because cafés are pickup sites, youths treat them as catwalks, taking the opportunity to display their taste, piety, status, politics, and bodies…in typical Lebanese style, nearly all women wore heels and makeup, with variations in how heavily the cosmetics were applied. In other words, with the exception of a greater proportion of young women wearing headscarves, youths in cafés in Dahiya dress like Lebanese youths elsewhere in the city. Most of them dress to be noticed, itself a violation of the religious rubric, which forbids publicly attracting attention from the opposite sex." (2013, p. 170)

Deeb and Harb's research mirrors the findings of a study, "Religion in the Everyday: Negotiating Islam in St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador," in which I have been involved in St. John's Newfoundland with Jennifer Selby.[5] We have also found a wide range of practices which are best described as flexible according to circumstance, life course, and context. For example, one of our participants describes her decision to wear the hijab after a tragic event in her life in which her mother was killed, her family home destroyed, and her mother's body was missing for a period of time. During the frantic search for her mother's body, Nour tried to think of something she could offer God for her mother's body and it was wearing the hijab. But, as she describes it: "My hijab is not like the perfect hijab. I think people who wear hijab think I'm not doing it the right way. I just cover my head you know sometimes a little bit is showing and so I'm not quite…I don't do it quite the same way as people who wear the hijab do." A replication of this study in Montreal by Amélie Barras has had similar results, revealing flexibility of practice that is made so by the complicated circumstances of every-

[4] The one exception was alcohol, which was somewhat less negotiable.

[5] This study includes 55 face to face interviews with Muslims in St. John's. Our participants represent a range of ages, life stages and degrees of religious practice, ranging from barely cultural Muslims to orthodox Muslims. Jennifer Selby is the principal investigator on that project, I am co-investigator. Jennifer's primary area of interest is the exploration of Muslim identity in contemporary social life and it is her expertise that has led the conceptualization and implementation of this research.

day life.[6]

The reader will perhaps have noticed that the three 'everyday' studies mentioned above each focuses on Muslims and Islam. The current scholarly preoccupation, indeed obsession, with Islam exhibits an exclusivity that is unfortunate. Here it is useful to turn to the broader literature from sociology of religion, which offers insight on the second theme of women and religion. Looking across research on various religious groups, including orthodox Jews, the Amish, Latter-day Saints, and Charismatic Catholics[7], there is much that can be learned by drawing these pieces of research into conversation with each other, especially in relation to women and the conceptualization of women's agency. One pattern that becomes visible by engaging in such a broad read is the tendency to view religious women as being without agency. Religious women are almost always seen as somehow being under the influence of both false consciousness and of men. There is no doubt that organized religion has patriarchal tendencies; however, to then dismiss religious women as being incapable of making decisions, or of being both religious and as having agentic capacity is reductionist. Moreover, the realm of the religious is not the only patriarchal game in town: so-called secular institutions are also patriarchal. As I have written elsewhere, secularism and religion operate "in partnership as organizing discourses that often, but not always, occlude the ongoing and systematic oppression of women across cultures and societies in both the Occident and the Orient, West and East, globally and internationally (Beaman, 2014b, p. 238). However, in public discourse and in law, religion is often presented as having the market cornered on perpetuating women's inequality, and secular society and institutions as the only hope for saving them. The emphasis on the equality of men and women in current policy, legal, and public debates is one manifestation of the way this belief circulates and is integrated in the regulation of religion.[8] These notions of agency are pervasive in the *SAS* case, (and we will return to them shortly) and others like it, in which the nuance of religion in everyday life is flattened and broader patterns between religions are rendered invisible. Although an admittedly problematic category, there is something about 'religion' that is worthy of investigation.

This leads to the third theme: there is a renewed energy to think more fully about religion and to create a more supple understanding of it. Rather than eliminating it as a category of analysis, a more supple understanding insists on critical analysis or querying of the stability of religion as a category and the concurrent drawing in of some of the insights from lived religion scholarship. Thus, this approach asks about the power and political dynamics of naming something as religious (or not) simultaneously with a move away from institutional and textual understandings of religion. Some of the people engaged in this project include Knott, Taira and Poole (2013) with their notion of the secular sacred, Linda Woodhead (with Ole Riis, 2012; 2016) and her focus on everyday religion, Courtney Bender (2003), and Helge Årsheim (2015), following Dressler and Mandair (2011), with the notion of religion-making. Winnifred F. Sullivan (2005) and Elizabeth S. Hurd (2015) have each contributed to this re-crafting of the concept of religion by adding critical cautionary tales about its stability. *SAS* in many ways epitomizes this new scholarly religious imaginary.

The *SAS* case contains traces of various currents of the way the religious person, especially the religious woman, is imagined. Some of these currents run in opposition to each other, some create back eddies of reverse currents that create space to think differently about religion. Rather than focusing on the 'decision' as a concrete yes or no to SAS (and other niqab-wearing women), my comments will consider the binaries that are invoked in the case, holding that it is an interesting study of the sorts of arguments that are playing out in public discourse more broadly. Thus, for example, the 'equality of men and women' is a major component of public discourse about the limits on publically acceptable religious practices, and is integral to the idea of living together.

2. The Facts

With these preliminary considerations in mind, let us turn to the *SAS* case. As with any legal decision, the case begins with a brief description of the 'facts'[9]. Most of this analysis relates to the statement of facts, rather than the lengthy substance of the decision. In brief, the case is about a niqab-wearing woman who challenges France's face-covering ban. The facts as stated by the Court in this case are remarkable for a number of reasons. The Court begins with the statement: "The applicant is a French national who was born in 1990 and lives in France" (para. 10). From the outset, then, the Court establishes that this Muslim woman belongs, at least nominally, to France. This may seem a trivial matter, but the broader context is such that Muslims are, in France and elsewhere, often conceptualized as outsiders who bring an 'other' religion as immigrants.

As the Court continues, though, the articulation of the facts seems to respond to undercurrents of popular

[6] For a critique of the idea of the everyday see Fadil and Fernando (2015a); for responses to this critique, see Deeb (2015) and Schielke (2015). For a reply to these responses, see Fadil and Fernando (2015b).

[7] See, for example, Beaman (2001), Campbell (2008, 2009), Kaufman (1991), Neitz (1987), and Olshan and Schmidtt (1994).

[8] See McRobbie (2009) and Hemmings (2011).

[9] See Foucault (1973); Smith (1978); Donzelot (1984, 1988).

myths, mobilizing truths, and beliefs about Muslims: Muslims are 'from away' and are poorly integrated (in fact, the beginning assurance that the applicant is a French national addresses this); Muslim women are oppressed and are controlled by their male relatives ("The applicant emphasized that neither her husband nor any other member of her family put pressure on her to dress in this manner" [para. 11]); Muslim women wear head and face coverings to annoy or to make a political statement, not because of genuine 'faith' ("Her aim was not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace with herself" [para. 12]); and niqab-wearing women are a threat to security ("The applicant did not claim that she should be able to keep the niqab on when undergoing a security check, at the bank or in airports" [para. 13]). This statement of facts sets up the decision that eventually follows. Though the Court takes (lengthy) pains to work through a wide range of positions about face-coverings and women (so much so that the Court's decision to uphold the criminal punishment of the wearing of face-coverings almost comes as a surprise), in the end the notion of living together, interpreted so as to inevitably mean that one must show one's face, prevails.

Valérie Amiraux argues that the flow of information, or 'authoritative declarations', about head and face coverings "is reminiscent of the social function of gossip, the ways in which it betrays secrets and perpetuates rumours." Gossip, argues Amiraux, creates a "sort of authority, regardless of the initial source" (Amiraux, 2014, 2016). Despite, for example, a large body of research that finds minimal evidence for the notion that women are forced to wear head coverings, and indeed in many cases their husbands/fathers ask and in some cases beg them not to,[10] the notion that Muslim women are forced by their male relatives to cover their heads and faces persists in public discourse.[11] This gossip, to use Amiraux' idea, permeates the social fabric of the courts, becoming support for a framework that requires a statement of facts such as that in *SAS*.

In a sort of reverse reinforcement, the statement of facts mobilizes these myths, or gossip, by addressing or partly refuting them. I say partly refuting because other than the beginning "the applicant *is*" (emphasis mine) the Court is careful to preface the 'facts' with "in the applicant's submission," "according to her explanation," "the applicant emphasized," and so on. These subtle qualifiers construct the statement of facts as facts according to the applicant rather than by the Court, lending them a tenuous quality that opens the possibility of doubt and positions the facts themselves as questionable. Moreover, the framing of the facts works up the story in a particular manner, whilst creating the impression that this is the only possible rendition, or the only facts that matter.[12]

One statement in the facts was particularly intriguing, as it characterized SAS as deciding to wear her niqab 'when the mood strikes'. The Court noted the following:

> "The applicant added that she wore the niqab in public and in private, but not systematically: she might not wear it, for example, when she visited the doctor, when meeting friends in a public place, or when she wanted to socialise in public. She was thus content not to wear the niqab in public places at all times but wished to be able to wear it when she chose to do so, depending in particular *on her spiritual feelings*." (para. 12, emphasis mine)

3. Tensions and Bifurcations

3.1. Fuzzy Religion in the Everyday

My tongue in cheek description of SAS' decision-making process regarding her wearing of the niqab as 'when the mood strikes' is intended to gesture to a disjuncture between religion as it is lived and practiced and religion as it is often imagined. Not only law, but social science and other scholarship generally have had difficulty moving out of a conceptualization of religion that relies on identity rigidity, rather than on a fuzzier[13] and more fluid understanding of how people 'do' religion. Most challenging is recognizing the flexibility of religion that is brought about by life course, circumstance, and context without then doubting the commitment or seriousness with which the practitioner takes her religion. Acknowledgement of flexibility often comes at a cost to the practitioner when her practices come up against rules, laws, or customs that run counter to them, particularly when she positions herself in relation to a specific religious tradition: 'but that isn't *really* religious' or 'that is custom, not religion'. Similarly, variability in practice can cast doubt on the necessi-

[10] For example, during the interview with Nour her son, in his late teens, came home and she shouted out to him "you don't like it when I wear hijab, do you?" See also Alvi et al. (2003), Clarke (2013), and Mossière (2013).

[11] In the interviews conducted by Barras in Montreal one of the interviewees reports an incident on a ski lift in which the (non-Muslim) man seated beside her heard her answer her cell phone in Arabic proceeded to interrogate her about her religion and expressed astonishment that she had been permitted to go skiing without a male family member, thus replicating the very patriarchy he imagined himself to be criticizing, and also demonstrating the power of 'gossip' and the narrative of the imperilled Muslim woman.

[12] For critical legal scholarship on case law and the 'facts', see Amsterdam and Bruner (2002), Belleau and Johnson (2008), and Johnson (2002).

[13] On the topic of fuzzy religion, see Voas (2009) and Voas & Day (2010).

ty of it. As an aside, it is not only those 'outside' of these practices that engage in such doubt: counter-currents within religion pose similar challenges, questioning whether particular practices are 'cultural' or 'religious'.

The introduction of flexibility in practice renders commitment suspect: in this approach, religion can only be essentialized (the five pillars) and 'pure'—one either wears the niqab, or one does not. Although there is space in *SAS* for an alternative conceptualization of religion, the potential vagaries of her 'mood' casts doubt on SAS' sincerity, even as it is her own sincerity and conviction that is the measure of her commitment. This becomes especially true when a moody choice is juxtaposed against the 'values of the nation', which is linked to living together. The use of a citizenship course as a sentence for violating criminal code provisions related to the facial covering ban implies that the offending woman is outside of citizenship, or does not know how to be a good citizen because of her religion or her wearing of a religious symbol. The Court notes that "the purpose of the course is to remind the convicted persons of the Republican values of tolerance and respect for the dignity of the human being and to make them aware of their criminal and civil liability, together with the duties that stem from life in society" (para. 28). Religious values, however identified, and the values of the nation are positioned against each other, rather than being in possible harmony, continuous, or indistinguishable. In the end, the Court acknowledges that niqab-wearing women may be disproportionately impacted by the ban, but that it is justifiable in order to achieve the social ends of living together.

3.2. Religious Women and Agency

Religious women are consistently assumed to be deficient in their capacity to make decisions about their own lives.[14] Paradoxically, religious women who are assessed as having agency either choose not to be religious or to be religious in ways that fit with secular ideals. Only the correct decision is judged to engage agency. The religious is imagined as an ideological constraint that impedes women's abilities to choose. The secular is imagined as ideologically free space, in which women's agency is unconstrained. Mayanthi L. Fernando (2010) argues that secular assumptions about freedom, authority, choice, and obligation preclude public intelligibility of particular kinds of religiosity.

Nadia Fadil (2011) examines the extent to which not veiling can be understood as a technique of the production of self that is functional to shaping a liberal Muslim subject.[15] She highlights the complex agency of the non-veiled Muslim, but makes an important observation that has implications beyond Muslim women: "The secular regulatory ideal is not gender neutral, but draws on a particular perspective on the (female) body, which views the disclosure of certain bodily parts (such as the hair and face, the figure) as essential for achieving 'womanhood'" (2011, p. 96). Jacobsen (2011), Jouili (2011), Mahmood (2005, 2009) and Pham (2011) each consider the complex ways in which piety, agency, and the human subject are layered and situated, and most importantly, are not captured by the "binary model of subordination and resistance" (Jacobsen, 2011, p. 74).

The Court in *SAS* reviews various reports and opinions of a number of commissions and groups who in almost every instance comment on the equality of men and women. One of these is the report of the parliamentary commission established by the Presidents of the National Assembly in 2009. That report takes the view that the veil is an infringement of the principle of liberty and is a "symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very existence, negated both the principle of gender equality and that of the equal dignity of human beings" (para. 17; it also positions the wearing of the niqab as being motivated by radicalism of individuals and not religion). In its judgment of December 2012, the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of women's choice:

> "Even where the wearing of the full-face veil is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the women, the principle of gender equality, which the legislature has rightly regarded as a fundamental value of democratic society, justifies the opposition by the State, in the public sphere, to the manifestation of a religious conviction by conduct that cannot be reconciled with this principle of gender equality." (para. 42, B.23)

Religious women, then, are subject to an agency override when the state knows best.[16] Throughout the decision, the theme of women's oppression, the denial of women's agency, women's coercion, the breach of women's dignity, and violence against women appears in numerous contexts, each time related to Muslim women in particular.

What are the broader questions about agency that are raised by the literature on religious women and the *SAS* case?[17] How is agency used to legitimate particular

[14] See Beaman (1999, 2008, 2012), Davidman (1991), Gallagher (2003), Olshan and Schmidt (1994), Mahmood (2005, 2009), Kaufman (1991), Neitz (1987), and Palmer (1994).

[15] See also Jouili (2011) for a similar argument.

[16] It is not, of course, only and always religious women who are subject to such an override. The increasingly restricted access to abortion in many Western democracies employs a similarly patriarchal stance.

[17] See Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil (2012, p. 52), who remind us that "a piece of clothing cannot itself be oppressive or emancipatory."

practices and to exclude or denigrate others? When is the subject visible, so to speak, and when does she disappear?[18] What are the conditions under which women are constructed as being 'free' and under what circumstances are they held to be forced or not exercising free will? Who makes those decisions and when?[19] To what end?

3.3. Evidence v. Gossip

The extensive social scientific research documenting the range of motivations for wearing the niqab and hijab has not deflected the notion that women who wear them are oppressed or the idea that the niqab itself is inherently oppressive. There is a curious wilful blindness to the evidence in favour of a narrative of oppression that has come to constitute truth in relation to Muslim women. The 'authority' (to draw again on Amiraux's analysis) of the notion that Muslim women are oppressed circulates in the submissions by the various agencies, groups, and arguments considered by the Court in *SAS*.

For example, although France's National Advisory Commission on Human Rights issued an opinion opposing the banning of the face covering, it too remains focused on the Muslim woman as imperilled, noting the detriment the law could pose to women, "because those who were made to wear the full-face veil would additionally be deprived of access to public areas" (para. 18). The Commission also emphasized the need to support women who were subject to violence.

The truth of the 'gossip' of Muslim women's oppression is necessarily accompanied by a second narrative—the myth of the equality of women. An underlying binary shapes the discussion of the equality of men and women in that the religious is equated with women's oppression and the secular with women's freedom, dignity, and agency.[20] Equality, which is always situated in the secular, is part of this story. Angela McRobbie has done some especially insightful work on the ways in which the myth of women's equality circulates to shut down critical analysis of women's inequality. She argues that through the "tropes of freedom and choice" feminism has been rendered redundant, and that "post-feminism positively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which emphasize that it is no longer needed, it is a spent force" (McRobbie, 2009, p. 12). The myth of women's equality glosses history[21], ensuring that "there is no trace whatsoever of the battles fought, of the power struggles embarked upon, or of the enduring inequities which still mark out the relations between men and women" (McRobbie, 2009, p. 19).

A second piece of 'gossip' circulates through the submissions considered by the Court: the danger of the niqab as a political statement/action. As mentioned above, the Court notes in the statement of facts that SAS does not engage in the wearing of the niqab to annoy people. Throughout the case, mention is made of the political use of Islam in both those submissions in favour of the ban and those opposed to it. For example, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe stated in his 'Viewpoint' that "the wearing of full cover dress has increasingly become a means of protesting against intolerance in our societies. An insensitive discussion about banning certain attire seems merely to have provoked a backlash and a polarisation in attitudes" (para. 37). To be sure, there is social scientific data to support the idea that some women wear face and head coverings in part as a statement of solidarity or protest. But this ignores the intertwining of the religious with the political and sets up 'real' religion as being outside of politics, rather than immersed and active in political life. At its best (though I show my bias

[18] See Kennedy (2009) for a discussion of cosmetic genital surgery and female genital mutilation in the context of choice. See Pham (2011) for a comparison of the way agency is invoked for 'women of cover' v. the construction of consumerism as choice. Nguyen (2011) explores the use of particular indices of 'correct living' in the context of the Kabul Beauty School, arguing that they echo earlier histories of imperial statecraft. Khandelwal (2009) argues that most people in the US overestimate their own agency and underestimate that of women elsewhere.

[19] Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Saba Mahmood challenge the Western "conceit of the self-owning individual presumed free from all forms of coercion, including those potentially entailed in religion, commerce, love, belief and comportement" (2009, pp. 13-14; see also Mahmood, 2001). In their introduction to *Gender, Agency, and Coercion*, Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips and Kalpana Wilson are cautious about judgements that condemn women's choices: "But judgementalism is not the same as judgement, and it should be possible to avoid the kind of moralising that tells others what they ought to think and do without thereby losing the capacity to challenge structures of domination and power" (2013, p. 12). The roles of collectivities, both as frameworks for action and as generators of agency, as well as the reshaping of the coercion-agency binary, are key themes in the volume.

[20] As Deepa Kumar points out, the West does not have a monopoly on either women's equality or women's oppression. Indeed, using the example of Egypt, he notes that liberal Western traditions have made significant contributions to women's inequality (2012, pp. 44-48).

[21] As Clare Hemmings argues, we need "to examine the ways in which Western feminist stories about the recent past coincide unnervingly with those that place Western feminism firmly in the past in order to 'neutralize' gender equality in its global circuits" (2011, p. 11). Furthermore, she says "Agency is thus mobilized discursively as *the opposite of inequality* rather than as part of the negotiation of power relations in constrained circumstances" (Hemmings, 2011, p. 209, emphasis hers). See also Douglas (2010).

here) religion has been a force for social justice, and it is undeniably linked to politics. Boldly stated, it is Islam and politics that is the specific concern in the current social landscape.

4. Conclusion: An Alternative to Living Together

The specifics of SAS and her implied spiritual whimsy[22] mark a stark contrast with the oppressed Muslim woman who must be rescued by society and the state and who poses a threat to social cohesion. She does not understand, so goes the rhetoric, the whole concept of living together and the obligation to expose herself (like other 'emancipated' women do). I do not use the phrase 'spiritual whimsy' disrespectfully. The research in which I and others have been engaged reveals a flexible and situated approach to religion that stands in contrast to a more rigid and institutional imagining of religion. I am not so sure that this insight is new, but that in focusing on one way of conceptualizing religion the contours of context in relation to religion have been largely ignored.

One of the key motifs in the case, as well as in public discourse in France and beyond, has become the notion of 'living together' or '*vivre ensemble*'. Though it sounds well-intentioned and like a code for inclusivity, it is often translated as a mechanism for disciplining those who 'don't really understand' how to live in harmony with others. It has become a rather heavy and inflexible concept rather than a point for negotiation and discussion about what it means to live together with difference. Thus, for example, citizenship courses are required of those who violate the ban on face covering, drawing to our attention the link between *vivre ensemble* and a failure of discipline regarding citizenship behaviour. Questioning the status quo results in a characterization of the challenger as not really understanding the 'values' of the nation. Re-training, disciplinary action, and corrective socialization are the solutions to this failure.

France is not the only nation in which this idea of living together has currency, and in which the apparel of Muslim woman is linked to citizenship. Zunera Ishaq is a 29-year-old niqab-wearing Muslim woman who, on October 9, 2015 finally took the oath of citizenship and became a Canadian citizen. She fought the federal government, most recently in the Federal Court of Appeal[23], for the right to wear her niqab while taking her oath of citizenship. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld her right to wear the niqab and stated that "there is no evidence of broad effects upon Muslim women generally or the larger Muslim community" (para. 36). It also dismissed the motion of the then minister of citizenship to stay the matter pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.[24]

As in *SAS*, though Ishaq herself is articulate, determined, and devoted to her nation, these qualities do not prevent the equation of niqab with women's oppression and barbarianism. The then Conservative Prime Minister made a number of statements regarding the case, saying "it is offensive that someone would hide their identity at the very moment where they are committing to join the Canadian family" (Whittington & Keung, 2015). The Conservative Party's website dedicated a webpage to the niqab saying covering one's face while being sworn in is "not the way we do things here" (Conservative Party of Canada, 2015). He also called the niqab a "product of a culture that is anti-woman" (Chase, 2015). In addition, he made a statement in which he divided 'new' and 'old stock' Canadians (CBC News, 2015). In September of 2015 during the federal election campaign, he promised to create a 'Barbaric Cultural Practices' hotline if he was elected, which he was not (Powers, 2015).

In thinking about this idea of living together, which as previously mentioned has a rhetorical appeal that is difficult to displace, Jacques Derrida develops it as an expansive notion that folds in the notion of living *well* together. Rather than rejecting living together as a lost cause, he redraws its boundaries, articulating a different vision which draws from the real of the everyday, and which models a version of what I have called elsewhere 'deep equality' (see Beaman, 2014a):

> "If 'living together' then means 'living *well* together,' this signifies understanding one another in trust, in good faith, in faith, comprehending one another, in a word, being in *accord* with one another. Why then speak of accord? Why this language of the heart [*coeur*], of accord and concord, even of 'mercy [*miséricorde*],' and of the compassion that must bring us closer and a bit more quickly to the question of 'forgiveness,' with or without *teshuvah*? The language of the heart reminds us that this peace of 'living together,' even if it is a peace of justice and equity, is not necessarily under the law of the law, at least in the sense of legality, of law [*droit*] (national or international) or of the political contract; and here, as I often do, I will distinguish, but without opposing them, justice and law [*la justice et le droit*]." (Derrida, 2012, pp. 25-26)

Moreover, Derrida is cautious about what he calls the 'new legalism', or what others have described as the juridification of social life.[25] Though they have very dif-

[22] This is, I would argue, the overall effect of the presentation of her agency in the case and certainly not my read.

[23] *Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq*, 2015 FCA 151.

[24] *Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq*, 2015 FCA 212.

[25] For an elaboration of the concept of juridification, see Fokas (2015), Koenig (2015), and Sandberg (2014) and Richardson, (2015), who uses judicialization.

ferent endings, both the *SAS* and *Ishaq* cases can be understood as part of the technology of law:

> "this new legalism, sustained by technological resources of investigation, communication, ubiquity, and unprecedented speed, runs the risk of reconstituting, under the pretext of transparency, a new inquisitorial obsession that transforms anybody into a subject or a defendant summoned to 'live together' according to the ensemble, while renouncing not only what one names with the old name of 'private life,' the invisible practice of faith, and so on; but also, and quite simply, while renouncing this possibility of the secret, of separation, of solitude, of silence, and of singularity, of this interruption that remains, we have seen, the inalienable condition of 'living together,' of responsibility and of decision." (Derrida, 2012, p. 34)

The French legislation assumes that displaying one's face is an integral part of living together: "[The legislature] was entitled to take the view that the creation of human relationships, being necessary for living together, was rendered impossible by the presence in the public sphere…of persons who concealed this fundamental element of their individuality" (*SAS*, para. 42, B.21), thus licencing the 'inquisitorial obsession' identified by Derrida, and putting the niqab squarely in opposition to the 'good citizen'. We thus return to the idea that a more supple understanding of religion and consequently religious identity is required, both in its lived dimensions, and also in its ability to be coupled with multiple identities such as citizen, feminist, mother, employee and so on. Part of the suppleness is a move away from identity rigidity and oppositional positioning.

Both SAS and Zunera Ishaq defy such opposition, seeking to re-frame themselves as both covered women and good citizens. Ishaq expresses no hesitation in showing her face for the purposes of identification before the citizenship ceremony, but wishes to swear her allegiance to Canada being all that she is, including, among other things, a Muslim woman. In her twenties, SAS combines devout religiosity with a complex approach to religion that is not easily captured by traditional social scientific imaginings of religion or by the unwieldy machinery of law. Based on her spiritual feelings, she is sincere in her religious observation, but being Muslim is, as is the case for Ishaq, not all of who she is. Essentializing her identity to 'Muslim' misses how she is a political, economic, and social participant in the world around her. It eludes her commitment to being 'French' and the ways that she constructs her own citizenship as a sometime niqab-wearing woman who wears her religiously-inspired covering when the mood strikes.

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Article

Inclusive Study of Religions and World Views in Schools: *Signposts* from the Council of Europe

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Abstract
This article outlines some issues in incorporating the study of religions, together with non-religious world views, into the curricula of publicly funded schools in Western democratic states. Attention is given to examples from work on this topic conducted within the Council of Europe since 2002, with a particular focus on *Signposts: Policy and Practice for Teaching about Religions and Nonreligious World Views in Intercultural Education*, a text published by the Council of Europe in 2014. *Signposts* is designed to assist policy makers and practitioners in interpreting and applying ideas from the 2008 Recommendation from the Committee of Ministers (the Foreign Ministers of the 47 member states) dealing with education about religions and non-religious convictions. Various issues raised by the *Signposts* document are considered. Towards the end of the article, recent UK and Council of Europe policies which emphasise the study of religions and beliefs as a means to counter extremism, and which have appeared since the publication of *Signposts*, are summarised and discussed critically. Attention is drawn to the dangers of certain policies, and also to the plurality of aims which studies of religions and non-religious world views need to have in providing a balanced educational programme.

Keywords
Council of Europe; education; extremism; globalisation; intercultural; pluralisation; religions; secularisation; teaching; world views

Issue
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1. Introduction

The processes of secularisation, pluralisation and globalisation have encouraged debate about the place of religion in publicly funded schools, leading to policy developments and changes in the education systems of some European countries. Recently published volumes on religious education in Western Europe (Rothgangel, Jackson & Jäggle, 2014), Northern Europe (Rothgangel, Skeie & Jäggle, 2014) and Central Europe (Rothgangel, Schlag & Jäggle, 2015) show the variety of education systems and approaches to religious education in various parts of Europe, but all show the ongoing influence of religious diversity upon those different systems. A further influence for change results from the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere in democracies (e.g., Habermas, 2006). For example, the shift in Council of Europe policy, which resulted in new work on the study of religion in public education from 2002, was related to that debate (Council of Europe, 2004, 2008a; Keast, 2007). A recent Council of Europe publication, *Signposts: Policy and practice for teaching about religions and non-religious world views in intercultural education* (Jackson, 2014a),[1] acknowledges

[1] Available in various formats at https://book.coe.int/eur/en/human-rights-education-intercultural-education/6101-signposts-policy-and-practice-for-teaching-about-religions-and-non-religious-world-views-in-intercultural-education.html in English, French and Spanish, with more translations to follow during 2016.

these changes, and considers issues in developing policy and practice in this field as part of public education across Europe.

With regard to the secularisation process, in England, to take one example, secularisation was reflected in changing attitudes of young people in schools, with research carried out in the 1960s suggesting that traditional Biblical studies was felt by many older secondary school students to have limited relevance to their personal concerns (Loukes, 1965) or sometimes including an unwarranted form of religious teaching lacking breadth and opportunities for critical discussion (Cox, 1967).

Pluralisation through migration, especially since the 1960s, led many educators to change the focus of studies of religion in fully state-funded schools from a form of single faith religious teaching to a 'non-confessional', inclusive, multi-faith approach, including learning *about* the religions of relatively newly established minorities such as Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as well as about Christianity and Judaism.

Theory and methodology from the new field of Religious Studies, which drew upon the phenomenology of religion to offer an impartial and objective approach which acknowledged increasing secularity and plurality, was influential from the early 1970s. A key source in the early stages of change was the global perspective of Ninian Smart (e.g., Smart, 1968, 1969) and the project on religious education that he led at the University of Lancaster (Schools Council, 1971). However, the relationship between Smart's theory and methodology to policy and to general practice in schools is complex and difficult to determine (Bråten, 2013). More 'bottom up' developments reflecting the increasingly multi-religious and multicultural nature of British society, as experienced by students and teachers in schools, also played an important part in bringing about change in schools (Cole, 1972). With regard to fully state-funded schools (as distinct from certain categories of schools with a religious affiliation that received state funding), the changes that appeared 'bottom-up' during the 1960s and 1970s were acknowledged in law in the 1988 Education Reform Act (Dinham & Jackson, 2012; Gates & Jackson, 2014).

2. The Council of Europe

While policy makers and educators in various individual states have grappled with similar issues in their own contexts, some international institutions have become increasingly concerned with addressing issues of teaching and learning about religions and non-religious world views internationally, regarding this educational activity as highly desirable within schools in democratic societies. For example, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) produced a document, the *Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools* (Jackson, 2008; OSCE, 2007). Another initiative is the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations programme, which encourages education about religions and beliefs globally through its Education about Religions and Beliefs website (http://erb.unaoc.org).

Significantly more extensive than the work of the OSCE and the UN in this field is that of the Council of Europe. This on-going activity has taken place over a much longer period than the OSCE's contribution. Since 2002, the Council of Europe has given attention to education about religions (and also, since 2008, non-religious convictions) in public schools across Europe. The earlier view of excluding the study of religions in public education—because religion was felt to belong only to the private sphere—was reconsidered. The events of September 11, 2001 in the USA were an impetus for change (Jackson, 2010).

The Council of Europe was established in 1949, a year or so after the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Based in Strasbourg, France, the Council of Europe aims to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law, and to seek solutions to social problems, such as xenophobia and discrimination against minorities. It also aims to promote awareness and development of Europe's cultural identity and diversity. Thus, there is an intention to develop across Europe a common commitment to the values expressed in the human rights codes—such as the value of human dignity—while at the same time respecting and valuing Europe's cultural diversity (including its religious diversity) and the traditions of each member state. There is a creative tension between a common approach to human rights and an acknowledgement of European diversity.

The Council of Europe integrates political activity with various projects undertaken under the auspices of the Council's directorates. Educational projects are conducted within the Directorate of Democratic Citizenship and Participation, which is part of the Directorate General (DGII) of Democracy. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe consists of members of the national parliaments of member states, not members of the European Parliament. The Committee of Ministers is made up of the Foreign Ministers of all 47 member states. Periodically, the Committee of Ministers makes Recommendations to member states based on Council of Europe projects. These recommendations are not legally binding in member states, but are intended as tools for use in policy development at a national level.

The Council of Europe's educational work at school level focuses on the overlapping areas of human rights education, education for democratic citizenship and intercultural education. Cutting across these are themes such as language, history and now religion and belief. Thus, the fundamental rationale for including religion

in the Council of Europe's educational work relates to human rights, citizenship and intercultural education. However, aims related to the personal development of students and to the intrinsic value of a broadly-based liberal education are by no means ignored. The term 'religious education' is not used in the Council of Europe documents, mainly because of its ambiguity. It can be used to describe forms of initiation into what we might call '*religious understanding*', through learning and religious practice. Sometimes the terms 'religious instruction' and 'religious nurture' are used for these processes. However, 'religious education' often refers to the promotion of an inclusive, general public understanding of religion or religions—what might be termed '*understanding religion(s)*'. Terms such as 'inclusive religious education' (Jackson, 2014b) or 'integrative religious education' (Alberts, 2007) are used in this way. The American Academy of Religion uses the designation 'religion education' (as distinct from 'religious education') to refer to an inclusive education about religions (American Academy of Religion, 2010). The Council of Europe documents use expressions such as 'the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue' or 'the dimension of religions...within intercultural education', in order to avoid ambiguity. This usage carries no intention to *reduce* religion to culture.

3. Towards the 2008 Council of Europe Recommendation

In 2002, the Council of Europe launched a major project on the study of religions as part of intercultural education, entitled 'The Challenge of Intercultural Education Today: Religious Diversity and Dialogue in Europe'. There were several outputs from the project, including a book based on the papers from a conference held in Oslo (Council of Europe, 2004) and a widely distributed reference book for schools across Europe (Keast, 2007). The project influenced the Year of Intercultural Dialogue and the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (Council of Europe, 2008b). However, most importantly, the Committee of Ministers—the Foreign Ministers of all 47 member states—agreed, in 2008, a policy recommendation on the dimension of religions and non-religious convictions within intercultural education. The Recommendation (Council of Europe, 2008a) was circulated to all member states.

The Recommendation provides guidance on education about religions and 'non-religious convictions' in the context of intercultural education. This form of education is logically distinct from types of religious education which aim *specifically* to nurture children and young people in a particular faith tradition. However, the form of 'open' intercultural education suggested in the Recommendation is, in principle, complementary to many forms of outward looking faith-based education (Jackson, 2013, 2014b, 2015a). The Recommendation acknowledges diversity at local, regional and international levels, and encourages connections to be made between 'local' and 'global', the exploration of issues concerning religion and identity, and the development of positive relations with parents and religious communities, as well as organisations related to non-religious philosophies such as secular humanism. The intention is to introduce young people to a variety of positions in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, within the 'safe space' of the classroom.

Regarding the selection of content for teaching, there is no assumption that *every* religious or non-religious position should be covered in class. Selection of specific subject content needs to relate to context. There is an emphasis on competence for understanding a variety of religions and world views, including well-selected information, plus the development of skills and attitudes to facilitate intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The aim is to provide knowledge but also to encourage reciprocity, sensitivity and empathy and to combat prejudice, intolerance, bigotry and racism. Students are encouraged to engage in dialogue and discussion managed by teachers equipped with specialist knowledge and facilitation skills. Teaching and learning methods are recommended. Illustrative didactical examples include interpretive (Jackson, 1997, 2004, 2009, 2011b, 2011c; Ipgrave, Jackson, & O'Grady, 2009; Miller, O'Grady, & McKenna, 2013) and dialogical approaches (Ipgrave, 2013; Leganger-Krogstad, 2011), which are 'open', 'inclusive' and 'impartial' and which acknowledge the varied backgrounds of participants. The Recommendation acknowledges that such provision needs to be supported by high-quality teacher training (at both initial and in-service levels), good quality resources, and on-going research and evaluation.

Whilst having clear goals, sensitivity is expressed to the educational systems and practices already in operation in member states, and attention is drawn to the relevance of 'the already existing best practices of the respective member states'. The Recommendation is provided as an adaptable discussion text and not as an inflexible framework. Attention is also given to the fact that different approaches would be needed with young people of different ages, taking 'into account the age and maturity of pupils to whom it is addressed'.

4. The Development of *Signposts*

To maximise discussion and action in member states in relation to the Council of Europe Recommendation, the Council of Europe and European Wergeland Centre established a joint committee in 2009 to work on ways of helping policymakers and practitioners in member states to discuss and apply ideas in their own national setting. The committee included specialists in religious education and in religion in the context of intercultural education from a variety of European countries. They

were not representing specific states, but they offered a variety of expertise which could be pooled. The committee designed and distributed a questionnaire to members of the Education Committee of the Council of Europe, based in each of the 47 member states, asking respondents to identify difficulties they felt they would have in applying the Council of Europe Recommendation in their own specific national settings.

An analysis of the questionnaire responses identified various issues which were common to many member states. These included:

- ambiguity and lack of clarity in terminology associated with teaching about religions and beliefs;
- a need to understand the component elements of 'competence' for understanding religions;
- how to make the classroom a 'safe space' for discussion and dialogue by students;
- how to help students to analyse representations of religions in the media;
- how to integrate a study of non-religious convictions and world views with the study of religions;
- how to tackle human rights issues in relation to religion and belief in schools and classrooms;
- and how to link schools to wider communities and organisations, with the goal of increasing students' knowledge about and understanding of religions and non-religious philosophies, such as secular humanism.

After much deliberation by the joint committee, and after listening to the experiences of colleagues in France, Québec, Norway and the Russian Federation, it was decided to produce a book, written primarily for policymakers and practitioners, which would explore aspects of the Recommendation in relation to the issues identified above raised by respondents to the questionnaire. The present author was given the task of writing the book on behalf of the committee, taking account of its deliberations, and drawing on relevant European and other international research, as well as giving concrete examples of experience of dealing with some of the issues in various education systems (Jackson, 2014a).

5. Using REDCo Research

Various research reports from the 'Religion, Education, Dialogue and Conflict' Project (REDCo), sponsored by the European Commission, proved invaluable in illustrating topics such as facilitating civil dialogue in the classroom, establishing classrooms as 'safe spaces' for dialogue, and helping young people to analyse media representations of religions (e.g., Knauth, Jozsa, Bertram-Troost, & Ipgrave, 2008; ter Avest, Jozsa, Knauth, Rosón, & Skeie, 2009; Valk, Bertram-Troost, Frederici, & Béraud, 2009).

With regard to linking personal concerns and social issues, REDCo research with 14−16 year olds in eight European countries (England, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation and Spain) showed support from young people for education about religious diversity. The research demonstrates that studies of religious diversity are not erosive of students' own commitments, but can help to develop a culture of 'living together'. The majority of 14−16 year old young people surveyed wanted opportunities to learn about and from one another's religious perspectives in the 'safe space' of the classroom, with teachers providing knowledge and understanding while also facilitating dialogue effectively (Jackson, 2012; Knauth et al., 2008; ter Avest et al., 2009; Valk et al., 2009). Thus, studies of religions can contribute to broader fields such as intercultural education and education for democratic citizenship, as well as contributing to students' personal development and to their religious literacy. The European REDCo research shows young people who want an opportunity to learn and talk about religion in schools. They see the classroom (not family or peer group) as the only likely potential 'safe space' for this to happen, and they appreciate skilful teachers who can *both* provide accurate information and manage discussions which include significant differences in viewpoint. There is certainly no general assumption, as one critic has claimed, that 'all religions are equally true' (Gearon, 2013), but there *is* a commitment to exploring the democratic and human rights principle of freedom of religion or belief within society.

With regard to issues relating to the classroom as a safe space for dialogue, REDCo research dealt directly with addressing issues of conflict as part of such discussions. For example, Fedor Kozyrev, working in St Petersburg schools, analysed videotaped examples of classroom topics dealing with religion and conflict. He highlights the importance of the teacher's adaptability in addressing issues of conflict through dialogue, emphasizing the importance of the relationship between teacher and students, established over time (Kozyrev, 2009, p. 215). Marie von der Lippe's research in Norwegian schools, shows how conflict can be generated by some media representations of religious material, and she suggests ways of dealing with this in class (von der Lippe, 2009, 2010). Drawing on research in Hamburg schools, Thorsten Knauth, demonstrates the importance of the teacher's awareness of the dynamics of classroom interaction between conservative Muslim students and more liberal Muslim peers influenced by values and attitudes from general youth culture. Knauth discusses how such conflicts can be addressed. He shows how well-managed classroom dialogue pro-

vided an opportunity for pupils to test and challenge their ideas (Knauth, 2009). These examples illustrate that it is possible to provide 'safe space' for civil exchange in which issues can be discussed, and in which the expression and acceptance of difference is accommodated. Olga Schihalejev, in reporting her classroom interaction research in Estonia notes that: 'If the student recognises that security is available and trust has been built up, he or she will risk entering into conflict or vulnerable areas rather than avoiding them or utilising uncontrolled ways to deal with them' (Schihalejev, 2010, p. 177). All of this research shows that moderated, civil dialogue on topics concerned with religion, including issues of conflict, can be conducted effectively in classrooms. A necessary condition is having teachers with skills to facilitate dialogue as well as knowledge of religions.

In addition to REDCo studies, other European research used in *Signposts* illustrates a number of themes, such as providing examples of how schools can build educational links with religious and other communities, including the organisation of visits to religious buildings, and of the role of members of religious and belief groups in giving moderated talks about their communities in schools, in which the role of the speaker is to inform (often through personal stories) and not to prosyletise. The use of visitors from various communities as speakers in schools is discussed, including an example of partnerships between secondary schools and primary schools, in which older secondary students are trained to give information about their own faith or world view. An account of the use of ethnographic methods on outside visits in order to maximise students' understanding of others' religious language, symbols and experiences is given, and it is noted that visitors have commented on the benefit of visits to schools to them personally and to their communities. Research from Sweden and the UK reports very positive responses from secondary school students in relation to their experience of listening to outside visitors talking about religious or ethical matters or going on visits to places of worship or to places concerned with ethics in society.

6. *Signposts* as a Discussion Tool

Signposts is not a blueprint but a discussion document, written to assist practitioners and policy makers from member states (or indeed other countries) in their thinking and action in relation to their own historical and cultural context. It is concerned with increasing 'religious literacy' for the whole population—increasing tolerance, and opening up the possibility of showing respect towards others' views and values. However, even the term 'religious literacy' is used in different ways. The Council of Europe view of 'religious literacy' implies a general understanding of religious language and practice, open to everyone, which can result from learning about religions (see also American Academy of Religion, 2010; Moore, 2007). However, the term 'religious literacy' is sometimes used very differently to imply the development of a religious *insider's* use of religious language (Felderhof, 2012). *Signposts* encourages users to give careful attention to precise use of terminology, and recommends the inclusion of glossaries in documentation, so that there can be a clear, shared understanding of technical terms.

Signposts acknowledges and advocates the importance of learning about the internal diversity of religions, as well as gaining a sense of religions as distinct phenomena. It is concerned with helping learners to understand religions, but recognises that this needs to be developed in some very different educational contexts. It is clear that, in order to achieve the goals set out in *Signposts*, specialist teachers are needed who could also assist with the training and professional development of other teachers. The next section of the article considers a selection of issues covered in or raised by *Signposts.*

7. Representing Religious and Cultural Plurality

Signposts takes the view that representing religions as entirely homogeneous systems of belief tends to produce oversimplified, stereotypical accounts which often do not correspond to the experience of believers and practitioners (e.g., Flood, 1999; Jackson, 1997). The internal diversity of religions is acknowledged, and they can be pictured organically, for example in terms of a relationship between individuals, particular groups and wider religious traditions. It is acknowledged that the study of individuals, in relation to the various groups with which they are associated, can inform an emerging understanding of a particular religion. At the same time, key concepts from a particular religion can be exemplified and enlivened through the consideration of particular examples of religious faith and practice. This does not imply that religions cannot be thought of, in some contexts, as 'wholes'. Looking at the interplay between individuals, groups and broad traditions shows the complexity of representing religions, as well as bringing them to life, and also demonstrates how individuals relate to or fit into particular groups and specific religions. This approach also can help students and teachers to understand why a religion, as practised, for example, by a student in a class, might be different in various ways from the generic representation of that religion in a school textbook. The approach can help to alleviate the concern of some religious students, as indicated in various qualitative research studies, that their religion is misrepresented by some resources and by some teachers (Moulin, 2011).

Signposts acknowledges terminological issues and provides ideas for addressing them. With regard to is-

sues relating to cultural plurality, there has been much debate around terms such as 'multicultural' and 'intercultural'. Some writing in the field of religions and education has worked with sophisticated formulations of multiculturalist theory, drawing on empirical research dealing with the interaction of what Gerd Baumann calls 'dominant' and 'demotic' discourses (Baumann, 1999). 'Dominant discourse' assumes the existence of distinct and separate cultures living side-by-side, often perceived as closed systems, with a fixed understanding of ethnicity. 'Demotic discourse', however, recognises 'internal diversity' of cultures (sometimes giving rise to conflict), the reality and significance of cultural fusion, the formation of new culture, intergenerational differences, and the emergence of new fundamentalisms (Jackson, 2004). Baumann's empirical research detected *both* forms of discourse in different contexts.

However, the rejection of multiculturalism through its identification *only* with 'dominant' discourse has been common among European politicians (e.g., Cameron, 2011; replied to in Jackson, 2011a). This view of multiculturalism, with its emphasis on discrete cultures, allows 'other cultures' to be perceived as rivals to the national culture. Such a one-sided representation has resulted in derogatory uses of the term 'multicultural' and avoidance of the term in some official documents, such as the final report of the UK Commission on Integration and Cohesion (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007, p. 13). The Council of Europe prefers to use the term 'intercultural', with its connotations of cultural interaction and dialogue (e.g. Barrett, 2013), and regards inclusive education about religions and non-religious convictions as a subset of intercultural education (Council of Europe, 2008a; Jackson, 2014a). Some writers prefer to use the term 'diversity', rather than multiculturalism. For example, in his work on 'super-diversity' Steven Vertovec analyses the complexity and changing character of cultural and religious diversity in the light of global, regional and local factors and their relationship over time (Vertovec, 2006). This, of course, includes the emergence of so-called 'radicalised' Islam in various European contexts.

8. Religions, or Religions and Non-Religious Convictions?

With regard to 'pluralisation', there is an argument that an inclusive school subject should cover non-religious philosophies as well as religions. This view was taken by the Council of Europe in its Recommendation of 2008 (Jackson, 2014a, pp. 67-75), and by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in its *Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools* (OSCE, 2007). In both cases, the argument for extending the range of 'inclusive education about religions' relates to the human rights principle of freedom of religion and belief ('belief' encompassing non-religious convictions). *Signposts* acknowledges the importance of debate on the topic within member states. In clarifying the ground to be discussed, *Signposts* makes a distinction between *organised* world views, such as religions and secular humanism, and *personal* world views of individuals. Research shows the latter often to be unconventional (e.g., Wallis, 2014). Personal world views might mirror particular religions or secular humanism, but are often more eclectic, for example, combining elements of more than one religion (e.g., Buddhism and Judaism), or features of one or more religions and Humanism (eg, bringing together an atheistic stance with elements of Christian ethics and spirituality) (Jackson 2014a, pp. 67-75). Some would argue that the school should provide opportunities for the exploration of personal as well as organised world views.

Signposts includes discussions of various other matters, such as human rights issues, and analysing media representations of religions, and invites readers to use the document in order to further discussion and action with regard to policy and practice in their own contexts.

9. Education and Extremism: A Changing Climate

As noted above, the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States were a *catalyst* for the Council of Europe's inclusion of studies of religions (and later religions and non-religious convictions) in intercultural education, but did not provide the total rationale for developments in the field. However, the climate has been changing for some time, and now a key political issue for many European democracies, is the 'radicalisation', and the extreme acts, of a small minority of people—including some young people—who, often, have been born and have grown up in those countries. For example, these might be individuals who have been prepared to commit acts of extreme violence on the basis of far right political views, as in the Breivik case in Norway (Anker & von der Lippe, 2015), or might be from a small minority of young Muslims prepared to adopt an extremist position, supporting or committing acts of violence in their own country, or leaving home to join an extremist group in another country, such as Syria. The dreadful atrocities committed in Paris on November 13, 2015 are a vivid example of such extremism. Thus, political attention to education, especially education concerning religions, has tended to become more immediately focused on countering extremism than on wider goals.

10. Example 1: UK Government Law and Policy

To take one example, in the United Kingdom, extremist activity led to the 'Prevent' strategy, which was initiat-

ed under the Labour Government, was revamped by the Coalition Government in 2011, as part of its overall counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), and continues as part of present Conservative Government policy. 'Prevent' focuses on: responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it; preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support; and working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed (retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011).

Specifically, with regard to education, non-statutory advice was published by the Department for Education in 2014 on the long-standing legal requirement that maintained schools should promote pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural (SMSC) development (UK Government, 2014). This non-statutory advice introduces the concept of 'British values', as articulated in the Government's 2011 development of the 'Prevent ' strategy: 'Schools should promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs'.

New legislation was introduced in 2015 through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015). The introduction of Part 5 of this Act gives the 'Prevent' strategy legal status in schools and colleges in England and Wales, which are now obliged by statute 'to have due regard' to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Non-statutory advice to schools, published by the Department for Education in July 2015 (UK Government, 2015), explains the counter-extremism requirements, in relation to primary and secondary, state and independent schools, and includes warnings against 'non-violent extremism', and a requirement for staff to report concerns, normally through the school's safeguarding procedures; however, the option of contacting local police in order to discuss concerns is also available (UK Government, 2015, p. 10).

In May 2015, a new Counter-Extremism Bill was announced at the first meeting of a new National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister. This proposes new legislation to make it much harder for people to promote extremist views. The emphasis will be on bringing communities together to defeat extremism, and on promoting values (again referred to as 'British values') of freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, and equal rights regardless of race, gender or sexuality.

11. Example 2: Council of Europe Declaration and Action Plan

At a European level, to take another example, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in May 2015, issued a Declaration against Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism (Council of Europe, 2015a) together with an associated Action Plan (Council of Europe, 2015b). In these documents, guiding principles on how to combat terrorism whilst respecting the rule of law and fundamental freedoms are provided by the European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The Action Plan includes strategies to prevent and fight radicalisation, including in schools, prisons, and on the Internet. The emphasis in educational policy is on developing competences required for democratic culture and intercultural dialogue. The work already done within the Council of Europe on education about religious diversity, intercultural education, human rights education and education for democratic citizenship is deemed highly relevant to the Action Plan. There will be an emphasis on 'initiatives to combat stereotyping and discrimination, to support inclusion strategies at local level, to build trust among citizens across social and cultural differences and to support intercultural communication and skills' (Council of Europe, 2015b).

12. Extremism and Education about Religions: Discussion

With regard to the United Kingdom, legislation and current policy have had a mixed reception. Although the National Union of Teachers (NUT) has produced a very carefully worded advice document (NUT, 2015), the General Secretary of the Union, has stated that the 'Prevent' counter-extremism strategy was causing 'significant nervousness and confusion among teachers', and that concerns over extremism could 'close down' classroom debates which could encourage democracy and human rights (retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33328377).

According to David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism law (https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk), the Counter Extremism Bill could provoke a backlash in Britain's Muslim communities, and risks legitimising state scrutiny of, and citizens informing on, the political activities of large numbers of law-abiding people (reported in *The Guardian*, 17 September 2015). One commentator satirises the proposals with an article headed 'Jesus Would Have Been Done for Extremism under This Government' (Fraser, 2015). Moreover, the specific identification of generic democratic or human rights values with a particular *nationality* has been criticised on a variety of grounds (e.g., Richardson & Bolloten, 2015), especially in view of its association by some politicians with a simplistic view of multiculturalism (see section 7 above, 'Representing Religious and Cultural Plurality').

The Council of Europe's approach is more measured, and refers to democracy and human rights values, referring back to the human rights codes rather

than associating such values with particular national traditions. The Council of Europe Declaration states:

> "We are in particular convinced that education for democracy and the building of more inclusive societies are vital components of the democratic response that we must give to the upsurge in violent extremism. Restoring trust and promoting 'better living together' are challenges vital to the future of our societies." (Council of Europe, 2015a)

There is a positive emphasis on learning to live together within societies that are inclusive, rather than a preoccupation with identifying remarks and actions that could be considered as potentially extremist. *Signposts* is specifically mentioned as being highly relevant to helping to develop appropriate educational strategies, with the goal of 'Building Inclusive Societies': 'The Council of Europe publication *Signposts*, based on Recommendation CM/Rec (2008) 12, will be widely disseminated' (Council of Europe, 2015b).

There are two key issues emerging from the policy developments outlined above that have particular relevance to education about religions and beliefs. The first is that there is a tendency for anti-extremism to become the predominant aim for studying religions, thereby excessively influencing the selection of content that relates only to this aim. The second, seen in the UK example and in the comments from its critics, is a view of anti-extremism which potentially, and inadvertently, undermines the 'democratic' justification that it claims to uphold.

With regard to addressing the first issue, it is important to combine liberal educational with instrumental personal and social reasons for learning about religions. Such a broadly based representation of religions, which acknowledges their different dimensions and their internal diversity, should encourage and inform civil classroom dialogue and discussion according to agreed ground rules, rather than focusing on extremism (Jackson, 2015b). This approach is consistent with the Council of Europe Action Plan.

With regard to dealing with the second issue, there is no escaping some degree of tension between democratic or human rights principles and some religious (and related cultural) positions. In current UK policy, which uses so-called 'British values' to support national and international security, there is a danger of slippage towards authoritarianism, and of inappropriate and potentially counter-productive actions and interpretations of policies. An appropriate way forward would be to support a more nuanced form of 'dialogical liberalism', which seeks a greater degree of dialogue between values as expressed in the human rights codes, and values that are rooted in particular religious and cultural contexts, than is to be found in some of the rhetoric of the UK Government. Care needs to be taken not to stifle all disagreement, or to oppose all alternative perspectives—including conservative religious positions—but to recognise that the limits of 'political liberalism' (Rawls, 1993) lie, not with dissent *per se*, but with those in society who deny the basic liberal rights of citizens or refuse to tolerate conflicting comprehensive views—in other words, those who reject the idea of political liberalism itself. On this view, non-liberal positions should be permitted, provided they do not seek to suppress alternative views. As far as possible, the state's response should be to promote discussion and dialogue, seeking what John Rawls calls 'overlapping consensus' except in clearly extreme cases, including those involving the coercion of vulnerable individuals by others or causing harm to others. At the level of social and political interaction within a society, basic human rights—as expressed in the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rather than in any national appropriation of democratic values—provide a set of provisional moral principles, derived from reflecting on the idea of democracy itself, relevant to dialogue between those with different religious or cultural perspectives.

13. Conclusion

Given the increasing need for close political attention to anti-extremism, it is important, from an educational point of view, to remember that 'social instrumental' aims provide only one set of reasons for studying religions and beliefs in schools, and that anti-extremism is but one of the range of social arguments for such study. As noted earlier, there is also a strong case for including religions and beliefs as an intrinsic element of liberal education, and for regarding education about religions and beliefs as also highly relevant to students' personal development. For example, a political focus on questions of extremism should not stultify study of and reflection on the spiritual dimension of religions as one means to understanding and appreciating the life views of religious people (see, for example, Gent, 2005, 2013). Equally, policies which inhibit the kind of moderated classroom dialogue, favoured by so many young people who participated in the European Commission REDCo project, and supported enequivocally by the Council of Europe 2008 Recommendation, should be held up to close critical scrutiny.

Finally, it is worth reporting a number of recurring views which have been expressed in discussions of *Signposts* with teachers, teacher education students, teacher trainers, academics and policymakers in various European countries, and which reflect their knowledge and experience:

- The provision of accurate, nuanced knowledge about the religions is a necessary condition for religious literacy; thus, university courses in religious studies that provide this, together with

skills for extending knowledge and understanding of religions, and for interreligious and intercultural dialogue, are important for the preparation of specialist teachers;
- Findings of relevant empirical research concerned with teaching about religions and non-religious convictions need to be translated into information that is available to and usable by teachers, policymakers and other professionals;
- Accounts of religious belief and non-belief need to reflect the diversity of personal world views 'on the ground', in addition to descriptions of 'organised' world views;
- Specialists in this field need to be enabled to support non-specialists and to participate in interdisciplinary approaches;
- Teachers need skills to initiate and facilitate moderated dialogue and exchange between students, based on agreed ground rules, in addition to having access to high quality information;
- Whole-school policies and practices are needed to support and sustain the general approach recommended in *Signposts*;
- Adequate financial resources are needed to implement the approach recommended in *Signposts*.

It is hoped that member states of the Council of Europe, in collaboration with the Council of Europe and with the European Wergeland Centre, will support discussion and courses based on *Signposts*, and will facilitate school-based research related to the main themes covered in the book.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The Fog of Extremism: Governance, Identity, and Minstrels of Exclusion

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Abstract
An insistent focus on extremism and radicalization with regard to current Islamist trends masks the failures of pluralist citizenship, amid a larger crisis of identity. Whether in Muslim-majority societies or in the Euro-North American diaspora, "Islam" and "politics" are touted as explaining patterns of severe violence by state/non-state actors. Neither category accounts more than superficially for the complexities at hand, which revolve around exclusionary models of identity, faith and civil society. Successful narratives of inclusive citizenship depend on key markers outside of modernist secular orthodoxy. Theologies of inclusion are vital in fostering pluralist civic identities, mindful of the ascendance of puritanical-legalist theologies of exclusion as a salient facet of public cultures. Multiple surveys reveal the depth of exclusivist conservatism in diverse Muslim societies. These stances not only undermine civil society as a locus for engendering pluralist identities, but also undergird the militant trends that dominate the headlines. Targeting militants is often essential—yet is frequently accompanied by the willful alienation of Muslim citizens even within liberal democracies, and a growing "official" sectarianism among Muslim-majority polities. Convergent pluralisms of faith and civic identity are a vital antidote to the fog that obscures the roots as well as the implications of today's extremist trends.

Keywords
citizenship; civil society; exclusion; human rights; Islam; minorities; pluralism; radicalization; secularism; sectarianism; sharia; theology

Issue
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> The Balkan minstrels continued to tell their tales, now interrupting each other. In their desire to be accepted they had forgotten the insults, and humbly, almost awkwardly, begged: *We want to be like you. We think like you. Don't drive us away.* The old lady sensed that there was something missing from their tales.
> 'Could you sing the things you have been telling us?' she asked.
> They were shaken as if they had been dealt a blow. Then, tearing themselves out of their stupor, one after the other, each in his own language, and finally in Latin, said 'No.' *Non.*
> 'Why not?' she asked kindly.
> '*Non, domina magna*, we cannot under any circumstances. We are minstrels of war.'
>
> They could not break out of the mold. Besides which, they would first have to consult their elders. Consult the dead…*Non*.
> Ismail Kadare, *Elegy for Kosovo*, 1998

1. Introduction

For well over a decade—in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and most notably the US-led "war on terror"—responses to Islamist trends have been marked by an avowed focus on "extremism." A rising concomitant is the targeting of "radicalization" through legislation and social policy. Indeed, the latter is deemed a longer term and more subtle facet of the strategic response to Islamism, and to militant groups in particular. "We are engaged in a struggle that is

fought on many fronts and in many forms," explains the United Kingdom home secretary, Theresa May, about a counter-terror law that includes banning "extremist" speakers from universities. "The threat we face right now is perhaps greater than it ever has been. We must have the powers we need to defend ourselves" (UK Government, 2014). This was echoed in France's response to the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, where the language of "war" against a foreign "army" (Daesh/Islamic State) was coupled with an extended state of emergency allowing for special police powers, and constitutional changes relating to citizenship.[1] An embattled "we" is engaged in nothing more, or less, than self-defense against the depredations of radicals—the very sentiments that drove the expansive post-September 11 vision of mortal combat against global terror, and the war in Iraq.

What is new about this ominous threat that will engage us indefinitely? Terms such as "cosmic" and "irrational" are commonly associated with the professed religiosity of the extremists and radicals that threaten our wellbeing (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Neumayer & Plumper, 2009; Wilson, 2012). Whether in Muslim-majority societies or in the Euro-American diaspora, "Islam" or "politics" is touted as an explanatory category for patterns of severe violence by non-state actors. For some—scholars, politicians, journalists—it is not merely religion but Islam in particular that accounts for a *sui generis* propensity to violence. Orientalist tropes abound here, blithely oblivious or in spite of the trenchant critiques of that tradition offered up by Edward Said and others. For others, the explanations are about politics: in a secular age that demands sensitivity to scapegoating and persecution, Islam and Muslims are foils for struggles that are about perceptions of justice and the failure of democratic avenues of expression. To the extent that religion is a significant factor in radicalism and militancy, it is confined to extremist quarters that can be contained if not eradicated.

This article argues that neither category provides a tenable explanation, for all the historical and scientific rhetoric that is proffered in the guise of erudite critique. A binary view fails to account for a larger identity crisis that provides the setting for current Islamist trends, militant and otherwise. In a context where church and state find themselves in a complex relationship that does not fit the more familiar models—American, French, Saudi Arabian—religion no longer occupies the tidy institutional place that modernity assigned it in our individual and collective trajectories. Narratives of citizenship ignore this shift at their peril, if wedded to secularist claims about civic identities. Progressive theologies can play a vital role through inclusive discourse and action. As David Santillana observed nearly a century ago in this regard, "every question of law is also a matter of conscience, and jurisprudence is based on theology in the final analysis" (1926, p. 5). Today, puritanical-legalist stances on the shari'a are a prime basis for exclusive and repressive orthodoxies: multiple surveys reveal the depth of conservatism on matters of faith and civic culture among ordinary Muslims. These stances nurture the extremism that dominates the headlines, and undermine civil society as the locus of pluralist identities. Military and policy responses to actors such as al-Qaeda, Daesh ("Islamic State"), Boko Haram and al-Shabab are necessary. Yet strategic alliances are rife with and among governments that actively promote or shield anti-pluralist actors. And a deeper malaise of pluralist citizenship within the western diaspora is obscured in the war on extremism.

Without an ethos that takes seriously not only public religion but minority traditions in particular, secular frameworks of inclusion fall seriously short on effective citizenship. Our primary focus here is on the nexus of Islamist extremism and the larger malaise of identity in a globalized, secular modernity. Insecure identities seek shelter in a social and intellectual conservatism that may be religious and sectarian, but also secular, as in the case of nationalism. Examples of such trends in non-Muslim contexts are offered, though an elaborate survey is quite beyond the scope of this paper. I will first set forth the dichotomous claims about framing the militancy of actors that are deemed extremist in terms of "Islam" and "politics" as exclusive categories, before venturing into the underlying tensions of identity that find expression in religious conservatism and radicalization. Finally, I will address the ensuing challenges of pluralist citizenship that require an ethos of secular *and* religious inclusion—where material incentives are a necessary but insufficient condition.

An elucidation here on terminology. "Islamism" is an unsatisfactory descriptor of Muslim political action: it signals attachment to a faith tradition regardless of whether this actually has any merit. We do not standardly use such loose tags for political Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or Christianity. Nevertheless, "Islamism" has become a term of art in academic and media commentary (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). I use it in the sense of a drive to foster "an ideological community," one that strives for *state governance* through official "moral codes in Muslim societies and communities" (Bayat, 2013, p. 4). Such drives may be expressed in national and transnational movements—from al-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, al-Shabab and the Taliban, to al-Qaeda and Daesh.[2] Islamists are distinguished

[1] Schofield (2015). The political and ethical perils of the "war metaphor" were promptly raised by *The Economist*—Prospero (2015).

[2] The term "Daesh" is used throughout this paper, as the appropriate acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) (Grayling, 2016). This is also

from non-political actors that advocate for spiritual or social welfare goals, and also "active pietist" groups that aspire to shape civil-political identities. The term *jihadi*, which tends to invoke a religiously-inspired struggle against "wordly" targets, including Muslim ones perceived as slack in their commitment to Islam, is highly diffuse; active pietists and civic movements may profess *jihad* as much as do militants (Abu-Rabi, 2010; Stephan, 2009). Many Islamists do not espouse militancy at all; some prefer the electoral route where available, as with prominent Egyptian and Tunisian and political actors in the "Arab Spring." Here, "militancy" and "extremism" refer to Islamist choices on this score, the acceptance of which is about "radicalization." The choices may be strategic or theological, informed or otherwise; it is our task to seek to understand why these choices are acted upon.

2. Framing Extremist Militancy

2.1. "Islam Is the Answer"

For an array of commentators, the self-proclaimed religiosity of actors who resort to violence suffices as the rationale for their choices. "Islam" accounts for a spectrum of motivations and realities that are summed up under the rubrics of extremism and radicalization, which characterize militancy ranging from that of major non-state groups to freelance terrorists. At its simplest, this equates the most aggressive forms of political Islam, or "Islamism," with Islam as a faith tradition. Typical are the post-September 11 writings of Bruce Bawer (2006, 2009), Gisele Littman (2005), Mark Steyn (2006), and Robert Spencer (2008, 2009). Populist in language, style and reach (many have been bestsellers), they perceive an "Islamified Europe" as the ultimate outcome of the mere existence of Muslim migrants—because "Islam itself is a political project," to quote Steyn. Muslim values, then, are not only incompatible with those of a Judeo-Christian West, but are ultimately ideological more than anything else. Indeed, the entirety of Muslim history and civilization are reduced—especially in the work of Spencer—to a linear narrative of animus against non-Muslims.

These populist writings, for all their tenuousness, have the benefit of an enabling analytical landscape. A key node is the "clash of civilizations" posited by Samuel Huntington (1996): an account of "Islamic culture" as a singular entity in perpetual conflict with western values, a teleology which Muslims fit into no matter where they are located. "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism," according to Huntington, but rather "Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power" (1996, pp. 217-218). Although a plethora of critiques have undercut virtually all the serious claims in this account,[3] it remains influential after the events of September 11. Populist discourse draws on its sweeping assumptions and projections, stoking public fears about migration, Muslim minorities and national security (Abrahamian, 2003; M. Dunn, 2006; Wright, 2015). Then there is the work of scholars such as Daniel Pipes (2002a), Niall Ferguson (2004, 2006, 2011), and Bernard Lewis (1990, 2002, 2003), who have weighed in with insights on the histories of the Middle East/Islam, and the implications for western societies. Many of these insights are essentialist in casting Muslims and Islam as a unitary vector separate from and threatening to the stability and wellbeing of western societies.

Even for an eminent historian of the Middle East such as Lewis, "Islam" serves as a discrete category that ultimately trumps the diverse politics, economics and cultures of Muslim societies past and present. His tone is more temperate than Huntington's. Yet the same teleology is voiced, wherein western societies find themselves in the path of a "Muslim rage" that drives contemporary conflicts. Thus: "Islam, like other religions, has also known periods when it inspired in some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence. It is our misfortune that part, though by no means all or even most, of the Muslim world is now going through such a period, and that much, though again not all, of that hatred is directed against us" (Lewis, 1990). But he can be cavalier, as in his oft-cited 2004 proclamation to a German newspaper that "Europe will have a Muslim majority by the end of the twenty-first century at the very latest…Europe will be part of the Arab west—the Maghreb." (Schwanitz, 2004).[4] Demographics in this context is, of course, a charged subject with far-reaching implications for perceptions of identity as well as security. And this is reflected in western academic and populist commentary on extremist militancy and social radicalization.

At the most mundane level of linkage between religious identity and anti-western animus, Pipes pulls no punches: "A vast number of Muslims, those living in the Europe and the Americas no less than elsewhere, harbor an intense hostility to the West. For most Muslims, this mix of envy and resentment remains a latent sentiment, but for some it acquires operational significance" (2002b). Just as forthright is the Harvard scholar Niall Ferguson, no specialist on the Middle East or the Muslim world, but an authority on global history. "The greatest of all strengths of radical Islam…is that it has demography on its side. The western culture against

the term used by the UN with regard to Syria, as in Resolution 2254 (2015, December, 18), adopted by the UN Security Council.

[3] Edward Said (2001) labelled it as being about "a clash of ignorance" in which "the West" and "Islam" are analytically poor banners.

[4] A claim challenged by *The Economist* (2006).

which it has declared holy war cannot possibly match the capacity of traditional Muslim societies when it comes to reproduction" (2006). Apart from the intriguing claim that demography is a greater weapon than ideas or anything else in the extremist arsenal, it is worth noting the leap in reasoning from "radical Islam" to "traditional Muslim societies." Furthermore: "A youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe…A creeping Islamicization of a decadent Christendom is one conceivable result: while the old Europeans get even older and their religious faith weaker, the Muslim colonies within their cities get larger and more overt in their religious observance" (Ferguson, 2004).

Bruce Bawer is almost regretful about the inexorable nature of this linkage, and the defensive impulse of its victims. "Many European Muslims," he asserts in his acclaimed *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying Europe From Within*, "may themselves be moderates, yet may have a concept of religious identity that makes it difficult for them to side with infidels against even the most violent of their fellow Muslims" (2006, p. 229). Evidence of this may heavily be to the contrary, judging by the volume of diasporic Muslim denunciation of acts of terrorism by fellow Muslims,[5] and the data on migrant integration and marginalization (Saunders, 2012). Yet if one accepts the premise that religious identity for Muslims is an undifferentiated whole—leaving scant room for distinction between a member of Daesh or al-Qaeda and a Muslim member of Amnesty International or Médecins Sans Frontières—then the apprehensions of Bawer, Lewis, Ferguson, and Pipes are warranted. Indeed, the premise was explicitly invoked by Anders Breivik, the Norwegian whose manifesto justifying his 2011 acts of mass terror repeatedly cited the writings of Bawer, among other influences (Breivik, 2011; see more generally Townsend & Traynor, 2011).

Those sentiments frequently lament the erosion of Europe's Christian identity, as a bastion against Islam and Muslims. How ironic, then, that the wider modernist discourse, even in much of the Muslim world, is about *secularism* as serving as a bastion against religion at large. At its most assertive, this latter view strips secularism down to the absence of public and private religion—a state of affairs which is deemed rational and friendlier to nonviolence. For the cluster of "new atheists," such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the trends in post-September 11 extremism have much to do with religious belief (Kettell, 2013; Jacoby & Yavuz, 2008). The intellectual integrity of this stance has been trenchantly challenged in assorted quarters, along with it ideological direction (Atran, 2010; Hedges, 2008; Ruse, 2010; Taylor, 2013). Suffice it to say that the new atheism plays into the politics of both the "clash of civilizations" *and* the demographic thesis, feeding public phobias about an invasive irrationality tied to Islam and Muslims. "We are at war with Islam," proclaims Sam Harris, "with precisely the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran, and further elaborated in the literature of the hadith, which recounts the sayings and teachings of the Prophet" (2004, p. 110). A stronger reiteration of Huntington would be hard to find.

2.2. "Politics Is the Answer"

Secular globalization, argues the French sociologist Olivier Roy in *Holy Ignorance*, has snapped the premodern link between religion and culture. Religions today tend to regard culture as "profane, secular, or pagan" (2010, p. 28), which stakes a claim to authenticity by asserting a purity that renounces the political. But since politics, like culture, is everywhere, it is subsumed within faith traditions—thus sacralizing the world. For Roy, this is the ultimate counterpoint to modernity's secularization of the world, wherein everything that was once sacred is now subject to the appraisal of the economic, social and scientific. In the confrontation of faith and material culture, "holy ignorance" is rife: each side reimagines the other in its own image, a process that "is not contradicted by external social practice" (2010, p. 217). Roy's rich data is not merely about faith traditions resisting external social realities, but equally about the secular "formatting" of religious practices in public policy and corporate culture, with scant regard to the actual complexities of those practices.

The flipside of claiming that Islam explains extremist militancy and radicalism, then, is that hard political realities do so. A major strand of analysis aims to counter the secularist essentialism that frames religion, and Islam in particular. The cliché that "Islam is way of life" ends up signifying that everything is somehow about theology. Orientalism's long history of doing this is a matter of record, and the legacy remains with us (Said, 1997, 1994). Sami Zubaida's *Beyond Islam* offers a detailed account of Middle East modernity that strives to locate religion within economic and social contexts, pointedly rejecting the very idea of "Islamic society" so beloved of Orientalist narratives (2011). Instead, it is the "materiality of religion" in everyday life—expressed in "the shaping of political actors, alliances

[5] This extends to repeatedly petitioning mainstream newsmedia to cease using the term "Islamic State" in describing the group widely called "Daesh" in the Muslim world—and a graphic social media campaign launched in 2014 against the group under the banner #NotInMyName. See more generally Charles Kurzman's web-page, Islamic statements against terrorism. Retrieved from http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-statements-against-terrorism

and conflicts"—that Zubaida holds up for appraisal, notably in premodern Ottoman and present day Egyptian, Iranian and Turkish societies (p. 78). The tangibility of this approach to understanding religion, along with its humanizing quality, stand in stark contrast to the exoticization and othering of Orientalist accounts. Further, the ciphers of oppositional "western" and "Islamic" societal values are exposed, with substantial sociological data about their shared and overlapping realities, past and present.

At the same time, such approaches can secularize faith-centred impulses and actions. What Said called the "political actualities" entailed by the trends that proclaim a "return to Islam," tend here to overwhelm and obscure the theological drives that are real features of the landscape (1997). This is not necessarily the intent—which, typically, is to offer a sober counter-narrative to essentialist accounts. Thus in Doug Saunders' *The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West*, the reader is offered an impressive corpus of statistical and historical data that map the social pathways of migrants in Europe and North America, including Catholics and Jews (2012). The debunking of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim claims is cogent and, in the present climate, laudable. Still, Saunders echoes the view that secularizing trends among Muslim migrants should reassure us—along with the growing "privatization of religion" in Muslim societies such as Egypt, Iran and Turkey. Social inclusion and social peace rest on the conformity of Muslims to a version of modernity that is familiarly secular.

Again, in response to the puritanical tendency to separate religion from public culture noted by Roy, there are official attempts at doing the reverse. Cultural categories, after all, are more amenable to secular analysis and management in public policy/lawmaking—the "formatting" of religion (2010, pp. 187-191). This is accentuated in settings where official secularism is hard-wired into the constitution, as in France and Belgium; but Roy's evidence extends far beyond. In the US, where religion is well integrated into political culture, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, where official orthodoxies prevail, minority practices must fit into the approved administrative formats. The growing diversification among religions worldwide, institutional and otherwise, intensifies the challenge of "managing" them via existing formats (Bouma, 2008; Juergensmeyer, Griego & Soboslai, 2015). Moreover, new security regimes worldwide since the events of September 11, 2001, and the Edward Snowden revelations of 2013, have ushered in pervasive intrusions into group and individual domains (Lyon, 2015)—underscoring the need to format and control a range of "religious" behaviors, from piety and worship to socio-political activity. In a reminder of how surveillance schemes can violate the basic civil rights of religious groups, the US Court of Appeals rebuked New York City police for the arbitrary "classification" of Muslims along lines reminiscent of official abuses against African-Americans, Jews, and Japanese-Americans (Hassan vs. The City of New York, 2015).

For Will Kymlicka, a leading scholar of citizenship in diverse societies where Muslims live in diaspora communities, the emphasis has been on "cultural inclusion" as the gateway (2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000); this is rationalized in terms of democratic and social justice, and the imperatives of civic education. Minority rights are likewise framed in terms of the complexities of ethnic politics and effective legal-political accommodation (Pföstl & Kymlicka, 2015). Tariq Modood draws attention to the limits of such multicultural frameworks when it comes to religious minorities, calling for more effective forms of secularism to accommodate such citizens (2000). Being secular does not ipso facto mean being "value neutral;" secularism itself embodies a variety of value-postures on civic life (Berger, 1999; Bhargava, 1998; Martin, 2005). Recent literature has gradually taken this on board, as in Joshua Castellino and Kathleen Cavanaugh's seminal *Minority Rights in the Middle East* (2013), which is attentive to the dynamics of religious and socio-cultural identities in pursuit of equitable citizenship. It falls short, though, in engaging with the growing role of the shari'a with regard to the region's minorities, beyond normative statements (Sajoo, 2014). An incisive study of the Coptic minority in Egypt by Paola Pizzo explores the vital role of institutional faith actors on all sides in seeking both social and political inclusion—and importantly, links this to civil society (2015). There is a hint here of the evolving theologies of civic membership, though this remains unexplored.

The upshot is a thrust to frame the issues in political terms, at the expense of attention to theological components. Despite much criticism, the analytical vocabulary of human rights, minority claims, and social justice remains dominantly secular and secularizing. In significant part, this reflects frail public support even in liberal democratic societies for the accommodation of some religious expressions in the civic domain, especially when "multicultural tolerance" involves Muslims post-September 11 (Benton & Nielsen, 2013; Wright, Johnston, Citrin, & Soroka, 2016). Examples range from veiling to municipal zoning for mosques; a conspicuous display of civic resistance was the 2009 Swiss ban on minarets, after the results of a referendum that strongly overrode the official accommodationist stance (Cumming-Bruce, 2009). These public encounters with religion bring "sacred" laws and norms under the scrutiny of the political domain and can impart a strong sense of desacralization, if not secularization. Evidently, it is not only Islamists and their counterparts in other traditions who politicize their faith. Indeed, religious actors "struggle to come to terms with the very social

landscape that the secular state was meant to address, namely the vast variation of identities housed within the borders of the nation" (Juergensmeyer et al., 2015, p. 32).

3. Extremism, Faith and Identity

3.1. Modernity's Orphans

Shortly after the arrest of Anders Breivik for the cold-blooded slaughter of civilians on the Norwegian island of Utøya on July 22, 2011, there was consternation among the police over his main preoccupation. Amid fresh corpses and pools of blood, Breivik demanded attention for a tiny cut on his finger, from a splintered piece of a victim's skull. "Look, I'm hurt. This will have to be bandaged up...I can't afford to lose too much blood," he complained. Later in prison, Breivik bitterly grieved the failure to upgrade his game console from Playstation2 to Playstation3, and also the grip on his institutional rubber pen. He strutted like a bodybuilder for a prison photo. On the basis of psychiatric reviews, the court ruled that Breivik was not psychotic. Recounting at length the narcissism, lack of empathy, isolated childhood, and the screed (noted above) that voiced a hate-filled politics, Karl Knausgaard argues that these cannot fully explain why Breivik committed what has been called "the worst attack on Norwegian soil since the Second World War":

> "Breivik's deed, single-handedly killing seventy-seven people, most of them one by one, many of them eye to eye, did not take place in a wartime society, where all norms and rules were lifted and all institutions dissolved; it occurred in a small, harmonious, well-functioning, and prosperous land during peacetime. All norms and rules were annulled in *him*, a war culture had arisen in *him*, and he was completely indifferent to human life, and absolutely ruthless. That is where we should direct our attention, to the collapse within the human being which these actions represent, and which makes them possible." (Knausgaard, 2015)[6]

For all the flaunting of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim bigotry, Breivik's bizarre acts leading up to, during and after the massacre amount, for Knausgaard, to "role-playing, rather than political terrorism." One may quarrel with his conclusion, which seems to assume that such role-playing is necessarily distinct from terrorism; terrorists are often intent on posturing larger-than-life roles. Yet it is surely true that the erosion of basic human constraints against acts of mass murder in peacetime and prosperity is no ordinary thing, and suggests acute alienation. Knausgaard contrasts the internal collapse of constraints and instincts with their external/societal demise in situations like Iraq and Syria, and earlier in the Balkans and Rwanda. But the extraordinary brutality of Daesh, al-Qaeda, and the like is also perpetrated by recruits (and "supporters") from places of relative peace and prosperity across the world.[7] In other words, by individuals who have much in common with Breivik. Daesh's behavior, Knausgaard observes, "cannot be ascribed to people having suddenly become evil but, rather, to the disintegration of the mechanisms that in a civilized society typically prevent people from engaging in rape and murder." This social disintegration, then, runs with the internal collapse of individual constraints and instincts.

Modernity's alienating structural effects on individual identity—*anomie*—were evident over a century ago to Emile Durkheim, and are a core concern in the social sciences (Orru, 1987). The effects are heightened by secular globalization as a vital feature of the contemporary landscape. As noted, public culture is in tension with religion not only among communities of faith, but also in the policy frameworks of modern states that "format" religious practices and institutions. It is no surprise that the ensuing challenges to identity can provoke strong responses. The "politics of resentment" finds global expression along diverse avenues (Mazar, 2014), from fierce protests over dignity and national pride to violent insurgencies on behalf of imagined precolonial identities. Narratives of humiliation, grievance and fear are a staple not only of extremist groups, but also of nationalisms and "democratic" demagogues. Receptivity to them rests on political and social alienations. For the anthropologist Scott Atran, who has interviewed youths drawn to violence on six continents—including most recently in Iraq—the alienations feed a "dynamic countercultural movement":

> "Violent extremism represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures, but their collapse, as young people unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search of a social identity that gives personal significance and glory. This is the dark side of globalization. They radicalize to find a firm identity in a flattened world where vertical lines of communication between the generations are replaced by horizontal peer-to-peer attachments that can span the globe." (Atran, 2015)

Social bonds and sacred values are key attractions in countering modernist alienations (Atran, 2010; Atran, Hammad, & Gomez, 2014). Groups like Daesh and al-Qaeda offer both: the intimacy of family-like group af-

[6] Knausgaard's account draws heavily on the comprehensive narrative in Sierstad (2013).

[7] The cumulative number of foreign recruits to Daesh is estimated to have doubled in the year since mid-2014, at 27,000–31,000 from 86 countries (*The Economist*, 2015).

filiation, and a view of the shari'a as sacred (2014). Beyond providing comfort and empowerment, sacred values confer legitimacy to narratives of grievance *and* of heroic response against long odds. Secular causes such as nationalism and ethno-cultural pride may similarly offer legitimating narratives, along with kinship-like support. But religious affiliations have the advantage of being inherently transnational, which allows for a greater repertoire of symbolic and social capital—with access to the digital tools of a globalized public sphere (Bunt, 2009; Eickelman & Anderson, 2003). Social media is not incidental to religious movements, but often a core aspect of their profiles and global reach; the gap between cyber and real communities offering social bonds and sacred values is rapidly shrinking (Bunt, 2009, pp. 291-292). Modernity's orphans are seldom averse to using its technological assets to the full.

Yet modernity's orphans are not confined to the margins of extremism or to "fundamentalist" religiosity. Anomie is a wider "malaise" (Taylor, 1991, 2007), and the responses to its secular forms are manifold. Multiple studies on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade have found remarkably little to distinguish the demographic markers of "violent extremists" from the rest of the population (Atran, 2015; Patel, 2011; Travis, 2008). They are usually not well-schooled in religion; many are outright irreligious. Conventional family ties are common, and evidence of pathologies is no greater than for the mainstream. Although many come from lower economic strata—in western and Muslim-majority countries—there is also marked representation from the middle classes. In this vein, while most Muslims in the western diaspora feel that they belong to their countries of residence, local populations, notably in Germany and Spain, mostly believe the contrary (Benton & Nielsen, 2013; Saunders, 2012). Pew surveys of US Muslims over several years consistently find negligible levels of sympathy, much less support, for extremism, and far higher levels of satisfaction with American life than is found in the general public (Pew Research Centre, 2011). By contrast, only 33% of the US public believed that Muslim Americans wish to be an integral part of the nation. On the eve of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump's call in December 2015 to exclude Muslims from entry into the US, 55% of Americans had an unfavorable view of Islam, and sentiments toward Muslims were the "coldest" of any religious community (Chalabi, 2015). Trump's proposal was supported by a majority of Republicans (43%) and 25% of all Americans, according to an NBC-Wall Street Journal poll (Bradner, 2015).

Isolating violent extremists from ordinary Muslims or mainstream society, it turns out, is harder for various publics, demagogues, and social scientists than identifying the sources and symptoms of modernist angst. It is harder still in the diverse societies of the "Muslim world"—from South-Central Asia and West Africa to the Middle East and North Africa—where fresh syntheses of Islam and modernity are in the making (Sajoo, 2008). Radicalization and violent extremism are real phenomena; yet they cast a fog over the complexity of modern social imaginaries, and hence to the nature of responses to those phenomena by states and civil societies.

3.2. Pluralism Revisited

In the aftermath of the 2010–11 uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen that came to be described as "the Arab Spring," a study on youths aged 17 to 31 in 2013 yielded telling results (Al-Anani, 2015; Atassi, 2013). The new governing institutions were uniformly felt to be unrepresentative, and most had no party affiliation. Large majorities considered themselves as Muslims first, ahead of national citizenship; the exception was Egypt, where 35% did so. Majorities in all four countries—from 91% in Libya to 57% in Egypt—favored implementing the Shari'a as national law. In Tunisia, widely regarded as the success story of the Arab Spring, only 14% felt that the revolution which toppled the authoritarian government of Zine El Dine Ben Ali was a success. Constitutional reforms have since garnered much public support, and a civil society coalition won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize (Chan, 2015). Yet Tunisia is among the highest sources of recruits per capita to Daesh and al-Qaeda, ahead of Saudi Arabia and exceeded only by Jordan (Sengupta, 2014).

The survey results are consistent with recent trends regarding citizenship, identity and religiosity across Muslim-majority societies. In tandem with fragile rule of law and democratic governance, citizenship tends to entwine with religious identity across the Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Enacting the shari'a as the law of the land is favored by over 70% of the population in states ranging from Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria and Pakistan to Indonesia, Morocco, Malaysia and the Palestinian Territories; the only regions where firm majorities oppose this are Central Asia and Southeastern Europe (Pew Research Centre, 2015). In sub-Saharan states where Muslims are a relatively small minority, the shari'a is still desired by more than half of Muslims (52%–74%) as national law. Religion is felt to be a precondition for individual moral standing by a majority of Muslims in all regions (Pew Research Centre, 2013). For large majorities the shari'a is the divine word, undistinguished from the corpus of legal rules or *fiqh* (An-Na'im, 2008; Moustafa, 2013; Pew Research Centre, 2013). It is also understood as subject to a single interpretation by the majority, especially in South Asia and the Middle East (Pew Research Centre, 2013); strong majorities in the Muslim world also hold to a singular understanding of Islam (Pew Research Centre, 2012).[8]

[8] Morocco and Tunisia stand out as exceptions to both claims:

Perhaps not surprisingly, the very acceptance of Muslim minorities is narrow. A majority of Egyptians, Indonesians and Jordanians, who are Sunni, do not recognize the Shi'a, whose origins are anchored in the earliest years of Islamic history, as fellow Muslims (Pew Research Centre, 2012). The Ahmadiyya minority, whose orientation is Sunni, enjoys even less acceptance. Sufi communities, most of which are also Sunni in orientation and whose esotericism has long been regarded as a core facet of Islam, are today recognized as Muslim by about half of Egyptians, Tunisians and Iraqis (Pew Research Centre, 2012). Post-September 11 initiatives to broaden the theological fold, such as the Amman Declaration by leading Sunni and Shi'a institutional figures who affirmed an inclusive and tolerant Islam (International Islamic Conference, 2005), have since run into hardline sectarian polemic at the highest levels (Fahim, 2015). Given the level of sectarianism not only in civil conflicts in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, but more broadly in tensions across the Muslim world, the theological backdrop—how the shari'a is perceived, and how individual/communal identities are tied to particularistic interpretations of Islam—can hardly be dismissed as merely captive to politics.

Theology stirred with politics has long been a staple of al-Qaeda, despite the hollow claims to juristic competence by Osama bin Laden (Lawrence, 2005). If the leaders of Boko Haram, Daesh, al-Shabab and the Taliban are even less versed on the finer points of theology, this has not stood in the way of their claims to authenticity and orthodoxy (Burke, 2015; McCants, 2015; Nordland, 2015). Even Arabic poetic traditions are marshalled in the service of these claims (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). And Daesh has invoked ritual, scripture and tradition, embodied in a manual, to rationalize the sexual enslavement of female children (Callimachi, 2015). This is endemic to the misogynistic attitudes that find their way into interpretations of gender in theology, far beyond the confines of "extremism" (Mir-Hosseini, Al-Sharmani, & Rumminger, 2015).

The conservative trends in the politics of identity that have provided such fertile ground for extremist theologies of exclusion are not confined to Muslim societies. Pew's "Social Hostilities Index," a complex measure of religiously-inspired acts of abuse/aggression by individuals and groups, has spiked—with intense majoritarian attacks against vulnerable minorities (often Muslims) in India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and China, as well as in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Indonesia (Pew Research Centre, 2014). For the celebrated Indian writer Arundhati Roy, "intolerance" is an utterly inadequate term to describe the "terror" that minorities such as Christians, Dalits, and Muslims now experience in her country (Roy, 2015). Much the same can be said of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, where Buddhist "extremism reflected in the laws suggests a future of even greater violence" (Mathieson, 2015; Physicians for Human Rights, 2013). Of late, researchers in the US describe thus the vulnerability of Muslims there:

> "It is not just that hatred against Muslims is extremely high today. It's that it's exceptional compared with prejudice against every other group in the United States. We examined prejudicial searches against black people, white people, gay people, Asians, Jews, Mexicans and Christians. We estimate that negative attitudes against Muslims today are higher than prejudice against any group in any month since 2004, when Google began preserving detailed data on search volumes." (Soltas & Stephens-Davidowitz, 2015)[9]

Hostility toward individuals and groups on the basis of their perceived faith affiliation inevitably privileges one kind of identity—religious—over others. Likewise, the stated theological agendas of extremist organizations, no matter how shallow or manipulative, make exclusive claims on the religious identities of their recruits and victims alike. Where does this leave the multiple identities that are central to pluralist civil society, and to countering violent extremism (Sen, 2006; Maalouf, 2001)? Modernist discourse has hitherto insisted on a "secularist" basis for the former. But secularist orthodoxy collides with hard realities about the place of religion in individual and group identities. Casting civic culture and citizenship as "bulwarks against religion" does not empower secular reason so much as narrow the reach of social inclusion in diverse public spaces (Taylor, 2011, p. 56; Stepan, 2011; Nandy, 1998). A nuanced appreciation of what is "secular," beyond the reflexive antagonism toward religion that is too often found in secular orthodoxy, brings us closer to the kind of pluralist citizenship that is professed in liberal ideology (Stepan, 2011).

A wariness of theologies of exclusion, religious or secular, is entirely proper in defending pluralist civic cultures. Far from being confined to the extremist/radicalized margins, exclusionary theologies are pervasive and fuel for recruitment to the former. A conspicuous example: "mainstream" Wahhabi interpretations of the shari'a as spearheaded by Saudi Arabia's clerical and political establishments are foundational for the theologies of groups such as Daesh and al-Qaeda (Armstrong, 2014; Daoud, 2015; Matthiessen, 2015; McCants, 2015).[10] That Saudi Arabia is a key

firm majorities subscribe to multiple interpretations, though in both countries majorities insist that the shari'a is divine.

[9] This is accompanied by a spike in actual hate crimes (Lichtblau, 2015). Similar trends prevail not only in Europe, but also in Australia (K. Dunn, 2015).

[10] Amid the competitive animosity between Riyadh and those

western economic and political ally has obvious implications: a mutual interest prevails in isolating extremism/radicalization as the "real" foe (Black, 2015). In neighboring Bahrain, the "extremist" tag serves not only to fuel sectarian repression of the Shi'a majority, but to undermine democratic accountability, with Saudi Arabia playing a leading role; as noted by Human Rights Watch (HRW), among others, this is abetted by Britain and the United States (Americans for Human Rights & Democracy in Bahrain, 2015; HRW, 2015; Ramesh, 2016). The extremist tag has also been exploited in Central Asia, where perceived Wahhabi tendencies have led to authoritarian crackdowns on *any* overt religiosity—as in Tajikistan, where even beards and dark clothing are suspect (Paraszczuk, 2015; Sarkorova, 2016). In an echo of the Soviet era, citizenship is construed strictly along lines of exclusive *secular* orthodoxy. Nor is there a dearth of such baggage today within western mainstreams, with the ascendance of the far-right and the banality of hate speech, in which religious identities are engaged willy-nilly.

Pluralisms that draw on theologies of inclusion, beyond mere accommodation or tolerance, offer the prospect of bridging modernist divides toward a richer civic identity. Scholars such as Diana Eck, Ashis Nandy and Charles Taylor have wrestled with Hindu and Judeo-Christian makings of fresh cosmopolitanisms—alongside Abdullahi An-Na'im, Tariq Ramadan and Omid Safi on the Muslim side—in fragmented public domains (Aga Khan, 2015a, 2015b; Karim, 2012; Marshall, 2013; Poor, 2015, pp. 152-158). To the questions "who is a Muslim" and "what is Islam," we have responses that engage fully with civic domains as well as with theology (Ahmed, 2015; An-Na'im, 2008). A fresh initiative in this regard is the Marrakesh Declaration (on Religious Minorities in Muslim-majority Countries), adopted in January 2016 by over 300 religious and political leaders from across the Muslim world (Marrakesh Conference on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Countries, 2016). In its focus on minority rights and citizenship, the Declaration calls for a vigorous Islamic jurisprudence, alongside a review of educational curricula—while invoking the inclusive spirit of the Charter of Medina drawn up by the Prophet Muhammad as a *civic* expression of religiosity.

Rather than transcend difference with universalist rhetoric and secular "reason," or merely enable differences to co-exist, the aspiration here is to mobilize religious affiliation as a contributor to civic ethics. The Rawlsian "overlapping consensus" is thickened, so that faith affinities cease being treated as outliers that must be privatized (Aga Khan, 2006; Taylor, 2011). Controversies over the wearing of Muslim head/face coverings in public spaces (courts, citizenship ceremonies, public schools, et al.) point to the dominance of a thin description of inclusion, despite its exclusionary impact. Likewise, sectarian trends are a reminder of the rigidities of identity among faith traditions: distinctiveness is equated with exclusivity, pluralism with dilution.[11] The queries "Who is Shi'a?" or "Who is Sunni?" or "Who is Protestant?" call for responses that are mindful of the slippage to chauvinism (Sajoo, 2015).

4. Conclusion

Exclusionary theologies that are fed by, and in turn reinforce, the narrowing of religious identities flourish well beyond the periphery, in Muslim *and* non-Muslim domains today. It is not that exclusivism, much less conservatism, simply turns into violent extremism on a "conveyor belt" of displeasure. Rather, the former validates ideologies that enable and incite extremism, including its sectarian expression. Theologies of inclusion matter because they draw on diverse heritages that are a legitimate part of a global landscape where religious identities matter. Faith traditions have long embodied a "rooted worldliness," a transnational sensibility with local commitments, as integral to their ethics. This is inconsistently nourished: religions, like secular cultures, have historic ups and downs in the generosity accorded the Other. Both require cultivation on this score, and convergence.

Yes, deficits in the quality of life, employment, equality, and accountable governance fuel disaffection that extremist violence thrives on. The Arab Spring had much to do with such disaffection, and the appeals to empowerment offered by Islamist actors (Bishara, 2013; Hamid, 2014). But neither material incentives nor military responses can obliterate extremist violence, even if they were to succeed in disposing of Daesh, al-Qaeda, and their like. Still less can they answer the challenge of exclusive identities that undermine civil society, citizenship and gender equity.

"*Non, domina magna*, we cannot under any circumstances." This is the response in diverse tongues of the minstrels of war when asked to sing their shared narratives, in our epigraph from Ismail Kadare's *Elegy for Kosovo*. The mold that holds the minstrels captive is too embedded, and the compulsion for war too robust, to let them partake in the grander narrative which they find so attractive. Kadare's lyrical account of the con-

terror groups, a shared sectarian narrative directed at the Shi'a and Iran continues to serve overlapping interests (Mathieson, 2015).

[11] In a graphic illustration, Wheaton College, a prestigious Christian evangelical institution located near Chicago, suspended a tenured professor who donned a *hijab* in solidarity with Muslims who "worship the same God." Her statement was deemed unacceptable on the basis that the Christian concept of God is uniquely Trinitarian and thence different from the unitarian Allah. After protests against her suspension among students and faculty, a settlement was reached for the professor to leave Wheaton (Hauser, 2016).

flicts in ex-Yugoslavia may be taken as symbolic of the ethno-religious inheritance that plagues the orphans of modernity. Yet this leaves out the role of modernity's own minstrels, notably those wedded to secular ideologies that impel wars on the Other. In Miroslav Volf's striking engagement with the stakes in the Balkan conflicts, the "character of social agents and their mutual engagement" is central to a *theological* exploration (Volf, 1996, 2016). Social inclusion, then, is as much a religious as a secular preoccupation—which calls for a more sophisticated appreciation of what these categories stand for. When the minstrels on each side have woken from what Kadare calls their "stupor," can they afford to say "*non*" to a fresher pluralism? Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and a host of other broken societies await the response.

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Article

"Too Smart to be Religious?" Discreet Seeking Amidst Religious Stigma at an Elite College

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Abstract
To advance understandings of how religion manifests in subtle, nuanced ways in secular institutions, we examine student religiosity and spirituality at an elite liberal arts school marked by a strong intellectual collective identity. Using mixed research methods, we examine how the college's structures and dominant culture influence students' religiosity and spirituality. Despite an institutional commitment to promoting students' self-exploration and inclusion of social "diversity," we found both campus structures and mainstream culture deterred open spiritual and religious exploration and identification. The structure of the college and its dominant secular, intellectual culture reinforced: (1) a widespread stigma against religious and spiritual expression, (2) a lack of dialogue about the sacred, (3) discreetness in exploring and adhering to sacred beliefs and practices, and (4) a large degree of religious and spiritual pluralism. Our findings additionally illustrate that early exposure to the campus culture's critical regard for religion had a long-lasting impact on students' religiosity. A majority of students kept their religious and spiritual expressions hidden and private; only a marginalized minority of students embraced their expressions publically. To increase students' comfort with religious and spiritual exploration, we propose that colleges foster intentional peer dialogues early in the college experience. Furthermore, we recommend that campus communities prioritize religious and spiritual literacy and respect.

Keywords
college; diversity; higher education; lived religion; religiosity; spirituality

Issue
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1. Introduction

Members of elite academic institutions are more likely to express discomfort with religion than people at other schools (Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2012). This is due in part to the historical secularization of higher education and science, and the perception among many at elite secular colleges and universities that science and religion are conflicting perspectives (Evans & Evans, 2008; Reuben, 1996; Smith, 2003). To better understand how people bring their religious lives into secular institutions in nuanced and often hidden ways, and to make "invisible religion" more visible in secular institutions (Cadge & Konieczny, 2014), we examine student religiosity and spirituality at an elite, secular liberal arts campus.[1] College is an important site to examine because, upon arrival at college, students must choose whether to embrace or leave behind religious identities learned from their families (Peek, 2005). College is also

[1] In keeping with Jacobsen and Jacobsen (2012), we characterize an "elite" school as one that is historically selective in its admissions, academically rigorous, and relatively well-known on a national level.

a time when many students become aware of how their religious and spiritual identities are regarded by wider society.

Our study contributes to a growing body of scholarship on college students' religiosity and spirituality (Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2015; Smith & Snell, 2009). We expand upon extant scholarship by interviewing various constituencies on campus, including administrators, faculty, and students to best understand the multiple cultural and structural levels which influence college students' religious and spiritual exploration on a secular campus.

We find that, despite institutional aims to promote tolerance for diversity and inclusion of students with diverse identities, the College's structures and dominant culture stigmatizes and deters religiosity. As sociologists Elizabeth Armstrong and Laura Hamilton discuss in their (2014) book *Paying for the party*, colleges and universities have institutional pathways which shape student experiences. At the liberal arts college we examined, the most common pathway for students to take was a secular one, as reinforced by academic life and the party scene. In and out of the classroom, most students, faculty, and administrators united around a mission of intellectual rigor. In this context, religion was viewed as highly suspect and implicitly contradictory to the mainstream campus culture which valued being a rational intellectual and a critical thinker. Due to the stigmatization of religion and its marginalized place on campus, few students engaged in public religious and spiritual exploration and dialogue. Most students instead hid their religious and spiritual pursuits, and explored them privately in individualistic ways.

2. Student Religiosity at Secular Colleges and Universities

Student religiosity typically declines somewhat in college (Astin et al., 2004). Although students may disaffiliate from formal religious institutions during their college years, they tend to grow spiritually and may adopt spiritual identities (Astin, Astin, & Lindholm, 2011; Lane et al., 2013; Lindholm, 2006). However, there is a great deal of variation in student religiosity and spirituality based on the kind of college or university that students attend (Cherry, DeBerg, & Porterfield, 2001; Freitas, 2010). Students at faith-based colleges are immersed in a more pervasive religious culture, and they tend to engage in spiritual and religious practices more than those at secular institutions (Kuh & Gonyea, 2015). In contrast, many students at secular public universities are disengaged from religion (Freitas, 2010). Other scholarship identifies how liberal arts colleges can be pervaded by a "narrative of religious intolerance" (Lane et al., 2013).

Although much research has been conducted on student religiosity at religious schools (Bouman, DeGraaf, Mulder, & Marion, 2005; Ma, 2010; Richter, 2001), we know less about how students on secular campuses, and in particular at elite colleges and universities, explore religiosity and spirituality. Consequently, in this study we focus on how student religiosity and spirituality manifest at an elite secular liberal arts school, which we expect will have low religious tolerance (Lane et al., 2013; Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2012).

Because studies of student religiosity in higher education fail to examine the complex, multi-level, cultural, and structural contexts that students are embedded in (Maryl & Oeur, 2009), we intentionally explore these factors. First, we examine how various constituencies, ranging from top administrators to students, view religion on campus. Second, we explore the extent to which religiosity is supported by the school and present in popular convening spaces. Lastly, we examine how students become aware of the overarching normative campus orientation toward religion, and the ways in which they consequently explore the sacred.

Based on the few studies that exist (e.g. Lane et al, 2013; Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2012), we expect that a general sense of religious intolerance among the students will affect the degree to which they felt comfortable sharing their religious backgrounds, beliefs, and practices. We also expect students to experience difficulty in reconciling their public, intellectual identities with religious identities (Smith, 2003; Speers, 2008).

3. Data Collection and Research Methods

This project began in a Sociology of Religion course taught by one of the authors. The class raised questions about student religiosity on elite secular campuses which had not been addressed in the extant literature. As a result, the author teaching the course trained the class in interviewing methods and helped them collect twenty-eight interviews with students on a small, elite, liberal arts campus in the fall of 2014. Participants were randomly chosen from a telephone list of the school's population. Interviews took place on campus in person, with the average interview lasting approximately thirty minutes. Participants were asked about their spiritual and religious histories, practices, and about campus culture regarding religion and spirituality.[2]

In the spring of 2015, we continued collecting data on campus religiosity. Interviewees were chosen based on purposive sampling. The authors invited student leaders from nine religious and spiritual organizations on campus to participate in the study. Faculty and administrators were invited based their leadership role in the campus community. Faculty participants were tenured and recommended by various members of the

[2] Descriptive statistics of these students' religious and spiritual profiles are shown in the Appendix.

community. During the second wave of data collection, we conducted nineteen interviews in total; we interviewed nine student religious leaders and eleven members of the faculty and administration. Student leaders were asked the same questions as students in the first wave, as well as questions about their experiences leading student groups. Professors and administrators were asked open-ended questions about how they perceived religious life on campus and their involvement with it.

All interviews were transcribed. Actual names and identifying information were replaced with pseudonyms and other descriptors. We then open-coded for: campus religious culture, student spiritual, religious, and secular identities, stigmas toward religion and spirituality, and respondent sociodemographics.[3] After identifying our initial primary categories, we completed a focused coding of all interviews. This additional coding included categories relating religion and spirituality to: the College administration and mission, initial experiences on campus, social interactions, academic experiences, social life, preconceived assumptions among students, dialogue on campus, pluralism and diversity, and religious and spiritual visibility/invisibility.

In addition to the interviews, we conducted a content analysis of the College's website. Through the website, the authors specifically explored the College's mission statement, as well as pages on student life, religious life, and social diversity on campus. We also analyzed the College's Senior Surveys (Higher Education Research Institute, 2013, 2014), which were administered to graduating seniors by the Higher Education Research Institute.

4. Hidden Religious and Spiritual Identities and a Lack of Dialogue

Our research exposed a stark discrepancy between students' public and private expressions of religiosity and spirituality. Most community members believed that the campus atmosphere was not particularly religious or spiritual. However, nearly three fifths of our randomly selected respondents identified as spiritual, religious, or both. In addition, 75% of the 2013 graduating seniors reported a specific religious affiliation.[4] This contradiction can be explained by our finding that many students' spiritual and religious practices were kept relatively private from their peers.

When students first arrived at the College, many of them quickly became aware of how religion was generally viewed negatively on campus. For example, senior Ali Roland, a leader of a student spirituality group, explained:

> "At the beginning of freshman year, even before the ideas [of religion and spirituality] were breached…there would be discussions within the friend groups, and if you did believe something, you would feel so uncomfortable. Because people would automatically be like 'Oh, you believe in God? Like, what are you, stupid?"

In addition, Grace Crowley, a senior leader of the Hillel group and former new member recruitment chair commented on how, "in the first week, and the first month, so many people want to get involved. But then they figure out the whole scene and figure out that maybe [Hillel] isn't that "cool" of a thing to do…" Roland and Crowley suggest that the subtle and explicit criticism of religious students' beliefs early in their college experience leads many students to hide their religious and spiritual backgrounds, beliefs, and practices for the rest of their time at the college.

Many students who arrived on campus identifying as religious or spiritual said that they began to avoid public displays of religiosity, and did not talk with their peers about their religious or spiritual backgrounds. One student explained, "In a very secular community such as [the College], I think people would be wary to describe themselves as religious or spiritual, whether or not they actually feel that way inside." Administrator Susan Nichols added:

> "I think that you could walk on this campus and think of yourself as a deeply religious person, and very quickly, just by observing conversations, decide—I'm going to be quiet about that. I'm not going to tell people that's an important part of who I am."

Even among their friends, students did not talk about their religious or spiritual lives. In fact, at the end of the interviews, a few of our respondents admitted that this was the first time they had discussed their religion or spirituality while at the College. Because students believed that the majority of the College students were not spiritual or religious, they assumed their friends and peers were secular.

Students and faculty members alike expressed surprise upon finding out that a student was religious. Meryl Parker, a faculty member, explained:

> "Whenever anybody 'announces' a religious identification in any way, my level of surprise makes me think that I just assume that everybody here is not religious, or not in any significant way. And then when somebody [explicitly] identifies as religious…I'm always kind of taken aback. And I definitely look at that student a little bit differently when I think about their self-identification with a religious group."

[3] Descriptive statistics of respondents from Wave 2 are available upon request.

[4] College Senior Survey 2013.

Parker's reflection shows that even some faculty members assume that most students on campus are not religious. Furthermore, when students deviate from the secular norm by making a religious identification obvious, they can be perceived differently and receive differential treatment from both faculty members and peers.

Respondents thought that the lack of religious dialogue on campus reflected the campus community's difficulty with approaching challenging dialogues in general. Yunus Farjad, a junior leader of the Muslim Students Association, explained, "If one has an opinion that goes against the majority of [the College's] students, they might feel pressured to not express it." Farjad, among many other respondents, found that the College community is not open to the expression of opinions or beliefs that might "rock the boat," as another respondent described.

5. Religious Discomfort and Stigmatization on Campus

The vast majority of the students, faculty members and administrators reported that the campus culture was not friendly to theism or organized religion. Various respondents described religious students on campus as being viewed as "weird," "backwards," or "off-putting." Students and faculty members alike shared experiences which suggested that the culture of religious discomfort is conveyed in both subtle, prejudicial and explicit, discriminatory ways.

5.1. Subtle Intolerance

Although many respondents reported a negative stigma towards religion on campus, it was often difficult for them to articulate their experiences with it. An anti-religious orientation often manifested implicitly in interactions between members of the community. Grace Crowley, senior leader of Hillel, the Jewish student group on campus, said students' discomfort with religion is, "not an outward thing...but it's like 'Oh, you're going to *Hillel*?' It's a look, or a glance, or a tone."[5] Similarly, senior Reuben Gamely described, "You know, it's like 'oh that person's *religious'* and that's like, '*oh*.' People don't identify as religious because it has a negative connotation…When you hear that someone is religious it has an off-putting effect." Crowley and Gamely reveal some of the subtle ways through which students at the College criticize their peers' religiosity and participation in student religious groups.

Administrators and faculty members also noticed that interactions between students conveyed undertones of intolerance. Dean Susan Nichols explained, "It's the subtle ways that we convey to one another—that's a goofy thing you're thinking. It's usually not words." Similarly, Christian faculty member Jamie Kim recalled that, when talking about religious identification, "Sometimes it's like 'Well, that's cool,' but sometimes it's like 'Oh…you're *that.*'"

These examples from students, faculty, and administrators indicate that religious students on campus sense a disapproval of their religious and spiritual identities through subtle gestures or cues. Students' perceptions of others' discomfort with religion led many students to not publicly affiliate with religion or engage in religious practices for fear of being judged.

5.2. Stereotyping and Overt Discrimination

In addition to subtle stigmatization of religion, some students and faculty described explicit stereotyping and discrimination on campus. For example, many respondents referenced an opinion article published in the spring of 2015 by a conservative publication on campus. The article argued that Islam as a religion is inherently violent, and that there is a high prevalence of extremism and violence among Muslims. In response, Fatima Choudhary, a junior leader of the Muslim Students Association, said she, "wasn't so much upset because of what they said, because [she] knew it wasn't true," but what bothered her most was that "this was such a widely available publication that is put everywhere on campus so any student can pick it up. A student who doesn't know much about Islam can pick it up and think, 'Oh, this is an official publication of [the College]. It must be legitimate.' And then when they read it, they'll believe it." Although Choudhary and the other Muslim students were used to being stereotyped in the mainstream conservative media, it concerned them to hear such direct stereotyping from a group of their peers on campus. Choudhary said that, in the wake of the article's publication, she became much more aware of her identity as a Muslim on campus, and more cognizant of how few other Muslim students there were at the College.

Jewish students also spoke of anti-Semitism from their peers at the College. In one incident, someone cut a hole out of the campus *sukkah* tent, a holy space for Jewish students during the *Sukkot* holiday. The same year, a friend of senior Hillel leader Zoe Holtzman found the message "Eradicate the Jews" written on a whiteboard on her door. Holtzman explained that Campus Safety investigated both of these incidents, but "nothing happened" and the perpetrators were never caught. Holtzman reflected on the sense of fear and insecurity the events incited, "Anybody who calls for things like that against people like yourself…It's going to kind of rattle you, and make you say, 'Wow, someone is really out there to get us,' right?" This experience suggests that Jewish students have felt uncomfortable and even unsafe on campus as a result of threats by their peers. Furthermore, because the perpetrators were never

[5] Bold type signifies emphasis by the respondent.

caught, Jewish students had to walk around campus every day not knowing which of their peers had committed these explicitly anti-Semitic acts.

These experiences demonstrated that the campus culture was not just apathetic or disinterested in religion. At times, members of the campus community were explicitly discriminatory and hostile towards organized religion. Although these incidents occurred intermittently, they directly threatened religious minorities on campus, made their identities more salient, and made them feel like outsiders. Such episodes not only made religious minorities feel misunderstood and more marginalized on campus, but among some, it instilled a fear of future interactions with their peers.

6. The Marginalization of Religion in Mainstream College Life

Respondents discussed how religion is stigmatized in the two main places that students regularly convene on campus: in the classroom and at parties. Because involvement in academics and the party culture were viewed as necessary parts of the student college experience by most students—and religion and theism were often viewed as incompatible with intellectual life and partying—religious students were marginalized and judged as deviant.

6.1. Academic Life

At elite liberal arts colleges, academics are a central part of college life. Like other liberal arts colleges, the College we examined generally promoted tolerance of social diversity in academic life. The College website (2013) stated that, "Woven throughout [the College]'s curriculum is the study of the world's races, cultures, religions and ideologies." However, students portrayed their classroom experiences as lacking conversation about religion, and at times even discouraging it. Students and faculty repeatedly stated how the intense intellectual atmosphere deterred religious exploration and acceptance.

Some respondents thought that faculty members ignored or demeaned religion in the classroom. Students and faculty members who identified as religious were particularly aware of critical attitudes toward religion in the classroom. Ji-Yun Lee, a leader of the College Christian Fellowship, said, "I've been in classes where the default mode was definitely 'religion is stupid.'" Jamie Kim, a faculty member and the advisor to the College Christian Fellowship, related that on campus, "You'll even hear faculty members with Ph.D.s who have biases against religion…" Although he hoped that faculty members would be open and accepting of religious beliefs, Kim suggested this was not always the case.

Many students perceived an implicit conflict between religious faith and scientific rationality. Students believed that you could not be both religious and intellectual, so students with religious identities were marginalized and viewed as unable to fully participate in academic life. A senior who did not identify as religious or spiritual, described, "The majority of kids I know here aren't religious. And even if they are practicing a religion, they're still…intellectual enough not to live by it." Ali Roland, a senior, similarly described how many students held the view that religion and intellect were implicitly opposed:

> "There's also this idea that...as students at [the College], we're too smart to be religious. Like we're too smart to put our faith into a higher power. Like I said, especially with an elite college like [College name], there's just this belief that being religious implies a lower intelligence level. I don't know if it's really spoken about that much."

In this context, there was considerable normative pressure to first be an engaged member of the prestigious college. To be a part of the College's elite privileged membership, one had to have a salient secular intellectual identity. To do otherwise would undermine one's perceived intelligence, which was one of the most valued traits at the College. These findings support our hypothesis that many students at this elite liberal arts school would have trouble reconciling their religious and intellectual identities. Because intellectual identities were central to being a part of the collective college identity, and religious identification was seen as oppositional to intellect, religious identities were marginalized and made suspect.

6.2. The Party Scene

At the College, partying was viewed by students as a central part of the mainstream social scene. Ninety percent of the graduating seniors in 2014 spent at least an hour partying in a typical week. In contrast, only ten percent of seniors prayed or meditated for at least an hour a week.[6] Unfortunately for religious students, most students we spoke with thought the party scene was not only incompatible with religiosity, but that the party crowd was particularly critical and dismissive of religion. It was a part of student social life in which religious students felt most marginalized, alienated, and judged.

Non-religious respondents assumed that religious students maintained strict religious commitments which did not allow for partying. Senior Henry Silber said that being at college involved the temptation to do "things that religions don't usually condone." Blake Rosenberg, a senior, explained, "People separate

[6] College Senior Survey 2014.

themselves from religion because it stops them from having a good time." Silber and Rosenberg's responses are indicative of a campus culture that perceives student religious identification as deviant and suspect, because it is viewed as a voluntary choice to not participate in the "fun" aspects of mainstream college life.

Religious students thought that the stigmatization of their religious traditions was particularly likely to happen at parties. Religious stigma was often expressed in the form of discriminatory jokes. Ji-Yun Lee, a self-identified Christian student, said that people in "party crowds" were more likely to make fun of Christians, or make Jesus jokes. Most of the religious students we spoke with said that they were not comfortable at campus parties.

Faculty also mentioned that the students who partied frequently were particularly likely to judge religious students. Faculty member Zach Sandler noted that religious students are generally regarded as "weird" by their peers, and that the stigma against religious students is related to the stigma against students who refrain from drinking alcohol. Similarly, administrator Harshad Bhat described that, "The minute a student says, 'I can't drink because of my culture, my faith,' now they're in that extreme crazy group, because it's proving this point that religion is backwards." Bhat's explanation further suggests that religious expression and practice were already assumed to be strange or deviant, and they were viewed as especially so when they interfered with students' ability to party.

7. The Perceived Lack of Structural Support for Religious Practice and Spiritual Exploration

7.1. Falling Short on the Institutional Mission

The College espoused an explicit commitment to support holistic student development and self-exploration, like many liberal arts institutions. It also sought to promote inclusion and tolerance of diverse social identities. These missions are clearly stated on the College's website and in its other publications. The College is guided by the motto "Know Thyself," which intimates a commitment to students' personal development and an intentional fostering of unique, individual identities. Religious and spiritual respondents thought that the motto could serve as a personal motivation for spiritual exploration. One student, when asked what religion means to him, shared: "It means knowing myself better. One of the big reasons I came to [the College] was because of Know Thyself." A senior administrator also believed that the motto could serve as a "perfect vehicle to give students permission to explore their religion and spirituality while they are here."

However, other respondents found that this motto was not an accurate reflection of students' experiences on campus. Rick O'Connor, a faculty member, noted that a more apt description of the College motto would be, "'Know Thyself, except don't talk about the religious part of yourself.'" Similarly, Sarah Wilder, a Protestant senior, shared: "Honestly, I think that a more accurate version of what the College actually achieves, or seeks to achieve, is...'Know Your Resume.'" Faculty and students alike believed that the College did not sufficiently endorse and support religious and spiritual life on campus.

Although the College's mission advocated a commitment to diversity and self-exploration, the College lacked an explicit commitment to the inclusion of religious and spiritual identities. For example, a page on the College's website on diversity," stated, "At [the College] you can be yourself—and be respected for who you are". A diversity fact sheet on the same page includes sections on racial and ethnic diversity, geographic diversity, and socioeconomic diversity.[7] Although the webpage explicitly encouraged multiple forms of diversity, it made no mention of religion or spirituality.

Despite a nominal promotion of diversity in its mission, students felt that the College and the campus community did not always support diversity in practice, especially when it came to religious diversity. Student leaders of religious and spiritual groups believed that members of the College saw religious diversity as potentially "dangerous" or "risky" to explicitly encourage.

7.2. Administrative Support and Limitations

Many religious students reported a lack of support from the administration for fostering religious exploration and inclusion. While these respondents generally thought the administration was tolerant and accepting of religious groups, they did not believe that the administration considered it important to actively engage with religion or spirituality.

Religious student leaders perceived a subtle lack of support from the administration. Ji-Yun Lee, a leader of a student Christian group, said, "I get the feeling that the administration is not too hot on us." Zoe Holtzman, senior leader of the Hillel group, commented, "I don't want to say that the administration is anti-religion…but they're not for religion." Holtzman and Lee's perspectives were echoed by other religious students, particularly those identifying as Christian or Jewish. Students in both groups thought that that they had to take their own initiative to help their religious groups thrive on campus.

Religious students additionally believed that the College had insufficient space and limited resources for the religious groups on campus. In particular, the majority of the Jewish student respondents expressed disappointment due to limited space available to them for

[7] Accessed May 15, 2015.

worship and practice. They were primarily concerned about the lack of a Kosher-friendly kitchen. Zoe Holtzman kept a Kosher diet at the College for her first three years. "That was really hard," she admitted. "Because of my limited options, I was getting really sick." Although no other respondents had tried keeping Kosher while on campus, many of them expressed concern that the College does not support Jewish students in this practice.

The challenges of limited space and resources are faced by all colleges and universities. However, these challenges are made especially difficult at a small school like the institution we studied, where there may only be a few students belonging to a particular religious group. Furthermore, religious groups were often comprised of students from a wide range of traditions and practices. Administrator Susan Nichols addressed the structural challenges to supporting religious students' needs:

> "There are challenges…for example, it can be hard to find mentors who have that background, availability, and interest. We've had different people over the years who have worked with our Jewish community or Muslim students. And when it's just a handful of students, you can't really justify hiring a full-time person. So piecing it together in a way that works and feels meaningful for students can be a challenge."

While Nichols and other administrators have put thought into how best to support the College's diverse religious population, they are aware that, given the structural limitations characteristic of a small college, not all students will be satisfied with the support for their identities and interests.

Our research demonstrated that some administrators are thoughtfully considering the needs of religious and spiritual groups on campus and attempting to uphold the college's mission of diversity. However, there was a disconnect between their efforts and students' perceptions of results, which led religious students to think that the administration did not prioritize their needs.

8. Religion and Spirituality on Campus

8.1. Spiritual Pluralism

Although cultural and structural factors combined to discourage public, shared discussions and experiences of the sacred, transcendent experiences were still part of students' lives on campus. Such experiences, however, often manifested in private, personal, and non-traditional forms. Regardless of specific religious or spiritual identification, students crafted their own unique sets of sacred beliefs and practices. One student, for example, identified as Catholic and believed in God, but did not specifically identify as "religious." Another student considered herself agnostic and was not tied to any particular religion. Yet, she admitted to finding herself praying sometimes. A third student described herself as both agnostic and "culturally Catholic." The latter term, she explained, she had created as a category to describe her own particular approach to Catholicism.

Although about two fifths of randomly selected student respondents did not explicitly identify as spiritual or religious, most engaged with spirituality in some way. In fact, three-fourths of the same respondents reported having had recent spiritual experiences. Many students spoke of experiencing spirituality through non-traditional avenues. Freshman and self-identified atheist Nikki Wilson said that for her, "Spirituality has a lot to do with nature….I remember one of the first days I got here, me and my roommate went to the [wooded area on campus]. It was probably the closest I've gotten to spiritual because we just sat there for a really long time, and it was really quiet…" Despite Wilson's tranquil moments in nature, she does not identify as "spiritual." Rather, she is drawn to nature and associates it with spirituality.

Blake Rosenberg, a senior and self-identified "agnostic/discordian," spoke of many aspects of his life that he considers sacred and divine. He referenced working at the community farm on campus, which he describes as a "holistic connection" that he cannot find anywhere else. When he writes, he says: "It is similar to a prayer, but instead of choosing God as my audience, I choose someone I know." Additionally, washing dishes offered him a similar spiritual experience. Rosenberg described his experiences as transcendent moments, without necessarily connecting them to a belief in God or a "spiritual" self-identification.

Another student, Henry Silber, was raised Jewish but considered himself neither spiritual nor religious. He "usually" doesn't believe in a higher power. However, Silber discussed the ways that reading and listening to music were spiritual experiences: "If there's a passage that's really incredible, or a piece of music that's jaw-dropping, I think that's a form of experiencing the divine. Like something pure, and beautiful….It makes me want to find something deeper." Even though Henry was not intentionally engaging in religious or spiritual practices, he experienced the spiritual through non-traditional avenues.

These three respondents did not label themselves as "spiritual" or theistic, yet they each cited spiritual or divine experiences in their lives on campus. All of these experiences were unique, personally meaningful, and deviated from conventional forms of organized religion.

8.2. Embracing Religiosity in Marginal Safe Spaces: Student Religious Groups

Although the general campus culture which stigma-

tized religion led the majority of students to keep their religious identities and expressions hidden, a small minority of students embraced their religious expressions publically. The College's head chaplain estimated that about ten percent of the College's students participated in a religious or spiritual group on campus. Perhaps because these students were a marginalized minority on campus, they were very grateful for the support they received from each other and from the chaplaincy.

Leaders of religious groups spoke of the difficulty in arriving at the College without sufficient community support. Counterintuitively, this lack of initial support actually contributed to some students' religious involvement. Ji-Yun Kim, a senior and leader of the College Christian Fellowship, spoke of her challenging arrival to the College:

> "I would have to say that I kind of struggled for a while, because there are so few Christians here. And there wasn't a lot of leadership….Normally there's a staff worker who leads the fellowship, but we don't have that here. And so that was hard."

Kim's struggles caused her to feel isolated, and she began to reconsider her identity as a Christian. However, she explained that as a direct result of the adversity she faced, "[her] faith skyrocketed" because she "had to take it into [her] own hands."

Zoe Holtzman shared a similar story: "It was really hard at first. I was pretty unhappy for about the first year." She wasn't satisfied with the availability of *Shabbat* services, and did not feel supported by her peers in her Jewish faith. But by her senior year, she had gained a different perspective: "What I've noticed here is that when you don't have people like you around you, you have to fight more for what you believe in and you have to identify more with that." For Holtzman, the anti-Semitic incidents on campus actually motivated her membership in the Hillel group. The discrimination the Jewish community faced "made us want to push Jewish life on campus more, and show that we're still a strong Jewish community that doesn't get derailed by those kinds of threats." Overt forms of discrimination from peers served as catalysts for the Hillel students to re-claim their place on campus.

Although the stigma towards religious groups on campus caused most students to veil or reject their own religious identities, the social climate on campus caused a contingency of students to become even more active and invested in their religious identities. Both Holtzman and Kim's experiences suggest that being in the midst of a campus culture that is not primarily religious caused them to further embrace their own religious identities.

Student religious groups became havens for many of their members by the end of their college experiences. Holtzman explained that by her senior year at the College, she thought of the Hillel group as her family. Similarly, Sarah Wilder, a Protestant senior, shared that a Protestant discussion group "is a place where I've opened up many times about things where I wouldn't elsewhere." The chaplaincy was another important source of support for religious students. Caitlin O'Connor, an agnostic Catholic, shared that she may not have stayed at the College if it had not been for the head chaplain's constant support and guidance. Overall, religious students' experiences showed how valuable student religious groups and mentors can be in providing support; such support was seen as especially important in the face of a campus culture critical of religion.

9. Discussion

This study examined a secular elite liberal arts college in order to make "invisible religion" more visible (Cadge & Konieczny, 2014) and to trace the cultural and structural facets of campus life which support or impede student religiosity. Although our findings are from a single small liberal arts college, based on past research, we suspect the subtle and explicit ways through which religious and spiritual life are repressed in public spaces on campus are likely to occur at other liberal arts colleges and elite secular universities (Freitas 2010; Jacobsen & Jacobsen, 2012; Lane et al. 2013).

Despite how the College's mission officially promoted the inclusion of people with diverse social identities, many students perceived a lack of peer, faculty, and administrative support for religious and spiritual exploration. The College additionally lacked a pathway for the majority of the student body to meaningfully explore religion or spirituality in a supportive environment. In mainstream social pathways on campus—such as in academic life and in the party scene—religion and spirituality were not only absent, but were viewed with suspicion. Students repeatedly spoke of how important being smart was to maintaining an identity as part of the prestigious College. They viewed religiosity as based on "belief" or "faith" rather than reason, and perceived an inherent conflict between religion and being an intellectual. Partying, a valued part of the student college experience for most non-religious students, was also viewed as incompatible with religious practice; religiosity was seen by non-religious students as an irrational, deviant impediment to having fun and getting the full college experience. Our findings correspond with Donna Freitas' (2010) study, which found that students often fail to reconcile religiosity with college party culture.

Despite the taken-for-granted, secular, mainstream campus culture, many students were involved in a discreet, individualized seeking of the sacred. While students were often hesitant to publicly self-identify as religious or engage in religious dialogue, behind closed doors they were more willing to share personal stories

and experiences regarding their spiritual and religious backgrounds, beliefs, and practices when given the opportunity.

A minority of students embraced a public religious identity and maintained small marginalized communities in which they could embrace and discuss their religious and spiritual lives. In the face of discrimination and prejudice from the larger campus community, some religious students deepened their commitments to their faith tradition and their small student religious communities. This finding suggesting that some students will embrace, strengthen, and assert their religious identities when confronted with adversity mirrors sociologist Lori Peek's (2005) scholarship on the *declared religious identities* of Muslim students after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In the face of religious stereotyping and criticism, some Muslim students developed a stronger commitment to their faith and expressed their religiosity in more public ways.

At the liberal arts college we investigated, dominant secular norms and structural institutional pathways combined to discourage religious practice and spiritual exploration among the students. Because the structural opportunities for religious practice and dialogue were limited and socially marginalized, students were more likely to develop discreet, private religious and spiritual beliefs and practices. With the largely invisible nature of student religiosity and spirituality on campus, few students explicitly requested greater administrative support of religious and spiritual initiatives. Consequently, the administration did not prioritize these measures. Thus, students' religious and spiritual lives remained largely concealed and private, and the cycle of invisible religion perpetuated.

Like many other liberal arts colleges, the College aimed to foster a community with dialogue and openness regarding various forms of diversity. In order to better fulfill this mission regarding religion and spirituality specifically, we suggest that student leaders and administrators at secular colleges and universities focus on creating safe spaces for "deliberative dialogues" early on in students' college experiences (Lane et al., 2013, pp. 348). Intentional open dialogue would help foster a greater openness among students in exploring religion and spirituality, and aid in preventing and addressing religious intolerance. We recommend that these dialogues begin as early as freshmen orientation. After undergoing an identity-sensitivity training that includes a component on religiosity and spirituality, orientation leaders should be given the space to facilitate safe, inter-faith dialogues among new students. We believe that early support in sharing one's story will have a lasting effect on students' comfort in publicly sharing their religious and spiritual identities and expressions during the rest of their time on campus.

Our study also reveals surprisingly high amounts of discriminatory attitudes and actions against students from all of the three major religious traditions represented at the College—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Safe spaces for practice and dialogue allowed these religious groups to form their own supportive communities, even in the midst of a culture of discrimination. These findings underscore the importance of prioritizing the creation of safe spaces for religious and spiritual groups to convene and practice in colleges and universities. We recommend that faculty and administrative members work with religious student groups to ensure that each group has a designated space on campus in which they can gather and maintain their religious practices.

In addition, our study has illustrated the importance of having religiously diverse faculty and staff members. Students cited the valuable role that faculty and staff mentors can play in increasing students' comfort levels on campus and providing support. Finding a full-time staff member can be a challenge, especially at a small college. If full-time staffing is not possible, we recommend that administrative members work with student leaders to consider alternative options, such as hiring a part-time staff member, or forming connections with religious leaders in the area.

Initiatives fostering religious dialogue and literacy are being intentionally developed on other college campuses across the nation. President Obama launched "The President's Interfaith and Community Service Campus Challenge," in 2011, which encouraged many colleges and universities to commit to fostering religious and spiritual respect and education (U.S. Department of Education, 2011). Prestigious Ivy League schools, such as Yale and Princeton, have become national leaders in developing programs of religious pluralism and spiritual exploration. Such programs are promising but, as we suspect based on our results and other research (e.g. Freitas, 2010; Lane et al., 2013), still relatively rare or marginal at most secular colleges and universities. Because college is a critical time of identity formation for many students, such programs are very important not only for supporting religious and spiritual students, but also for promoting inclusion of people of all religions into campus social life. While at college, students may also be exposed to a greater diversity of identities in their peers than ever before. Colleges should take advantage of this opportunity to help students develop relationships with people from other faith traditions.

Future research should follow youth in their transitions from college to the workplace to examine the extent to which hidden religious and spiritual orientations are carried on into the world of work. We predict that the attitudes, beliefs, and practices that students develop with respect to their own spiritual and religious lives, and that of others, during their college years will affect their attitudes in subsequent life experiences in their workplaces and other often secular in-

stitutions. Future research should also examine how religious tolerance developed during one's youth, or the lack there of, shape one's treatment of members of other faith traditions during adulthood.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Appendix

Table 1. Religiosity and spirituality of randomly selected respondents (*N*= 28).

	Total	Percent
Religious Self-Identification		
Religious and Spiritual	8	28.6
Religious	3	10.7
Spiritual but not Religious	5	17.9
None	12	42.9
Denomination		
Protestant	2	7.1
Catholic	7	25.0
Jewish	4	14.3
Episcopalian	1	3.6
None	14	50.0
Belief in a Higher Power		
Yes	16	57.1
No	6	21.4
Not sure	6	21.4
Frequency of Prayer		
Daily	7	25.0
Weekly	1	3.6
Monthly	1	3.6
Yearly	3	10.7
Never	16	57.1
Frequency of Attending Religious Services		
Weekly	10	35.7
Monthly	2	7.1
Never	16	57.1
Spiritual Experiences		
Had at least one kind of spiritual experience		
Meditation	21	75.0
Nature	7	25.0
Running/Sports	5	17.9
Other	2	7.1
None	7	25.0

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Article

Secular New Zealand and Religious Diversity: From Cultural Evolution to Societal Affirmation

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Abstract
About a century ago New Zealand was a predominantly white Anglo-Saxon Christian nation, flavoured only by diversities of Christianity. A declining indigenous population (Maori) for the most part had been successfully converted as a result of 19th century missionary endeavour. In 2007, in response to increased presence of diverse religions, a national Statement on Religious Diversity was launched. During the last quarter of the 20th century the rise of immigrant communities, with their various cultures and religions, had contributed significantly to the changing demographic profile of religious affiliation. By early in the 21st century this diversity, together with issues of inter-communal and interreligious relations, all in the context of New Zealand being a secular society, needed to be addressed in some authoritative way. Being a secular country, the government keeps well clear of religion and expects religions to keep well clear of politics. This paper will outline relevant historical and demographic factors that set the scene for the Statement, which represents a key attempt at enhancing social inclusion with respect to contemporary religious diversity. The statement will be outlined and discussed, and other indicators of the way in which religious diversity is being received and attended to will be noted.

Keywords
Christian denominations; Christian missions; demographics; ethnic diversity; New Zealand; reception; religious diversity

Issue
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1. Introduction

Although prior to the late 18th century there was some sporadic encounter of European explorers with this distant land deep within the South Pacific, it was, to use King's phrase, "as the eighteenth century merged into the nineteenth" (King, 2003, p. 116) that saw the beginnings of European colonial settlement. In this context two religious cultures collided. On the one hand there was the religion of the indigenous inhabitants, the Maori, who "had always been a highly spiritual people" (King, 2003, p. 139) even though, at first, the culturally embedded nature of this spirituality meant some Europeans did not think, initially, that Maori had any religion as such (Irwin, 1984). On the other hand, the religion of the Europeans, Christianity, arrived on these shores initially in the form of two Protestant missionary movements (Anglican and Methodist), followed soon by a Catholic one (Marist). Only in later decades of the 19th century did settler Christianity arrive in earnest to re-shape the religious landscape. Throughout, as sociologist Hans Mol (1982) has noted, profound change occurred to Maori religious life and sensibility in the wake of European colonization and evangelization (see also Pratt, 2015). And whilst the incoming European religious culture has been referred to as a 'transplanted Christianity' (Davidson & Lineham, 1989), Mol rightly observes that the incoming Europe-

ans brought with them their own dissensions and disruptions: "migration to the other side of the world meant vast discontinuities with the past" (Mol, 1982, p. 1). If there was an expectation that colonisation and concomitant evangelisation would result in a homogenous society, the sociological and cultural reality was quite otherwise. In reality, even then, diversity ruled (Colless & Donovan, 1985).

Whilst, superficially, it could be said that there were two cultures—Maori and European (known colloquially as 'Pakeha')—and two religions, Maori and Christianity, in reality there was, and is, a diversity within and of Maori culture (Best, 1974) and a manifest variety of Christianities (Davidson, 1997). The arrival of European settlement brought with it the beginnings of the modern era of religious diversity. And although popular historical perception tends to elide this diversity—presuming but one homogenous form of Maori religiosity and one dominant (Western) form of Christianity (with at least a nod to the divide between Protestant and Catholic and perhaps an acknowledgement of Protestant denominationalism)—the fact of the matter is that diversity, at least within the dominant religion, was from the outset a major feature contributing to the cultural evolution of New Zealand as a modern secular state and society. As the nineteenth century progressed, and especially following the signing of a treaty between the British Crown and the Maori Chiefs (Orange, 1987), that diversity was extended with the arrival of other religions, further expanding and consolidating during the 20th century. This development has been largely within a context of liberal tolerance and acceptance of, albeit limited or constrained (cf. the history of immigration policies, for example), diversity—arguably a hallmark of what it is to be a secular society (Griffiths, 2011). At the same time, from the late 20th century on, changes in religious identity, demographics, and allegiances have seen a rise in non-religious identities and a concomitant contentious identification of 'being secular' with being 'non-religious' if not, in fact, signifying being 'anti-religion' as such.

Other than when caught up with the educational question as to whether and in what mode religion should be taught in schools (McGeorge & Snook, 1981; Turley & Martin, 1981), religion has not been a matter of deep interest or controversy in New Zealand in recent decades. Religious spats have certainly flared from time-to-time ever since free-thinkers, emerging new Church denominations, and other relatively fringe elements of Christianity accompanied the main Christian Church bodies to this far-flung British colony in the 19th century. But such dissensions, even when gaining publicity, were always matters internal to Christianity. Today New Zealand, as we shall see below, is one of the least overtly religious societies within the orbit of Western secular influence. It can be very hard for religion to get any kind of exposure in the media, unless it is for all the wrong reasons, such as paedophile priests or other forms of sexual misconduct and abuse. New Zealanders, I suggest, are arguably among the most studiously ignorant of religion; religion is a subject of discussion that is actively avoided and deemed better to ignore. As a result, misunderstanding and prejudice appears rampant.

In this paper I shall sketch the historical development of religious plurality since the 19th century—when Europeans, and so Christianity, arrived, settled and interacted with the indigenous Maori. I shall then outline the key demographic changes, with reference to census data, that demonstrate the nature and extent of a blossoming religious diversity, including the relationship between ethnic and religious diversities, together with a rising abjuring of religion that has become more prevalent in the last few decades and, with that, a challenge to what it means to be secular. I shall outline and discuss the National Statement on Religious Diversity and the reception it has received. Where has this statement come from, and what does it seek to assert and achieve? Finally, I shall review of a variety of other forms and avenues for engagement with religious diversity and offer some concluding remarks. Arguably, so far as social inclusion is concerned, it would appear that when it comes to religion New Zealand is happiest if religion is mute. But for some in this country, there are certain religions which they would rather not see included at all; and for others, religion as such should be a private matter only and not even on the agenda of social inclusion *per se*. How might this sit with the history and reality of religious diversity in New Zealand?

2. A History of Religious Diversity (I): Colonial Christianity

Prior to the arrival of Europeans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and with them missionary Christianity, the indigenous Maori followed their own primal religious traditions (Irwin, 1984). During the 19th century, missionary evangelical outreach and conversion among Maori, despite a relatively slow beginning, was on the whole quite successful. Christian missions began with the arrival of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) and its first missionary, Rev. Samuel Marsden (Davidson, 1997, pp. 8-10). Marsden came from Australia where his hospitality to Maori who visited him there garnered Maori protection and support to establish the first New Zealand mission. He conducted the first known formal service of worship, on a beach in the Bay of Islands (upper north of the North Island of the country), on Christmas Day 1814 and soon thereafter returned to his home in Sydney. By the time he came back to New Zealand in 1819 the CMS mission, which was premised on the principle of introducing 'civilisation' as the precursor to promoting Christianity,

was in serious trouble. It almost collapsed, but in 1823 relocated to a new location where it fared better. An important contribution to the study of Maori language was made, including work on a translation of the Bible. The first baptism of a Maori occurred in 1825. Anglican missionary outreach to Maori was well underway, and its legacy persists to this day.

The Rev Samuel Leigh, the first Wesleyan (Methodist) minister to Australia, began the New Zealand work of the Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS), also in the north of the country, in 1822 (Davidson, 1997, p. 13). However this, too, proved a difficult beginning, with considerable tension between the local Maori community and the Mission station emerging. Interpersonal difficulties among the missionaries were also factors involved. The station was sacked by Maori in 1827 and the Wesleyans withdrew for a short while. Rather like the Anglicans, in 1828 they relocated and regrouped at a new site—on the Hokianga harbour on the western side of the upper North Island—and soon expanded from there. By 1830 scant missionary success could be recorded as it would appear there was little or no understanding of the real task. Physical, spiritual and psychological isolation took their toll and there was considerable difficulty in language acquisition. Methodist missionaries seemingly had little to offer the Maori. But the venture was not a total failure. Maori language (*Te Reo Maori*) was learned eventually by some; significant points of contact were gradually made between missionaries and Maori and, as with the Anglican missionary endeavour, such contacts and attendant relationships played a significant role in the emergence and signing of the *Treaty of Waitangi* (see New Zealand History, n.d.), the 1840 document that marked the commencement of New Zealand as a modern nation State governed by England—so making it part of the English colonial empire.

In January 1838 a French Catholic bishop, Jean Baptiste Pompallier (1807−1871), arrived in New Zealand together with two members of the Society of Mary (Marists), a newly formed French missionary order (Davidson, 1997, p. 16). The first Mass was celebrated on January 13 in a private home—just across the harbour from the Wesleyan Mission Station. Pompallier himself was able to preach in Maori only three months after his arrival. He also had to learn English. He urged his missionary priests to be sensitive to Maori customs, on the one hand, but also to attack 'Protestant errors' on the other. On the whole the approach of the Catholics was much more accommodating towards Maori life and customs than that of the other two Christian missions. But the Catholics had less to offer the Maori, by way of material benefits, than the Anglicans and Methodists with their emphasis on education, health, and agricultural technology. "Catholic missionaries opted for a life of poverty which had difficulty competing with the attractions of the Protestant missions"; however "without the demands of families and mission stations, [they] were often able to get closer to Maori than their Protestant counterparts" (Davidson, 1997, p. 16). More French Marists joined Pompallier who established his headquarters at the township of Russell in the Bay of Islands which, for a while, was the capital of the colony. There he set up a printing press to rival the Protestants.

As a result of these developments a twofold suspicion and animosity attached itself to the Catholic missionary endeavour, namely Protestant vs. Catholic rivalry (religious); and French vs. British rivalry (political). This played a part in the urgency with which the British concluded the 1840 Treaty with the Maori chiefs. New Zealand was henceforth ruled by Britain, but without an established Church. Although New Zealand was a predominantly Protestant society, Catholics nevertheless had a free hand to be about their own religious business, as did the many varieties of Protestant denomination and sects that attended the burgeoning arrival of settlers seeking a brave—and religiously free (i.e. allowing of diversity)—new world. Thus a distinctive development foreshadowing the emergence of a broader religious diversity emerged around the middle of the nineteenth century, namely a secular polity that gave freedom to, as well as from, religion under the law.

At this stage religious diversity was really a matter of Christian denominational variety. "The pluralistic nature of New Zealand settler society, with denominations having to exist alongside one another in a religious mix very different from England, was already beginning to determine the reaction of the people to religious issues" (Davidson, 1997, p. 30). No one Church had pride of place, constitutionally, over any other; although, by dint of being a British colony the Church of England, transplanted into the colony as a missionary endeavour, then servicing a settler community and undergirding a new society, emerged as the *de facto* national Church. The matter of establishing the Church in a colonial context involved transplanting not just religion as a set of beliefs and values, but also its institution(s), with accompanying customs, polity, and agendas.

By 1874 the Anglicans were institutionally organised as 'The Church of the Province of New Zealand'. For many years generations of New Zealanders would not know what 'religion' (Church) they belonged to, as they seldom darkened the door of any. But when pressed, as for example to record a religious identity at census time, even with an opt-out option many simply said 'C of E' (Church of England). They might not be active believers, but they knew whence they would be buried, and in the meantime where they were most likely to marry and have any children christened. One did not have to commit to being Anglican; it was part of the British culture which had stamped its imprint upon New Zealand. By contrast, one committed to virtually every other Church.

Whereas the CMS was an exclusively missionary organisation, and the colonial (settler) Anglican Church came later, the Methodist WMS saw itself as having a responsibility to minister to both Maori and Pakeha (European) from the outset. This, together with its strong emphasis on lay participation and local initiative, meant the transition to, even co-development of, a settler Church alongside Maori mission work was perhaps more easily achieved. However, other varieties of Methodism (for instance: Primitive Methodists, Bible Christians) which came out with the settler ships were concerned exclusively with ministry to the settler communities, and they remained legally tied to their English Churches of origin for a long time.

As for the Catholics, who initially made no formal distinction between missionary and settler work, incoming settler communities soon predominated in terms of demand. In particular the needs of the Irish Catholic settlers—including educational as well as spiritual and pastoral needs—came to the fore and required much energy and effort (King, 1997). Indeed, as Davidson (1997, p. 38) notes: "The distinctive French Marist influence on early New Zealand Catholicism was overtaken by the impact of the Irish settlers and the Irish priests and nuns who gave their own special character to Catholic identity in New Zealand".

Coming out of Scotland, Presbyterians began in New Zealand as a settler colonial Church. Presbyterian worship began formally in 1840 and the first Presbyterian Church was opened in 1844 in Wellington. A mission to Maori, despite an early failed attempt, was a secondary concern that was pursued nevertheless, but the primary focus was the Scottish settlers. And just as Methodism out of England was itself a diverse affair, so too was Scottish Presbyterianism—the 'Kirk' (Church of Scotland) was the established Church in Scotland, but in the 1840s ministers also came to New Zealand from the dissenting Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and both the clergy and a Lay Association of the Free Church of Scotland set their sights on Otago, in the lower South Island, establishing a settlement as a Free Church colony there in the 1840s. But the dream of an Antipodean Free Church theocracy was doomed from the outset: most of the settlers to the South were, in the end, English rather than Scots, with a good measure of Irish as well. The tide of secularism was also high in the new settler communities: they hadn't come half-way round the world to be dominated by pontificating parsons yet again. In the event, the discovery of gold in Otago-Southland in the 1860s put paid to the remnants of a dream for a religious utopia of the south. But an imprint and a heritage had been created: Otago-Southland for a long time had greater than 50% of the population identified as Presbyterian, and the Scots' emphasis on education bore fruit with the establishment of the first New Zealand University (now the University of Otago) in Dunedin in 1869.

Along with the arrival of members of the Church communities noted above, the 1840s and 1850s saw members of other smaller Christian Churches begin to arrive. Communities of Brethren, Baptists, Congregationalists, Quakers (Society of Friends), and the Salvation Army, together with their institutions, were late 19th century transplants. A distinctive New Zealand colonial religious (Christian) identity began to emerge. The idea that there should be an 'established Church' was widely resisted by virtually all. No one denomination was to be predominant. However, together with the reality of sectarian tension and religious bigotry, this resulted in a strong secular flavour in the political development of the country from colonial outpost to self-governed dominion.

3. A History of Religious Diversity (II): The World Comes to New Zealand

If Christianity was by far the predominant religion, it was not to remain in a wholly singular position for long (Donovan, 1996). By the late 19th century the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—which is another world religion, in reality an alternate Christianity, not another denomination as such—had been established and pursued a vigorous outreach into the Maori community as well as into the settler European communities. Census and other records also show a varying and relatively early presence of Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish and Sikh adherents. For the most part, numbers were so low as to vitiate the prospect of establishing their own religious communities, except for Jews who were able to have synagogues in the late 19th century in the capital city, Wellington, and also Auckland (Beaglehole & Levine, 1995; Gluckman, 1990).

By the late 19th century the religious landscape of New Zealand was one of Christian denominational diversity coupled with a smattering of other religions, and the decided flavour of Secularists and Freethinkers with, for the most part, an imported religious leadership (Stenhouse & Thomson, 2004). The quest to recruit and train colonial clergy was only in its infancy even quite late in the 19th century. However colonial Church architecture, as well as the distinctive use of timber, of which there was an abundance, made its mark quite early on. The legacy of this remains, even despite the combination of more modern approaches to Church buildings that emerged during the 20th century and, in the last couple of decades, the emergence of Middle Eastern and Asian architectural tropes with the erection of mosques, gurdwaras, and temples of various sorts.

4. New Zealand, Religion, and Secular Society

A very significant and far-reaching 19th century development was the Education Act of 1877. This declared

New Zealand to be a secular society in that the state would provide primary education that was "free and secular and compulsory" (King, 2003, p. 233). In response, the Churches for the most part initially backed a 'Bible in Schools' movement which, from 1879, agitated for the reading and teaching of the Bible in schools as an inherent element of culture and heritage. Sectarian division was, however, the Achilles' heel to any uniformity although, from 1895, the pattern of a negotiated half-an-hour per week teaching period during which, technically, a school would be 'closed'—that is, it would not during that period be operating as a state school—thus allowing volunteers from local Churches, very often clergy in the early days, to provide some form of Bible instruction. A point of contention then, and ever since, is that, for the most part, rather than meeting a cultural educational lacuna, the 'Bible in Schools' educational programme is often an agent for evangelical outreach. Much depends, especially today where it may be allowed—individual Boards of Trustees now determine whether or not to have the programme—, on the nature of the individual volunteer conducting the class and the choice of curriculum followed. Some are better than others; some more educationally appropriate, others clearly not.

The long-lasting legacy of this late 19th century development has been to obviate religion as a bona fide subject of educational study within the secular state system. The Catholic, Anglican, and Presbyterian Churches all developed their own private school systems to a greater (Catholic) or lesser degree. Smaller Churches, such as the Methodists, might have had one or two. Nowadays Jews and Muslims also have their own, as do some sectarian Christian Churches such as the Exclusive Brethren. Some religious education has ever been available for those who wish it, but its exclusion today from State primary and secondary education, together with its very late and limited appearance in the tertiary sector—now under significant threat—has had significant consequences for the prospect and quality of public debate about religious matters. The predominant cultural view has ever been that there are two subjects one never discusses in public—religion and politics. The latter may be allowable on some occasions; the former never—except when secular media and its supporting pundits go on the warpath against some aspect or other of religion or religious people.

During the 20th century the denominational diversity of Christianity consolidated and became institutionally established. Where initially there had been dependency on 'sending' authority, mostly out of England, in some cases Australia, independence of governance and identity was gradually gained. In 1907 New Zealand emerged from 19th century colonial status to being an independent Dominion of the British Empire. And where England went, as it did in 1914 (WWI) and again in 1939 (WWII), New Zealand would follow. But in the aftermath of the Second World War three factors emerged as highly significant for the religious landscape of New Zealand. First, the country itself moved from the status of a Dominion to being an autonomous member of the British Commonwealth. The ties to mother England loosened somewhat. And, in consequence, Christian denominational identity, whilst heading toward a post-War peak in terms of numerical strength and cultural influence, began also to self-question as a combination of war experience and the impact of Christian ecumenism was felt. The ecumenical movement flourished in New Zealand during the third quarter of the twentieth century to the extent that five Churches—Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist, Congregationalist and Churches of Christ—entered formal negotiations to unite. However, despite a substantial expression of support from all sides, the failure of the Anglicans to carry a decisive vote saw their withdrawal in 1976. An attempt to proceed in the early 80s without the Anglicans also foundered; the ecumenical tide was on the turn.

Indeed, ecumenical energies were soon eclipsed by other cultural and demographic changes that had begun to impact New Zealand society, including a renaissance of Maori culture and language, and growing immigration with its attendant cultural and religious pluralities. These factors threw into sharp relief questions of national and Church identity. By the 1990s the country was officially bi-cultural (Maori and 'Pakeha'—meaning primarily European, but inclusive of all who are not Maori). The *Treaty of Waitangi* had been restored to its pivotal place of influence, and the major Churches which not so long ago had sought to 'become one' embarked, each in their own way, upon distinctively different bi-cultural journeys. But if diversity was somewhat dominated in the public and religious sphere by cultural duality, in reality this was already eclipsed by the upsurge in diverse races, cultures and religions that were arriving daily—whether as immigrants, or as refugees. Indeed, the 1987 Immigration Act ushered in a significant broadening of immigrant and refugee populations.

5. Demographic Developments: From Christian Predominance to Religious Diversity

By the late 20th century evidence from census data (Statistics New Zealand, various reports) suggest a close link between ethnic diversity and religious diversity. And, in more recent years, while the number of Christians has decreased, the numbers of believers of other faiths have increased. Although still a small percentage of the total population, they nevertheless are part of the changing religious landscape where diversity and not a relative homogeneity is the watchword. The recent (2013) census of the New Zealand population certainly produced some surprises, including that,

as compared to the 1906 census when 92.9% of the then population of slightly less than one million recorded as Christian, now only 45.1% of the population (4.2 million) so identified themselves.[1] Whilst in one hundred years the raw number of Christians has more than doubled, from c. 881,000 to c. 1,913,000; as a proportion of the total populace the Christian bloc has halved. But perhaps what is more significant in terms of comparison is that in 1956, out of a population of 2,174,062 there were about 1,906,650 Christians (87.7%). Thus over the whole of the past half century or so total numbers have barely increased (not by virtue of remaining static, rather by a process of increase then steady erosion) but the demographic proportion has declined dramatically. What changed? Basically, two things—and these are found elsewhere in many secular western societies—namely an increase in religiously diverse populations, and an increase in the numbers who eschew any particular religious identity. In New Zealand's case, 1906 saw some 4,768 persons (c. 0.5%) in total recorded as belonging to a religion other than Christianity, in 1956 it was 6,612 (c. 0.3%—a proportionate decline) but in 2013 this had become 245,223 (5.98%).

Clearly, at almost 6% other religions are not a major component of the population as such. Diversity is present but not obvious. Yet significant demographic shift and development has taken place over recent decades, and is set to continue. A process of demographic change is underway. And this has consequences for religious diversity. For example, whereas Zoroastrians went from only 4 persons in 1956 to 972 in 2013, Buddhists leapt from 111 to over 58,000 in the same period, and Sikhs likewise from 133 to 19,191. But the largest growth has been that of Hindu adherents who went from about 1600 in 1956, to around 17,500 in 1990 and just on 90,000 at the 2013 census. Muslim increase was from 200 (1956), to some 6000 (1990) and around 46,000 in 2013. Jews were around 3800 in 1956 and in 2013 are at 6867. But in 2013 two new categories were included: Spiritualism/New Age (18,285) and Maori religion (2,595). The category 'Maori religion' reflects developments within contemporary Maori culture either toward a secular position, especially in the case of many urbanised Maori (and most Maori today are of mixed race and culture), or toward an intentional attempt to recover elements of 'lost' Maori religion and so religious identity.

Overall, it is evident that religion in New Zealand is diversifying, but arguably such diversity was not the main factor contributing to the decline of the proportional share of Christianity. That is more directly attributed to the dramatic rise in the population of persons recorded as having no religion (1906 = 1,709; 1956 = 12,651; 2013 = 1,635,345). In half a century this category has moved from less than 1% of the population to over 38%. Add to that the two long-standing census categories concerning religion: 'Object to answering' and 'Not stated' (combined figures: 1906 = 2.8%; 1956 = 8.8%; 2013 = 12.3%) and the proportion of the population abjuring any religious identity is now sitting on 50%, and climbing. So, in broad terms, we might say roughly half the population is religious, and half not. But if the half that are religious in terms of the census were fully active and engaged in the life of faith, religious leaders would be rejoicing.

In point of fact census religious identity is not, and never has been, reflected in life-of-faith behaviours, and that has been a sociological reality for a long time. Nevertheless, the chief conclusion drawn from this cursory examination of demographic changes vis-à-vis religion is that New Zealand can be said to lead the world in terms of secularism—provided this term is understood in its popular usage as denoting non- or irreligion, and not in what I would regard as the more usual sociological sense of denoting social acceptance of religious diversity *per se* and a social policy of equal allowance and treatment of diverse religious identities (Dobbelcare, 2002). New Zealand is officially secular in this latter sense, but popular discourse often belies a tendency to equate 'secular society' as one where religion is absent from the public domain, if not from society absolutely. Although there is evidence to suggest census disavowal of religious identity cannot rule out a propensity to hold various supernatural beliefs, advocates of ideological secularism trumpet the decline of Christianity as a triumph for rational humanism, and sometimes not even that. However, it seems often they are puzzled, or blind to—or in some cases even fearful of—the rise of other religions. But that is another matter.

A useful comparison of religiosity, as measured by census returns that aggregate religious categories, alongside categories indicative on no religion, yields the following in respect of recent data (see Table 1).

Table 1. Census returns.

Country/Year	% religious	% no-religion
New Zealand 2013	51.1%	38.6%
Australia 2011	68.3%	22.3%
USA 2008	83.1%	16.1%
Canada 2011	76.5%	23.5%
UK 2011	67.7%	25.1%

Sources: Statistics New Zealand 2013 Census; Australia 2011 Census; US 2008 Pew Center Report; Pew Report of Canada's Religious Landscape, 2013; UK Office for National Statistics 2011 Census.

[1] The census data has been comparatively analysed by Dr. Todd Nachowitz (2007), whilst a PhD candidate in the Political Science and Public Policy programme of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Waikato. I am grateful to Dr. Nachowitz for allowing me free access and use of his material.

Along with a rise in those declaring no-religion, New Zealand has seen a steady numerical decline of those identifying as Christian since the post-WWII peak in the late 50s and early 60s.

6. Ethnic Diversity and Religious Affiliation

As indicated by an analysis of census data, a distinct correlation exists between ethnic diversity and religious affiliation. Europeans constituted 93.7% of the population in 1906. Half a century later the change was miniscule—Europeans were still 92.7%. But in 2013 a considerable change is registered with Europeans now at 74.2%. Still a majority, but a significant decline nonetheless. Maori figures at the same points are 5%, 6.3% and 14.9%, respectively.[2] All others combined hovered around 1% until well into the 20th century when changes due to immigration took hold. In 2013, peoples of Pacific Island origins made up 7.4% of the population, the category of 'Asian' came in at just under 12% and all others combined at just on 3%. Of the nearly half million Asians recorded, Chinese comprise approx. 35% and Indians approx. 33%. The 2013 Census shows a correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation as follows:

- European—Christian: 47.4%; no religion 45.7%; other religions less than 0.50% ea
- Maori—Christian: 46.1%; no religion 44%; other religions less than 0.40% ea
- Pacific—Christian: 73.8%; no religion 16.6%; other religions less than 0.70% ea
- Asian—Buddhist 9.4%; Christian 28.6%; Hindu 18%; Muslim 6%; no religion 29.4%

This is but a snap-shot, not a full picture. But it is sufficient to indicate the nature of the changes to religious diversity that are currently taking place, and will continue to do so as the demographic profile modifies further due to immigration, which is a function not only of policy but also of specific links the country has to the Pacific Islands, and also to Asian countries, especially China—with whom New Zealand was the first Western nation to sign a free trade agreement. In consequence, it is clear there will be significant implications for religious diversity as a direct result of on-going changes to the ethnic composition of the society.

7. The National Religious Diversity Statement

A project of the New Zealand Diversity Action Programme of the New Zealand Human Rights' Commission (HRC), supported by Victoria University of Wellington and the Ministry of Social Development, the 'Religious Diversity in New Zealand' document which was launched in 2007 seeks to provide a basis for raising awareness and promoting ongoing discussion of contemporary religious plurality in the country. It also aims to articulate aspirational ideals for the guidance of the wider community in matters of religion. It sets out a number of principles which are grounded in international human rights treaties and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. These include freedom of religion, conscience, and belief; freedom of expression; the right to safety and security; the right to reasonable accommodation of diverse religious practices in various settings.

The Statement has been endorsed by a wide range of faith communities and leaders as well as many citizens, of various religious persuasions, who wish to see a better public climate for the acceptance and discussion of religion within society. Many individuals endorsed, supported, and even contributed to the development of the Statement. It is largely regarded as representing a positive step in promoting better awareness and acceptance of religious diversity beyond the simple ethic of tolerance that has long been characteristic of New Zealand's social mores. And today this ethic, in the glare of hostile light trained upon the global hotspots of religious extremism, is under threat. From a post-WWII period when there was a climate of tolerance and liberal acceptance that often undergirded interest in the 'other', whether cultural, religious, or both, there is now an increasing xenophobia and reaction to the suspicion of a hostile other—as seen, for instance, in the current global phenomenon of Islamophobia. These are major factors which the Statement seeks to address, among others.

Early in the 21st century many western secular governments, previously none too concerned with their religious constituency so long as the peace was not disturbed, began, in the aftermath of 9/11, to address both counter-terrorism and the promotion of religious harmony as a matter of new social policy. Although being intensely secular in the sense that, apart from the daily prayer which opens the proceedings of parliament when in session, government in New Zealand has nothing to do with religion. It is a private matter for citizens to pursue as they see fit. Nevertheless the New Zealand government in 2004 joined with a number of other governments in the Southeast Asia and South Pacific region to meet more or less annually

[2] There are few, if any, full-blood Maori. Racial intermingling has been very widespread. However, by law, a person who can claim even one Maori in their ancestral lineage may register as Maori. Further, Maori culture has a strong communal dimension: being Maori means having a place of belonging not only within an immediate family (*whanau*) but also a wider familial group (*hapu*), and through that, affiliation to a sub-tribe and/or major tribe (*iwi*). It is tribes who have settled disputes and grievances with the Crown, arising from 19th century land confiscations and other abuses, upon which compensation has been settled in the order of millions of dollars in land and cash. Being identified as Maori no longer attracts the opprobrium it once did.

for a formal regional interfaith dialogue (Bouma, Ling, & Pratt, 2010). The emerging globalised expressions of a religiously motivated terrorism were brought closer to home by the Bali bombing in 2005, and perhaps even more so by the London bombings that same year—many more New Zealanders are familiar with the London Underground than they are with Balinese beaches. Thus wider political initiative and interaction sparked the awareness that something was needed at a local (national) level.

Indeed, the idea for a national statement concerning religious diversity grew directly from the New Zealand delegation that attended the first regional interfaith dialogue in Yogyakarta, Indonesia (the Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation) in 2004. In effect, the proposal to create such a statement constituted part of the New Zealand response to concerns that interfaith harmony, as a tool of counter-radicalization, ought to be something of a political priority within the countries of the region.

As it happened, with the facilitative support of the Human Rights Commission and led by Professor Paul Morris of the Religious Studies Department at Victoria University, Wellington, the Statement was developed between 2004 and 2007. Morris had attended the first regional interfaith forum as a member of the New Zealand delegation. A public consultative process was pursued, together with the involvement of an ad hoc multi-faith reference group convened in Wellington, to draw up an initial draft.[3] As a product of that process, the statement was first published in 2007 with a print-run of 10,000 funded by New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO. It was soon endorsed by a wide range of faith communities and leaders and a second, revised, edition was published in 2009 in English and nine other languages.[4]

Four chief reasons (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 5) underlying the Statement are given, namely the perceived need for a wide-ranging public discussion about religious diversity as such; the reality of instances of religious discrimination drawing attention to the need for awareness of religious rights, especially regarding minority groups; a recognition that increased religious diversity was impacting on many aspects of social and cultural life and in some cases resulting in discord, even violence—most typically the occasional assault on an individual; most dramatically the firebombing of a mosque in 1998, although for most the reference to religious violence is elsewhere, overseas; and the need for a succinct resource to which people may turn for some initial information and guidance.

In a society such as New Zealand, where the very consciousness of the presence of religion can disrupt and disturb the secular presumption of the absence of religion from public life, the Statement provides a basis for discussion of and about religious diversity. It affirms that the State seeks to treat all faith communities and those who profess no religion equally before the law. Following a Foreword from the Prime Minister, the booklet carrying the Statement comprises an Introduction followed by the eight clauses of the Statement. A note on the origins of the Statement, a succinct yet detailed commentary on the each of the clauses, acknowledgements and endorsements recorded at the time of printing, are also included.

The Introduction (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 2) states quite straightforwardly that "New Zealand is a country of many faiths, with a significant minority who profess no religion. Increasing religious diversity is a significant feature of public life". The foundation for affirming this diversity is implied in an assurance, given by Governor Hobson, at the time of the signing of the 1840 *Treaty of Waitangi* between the Crown and the Maori Chiefs: "the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also Māori custom shall alike be protected". The role the Christian religion has played, and continues to do so, with respect to the development of the overarching national "identity, culture, beliefs, institutions and values," is acknowledged (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 2). Nevertheless, demographic change as a result of recent immigration is recognised to now be a driver of religious diversity: "It is in this context that we recognise the right to religion and the responsibilities of religious communities."

Furthermore, the Introduction situates the affirmation of diversity within the context of Human Rights and the fact New Zealand is a signatory to a number of international treaties, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, which uphold the right to freedom of religion and belief. This includes the right to *hold* a belief; the right to *change* one's religion or belief; the right to *express* one's religion or belief and the right *not to hold* a belief. These are reflected in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act, enacted in 1990 and 1993 respectively. The point is made that the right to religion entails affording this right to others and not infringing their human rights in respect to religious identity.

The eight clauses of the statement on religious diversity are as follows:

1. The State and Religion: *The State seeks to treat all faith communities and those who profess no religion equally before the law. New Zealand has no official or established religion.*

[3] The Statement is obtainable as a downloadable pdf from the Commission website: www.hrc.co.nz

[4] These languages are: Arabic, Chinese, Gujarat, Hindi, Korean, Maori, Punjabi, Tongan and Samoan.

2. The Right to Religion: *New Zealand upholds the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religious or other belief.*
3. The Right to Safety: *Faith communities and their members have a right to safety and security.*
4. The Right of Freedom of Expression: *The right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media are vital for democracy but should be exercised with responsibility.*
5. Recognition and Accommodation: *Reasonable steps should be taken in educational and work environments and in the delivery of public services to recognise and accommodate diverse religious beliefs and practices.*
6. Education: *Schools should teach an understanding of different religious and spiritual traditions in a manner that reflects the diversity of their national and local community.*
7. Religious Differences: *Debate and disagreement about religious beliefs will occur but must be exercised within the rule of law and without resort to violence.*
8. Cooperation and Understanding: *Government and faith communities have a responsibility to build and maintain positive relationships with each other, and to promote mutual respect and understanding.*

The Statement includes a commentary expanding on each clause. Some of the key points are as follows:

1. The State and Religion. The history of religion and religious diversity in New Zealand, beginning with the variety of Christian denominations and the accommodation of non-religious perspectives in "perfect political equality" is noted (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 7) and attention drawn to the context of there being neither a strict constitutional demarcation nor the presence of a state religion; the country is, in effect, religiously neutral *qua* State, though historically—and until recently—dominantly Christian so far as the population is concerned.
2. The Right to Religion. Human rights legislation and norms are alluded to with specific mention of "the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of religion of other non-religious ethical beliefs" (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 7).
3. The Right to Safety. In a context where there are occasional outbursts of vandalism of religious property and abuse directed to persons of faith, the right to be safe, in terms of both persons and property, is upheld. And this includes "the broader sense of being secure in being different" (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 7).
4. The Right to Freedom of Expression. The importance to a democratic state of freedom of expression and of the media is acknowledged along with the need for these to be exercised in a responsible manner, both with "the right to religious expression and the right to express views about religion" (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 8).
5. Recognition and Accommodation. The motif of "reasonableness" applied here is directly referenced to existing legislation. It goes to the heart of a positive apprehension of religious diversity within wider society: customs and practices that express the identity and life of those who are ethnically and religiously different need to be allowed for, and this includes "different dress codes and schedules and calendars for prayer and holy days" (*Statement on Religious Diversity in Aotearoa New Zealand*, 2009, p. 8).
6. Education. The nature of the history of secular education in New Zealand is noted, and a strong emphasis is placed on the need for genuine education about religion and religions, especially in a context of increased diversity and tensions arising from that diversity largely based on ignorance and suspicion. It is also noted that some of the best such educational programmes are found in Roman Catholic and Anglican integrated schools. Ironically, it is the education of some religiously confessional schools that serves the interests of the study of religion in a way completely lacking within the State school system.
7. Religious Differences. The potential for difference to lead to dissension is recognised, with the caveat that tensions arising from a clash of deeply held different, especially conflicting, beliefs and perspectives need to be managed within the law.
8. Cooperation and Understanding. Responsibilities accompany rights: the desire to live in peaceful mutuality of respect requires to be worked at. This is a duty resting on social, cultural and political institutions and individuals alike.

There is, of course, little in the statement that is new *per se*, or otherwise not to be found in existing legislation. However, as the Statement itself notes, its intention is to be aspirational; to focus attention upon religious diversity as such and so provide a platform for addressing issues that may from time to time arise from the fact of this diversity. It is a bold attempt at a public statement about religion in a society whose

dominant and unexamined public understanding of 'being secular' would seem to amount to 'ignoring religion'. Certainly this is the case with the secular press: it is not that it is 'secular' in the sense it is not owned by a religious body; its very secularity is a stance taken that is a priori dismissive of matters religious—unless, being contentious, they either bring religion into disrepute, or else confirm religion as belonging to the realm of the ridiculous. Thus attempts to gain media interest in and exposure of such a positive development as suggested by even the fact of the statement—let alone some good developments since, as noted below—have been singularly unsuccessful.

8. Reception of the Statement

The Statement was first presented at the National Interfaith Forum held in Hamilton, New Zealand, in February 2007. This gathering, comprising interested individuals—it is not in any sense formally representative of religious communities as such—endorsed the Statement and urged communities to engage with it as a means of promoting dialogue and understanding. Subsequent to that event, the formal launch by the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, occurred at the *Asia Pacific Regional Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation*. This May 2007 event was a meeting of the Southeast Asia and Pacific annual Regional Interfaith Dialogue Forum that had begun in 2004 (Pratt, 2010b).

Although widely received and attracting formal endorsement from Church and other faith community leaders, there was early strident opposition from some Christian quarters—broadly speaking, those who might be identified as 'evangelical-conservative' or simply 'right-wing' Christians. In other words, the very inception of the Statement attracted resistance from some Christians, among them the ultra-conservative Destiny Church, which did not wish to admit the acceptance of religious diversity. It wanted instead to promote the notion that New Zealand is exclusively a Christian country. Brian Tamaki, the self-appointed 'Bishop' leading this Church, proclaimed opposition to any promotion of religious diversity in New Zealand. Although resiling from advocating the outright expulsion of other religions, he nonetheless asserted that "alternative or foreign religions" should "not be afforded equal status" with Christianity. Tamaki represented an extreme conservative view that identifies "opening the door to a diversity of religions" with "dismantling our own Christian heritage" (New Zealand Herald, 2007).

This was not unlike similar exclusivist resistance to religious diversity as experienced in Australia (Bouma, 2012, 2013). Closer Economic Relations (CER) protocols between Australia and New Zealand, and other bilateral arrangements, are not the only forms of cultural connections that link these two countries—otherwise separated by over 1200 miles of ocean, as well as very different colonial histories and governmental arrangements. In the case of religion, many contemporary conservative evangelical Christian Churches and organisations enjoy trans-Tasman links and exchanges of personnel with the result of that there can be found similarities of religious outlook and theology. But resistance to a statement affirming of religious diversity was not just found in certain right-wing Christian quarters. It was also objected to by secular humanists, mostly by way of letters to the editor in local newspapers, who did not wish to see any apparent privileging of religion as such. Clearly, in differing ways, such a statement hit a raw nerve.

With a measure of support from some other conservative Christians for whom also the notion that New Zealand is not, officially, a Christian country was both novel and objectionable, Destiny Church New Zealand staged a demonstration outside the May 2007 Waitangi meeting and launch to express opposition to the Statement's reference to the separation of Church and state, arguing that New Zealand should, in fact, be a Christian state. Some representatives of Destiny Church and the Exclusive Brethren had also appeared at the February Interfaith Forum to voice their opposition. They were given a polite hearing and, ironically for them, experienced a measure of that tolerance and acceptance which inheres to the secular context of religious diversity to which they were objecting.

In existence now for a few years, the Statement may not be as well or as widely known as it should be, but it is readily available via internet sources and well referenced in respect to ongoing interfaith activities and resources (see Human Rights Commission, 2012). There is arguably a work of promotion and education that is yet to take place, although an interesting recent development is the inception of a new organisation, The Religious Diversity Centre in Aotearoa New Zealand, to be officially launched in early 2016. The Trust backing this new development has as its first aim that of providing "high quality research and educational resources on religious diversity" and references in its Trust Deed the Statement on Religious Diversity.

9. Engaging Religious Diversity

Along with the Statement, its reception, on-going influence, and use as a document of reference, there have been a number of other relevant initiatives and activities worth noting as they exemplify the affirmation of religious diversity within a context of social inclusion.

The Human Rights Commission (HRC) carries out many statutory functions as well as exercising initiative in promoting the greater good. Among the latter is its work in facilitating a national interfaith network, producing a monthly electronic interfaith newsletter, and its facilitating of the development of the Statement on Religious Diversity in the first place. In 2007, the Com-

missioner, Joris de Bres, observed that although an arm of secular government,

> "The primary functions of the Commission under the Human Rights Act are to promote respect for human rights, and to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious relationships between the diverse groups that make up New Zealand society. No other public agency has such a clear statutory mandate to promote the right to religion (including the right not to hold a religious belief), and to promote understanding between faith communities….This does not in any way compromise the secular nature of the Commission or the separation of church and state: the state has as much of a responsibility to engage with citizens who share a community of belief as they do with those who share a community of culture, ethnicity or geography." (de Bres, 2007, p. 9)

Together with promoting the Statement, the HRC publishes a monthly e-newsletter (*Te Korowai Whakapono*) which has to do with all sorts of religious diversity matters. The HRC is behind the New Zealand Diversity Action Programme of which an Interfaith Network is one of a number facilitated by the Commission. Each August the HRC organises a religious diversity forum within its larger annual New Zealand Diversity Forum. It also publishes, within the annual Race Relations Report, a review of religious diversity developments. The HRC has produced a range of relevant sundry publications and is active in dealing with discrimination complaints involving religion and belief. In general terms, the Commission promotes freedom of religion and belief and the harmonious relations between people of different beliefs in a context of growing religious diversity of New Zealanders, in large measure as a result of increased immigration from Asia and elsewhere. Furthermore, global tensions and the rise of Islamophobia since the terror attacks of 9/11, as well as subsequent terrorist events, have made of religion and religious diversity an important human rights issue in New Zealand. Significant attention has been paid to the Muslim community (Pratt, 2010a, 2011).

The Office of Ethnic Affairs of the New Zealand government is also active in the field of religious diversity and the promotion of interreligious and intercultural relations. It provides a focal point for the United Nations' *Alliance of Civilizations* programme. Given the close linking of ethnic and religious diversity that tends to take place, the Office works across a wide range of ethnic communities and religious organisations that overlap including, in particular, the Muslim community and *inter alia* the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand. It has pursued with this community a 'Building Bridges' project and hosted events such as in 2013 'The Muslim World Forum'.

Other positive responses to the fact of religious diversity include, since 2003, the holding of a regular, almost annual, National Interfaith Forum. As noted above, it was at one of these (2007) that the Statement was endorsed prior to being officially launched. In the foreseeable future, a likely pattern will be a bi-annual national gathering with, in the alternate years, one or more regional interfaith events. Since the 1990s there has been a gradual development of Regional Interfaith Councils or Forums. Although there is no overarching national Interfaith Council as such, the loose networking between the regional groups seems to be proving effective and workable. Indeed, there is resistance to having energies channelled into the establishment and maintenance of any interfaith bureaucracy. In this context, the ongoing facilitative support of the HRC, and to a lesser extent the Office of Ethnic Affairs, is important. However, it does tend to reinforce a public perception that religious diversity is more a sub-set of ethnic diversity and Human Rights concerns as opposed being but one societal response as a direct affirmation of religious diversity as such.

There are also a number of active bilateral councils, some of which have been quite long-standing. These include, for the most part, Councils for Christians and Jews (CCJ) and Councils for Christians and Muslims (CCM). At times, such as in the major city of Auckland, these councils organise joint events and consultations. And various faith communities, including many of the Churches—notably Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, and Methodist—also have their own interfaith committees and/or allied structures with an interfaith component. The ebb and flow of organisational energy and priority notwithstanding, interfaith engagement seems to becoming a more integrated aspect of many religious communities, as opposed to being a comparative fringe activity for enthusiasts. But even this assessment may be somewhat optimistic.

A number of legal measures have been put in place that recognize and support religious diversity. These include an amendment to the Holidays Act in 2010 to allow the transfer of public holidays, such as Christmas and Easter, to days of other personal religious or cultural significance and, in 2011, a review of immigration policy to better provide for the immigration of religious workers. A number of significant resources have also been forthcoming in recent times, including the New Zealand Police manual, *A Practical Reference to Religious Diversity* (2005/2009), among others, for example Pio (2014).

10. Conclusion

New Zealand is an ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse nation, and the depth and nature of that diversity is set to increase. Overall, the European population is declining as a relative proportion compared to the

increasing populations of Maori, Pacific Islanders, Asian and just about all other minor categories as well. The number and proportion of people at census time being recorded as having no religion looks set to increase. Significantly, since 2001 the total increase of those registering no religious affiliation has risen by almost 60%. It now comprises the largest single category after Christianity. And, as at 2013, the sum of all non-Christian religions combined is only about one third more than those who mark 'Object to answering' the question. It is clear the decline in the total Christian population is more a result of rising non-religious identity than it is a reflection of demographic changes wrought by immigration, although it is nevertheless true that among recent immigrants, especially from China, it is likely a good proportion profess no religious identity. In this context of changing demographics and increased religious diversification, the New Zealand Statement on Religious Diversity is both a beacon and a challenge. Only time will tell if the sentiments and hopes expressed therein result in lasting positive outcomes. But unless there is renewed effort to make good on the aspirational hopes and actions embedded in the Statement, such as in respect to Schools teaching "an understanding of different religious and spiritual traditions" for example—an aspiration that remains as red rag to a bull for many who confuse being secular with being non-religious—what time is likely to tell is the fading of a dream of true social inclusion in the face of religious apathy and rejection. Certainly it would seem since the demise of the Clark (Labour) government, the recent years of the Key (National) government displays much less interest in, let alone support of, interfaith matters and engagements within wider society, reflecting the default position of treating religion as an entirely private affair, not something that should concern the organs of state.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Secularities, Diversities and Pluralities: Understanding the Challenges of Religious Diversity in Latin America

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Abstract
Latin America is experiencing today the greatest religious diversity in its entire history. However, it must also be noted that a large number of the growing religious minorities may be classified into types of Christianity with conservative overtones. In this paper we will suggest that the literature streams on multiple secularities in contemporary (Western) societies and religious diversity in Latin America do offer insightful perspectives yet fail to adequately convey the challenges raised by the religious across contemporary Latin America. Addressing Latin America's historical background, we will distinguish conceptually and empirically among different degrees of secularities, diversities and pluralities and will construct with these distinctions a descriptive-normative model that can guide future analyses of secular and religious phenomena in Latin America. It is only through a comprehensive understanding of diversities, pluralities and secularities that the debates on those human rights crucial for social inclusion—from sexual and reproductive rights to gender and religious equality—can be fruitfully conducted in and beyond Latin America.

Keywords
Christian hegemony; multiple secularities; pluralism; religious diversity

Issue
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1. Introduction

Different realities require different analytical approaches and policy responses. Latin America,[1] like any other macro-region, has a complex religious history, ranging from the colonial predominance of Catholicism between the 16th and 19th centuries to a manifest multiplicity of religions in the last decades. However, whereas other world regions might have similar histories of colonial evangelizing regimes and comparable landscapes of religious diversity, the complexity of the Latin American experiences cannot be equated with the complexity of those regions' religious histories and configurations. In this paper we argue that perspectival biases in the idea of multiple secularities and conceptual inaccuracies in the analysis of religious diversities in Latin America may be contributing to misunderstandings of the challenges associated with social inclusion that the region faces today.

Firstly, we will offer a legal historical overview of Latin America's colonial background. We will argue that such a background and its religious dogmatism cannot be neglected in comprehensive accounts of contemporary religious issues in Latin America. In our view, such

[1] In this paper the term "Latin America" encompasses only Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries on the mainland. The Caribbean requires a separate analysis due to its diverse historical experiences (e.g. the Cuban path towards state atheism in the aftermath of the Revolution).

accounts must also include reflections about the fact that the growing religious minorities in Latin America are mostly *Christian* minorities. We will then address the literature that deals with "multiple secularities" across the globe and the literature that analyses religious diversity in Latin America. We will point out the former's underrating of post-colonial cases and the latter's conceptual imprecisions regarding Christian minorities, religious diversity and pluralism. Our analysis will suggest how these gaps are detrimental to the understanding of secular and religious phenomena in Latin America. After these preparatory discussions, we will present a descriptive-normative analytical model that can be used to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the religious fields in Latin America and their multiple degrees of secularities, diversities and pluralities. We will conclude with the observation that, by identifying and reflecting upon those complexities and degrees, it is possible to discuss with more precision the impact of religious phenomena on human rights and, by extension, on social inclusion.

2. Religious Diversity in Latin America: A Legal Historical Overview

In 1493 (shortly after receiving news about the West Indies), the Pope granted to the Spanish kings the administrative control of the Catholic Church in the new territories, later confirming this decision with the Papal Bulls of 1501 and 1508; in 1514 he extended this privilege to the Portuguese kings. The system was called Royal Patronage (*Patronato Real* or *Padroado Real*). Iberian crowns enjoyed the prerogative of appointing bishops in their colonies; hence, the civil and ecclesiastical administrations often overlapped. The Iberian empires throughout the colony banned non-Catholic religions (particularly Judaism, Islam and Protestantism) in the Americas with relative success. The Spaniards adopted a cross-and-sword policy of expulsion and forced Christianization in both the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas (Prien, 2013, pp. 3-11). Small numbers of Jews and Muslims fled to America after being expelled from Spain (1492) and Portugal (1497), but many of them converted to Christianity to avoid persecution from the Inquisition. A few native peoples (e.g. Cunas, Mapuches, Amazonian Indians) managed to escape from Iberian rule and were able to maintain, to a great extent, their cultural identity; similarly, Africans who escaped slavery and formed autonomous settlements could partially preserve their religious traditions. But most African and indigenous peoples (were) converted to Christianity—though some of their beliefs and religious practices remained, hidden, through syncretism (Rauhut, 2012). The absence of competing religions resulted in an absolute religious intolerance. While in Europe the Augsburg principle *cuius regio, eius religio* could not be effectively enforced, leading to a proliferation of edicts of religious tolerance throughout the continent, the Iberian empires in America implemented the Inquisition's goal of the systematic control and extermination of sects, heretics and nonbelievers (Chuchiak, 2012). The region became the ultimate expression of the Iberian Counter-Reformation and was unable to develop any significant form of social conviviality with other religions for almost four centuries.

After the wars of independence (early 19th century), relations between church and state became a central dispute between the emergent political factions: liberals, who usually advocated for religious tolerance and encouraged secular authorities, and conservatives, who aligned themselves with the Catholic Church as a rule. Although liberals dominated the new governments, they were aware that religion was a powerful force for social cohesion in the effort to build a national identity in the political chaos of the post-independence era. Thus, they assured the clergy that the Catholic Church would preserve its privileges. As a matter of fact, all the new nations were confessional states, and the Roman curia was forced to allow the new countries patronage rights (Prien, 2013, pp. 277-278, 291-297). All Latin American Constitutions of the early nineteenth century declared their unrestricted, and in some cases perpetual, devotion to Catholicism as the state religion; in some cases, even private worship in other faiths was banned.[2] All Latin American Constitutions adopted shortly after the Spanish *Reconquista* and restoration (1814–1820) maintained confessional clauses, excluding any other religion.[3] Two centuries later, Costa Rica remains as the only confessional State in Latin America. Non-confessional constitutions in the mid-nineteenth introduced freedom of worship and religious tolerance, allowing missionary Protestantism and immigration by Protestants,[4] especially in Brazil and the Southern Cone. Nevertheless, Catholicism was preserved as the state religion.[5] In 1910, at

[2] Cf. e.g. Article 1 (Chapter I) of the 1811 Federal Constitution of Venezuela; Article 4 (Title I) of the 1812 Constitution of the Republic of Cundinamarca; Article 10 of the 1823 Constitution of Chile.

[3] Cf. e.g. Article 8 of the 1823 Constitution of Peru; Article 5 of the 1824 Constitution of the Empire of Brazil; Article 5 of the 1824 Constitution of El Salvador; Article 11 of the 1824 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Central America; Article 3 of the 1824 Constitution of Mexico; Article 45 of the 1825 Constitution of Guatemala; Article 5 of the 1825 Constitution of Honduras; Article 3 of the 1828 Constitution of Chile; Article 8 of the 1830 Constitution of Ecuador; Article 6 of the 1831 Constitution of Bolivia.

[4] Mostly from German-speaking countries, Denmark and the Netherlands.

[5] According to Prien (2013, p. 360), several constitutions granted religious tolerance, while preserving Catholicism as the state religion; for instance, in the *Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata's* (1819), and later in those of Argentina (1853), Brazil (1825), Uruguay (1830), Paraguay (1870), Chile (1833) and its

least 94% of Latin Americans were Roman Catholics; this percentage remained practically unchanged until the 1980s (Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 26).

Today, non-confessional constitutions represent the absolute majority in the region. Nevertheless, there are notable differences, resulting from dissimilar historical paths and domestic political dynamics. Nine constitutions make at least a passing reference to God in their preambles (Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru). The concept of morals, which is invoked as a restriction on some rights and freedoms connected with religion, explicitly derives from one single religious tradition (Catholicism) in Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru. In some countries (e.g. Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru) religious instruction in public schools is based on Christian values. The right to conscientious objection to military service for religious beliefs is not recognized in several countries. In sum, when comparing Latin America's contemporary challenges associated with religious diversity and social inclusion to those in other world regions, one should consider the crucial role of the colonial experience in understanding the absolute predominance of one religion to the exclusion of any other; this background yielded divergent secularization processes, with specific regional and national paths, dynamics and targets.

3. Religious Diversity in Contemporary Latin America

Latin American nominal Catholics amount to nearly 40% of the world Catholic population (Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 4; Parker, 2005, p. 36). However, the percentage of people identifying as Catholic has fallen significantly. According to Latinobarómetro (2014, p. 4), the percentage of Roman Catholics fell from 80% in 1995 to 67% in 2013. A recent report by the Pew Research Center (2014a, p. 14) suggests that there are some countries in Latin America whose nominal Catholics may amount to half (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) or less than half (Honduras and Uruguay) of the total population. Atheism, however, has not necessarily increased.[6] The emergence of non-Catholic religions and organizations in Latin America has been acknowledged and studied in a number of works by social scientists (e.g., Beltran, 2011; Bidegain & Demera, 2005; De la Torre & Gutiérrez, 2007, 2008; Fediakova, 2007; Ferre, Gerstenblüth, & Rossi, 2009; Forni, Mallimaci, & Cárdenas, 2003; Freston, 2011; Garma, 2007; Garvin, 2005; Parker, 2005, 2012). In these works the concept of religious diversity has been put forward as an unmistakable fact in contemporary Latin America. The religious predominance that Catholicism enjoyed until the second half of the twentieth century has indeed been challenged by expanding religious minorities.

However, there is a factual particularity that is worth pointing out. The growing non-Catholic minorities in Latin America are mostly *Christian*[7] minorities. Describing Latin America as "the world center of Christianity" (Freston, 2012, p. 80; our translation) might perhaps be an over-statement, but it is an unequivocal fact that the majority of the non-Catholic minorities spreading across Latin America are historical or emergent forms of Protestantism. In this sense, we observe two complimentary processes of religious migration: an inter-American flow of religious denominations and a conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism. The former is a process that spreads from the United States and Brazil towards the rest of the continent. Apart from the historical Protestants who arrived starting in the 19th century, the first agents of this migration wave were U.S. missionaries who were no longer allowed to travel to China after 1949 and were sent instead to Latin America (Prien, 2013, p. 553). With the exception of Uruguay, a wide spectrum of Anglo-American denominations has achieved a remarkable presence in all Latin American countries, in particular, in Brazil and Central America (Table 1); these include Baptists, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Adventists. Additionally, several Brazilian Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches have also penetrated the Andean region and other Latin American countries—e.g. the *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* and *Deus é Amor*.

It could be said that the migration process above is being consolidated or extended through a complimentary process of conversion. That is, current religious minorities are also the result of individuals who decide to convert (Freston, 2012) to another Christian religion. At least a third of current Protestants were raised as Catholic and half or more say they were baptized as Catholics. Interestingly, 60% of converts to Evangelicalism said that one reason they left the Catholic Church was their desire for a more assertive teaching on moral questions and greater commitment, reflected in conservative positions on typical hot-button issues (Pew Research Center, 2014a, pp. 5-6). The resulting religious landscape is a particular one.

If figures from the latest survey by the Pew Research Center (2014a) are considered, only 8% of the total population in Latin America would be religiously unaffiliated, and 88% would be Christian (19% Protestants and 69% Catholics). Results from the World

Ley Interpretativa (1865), Bolivia (1906), Peru (1915), Venezuela (1874), Honduras (1848, 1865, 1873) and Costa Rica (1860).

[6] In countries like Chile and Uruguay, however, the numbers of atheists, agnostics and religiously unaffiliated has remarkably increased (Pew Research Center, 2014a).

[7] By referring to this comprehensive category, we want to convey not an idea of hierarchical "varieties" of a single religion (Catholicism) but their theological, ritualistic and socio-political coincidences—regardless of whether these are seen as derivative or independent.

Table 1. Percentage of Catholics and Protestants.

	Country	Estimated Population 2013 (millions)	Catholics	Protestants/ Evangelicals	Total Christians
Countries with absolute Catholic dominance (>70%)	Paraguay	6.6	90%	6%	96%
	Mexico	116.2	83%	5%	88%
	Peru	29.8	81%	13%	94%
	Ecuador	15.4	80%	11%	91%
	Colombia	45.7	80%	14%	94%
	Bolivia	10.5	78%	16%	94%
	Argentina	42.6	76%	5%	81%
	Panama	3.6	75%	20%	95%
	Chile	17.2	70%	15%	85.%
Countries with significant Evangelical influence (>20%)	Brazil	201	64.6%	22%	86.6%
	Costa Rica	4.7	63%	23%	86%
	Guatemala	14.4	59%	36%	95%
	Nicaragua	5.8	53%	28%	81%
	El Salvador	6.1	51%	33%	84%
	Honduras	8.4	47%	36%	83%
Countries without religious dominance	Uruguay	3.3	45%	10%	55%

Source: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. International Religious Freedom Report for 2013.

Table 2. Percentage of Christians and non-Christians.

Affiliation/Country	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Peru	Uruguay
Total Christians*	71.2	78.9	75	77.1	76.1	86.8	31.2
Total non-Christians	10.9	5.6	0.2	1.1	0.3	1.7	7.5
Other; Not specific	9.7	1.2	0	0.9	0.3	1.4	7.3
Spiritist	0	3.5	0	0	0	0	0
Espirit, candomble, umbanda, esoterism, occultism	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Buddhist	0.5	0.2	0	0.1	0	0	0
Hindu	0.2	0	0.1	0	0	0.2	0
Jew	0.3	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0.2
Muslim	0.2	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
None	16.9	15	23.1	21.4	23.5	10.1	60.7
Don't know/No answer	0.9	0.6	1.7	0.3	0.1	1.5	0.6
N=	1,030	1,486	1,000	1,512	1,202	1,210	1,000

Source: Adapted from figures obtained through World Values Survey's online-analysis tool, wave 6, 2010–2014. * Roman Catholics, Protestants, Christians, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons, 7th Day Adventists and Orthodox.

Values Survey are somewhat more conservative, but the pattern is also noticeable. Table 2 presents the most recent figures (waves 2011–2014) from the World Values Survey on religious denominations in some countries in Latin America. Although there are exceptional cases like Uruguay, this survey suggests that more than 70% of the population in Latin America is nominally Christian even in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, where non-Christian minorities are comparatively significant.

If the figures in Table 2 are compared, for example, to the more even distribution in the Asia-Pacific zone of Christians (7%), Muslims (24%), Unaffiliated (21%), Hindus (25%), Buddhists (12%), Folk religions (9%), Other religions (1%) and Jews (<1%) (Pew Research Center, 2014b), it is possible to state that the "religious diversity" label might have been used in Latin America too liberally and without the necessary nuances. Granted, the unique institutional/group identity, the doctrinal-theological specificities, and the particular socio-political histories of Christian minorities—as well as the diversity within Catholicism[8]—must be acknowl-

[8] Catholicism, as a global religion, is not only a mirror of the diverse societies where it can be found (Levine 2014), it also comprises a number of sub-institutions (e.g. religious orders, convents, schools, charities, etc.) and hierarchical structures (e.g. parishes, dioceses, bishoprics) whose direction by different individuals or groups across a multiplicity of historical peri-

edged and carefully reflected upon. However, it would be misleading to assume that there are no similarities between some of these minorities' theological principles and moral-political stances and those found in Latin America's Catholicisms. From a global perspective, Latin America still exhibits low levels of diversity, comprising, as it does, a majority of Christian, mostly conservative, confessions. Notwithstanding the theological antagonisms and mutual distrust among Protestants, Evangelicals and Catholics, it is not unusual to find coinciding conservative stances among them on social issues such as marriage, family, sexual orientation, reproductive choices, gender relations, education and personal autonomy. In these areas crucial for social inclusion one could speak of a Christian hegemony. This is characterized by the persistence of unequal rules of the game in the religious market; high control by churches over the educational system; promotion of traditional (Christian) values and views on personal autonomy (which leads to discrimination in workplaces and in schools, for instance); legitimation of sexism, homophobia, transphobia and other forms of discrimination; and/or the criminalization of abortion and stigmatization of women. From a legal point of view, such a framework creates inconsistencies with international human rights standards.

From this brief overview we can conclude that Latin America's religious fields diverge from those in the U.S. and Europe, where challenges arise instead from large waves of immigrants bringing with them their Christian *and non-Christian* religions. Similarly, Latin America's challenges are not those of African and Asian states, which have adopted Islam as an official religion and where minority faiths are discriminated against, conversion is punished, and several forms of religious-related violence are common. The challenges in Latin America are different. While all Latin American countries ban religious discrimination, recognize religious freedom, and protect indigenous religiosity, most of them remain countries where Christian denominations prevail and where religious equality is far from being achieved outside of constitutional texts.

4. Perspectival and Conceptual Shortcomings

In our view, there are two sets of literature on secular and religious diversities that are crucial to understanding Latin America's religious fields. The first offers a comparative framework of multiple secularities across the globe; and the second refers to the religious diversity/pluralism in Latin America. We will argue that there are critical shortcomings in both sets and also potential contributions between them if those very shortcomings are worked out. We will argue that multiple-secularities approaches do not necessarily overcome the west-and-rest discourse and can be further improved by considering the case of Latin America, yet without the conceptual overlapping between the ideas of religious diversity, plurality and pluralism that can be found in some scholarly works on this region.

Modernity in the west-and-rest discourse is conceived as a European innovation that has been globally transferred and whose European standards are the arrival point of every modern society (Hall, 1996). For decades, postcolonial authors have deconstructed this discourse (Boatcă, 2015, pp. 201-226; Costa, 2006, pp. 83-97; see also Bhambra, 2007; Chakrabarty, 2000). Recently, some debates on secularisms and religious diversity have considered the postcolonial critique of Occidentalism and have adopted a "multiple modernities" approach. A group of scholars, for instance, has proposed a model of "multiple secularities" which "acquire different shapes in different countries", for they operate "according to different cultural logics that document specific social histories of conflict"; these secularities, in a sense, "'respond' to specific…reference problems and offer 'solutions' to them" (Schuh, Burchardt, & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2012, p. 358; see also Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). In a later publication, Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr and Middell (2015) accounted for these problems and distinguished four analytically ideal (not normative) types of secularities (see Table 3).

Table 3. Multiple secularities.

Reference Problems	Ideal types (Secularity for the sake of…)
Individual freedom vis-à-vis dominant social units	…individual rights and liberties
Religious heterogeneity and the resulting potential or actual conflictuality	…balancing/pacifying religious diversity
Social or national integration and development	…societal or national integration and development
Independent development of institutional domains	…the independent development of functional domains of society

Source: Own elaboration based on Burchardt et al. (2015).

To these four problem-secularity type combinations the authors add four accompanying groups of "guiding ideas": freedom and individuality, toleration and respect, progress and modernity, and rationality and autonomy, respectively. These guiding notions are normative "reference point[s]" that legitimize "religious-

ods and world regions yields greater diversity in performative and ideological terms.

secular distinctions" (Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr & Wegert, 2013, p. 615) and are held by individuals, groups, states or functional domains. We agree with the authors as to the convenience of separating the notion of the secular from linear narratives of modernity and underlining the historically contingent meanings of the secular and the different starting and arrival points of the societies studied. We also prefer the concept of "secularity" over "secularism" (which is usually restricted to the relationships between organized religions and the state) as a way to extend the analysis to the relations between the triad of state, organized religions, and society with its functional domains, e.g. education, science, media, business. In this sense, the concept serves to remedy what Frigerio and Wynarczyk call the "dominant model" (2008, p. 248) in analyses of religious fields—the exclusivist emphasis on the churches and the state alone that can be found in the specialized literature on Latin America (e.g. Amuchastegui, Cruz, Aldaz, & Mejia, 2010; Blancarte, 1994; Levine, 2009; Masferrer, 2013; Moran, 2013; Parker, 2012; Sawchuck, 2004) and beyond (e.g. Lavinia & Turcescu, 2011; Robbers, 2005). Nevertheless, this model may not overcome the west-rest bias. The groups of "guiding ideas" in each combination above are analytically useful but include complex concepts which, at least in some post-colonial societies, constitute implicit or explicit (quasi)epistemologies—e.g. progress, modernity and rationality—that have guided secular *and non-secular* individuals, states, groups and functional domains alike in a variety of projects, controversies and disputes. It is therefore not surprising that the authors find difficulties in inserting the case of South Africa into their model. They acknowledge that whereas modernity in the West meant a "struggle between Christianity and secularizing and secularist forces," Christianity in South Africa "became fundamentally intertwined with modernity" (Burchardt et al., 2013, p. 621). What would happen then to the model if it were constructed from the outset with this type of "exceptional" (postcolonial) cases? The case of Latin America is a useful one because it represents, first off, a region where "cultures of secularity" (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012, p. 888) *as well as* religious cultures and phenomena—emerging religious minorities included—fill the social landscape and the discursive space.

However, in our view, some scholarly debates about Latin America's religious diversity do not necessarily offer a sound analytical platform upon which an alternative model—aimed at understanding not just multiple secularities but multiple *religious phenomena* beyond those of the West—could be constructed. In some scholarly works on Latin America's religious phenomena the concepts of diversity, plurality and pluralism are used interchangeably either as descriptors of the simultaneous presence of different religious denominations or as counterparts to concepts such as religious monopoly, hegemony, uniformity or majority. For instance, in a work on religious diversity in Latin America, an author asserts that "there is already a Latin American religious pluralism which is based in a growing diversity of heterogeneous cultural expressions." Later on, however, he explains this "religious pluralism" by referring circularly to the "diversity of beliefs" (Garma, 2007, p. 50). In a major work on religious diversity in Mexico, the introductory chapter points to the need to study the scope of "the diversification and the religious plurality" in Mexican indigenous localities (De la Torre & Gutiérrez, 2007, p. 14), thus implying the occurrence of two different realities, yet no conceptual distinction between these two concepts is provided in the text—instead the terms religious pluralism, plurality, diversity and diversification seem to be used interchangeably (2007, pp. 7, 9, 11, 14, 15). Similarly, in an introduction to a co-edited volume on religious diversity in Colombia, "religious plurality" is accounted for by the "religious diversity" (African religions, Sephardic Judaism, Islam) reportedly found in Latin America during colonial and postcolonial times (Bidegain, 2005, p. 15).

These conceptual-analytical imprecisions have been pointed out by other authors. Frigerio and Wynarczyk (2008) refer to the importance of Beckford's conceptual distinction between pluralism as i) "the magnitude" of religious diversity, ii) the extent to which religious minorities are "accepted" in a society and iii) the acknowledgement of the "moral and political value" of religious diversity (2008, pp. 233-234). In the view of these authors, the mere presence or growth of religious diversity does not necessarily equate to pluralism in sense ii) and, more importantly, in sense iii), that is, pluralism as the positive sanction of the moral and political relevance of new religious expressions and organizations. For pluralism to exist, the authors assert, there must be a fair "regulation" of the "religious market" (2008, p. 248), where the state as well as non-state institutions, such as NGOs and mass media, sanction the extra-religious importance of religious minorities. Frigerio and Wynarczyk's conceptual distinctions are similar in principle to Levine's. Levine (2009) distinguishes between religious plurality and religious pluralism. The former equates to the existence of religious diversity, that is, the quantitative presence of religious groups, denominations, and churches; religious pluralism goes beyond this presence and amounts to "the construction of rules of the game" (2009, p. 407; see also Freston, 2012, pp. 87-88) that give equal rights and legitimacy to the newcomers in the religious field. For Levine plurality serves as a necessary, though insufficient, condition of pluralism. From a stronger normative position, Eck (2001) had suggested earlier a similar clarification of religious pluralism. For this author, as well, religious pluralism does not amount to religious diversity. Firstly, whereas religious diversity is just "an observable fact," religious pluralism, in the author's view, must be "real engagement" with the re-

ligious other; secondly, whereas religious diversity entails only tolerance, religious pluralism also demands the understanding of the religious other and the overcoming of "stereotypes and prejudices"; thirdly pluralism must not become "valueless relativism" but must rather strengthen "the health of religious faith" (2001, pp. 69-71). Eck notes as well that pluralism does not refer to a given state of affairs but to "the ongoing work of each generation" (2001, p. 72).

With the above shortcomings and conceptual guidelines in mind, we now propose an analytical frame focused on the concrete hegemonic framework of Latin America and the conceptual distinctions between, and degrees of, secularities, diversities and pluralities.

5. A Three-Dimensional Model of Religious Pluralisms

In this section we describe both a series of key dimensions and a scale of degrees by which those dimensions can be analysed and referred to in debates on religious diversity, religious plurality and social inclusion, as depicted in Figure 1.

Firstly, we propose three key dimensions as axial categories that represent, in our view, the most important subfields in a given region's religious field/s: society, organized religions and the state. What we suggest is to regard them as institutions but also as interdependent sub-fields of forces; that is, partly autonomous and partly dependent axial spaces where symmetric and asymmetric relations of power between individuals, groups and institutions take place either in manifest or latent forms (Lukes, 2005). By referring to them as currently existing sub-fields we do not mean clear-cut spaces whose analysis concerns only present-time phenomena. These are dimensions whose constitution is to varying degrees related to their historicity. Thus we understand the *organized religions dimension* as one of the religious field's subfields, where historical churches and emergent organized religions and syncretic cults can be found either separate from each other or connected through symmetric or asymmetric links. In the same fashion, we suggest looking at the state not as a macro-institution but as a dimension where struggles for, and the granting of, religious rights take place. Similar to Frigerio and Wynarczyk's proposal (2008), our axial spaces include the *society dimension.* Yet we do not understand "society" as particular organizations and mass media that regulate the religious market (2008, pp. 228-229), but more generally as a subfield that is constituted by a wide range of individuals and groups that interact or not in a given context and can range from the atheist or the non-believer to the religiously-unaffiliated and the religiously-(multi)affiliated.



Figure 1. A three-dimensional model of religious pluralisms.

The second particularity of our model is aimed at overcoming the implicit and explicit binarisms in the literature on the emerging religious diversity in Latin America by adding degrees which can further qualify the three dimensions above. Like Eck (2001), Frigerio and Wynarczyk (2008) and Levine (2009), we sustain the analytical relevance of distinguishing between the quantitative emergence of religious diversity, the configuration of religious plurality, and religious pluralism as a combined and ceaseless process. Following this logic, instead of conveying in our model the idea of societies that are "uniform" or "diverse" in terms of religious (un)affiliation; "hegemonic" or "plural" in the subfield of organized religions, and "confessional" or "secular" with regard to the state, we want to convey multiple degrees of diversity, plurality and secularity that can be found in society, organized religions and state dimensions respectively. These degrees are not cumulative stages towards religious pluralisms; they are societal features that do not, and should not, necessarily unfold sequentially. Each degree is meant to be analysed qualitatively, quantitatively or both, to assess how much of, and which specific manifestations of, the degree in question can be empirically verifiable in a given case. We consider it important to point out as well that the degrees, which we will expand on below, are based mostly on descriptive analytics but also on a cautious normative standpoint, upon which a flexible concept of ideal religious pluralisms will be conveyed. These ideal religious pluralisms amount to the degrees illustrated in Figure 1's outer circular layer and are based on the idea that *complete* and *permanent* harmony, ecumenism and cooperation in societies (Mouffe, 2000) and religious fields might stand as desirable teleologies and even practical goals but should not be regarded as necessary requirements for a sound religious pluralism. We will expand on these realistic expectations in the sub-sections below.

5.1. The State Dimension

As observed, secularity in Latin America mainly relates to the state protection of the rights of religious minorities and the demise of the institutional privileges enjoyed by the Catholic Church, rather than to the decline of religiosity or the retreat of religion from public spaces. Due to the secular paths taken in Latin America (i.e. usually from Catholic confessionality to impartial but non-atheist states) we basically distinguish between: 1) *religious intolerance*: confessional states where non-adherents to the state religion are socially excluded and even private non-Catholic worship is expressly forbidden, creating favorable conditions for structural discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it; 2) *religious tolerance*: confessional states where religious minorities, although being socially excluded to different extents, are allowed (rather than entitled) to hold religious ceremonies in public, and the Catholic Church is supported by the government and enjoys other legal and political prerogatives; 3) *religious freedom*: confessional and non-confessional states that recognize the freedom to choose a religion or belief, consistently maintain a certain church-state separation and allow the legal recognition of non-Catholic religions (including their rights to possess properties, land and media; to form political parties; and to declare political positions), but where the Catholic Church might retain some privileges in consideration of its majoritarian status or cultural relevance for the nation; and 4) *religious equality*: non-confessional states that revoke the Catholic Church's privileges and establish principles of state evenhandedness vis-à-vis theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.

5.2. The Society Dimension

We suggest qualifying the degree of religious heterogeneity in society by contrasting the previous religious uniformity of Latin American colonial societies with their contemporary diversity and by breaking down the latter into a) *invisible diversity*, b) *nominal diversity* and c) *reflexive plurality*. Our starting point is the idea that a plural society should first and foremost know about the actual existence of the religious alternatives that can actually render that society plural. By proposing *invisible diversity* as an analytical distinction, we want to bring attention to the fact that there have been, and surely still are and will be, non-Catholic individuals and groups in Latin America whose religious or non-religious profile is unknown beyond limited circles of state and/or religious experts. When the religious others' local presence is ignored by the majority of individuals and major groups (e.g. media, educational institutions, business, political parties, civic organizations, etc.), we can speak about a situation of *invisible diversity*. Individuals and groups in one of Mexico's western-central states may be aware of the presence of publicly active Jehovah's Witnesses in the vicinity but individuals at large, and perhaps the local media or business sector, might not necessarily know about the presence of members of the "Marian Trinitarian Spiritualism" church (Sanchez, 2009). In such a case quantitative and qualitative assessments of what/how much religious diversity has been detected in a region can give a better sense of how much invisible diversity prevails there.

By *nominal diversity* we mean societies where there is both a factual presence of religious minorities as well as some major institutions, and/or individuals within those institutions, that do know about the presence and basic constitution of alternative religions and religious groups in that society. These are social institutions and individuals, beyond limited circles of religious or state experts, which are relatively knowledgeable about general facts of those religious alternatives—

their main doctrinal tenets or organizational characteristics, for instance. Within this category it is also possible to distinguish between a) actively hostile scenarios—where religious minorities are discriminated against or attacked (Dias, 2012; Vallverdu, 2005, p. 62); and b) passive scenarios—where individuals affiliated to the majority religion are aware of the presence and basics of the religious others but have little or no desire to understand them further—and vice versa (Mendoza, 2008, p. 202).

We suggest reserving the term *reflexive plurality* for societies where individuals from different religious groups—as well as atheists—know about the presence, the basics and at least some of the substantial views and background of their religious counterparts. These societies may or may not enter into cooperative relations based upon such knowledge. We do not see societies with reflexive plurality from a radical idealistic viewpoint, that is, as perfect societies where everybody knows with precision the history and doctrinal configuration of each religious alternative and where cooperation is therefore the norm (cf. Eck, 2001). For us, reflexive plurality does require openness and tolerance in order to be aware of prejudice (Eck, 2001), but such an openness can well remain as the base of a detached understanding.

5.3. The Organized-Religions Dimension

As to the plurality of churches and other organized religions, Latin America is characterized by the historical monopolistic position of the Catholic Church. In some cases, this monopoly remained uncontested even after the post-independence secular reforms that took place at different points in time across the region. What has followed, after the nominal challenge of this monopoly over the last two centuries, are different types of non-monopolistic dimensions of organized religion. From a descriptive position we distinguish two types: *Catholic hegemony* and *Christian hegemony*; from a normative position we distinguish one further type: *dialogical plurality*. Catholic hegemony describes dimensions where the Catholic Church, as an internally-diverse majority church in most countries, co-exists with Christian minority churches as well as other religious groups, associations or communities whose collective identity is not necessarily that of a church (as in the case of the Umbanda; Prandi, 2004, p. 229). Notwithstanding this coexistence, the Catholic Church and its ensemble of religious orders, Catholic groups and associations retain a clear religious and extra-religious (political, cultural, educational) pre-eminence (Levine, 2014; Levy, 1996). This Catholic hegemony is better apprehended if it is seen as the outcome of the historical religious and extra-religious activism of this church and its organizations. Regarding the case of Argentina, Carbonelli and Jones refer to such an outcome as a "cultural matrix" that has the capacity "to confer meaning on national identity and to shape state structures" (2015, p. 160; our translation).

Similar to a duopoly, a *Christian hegemony* could be described as a religious field where the Catholic Church and Christian denominations share a dominant position, which can result from various forms of cooperation or unintended alignment on moral and extra-religious issues (e.g. against reproductive rights, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, etc.). Through extra-religious activism, direct intervention in politics and the operation of media channels and radio stations, Christian morals, values and worldviews thus continue to shape social relations and define the rules of the game. Brazil illustrates this case. According to Freston (1998), Brazilian Pentecostal churches—which themselves seek a hegemony within the Brazilian Protestant milieu—tend to have no united political front but do have an active presence in the country's politics. Brazilian Pentecostal politicians have been elected as governors, federal deputies and city officials; in the most recent legislative period, they accounted for 12% of the seats in the Brazilian Congress (Machado & Burity, 2014, p. 601).

Dialogues are a main component of what we consider as an organized-religions dimension with *dialogical plurality*. This is a plurality that describes religious fields where majority and minority religions and religious groups not only value (Frigerio & Wynarczyk, 2008) their different or similar contributions to the religious and extra-religious dimensions but do so by openly communicating with each other (Vallverdu, 2005, p. 63). This particular type of religious plurality may include interfaith dialogues as well as other (socio-political) dialogues among the religious denominations' lay members or non-"authorized" voices (Levine, 2009, p. 406). Nevertheless, dialogical plurality, just as reflexive plurality in the society dimension, is not necessarily expected to produce cooperative engagement (cf. Eck, 2001) or a harmonious ecumenism (cf. Hagopian, 2009; Parker, 2005). Even less are such dialogues likely to be an effective means of overcoming asymmetries of power. Nonetheless, we consider dialogues as conducive to the creations of conditions of competence, dissent and negotiation that may well contribute significantly to progress towards more inclusive rules of the game. Here Frigerio and Wynarczyk's notes on the role of social institutions are relevant. A sound level of dialogical plurality is manifested when majority and minority religions/religious groups alike are able to dialogue, under equal conditions of openness, with state institutions as well as with society's civic groups, mass media, NGOs and other non-state organizations.

6. Conclusions

Drawing critically from the literature on religious diver-

sity and the multiple-secularities approach, the analytical model we propose is aimed at overcoming Eurocentric categorizations and conceptual imprecisions. The model above contains both descriptive and normative analytical categories whose even and balanced distribution in Figure 1 is meant to represent neither symmetric dimensions in actual societies nor degrees of diversity, plurality and secularity that develop jointly in a linear fashion. Although the model does propose normative scenarios in the dimensions of state, religion and society, it is not meant to suggest a method which Latin American societies would have to undertake in order to develop and/or consolidate religious pluralism. The model above clarifies key concepts that can be used in specialized discussions and problematizes the interpretations of contemporary realities regarding the religious fields in Latin America. It is also a flexible analytical tool that can be adapted to local, national or transnational contexts and approaches. For instance, it can enable multi- or inter-disciplinary comparisons of degrees of secularities, diversities and pluralities that can be empirically observed across multiple local contexts—e.g. across Chiapas in Mexico, Chimborazo in Ecuador and Cauca in Colombia, where Protestant communities have apparently developed in comparable terms (Gros, 1999). Once operationalized, the model can also be used as a framework for comparative analyses of the degrees of religious pluralism across different Latin American countries or regions; these comparisons can be quantitative or qualitative and generate, for instance, *indexes* or *typologies* of religious pluralism. If the model is properly adapted—particularly the model's departure point, i.e. the region's historical background—it can also assist comparative analyses of the development of religious diversities/pluralisms, or other religious/secular dynamics, within and across postcolonial regions beyond Latin America. In any case, adaptations in our view would have to be cautious and preferably follow the non-Eurocentric, non-linear, complex (multiple dimensions and degrees) and realist rationale of the original model.

Above all, we consider both the discussion and the analytical proposal above to be key inputs for contemporary debates on social inclusion. As suggested in this paper, there are conceptual and empirical links between the consolidation of reflexive plurality in society at large, the development of dialogical plurality among organized religions and atheist organizations and the attainment of religious equality in terms of equal rights granted by the state to organized religions. More importantly, it can also be said that the development of reflexive and dialogical pluralities in the first two subfields may facilitate not only the consolidation of religious equality among organized religions but also the de-centering of Christian values in public education and the granting by the state of gender equality, as well as comprehensive sexual and reproductive rights for all individuals regardless of their sexual orientation—some of the crucial inclusive rights where there has been important progress on the legal and judicial fronts, but whose *de facto* fulfillment, and political debate at times, has been somewhat hindered by hegemonic churches and individuals' religious beliefs alike. The decrease of Catholic or Christian hegemony and the increase of dialogical plurality among organized religions, coupled with the presence of a reflexively plural society, may not be sufficient yet remains a necessary condition for the attainment of the aforementioned rights. A dialogical field of organized religions, together with societies whose reflexive plurality is high, may also facilitate the legal application and extra-legal consolidation of those inclusive rights. The resulting religious pluralisms—or the reflexive and dialogical cultures, and legal frames, of equality, understanding and dissent—provide, in principle, effective conditions for social inclusion.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Article

Jews, Muslims and the Ritual Male Circumcision Debate: Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion in Germany

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Abstract
On 7 May 2012, the Cologne regional court ruled that circumcising young boys was a form of previous bodily harm (*körperverletzung*). Although both Muslims and Jews circumcise infant boys as a religious practice, the Cologne court found that the child's "fundamental right to bodily integrity" was more important than the parents' rights, leaving Muslim and Jewish parents under suspicion of causing bodily harm to their children. After heated public discussions and an expedited legal process, legal authorities permitted the ritual circumcision of male children under a new law. However, the German debates on religious diversity are not yet over. On the third anniversary of the Court decision in 2015, thirty-five civil society organisations organised a rally in Cologne for "genital autonomy", calling for a ban on ritual male circumcision. In this article, I will focus on religious diversity, which is undergoing changes through minority and immigrant claims for religious accommodation. Analysing the ongoing controversies of ritual male circumcision in Germany, I argue that this change is best observed with Muslim and Jewish claims for practicing their religion. By using political debates, news reports and information provided by lawyers and medical doctors who were involved in the public debate, I show that religious diversity debates are a litmus test for social inclusion: Muslims and Jews, in this context, are both passive subjects of social inclusion policies and active participants in creating a religiously diverse society in Germany.

Keywords
Germany; Jews; Muslims; religious diversity; ritual male circumcision; social inclusion

Issue
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1. Introduction

On 7 May 2012, a German regional court in Cologne ruled that circumcising young boys was a form of bodily harm (*körperverletzung*). Although both Muslim and Jewish families circumcise infant boys as a religious practice, the Cologne court found that a child's "fundamental right to bodily integrity" superseded the religious rights of parents. This potentially rendered Muslim and Jewish parents under suspect of causing bodily harm to their children. After heated public discussions, international political pressure, and a speedy legal process, the regional court ruling was replaced by a new national German law that permitted the ritual circumcision of male children. Despite the national law, male circumcision continues to be a highly contested issue. On 7 May 2015, thirty-five civil society organisations organised a rally in Cologne for "genital autonomy", calling for a ban on ritual male circumcision, as this practice continues to be an integral part of Jewish and Muslim lives in Germany in the shadow of political and legal challenges.

In this article, I will focus on the role of the German debate on ritual male circumcision in shaping religious diversity. Although religious diversity has been defined in multiple ways, ranging from demographic description of a society to institutional recognition of religious minority groups, I will focus on the aspect of social in-

clusion of religiously diverse groups in institutional settings (Bouma, Ling, & Pratt, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2006;). I aim to show relations between two religious minority groups who make claims to the German state authorities in order to practice ritual male circumcision—an act that challenges the norms of German society.

As a key aspect of social inclusion, religious diversity is undergoing contested changes through minority and immigrant claims for religious accommodation (Koopmans, 2013; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2006). I argue that this change is best observed by analysing Muslim and Jewish claims for practicing their religion, and how these claims get taken up in public debates. Jews and Muslims in Germany have collaborated in bringing similar claims for religious practices in the past, such as in the case of pointing out to the parallel dynamics of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism in Germany. This does not mean, however, that both communities collaborate on religious diversity claims. Jews and Muslims in Germany also have important fault lines, which divide both communities, which I have elaborated elsewhere (Yurdakul, 2010).

Using discourse analysis of political debates, newspaper reports, focus group interview with Muslim men as well as meetings[1] with key informants in the public debate, I show how religious diversity debates are a litmus test for social inclusion: How to socially include minority groups if their religious practices are conflicting with the norms of a majority society? The decisive point here is whether or not minority groups are considered as "full members" or "foreigners" in a given society. In this context, I suggest that Muslim and Jewish groups are both objects of social inclusion policies and active participants in negotiating religious diversity, thereby playing both passive and active roles in the shaping of a socially inclusive German society.

2. Who has the Right to Decide on the Limits of Religious Diversity?

Political and legal authorities make institutional arrangements in order to accommodate religious diversity (Bramadat & Koenig, 2009; Giordan, 2014). The regulation of religious diversity is often defined in a top-down manner, such as through government policies. European institutions, such as national and European-level Courts, act as authorities for playing important roles in shaping what kind of practices of religious diversity are permissible in the European public sphere (Greenfield, 2013; Koenig, 2007). However, religious groups, in this case Jews and Muslims in Germany, challenge these regulations in their everyday lives (Kastoryano, 2002; Laurence, 2001; Peck, 1998). Despite the top-down legal decision-making process, many Jewish and Muslim groups may continue practicing their religions and as a result they may be excluded from social institutions[2].

3. Stigmatisation of Jews and Muslims

Ritual male circumcision is the practice of removing the foreskin of a new born or prepubescent male child (Gollaher, 2000), and is a practice mainly associated with Jewish and Muslim religious traditions. The political significance of the ritual stems in part from the fact that it is irreversible, and as argued by some legal, political, and medical authorities and scholars, it is considered a major infringement of children's rights to bodily integrity (Schüklenk, 2012). While circumcision is a gendered practice that permeates across minority religious groups in many European countries, social service agencies, legal institutions, and other state-related institutions, such as hospitals, have a limited understanding of the practice itself. For these social actors, circumcision is often understood as a sign of cultural backwardness, and in some cases as an act of violence against male children. These understandings of circumcision as evidence of violence and backwardness—instead of as contested faith-based practices for example—are produced by reifying minority cultures as monolithic traditions marked by their inherent ignorance of children's well-being (Benatar, 2013; Lang, 2013).

Scholars have examined the body politics of Jewish histories in secular Europe. Sander Gilman discusses the stigmatisation of the Jewish body through medical constructions in his work on *The Jew's Body* (1991). He explains how the rhetoric of modern science marks the Jewish body as different. Gilman shows how modern medicine, as a discursive agent of secular authorities, stigmatises the Jewish body by disseminating it to its parts (such as the infamous Jewish nose) and describing it as deviant from "the norm". Law and medical sciences distill and embody non-Muslim and non-Jewish values i.e., those of Christian or, at least, liberal Christian values. Similarly, the Muslim body politics in Europe is about how Muslim bodies are marked as different and are excluded from the European public sphere (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014; Lettinga & Saharso, 2014). Drawing on such work on Jewish and Muslim bodies, I aim to show how discursive agents, such as legal authorities, newsmakers, and key political stakeholders try to shape minority bodies, those of Jews and Muslims, in Europe. I will focus on two major areas where secular discourse prevails (namely, science and

[1] These are meetings rather than interviews, because our conversations did not have traditional interview structure in a sociological sense. In addition, I had the chance to ask questions to some of them in public meetings.

[2] For Muslims, primarily from educational institutions and job market, such as in the case of Muslim women's headscarves (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014).

law) exceptionally present in Germany, which marks the limits of religious diversity and the borders of social inclusion into German society.

This study also contributes to ongoing scholarly discussions about ritual male circumcision among legal scholars, bioethicists and sociologists. I argue that many legal scholars fail to adequately look into the perspectives of minorities themselves, and instead simplify debates on rights and obligations (Merkel & Putzke, 2013). Criminalising religious practices through law enables governing authorities to gain greater control over minority religious practices. This focus on legal aspects presents us from understanding the performative effects of religious diversity. In other words, I suggest that we look at how the law affects people, rather than just *law in books*. In this article, I examine the German court decision in 2012, but also delve into how social actors discuss the outcomes of the legal debates. My analysis of the circumcision debate considers factors such as Jewish history in Germany as a potentially important contextual factor that affected the decision-making process in 2012[3].

By drawing on this contextual framework, as a sociologist, I focus on the majority-minority power relations and the interrelations between two minority religious groups in this debate. I do this by reconstructing how key stakeholders talk to each other in the public sphere by referring to their own political positions. In these discussions, we find how Muslims and Jews are both objects of German social inclusion policies, but also active participants of how to create a religiously diverse society in Germany. In the following, I will discuss the historical context of the circumcision debates and link them to current media and political controversies. My fieldwork in public discussions, focus group interview and meetings with key stakeholders shows how religious diversity is discussed within minority groups.

4. Historical Context

The 2012 circumcision debate in Germany was not the first debate on religious diversity within German context. It has persisted throughout history in relation to the particular traditions of Jews in Germany (Judd, 2007; Kokin, 2014; Lavi, 2009). With the incoming flux of immigrants from Muslim countries, most notably Turkish immigrants and their eventual settlement in Germany, this revived the debate on ritual slaughtering[4] (Lavi, 2009; 2010) and ritual male circumcision[5] (Yurdakul, 2013). As we shall see, the stigmatisation of minorities remains constant during these discussions, regardless of the outcome.

The history of debates around circumcision prior to the 2012 law has been detailed in a book, *Contested Rituals* by historian Robin Judd (2007). She describes the political and social circumstances of Jewish life in Germany and shows how exclusionary approaches can be found in the writings of German scholars since the turn of the century. These writings have been stigmatising Jewish ritual behaviours for centuries, from defaming their masculinities to pointing out ritual practices as barbarism (Judd, 2007; see also Heil & Kramer, 2013). Although this debate on circumcision took place in another socio-political period in the 19th century, it is interesting to see that some of the political actors (medical doctors, state attorneys and Jewish community leaders) and the theme (circumcision ban) similarly take front stage. In terms of stigmatisation, Judd quotes the example of a ritual male circumcision case in Baden in 1881. The state medical examiner, named E. Sausheim, argued that the mohel (circumciser) should be suspended and the oral suction (metistsah be'peh) should be outlawed (Judd, 2007, pp. 1-2).

The use of science and law to exclude Jewish religious practices have been exemplified in Sander Gilman's brilliant essay in *Haut Ab!,* the Jewish Museum's temporary exhibition catalogue on the ritual male circumcision (2014-15). He states that "No medical circumcision discussion had been independent from ideological perspective" (2014, p. 123, translated from German). He points to the unproven discussions on whether circumcision can be a cure for syphilis or cervical cancer, or even HIV. In some cases, newsmakers make blanket statements on sexual impotency of circumcised men (Stehr, 2012). In the context of these discussions, Sander Gilman concludes that at the end of all these debates the decisive factor is not science, but cultural acceptance (Gilman, 2014). In fact, in assimilatory efforts of Jews into German social and cultural life, in 1843 in Frankfurt, a liberal group of Jews, including Rabbi Abraham Geiger, who was the leading figure of Reform Judaism in Germany, wanted to abandon ritual male circumcision, arguing that it was barbaric (Gollaher, 2000).

Muslim immigrant integration and criminalisation of Muslims mark a shift in the current debates. Sander Gilman questions why the ritual circumcision debate came back onto the political agenda in Germany and even beyond, such as in Scandinavian countries or in Britain where it is still contested and performed under restricted conditions. He argues that this has a lot to do

[3] This contextual analysis of the circumcision debate, which brings social factors into the debate, is present in some recent legal scholarship (Fateh-Moghadam, 2012).

[4] Turkish butcher Rüstem Altinküpe brought the case of ritual slaughter to the court, and won his case in 2006 (*Jüdische Allgemeine* 1.10.2009). *Halal* slaughtering of meat is permitted in Germany under restricted conditions. For Jewish and Muslim ritual slaughtering in Germany (see Lavi, 2009).

[5] As I will discuss in the following pages, ritual male circumcision is permitted in Germany after a court case in 2012, but it is practiced under restricted conditions.

with the "fear of Islamisation" (Gilman, 2014, p. 125), as Islam is frequently regarded by newsmakers and politicians as a religion that is not compatible with German society, and Muslims have difficulties in being socially included into the German way of life.

5. Method

The data for this article has been collected from various media resources, legal documents, participant observations, meetings with key stake holders and focus groups. The legal data was collected from Court decisions and press releases of the Cologne local and regional courts (*Amtsgericht* and *Landgericht*) as well as the decisions and public statements of the German Ethics Council, which are available on their website.

The media data is from three German newspapers that spanned the political spectrum since the beginning of the legal circumcision debate on 26 June 2012 to 31 December 2014, when the circumcision debate was ongoing on a smaller scale. I collected all the articles that discussed "circumcision" from their online archives, sorting out those on female circumcision, or circumcision debates in non-Western countries to refine the sample[6]. The German newspaper data was collected from three major sources: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *tageszeitung* (taz) and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (FAZ). I chose these three newspapers in order to cover the political spectrum in the German media. SZ appeals to a left-liberal readership, FAZ is a conservative newspaper, taz is a left-leaning newspaper, showing the perspectives of the Green Party[7]. For all these newspapers, I created a chronology of events, which documented what has been discussed in each newspaper on a weekly basis. In addition to the systematic data collection from these German daily newspapers, I also used newspaper articles from *Jüdische Allgemeine*[8], a weekly newspaper of the Central Council of Jews; *der Spiegel,* a popular weekly magazine, *die Zeit*, a high-brow weekly newspaper, as well as the European edition of the Turkish national newspaper, *Hürriyet*.

In addition to media data, the study also includes data from a focus group and four meetings with key stakeholders. The focus group participants were four Turkish Sunnite Muslim men, all of whom reside in Germany[9]. All of these men were circumcised as children either in Turkey or in Germany and they discussed how they are affected by the ongoing circumcision debate. I met with key informants who were active in the circumcision debate: Ilhan Ilkilic, MD, a member of the German Ethics Council who drafted the circumcision law; Mustafa Yeneroglu, lawyer and the previous head of the Islamic Community of Milli Görüs, who politically supported the legal case of male circumcision in Germany; and Zulfükar Çetin, co-author of the controversial book on circumcision, *Interventionen gegen die deutsche "Beschneidungsdebatte*" (*Interventions against the German "circumcision debates"*). This book was cited frequently in the German circumcision debates in order to exemplify minority men's perspective. A final informant for this research was Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek, the curator of the Jewish Museum exhibition on circumcision. I had the chance to directly ask her questions during a closed meeting within Jewish-Muslim Study Group at the Jewish Museum in December 2014.

6. Social Inclusion, Exclusion and Religious Diversity

The peak of the circumcision debate was the Cologne regional court's decision on 7 May 2012, which criminalised Jewish and Muslim parents for causing bodily harm to their children. The German public was divided into two groups: those who were pro-ban of circumcision argued that (1) the right of self-determination of the child is violated, (2) the circumcision is irreversible and irreparable. Without reason a child loses a healthy part of its body, (3) the surgery is dangerous to the human body like every other surgery, and (4) circumcision is only reasonable in those cases where it is medically indicated. Those who are against the ban argued that the exercise of parental care of § 1627 I BGB (German Civil Code), covers all of the parents' decisions as long as they benefit the well-being of the child. The main argument of those who are against the ban is that excluding a child from the religious group is against the child's well-being. This is justified as parents are prevented from passing on their values and beliefs to their children.

A major finding from my discourse analysis is that, "child's well-being" is vaguely defined, and is usually concealed under "child's right to bodily integrity" or "child's right to self-determination". For example, in its legal decision, the Cologne Regional Court concluded that:

> "Neither is the request of the parents capable of justifying the act, since the right of the parents to

[6] In this time period, hundreds of newspaper articles appeared in the newspapers, for example in the FAZ there are 352 mentionings of words Jewish and circumcision whereas 181 mentionings of Muslim and circumcision. In the SZ, such words appeared 370 to 186 and in the taz 248 and 160. These articles are only about male circumcision.

[7] SZ has the highest circulation at 1.1 million per day. FAZ has an estimated circulation of almost 400 thousand, taz has the lowest circulation among all, about 60 thousand.

[8] I thank Zülfukar Çetin for opening his newspaper archive for the missing resources.

[9] Due to the gender sensitivity of the subject, this focus group interview was solely conducted by my assistant Mr. Özgür Özvatan, at the Humboldt University of Berlin.

> raise their child in their religious faith does not take precedence over the right of the child to bodily integrity and self-determination. Consequently, the parental consent to the circumcision is considered to be inconsistent with the well-being of the child." (*Landgericht Köln*, 151 Ns 169/11)[10]

In this legal statement "children's well-being[11]" is constructed through an individualistic understanding of the child, isolated from their parental social context who are minorities. In fact, in a similar logic, medical doctor Matthias Franz, an opponent of circumcision, argues that "In this context, religious freedom cannot be a justification for (sexual) violence against young boys, who are unable to consent" (Franz, FAZ, 21.7.2012). In this case, German legal and medical authorities, rather than Jewish and Muslim parents, decide on behalf of the child who cannot give consent. In other words, children's well-being is best decided by the state authorities, as practices of religious diversity are not acceptable when it comes to minority parents.

One such argument along the same lines is that circumcision is a form of stigmatisation of children, because they cannot reverse the operation. The aforementioned court decision on the circumcision:

> "Moreover, the circumcision changes the child's body permanently and irreparably. This change runs contrary to the interests of the child in deciding his religious affiliation independently later in life. On the other hand, the parental right of education is not unacceptably diminished by requiring them to wait until their son is able to make the decision himself whether to have a circumcision as a visible sign of his affiliation to Islam." (Court decision from 7 May 2012; *Landgericht Köln*, 151 Ns. 169/11)

The marking of the body for a sign of belonging to Islam or Judaism is further interpreted as stigmatisation: "This is also a way to prevent a threatening stigmatisation of the child" (Court decision from 21 September 2011; *Amstgericht Köln*, 528 Ds 30/11). The discourse on stigmatisation of children has already been mentioned in criminal law scholar Holm Putzke's above mentioned statement, namely that the less parents circumcise their children, the less stigmatisation will take place. I argue that such an approach does work from a political point of view as it holds Muslim and Jewish parent responsible for the stigmatisation of their children and their exclusion from German society. In earlier works, Holm Putzke at the University of Passau, argued for the criminalisation of circumcision in Germany: "For the more frequently boys are not circumcised, the less this condition, this gives reason for stigmatisation" (2008, p. 21) in this way dividing Germany into circumcised and uncircumcised people.

Similarly, anti-circumcision debates were picked up by immigrant political actors even before 2012. Turkish-German sociologist and Islam-critic Necla Kelek brought up the issue in a German Islam Conference and also wrote about the possible harms of ritual male circumcision in her book Lost Sons (Kelek, 2006). Being a pro-ban advocate only for Muslim circumcision, Kelek differentiated between Jewish practices of circumcision, and the Muslim practice. According to her, Jewish practice is based on religion (therefore should be permitted), whereas the Muslim practice is merely a tradition (and therefore should be banned). In this way, Kelek argued that only religious acts have the potential to be legally permitted in Germany, disregarding other arguments such as a child's well-being.

The German media was divided in the debate. On the one hand, newsmakers gave public voice to medical authorities, religious clergy, legal authorities and scholars who are mostly pro-ban. German newspapers, such as *FAZ*, *die Welt* or weeklies, such as *der Spiegel*, were quick to publish photos of rabbis practicing circumcision ceremonies. They used provocative headlines, such as "*Ritual, Trauma, Kindeswohl*" (Ritual, trauma and well-being of the child), "*Auch die Seele leidet*" (The soul also suffers), "*Freiheit ist wichtiger als Tradition*" (Freedom is more important than tradition).

Those who are anti-ban were featured in mainstream newspapers but mostly writing editorial pieces for the minority newspapers, such as *Jüdische Allgemeine* or *Hürriyet*. Both Central Council of Jews and Islam Council reacted immediately grounding their arguments in different social and historical facts. Ali Kizilkaya, the executive director of Islam Council drew on to the integration debates and argued that Cologne Court's pro-ban decision is against Muslims efforts to integrate into Germany. Dieter Graumann, the previous Chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany argued that this decision makes Jewish life in Germany impossible. Although the Court decision was about the specific case of a Muslim boy, the politicians and newsmakers started focusing on Jewish circumci-

[10] This English-translation is available at the https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ilm/CircumcisionJudgmentLGCologne7May20121.pdf

[11] "Children's well-being" appears as a nebulous concept in policy-making and in legal discussions. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration" (1990, Article 3). This statement may involve excessive statism (state authorities deciding on behalf of parents) but also discrimination against certain minorities (state authorities prohibiting Islamic rituals). However, it is noted that circumcision is irreversible and the child must decide later himself if he belongs to Islam. This statement of the Landgericht Köln brings Islamic practices under spotlight.

sion in Germany, with central figures of the Jewish community in Germany as well as the Chief Rabbi from Israel, commenting on the legal decision. Newsmakers in the European edition of *Hürriyet* were not so concerned about the decision, perhaps because Turkish communities in Germany have been confronted with such religious bans in the past, such as that of the headscarf debate. The circumcision issue carried second or third rate importance in their reporting. Some reporters mentioned travelling outside of Germany to carry out circumcisions, where families may take children to Turkey, if it were to be banned in Germany.

At this same time, there were those who were anti-ban, but were not represented in the media discussions. Social workers who are embedded within Muslim societies in Berlin claimed that they were excluded from the debates. Although they were coming from migrant families and had face-to-face contact with many Muslim families as part of their job, no journalist quoted their thoughts about the circumcision debate. Their voices went unheard, despite the fact that they were frontline social workers. In my meeting with Zülfukar Çetin, at that time a social worker at the anti-racist organisation *Reach Out*, he told me he felt excluded, he mentioned that no one asks the youth in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg about what they think, even though they are the subjects of the debate. In his book co-authored with Alexander Salih Wolter, Çetin pointed out that the debate polarised men as "circumcised" and "uncircumcised," therefore creating multiple forms of masculinities, which are in competition with each other. They argued that the so-called "Judeo-Christian tradition of the West" is paradoxically referring to Jewish traditions as crimes and therefore anti-Semitic in itself. This paradox reached its highest point in the circumcision debate, in which anti-Muslim racism accompanies anti-Semitism (Çetin & Wolter, 2012, p. 39). Both groups, they argued, were excluded from being members of German society due to their religious practices.

Another key actor in the debates was the German Ethics Council, a government agency which was responsible for making recommendations for drafting the 2012 circumcision law. The Ethics Council made an anti-ban decision and made suggestions to the legal authorities to draft the new circumcision law. In our meeting[12] with Ilhan Ilkilic, MD, a member of the German Ethics Council, he stated that the Ethics Council decided according to the presumption that religious freedom is seen as a more important liberal value than bodily integrity of children[13] (also see Ilkilic, 2014). According to the Ethics Council's suggestions for regulating male circumcision, a child's consent would still be important in conducting the circumcision; religious circumcisers can practice circumcision on children only until the 8th day, after this day medical personnel would be responsible for circumcision. The Ethics Council's draft law was passed to the *Bundestag*. With this law, Muslim and Jewish practices of religious diversity became lawful, implying that Muslims and Jews are socially included into the religious life in Germany.

However, a member of the *Ethikrat* (Ethics Council) was against the law altogether. Reinhard Merkel argued against the practice of circumcision on the grounds that there is no obligation under the law to take the consent of the child and no obligation for anaesthesia (*Die Zeit*, 1 October 2012). In fact, Merkel had previously pointed out the ethical, legal and historical problems of this decision earlier, by stating that: "No right to freedom permitted an interference with the body of a human. This is also true for circumcision in boys. And yet the case is difficult" (SZ, 30.8.12). He especially pointed to the fact that Jewish history in Germany has played an important role in passing this decision:

> "If an unknown religious group were to come to Germany today with the ritual of male circumcision, common in no other place of the world, it would be prohibited on the spot. And if it was solely Muslim religious practice, the Bundestag certainly would not have responded to the Cologne judgement with a resolution as on the 19 July. But circumcision is an ancient custom constitutive of Judaism. And that's the real problem of legal policy. Hiding this fact is useless; because only with this provenance its significance is clear. The terrible mass murder in history makes German Politics certainly most prominent and unique duty to show particular sensitivity to all Jewish matters. This cannot be shaken. Circumcision is obviously a matter of particular importance." (Merkel's commentary in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30.8.2012)

In fact, in this statement, Merkel says that Jewish and Muslim religious practices, such as circumcision, cannot be included into German social life. Due to the German responsibility towards Jews, the law was passed. This statement, I argue, shows how Jews and Muslim are still not considered as a part of German society, but as "foreigners". If Germans were not fulfilling their responsibility towards Jews in the frame of "*wiedergutmachen*" (to redress), the law would not be passed. Merkel implies that such religious practices would not belong to

[12] Yurdakul and Lavi meeting with Ilhan Ilkilic, 22.1. 2015, Berlin.

[13] Ilkilic mentions in an interview: "In my view religious freedom is more important than the violation of physical integrity, because the practice does not alter the function of the organ, if the operation is carried out safely and correctly. And in addition, a ban puts huge pressure on Muslims because circumcision represents an important ritual for them." (Ilkilic, 2013)

German society under normal circumstances. As Sander Gilman showed cultural acceptance of religious practices is the decisive factor in social inclusion (2014). In this case, Jewish and Muslim ritual of male circumcision is still a contested practice, despite the fact that it can be legally practiced in Germany.

The debate spread to international media, yet the importance given to the debate, especially in Israel and Turkey, varied. In the Israeli daily newspaper, Haaretz, the circumcision debate was a daily discussion. The European Rabbis Conference (*Europäische Rabbinerkonferenz)* was cited in the German newspapers: "The ruling is seen as the most serious attack on Judaism since the Holocaust." (SZ, 16.7.2012). The Chief Rabbi of Israel Yona Metzger came to Germany to discuss the issue with politicians and to hold a press conference in the hall of the Federal Press (*Bundespressekonferenz*), addressing the national and international media, and warning against anti-Semitism in Germany (taz, 21.8.2012). Similarly, President Shimon Peres sent a letter to the German President Joachim Gauck, asking him to intervene to safeguard the religious rights of Jews in Germany (SZ, 25.8.2012). In Turkey, the possible ban on circumcision did not find much political resonance. Turkish citizens carried out some independent campaigns to protest the legal decision (Tosun in Hürriyet, 29 June 2012).

During these discussions, Chancellor Angela Merkel has personally followed the circumcision debate. In fact, she infamously said: "I do not want Germany to be the only country in the world where Jews cannot practice their rituals. Otherwise, we turn into a laughing stock (*komiker nation*)"[14]. This shows her support to pass the circumcision law without causing more damage to Germany's international image (FAZ, 17.7.2012). Just before the passing of the law, she paid a political visit to the Central Council of Jews in Frankfurt, where she said that Germany shows tolerance to religions (FAZ, 25.11.2012). On 12 December 2012, approximately 6 months after the debate in Cologne, the *Bundestag* adopted the proposed law explicitly permitting male circumcision to be performed under certain conditions (§1631(d) part of the German Civil Code (BGB)), making ritual male circumcision a lawful religious practice in Germany.

7. A One Way Street: Inclusion into a Minority, but Exclusion from a Majority

As political scientist Kerem Öktem mentions in his study on "Signals from the Majority Society," in which he interviewed Jews, Muslims and Germans on the circumcision debate during these discussions in Germany, both Jewish and Muslim interviewees clearly stated that they felt that they are excluded from European societies as their religious practice and male bodies are criminalised and stigmatised (2013). In fact, in a focus group interview that we conducted with four religious Turkish and Sunnite Muslim men, we also heard many times that their circumcised male body is an integral part of their minority identity (see also Kokin, 2014). For example, in the focus group interview, Ali (pseudonym) said "being circumcised is a form of belonging. It is a part of being a man". Similarly, Tarik mentioned that he would find it shameful if a man is not circumcised. Our focus group participants discussed how being circumcised is an in-group identity marker for a minority group in Germany, that is striving to belong. In fact, this finding was also evident in other public testimonials by Turkish men, such as the co-leader of the Green Party and a prominent politician of Turkish background, Cem Özdemir, who wrote about how his relationship with his body gives him an in-group recognition and a feeling of belonging (2008, pp. 235-238).

A key finding in our focus group involved the shared identity markers among Muslim and Jewish groups that practices of circumcision engendered. One participant claimed that male circumcision is a bodily marker, which binds Jews and Muslims in Germany. Hasan said "In Judaism, in Torah it is definitely in it (in their religion). I mean...When we are all circumcised, then 'hey! You are also circumcised!'...I find it positive. Normal. You are also one of us[15]". Hasan is pointing to circumcision as an identity marker for both Jews and Muslims in Germany, a constitutive marker of their minority belonging.

Although some men, like the focus group participants, consider circumcision as a form of social inclusion, in the sense that it is belonging to a minority group in Germany, it is also regarded as a marker of social exclusion by many German legal, medical and political authorities. These groups express concern over whether granting freedom of religion to immigrants and minorities would cause social disintegration or not.

Reflecting on the minority perspectives on the debate, the Jewish Museum in Berlin organised an exhibition and a series of events. Focusing on the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy in a playful way, the title of the exhibition, called *Haut Ab!*, which was intended as a pun on the German term, "skin off!" or "get out!" Speaking to Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek, the curator of the exhibition[16], she aimed to contextualise the con-

[14] This is the translation in the National Post on 17 July 2012. The German original is cited as follows: "Ich will nicht, dass Deutschland das einzige Land auf der Welt ist, in dem Juden nicht ihre Riten ausüben können. Wir machen uns ja sonst zur Komiker-Nation." (Jones, 2012)

[15] In the framework on minority belongings, in our book on the headscarf debates, we focus on the ways in which Muslim women use the headscarf as a method of protest and asserting national belonging (2014).

[16] Meeting with Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek in the Jewish Muse-

troversial circumcision debate historically. At the same time, the exhibition showed the religious diversity of male circumcision practices, varying from photos of crying boys from Turkish immigrant families in order to reflect the contemporary history of ritual male circumcision in Germany, to videos on Jewish life in Germany.

A panel of scholars presented at an event on Jewish-Muslim relations, organised with the *Haut Ab!* exhibition on 4 December 2014. The panel included historian Alexander Hasgall, political scientists Mounir Azzaoui and Kerem Öktem, as well as Hannah C. Tzuberi, a scholar of Judaism and Islam. It was emphasised that the circumcision debate in Germany brought Jews and Muslims together as minorities who have been struggling for their practices of religious diversity to be socially included as minorities. Referring to a public poll that was conducted by a polling agency, Infratest, the academic director of the Jewish Academy Yasemin Shooman stated that 70% of German society was against the circumcision law (also see Heimann-Jelinek & Kugelmann, 2014). She questioned whether there is any protection of minorities in this context that their practices of religious diversity are clearly socially excluded.

With the introduction of the circumcision law, the debate on legal recognition and regulation of male circumcision in Germany seemed to be over. But German criminal lawyers have argued that section 1631 d BGB is against the constitution[17], and are preparing to continue the debate, with the support of some medical doctors. On 3 June 2015, the Elisabeth Hospital in Essen organised a conference on medical and legal perspectives on the circumcision debate. The conference included medical doctors who have been publicly active against circumcision. They argued that: “surgery in the genital area of a little boy means a painful and traumatic experience, which therefore should be considered independent of its implications” (Liedgens & Eckert, 2015). In short, the male circumcision debate is continuing to legalise and medicalise discourses in order to criminalise and pathologise Jewish and Muslim religious practices, leaving little opportunity to discuss religious diversity in a socially inclusive society.

8. Conclusion

Ritual male circumcision, a latent subject of discussion for many years, has returned to the Western secular political agenda (for a historical debate see Judd, 2007). The circumcision debate is, in fact, not a uniquely German debate, but it is a discussion on who has the authority to decide on body politics in Europe and in the rest of the Western countries, where Jews and Muslims are still considered strangers. Social inclusion, which is determined by legal authorities through court decisions, political actors and scholars, as well as media discussions, show how Jewish and Muslim religious practices are still discussed in the contexts of public threat and stigmatisation. The language that has been used in legal decisions and in the media have deeply stigmatised and criminalised Jewish and Muslim people in this context.

The purpose of this article is not to endorse ritual male circumcision, but rather to show how social inclusion and exclusion of minorities are decided in public debates through local courts, media debates, and scholars’ press statements. Ritual male circumcision is one significant case, which shows different dynamics of what plays a role in determining religious diversity in order to socially include minorities. My suggestion for further analysis is to critically look at how social actors of minority groups challenge the existing socio-legal discourses through their religious practices and bodily performances. A systematic research agenda, which focuses on how legal decisions are interpreted and debated by minority groups, will enable us to see who belongs to Germany and Europe and what will shape German and European futures.

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[17] Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1631d Beschneidung des männlichen Kindes (German Civil Code, Circumcision of Male Children), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__1631d.html (accessed on 15 April 2015)

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Article

In the Shadow of Bell Towers: The Use of Religious Capital among Christian-Catholic Second Generations in Italy

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Abstract
Evidence from some contemporary ethnic groups suggests that ethnic religion may play a strong role in the lives of second generation members. This is evident in recent studies on Muslims living in Europe. But Europe's immigrant population is not just Muslim in origin. Migratory flows from Latin America, the Philippines and Eastern Europe (i.e. Romania or Ukraine) bring people from Catholic and Christian countries to Europe. And—as in the Italian case—these groups are now the majority among the whole immigrant population. Consequently, the almost exclusive focus on the Islamic component has allowed little investigation of the increase of the Christian-Catholic component. The paper describes and compares the religious paths of immigrants' youth from Peru, the Philippines and Romania, considering the following questions: How do they interact with/develop their religious identity? Is this generation seeking less visible, less participatory means of contact with the church to better integrate with their peers? Or, on the contrary, do they choose, strategically, to reinforce the Catholic part of their identity in order to succeed better in the integration process in a Catholic country?

Keywords
Christian-Catholic; discrimination; identity; immigrants; Italy; religion; second generation

Issue
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1. Introduction

The question of how faith, ethnicity and acculturation relate to one another is highly pertinent in the Italian context, where Catholicism continues to be the religion of reference for the majority of the population in spite of the secularization process of other European countries (Garelli, 2013; Marzano & Pace, 2013; Pérez-Agote, 2012). Around five million migrants were registered at the beginning of 2014 (ISTAT, 2015) in Italy, which outlines a complex situation, characterized by immigrant flows from more than 191 countries, especially Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia. The presence of immigrant minors in Italy has by now been an established fact of life for at least 15 years, highlighting the stabilizing character of migratory flows towards the country: a rapid evolution which had affected first schools and then the whole society (Vilaça & Pace, 2010). In this scenario, Christian-Catholic second generations are increasing in numbers and visibility. So far, from the religious point of view, the Italian scenario has deeply changed after the considerable Eastern European migration flows. Romanians, Ukrainians and Poles have modified the religious composition in the migrant population. Even if the media sometimes continue to stress the risk of Islamization (Allievi, 2009), it is incorrect to speak of an "Islamic invasion", first of all because of the statistics: according to estimates by the Italian National Office Against Racial Discrimination (UNAR), Christians constitute 52% of immigrants and Muslims 32% (UNAR, 2015).

In this context, I applied my research on three Christian-Catholic immigrant groups which are repre-

sentatives of the great majority of non-Muslim immigrant population in Italian, as well as in Europe. I carried out qualitative research in order to investigate how religion and integration paths interact with and influence one another, both on the societal and on the individual levels in the case of Christian-Catholic second generations in a specific context like Italy, a recent immigration country and a Catholic one, considering the following questions: How do they interact with/develop their religious identity? Are they followers of the "traditional religiosity" of their parents (the first generation) or do they belong to the "secularised millennium generation"? Are they looking for a different (from their Italian peers) relationship with religion, more spiritual, requiring regular meetings, or do they want to get away from this? Are this generation seeking informatics religious tools and means of contact with the church, less visible and "non-inserted" in the integration process among peers? Or, on the contrary, do they choose, strategically, to reinforce the Catholic part of their identity in order to succeed better in the integration process in a Catholic country?

In order to answer my research questions, I focused my attention on three specific youth groups: Filipinos, Peruvians and Romanians.

My thesis is, on the one hand, that these young people (that enjoy a good reputation among Italians) who—formally—haven't negotiated their religious identities at school or in the broader society due to their Christian-Catholic adherence can easily maintain a strong religiousness. On the other, they are "children of their time" and they share with their peers (Italians as well as those who belong to other nationalities) the idea of leaving religion and returning just for family reasons or for special events. Paradoxically, these young people are going to develop (maybe similarly to their Muslim peers, even though for different reasons) and "amphibian strategy": e.g. as their Moroccan peers, Filipinos "choose, paradoxically, the same strategy because they do not want to be rejected by their Italian peers who don't attend church, do not spend their free time in religious associations, and don't share their values of filial piety, respect for parents, and family centeredness" (Ricucci, 2010).

The paper uses qualitative research data collected in the Italian context: it is of course a peculiar case due to its religious characteristics but findings can offer interesting and generalizable consideration for research on the relationship between second generations and religion in Europe.

2. Methodology

Thanks to the qualitative approach, the paper presents a complex scenario in which assimilation tensions are mixed with identity cleavages, individuating how Christian-Catholic second generations are changing common perceptions of the relations between religion and immigration. Here, the perspective I assumed is that there are many possible patterns in the relationship with religion among Christian-Catholic young people (as well as their Muslim and Italian peers) and the outcomes depend on three sets of factors: a) Personal and demographic factors (e.g. gender, age, length of residence); b) factors that are external to individuals and their communities (policies towards diversity in the society); and c) Differences between immigrant groups and society at large (such as differences in values).

This paper presents a part of the findings collected during a fieldwork study (carried out along the last four years) that allowed me to explore the social and religious experiences of three specific youth groups (Peruvians, Romanians and Filipinos) with migratory backgrounds behind and beyond their faith communities. Specifically the qualitative sample is composed of 75 interviews[1] with young people[2], aged 18–29, speaking Italian, gender balanced and equally distributed among the three immigrant sub-groups: Peruvians, Romanians and Filipinos, that I'm going to describe briefly.

Filipinos—particularly women—were the first to arrive. Today the community is numerous with a high incidence of family reunion, adolescents and young people who received the call to Italy after years of being "children left-behind" (Parrenãs, 2003; Zanfrini & Asis, 2006). The Peruvian community, on the other hand, began its immigration flow towards the middle of the 1980s. This was also principally female: as with the Filipinos, South American women left first, to be joined later by their children and, possibly, their partners (Caselli, 2008; Paerregaard, 2010).

The Romanians present different characteristics: their migration exploded in the 2000s with a greater balance between the sexes, even if women were in the majority (Cingolani, 2009; Ricci, 2006). In any case the three groups share same characteristics: 1) Relative ease of insertion into the labour market (Betrand & Mullainathan, 2004); 2) Prevalence of care-giving among the women; 3) Positive acceptance on the part of Italian society; 4) High rate of children left behind and rejoined years later with their families; 4) Positive image of the children in schools. Using an American concept, Italian media, government, and schools as well as the general debate portray Filipinos, Peruvians and Eastern Europeans as the "model minority", contending that ethnic cultural traits predispose them to

[1] I used a model of open semi-structured interview around certain issues (e.g. religious belonging, but also education, friendship, relationship with the family of origin and with ethnic and/or religious associations and migration biography). All the collected material has been codified and analyzed with Atlas.ti.

[2] To this qualitative material I added 4 interviews with key-informants and 12 interviews with representatives of first generation involved in ethnic parishes activities.

be financially and educationally successful (Yu, 2006; Yang & Ebaugh, 2001). These images create borders between these and other immigrant groups. Two phenomena upset this peaceful scene: the fact of young Latino gangs; and racism against Romanians when they are all equally considered as being of Roma origin. These two issues, however, do not erode their positive perceptions among Italians (UNAR, 2015).

For the parents' generation, religion has been a card to play (even strategically) in the dynamics of insertion in the labour market and acceptance: Filipinos and Peruvians have been welcomed, partly because of their Catholic origins; Romanians, whether Orthodox or Catholic, have also benefitted from their unproblematical religious belonging, which does not demand alternative (to the churches) places of prayer, special work timetables to fit in with prayer or diets and ad hoc teaching in schools. The reunited children's generation from these three backgrounds undoubtedly gain from their ethnic-religious identity which does not draw attention to them—as happens with their Muslim peers. This fact, however, does not make them representative examples of religious culture in their home countries, and nor does it immunize them against the effects of the adaptation process implicit in the integration path, including progressive distancing from institutional religion.

3. Religion Matters: Catholics Cope with Integration Challenges

The children of immigration too are children of their age from the religious point of view and are therefore fully part of two dynamics the individual-religion relationship is undergoing. The first concerns the persisting belonging of the youngest to their parents' religion, in spite of growing religious pluralism and the advance of the secularization process (Berger, Davie, & Focas, 2008; Garelli, Guizzardi, & Pace, 2003; Hervieu-Léger et al., 1992; Tos, Mohler, & Malnar, 2000). In a broader sense, the Italian situation reveals particular characteristics compared with other European countries: higher average rate of religiosity; faint presence of other denominations; renewed presence of the Church in the public sphere[3].

Contrary to the expectations of many observers of modernity, we are not witnessing today a falling off from the religious sphere but a different way of belonging to it and expressing it (Bréchon, 2009; Hoge, Dinges, Johnson, & Gonzales, 2001). And it is in this direction that we find the other dynamic, that of the growth of the individualism of faith. In the field of studies of religiosity, the decline in young people's attendance at Sunday services is generally considered an indicator of the process of individualization of religious faith; faith is more and more a private fact accompanied by a reduction of participation in parochial life and observance of the Church's teaching on matters of moral and sexual orientation. This aspect, along with religious institutions' difficulty in reading and interpreting the needs of orientation and their answers to advanced modernity, makes Berger's "solitary believer" (1992) topical today, reinforcing what Davie (1994) identifies as "believing without belonging".

Among the Christian group, most of the interviewees say they are Catholic or Orthodox believers: only 5 Romanians said they believed in a superior being, without going into detail. In describing how they live their lives as believers, all of them, more or less directly, referred to their ethnic churches, which, since their arrival in Italy, have been a point of reference. How this point of reference functions, however, changes in time: if at the beginning it is the "place of worship" par excellence, where one reinforces one's identity, it later becomes principally a point of reference with regard to cultural and linguistic environment.

> "Why do I come to this church? Well, it's not strictly for religious reasons, but cultural. Part of the reason is to keep some contact with the Filipino community because it's our only source of cultural identity. It's also important to our parents—this is not the most important factor, but one of the important factors. Another thing is that we think about the next generation. Our kids will have the same exposure if we have contact with the Filipino community." (F, Filipina, 20-year-old)

According to another attending member:

> "The first thing that attracts people is fellowship, a sense of closeness. It's trying to find a group that's at ease. There is a sense of comfort in being with other Filipinos because there's an understanding in terms of background." (M, Filipino, 22-year-old)

> "It's like being part of an extended family. You feel protected, safe. You don't have to justify who you are, what you do, why you came to Italy." (F, Filipina, 20-year-old)

> "I feel well when I am in church. I think of my grandmother at home and get a little homesick. She and I often went to church together. Here I can come with my mother only sometimes because she often has to work on Sundays too. But when we come we meet a lot of people we know and chat with them until it closes. It's like being in Romania and it does us good, especially when outside, round and about, we hear Italians complaining about foreigners, therefore about us." (F, Romanian, 18-year-old)

[3] For details see Garelli (2011).

> "For us Peruvians, Mass is an important occasion for meeting the community. It is much more than prayer: it is gathering as a family, feeling at home. Our parents feel as though they were back in Peru, not least because they speak Spanish, which is also the language of the Mass, so everything is simpler. The feeling for us young people is of turning back to the world where we grew up but don't live there any longer." (M, Peruvian, 19-year-old)

Religion is left in the background: the reunion of compatriots, speaking the same language, the reassuring feeling that they are in a protective cocoon—this is what young people experience. This not surprising when we consider that they have spent part of their lives elsewhere and at a certain point came to Italy, a context where being a child of immigrants—a foreigner—is not easy (Ricucci, 2012), where the insertion process is interwoven with the identity-building process of their age-group. This explains why attendance at ethnic churches is most frequent in the early years in Italy and diminishes thereafter. Integration alone does not suffice to explain this divergence: it is mixed up with how these young people imagine the host society perceives them. For them too—Christian Catholics in a Catholic country par excellence—there are problems: paradoxically, they too have to deal with prejudice like their Muslim peers.

Race, an involuntary and inscriptive marker, is considered in the case of Filipinos and Peruvians to be one of the central features of identity, which separates them from Italian society. Among Romanians, their association both with Roma and with criminals risks negatively affecting their integration process: in these cases both the colour of their skin and religious belonging can be useful to avoid being noticed.

However, one of the most significant ways in which young members of the churches articulate their ethnic identity is through the appropriation of certain elements of "practised culture", that is, values and standards of their traditional morality. These values, ubiquitously invoked in their discourse about their identity, consist of a set of core traditional values—most significantly filial piety, respect for parents, family-centeredness and a work ethic.

> "My Filipino values include respect for elders, and emphasis on education. Another thing I love about my Filipino culture is its family-orientedness. I adore my parents. And I really like how children take care of their parents." (F, Filipino, 20-year-old)

Compared to non-churchgoers, church members display a considerably higher degree of attachment to these values and standards of morality, which are appropriated by them as highly relevant criteria of their ethnic identity and as self-defined markers for signalling membership and exclusion. Indeed, the more "religious" a member is, the more embracing he/she tends to be of the traditional values espoused by his/her parents. The non-churchgoers, although they may generally observe these values, are not as strict in their interpretation of or adherence to them. Furthermore, compared with non-attenders, church attenders hold far more strictly to traditional views regarding sexual morality and gender relations, displaying a much more critical stance toward Italian (European) culture and values such as individualism and liberal sexual morality.

4. Growing Up Feeling Themselves as "Unwelcomed"

What does it mean to live as children of immigrants in a country where immigrants are not so welcomed? Relations of friendship, work, closeness to the Italian community and a passport are not enough to shake off the immigrant mantle. Perception means more than reality. It is the recognition theme that the Italian community—today as yesterday—may be composed of people with different somatic traits from the usual, who wear clothes which evoke faraway places (from Indian saris to the colourful robes of African women, from the chador to the Sikh turban), people believing in a divinity which is not that of the majority of the population (who, to be truthful, believe more from culture and education than from convinced and active faith) (Martino & Ricucci, 2014).

Of course an attitude of mistrust (sometimes becoming outright hostility) has no effect on the rights which may be claimed, but may make daily life more difficult. For example, it may be more difficult to rent accommodation outside "typically immigrant" areas and neighbourhoods. It might mean not being able to find wok other than that—low paid, dirty, dangerous, heavy and socially penalizing (Ambrosini, 2005)—reserved for foreigners.

It is not a simple matter to touch upon stereotypes and prejudices. The feeling that immigrants and their children are unwelcome guests is returning to the fore in these years of reduced employment opportunities and welfare benefits. Indeed, a 2014 survey carried out by Eurobarometer reported a resurgence and strengthening of dangerous stereotypes and prejudices among the Italian population: this finding confirms what another survey had already shown in 2010 (Camera dei Deputati, 2010): one-quarter (25%) of the interviewees declared that immigrants were taking work away from Italians, and almost half (no less than 48%) considered it right to give precedence to Italians when hiring (Pouschter, 2015).

Apart from wishful thinking and claims, what is really going on?

If entry into the community of citizens is step-by-step journey from the precarious initial insertion leading to social integration, the environments in which it is

possible to read the characteristics of the itinerary are those of every family's daily life: home, school, work, free time (Zincone, 2009).

Yet it is clear that integration represents (or should represent, since it cannot be taken for granted) the other side of settlement, the decision to transform one's migratory project from temporary to permanent. In this sense, some social-insertion environments help to make up an information mosaic, the best possible indicator to describe the lights and shadows of integration into Italian society of those who are not (yet) citizens (Zincone, 2006). As various studies have shown, an immigrant integrates into the arrival society, but the real question is into which part of the society s/he integrates and, above all, how this process varies from one generation to the next: does the passage from first to second generations follow the "downward assimilation" logic described by Portes (1996) and Gans (2009) or does it delineate ascending mobility strategies typical of an immigrant middle class (Perlmann & Waldinger,1997; Winthol de Wenden, 2004).

Somatic traits, first name, surname and religious affiliation "condemn" or "acquit" young people in the eyes of Italians. This is the story of some youth with a migratory background like Mohammad and Fatima, who—as they referred during an interview carried out in 2014—perceive themselves to be at risk. Even if they possess Italian passports, they are—in the common perception—foreigners. What's more, since 11/9 they are foreigners and "potential terrorists", a worrying and intimidating association (Guolo, 2010, 2015). Also Jocelyne and Isabelle, two Filipinas, are trapped within their identity. At school they are considered as "custodians of traditional values and carriers of a religiosity which are not often found among young people today" (F, Filipina, 19-year-old). Then again, Roberto and Victor, two Peruvian boys, whose rapper clothes cause them to be stopped and checked by police. Peruvians attract attention because of rival gangs settling accounts. The next step is easy: all young Peruvians (both boys and girls, those involved in the game of the "boss's girlfriend" and, playing this role, they become the "bone of contention") are members of "Latino gangs" (Queirolo Palmas, 2009).

> "Is there any way out? How can one react to and 'survive' daily life so conditioned by damaging stereotypes? According to one young interviewee, their patience has almost run out: "It doesn't matter who we are, what we do. The only thing that matters is what our parents do. We will always be immigrants for you. Italy should take note of the Paris banlieues and the London riots. Sooner or later we young foreigners, best in the class but judged only according to our parents' occupation, will stop being good. We will start shouting and demonstrating, making our presence felt." (M, Peruvian, 21-year-old)

Self-definition is never easy and can take place on different levels: linguistic or national, local or global, gender or generational. Using labels and categories is not a game, but often awareness of the weight (and consequences) of the use of words (one's own and others', spoken and written, enounced and read) is lacking. Sometimes this may help to create or widen fissures, even increasing the spectre of fear. Therefore the role played by the society where one grows and builds one's identity is crucial. Indeed, how young foreigners portray themselves and what identity they decide to adopt partly depends on how the society where they live sees them. The theme of immigrants' identity, especially second generations', is not ascribable to an "either-here-or-there" optional choice. It must be framed in a more general context involving traditionally different actors: 1) The individual (one may feel loss and homesickness or may try to forget and camouflage oneself); 2) The family (which has, in most cases, taken the decision to leave and makes choices about future plans, whether to become part of the new society or stay on the edges); 3) The welcoming society which, with its attitudes and policies may encourage, in migrants, disparagement or revaluation behaviour with regard to belonging and various cultural traditions. Further actors have recently come on the stage: 4) The society of (one's own or one's parents') origin, which continues to be present through transnational ties and local visits; and 5) Virtual space where cyber homelands are constructed, nostalgic sites for the first generation, a refuge for reunited adolescents, an exotic discovery for second generations (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011).

What we have said hitherto brings us to the theme of identity and how the protagonists of this contribution are finding their voice, giving life to civic activism paths and combatting the image that will always see them as foreigners. It is a story of involvement and identity results with roots in their family history, which for many of the young people I met has been a history of reunion. And in the crevices of this process, transversal to all origins, attitudes mature and the insertion strategies so well described by Berry (2008) are outlined.

From the family to free-time associationism: another environment in which young people's identities are polished, sometimes being called into question. They are also the setting where—little by little—young people are beginning to express themselves, showing themselves to be autonomous subjects distinct from the immigrant stereotype of an unskilled labourer doing precarious, ill-paid, dangerous and socially penalizing jobs (Ambrosini, 2005). The web, which is what characterizes these youth, insofar as they are part of the Facebook generation or Millennials, becomes a context rich in opportunities—to show themselves, express themselves and (as happened to the children of North African emigration) to rediscover hushed up identities (Premazzi, 2014).

5. Conclusion

If "Muslim youth have assumed a central, if complex, place in the politics and cultures of the global South and North" (Bayat & Herrera, 2010, p. 5), Christian-Catholics are on the way back, especially in Europe. While in American society sociologists pay growing attention towards this specific youth group, in Europe the "fear of Islam" risks overcoming any another change. Among the novelties of the last ten years there is an increasing number of youth with a Catholic or Christian background and, as a result, the reinforcement—at least on paper—of the mainstream religion in the Italian context, or, in a broader sense, its Christian origin. The thesis is that the acculturation process under which these young people define their integration paths is stronger than their religious socialization. Broadly speaking, there is more to the lives of these youth than mere religiosity, conservative cultural ideas, and attachment to their home countries. Despite common elements of identification and cultural specificities, these youth have as much in common with their peers, both Italian and foreign, as they share among themselves. While there exist many lines of demarcation within the category of "children of immigrants" along lines of class, gender, education and cultural divides, to name a few, there are also certain common attributes that make the category of "Christian-Catholic" meaningful. But to understand what's happening we have to bear in mind that this group stands at the crossroads of three sociological areas of interest: their youth, their assimilation process and their ethnicity. Considering these three facets, their religious belonging as well as their level of religiousness assumes relevance on two planes: in their relations with both the host society and ethnic communities; and in their interaction with peers.

As an interviewee says:

> "Religion is a marker. It doesn't matter if you are Muslim or Catholic. You are what your country of origin says you are. This is our life as immigrants: we cannot choose what we want to do, who we want believe in….I'm a Filipino and when teachers at school speak about me, they immediately class me as a village woman, with a mother involved in domestic services, with a high level of religiousness and strong moral values. It is the same for my Romanian friends. Is it the same for Muslims? They are treated as dangerous, or as at risk, because they belong to a dangerous community. It's funny: they don't attend a mosque or any community events." (M, Filipino, 19-year-old)

How have second-generations responded to this stereotyped environment? There have been several reactions that I witnessed during my research. Some young people have downplayed their ethnicity and their religion, and have sought to "pass" as non-Filipino/Latino or Romanians. Sometimes is very difficult: skin colour and somatic traits prevent them from hiding their ethnic origins. This is the case, of course, for Filipinos and Latinos, whose appearance and accent give them away. However, if Romanians are apparently advantaged in choosing an assimilation strategy, they share with peers the daily struggle with their families and ethnic communities.

> "I attend Mass more because of solidarity with my family rather than personal enthusiasm. They expect my participation, it is like family loyalty." (F, Peruvian, 22-year-old)

> "It is important to me because it is important to my parents." (M, Romanian, 23-year-old)

Some of them choose the mediation path: they go to church and show loyalty to family values, but without either commitment or conviction.

> "Mass is the only time a lot of Romanians get together. Yes, you can go to a disco, but it is different: in the disco you find only Romanians who want to forget their origins." (M, Romanian, 23-year-old)

This quotation introduces another aspect: religious belonging is perceived in a social rather than a spiritual sense or in one of deep commitment. It is quite evident that for those young people inserted in the Italian context, with positive relations at school or at work, neither the parents' religion nor their religiousness is very important. Children of immigrants, at the stage of the 1.5 generation, do not express the same enthusiasm for religious icons considered vital by the first generation. They respect their parents' desire to preserve certain traditions, but do not personally speak of them with the same enthusiasm. Nevertheless, while their experience differs from the first generation, it is equally distinct from Religion Italian Style as described by Garelli (2011). The second-generation youth in these Christian Catholic congregations have charted a path that contains elements of collective expression (festivals, language, transnational ties) as well as personal agency (intense religious experience, youth organizations). Their involvement in the ethnic congregation connects them not only to families and their ethnic community here, but also to many peers in their home countries. The situation of those who have not established a positive relationship with Italian society, who have not managed to integrate, is different. They have remained anchored only to their family and community, declaring that they assiduously attend their ethnic church and its functions. In these cases, however, attachment to their community of origin seems to be dic-

tated rather by necessity than by choice. Indeed the community, and consequently the ethnic church, are elements of support for those young people with a limited knowledge of Italian, and have not developed a mixed network of friends, but have made of contact with compatriots and activities organized within their ethnic circle the main contexts of their identity. As for the first generation, the church becomes a safe port in the storm of Italian society. They are prime candidates for a "downward assimilation" path. Foreign youth are a large and fast-growing group, and it is important to understand if and how religion can help them in the acculturation process as well as in the transition to adulthood as children of immigrants. The risk of marginalization, drug involvement, the decline in moral values, dropouts and inability to find a place in Italian society is one of the challenges both to their families and ethnic communities as well as to them. Differences with the parents' generation are to be expected. Nevertheless, the great importance the ethnic parishes continue to have for these young people shows that they are still "in between": on the one hand, for the various reasons mentioned above, they continue to follow their ethnic church and, on the other, they look for an autonomous way of belonging and religious adherence. In doing this they are both "children of their age", as young people who want to express themselves beyond the adult generation, and "children of immigrants". This marker, as happens for their Muslim peers, intervenes frequently in their daily life. Their religious belonging to Catholic or Christian Orthodox churches can help them only apparently: they feel that they are stigmatized for their saints' processions, for the length of their masses. It is a mirror image of Italians remembering a not-so-distant past, and the experience of their co-nationals abroad, stigmatized because of religiousness and their habit of carrying statues around in processions.

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Article

Participation and Sharing, or Peaceful Co-Existence? Visions of Integration among Muslims in Switzerland

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Abstract
At least three traditions in sociological thought address the question of social inclusion. In the systems theory proposed by Luhmann, inclusion means that individuals are able to adapt and gain access to functional subsystems, such as the labor market or the welfare state. In the tradition of Simmel, social inclusion is seen as an outcome of "cross-cutting social circles". Both perspectives are addressed in Lockwood's distinction between social integration and system integration. Building on these theoretical traditions, the study proposes a typology of migrant integration in which inclusion requires a realization of both social and system integration. Against this theoretical background, the paper deals with the question of which kind of integration the Swiss Muslims strive for through civic engagement. Drawing on narrative autobiographical interviews, the study reveals two main tendencies among the studied Muslims. While some seek an opportunity to engage with people of other worldviews through civic engagement (social integration), others limit their civic engagement only to those religious communities that cultivate a strong collective Muslim identity, and reduce their contact with non-Muslims to a peaceful co-existence (system integration). The study also shows that these two attitudes are associated with two views on outgroup tolerance. While the advocates of social integration are for *liberal* tolerance, the supporters of system integration show tendency towards *multicultural* tolerance.

Keywords
coexistence; inclusion; Muslims; participation; segregation; social integration; Switzerland; systemic integration; voluntary associations

Issue
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1. Introduction

Without a doubt, one of the most common markers of social inclusion and exclusion throughout the history of mankind has been religious affiliation. Numerous examples of religious repression can be seen throughout history (Schneider, 2002). The traumatizing experiences of the World Wars and the Civil and Human Rights Movements in the second half of the 20th century have given rise, in Western countries, to extensive measures to institutionalize a culture of tolerance. However, with the rise of Islamic consciousness in the Islamic world and its expansion into Western countries in the last two decades there have been increasing calls to underscore the limits of tolerance. Thus, the integration of Muslims has acquired an unprecedented political relevance.

In the presented study, we do not analyze the objective inclusion of Muslims. Instead, we focus on one of the subjective aspects of integration, namely Muslims' normative views on their inclusion. We begin the paper with a survey of sociological theories of integration/inclusion as well as a review of the state of re-

search. We then draw on narrative autobiographical interviews to analyze Swiss Muslims' views of integration and their preferred type of inclusion in Swiss society. Finally, we address the question of outgroup tolerance among the interviewees.

2. Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

We begin this section by discussing two traditions of sociological thought that have addressed the question of social inclusion. We then develop a conceptual framework merging both traditions. Finally, we outline our research questions.

2.1. Inclusion through Access to Functional Subsystems

Inclusion is a new and extensively discussed concept in modern systems theories. Lockwood (1964) distinguishes between *social* integration, the interaction between individuals, and *system* integration, the interaction between institutions. Luhmann's systems theory (1997) differs from Lockwood's typology as it first replaces the concept of system integration with that of *integration*. In addition, he argues that social integration should no longer refer to the relationships between human individuals but to the communicative relationship between people and functional subsystems. As a result, Luhmann (1997) proposes a substitution of Lockwood's concept of social integration with the notion of *inclusion/exclusion*. Hence, people who lack of civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1950), such as the residents of the Brazilian Favelas, are more or less excluded (see also Farzin, 2006; Stichweh, 2005). In summary: Luhmann's concept of social inclusion highlights individuals' ability to adapt to and access *functional subsystems*. Of particular relevance for Luhmann is the inclusive function of the welfare state in providing all individuals with similar life opportunities and social security. However, Kronauer (2010) has argued that inclusion goes beyond material subsistence and poverty containment to also include social interaction between individuals and groups. This position is advocated in the second tradition outlined in the following section.

2.2. Inclusion by Bridging Networking

Even though Simmel is rarely discussed as an integration theorist, his reflections on modernity can also be read as an implicit theory of integration. According to Simmel (1908a), modern societies are characterized by the "intersection of social circles", as individuals go beyond their original social circles to join new social networks. Although a modern person continues to be a member of his/her family, he/she also establishes contacts with other social circles, including voluntary associations. As he/she stands at the intersection of the social circles he/she is a member of, he/she develops an individual identity distinct from that of other individuals. Individualization is, therefore, the result of the accumulation of affiliations with different social circles (see also Nollert, 2010).

While the individualization process increases freedom of action, it also creates uncertainty. A modern person suffers from similar unease as Park's *Marginal Man* does: "One who is poised in psychological uncertainty between two (or more) social worlds, reflecting in his soul the discords and harmonies, repulsions and attractions of these worlds" (Stonequist, 1937/1961, p. 8). Therefore, it is unsurprising that people who engage in cross-cutting social circles sometimes lack a sense of community and suffer from a resulting attachment deficit (Nollert, 2014).

Instead of having a dominant or *solitary* identity (Sen, 2006), modern individuals develop *cross-cutting identities* (Bell, 1980, p. 243), with the consequence that they do not *a priori* know which part of their identity is salient. Modern individuals are often faced with loyalty conflicts. This is a result of being constantly confronted with divergent, if not contradicting, expectations from the circles they are affiliated with. In short, modern people are faced with a variety of intra-role and inter-role conflicts (Dahrendorf, 2006).

Although affiliation with cross-cutting social circles can cause much distress at the intrapersonal level, in the realm of social relations, it can also be a source of social integration. Thus, as an individual's attachment to his/her circle of origin is lessened and he/she is partially integrated into new social circles, he/she becomes more open-minded and his/her prejudice is reduced. Quoting from Simmel's (1908b) essay "The Stranger", Park describes the Marginal Man as follows: "He is the freer one, practically and theoretically. He views his relation to others with less prejudice. He submits them to more general, more objective standards, and he is not confined in his action by custom, piety, or precedents" (Park, 1928, p. 888).

Finally, one has to take into consideration that increasing and intensifying social contacts contribute to the erosion of homogeneous group identities. Welsch (2009), for instance, has argued that intercultural contacts ultimately result in a vanishing of cultural differences und the emergence of *transcultural* individuals with hybrid identities.

To sum up, social integration requires that individuals are not restricted in their social contacts by normatively homogeneous communities with rigorous boundaries. Thus, in line with Putnam's social capital theory (Narayan, 1999; Putnam, 2000), it can be argued that social integration requires social ties that would build *bridges* between social circles. This notion is also in line with Berry (1997)'s concept of integration in his typology of *acculturation strategies*, according to which integration goes beyond a mere side-by-side existence

of separate, normatively homogeneous social circles to also include interactions between individuals and groups.

2.3. Inclusion as Realization of System and Social Integration

An encompassing definition of *social inclusion* can be derived from Lockwood's (1964) distinction between social and system integration. Lockwood defines social integration as orderly or conflictual relationships between actors, and system integration as orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts of a social system. One aspect, namely social relations, is the focus of network approaches. The other aspect, the relations between institutions, is the focal point of systems theories. Thus, on one hand, network approaches underscore the engagement of individuals in social groups alien to their ingroups. On the other hand, systems theories emphasize the congruency and coordination between markets, businesses, governmental institutions, and churches.

While systems theory is often criticized for neglecting social relations (Granovetter, 1985), the network perspective is reprehended for disregarding the impact of institutions (Brinton & Nee, 1998). In fact, social networks and associations are not sufficiently integrated unless they are embedded in a variety of political, economic and cultural institutions.

In our view, a thorough integration requires both system and social integration. Moreover, we regard system integration as something more than a mere coordination between institutions. In line with Luhmann's concept of inclusion, we argue that individuals also need access to these institutions in general, and to the labor market and welfare state in particular. In other words, individuals have to be "anonymously" integrated into the labor market and, if unemployed, sick, or old, into welfare institutions that guarantee their maintenance.

Our typology (see Figure 1) is based on two dimensions. From the network perspective, integration is realized when people maintain face-to-face contacts with a broad range of people (*social integration*). In contrast, systems theories regard integration as harmony between institutions as well as people's access to these institutions (*system integration*). From the intersection of these two dimensions, there emerge four types of integration: *inclusion, interaction, co-existence, and exclusion.*

Inclusion refers to a situation in which both system and social integration occur. Therefore, people can only be regarded as included if they are endowed civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1950), and if they can establish crosscutting social ties (Kronauer, 2010). This premise is compatible with Bourdieu's theory of capital (Bourdieu, 1983), according to which social inclusion can only be achieved if people have access to institutional resources, and that these resources are often made available through economic and cultural capital, or when social capital is generated through active participation in social networks. In the opposite case, *exclusion* happens when both social and system integration are absent. *Interaction* refers to a situation in which individuals (or groups) have social contacts to one another, but lack universal access to the core institutions of society. Extreme examples of this type of integration are slaves, child laborers, or illegal workers. *Co-existence* can be defined as system integration without bridging social ties. This type of integration can



Figure 1. Social inclusion as realization of system and social integration.

even be, paradoxically enough, achieved in a highly segregated society, provided that the labor markets provide jobs and the state guarantees for welfare and equal rights. Hence, co-existence implies a segregationist multiculturalism, or, as Sen (2006) has put it, a *plural monoculturalism*. This is for instance the case when a minority prevents its members from contacting with the dominant population and strives instead for a segregated lifestyle, albeit in peaceful co-existence with other social groups. Co-existence is also compatible with a neo-liberal regime. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the co-existence model was supported for a long time by political neoliberalism. Thus, the cultural minorities were allowed to experience their own lifestyles, so long as they minimized their claims on social welfare. However, because this kind of co-existence can transform into spatial segregation, it has lost political support in the last few decades (Kivisto, 2013).

2.4. Research Questions

Our concept of social inclusion assumes, in line with Lockwood, a positive coordination of functional subsystems, and, in line with Luhmann, access to the core institutions of society. Moreover, drawing on Putnam's concept of bridging social ties, we assume that inclusion requires people to have cross-cutting group memberships.

In the public debate on integration of migrants, religious affiliation is of special interest. This is simply because orthodox religious leaders usually demand from their followers strict adherence to specific normative standards and restricted contact with "non-believers". In this sense, members of religious minorities are constantly exposed to psychic tensions, having to choose between retreating into the religious community and being socially open. Indeed, both alternatives pose their own risks. While retreat often leads to isolation, stigmatization, and orthodoxy, becoming open might lead to a loss of identity (see Coser, 1956).

Regarding the foregone reflections, the paper deals with following questions. First, it explores the question of which kind of integration the Swiss Muslims strive for through civic engagement, and which kind of normative positions they advocate when it comes to their integration into Swiss society. Second, we explore the question of the attitude of the interviewees towards outgroup tolerance.

3. State of Research

So far, sociological studies on the subjective dimension of migrants' integration have been mainly focused on the views and perceptions of the native population. In contrast, the views of Muslims on the topic of integration are widely under-researched. Studies based on World Values Surveys, as well as European Values Surveys, usually focus on the attitudes of natives towards Muslims, thus neglecting value orientations of Muslims (an exception is Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2009), as well as their attitude towards integration. However, some studies address the extent of tolerance among different religious communities including Muslims. For instance, the studies by Inglehart and Norris (2012) and Tausch (2014b, 2015) based on PEW-data, indicate that the tolerance of Muslims varies widely between countries. Tausch and Karoui (2011) and Tausch (2014a) also show that the Salafist position is marginal in Europe. Miligan, Andersen and Brym (2014) have documented that tolerance within Europe varies not only between countries but also between Muslims and Christians and between practicing and non-practicing believers. Finally, drawing on a survey of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in six European countries, Koopmans (2015) has argued that religious fundamentalist attitudes among Muslims are more widespread than among native Christians.

However, the mentioned studies and data from the European and World Values Studies are of limited value for our research as they do not analyze behavior, and do not inform what integration means to Muslims and which type of integration the latter prefer. Furthermore, the studies also presuppose a stability of values over the course of life, while our qualitative research suggests, in line with Park (1928), that values might change as a result of migration and interaction with the native population (see also Rudnev, 2013).

Closer to our research question is the study carried out by Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk (1998). The authors analyzed the adaption strategies of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, and compared them with members of the Dutch majority. They identified four adaption strategies: assimilation (original culture is considered unimportant, whereas contact with the majority is regarded as important), integration (both the original culture and contact with the majority are regarded as important), separation (original culture is considered important, whereas contact with the majority is not), and marginalization (both the original culture and contact with the majority are considered unimportant). Most Moroccans and Turks preferred integration, whereas the Dutch had positive attitudes toward both assimilation and integration. However, the Dutch believed that separation would be the strategy chosen most frequently by the immigrants.

According to Brettfeld and Wetzels (2007), who combined qualitative interviews and a survey of Muslims in Germany, most Muslims (more than 70%) argued against assimilation. However, more than 45% also thought that foreigners should adapt to the native culture, and only 9% favored separation. The survey also showed that segregation is mostly favored by fundamentalist and orthodox Muslims. A small minority of the fundamentalists also supported religiously moti-

vated violence, disliked democracy, and indicated intolerance. Moreover, the authors emphasized that the combination of beliefs of segregation and radicalism among these Muslims closely resembles the position of the Neo-Nazis.

A telephone survey of 1350 young Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany (Frindte, Boehnke, Kreikenborn, & Wagner, 2012) indicated that the two studied groups have similar positions on integration. The findings suggest that the most radical views (anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism) are supported by a sub-group of non-German Muslims (i.e., Muslims without German citizenship), who also favor separation. The non-German Muslims who favored integration were those who had more social contacts with Germans. Neither German nor non-German Muslims favored assimilation.

In their interviews with 21 Muslim intellectuals or those active in public or community debates, Modood and Ahmad (2007) examined what these Muslims think about multiculturalism. The analysis shows that the respondents advocate multiculturalism, as long as it includes faith as a dimension of difference. In most of the other aspects of the multicultural ideal, the respondents seemed to share the views of non-Muslim British multiculturalists. Yet some of the interviewees believed that Islam's multicultural concepts are superior to the offers of any other faith or civilization. This view was advocated by those who are specialized in engaging with contemporary Western discourses rather than by religious authorities.

Finally, the qualitative studies of Yasmeen (2014) and Duderija (2014) both underline that certain Muslim minorities, in particular Salafists, cherish exclusionary practices. On one hand, they develop a sense of superiority towards the religiously other and therefore have little interest in social interaction with non-Muslims. On the other hand, they also take an exclusionary stance towards non-Salafi Muslims and Muslim women.

In summary, the research on integration views and preferences of Muslims in Europe suggests that a large majority of them favor a combination of conservation of their original culture and partial assimilation. This also includes making social contacts with the dominant population. Only a very small minority prefers separation while advocating radical worldviews and intolerance.

4. Methods and Data

4.1. Collecting Data

Regarding methodology, this study was based on a combination of document analysis, participatory observation, semi-structured interviews, and narrative autobiographical interviews. The *document analysis* was used to investigate the content of the websites, bylaws, communiqués, and other documents of the selected associations. Insight into the ways in which association members negotiate their collective identities was gained by *participatory observation*. *Semi-structured interviews* were conducted with association principals (President, Vice-President, or Imam), who acted as gatekeepers for us. The goal of these interviews was to collect information on the history, objectives, and internal relations of each association. The semi-structured interviews also helped to establish the trust of the gatekeepers.

Narrative autobiographical interviews, the main data-gathering method of the study, were conducted in order to gain insight into the narrative identities of the selected active members of the associations. In line with Lucius-Hoene (2000), narrative identity was understood as "a situated, pragmatic, autoepistemic and interactive activity drawing on culturally transmitted narrative conventions which is performed within the research context".

The transcribed interviews were analyzed according to the so-called "reconstruction of narrative identity" method developed by Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann (2004). Since this method is relatively new, its fundamentals are described below. Prior to this description, a brief explanation of the three dimensions of narrative identity (*temporal*, *social*, and *self-referential*) will be given, which the authors have accorded a prominent position in their evaluation.

The *temporal dimension* primarily relates to the question of how the story is structured in terms of time. Narrative autobiographical constructions include justifications and explanations for how the self became what it is. Thus, they also form the basis for orientation of actions and plans for the future (Lucius-Hoene & Deppermann, 2004, p. 57). Also important to the temporal dimension is the question of *agency*; one would like to establish if the narrator presents him/herself as an active and acting subject in his/her narration, or as the passive object of forces and powers that he/she cannot control.

The *social dimension* is concerned with the following questions:

- *Positioning:* What roles does he/she assign to him/herself and his/her interaction partners (both in the narrated episodes as well as in the interview situation)?
- *World construction* (*Weltkonstruktion*)*:* How does he/she describe the physical and social environment and the general conditions of his/her stories?
- *Narrative conventions*: To which culturally transmitted narrative conventions does he/she have recourse in his/her narration?

The *self-referential dimension* is about the self-

reflections of the narrator. The following questions are of particular interest:

- What characteristics does the narrator ascribe to him/herself?
- Which attachments are thus expressed?
- How does his/her "theory of self" express itself? What assumptions about him/herself does he/she make as an "expert on his/her own ego"?
- What discoveries does the narrator make about him/herself during the narration (*autoepistemic processes*)?

4.2. The Analysis Procedure

Once the interviews are transcribed, one starts with the analysis of the collected texts. The reconstruction of narrative identity consists of three main steps: rough macroscopic analysis, detailed microscopic analysis, and reconstruction of the case structure.

- In the macroscopic structural analysis, one attempts to reconstruct how the narrator structured his/her story chronologically and thematically.
- A detailed microscopic analysis is a sequential analysis of a selection of interview passages that appear particularly relevant to the enquiry. Here, "general heuristics" are analyzed first ("Questions regarding the data": *What* is shown; *how*, *why*, and *why thus* and not otherwise?). Thereafter, one tries to find clues about the three dimensions of narrative identity in the respective passage. Due to the fact that narrative identity, by definition, represents a linguistic performance, one should also employ a series of linguistic and communicative methods in undertaking such analyses (see Lucius-Hoene & Deppermann, 2004, chapter 9).
- Once the analyses on the macro and micro levels are completed, one attempts to assemble the many fragments into a *case structure*.

For the sake of brevity, in this article we present only an abridged report of our analyses.

4.3. Sampling

Although our premises apply to all people, for the following reasons we focused our project on Muslims in Switzerland. The mass media in Switzerland and wider Europe often define Muslims as members of a minority that is difficult to integrate. They therefore face prejudice and discrimination (Cesari, 2004; Kivisto, 2013; Kühnel & Leibold, 2007; Sheridan, 2006; Stolz, 2005), which exacerbates their opportunities and willingness to establish and maintain contact with other communities. Moreover, many migrants are from countries with weak civil society structures (Gellner, 1994) and are therefore likely to have little experience with voluntary organizations (Amacker & Budowski, 2009). Finally, they are sometimes drawn into the maelstrom of religiously inspired anti-systemic movements in the Islamic world. This involvement may manifest itself as alienation from the local civil society. For these particular reasons, it seemed all the more interesting to examine whether Muslims' civic engagement has a significant impact on their attitude toward outgroups and toward the whole society.

The study was based on purposeful, two-step sampling. Firstly, eight Muslim voluntary organizations in Switzerland were selected, some with an outspoken bridging character, others with a pronounced bonding culture. Secondly, 26 members of the selected organizations (16 men and 10 women) were chosen for narrative autobiographical interviews.

5. Integration from the Point of View of Muslims: Two Prototypical Cases

As the narratives we analyzed in our research project corresponded to either the type *inclusion* or the type *co-existence*, with nobody matching any of the other two types, in this section we deliver two prototypes that almost perfectly represent the types *inclusion* and *co-existence*. In section six we refer to other autobiographical narratives of our project to underpin the findings presented in the two prototypes.

5.1. Case Study 1: Akbar

Along with his parents, Akbar (52) arrives in Switzerland from Pakistan at the age of two. His father, a lawyer and religious scholar, has the task of looking after the affairs of the Ahmadiyya community, which represents a minority within Sunni Islam, in the Diaspora. Akbar is sent to an international boarding school where he comes into contact with a variety of nationalities and religions. After graduation, he studies linguistics and graduates with a degree in German literature. He is self-employed, and through his office, he coordinates teaching assignments, translations, consultations, and volunteer activities. He works both as a high school teacher and as a lecturer in intercultural studies at a technical college. Although Akbar is very active professionally, volunteer activities take up much of his time. He maintains several charitable projects, holds a post of responsibility in a mosque organization, and is very active in the Swiss Green Party, a secular leftist party. He is also committed to development aid, plays an active role in local politics, and is active in associations for the integration of marginalized people, as well as intercultural dialogue. Akbar is married and has two children.

Akbar's worldview points to a carefree childhood in a social and missionary upper-middle class environment. When asked how he became the man he is today, Akbar replies:

> "It was primarily my parents who pointed me in this direction. I did, as I said, grow up in the mosque. And that's a mosque to which African kings had come; Muhammad Ali had come, the boxer. Presidents of different countries had come, but also the tramp, the poor man from the street. Even a Swiss tramp. My parents took equal care of everybody. I cannot remember any man ever coming to my parents and saying that he was hungry, or needed somewhere to stay the night, or that he was cold, that they would not have taken care of. And that, of course, is something that has affected me very much, you know? And everything else is in consequence of the fact that my parents have influenced me thus, you know? I think that has been the key point. And then, of course, there was the international school. There [we talked about everything, for instance] the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And there were Israelis at the school, and there were Arabs. And we discussed things all night long."

The experiences of his formative years affect him to the present day. As a humanistic understanding of Islam dominates his family's culture, being helpful and charitable is prominent in Akbar's sense of self.

> "Education is my identity, women's rights are my identity, these I promote most of the time, you see? Or, to put it roughly, standing up for people who are in distress or who are underprivileged. It does not matter which country they are in. I campaign for such people in Pakistan, but I equally campaign for such people in Switzerland. This may be my identity or it is identity-forming."

Given this sense of self, Akbar's numerous civic activities are not surprising. In this respect, a high degree of continuity can be observed with respect to the temporal dimension of his narrative identity. This is particularly noticeable in his identification with his life-work—a school project for marginalized girls in Pakistan—because the project is a realization of his childhood dream:

> "There [at school] when I was fourteen, I decided this, and I typed this on my first electric typewriter which I had bought or got as a present, that later, when I had grown up, I myself would build such a boarding school, though not for the richest people, but for the poorest, you know?….And I have now made this a reality."

As the first generation of female students approaches the end of high school, a college with a two-year degree course is being planned. It is with pride that Akbar points out that about half of the 200 girls enrolled come from Christian families, who often live a marginalized existence in Pakistan. Thus, he wants to counter the widespread notion that Muslims only support their co-religionists.

> "The important point is that all of these girls attend our school without paying fees. They belong to the lower class. These are [also] people who are underprivileged because of their religious affiliation—they are Christians. We have a disproportionate number of Christians, considering that we have roughly fifty percent Muslim girls and fifty percent Christians, you know?"

Akbar's strong inclination toward charitable activities is in line with the humanitarian objective of his religious community. However, this does not mean that he identifies exclusively with his religion. Rather, he identifies with his many activities and memberships, which contribute to a complex and varied social identity.

5.2. Case Study 2: Urs

In his autobiographical narration, Urs (30) depicts a difficult adolescence. The reason seems to lie within his family. His mother divorces his father, who is struggling with addiction problems. She places Urs in the care of a foster family and emigrates. Urs finds support in the new family, whose members are deeply religious. His foster parents are puritanical Protestants and followers of a free church. He enjoys a warm family life and practices Christian rituals with the family. For a young man who was raised far from religion, his new life as a disciplined, practicing Christian is a fascinating experience. After a while, Urs leaves the family and moves abroad to be with his mother. The familial, religious life of the young teen now gives way to a much more permissive adolescent life.

Upon his return to Switzerland, Urs initially joins a strongly patriotic, conservative political movement. Later, he takes an interest in the Palestine question. In particular, the bombing of an airport in the occupied territories by the Israeli army seems to have had a drastic effect on him ("I lost it completely")—the more so, as the airport was built with the funds of SDC (The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation). He is now committed to the Palestinian cause. During a short stay in the Gaza Strip, he becomes fascinated by the hospitality of the Palestinians, their human warmth, and their supportive communal life.

He attributes the hospitality of the Palestinians to Islamic principles. It also excites him that Islam is a vibrant, community-based religion that permeates the

everyday life of the faithful. His adoption of Islam is made easier by the fact that he did not give up his faith in God. At age 21, he converts to Islam.

In the foreground of Urs' conversion to Islam, we find first of all the *re-socialization* of a young person who longs for the *warmth of a community* (Bauman, 2000). This also explains his earlier involvement in a patriotically oriented political movement. In addition, his longing for a "normative edifice", which would give him guidance, testifies to Durkheim's understanding of an anomic state before conversion. In this respect, it is also possible here to speak of a *methodizing of life* (Weber, 1905/2002; Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999) as a result of conversion.

After conversion, Urs becomes a strictly practicing Muslim who places religious ritual at the center of his life. Henceforth, he dedicates himself to the cause of Muslims in Switzerland as well as abroad.

> "I really want to practice my faith consistently and don't want it pushed into a corner again and again through argument and discussion about the centrality of Western modernity. If something has to be at the center, then, conversely, I want religion, faith in God, and religious rituals to be at the center and the world to be organized around them. And this I thought I had found in Islam at the time, hadn't I? Yes, this is how I became the person I am today."

It is in this association that Urs finally finds the stability, nest warmth, and sense of family he has been missing for so many years.

> "The stability and constancy of an association, an organization, I only found here, in this association. At the same time, it has become a kind of center of life for us, has it not?"

When questioned if he had any sympathy with a particular political party or identified with a specific political orientation beyond his commitment to Islam, Urs gave this answer.

> "That's for me…how should I say? As already mentioned, my identity is Islam, and from this life-order perspective [Lebensordnungsperspektive] I am a little bit eclectic, when it comes to voting for a party.
> […]
> [Moreover,] I simply couldn't be in a party at all. That's the reason. However, I think, nowadays many people believe that this political system is just too narrow."

What Urs strives for is the greatest possible autonomy of the Muslim community and its freedom to live up to its religious code. At the same time, he attaches great importance to the recognition of Islam and its acceptance as "normal" by the host society.

> "We see ourselves as a family with an idea. And the idea is that Islam gets naturalized in Switzerland. That one day the Muslims can say: We live here in Switzerland, not as guests, but as Muslims who are a recognized part of Switzerland.
> […]
> Actually, we want to do away with the Muslim migrants' guest mentality that has prevailed up to now….We should not always ask for whatever we need. We should just take it. We should, for example, be able to build a mosque without having to beg society for a friendly gesture and without having to bow our heads. We should simply build it, as soon as we have the money for it and we have sought permission. This is more or less the idea, that we have a normalization discourse and try to normalize Islam in Switzerland, to normalize it according to the meaning of Jürgen Link's normalization theory."

By being a "normal" part of Swiss society, Urs means that practicing Muslims should be allowed to live up to their religious code of conduct in the public sphere without being stigmatized for it. In order to demonstrate this, he mentions the example of the normalization of homosexuality in Switzerland.

> "We remember, for instance, the homosexuals here in Switzerland. They too had…let's say in the 1950s, they could have been arrested if they outed themselves as homosexuals. Today, they are even allowed to marry, as homosexuals, aren't they? So we want to impose [on] society a similar normalization discourse, in the sense of 'We are normal. What we do here is normal. We belong to Switzerland', and that the tolerance imperative, the freedom rights, and the plural, democratic system of Switzerland oblige the society to accept this normality."

"Normal" does not primarily mean that Muslims have the same civic, political, and social rights. Rather, it implies a peaceful co-existence between Muslims and non-Muslims. Consequently, his association is not looking for interaction with the dominant population but separation from it. It attaches importance to possessing the right to an orthodox education of children, as well as segregated sports (both after gender and faith) and separated burial grounds. Finally, it denounces Muslims who campaign for the modernization of Islam.

6. Discussion

As typical cases of the two main groups of interview-

ees, Akbar and Urs have contrasting views on integration.

Akbar is engaged in numerous volunteer associations beyond the cultural/religious community he belongs to. Islam is only one part among others in his identity, and he shows strong identification with the many social projects he is engaged in. In Akbar's narration, neither excessive identification with an ingroup nor hateful demarcation against any outgroups can be noticed. It is only from the jihadists that Akbar distances himself. The active role he plays in the secular and left Green Party is also an indication of his deep concern for social welfare issues. Therefore, it can be said that he is in favor of *social integration*.

Urs, on the other hand, prefers *co-existence*. He is exclusively engaged in the Islamic organization which he co-founded. His most important cause is the equal treatment of Islam in Switzerland, achieving maximum autonomy for the community of practicing Muslims, and the separation of Muslims from non-Muslims. He relies on the democratic tradition and the liberal values of Swiss society to justify the demand of his organization for tolerance vis-à-vis practicing Muslims. His primary concern is the tolerance of his ingroup by outgroups and not vice versa. During the entirety of the interview he does not mention any other social groups that suffer from stigmatization. When he refers to the successful campaign of the Swiss homosexuals in "normalizing" their sexual orientation, he does so to demonstrate the strategy of his association. Any expression of sympathy that goes beyond this cognitive level is absent from his assertions.

His devotion to Islam and the Muslim community prevents him from engaging in secular organizations, such as trade unions, political parties, or neighborhood associations, in which religious affiliation is expected to be a personal, private issue. His position can therefore be interpreted as advocacy for high *systemic integration* but low overall *social integration*. According to our typology, he is primarily interested in a peaceful coexistence between the native population and Muslims. Thus, he demands the integration of *Islam,* while rejecting the requirement that Muslims should engage with the non-Muslim population of Switzerland.

As for the second focal point of the study, Akbar and Urs also represent two distinct types of outgroup tolerance. From a libertarian perspective, Urs demands that the Swiss native population should respect and even guarantee the autonomy of his ingroup and should not interfere in its internal affairs, thus allowing it to live up to its specific norms and rituals in its exclusive spaces. This attitude is based on putting collective rights of social groups over the rights of individuals. Hence, we suggest labeling this kind of attitude as *multicultural tolerance*.

In Akbar's narrative, there is no explicit reference to tolerance. However, his pride in being open to the views of different social groups (for instance the views of both Israeli and Arab students on the Palestinian conflict at the boarding school), his sensitivity towards human rights issues and his "standing up for people who are in distress or who are underprivileged" are all indicative of his openness, sympathy and care for marginalized people beyond their group attachments. Such an attitude is based on putting the rights of individuals over the collective rights of social groups. Hence, we suggest labeling such an attitude as *liberal tolerance*.

As already mentioned, Urs and Akbar represent two main groups among our interviewees. While the one group favors system integration as well as multicultural tolerance, the other group is supportive of both social integration and liberal tolerance (for a detailed description of this typology see Nollert & Sheikhzadegan, 2014, 2016). Furthermore, we could identify two subgroups among the latter. While one group showed clear shift towards liberal tolerance through civic engagement, the members of the other group were raised as tolerant individuals in the first place. Taking Akbar's childhood into consideration, it is fair to characterize him as a person whose tolerance was due primarily to his socialization in a tolerant environment.

The insight won by the above-discussed narratives can be well supported by other narratives. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the question of tolerance.

Respondents like Akbar have generally numerous civic engagements, a relatively complex social identity, and are supportive of liberal tolerance. For instance, Bekim, a 55-year old Kosovan migrant (who was also a trade-unionist) told us that in the course of his commitment to diverse volunteer associations, he has overcome both his distaste for religion and homosexuals. Similarly, Aras, a 58-year old Marxist-oriented trade-unionist of Turkish origin, developed a greater tolerance towards right-wing religious workers. A Syrian woman reported how civic engagement in her neighborhood helped her to overcome her social isolation as a housewife, to establish contact with people of different ethnic and social origins, and to restore her self-image as a socially active person. Regaining her self-consciousness, she co-founded an association of Arab women as well as a "roundtable of religious dialog".

Conversely, orthodox Muslims such as Urs, who are exclusively committed to a single association, tend to grow in distance from other social circles, including their original peer groups, and are generally supportive of multicultural tolerance. Mehmet (36), the son of a Turkish labor migrant family joined the organization of Urs after experiencing a spiritual transformation. Since then, he sees his religion with new eyes. He uses all his leisure time to empower practicing Muslims and to enhance their ability to live up to their faith. Sara (22), the daughter of a Kosovan labor migrant family, had to endure bitter experiences of discrimination because of her head scarf. She joined the same organization in or-

der to participate in its collective action to protect the rights of practicing Muslims.

Indeed, the notion that membership in different social circles promotes tolerance is not new. For instance, de Tocqueville has underscored the role of voluntary associations in promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. Durkheim (1897/1951), has argued that in modern societies, neither the family, the religion, nor the state have an integrative function in society (see also Pescosolido & Georgianna, 1989). According to him, the only source of integration is voluntary association because social circles crosslink their members and curb any excessive emotions within in the group. Moreover, Allport (1954) has postulated the contact hypothesis, according to which, people who belong to a variety of social groups have more contacts and, therefore, tend not only to overcome their stereotypes and prejudices, but to also develop more generalized tolerance (see also Frölund Thomsen, 2012). Finally, Roccas and Brewer (2002) have argued that people with complex social identities are more open to change and more tolerant of otherness: "In sum, both cognitive and motivational factors lead us to predict that complex social identities will be associated with reduced ingroup favoritism and increased tolerance and positivity toward outgroups in general" (Roccas & Brewer, 2002, p. 102; see also Brewer & Pierce, 2005).

7. Conclusions

The research project outlined in this article focused on the subjective dimension of integration. It did this through investigating the views of Muslims in Switzerland on the optimal way of their integration into Swiss society. The autobiographical narratives we analyzed suggest that Muslims in Switzerland prefer one of two options. The preferences are either a combination of social and system integration (social inclusion) or a peaceful co-existence that would provide equal rights to Muslims, but also foster segregation of Muslims from non-Muslims. Accordingly, we found two distinct types of outgroup tolerance. The interviewees who supported social inclusion showed a *liberal* tolerance, based on the primacy of individual over collective rights. On the other hand, the interviewees who advocated peaceful co-existence between autonomous faith communities showed a *multiculturalist* tolerance, which means that they were more concerned about the collective rights of the communities than the rights of individual members of social groups.

Although only two prototypical cases are discussed here, our research has important implications for the future research. Firstly, it underlines the multidimensionality of the term integration. Secondly, it shows the linkages between the attitude towards integration and the outgroup tolerance. Thirdly and finally, it shows the importance of biography and habitus for the development of outgroup tolerance and of personal attitude towards integration.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Negotiating Social Inclusion: The Catholic Church in Australia and the Public Sphere

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Abstract
This paper argues that for religion, social inclusion is not certain once gained, but needs to be constantly renegotiated in response to continued challenges, even for mainstream religious organisations such as the Catholic Church. The paper will analyse the Catholic Church's involvement in the Australian public sphere, and after a brief overview of the history of Catholicism's struggle for equal status in Australia, will consider its response to recent challenges to maintain its position of inclusion and relevance in Australian society. This will include an examination of its handling of sexual abuse allegations brought forward by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, and its attempts to promote its vision of ethics and morals in the face of calls for marriage equality and other social issues in a society of greater religious diversity.

Keywords
Catholicism; multifaith societies; public sphere; social inclusion

Issue
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1. Introduction

For much of Australian history since colonization in 1788, Catholicism held outsider status among the nation's public institutions. Although Catholics arrived on the ships of the First Fleet in 1788, Australia's early history emphasized the Protestantism of the majority of early settlers from Britain. Furthermore, Catholicism was understood as the religion of the immigrant and the 'other', and in particular of Irish and other Catholic immigrants, fuelling xenophobia in a nation that was protective of its self-understanding as a British colony (O'Farrell, 1985, pp. 1-8). But today Catholicism is seen as a powerful and important religion in Australian society, one which is able to shape public opinion, and whose leaders are heard in Canberra, the nation's capital. However, recent controversies have placed the Catholic Church in Australia again under the spotlight as its role in the nation's civic culture is increasingly questioned. That Catholicism in Australia is experiencing troubled times has been attested to by a number of analysts (see Collins, 2008; McGillion, 2003; McGillion & Grace, 2014). The scandal of child sexual abuse by clergy, which has been the subject of a national Royal Commission, is a case in point, and has done great harm to the Church's reputation in many communities. This scandal involves criminal behaviour by clergy, but other kinds of challenges are also present. These include greater levels of religious diversity in Australian society and its impact on the Church's status in the public sphere, for reasons which we will consider in more detail below. Furthermore, the Church's stance in opposing reforms to marriage legislation in Australia to allow gay marriage runs counter to the views of the majority of Australians, according to opinion polls. This paper argues that social inclusion, be it by religious, ethnic, or gender minorities, is hard won, but once won its continuation is not guaranteed. This argument will

be assessed using the case of the Catholic Church in Australia, and how its full inclusion in the public sphere required a concerted effort, by Church leaders and laity alike, to reach consensus with the rest of Australian society on a number of social issues such as education, freedom of religion and freedom of speech. The Catholic Church in Australia was able, over a number of decades, to create important social institutions such as places of worship, schools, universities and colleges, hospitals and social service provision that cemented its place in Australian society. It should be noted at the outset that the Catholic Church in Australia is not a singular institution managed by a specific individual or group. Rather, the Catholic Church in Australia is made up of over 30 dioceses led by bishops who report to the Pope in Rome. Furthermore, a large number of religious orders and Catholic organizations operate in the country. The Church in Australia also comprises a number of associations and groups that organize cultural events, spiritual activities, and charitable work.

How the Catholic Church in Australia became a respected part of society will be the subject of the early part of this paper. Following this there will be a consideration of the plight of the Catholic Church in Australia in recent times, including the issues referred to above, the sexual abuse of minors scandal, its response to the same-sex marriage debate, and increasing levels of religious diversity. Our focus here will be with the public sphere as theorized by Jürgen Habermas. As Habermas (1989) shows, the public sphere is that space within civil society where ideas can be shared freely, and where public opinion can be generated, expressed and commented on to help form public policy. Exclusion from the public sphere is fatal to successful social inclusion for a social group. As we will see below, it is precisely because of its success in the public sphere, through the creation of schools and other educational facilities, media outlets, and Catholic participation in law, commerce and many other areas of civic life, that the Catholic Church in Australia has established its place in Australian society. However, it is also the challenges that it faces in the Australian public sphere that have led to renewed criticisms of its credibility. Before beginning our discussion of Catholicism's inclusion in Australian society, the next section will examine the notion of the public sphere in greater detail.

2. Social Inclusion in the Public Sphere

Social inclusion is the goal of social minorities seeking greater harmony in their social interactions in society, and their desire for acceptance. Greater levels of social diversity add to this need to maintain a high degree of social inclusion, and religious diversity is an important aspect of the pluralism of modern societies. As Gary Bouma writes: "Diversity is the new normal. The rise of Pentecostal spirituality along with Muslim communities, Buddhists and Hindus has required making room, geographical, social and physical for mosques, temples, and other spiritual places" (Bouma, 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, greater diversity gives rise to a heightened need for the equal recognition of diverse social groups. Axel Honneth (1995, 2012) has written of recognition as being an essential drive for social groups and for individuals. Using Hegel as his point of departure, Honneth has analysed the critical role that recognition is playing in modern society as a means of structuring society towards greater social harmony. Hegel proposed that people attain their self-esteem by being acknowledged by their peers and by those from higher social orders. This reciprocal respect becomes the basis, Hegel observed, for a dynamic system of recognition, because as people attain a greater sense of their own identity, they desire that this evolution in their personal character continue to be recognised by others. If it is not conflict ensues. Honneth points out that this process happens at both the psychological and the social level. In the social world, social groups demand recognition for their status in society, be it based on their ethnicity, gender, sex or class position. When these groups feel that they are being disrespected or deprived of rights, then social conflict ensues until the social group in question feels that it has achieved a greater degree of recognition and reconciliation with the rest of society (Honneth, 1995, 2012; Lysaker & Jakobsen, 2015).

Charles Taylor has also made important contributions to discussions about social inclusion in diverse societies, in both his writings on recognition, and research for the Québec government on multiculturalism (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008; Taylor, 1994). Taylor argues that in the public sphere, and in society generally, "a politics of recognition has come to play a bigger and bigger role" (Taylor, 1994, p. 37). In liberal multicultural societies the recognition of unique identities and cultures is essential, because these societies now incorporate the politics of identity which underpins a "politics of difference" (Taylor, 1994, p. 38). Higher levels of individualism also play their part (Taylor, 1989). In their report on multiculturalism in Québec, Canada, Taylor and Gérard Bouchard conclude that a high degree of success has been achieved, but headway still needs to be made (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008, p. 18). In particular, their report finds that Québec's secularism is an important ingredient in achieving successful multiculturalism (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008, p. 20; see also Taylor, 2007). In sum, minority groups in this region of Canada have been able to achieve social inclusion due to favourable conditions implemented by government policy. However, social inclusion can be won and lost, or at least challenged. Pace (2013) has presented research to show that the position of pre-eminence that the Catholic Church enjoyed in Italy has been challenged in recent decades by the rise of greater levels of seculari-

zation and religious diversity. Pace reveals growth in the number of religious sites in Italy, but these are the product of Pentecostal and non-Christian religions, rather than a resurgence of Catholicism. As Pace concludes, the Catholic Church in Italy must now share the public sphere with a number of new religious groups, including other religions, rather than being the dominant faith (Pace, 2013, pp. 316-317). These theories about social inclusion can be understood as taking place within the public sphere of society.

As Habermas (1989) has written, the public sphere is a crucial site for the successful inclusion of social groups. Ideally, the public sphere is that social space where an open forum exists for the widespread dissemination of ideas, and where ideas can be debated without sanctions or the fear of sanctions from the state or other powerful interest groups. The public sphere is made up of numerous social institutions and cultural sites. These include the media, volunteer associations, and physical spaces such as cafés and marketplaces. What each of these sites share is that they are free of surveillance and duress and that opinions expressed in them are interpreted as a contribution to ongoing debates about how society can be improved, or discussions about how the social standing of a particular group may be enhanced. The lack of a free and accessible public sphere is evident in those states which political theorists describe as being authoritarian or totalitarian.

Habermas is specifically interested in the *bourgeois* public sphere, which consists of private citizens coming together to form a public, a space that is formed for the free exchange of capital (Habermas, 1989, p. 14ff). Newspapers, which Habermas pinpoints as a crucial element of a successful bourgeois public sphere, enhance the ability of citizens to trade efficiently, as these forms of media are able to spread information far and wide in a cost effective manner. These are enhanced by the development of journals and other periodicals which convey not only information, but also opinion about social issues and political topics, with the aim of forming opinion among others (Habermas, 1974, p. 53). Although the bourgeois public sphere is important in Habermas' estimation, he notes that other forms of the public sphere exist. An example is the "public sphere in the world of letters" (Habermas, 1989, p. 29), where intellectuals and artists share ideas and shape public opinion. Habermas has also emphasized that the free discussion of ideas in the public sphere should include religious ideas and beliefs, and he points out that secular liberal states should allow for religious views impacting on public discourses and not attempt to constrain them (Habermas, 2006, p. 8). As we shall see below, the Catholic Church in Australia has been successful in playing its part in shaping public opinion through media outlets such as newspapers and journals, as well as playing a distinctive role in education and politics.

Taking the above points into consideration, therefore, the remainder of this paper will speak of the public sphere in its wider understanding, as that social space where free citizens and institutions form opinions, criticise, and contribute to ongoing social and political debate. Furthermore, social institutions such as those developed by the Catholic Church in Australia in education and social services help to achieve greater social recognition, in Honneth's terms. Overall, becoming a recognised voice in the public sphere is symbolic that a social group is reaching acceptance and recognition in the wider society. This is something that the Catholic Church in Australia has been able to achieve. In the next section we will discuss how the Catholic Church in Australia developed key social institutions, and formed public opinion, so as to make it possible to achieve a greater degree of social inclusion in Australian society.

3. Winning a Place at the Table: A Brief Overview of Catholicism in the Australian Public Sphere

The first Catholics arriving in Australia in 1788 were not clergy or dignitaries. They were convicts sent to Australia in the mass deportation of prisoners under a penal policy to clear out Britain's overcrowded criminal justice system (Thompson, 2002, p. 1). Migration would continue to be important for Catholicism's future diversity. For example, after the Second World War many thousands of Italian Catholics arrived bringing with them their distinctive Catholic culture which influenced the nation's largest cities, Sydney and Melbourne (Mecham, 1991). In recent decades arrivals of Catholics from countries such as the Philippines have begun to make their presence felt in the Church. Catholics have maintained an average 25% (approx.) of the Australian population for much of the last century; including at the last national census in 2011 (see Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2006, 2011). Notwithstanding the ethnic diversity of the Catholic Church in Australia today, many of the first Catholics to arrive during the colonial period were Irish, and their brand of Catholicism would have a significant impact on the culture and politics of the Church for much of the twentieth century, particularly because many priests were of Irish origin or descent (Dixon, 2005, p. 3).

Involvement in education was essential for the Church securing social inclusion in Australia. Before Federation in 1901, Australia comprised a number of separate colonial states which drafted their own legislation about everything from education and security to railway gauge widths. Today state governments continue to legislate for, and manage, primary and secondary education, while universities are run by the federal government. Prior to Federation, the involvement of churches in education was a contested issue, and prominent Protestants advocated a secular educa-

tional policy for schools, while allowing some religious instruction at the discretion of headmasters and school boards (Thompson, 2002, p. 18). Catholics and some Protestant denominations were unhappy about this, and pushed for their own schools. Funding was often a key issue. By utilising teachers from European and local religious orders Catholics were able to establish schools of their own, although many of them were poorly resourced due to financial constraints (Dixon, 2005, p. 6). However, some politicians wanted the country's education system to have greater national coherence. Henry Parkes introduced into the New South Wales parliament his *Public Schools Act 1866* (NSW), which legislated that schools should be governed by a Council of Education. Parkes's vision was for a secular educational system and did not allow for the funding of Catholic schools (O'Farrell, 1985, p. 151). What eventuated in most states was a dual-system educational policy, with the state providing a secular education alongside denominational and religious based private schools that did not receive government funding. These issues were largely unresolved well into the twentieth century, and although it was left to each state to administer its own education system, private and religious schools effectively eased the state's financial burden in the provision of education. It was not until the 1970s that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's Labor government provided substantial federal funding to both public and private schools, and therefore gained a greater policy making role in education. Today, the Catholic school system educates a high number of students, and is recognised as a key player in each state's education framework. As well as its network of schools, the Catholic Church in Australia has also involved itself in tertiary education, with the establishment of the Australian Catholic University (ACU) in 1991, which began life as a number of separate training colleges (Dixon, 2005, pp. 43-44). Along with the ACU, the University of Notre Dame Australia has also opened campuses. In summary, by educating generations of Australians from all social backgrounds the Catholic Church has delivered a key social service, while at the same time proving its importance in the nation's social fabric and making its brand known throughout the country.

The Catholic Church's place in the Australian public sphere was also established through its involvement in the nation's political scene. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Catholics were predominately from the working classes, and this class identification saw the majority of them supporting the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 6). Greater levels of Catholic interest in Australian politics were initially spurred by the international movement known as Catholic Action. Catholic Action became prominent in the 1920s and, supported by the popes promoted higher levels of social action by lay Catholics, a role which had hitherto been the concern of the clergy (Massam, 1996, pp. 192-193). Two different forms of Catholic Action arose in different parts of Europe, which caused some degree of confusion as the movement spread around the globe. Italian Catholic Action was largely a devotional movement which emphasized traditional practices of prayer and piety, along with the promotion of Catholics into political positions to develop policies supportive of the Church (Massam, 1996, p. 195). The other form of Catholic Action began in Belgium and was centred on a Catholic response to industrialization. This form of Catholic Action was about forming young working class people with Christian values to counter communism. Elements of each of these two interpretations was embedded in Catholic Action in Australia, and lay Catholics involved in the movement were encouraged to be loyal to the Church while being wary about communism. For the most part, Catholic Action involved the establishment of study groups where young people could discuss their faith in the context of the times (Massam, 1996).

Catholic support for the ALP was largely unquestioned until the 1930s and 1940s, when concerns began to be raised about the ALP's relationship with militant labour unions and communism. A small group of Australian Catholic political and social leaders became disillusioned with a number of the ALP's social policies, which they viewed as contradicting Catholic moral teaching. One of these Catholic dissidents was a Melbourne based journalist named B. A. (Bob) Santamaria, who had for some time been involved in anti-communist activities on behalf of the Church. He established a group called the Movement, which tasked itself with countering the influence of the Communist Party in trade unions by electing Catholic anti-Communists to union committee roles and other positions of influence. Santamaria had a good working relationship with many Catholic bishops, which meant that his ideas had some measure of impact on Church policy regarding labour issues (Henderson, 1983). The Movement became a national body in 1945 with the support of Archbishops Mannix and Gilroy, but kept its activities clandestine (Campion, 1982, pp. 104-106). Although the Movement was a secretive organization, Santamaria sought to influence the political sphere more publicly, and to do so he established the newspaper *Freedom* in 1943, which in 1947 changed its name to *News-Weekly* and continues to be printed (Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 61). *Freedom* published articles that warned of the perils of communism in Australia. This dovetailed neatly with the less public work of the Movement. Although Santamaria and his work were not supported by all Catholic bishops in Australia (see Duncan, 2001), both *Freedom* and the Movement achieved many of the goals that Santamaria hoped that they would, such as providing a voice for non-communists who were passionate about labour issues,

and creating greater representation for non-communists, and Catholics, in the labour movement and in the ALP.

However, matters came to a head when the leader of the ALP, Dr H. V. Evatt, accused Santamaria and other Catholics of undermining the party (Duncan, 2001, p. 225). As tensions rose, a number of Catholic politicians, and non-Catholics concerned about the ALP and communism, split from the party to form the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which was formed in 1956. The new party never elected a sufficient number of Members of Parliament to govern, but it took enough votes from the ALP to keep it out of office until 1972. By the late 1970s the DLP was a spent force in Australian politics, and few now vote for it. Santamaria died in 1998 and was given a state funeral and a number of posthumous awards (Henderson, 2015). His legacy, however, has been contested and he is viewed by some as a hero of conservative values, while for others he had a divisive influence on Australian politics.

As well as highlighting the importance of Catholicism in Australian politics, Santamaria's activities and the DLP are examples of the importance of the media in gaining access to the public sphere. Santamaria trained as a journalist and was well skilled in creating newspapers and other printed publications to publicise his movement's opposition to the role of communist groups. Moreover, the creation of a wide range of media outlets was another way in which the Catholic Church secured greater inclusion in Australian society via the public sphere. Some of the first Catholic newspapers and periodicals were the *Catholic Magazine* and the *Catholic Press*. Today Catholic newspapers continue to be printed and are mainly supported at the archdiocesan level in each state, with the *Catholic Weekly* sold in Sydney and the *Catholic Leader* sold in Brisbane, and so on. The Catholic Church in Australia also captured market share with periodicals and radio stations. Periodicals include Santamaria's *A.D. 2000* and *News-Weekly* magazines which maintain high enough readerships to continue printing. The Catholic radio station 2SM began broadcasting in the early 1930s and was one of the most popular radio stations in NSW and Queensland until it succumbed to increased levels of competition in the radio marketplace in the 1980s. Catholic intellectuals such as the poet Les Murray provide commentary and analysis about social issues in the media. This involvement in the media continues today with the use of the Internet. There are a number of websites at the diocesan and local parish level, and most Catholic organizations have their own websites.

Another way in which the Catholic Church in Australia has secured its place in the national consciousness is through the creation and continued investment in social service institutions. These include hospitals, aged care facilities, services for those afflicted with dependency or mental health issues, family break-up and domestic violence respite centres, services catering to those in financial distress, services for those experiencing homelessness, and refugee support and advocacy. There are also social service provisions run by Catholic organizations aimed at assisting Aboriginal people and their communities. Of course, these institutions were established to aid those in need, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, not to promote Catholicism. But a consequence of their establishment was a greater presence in the public sphere for the Catholic Church in Australia. Some of Australia's best-known Catholics are recognised for their work in these areas, such as Father Chris Riley who runs Youth Off the Streets, receiving credit for his work with disadvantaged young people (Williams, 2004). Organizations such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society, which provides financial assistance to the needy, as well as running charity stores throughout the country, are well known to the Australian public as a first port of call in times of distress. These organizations serve as a sign that Catholicism is an integral element of Australian society, providing social services and outreach without seeking profit. As Brennan (2001, p. 39) points out, advocacy "for the poor, disadvantaged, marginalised or excluded" is an important role for the Church in the public forum, and it has been one of the ways that it has impacted on the Australian public sphere.

Finally, Catholicism made its public presence felt in Australian society through events such as Eucharistic congresses and processions, and papal visits, both of which attract large crowds and media attention. International Eucharistic Congresses took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the 1928 event was held in Sydney drawing crowds of over 500,000. The most recent one in Australia took place in Melbourne in 1973. Smaller but no less public Eucharistic processions were held in many of Australia's major cities, organised by local dioceses or Catholic organizations, and these processions would involve thousands of Catholics following the Blessed Sacrament from a designated church to the Cathedral. In 2005 Cardinal George Pell re-instated them in Sydney, and they have now returned as a regular event there and are held at the feast of Corpus Christi. Hosting papal visits in a televised age has also put the Catholic Church in Australia at the centre of the news cycle. In 1970 Paul VI visited as part of a world tour. In 1986 John Paul II toured the country attracting large crowds, including over 200,000 who attended his mass at Randwick Race Course in Sydney. He returned in 1995. In 2008 World Youth Day was held in Sydney, and Benedict XVI became the third pope to visit Australia, also generating large crowds of up to 350,000 Catholics from across Australia and the world. These public events have helped to generate a sense of pride, community and public presence for Australian Catholics, and they have served as a palpable statement by the Catholic Church in Australia that it

has an important place in the national fabric.

The high water mark for the Catholic Church in Australia came at almost the same time as its credibility started to come under question. Two events mark the prominence that it has come to enjoy in Australia, and these are its holding of World Youth Day in 2008, and the Canonisation of Australia's first saint, St. Mary MacKillop, in Rome in 2010. As mentioned, World Youth Day drew international attention to the Church in Australia, and the canonisation of Mary MacKillop raised its standing in the global Church. Hosting World Youth Day, a global event which attracts large numbers of visitors and foreign media, boosts income for host nations, and includes a papal visit, was pushed by the efforts of Cardinal George Pell (2010, p. 117). Pell also had a hand in efforts to canonise Mary MacKillop. The cause for her beatification had been underway for some time and efforts for this had fallen to the religious order that she had co-founded in Australia in 1866, the Sisters of St. Joseph of the Sacred Heart (Paton, 2010, p. 7). Pell provided the order with support for the cause, and with the Australian bishops' connections in the Vatican, the cause was given a major boost. The motivation for the canonisation was clear—an Australian born saint would provide the Catholic Church in Australia with a symbolic boost to its credibility, and provide a rallying point for Australian Catholics. MacKillop was born in Melbourne in 1842 and founded her order with the Catholic priest and intellectual Fr. Julian Woods. The order concerned itself with the education of the children of the poor, and continues to run a number of schools across the country.

What is evident in the above discussion is that Catholicism's role in the public sphere has shifted from a position of outsider status to that of an important voice in Australian society, and it has become an organisation that provides a wide range of important social services to large numbers of Australians, both Catholic and non-Catholic. The Catholic Church's successful inclusion in the nation's public sphere, therefore, has been secured through a long and steady struggle as Church leaders and Catholic laypeople have worked towards establishing these institutions, achieving educational equality, and making Catholicism's presence felt in the media and in the public forum. Furthermore, the Church's struggle for recognition also means that it enjoys a high degree of credibility in the public sphere, and its voice on a number of social issues is listened to seriously. This has all been achieved while Catholicism remains a minority group within Australian society, albeit a large minority. However, as this paper argues, inclusion in the public sphere is not guaranteed even if it has been achieved by the sorts of struggle outlined above. As we will see in the next section, a number of events have taken place in recent years that challenge the credibility that the Church currently enjoys in the public sphere and in Australian society more generally. As will be argued, these challenges to Catholicism's role in the Australian public sphere are an example of the processes that can occur when social inclusion and recognition are contested, and also reveal that a place in the public sphere needs to be constantly renegotiated if it is to be successful in the long term.

4. Social Inclusion Contested: Australian Catholicism under Siege

As we saw above, the Catholic Church in Australia has managed over a sustained period of time to embed itself as a key player in the nation's public sphere. This has been achieved through an investment in education, the media, and the provision of social services, among other things. However, more recently a number of scandals and events have erupted which have raised questions about the Catholic Church's place in the Australian public sphere. These include the child abuse crisis that has affected Catholicism on a global scale (Keenan, 2012; Tapsell, 2014; Yallop, 2010; Weigel, 2004). Another issue is the Church's stance in the marriage equality debate in Australia. These are considered in this section, along with the impact that they have had on Catholicism's credibility in Australian society.

In 2013 the Labor Government of Prime Minister Julia Gillard launched a Royal Commission to investigate the large numbers of reported cases of child sexual and physical abuse at the hands of personnel from religious and secular care organizations. The Commission spent some time examining the Church's response to allegations of child sexual abuse in Australia by members of its clergy (see Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2014). The Commission found a history of non-reporting of abuse to police, offending clergy being moved from parish to parish where they caused further harm, and a lack of support, moral and financial, to victims. The Commission focused in particular on the Melbourne archdiocese's Melbourne Response, which was established to investigate allegations of abuse internally and reach agreement with victims about redress and compensation. Operating separately from the Melbourne Response is Towards Healing, which was set up by the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference to investigate complaints for the rest of the country. The Commission criticised the Church for the way in which these structures sought to minimize compensation. In some cases victims received a one-off payment, and those who fought for more, it was reported, were faced by a Church with formidable resources to fight them in the courts. As the Commission proceeded, media coverage brought to light how some of the victims of Catholic clerical abuse were treated by the Church. These stories put a human face on the issues. One of these was the case of the Foster family, in which two of Chrissie and Anthony Foster's daughters were abused by a

priest, sending the girls' lives out of control, one dying of a medication drug overdose in 2008 (Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2015b). The Fosters were shocked to find, however, that when they approached Church leaders for help, little was forthcoming (Foster, 2011). Another case was that of Mr John Ellis, which the Royal Commission looked into in some detail (see Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2015a). Ellis had been abused as a child and this had had a devastating impact on his future relationships and career. He contacted Towards Healing seeking compensation, which was denied. The Church spent almost the same amount of money fighting him in court as Ellis had initially asked for.

These events were widely publicised in the media (Marr, 2013), and added another dimension to the child abuse scandal—not only was abuse occurring, but the Church was responding to it in a muddled and defensive manner. It was choosing to litigate with the victims of paedophile priests rather than working out adequate compensation claims. Moreover, in some cases, whenever the Church was backed into a corner and left with no option but to pay victims compensation, it claimed its status as a business non-entity (Marr, 2013, p. 76). This is possible because most of the Church's property and other assets is not owned by individuals or by a single company, but is located in trust companies or non-corporate entities that cannot be sued. Further to this, it seemed to the public that rather than reforming Church structures to sanction offending clergy and prevent abuse, the Church was engaged in damage control. Although the Foster and Ellis cases are only two examples, and other dioceses have chosen to respond in other ways, some more generously, the negative impact of the scandal has been enormous for the Catholic Church in Australia. The reputation of its priests and religious, who were once held up as exemplars, has been tainted in some respects by the actions of a few, and the "tragedy of the abuse scandal is that those exemplars have now become figures of general distrust" (McGillion & Grace, 2014, p. 110). Furthermore, the abuse crisis has distracted attention away from the Church's "good works" in social services, and its response to the victims has left the impression that it has "failed to care about people who have been damaged by its clergy and religious" (McGillion & Grace, 2014, p. 130). The crisis has also called into question the efficacy and credibility of Church leaders, including bishops, whose missteps in dealing with offending clergy was of great concern to the Royal Commission.

Other issues have also challenged the positive standing of the Catholic Church in Australia. Its position on marriage equality has placed it at odds with prevailing opinions among many in the Australian public sphere. One opinion poll has indicated that up to 70% of Australians support changes to the Marriage Act to allow homosexual couples to be legally wed (Cox, 2015). As in Ireland, where the electorate voted to change marriage laws to allow same-sex marriage, there is evidence of a rift between public views on this issue and those held by the Church. The Catholic Church's efforts to resist the introduction of same-sex marriage in Australia have mainly focused on information campaigns for its own congregations. The booklet *Don't Mess with Marriage* was distributed to Catholic parishes around the country in 2015, in an effort to educate Catholics about the reasons why the Church opposes same-sex marriage. The text states that the Church supports a 'traditional' view of marriage between one man and one woman: "On this traditional view what allows for this special kind of union between a man and a woman in marriage is precisely their difference and complementarity" (Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, 2015, p. 17). The document calls Catholics to action, by petitioning members of Parliament and being vocal in their local communities about the issue. The document offers a simple and clear-cut view of marriage to its readers, presenting heterosexual marriage as normative across all times and places. But it largely ignores exceptions, such as polygamy that is practised in some contemporary cultures, as it has been throughout history. However, as a teaching device *Don't Mess with Marriage* effectively outlines the Church's views on the matter and the reasons why it opposes legislative change.

The Church's stance here, however, raises questions for some about whether or not it is in tune with majority opinion. Although, as Brennan (2001) points out, it is not the role of the Church to go along with public opinion but rather to help form it, the Church is inevitably left in the position of holding to a moral argument that some ordinary citizens consider out of step with a progressive social order. Furthermore, greater social and religious diversity in a secular society means that the Church's message is lost among a plethora of competing views. The issue of religious diversity in a secular society is another area where the Catholic Church in Australia is facing increased challenges as it seeks to retain its position as a credible voice in the nation's public sphere. We will consider this in more detail in the next section.

5. Religious Diversity and Secularism

The child abuse scandals, and the politics of identity, are not the only areas where the Church in Australia has been challenged. As Bouma (1996, 2011), Pace (2013) and a range of other theorists have discussed, industrialized societies like Australia are today becoming increasingly diverse in religion, and this diversity is the result of higher levels of migration and higher levels of nonbelief, especially among the young. As Aus-

tralia becomes a multifaith society, mixed with greater levels of atheism and/or religious non-practice, the ability of a church such as the Catholic Church to shape public opinion has become more difficult. At the 2011 census Catholics in Australia remained the largest religious group, with 25.3% of the population identifying as Catholic (ABS, 2011). But a closer look at the figures reveals that the fastest growing religions in Australia are Islam and Hinduism, and these two religious groups also have the youngest demographics for religion (although they presently number only 2.2% and 1.3% of the population respectively).

Furthermore, as well as increasing diversity in religious belief, Australian society is showing greater secularization as more and more people, especially youth, identify themselves as being of "no religion" in surveys such as the national census. This situation parallels that of the United States, where research carried out by Robert Putnam and David Campbell in their book *American Grace* (2010) discovered a significant rise in the number of young Americans describing themselves as having no religion, a group Putnam calls the 'nones'. Identifying as having no religion was particularly high in the cohort of Americans who entered adulthood in the 1990s (Putnam & Campbell, 2010, p. 122). In Australia, the number of respondents in the national census reporting "no religion" has risen from 15% in 2001 to 22% in 2011 (ABS, 2011). As in America, the Australian case reveals that youth occupy a large portion of this segment of the population: "This is most evident amongst younger people, with 28% of people aged 15–34 reporting they had no religious affiliation" (ABS, 2011). Overall, the reality for Australian society, based on current statistical models, is that it will become both an increasingly multifaith society on the one hand, and increasingly secularized on the other, and this will include a social tapestry of many religious beliefs alongside 'nones' who identify as having "no religion". These social changes will have ramifications for the position of Catholicism in the public sphere as it negotiates with an ever more diverse society in its efforts to promote its vision of social justice, morality and ethics.

All of these issues amount to, therefore, a greater level of contestation about the credibility and relevance of the Catholic Church in Australia. Catholics have achieved a high level of social inclusion in Australia, and this will continue. The Church also continues to provide a number of important social services integral in many Australian communities. As Bouma (2006, pp. 67-68) points out, Catholicism's extensive social institutions, as well as its solid population numbers, are indicative of a thriving Church in Australia. But although the long-term inclusion of the Catholic Church in Australia is not in question, what is evident from the above discussion is that this inclusion can be tested, and credibility can be undermined by a number of issues and social transformations, such as those considered above. The child sex abuse scandal has been one example of the undermining of the Church's credibility in the Australian public forum (McGillion, 2003). For Collins, the rise of demographic cohorts professing no religious affiliation means a society with higher levels of individualism, which is challenging to institutions like the Catholic Church that hold to a communitarian understanding of society (Collins, 2008, pp. 162-163). As Habermas, Honneth and Taylor have argued, the public sphere and issues of recognition are integral to successful social inclusion. Social inclusion, however, must not only be attained but continually maintained, and the sorts of challenges that the Catholic Church in Australia has faced in recent times is an example of how this maintaining of inclusion is the result of ongoing negotiation between minority groups and the wider society.

6. Conclusion

This paper has argued that social inclusion is constantly being recontested in diverse and multifaith societies. Social inclusion is highly sought after by social groups who hold minority status, and as Honneth has claimed, recognition of the values and contributions of these social groups is what is at stake. The public sphere is often the social and cultural site where these struggles for inclusion take place, and a successful presence in the public sphere is essential if a social minority is to achieve full inclusion in the wider society. However, as argued here, social inclusion cannot be taken for granted once achieved, and any number of challenges can arise to bring the status of accepted social groups into question and thus undermine their credibility in the eyes of others in the public sphere and in society at large. We have in this paper examined the case of the Catholic Church in Australia as an example of how social inclusion can be achieved and then challenged.

Catholicism in Australia was initially understood as a foreign religion in a nation that understood itself as Protestant and in which the Anglican Church held great power. Over time the Catholic Church was able to engage with Australian society through its successful forays into the public sphere, where it made valuable contributions to social debate, policy decisions, and culture, through the development of educational institutions, media outlets, and the involvement of Catholics in the public sphere. By the early twenty-first century Catholicism appeared to occupy a foundational place in Australian society as an institution that was part of the very fabric of its social, political and cultural life. However, just as this apex was reached social forces began to gather which have greatly undermined, in the eyes of many, the status of the Church. The sexual abuse of minors scandal is at the forefront of these, and the Royal Commission brought the extent of the crimes into public view. The Church's stance on issues

such as same-sex marriage, which opinion polls claim the majority of Australian voters support, has also had the effect of raising questions about the fit between the values of the Church and the values held by Australians at large. Finally, greater levels of religious diversity means that the Catholic Church in Australia now shares social space with many more religions that are supported by growing migrant communities, a similar situation in some ways as that studied by Pace in the Italian context. As well as rising levels of religious diversity, greater levels of secularism have dented the Church's standing in some respects, as it now shares the public forum not just with other religious traditions, but also with a vocal and more numerous number of persons and groups who identify as holding no religious beliefs. A church as large as the Catholic Church is not only part of a diverse society, but also contains great diversity itself. The next phase of Catholicism's involvement in Australian society will no doubt involve responding to these challenges, and working towards re-establishing the high levels of credibility and relevance that it once enjoyed. Whether or not this task can be achieved will depend on its ability to achieve renewed recognition in the Australian public sphere.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Religious Education in Russia: Inter-Faith Harmony or Neo-Imperial Toleration?

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Abstract
This paper explores the approach to religious education that has been instituted in Russia since 2012. The new policy's manifestly proclaimed goals seem convergent with the values of religious freedom, self-determination, tolerance, and inter-faith peace that are espoused by Western liberal democracies. Yet Russia's hidden religious education curriculum is far more consistent with a neo-imperial model of ethno-religious (Russian Orthodox) hegemony and limited toleration of selected, other faiths whose reach is restricted to politically peripheral ethno-territorial entities. This model embodies and revitalizes Russia's imperial legacies. Yet the revitalization is, in itself, an outcome of strategic choices made by the country's religious and secular elites in the course of its desecularization. Building on discourse analysis of five Russian textbooks and a teacher's manual, this article shows how the neo-imperial model manifests itself in the suppression of exogenous and endogenous pluralism, cultivation of the ideology of "ethnodoxy", and in essentially imperialist mythology. The paper concludes by predicting the new model's potential instability.

Keywords
education; ethnicity; multiculturalism; religion; Russia; hidden curriculum, neo-imperialism

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion", edited by Gary Bouma (Monash University, Australia).

1. Introduction: How Things May Not Be Quite What They Seem

The drama surrounding attempts to find a place for religion in Russia's state-run schools unfolded after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its official atheism. The drama lasted more than two decades, and involved tense debates, competing initiatives, and political struggles. Yet, at least for now, the drama seems to be over. In 2012, a new policy was finally put in place. Since then, Russian state-run schools have taught the "fundamentals of religious cultures." The course received approbation in selected regions, where nearly 240,000 fourth graders took it, after then-president Dmitry Medvedev authorized the experiment in 2009. The course teaches four religious cultures. Only Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism—often dubbed Russia's 'traditional' religions—are included. All other faiths are not. Students can study one of these four religious cultures, choose a survey of world religions, or take a secular ethics course. Russia's rulers, including Vladimir Putin, have supported the new curriculum, and there has been a push to expand it. Patriarch Kirill, the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), recently spoke in favor of making the course mandatory for grades two through nine or ten.

Existing literature has focused largely on the history and politics of the struggles surrounding the introduction of religion into public schooling, and—to a lesser extent—on the content of the new course and its textbooks, primarily the textbooks on Orthodox culture. This literature includes critical commentary on aspects of the new curriculum and its implementation (such as

state patriotism and the privileging of Orthodoxy). Yet experts have also emphasized its positive, constructive aspects. These are said to include consensus building; an open-minded search for reasonable compromise between the state, religious groups, and educators; and—particularly when contrasted with Russia's past—the curriculum's multicultural, inclusive nature.

Such evaluations evoke some of the core values that have shaped contemporary approaches to religious education in Western liberal democracies. As will be briefly discussed below, while specific policies have varied historically and cross-nationally, contemporary liberal approaches to religious education emphasize multicultural inclusion of diverse religious and secular orientations and constituencies into a shared educational and public spheres. Therefore, Russia's educational innovations may appear to bring the country closer to the aforesaid Western values. I will show that Russia's religious leaders—including, paradoxically, her staunchest proponents of the country's civilizational uniqueness—wish to present the new policy in this light. Russia, proponents say, is simply doing what the West—and especially Europe—has done all along.

This article—in contrast—shows that Russia's new policies may not be quite what they seem. On the surface, they display a multicultural compromise that resembles a liberal-democratic model of inclusion, but—under the surface—are supported by a neo-imperial regime of ethno-religious toleration that is being consolidated through the policies. Social scientists have long suggested that modern liberal-democratic forms of inclusion have been historically preceded by other ways of handling pluralism, such as through imperial regimes of toleration, which handled ethno-religious pluralism in the Russian Empire. I suggest that a modified version of an imperial regime of toleration has reemerged in post-Soviet Russia. This model secures a hegemonic role to the Orthodox Church and identifies the Russian people as "first among equals" within the neo-imperial project that has increasingly impacted the ideology, politics, and foreign policy of Russia in recent decades. These neo-imperial orientations, I argue, manifest themselves in the policy arrangements and content of the new course on religious cultures. Meanwhile, the idea of multi-cultural inclusion of diverse religious groups is used to legitimize the new policies by making them presentable and acceptable to Western critics.

I approach this task as a social scientist. My goal is not to criticize or praise Russian policies, but to show how these policies are shaped by the Russian and Soviet imperial legacies, and how the choices and strategies of Russia's religious and secular elites have contributed to a neo-imperial model of ethno-religious toleration. In particular, I link the emergence of this model to elites' decision to use a top-down approach to reviving religion (i.e., desecularizing) in Russia's institutions. This paper incorporates conceptualizations of empire, imperial toleration, and desecularization with qualitative discourse analysis of five Russian textbooks and a Manual for teachers. The analysis shows how the neo-imperial model manifests itself in the texts' content.

This article begins by briefly outlining the core ideas around which a consensus on religious education seems to have emerged in liberal democracies. I then provide an overview of how Russia has approached religious education, how religious education policies have been presented by Russian leaders, and how experts have identified these policies with modern Western practices. This section is followed by an analysis of the imperial and neo-imperial political and ideological context of Russia's policies. I build on desecularization theory and research to suggest that Russia's religious and secular leaders have opted for a desecularization "from above", which has led to the re-emergence of a neo-imperial pattern of religious hegemony and limited toleration of ethno-religious pluralism. Finally, I show how these neo-imperial orientations have manifested in the ideological context of the new textbooks.

2. Liberal Democratic Consensus in Religious Education

In order to understand how the emerging Russian model of religious education differs from the model in Western liberal democracies, let us look at the nature of the model around which Western democracies have built consensus. There is no doubt that existing approaches to and forms of religious education in Western liberal democracies vary historically, cross-nationally, and intra-nationally. These variations reflect the different patterns of historical church-state and church-state-and-school relations in democratic societies (Monsma & Soper, 1997); prevalent models for regulating religion in the public sphere, including in education (Richardson, 2004; Plesner, 2005a); and country-specific historical trajectories and institutional arrangements for integrating religious minorities (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). In the US, the First Amendment to the Constitution and the country's strict separation of church and state placed religious education beyond the scope of public education. In most of Europe, religious education has been incorporated in public school curricula. Generally speaking, models of religious education in Europe include:

(a) teaching religion as a separate and official school subject, a subject for which the state may have sole responsibility (as in the UK and Norway) or co-responsibility with the churches (as in most German states);
(b) offering religion outside formal curricula, and under the control of the church or other faith communities (as in the German

states of Brandenburg and Berlin); and
(c) teaching religious traditions within history, social studies, or other subjects (e.g., in France with exception of Alsace-Lorraine) (Plesner, 2005b, p. 1).

Approaches to religious education in public schools vary in many other ways, such as in whether one teaches *in*, *for*, or *about* religion; whether one presents the subject as a devotion or confessional; whether one teaches students in segregated or integrated classrooms; and whether one offers religious education as an elective or mandatory course (e.g., Jackson et al., 2007; Lahnemann & Schreiner, 2009). Similarly complex and diversified is the landscape of forms and approaches to religious education in liberal democracies outside of Europe. Thus in most Australian states, religious instruction remains an important feature of public school curricula, while the schools of Canadian Ontario teach religion in a neutral way, and Quebec just introduced religious education as a subject for primary and secondary schools in 2008 (for a survey of non-European approaches to religious education, see—for example—Beaman & Van Arragon, 2015). Yet amidst the growing religious and cultural diversity of the Western world, the need to develop a set of international principles and standards (compatible with basic democratic principles) for incorporating religion into public education became pressing, and commonly recognized among the West's educational administrations and scholarly communities. Europe took a leading role in developing these principles. Despite the considerable plurality of conceptualizations, institutionalizations, and practices of religious education in European democracies,

> "there have been several significant European-wide developments that aim toward the creation of a more general, trans-national consensus regarding the rationale and guidelines for RE [religious education—E.L.] in public schools. These developments include public statements and research activities sponsored by the European Union, projects and documents developed by the Council of Europe, and initiatives undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)." (Grelle, 2015, pp. 236-237)

A consensus regarding religious education has been reached during these activities, and endorsed in the *Toledo Guiding Principles of Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools* (OSCE, 2007). The consensus serves as "a basis for the study of religions in educational institutions across Europe and beyond that is not driven by any theological agenda, but rather relates to human rights, citizenship and intercultural education arguments" (Jackson, 2010, p. vii). This consensus is not about a particular form of religious education, but about the general principles and framework within which particular jurisdictions should design their specific forms of religious incorporation in curricula. This framework is grounded in the democratic values of human rights and religious freedom. It establishes international standards that prohibit violations of these rights, and prevent indoctrination of students into any particular system of religious values or dogmas. Van Arragon and Beaman suggest modern democracies agree that a country's chosen model should cause no harm to religious or non-religious minorities "by practices they experience as coercive indoctrination" (2015, pp. 3-4). They emphasize that, particularly in public schools, "the quest is for a mechanism which will both protect the religious freedoms of religious groups while at the same time persuading students to see their religions and religious traditions in the context of wider, commonly accepted civic values and interests" (p. 3).

These guiding principles give public schools the charge to accommodate religious constituencies with respect to their rights and freedoms, and—by doing so—help build inter-religious and "intercultural understanding, tolerance and harmony (Weisse, 2007, p. 17). The sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime (2007) notes that, "whatever their legal framework, all European countries are facing the question of how to approach religious faith respecting the freedom of conscience of students and their families while at the same time educating them towards freedom of thought and a critical stance" (p. 100). As such, religious education (as education *about* and *from* religions) is perceived by leading European scholars as another form of civic education, which facilitates the development of European and global values of citizenship and cultural pluralism (Jackson, 2003, 2007). Thus it seems that—amidst the diversity of national, socio-historical, and legal contexts, and in the varied forms of religion's delivery into schools—there is indeed a consensus on principles and desirable outcomes.

This developing consensus is a commonly shared approach, and is rooted in the cornerstone principles of liberal democracy. It views the harmonious unity of diverse groups as a result of policies and structural arrangements that are based on respect for religious freedom, choice, and cultural self-determination. Findings from the EU-funded research project, *Religion in Education. A Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict in Transforming societies of European Countries*, 2006–2009 (REDCo), suggest that this approach succeeds, and brings desirable outcomes. Thus it was found that students from countries with different, even polar, models of religious education (e.g., English versus French) reported that at school they "learn to respect everyone, whatever their religion" (Jozsa, 2010, p. 43). The liberal democratic approach respects freedom of critical thought, which precludes hegemonic imposition of religious views and ascription of religious

identities. And it is in this regard, we will see, that the liberal democratic approach differs from the emerging Russian model. However, in order to see how and why the Russian model is different, let us look at how the model developed and at its essential traits.

3. Teaching Religious Cultures: A Brief History and Basic Facts

By all historical accounts, attempts to find a place for religion in public schooling date back to the fall of the Soviet rule and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia; that is, they date back to the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Some highly positioned members of the political, administrative, intellectual, and religious elites lobbied for and contributed to the process of introducing religions into schools. The process lasted more than two decades, and has gone through a number of dramatic stages. It was marked by considerable struggles between the forces that promoted and supported a (re)introduction of religious education and those who opposed it (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, 2010, for an analysis of the social and political dynamics of the struggle). The ROC MP, Russia's largest and most influential religious organization, played a key role in the process. Initially, the ROC MP insisted on teaching only one course, on Orthodox Culture. In 2002, Minister of Education Filippov signed an order introducing the course on Orthodox Culture into the basic curricula of municipal schools. A highly controversial textbook, *Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture*—written by Alla Borodina—became the first educational text taught in the course. One year later, in 2003, after receiving heavy criticism for privileging Orthodoxy in a religiously diverse society, Filippov suggested developing a course on multiple religions instead. Orthodox hierarchs strongly objected to the suggestion; in their pursuit to preserve a separate course on Orthodoxy, they began lobbying for a confessional model of religious education, which would allow students to be taught their religious preference in separate classrooms (Vasilenko, 2005). These hierarchs might have calculated that, in a country where a vast majority of citizens (up to 80%, according to some polls) identified themselves as Orthodox, a similarly vast majority of parents and students would opt for a course on Orthodox Culture; the expectation did not, however, quite materialize. In 2007—through amendments to education law—local and regional curricular components were abolished, leaving public schools bound only by the federally mandated curricular standard. The same year, the ROC MP leadership—in collaboration with the Ministry of Education—expanded the federal standard by establishing a new curricular area called *Spiritual-Moral Development of Russia's Citizens;* the course on religious cultures became the first taught within this new division.

The process culminated in the development and implementation of a course called the *Fundamentals of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics* (FRCSE), which was introduced as a mandatory component under the Federal Educational Standard through the directives of President Medvedev (August 2, 2009) and the Government of the Russian Federation (October 29, 2009). The course was taught on a trial basis in nineteen regions of the country in 2009–2010, and introduced in two more regions (the Mari Republic and Yaroslavl region) in 2011. Some observers noted that the course had been taught *de facto* in selected regions of the country long before it became mandatory (Glanzer & Petrenko, 2007). In February 2012, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin praised the experiment, and approved its expansion at a meeting with the religious leaders of Russia's major confessions while at the Danilov Monastery in Moscow (Stenogramma, 2012). After his approbation, the course was launched in all state-run general education schools. Since 2012, teachers have been required to teach the course to all fourth graders for one hour per week (34 hours total). The ROC MP leadership is currently pushing to expand the course, making it a requirement for almost the whole of elementary and secondary school (grades two through nine or ten).

How does the newly instituted approach work? Students and/or their parents are allowed to choose between six modules, five of which have an explicitly religious focus, and one of which is dedicated to secular ethics. There is one textbook for each module, and one instructional Manual for teachers (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011). The texts focusing on religions include: *Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture* (FOC) (Kuraev, 2012), *Fundamentals of Islamic Culture* (FIC) (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012), *Fundamentals of Judaic Culture* (FJC) (Chlenov, Mindrina, & Glotser, 2012), *Fundamentals of Buddhist Culture* (FBC) (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012), *Fundamentals of World Religious Cultures* (FWRC) (Beglov, Saplina, Tokareva, & Yarlykapov, 2012), and *Fundamentals of Secular Ethics* (FSE) (no author, 2012). These textbooks have been written by individuals who held positions in both secular and religious institutions (Basil, 2013, p. 733), have been approved by the Ministry of Education Coordinating Council, and were published by the largest state-controlled publishing house (*Prosveshchenie*) in 2012. Authored by Daniliuk and identical in all textbooks, the first and last lessons articulate the course's general goals and patriotic ideals in language understandable to fourth-graders. Later in this article, I present findings from critical discourse analysis of five of these textbooks (the ones dealing with specific religious cultures). The findings reveal the latent ideological content of the textbooks, and shed light on the new course's 'hidden curriculum', to use a term from sociology of education. However, let us first look at the new curriculum's manifestly proclaimed goals and principles as they were articulated by its promoters and advocates.

4. Legitimizing the New Curriculum

As mentioned above, the introduction of the new policy involved serious political struggles. Resistance and criticism came mainly in two forms. First, there was vociferous and energetic resistance from secular intellectuals, educators, opposition politicians, and human rights activists. The second type of serious resistance came from Muslim leaders (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2010) and other minority religious groups who feared the new arrangements would further disadvantage them by privileging Orthodoxy. Remarkably, since the criticisms came from very different angles, both sides' arguments against bringing religion into schools emphasized the constitutionally secular nature of the Russian state and Russian education, as well as the need to protect religious freedom and human rights. These arguments resonated with the values of Western liberal democracies; it is therefore no accident that official advocates of the new curriculum chose to focus on precisely these Western values.

Telling is the following statement by the ROC MP's then official spokesman, archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin—former chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society and a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation:

> "Proposed by the President, [Dmitry Medvedev at the time—E.L.] the model of teaching religious cultures is based on the principle of free choice and has long been established in most countries of Europe and the world and everywhere contributes not only to the moral upbringing of people, but also to the strengthening of inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony and cooperation." (Chaplin, 2009)

The emphasis here is clearly on free choice, religious liberty, and inter-religious harmony, which, along with the explicit reference to the European and global experience, implies that Russia would join the club of civilized Western liberal democracies by introducing the new religious education policy. Chaplin further stated that the new approach "satisfies interests of practically all religious groups and the groups with different world views that are *actually* [emphasis added—E.L.] represented in our society" (Chaplin, 2009). Let us note that the 'actually' represented groups do not include Protestants, Catholics, and many other established and new religious groups who are present in Russia and excluded from the new arrangement. The exclusionary and discriminatory aspect of this policy has been persistently glossed over by its advocates.

The same line of argument was presented by another ROC leader, Hilarion Alfeyev, the Metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the ROC:

> "In Europe, and particularly in Germany, teaching spiritual and moral subjects is a common practice, in spite of the heated debates surrounding it. It is gratifying that in our country religious education in coming back to the school system after a long break." (Alfeyev, 2010)

Proponents of the new course also included in their rhetoric appeals to Russia's Law on Education, which was originally formulated in the early, relatively liberal climate of the post-Soviet transition. In particular, the Law states that,

> "the content of education must contribute to mutual understanding and cooperation among people and nations irrespective of their racial, national, ethnic, religious and social affiliation; it has to accommodate the diversity of world outlooks and help students to exercise their right to the free choice of opinions and convictions." (Law on Education, 14 [4])

Following this logic, the *Conception for the Spiritual-Moral Development of Russia's Citizens*—the foundational document behind the new course (Daniliuk, Kondakov, & Tishkov, 2009)—promises that religious education will help future citizens of the Russian Federation internalize "the values of tolerance created on the grounds of inter-confessional dialogue" (p. 18).

Under such an interpretation, the new curriculum perfectly matches the values and expectations for religious education in Western democracies, which I discussed earlier. And—compared to the not so distant Soviet past, where religions were almost entirely suppressed, and even against earlier plans to introduce only Orthodox education in multi-religious Russia—the new policy does appear an important advancement towards religious liberty and multiculturalism. Not surprisingly, as we will see below, experts in Russia and the West have noted and emphasized these remarkable developments.

5. Expert Evaluations

Writing before the introduction of the new curriculum, Kozyrev and Fedorov (2007) raised the following theoretical possibilities of Russia's development in the area of religious education. Since contemporary Russian culture is rooted, they said, in "a common European cultural and religious heritage,…one might expect that the new global challenges facing Russia today will bring to life the same social, cultural and scientific developments as in the West and that that would result in growing partnerships and mutual understandings with European states" (p. 133). Yet their assessment of the place of religious education in Russia was inconclusive. On the one hand, they suggested that an increased role

for religious education in Russia might contribute to inter-religious dialogue. However, on the other hand, and given the history of post-totalitarianism in Russia, the introduction of religious education could become "a factor of conflict" (p. 155). Against the background of this cautious assessment, later Russian evaluations of recent developments in religious education have been far more positive. For example, Romanova (2013) says that the course fits the "fundamental principle" of building "unity in diversity," which "reflects the social, ethnic, cultural, and religious complexity of Russia and the modern world" (p. 293). Overall, since the introduction of the course, criticisms by Russian experts have become less noticeable, which can be attributed—at least in part—to growing compliance with a new, far more authoritarian, ideological mainstream.

Development and implementation of the new policy did not escape the attention of Western observers (see Basil, 2013; Clay, 2015; Glanzer, 2005; Glanzer & Petrenko, 2007; Loya, 2006, 2008; Willems, 2007, 2012). The course's multi-module, multi-religious, and multicultural structure, and its elective nature have been generally appreciated by observers, and interpreted within the discourse of accommodation for religious diversity and religious freedom. Thus, before the course was introduced in its present six-module structure, Willems (2007) argued that "schools must ensure that the other large or traditional religions can be offered similar instructions" to properly address the issue of religious freedom (p. 241). After its introduction, the six-module course structure was described as "the correct formula", signifying that many Russian leaders had the "capacity to compromise on this very difficult issue," as well as openness "to the idea of turning away from a tradition of ideological or ecclesiastical dominance, prevalent during the Romanov and Soviet eras," and a readiness "to follow a path where cooperation and negotiation replace the demands of one omnipotent opinion" (Basil, 2015, p. 739). Clay (2015) also notes the new curriculum's multicultural nature. Yet he suggests that the new Russian model of religious education "strikingly resembles the state-sponsored hierarchy of religions in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire. Increasingly, the Russian state actively cooperates with certain favored religious organizations, labelled "traditional," to achieve its social and political goals" (Clay, 2015, p. 44). This observation adds an important dimension to existing evaluations of the Russian model as convergent or inconsistent with the above described consensus on the place of religious education in liberal democracies. The Russian experience can and should be compared with Western models, yet its nature becomes clearer when we observe it in the context of Russia's own history, going back well beyond the relatively short post-Soviet and even Soviet past. Below, I take this point a step further, and suggest that Russia's emerging model can be described as *neo-imperial*—not only in its reliance on selected 'traditional' organizations, but also in its recreation of an imperial mode towards handling ethno-religious pluralism. This, we will see, is reflected not only in the course structure, but also in its ideological content. Thus, let us look at Russia's new model of religious education in the context of the country's imperial history and its neo-imperial aspirations.

6. Russia's Imperial Legacies and Aspirations

Among the many factors that have shaped Russia's approach to religious education, a most important and perhaps most overlooked one is the country's imperial legacies and the neo-imperial aspirations of its current leadership, political and religious. Historically, what we now know as the Russian Federation was once the core of two empires, Russian and Soviet. Moreover, its ethno-territorial composition and current "vertical" structure of governance is a remnant of these empires. And in the last twenty years (and increasingly in the last few years), Russia's ruling regime has worked to rebuild and regain its partly lost imperial might.

There have been debates as to how one should define empire. Yale H. Ferguson (2008) lists four main approaches for how one might identify an empire, all useful in some way. One approach simply compares the questionable empire to indisputable ones. Thus, a political entity can be considered an empire if it is similar to the Roman, Ottoman, or Tsarist Russian empires. To use Giorgio Agamben's (2009) term, the known singular cases serve as "paradigms" that help to recognize and understand unique cases while avoiding generalizations. The second approach delves more into what constitutes the essence of empirically existing empires, and attempts to give a general, "ideal type" definition. The third, "constructivist" approach relies on opinion and perception. To simplify, it holds that an entity is an empire if it is broadly perceived as one. Finally, the fourth, "normative" approach treats a polity as an empire in order to praise it or resist and change it (Ferguson, 2008, pp. 272-273). One could argue that Russia is an empire under all four criteria, but—for the purpose of this paper—let me limit the discussion to the first two. First, pre-Soviet Russia is among the aforesaid paradigmatic examples, and its Soviet version is commonly seen by social scientists as a modified reincarnation of the Tsarist original. In its present form, Russia is the largest remnant of both, and its ethno-territorial structure and even ethno-religious composition are part of its imperial legacy of conquest and colonization. Furthermore, the Russian Federation largely fits ideal-typical definitions, such as Motyl's (1999) structural definition:

> "Empires…are structurally centralized political systems within which core states and elites dominate

> peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for their significant interactions, and channel resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery." (Motyl, 1999, p. 126)

When the Soviet Union was near its death, and shortly after its demise in 1991, Russian leaders appealed to regional authorities to take, in the famous words of then president Yeltsin, "as much sovereignty as you can swallow." This was instrumental in undermining the centralized structure of Soviet control, and for a short while, centrifugal tendencies were tolerated by the relatively weak central government of post-Soviet Russia. Yet a rude awakening followed when Moscow's bloody war in Chechnya set very clear limits on any aspirations for regional and ethno-territorial sovereignty. With Putin's rise to power, structural, imperial-style centralization accelerated. Since 2004, regional governors have been appointed by Moscow, and the practice of rebuilding a "vertical of power" has continued and intensified. Political discourse glorifying Russia's imperial legacy, including its Soviet hypostasis has become mainstream. Even so-called "liberals" and market reformers like Anatoly Chubais have proclaimed the creation of a "liberal empire" (Chubais, 2003). In recent years, military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea made Russia's neo-imperial aspirations even clearer. Russia has reverted to imperial models after a short-lived attempt to change to de-centralized, democratic modes of governance and center-periphery relations. Its political structure and current prevailing orientations can thus be legitimately called neo-imperial, and it is in this context that we will look at the re-emergence of the old, albeit modified, imperial practices of handling ethno-religious pluralism in education.

7. Patterns of Dealing with Religious Diversity in Imperial and Neo-Imperial Russia

A closer look at how religious and ethno-religious diversity was handled in the Russian and Soviet empires will give us better insight into the nature of the new model of religious education in contemporary Russia.

7.1. The Russian Empire before 1917

In the Russian Empire, ethnic and religious identities were closely interrelated. Russians were Orthodox; Chechens, Tatars, and Kazakhs were Muslims; Buryats and Kalmyks were Buddhists; and so on (e.g., Willems, 2007, p. 232). Religious identity was practically assigned at birth, and was considered a valid indicator of one's ethnicity. Furthermore, these faiths and identities represented a hierarchical system with the ROC at the top. "The Russian legal code, systematized in the mid-nineteenth century, established a hierarchy of a handful of recognized religions" (Clay, 2015, pp. 47-48). In this hierarchy, the next, lower level was taken by other Christian confessions (*inoslavie*), such as the Apostolic Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism (*inoverie*) were positioned at an even lower level, with different kinds of pagans occupying the bottom level (p. 48). Furthermore, and very importantly for this article's argument, the Russian Empire had what sociologists of religion would call a monopolistic division of religious markets prior to 1917. Religious adherents belonged to historically distinct and—typically—geographically separated ethnic groups. This meant that ethnic and religious identities were closely linked, not only to one another, but also to a particular and clearly demarcated territory. To put it differently, ethnic divisions in the country coincided with religious and territorial divisions. Thus the Russian Orthodox ethno-religious majority group occupied the central part of the empire while minority ethno-religious groups lived on its periphery. Minority groups belonged to particular territories because they were colonized by the empire at different times in its consolidation. Thus Muslims dwelled either in Central Asia, North Caucasus, Crimea, or the Volga river Basin (Bulgaria); Buddhists lived in traditional regions south of the Ural mountains (Kalmykia) or in the Baikal region (Buryatia and Tuva); Lutherans lived to the north and west from the imperial capitals (Finland and Estonia). The fact that the first synagogue, first mosque, and first Buddhist temple were all opened in St. Petersburg—the capital of Russian Empire—only at the turn of the twentieth century (in 1888, 1913, and 1915 respectively) suggests that minority ethno-religious groups were not welcomed and did not settle in the Orthodox parts of the empire. Within this ethno-religious-territorial structure, minority religions were tolerated in that they were allowed to be practiced and even taught in schools, though within clearly demarcated geographical boundaries. Thus, Tatar children received Islamic instruction in Kazan and Crimea, Finns received instruction in Lutheranism in Finland, and Russian children were instructed in Orthodoxy everywhere they resided.

This system was a particular, imperial "*regime of toleration*," to borrow Michael Walzer's term (1997, p. 14). In multinational empires like Persia or Rome, Walzer explains, various cultural and religious groups could entertain a certain level of legal autonomy, ruling themselves "across a considerable range of their activities" (1997, p. 14). They co-existed with one another because they had no other choice, and because their "interactions [were] governed by imperial bureaucrats in accordance with an imperial code…designed to maintain some minimal fairness, as fairness is understood in the imperial center" (1997, p. 14). He considers this regime of imperial toleration the most historically successful at dealing with the problem of religious

diversity (p. 15). When taxes were paid and groups did not openly object to the central authority, peaceful co-existence among groups could be maintained. However, Walzer argues that—in comparison with a liberal democracy— this type of regime is nothing more than autocratic and discriminatory, and can become "brutally repressive" (p. 15). Moreover, as shown by Barkey (2014) in her comparative study of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, a positive relationship between an empire and toleration of diversity should not be assumed. Toleration of diversity is not essential to imperial states (or regimes); diverse groups are incorporated for economic and/or political expediency, and states would not hesitate to engage in "serious persecution of minority populations" should there be a change in pragmatic orientation (p. 227).

It is difficult to doubt that the Russian Empire represents an imperial mode towards the toleration of diversity. Historians like Geraci and Khodarkovsky (2001) clearly show the applicability of Walzer's concept to Tsarist Russia, even though they do not use Walzer's term. In Tsarist Russia, taxes were paid and religious minorities functioned within prescribed territorial boundaries and within a centrally defined legal code; minority religions were taught in regional schools and indigenous languages under the supervision of local religious communities and organizations. Yet—grounded in the imperial model of separating ethno-religious groups into territorial enclaves on the outskirts of the country, and of relegating them a silent minority status under the bureaucratic control of the central authority—this regime represented a distinctly autocratic approach to handling cultural and religious diversity and enforcing peaceful co-existence.

7.2. The Soviet Empire

After 1917, schools became thoroughly atheistic. No religion was taught as a subject in its own right, and religion could not be incorporated within other subjects like history or literature, at least through the 1960s. In the 1980s, and closer to the collapse, some minimal knowledge of religions was given to students through courses on world and Russian history (Lukhovitskiy, 2005, p. 147). Although it was difficult to completely exclude references to religions when teaching the humanities, any positive references to religious life or thought were ridiculed, banned, or excluded from legitimate educational discourse. In this sense, the Soviet model was even more secularized than the laical approach developed in France, which—according to Willaime (2007)—is not alien to incorporating religious themes within the humanities and social studies (p. 64). As such, the Soviet school represents a truly extreme case of opposition to confessional or denominational teaching.

Being totally a-religious and anti-religious, the Soviet schools did not have to address the issue of religious diversity; religious diversity was no longer an issue. Religious life was suppressed all over the country, and existing cultural diversity no longer had a manifestly religious dimension. Thus the Soviet imperial regime did not have to exhibit toleration of religious diversity. Although religions were still practiced around the country, the state effectively and overtly exhibited intolerance towards religion. True, the intolerance was applied selectively: some churches (such as the ROC MP) were less suppressed than others (such as the Baptists or Greco-Catholics), and the selectivity resembled—to a degree—the pre-1917 hierarchical structure.

However, cultural diversity was effectively reduced to ethnic differences. Even within that realm, diversity was supposed to be limited; cultures could be national in their form, but official doctrine stipulated that cultures be socialist in their content. Soviet approaches to handling diversity evolved over time, yet they invariably aimed at suppressing ethno-national self-determination. This suppression included massive and forced *russification* of ethnic republics and regions, as well as forced relocation of ethnic groups, which changed the ethno-territorial composition of the country considerably; the country's composition became more complex and mixed than it was before the revolution. In addition to deportations and other forced relocations, the Soviet industrialization and urbanization increased geographic mobility, leading to greater ethnic heterogeneity in large cities. However, these changes did not eliminate the challenge of ethno-religious diversity, which continued to exist, albeit in a suppressed way. *Russification* of the republics potentially involved their Orthodoxization, further reinforcing the minority status of non-Orthodox ethnic groups. Moreover, this mixing of cultures and ethnicities within regions prepared the ground for future tensions and conflicts, including ones that surrounded religious education in public schools after the collapse of communism (Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2010).

7.3. Postcommunist Russia

As the Soviet order and its official atheism collapsed, the return of religion to the public sphere raised with renewed vigor the question of religious diversity. Russia's handling of religious diversity has reflected the prevalent pattern of its desecularization. Sociologists use the term "desecularization" (Berger, 1999) to denote the process by which religion reasserts its societal influence after a period of secularization. The process is not self-propelled. Actors and activists initiate and promote it in the direction that best serves their interests and visions. Depending on the actors involved, desecularization of public institutions may develop "from above" and "from below" (Karpov, 2010, 2013). In Russia, the predominant pattern of the return of re-

ligion to the public sphere, including in education, was "from above." In other words, it was carried out through an alliance of religious and political elites with minimal and rigidly controlled grassroots participation (Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, 2010). In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, religious elites—especially those of the ROC MP—faced a formidable challenge. They needed to reassert their dominant role in society, but—after seven decades of atheistic suppression—their actual flock was negligibly small, a fact which undermined the legitimacy of any claims they might make to religious domination. Under these circumstances, the ROC MP leadership and other leading religious groups chose the path of least resistance and most efficacy. Specifically, they attempted to "reclaim" their positions of domination by re-attaching religion to ethnicity (Karpov, 2013, p.16). This meant that the ROC MP claimed all ethnic Russians as part of its flock regardless of whether 'the flock' had been baptized, attended church services, or believed in Orthodox teaching. Similarly, Russia's Muslim leadership could claim Chechens, Ingushs, Tatars, Bashkirs, and other historically Islamic people as Muslims, regardless of these peoples' religiosity or lack thereof. Buddhism was relegated to Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins; Judaism was relegated to Jews, and so on. This, again, was the shortest path to reasserting the dominant societal position of these religious groups. For minority religions, i.e., non-Orthodox ones, this path was the only way to re-establish recognition, status, and control vis-à-vis the ROC MP, which claimed dominance within the hierarchy of post-Soviet religions. The path also allowed control of any competition on the religious market, and helped keep any outsiders out. In other words, this was a way to prevent and suppress any "exogenous and endogenous religious pluralism" (p. 11). The exogenous threat was—in particular—associated with American and other Protestant missionaries, who enthusiastically turned their steps to evangelize Russia in the mid-1980s, and were initially received there with great fervor. Endogenous pluralism developed from within as deviations from the official versions of Orthodoxy, Islam, and other faiths (Burdo & Filatov, 2004; Mitrokhin, 2004; Papkova, 2011). For example, mass conversions to Pentecostalism in Siberia and the Far East (territories perceived as canonically Orthodox) represented both an exogenous and endogenous threat to the ROC MP domination. The high rate of conversions, in particular, led to changes in legislation on religion (Shterin, 2012). Trying to minimize the challenge of pluralism, the ROC MP leadership lobbied for "The Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations", which was passed in 1997 and privileged Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism as Russia's traditional faiths. All other religions were deemed 'non-traditional', and their rights were curtailed. Especially disadvantaged were the newly arriving or re-emerging groups affiliated with Protestant and other Western religions, such as the Salvation Army, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and many others. The definition of 'traditional' religions or religious organizations is missing from the law. However, it may be found in the Manual for teachers of religious cultures (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011). Traditional religions are there defined as those that have been "transmitted from one generation to another within a particular entity of people. They develop within ethnic or state-defined boundaries" (p. 203). This definition clearly resonates with the ethno-territorial religious divisions of the Russia Empire. The 2015 edition of the 1997 law reinforces this resemblance by stipulating that a religious organization may be established by "the citizens permanently living on the same territory or in one settlement of urban or rural type" (Amendments to the 1997 Law, 2015). The logical outcome of this strategy was a reestablishment (albeit a modified one) of the imperial model for dealing with religious diversity. The boundaries of religious communities have once again become co-extensive with ethnic and territorial boundaries. Making this neo-imperial model legitimate in people's eyes represented a serious challenge for elites, although it was deeply rooted in pre-revolutionary patterns and mentality. First, the successful imposition of such a model had to overcome social-structural and psychological obstacles. In particular, during Soviet ethnic mixing and migration, the boundaries between ethno-religious communities substantially disintegrated and lost their distinctive character. Second, in spite of decades of atheism, religious conversions did not come to a total halt, which corroded the once solid connections between a particular religion and its corresponding ethnicity. Thus Orthodox Christians became Baptists, Muslims converted to Lutheranism, and some even joined the International Society of Krishna (Willems, 2007, p. 232). Finally, boundaries between religious communities were more often imagined than real because levels of religious belief, belonging, and behavior were quite low after years of atheism.

To revive, inculcate, and disseminate the beliefs that ethnic and religious boundaries are essentially intertwined, and that crossing these boundaries should be viewed with suspicion and be discouraged, a particular type of ideology was propagated. In my previous, co-authored work, the ideology is dubbed "ethnodoxy", and conceptualized as a "belief system that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant religion and consequently tends to view other religions as potentially or actually harmful to the group's unity and wellbeing and, therefore, seeks protected and privileged status for the groups' dominant faith" (Karpov & Lisovskaya, 2008, p. 370; Karpov, Lisovskaya, & Barry, 2012, p. 644).

It is in this context of limited pluralism—reverting to a neo-imperial regime of inter-faith relations, ethni-

cization, territorial binding of religion, and propaganda of ethnodoxy—that the new Russian model of religious education is best understood. The structure and content of the new curriculum are functional within the neo-imperial model. First, it selectively privileges some religions and effectively excludes others. Second, it retains the privileged status of Orthodoxy vis-à-vis other religions. Third, it promotes ethnodoxy by involuntarily including students in and excluding them from preassigned ethno-religious categories. Findings from my discourse analysis of the five modular textbooks and the teachers' Manual show how these unarticulated goals are meant to be achieved. The analysis leads me to conclude that the ideas of the course are congruent with the neo-imperial ideology of the Russian state. Let us now turn to the analysis and its findings.

8. Findings from Discourse Analysis

8.1. Suppression of Exogenous Religious Pluralism

The course obviously limits the range of studied religions to Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. This range of inclusion and exclusion mirrors the restrictive 1997 law. The 'big four' are taught in separate modules, and to each is devoted a specially developed textbook. No modules exist for non-Orthodox Christians. For the millions of Russian Protestants, no module exists on the Fundamentals of Protestant Culture. No module exists for perhaps a million Russian Catholics, nor for the 1.5 million Armenian Apostolic Christians (numbers taken from Clay, 2015, p. 56). One of the course's five modules covers the textbook, *Fundamentals of World Religious Cultures* (FWRC). Here, one would expect to find other religions discussed. However, this isn't entirely the case. The FWRC textbook (Beglov et al., 2012) primarily focuses on the four traditional faiths; it mentions paganism in passing, and gives scant attention to Roman Catholicism, Western Protestantism, and the Armenian Apostolic church. Presentation of these religions spans 1.3 pages out of the FWRC textbook's 79 pages. Information about these non-Orthodox branches of Christianity is scarce. Protestantism is represented as one undifferentiated religion. Information is often inaccurate and biased. Thus students learn that the Orthodox Church was established after the Great Schism between Eastern and Western Christianity in the eleventh century. 'Orthodox' is translated as, "teaching about God correctly and truthfully" (pp. 46-47). The limited space of this article precludes a detailed analysis of these interpretations, yet it is clear that the textbook's interpretations are historically and semantically inaccurate and and biased in favor of Orthodoxy. For example, the term 'Orthodoxy' hardly means 'correct church', and such a translation has an unfavorable connotation for other Christian churches.

The course's Teachers' Manual (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011) reinforces these attitudes towards non-Orthodox churches. Interestingly, the Manual's discussion of Roman Catholicism is lengthy and detailed, consuming 13 pages, which is comparable to its presentations of Judaism (17 pages) and Islam (22 pages). However, it presents Catholicism as entirely foreign to Russia. The chapter on Catholicism gives no mention of Catholicism or Catholics in Russia (pp. 102-116). The presentation of Protestantism spans 25 pages, and selectively identifies only four Protestant denominations—Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and Baptists (pp. 117-141); certainly, these four denominations do not exhaust all Protestant groups in contemporary Russia. Given that Protestants constitute the third largest group of believers in modern Russia (Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135), 25 pages isn't exactly excessive next to the 24 pages devoted to Orthodoxy. Like the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church is portrayed as foreign to Russia, even though it is Russia's oldest and most influential Protestant denomination. Only ten lines at the end of the chapter are devoted to Lutheranism; these lines mention that the Lutheran Church was established in 1576, and was primarily attended by people of Finnish and German origins (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 125), once again implying the ethnic boundaries of religious affiliation. At the same time, the Manual doesn't indicate the rapidly growing numbers of Protestants in Russia; charismatic and Pentecostal Christians in Siberia and the Far East (Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135) largely reflect the conversions of ethnic Russians. Since these facts disagree with the dominant ethnodoxy, they are ignored.

The notion that 'non-traditional' faiths are fundamentally problematic is reinforced by the definition the Manual provides of 'new' religions. First, the Manual explains that 'new' religions are synonymous with 'non-traditional' ones, and that they may include both emerging (recent) and re-emerging (historically old) religions (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 202). Although this is not explicitly articulated in the Manual, such an understanding allows for categorizing Catholicism and Protestantism as 'new' religions since they are re-emerging religions. Secondly, and more importantly, the 'new' religions are described—in sharp contrast with 'traditional' ones—as less concerned with faith as such, and more concerned with earthly matters. They are said to be rooted in the emotional and psychological aspects of faith rather than its doctrinal dimensions, and as appealing to young people's desires to belong to a collectivity of like-minded people, as well as to their immature susceptibility to peer pressure (pp. 204-207). Making 'non-traditional' (or 'new') religions even less attractive, the Manual cites the document accepted at the Hierarchical Council of the ROC in 1994, which declares all 'new' religions "incompatible with Christianity" (p. 210).

8.2. Suppression of Endogenous Pluralism

Suppression of endogenous pluralism is similarly achieved through inclusion of the 'right' and exclusion of the 'wrong' factions and currents *within* confessions. We have already seen that Christianity is discussed in a very limited way in the World Religions textbook and in the Manual. All other textbooks give little if any attention to religious diversity within faiths. Thus, the textbook on Orthodox Culture heavily focuses on a generic type of Russian Orthodoxy. Not a single Orthodox group outside of the ROC MP is mentioned. Students will learn nothing about the Old Believers and Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (formerly in Exile), let alone the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, or the Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate that broke from the ROC.

Similarly, while the textbook on Islam (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012) rightly calls Islam a "world religion" and mentions that there are 1.5 billion Muslims on the planet (p. 6), it bypasses the enormous diversity within Islam. It neither discusses nor mentions the Shia-Sunni split, Sufism, Ahmadiyya, or other currents. The Teacher's Manual is equally silent on the issue of Islamic diversity.

In a remarkable contrast, textbooks on Buddhist (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012) and Judaic Cultures (Chlenov et al., 2012) acknowledge internal religious diversity and different interpretations within the faiths. Buddhism is represented by three teachings—Theravada, Mahayana, and Gelug (or Gelukpa). None of the three—including Gelug, the most common strand in Russia—is described as more truthful or better than the others (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 32). Similarly, the Judaic Culture textbook discusses Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed Judaism, as well as Hassidism. Although its interpretation of Reformed Judaism as "simplifying" and "distancing from Orthodox Judaism" (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 56) possesses a disapproving connotation, this textbook is the only one of the five that gives a definition of religious tolerance (*veroterpimost'*) as "acceptance of the right of other faiths to exist freely" (p. 7).

8.3. Ethnodoxy

All textbooks on religious cultures mention the historical connections between nationalities (ethnicities) and particular religions. However, not all represent this connection as rigid and inseparable. Ethnodoxy is particularly strong in the textbooks on Orthodox and Islamic cultures. The first textbook on Orthodox culture by Borodina (2002) presented Orthodoxy as inseparable from Russianness and Slavic ancestry (Shnirelman, 2012, p. 264). The 2012 Orthodox Culture textbook strengthens this connection. Students are taught that a person "does not typically choose his/her culture. They are born into it, breathe it, and grow within it" (Kuraev, 2012, p. 6). The textbook instructs that, to properly understand "all that is connected to the world of religion," students should look inside their souls and to "feel its connection to Motherland [i.e., to Russia—E.L.]" (p. 32). Although the textbook is supposed to be about Orthodox culture in general, it represents Orthodoxy as an essentially Russian phenomenon. It provides no distinction between the Orthodox Church proper and the Russian Orthodox Church as a particular embodiment of Orthodoxy. In this sense, the textbook is on Russian Orthodoxy, not on Orthodox culture. For example, it admits that in "Orthodox Church prayer and sermon may be in languages other than Russian." However, immediately after this concession, it suggests that the "*Russian* [emphasis mine] Orthodox Church prays in Japanese, English, German and many other languages" (p. 54). By doing so, the textbook subtly implies that all Orthodox churches—regardless of the language in which they *conduct services*—fall under the jurisdiction of the ROC MP. Why a service conducted in English does not belong to the American Orthodox Church, or why Greek services do not belong to the Greek Orthodox Church is left unexplained. In the fine print, it admits that other Orthodox Christians exist in "Bulgaria, Serbia, and Czech Republic" (p. 54). Yet the range of "other countries" is limited to these three Slavic nations, leaving aside the rest of the world, where Orthodoxy was introduced much earlier or took root later. Especially salient, the overtly Russian nature of what is presented as Orthodoxy manifests itself in how the textbook describes Easter. Although Easter is a common feast for all Christians, the textbook uses the concept 'Russian Easter' interchangeably with the concept 'Christian Easter,' thus implying that specifically Russian traditions for celebrating Easter are the same traditions celebrated by the whole of Christendom (pp. 29-31) .

The link between Orthodoxy and Russianness is further emphasized in the story of the tenth century baptism of the people of Kyivan Rus', which is recounted in both the Orthodox and World Religious Cultures textbooks. This adaptation is done entirely in the spirit of cultural-imperialist appropriation; the Kyivan *Rus'* is appropriated as Kyivan *Russia*, even though the former is also the cradle of the Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures and nations, and even though Ukrainian Greco-Catholics legitimately trace their roots to the times of acceptance of Orthodoxy by ancient Rus'. Such an imperialist appropriation of Rus' is by no means novel. Appropriation is part of the Russian religious nationalism that has been cultivated since the second half of the nineteenth century, and resurged in Russia after the collapse of communism. This ideology is clearly present in both the Orthodox and World Religious Culture textbooks. Both textbooks (Kuraev, 2012, and Beglov et al., 2012) blur the distinction between Russians and the people of the *Rus*'. The texts consistently refer to the people of Kyivan Rus'—its princes Vladimir

and Jaroslav, and their ambassadors to Constantinople—as 'Russians' (*russkie*) (Beglov et al., 2012, p. 42; Kuraev, 2012, p. 59). Further, the textbooks represent the adoption of "Orthodoxy" (which, strictly speaking, did not exist as a confession at the time of baptism of Rus' in 988 A.D.) as the starting point for the establishment of 'Holy Russia,' a mythologeme that has occupied a central role in Russian religious nationalism and imperialism from the Tsarist times to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Let us note that—in this regard—the textbooks' ideas have become congruent with the neo-imperialist ideology that has been cultivated in Russia and used to justify its openly expansionist aspirations. The Orthodox Culture textbook explains the meaning of 'Holy Russia' as the Russian people's "search for holiness" (Kuraev, 2012, p. 60). It notes that "high appeals of the Gospel found a quick response among Russian people after they had been baptized" (p. 59). This all sounds as if the people of Rus' (read 'Russians') were predestined to become Orthodox believers, and that no other faith could possibly match "the Russian soul" or Russian worldview. From these presentations, students are likely to learn that being ethnically Russian means being Orthodox—as if by birth—and that being Orthodox ultimately means being Russian.

Finally, this belief is enhanced by the overall aesthetics of the Orthodox Culture textbook. All illustrations and photographs represent Russian churches, Russian icons, Russian art, or stereotypically Russian individuals. There are fifteen photographs of lay people in the textbook in which the photographed persons' facial features are clearly recognizable. All are stereotypically Russian (or at least Slavic), with blond hair, beards or braids, and blue eyes. No Asian-looking (e.g., Tatar or Yakut) physiques or features can be found among the pictures. Moreover, to reinforce attribution of Orthodoxy to the Russian land, the textbook liberally uses appropriate imagery—both visual and verbal—of typical Russian nature and landscapes. For example, a lengthy excerpt from Solzhenitsyn narrates that the "Orthodox churches and bell towers are the key for understanding the conciliatory nature of Russian landscape….In these very bell towers our ancestors had invested the best of them, all their understanding of the meaning of life" (Kuraev, 2012, p. 61).

The Islamic Culture textbook is no less permeated with ethnodoxy. Throughout the text, the word 'Muslim' and ethnic markers are used interchangeably. For example, in the lesson on customs and morals, it is noted that "Muslims are very hospitable. If you happen to be a guest in the house of a mountaineer, such as an Ingush, Chechen, or Avar", you will be given everything you need (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012, p. 67). Similarly, heroic acts of "Muslim people" in times of war or peace are discussed as the "heroism of Bashkir or Dagestani people" (p. 55). Three examples of "Muslim heroes" are remarkable in this sense. One is Musa Dzhalil', a Soviet poet who died in a Nazi camp. Another is Abdul Khakim Ismailov, a soldier, one of those who erected the Soviet banner over Reichstag in May of 1945. The third is Makhmud Esambaev, a famous dancer in the Soviet Union. Who were these people? Dzhalil' and Ismailov were members of the Communist Party of the USSR. All three were recipients of numerous Soviet-time governmental awards, and experienced the peak of their popularity under Soviet atheism. However, the textbook unequivocally labels them 'Muslims.' This labelling is done posthumously, and thus ascribes religious identity arbitrarily (pp. 54-57). What, then, makes them Muslim? The answer is clear. The only aspect that makes these heroes Muslim is their membership in traditionally Islamic ethnicities—one was a Tatar, another Dagestani, and the last Chechen. Thus, the students are subtly but surely forced to develop a rigid connection between ethnic and religious identity.

Of the five textbooks, the ones on Judaic and Buddhist cultures show the least evidence of ethnodoxy. Moreover, they include a number of anti-ethnodox statements. Both FJC and FBC emphasize the global reach of Judaism and Buddhism, and do not necessarily relate these religions to particular ethnicities or geographic territories. Statements like these typify the textbooks' content:

> "millions of people in various countries glorify Buddha." (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 8)

> "Buddhist rituals emerged and developed under the influence of traditions and customs of various peoples, different in their culture, language and lifestyle." (p. 52)

Similarly, the Judaic Culture textbook shows a low or non-existent level of ethnodoxy. The text differentiates between 'religious' and 'non-religious' Jews, and suggests that one does not have to be religious to be considered an ethnic Jew (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 7). By so saying, the text suggests that the religious marker of Jewishness is not rigidly attached to its ethnic marker. Moreover, by suggesting that members of any ethnicity who pass an exam may become a Jew in religious terms (p. 67), the textbook paints the ethno-religious boundary as permeable. However, it is permeable in only one direction. Ethnicity does not presuppose religiosity, but acceptance of Judaism automatically includes one in the "Jewish people" (p. 7). Thus, students of the Judaic culture textbook receive a mixed message on the link between ethnicity and religion. The ethno-religious boundary seems to work as a one-way street, i.e., religion assumes ethnicity, but not the other way around. Let us note, however, that while this representation only partly fits our definition of ethnodoxy, eth-

nodoxy itself is a foundational dogma within Judaism. It reflects an essential dogma of Judaism rather than an ideological interpretation of the faith.

8.4. Hierarchy of Religions

As mentioned above, the idea of the hierarchy of religions is central to the neo-imperial model of dealing with religious diversity, and is clearly reinforced by the textbooks discussed. These textbooks put the ROC at the top of the religious hierarchy. The textbooks do not say this directly. However, the notion is promoted through how they represent each religion's relation to the Russian state. Therefore, it is remarkable that each textbook glorifies the role of the state in the historical and contemporary development of the faith it discusses. Yet each faith's position in the hierarchy of religions becomes obvious through what the textbooks specifically do or do not say about the Russian state. Unsurprisingly, representations of how the ROC stands vis-à-vis the state unmistakably indicate that the Church possesses a much higher status than Islam, Buddhism, or Judaism. For example, only the FWRC textbook recounts some of the historical faults of the state towards the Orthodox Church, such as Peter the Great's abolition of the institution of Patriarchate (Beglov et al., 2012, p. 46). The ROC is depicted as a victim of ill-treatment by the state, on the one hand, and as an important player in the history of Russian society on the other. Thus Orthodoxy emerges as an invariably positive force, while the state is portrayed as capable of injustices (albeit only past and limited ones). Yet any historical injustices by the state towards minority religions have been totally omitted from the textbooks. Moreover, the Judaic and Buddhist culture textbooks not only gloss over all instances of mistreatment by the state, but also ignore the positive contributions of Judaism and Buddhism to the Russian state and society. When speaking of the Russian State, the textbooks express only gratitude. For example, the Buddhist culture textbook thanks Elisabeth II for officially recognizing that Buddhism existed in Russia in 1741 (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 38). The textbook emphasizes that a temple in Buryatia was built in memory of Russia's victory over Napoleon in 1812 (p. 64). The Judaic Culture textbook gratefully brings up the February Revolution of 1917, which "removed all forms of inequality of Jews as citizens and made Judaism equal with all other religions in the country" (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 48). Not a word of criticism of the state policy against Buddhists or the state-supported anti-Semitism is uttered. Islam seems to construe its status somewhere between—on the one hand—Buddhism and Judaism and—on the other—Orthodoxy. The Islamic culture textbook neither praises the Russian State for its support, nor blames it for any ill-treatment of Islam or Muslims. Yet, similarly to the Orthodox culture text, it strongly emphasizes the contributions of Islam to Russian culture (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012, pp. 52-53). In sum, Orthodoxy has an invariably positive image, and was unjustly treated by the state. Islam contributed positively to Russia, but the textbook mentions no state injustices against Muslims. Finally, Judaism and Buddhism are thankful recipients of state favors, yet none of the religions' positive contributions are mentioned.

Thus, the textbooks' content demonstrates that the ROC is entitled to boast not only of its contributions to the Russian state and nation, but also to remember that it was once hurt by it. Islam is not entitled to remember any wounds, but is allowed to claim its contributions. Buddhism and Judaism may only thank the state for its favors. The hierarchy that transpires is very clear. I conclude that, by means of these representations, the studied textbooks approve the existing hierarchical relationships between religions and vis-à-vis the state. Such approval provides ideological support to the neo-imperial model of religious toleration in the context of—to use Motyl's definition of empires—"structurally centralized political system[s] within which core states and elites [including the ROC MP elites—E.L.] dominate peripheral societies" (1999, p. 126).

9. Conclusion

We have seen that the content of the textbooks designed for the religious education of Russian students exhibits a specific constellation of ideological characteristics. These include bypassing the reality of exogenous and—in the cases of Orthodox and Islamic textbooks—endogenous pluralism. Furthermore, the textbooks on Orthodox and Islamic cultures—whose combined target audience accounts for the vast majority of Russia's students—promote the ideology of ethnodoxy, which rigidly links religion to ethnicity and leads to negative perceptions of ethnically "alien" faiths. Moreover, the Orthodox Culture textbook employs mythologemes and interpretations that have been historically central to Russian religious nationalism and imperialism, and that are congruent with the neo-imperialist expansionism of Russia's current leadership and its dominant ideology. Finally, the textbooks perpetuate the notion of an imperial, state domination of religious minorities, as well as a hierarchy of religions in which the ROC MP sits at the top. These findings indicate the function that religious education is supposed to fulfill in contemporary Russia. The manifestly proclaimed goals of religious education appear convergent with the values of religious freedom, self-determination, tolerance, and inter-faith peace that are espoused by Western liberal democracies. Yet the hidden curriculum of religious education that shows in this constellation of ideological characteristics is far more consistent with a neo-imperial model of an ethno-religious hegemony (of Russian Orthodoxy) and

with limited toleration of selected faiths whose reach is supposedly restricted to politically peripheral ethno-territorial entities. This model embodies and revitalizes Russia's imperial legacies. Yet this revitalization is in itself an outcome of strategic choices made by the country's religious and secular elites.

As was mentioned above, the neo-imperial model emerged as a result of a lengthy process that involved intense contestation and political struggle. However, in the current, increasingly authoritarian political atmosphere, any further contestation of the neo-imperial model of ethno-religious hegemony has been shunned.

Yet no matter how much the new model resonates with Russia's imperial traditions and current authoritarianism, it may be a short-lived creation. Social and geographic mobility in today's Russia undermines ethno-territorial approaches to religious pluralism. The suppression of pro-independence movements in Russian regions requires resources of which Russia may run out in the not so distant future. The "vertical of power" that has enforced the hierarchy of religions may crumble as a result of economic and socio-political challenges. And, finally, globalization leads to a rapid growth of religious diversity, and undermines traditional, imperial approaches. Under these circumstances—and if it wishes to preserve itself as a unified political entity—Russia must adopt a much more consistently pluralistic and non-hegemonic model of religious education.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

How a Collective Trauma Influences Ethno-Religious Relations of Adolescents in Present-Day Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Abstract
This article combines a historical perspective on intergenerational transmission of collective trauma with a psycho-anthropological approach in regards to the construction of multiple identifications by Bosniak adolescents growing up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the Balkan war that took place in the early 1990s. This research is based on the ethnographic fieldwork I conducted during my three-month stay in Sarajevo, a city that has been the center of battles between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks. The aim of this research is to understand the ways in which memories of the war linger on in contemporary interethnic and interreligious relations. I applied Dialogical Self Theory to analyze dilemmas and ambiguities emerging from the multiple identifications of Muslim adolescents, to whom coexistence with Bosnian Serbs has come to be part of everyday life. During oral histories, my informants expressed a desire to maintain a sense of normality, consisting of a stable political and economic present and future. I argue that nationalist ideologies on ethno-religious differences which were propagated during the war stand in the way of living up to this desire. On a micro level, people try to manage their desire for normality by promoting a certain degree of social cohesion and including the ethno-religious other to a shared national identity of 'being Bosnian'.

Keywords
Bosnia-Herzegovina; collective trauma; Dialogical Self Theory; ethnicity; group identity; post-conflict coexistence; reconciliation

Issue
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1. Introduction

The research group of this article consists of Bosniak[1] adolescents living in Sarajevo, Bosnia. I have consulted the personal narratives of my informants in order to gain a better understanding of their cultural and personal identifications. My informants grew up, partially, in a conflict setting, transitioning from ethnic hostility to a peaceful coexistence with the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. During the life stories[2], these Bosniak adolescents spoke about their memories of the Bosnian civil war from 1992 to 1995, during which Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks fought for Bosnian territory. My key informants emphasized how this ethnic conflict is no longer part of their present, everyday lives. They identify themselves most with being citizens of Bosnia—a tolerant interethnic country. As these findings seem to be ideal for the conservation of the current peaceful situation in Bosnia, I had my questions about how my informants perceive the Bosniak part of

[1] Bosniak refers to an ethnic group mainly situated in Bosnia, but also in the rest of the Balkans. Though not all Bosniaks are Muslim or practice the religion, within this article the informants do share an ethno-religious Islamic Bosniak background.

[2] Questions for the interviews originate from: Atkinson, R. (1998). The life story interview. *Qualitative research methods*. London: Sage University Paper.

their identity and the rather rapid establishment of reconciliation, which broadly refers to a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12). A rapid reconciliation seems unlikely, especially because analysts concerned with post-conflict Yugoslavia point out how most people in former Yugoslavia seem significantly less able to rebuild functioning relationships across ethnic boundaries. Existing and rather pessimistic views on the (re)building of feelings of tolerance and trust toward each other by the different post-Yugoslav populations hinder this process (Stefansson, 2010, p. 63). In order to understand these perceptions, it is necessary to consult the different ways in which academic literature has conceptualized the process of reconciliation. Firstly, a distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' reconciliation has been made (Eastmond, 2010, p. 4). The former is based on the actual departure from violence and refers to a more open-ended and fragmented process (Borneman, 2002) while the latter, 'thick' reconciliation, looks more thoroughly at the quality of relationships and coheres with a mutual understanding of unity derived from a common past and shared future. Within this more idealistic stance, key factors for social as well as individual healing are acknowledgement of the ethnic other, and forgiveness (Amstutz, 2005; Lederach, 1997). Others have taken a more pragmatic stance in the debate by arguing that the only realistic scenario, at least in the short term, is a definitive level of social interaction and cooperation between former enemies. Social scientists have shown how specifically in the Bosnian case, reconciliation is understood more pragmatically as peaceful coexistence in the sense of 'respectful relations' and 'life together' (Eastmond, 2010, p. 5). Within this discourse, both research and practice have often focused on a more institutional reconstruction of post-conflict societies. To understand local meanings and social realities of reconciliation, ethnographic fieldwork is crucial in order to provide a substantial and complete understanding of this process of healing for both society and individuals. This article provides a counterview on existing pessimistic attitudes on living together in post-conflict Bosnia and is therefore an essential contribution to the academic discourse of post-war settings.

I asked myself how the Bosnian collective trauma[3] was transferred to a generation who grew up in the middle of it, approximately twenty years after the outbreak of the war. What caused this cohesive thinking to emerge amongst adolescents who were victims of war themselves? The main research question for this ethnographic study was therefore: How has the collective trauma of the Bosniak ethnic group influenced the identity formation of adolescents, as well as their ethno-religious relations with people from the Serb ethnic group? At first glance, anthropology, focused on the interpretation of socio-cultural relations between people, might not seem to be a matching discipline for researching the conceptualization of identity—a notion traditionally applied to the individual. However, in recent years there has been a shift in the meaning of the core of concept 'culture' within anthropology; the concept no longer merely coheres with the relations between people, but also with the dynamic relationship of the individual and the community (van Meijl, 2009, p. 37). This has caused an increased interest in the concept of identity (van Meijl, 2009, p. 38). The role of social anthropologists in this discourse is to emphasize the diversity and possible frictions within the identification repertoire of the self. Before coming closer to the answer of my main research question, I will firstly elaborate on the methodology consulted during my fieldwork period of three months. Hereafter follows the contextualization of my fieldwork location and the Bosniak community. This is needed, due to the high complexity and sensitivity of the history of Bosnia. I will move on to the presentation of my theoretical framework on group identity, together with my fieldwork findings related to this. Thereafter follows a theoretical presentation on individual identifications, which is necessary to understand interethnic relations on a micro level. Dialogical Self Theory (DST) is an essential framework for understanding individual identifications and the self; the concept will be linked to the personal narratives of my informants. Finally, I will present my conclusions, by revisiting my research question.

1.1. Methods

During my fieldwork period of three months, I conversed with different citizens of Bosnia who have shared their stories with me. My landlord, roommates and friends of acquaintances, have provided stories about their life course, humorous and striking anecdotes about the war, and so on. My dual background of Dutch and Bosnian helped me to investigate the narratives in a broader cultural context. Being a 'native anthropologist', I was not studying a distant culture, moreover, I was already familiar with, for example, the language and certain cultural values, being that these match my own cultural background, to an extent (Narayan, 1993, p. 671). The social network I developed during my stay made it easier for me to come in contact with my five key informants: Bosniak adolescents

[3] With the different definitions of the term 'collective trauma' I refer to "a shared mental representation of a traumatic past event during which the large group suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame and humiliation in a conflict with another large group" (Volkan, 2001, p. 87). In this specific case study the term 'trauma' continuously refers to the collective trauma of the Bosniak ethnic group in Bosnia that experienced brutal sectarian violence and widespread ethnic cleansing between 1992 and 1995.

who were between 21 and 24 years old at the time of my fieldwork, living and studying in Sarajevo and who had lived in Bosnia during and after the Bosnian war in the 1990s. Two of my informants described themselves as "not really religious", while the other three were consciously practicing Islam either through prayer or, for example, by fasting during Ramadan. I embraced this diverse religiosity within my research group, as I believe it corresponds with the Bosniak community in Bosnia, where the practice of Islam is a strong mixture between secularized Muslims and those who strictly live by the rules of Islam. My key informants have in common that they were all strongly affected by the outbreak of the war. Two have lost their father during the conflict; others were confronted with severe forms of violence or discrimination. These youngsters were interested in helping me with my research, for the mere reason that they were able to do so. Some had doubts if they could provide me with 'the right' information for my research. As one of my informants told me, "I'd love to meet up. I'm a student and a Bosnian Muslim. Not a religious person, though. But it seems that you're just looking for Bosniaks? Let me know if I'm wrong." This informant is somehow immediately distancing himself from the religious dimension of his ethnic background. While this seems to be contradicting, in the section *The Breakdown of Yugoslavia* I will explain in further detail how it is not so strange to consider oneself as part of an ethno-religious group, without being a religious person.

I initially met with all my informants in a similar way, during a short chat over coffee somewhere, in a café or in a park. This first meeting was meant as an introduction, not only to each other, as individuals, but also to grasp if we could form a longer working relationship with one another and complete a more intense life story interview. During this first meeting, one of my informants told me about his family's stay in Germany for several years during the war. As he grew up outside of Bosnia for a period of time, I could not include this person to my sample. He did however lead me to my first key informant, because they were living together in a flat share. This qualitative method of 'snowball sampling' (Babbie, 2007) is relevant for post-conflict research due to the sensitivity of the topic and has helped me to find my informants. After the first meeting with my key informants, it varied per person how much time we were able to spend together before and after conducting the recorded interview. In the context of cooking together, taking a walk or having a drink, I was able to practice participant observation (Spradley, 1980) to gain a better understanding of the social and cultural contexts my informants are placed in. In practice, this entails that we were part of the same community for a short period of time and that I was introduced into their personal and social lives. I had the opportunity to talk about 'off-topics' such as music preference, artistic interests and the more personal developments of my informants. This 'deep hanging out' is a very basic qualitative research method which enables close contact with informants and their everyday worlds of meaning and provides a perspective 'from below' (Geertz, 1998). Finally, during the recorded life stories, I started with the circumstances and the environment my informants were born into. For example, what they could remember about their first years as a child and how they would describe their parents. I also asked questions related to important social others from their neighborhood they looked up to, tensions they experienced in school and how they filled in their free time. Though these specific stories are not presented in my analysis, they help with understanding personal experiences and balancing these experiences with more general historical developments (Leydesdorff, 1996; Tonkin, 1992).

2. The Breakdown of Yugoslavia

2.1. Tito's Communist Regime

The different peoples of former Yugoslavia share a long history and the multi-ethnic structure of the area is central to the events that took place during the war. Even though Bosnia has just become an independent country at the end of the last century, the Bosniak ethnic group had emerged far before the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Between 1953 and 1980 Josip Broz Tito was president of Yugoslavia and by many citizens of Bosnia, this period is described as a harmonious time where conflicting ethnic groups were 'finally' able to live together in peace. This so-called peace did indeed come, but it was more related to imposed communist power—enforced by mass shootings between 1945–46, death marches and concentration camps—than to reconciliation policies. Tito's secret police sowed fear through punishment and intimidation amongst those in Yugoslavia who did not agree with his regime (Malcolm, 2002, p. 193). Even though the 1946 constitution of Yugoslavia acknowledged the freedom of belief, multiple sanctions carried out under communist rule provided argument for the opposite. In 1950 a law was issued with regard to the Bosniak group that concerned the prohibition of wearing a veil, the closing of elementary schools where children learned the basics of the Koran and it was even against the law to teach children in mosques (Malcolm, 2002, p. 195). These measures taken against Islamic religious life in Yugoslavia lasted for several years, but in the late 1950s and 1960s a noteworthy change occurred concerning the Bosniak community. Tito changed the general treatment of Islam and he started to use the community to promote his new foreign policy, advocating a more Western approach. The main reason for this change can be traced back to Stalin ejecting Yugoslavia from Cominform—a

Soviet dominated organization aimed to coordinate actions between Communist parties. This made Tito and his country very dependent on the West, for loans and moreover, for diplomatic support. In other words, he needed a Bosniak community in order to succeed in keeping the Western democracies on his side (Malcolm, 2002, p. 196).

2.2. The Bosniak Fight for Recognition

In the early 1940s, the Bosniak community in Yugoslavia was mostly considered a problem by the Yugoslav Communist Party. This problem was thought to solve itself, due to the community gradually fading away, as its members would eventually identify themselves with the Croats or Serbs (Malcolm, 2002, p. 197). The issue was however far more complicated than this. Even though its neighboring republics treated Bosnia as a piece of territory ready to be divided amongst them, the Bosniak community was seeking for recognition, specifically in the sense of national territory. One reason for this was the policy drop of 'integral Yugoslavism', which caused for the separate republics to strengthen their national identities. Another reason for this desire towards recognition was the structure of the Communist Party within Bosnia, where Muslim communist officials formed a small elite (Malcolm, 2002, p. 198). One could thus conclude that the rise of the Bosniak community was not a movement originating from merely Islamic religious grounds. The drive towards recognition of the community as a national category was in matter of fact, a political move, led by communists and other secularized Muslims, who would benefit from the development of a Bosniak identity (Malcolm, 2002, p. 200).

I will now explain why and how exactly the development above would be beneficial. Bosnia was considered lower in status than the other republics of Yugoslavia, which was thought to come from the belief that the republic was not a distinctive nation, but that Bosnia only consisted of fragments of the Serbian and Croatian nations (Malcolm, 2002, p. 201). The census in 1948 on the nationality of the citizens of the Bosnian republic also gives a clear picture of the way the region had been portrayed. Bosniaks had the option to classify themselves as 'Muslim Croat', 'Muslim Serb' or as 'Muslim: nationality undefined'. At least 778.000 people chose the 'undefined' classification, whereas only 72.000 chose 'Muslim Serb' and 25,000 chose 'Muslim Croat'. These statistics show the marginal willingness of the Bosniaks to identify themselves with the neighboring republics (Malcolm, 2002, p. 198). This perception of Bosniaks stems from the late nineteenth century when Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians started to identify themselves as Croats and Serbs, purely based on their religion. These ethnic labels caused for further complexity regarding the ethnic genealogy of Yugoslavia, consisting of peoples sharing the same language and history. Moreover, this made it impossible for 'Bosnian' to be a third ethnic category, as the existence of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had arisen. Therefore, the Muslims needed a specific Bosniak identity as a national identity, as they believed this development would prohibit Bosnia from getting divided amongst the two other republics (Malcolm, 2002, p. 200). Anthony Oberschall (2000) concludes that before the fall of Yugoslavia, it was not a necessity to know to which ethnic group your friends or neighbours belonged to. It was only after the increased influence of the mass media and the populist movement after Tito's death in 1980 that people started to look differently at their fellow citizens. Those with whom they worked and lived had now become what they considered the enemy (Oberschall, 2000, p. 988). This more idealized view does not take into consideration the changing characteristic of attitudes towards other ethnic groups related to, for instance, different periods in history. Tone Bringa (1995) emphasizes that before the war, Bosnia was not simply an unquestionably tolerant and cohesive society where citizens felt no need to classify one another under the ethnic labels of Serb, Croat or Bosniak. Nor does she believe the opposite 'age-old hatreds' approach to be accurate, which implies that the ethnic groups in Bosnia have always hated each other and that the seemingly tolerant society under Tito's regime was merely the result of communist suppression. What can be concluded from this is that there were both tolerance and prejudice in Bosnia and that to some, an ethnic label was of importance, but to others, it did not matter. These attitudes are strongly dependant on a person's age and the socio-cultural environment they grew up in (Bringa, 1995, p. 3).

3. The Collective Identity

3.1. Chosen Trauma

The Bosnian war in the 1990s was a period in which, characteristically, it became more customary for wars to occur within states instead of between them. We are dealing with groups who had many similarities, considering their shared histories, yet they were stressing their significant differences (Volkan, 2001, p.79). As I have explained in the historical background section, the development of the Bosniak identity, as a collective identity, was strongly dependent on the other ethno-religious identities within the country. The Serb group identity, specifically, has had a lot of influence when looking at the violent events that took place between the two. One can define group identity as a subjective experience of thousands or millions of people who are connected by significant similarities, yet at the same time there are shared characteristics with members from other ethnic, national or religious groups. The

most important task of the members of a large group is to preserve, to protect or to recover the collective identity of the group (Volkan, 2001, p. 81). I will focus mainly on one specific aspect of group identity, which is most relevant to my research. This is the way in which a violent and traumatic event from the past becomes part of the group identity in the present and therefore also for later generations of the same group. With this I am referring to the process where sharing trauma can become an essential part of the bonding between different individuals from a group. A traumatic experience or event can later, especially with the future generation, be used to protect the then threatened group identity. This transgenerational transmission of trauma can be connected to the incapability of the previous generation to process the trauma and often the interconnected humiliation of the ethnic group. The task of the next generation, as it is the case with my informants, would be to eventually process the losses and humiliations (Volkan, 2001, p. 87).

Due to the strategic aspect of the use of the trauma, the term 'chosen' trauma is most suitable according to Vamik Volkan (2001). He emphasizes that the group may not have chosen to become victims of violence, yet they have chosen to connect this trauma to their present-day group identity. The most important thing about chosen trauma is that it is not merely a shared memory. The circumstances during the time of the historical event do not need to be relevant or true in the present, but it still retains a certain function. Furthermore, the trauma does not need to be present in the everyday lives of individuals, as its power lies unconsciously, playing a role in the identity of the members of a group and in that it can always be reactivated (Volkan, 2001, p. 88). This reactivation generally occurs, under more stressful circumstances. The fears that are interconnected with the trauma come to the surface and the members of the ethnic group experience the trauma as if it was once again a danger (Volkan, 2001, p. 89). In *The manipulation of ethnicity: From ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia*, Anthony Oberschall (2000) acknowledges a similar moment of reactivation, when he makes the distinction between a 'normal' frame and a 'crisis' frame. The normal frame is linked to more usual circumstances, under which memories are being suppressed and one does not consciously think about the past. I think the crisis frame of Oberschall joins the moment of reactivation of Volkan, as the suppressed memories from the past have the opportunity to come up due to, among others, feelings of fear. Furthermore, Oberschall explains the increased fear from a political perspective, as he believes the role of (populist) political elites and their use of mass media is crucial to the reinforcement of fears from the past (Oberschall, 2000, p. 989). I will focus on the situation during my fieldwork, where ethnic groups live together in peace within a normal frame. What I was able to research, is the role that these historical events during the Bosnian war have had thus far on the lives of Bosniak adolescents. For this reason, I asked my informants about their perceptions and their memories of the conflict.

3.1.1. Remembering 1992–1995

It is true that not all of the citizens of Bosnia have been severely influenced by the violent events during the war, for instance, through fleeing the country or settling in a safe area. My informants are however far from an example of this. Two out of the five key informants I have spoken to on a regular basis have lost their fathers during the conflict. Most of my informants were also situated in Sarajevo at the time the city was under siege. Even though they have few memories of the war, the stories my informants told can be described as vivid and detailed. One of my key informants is Harun, who grew up in Sarajevo. At the time our interviews took place, he lived in Sarajevo with his mother and was studying Political Science. He had told me about his childhood, how his father grew up in a communist Yugoslavia and how this has had an influence on his perceptions of ethnicity up to this day. The fragment below is part of his answer when I asked him what personal memories he had from the war:

> "I was told that I had not seen the sunlight until I was, I think, three years old. This was not possible at all, you could not risk the danger of going on the streets, because you might get shot by a sniper. Or, I don't know, be killed by a grenade. I have a picture; it is not a real photograph, but a combination of five or six snapshots of a falling grenade. See, the grenade fell in the area around my building and it blew up my neighbor's leg. Yes, this is what I can remember. I can perfectly remember the sound of the grenade and I still have this image of blood, everywhere, and him screaming. It was in the middle of the day I believe, around three o'clock." (Interview Harun, July 2012)

Equally, or even more intense, were those descriptions my informants had no personal memory of but that had been passed on to them by family members and their friends. Another key informant was Haris, who did not grow up in Sarajevo, but was living and studying there at the time of my fieldwork. He lost his grandfather during the war and explained to me how his own father had become a different, almost unrecognizable person after the conflict. He told me what he remembered from the stories he had heard from others:

> "I remember stories about how they murdered pregnant women, how they burned children in ovens. I remember, I don't know if it is true or not, but

> I remember that a man told me about two Serbs who attacked a pregnant woman. They had placed a bet for a crate of beer, betting whether the woman was pregnant with a boy or a girl. And they just cut open her stomach." (Interview Haris, July 2012)

Haris also told me stories about the aftermath of the Bosnian war. This time, he spoke about his own experience with Serbs when growing up. During his teenage years, an introduction meeting was organized at his high school where everyone was supposed to tell a little bit about themselves. After one of his classmates said they came from Srebrenica, a city known for the killings of Bosniak men and boys, a group of Serb boys started laughing and commented: "we thought that we had gotten rid of all of you there". This can be described as a very unpleasant experience, at the least. One might even think that this small encounter could be classified as traumatizing, whilst the threats from 1992–1995 are being brought to a peaceful, 'normal frame', although disguised in humor. The last memory I wish to present here, is from Amra, a key informant who was studying veterinary medicine in Sarajevo. She had to move a lot when she was a child, also due to the insecurity of certain areas during the war. She comes from a very religious family and has the most memories of the war, as she was my oldest informant. She told me the following story from her teenage years:

> "I experienced such a culture shock when I moved to an area where the different ethnic groups were living together and where they could not stand each other. You are not able to go out somewhere, because the owner happens to be a Serb. You are afraid to go to a place, because you know you are not welcome there, because my name is Amra." (Interview Amra, August 2012)

Amra is talking about an experience, which she describes as shocking, because for her this kind of hostility between ethnic groups was not normal. I will come back to the impact of these experiences in the next section, where memories will be placed in the present everyday lives of my informants.

3.2. Chosen Amnesia

Haris' story about the pregnant woman became part of his memory about the war even though he was not sure whether or not the story had actually happened. Memories from the past can take up a shape which does not necessarily coincide with truths. The story told to Haris, true or false, can be employed for diverse goals. Richard Esbenshade (1995) emphasizes that it is not so much about looking at the factual truths of a history; moreover, it is of greater interest to look into the different contextual ways in which the past is being remembered by groups. In this way, Esbenshade breaks with the dichotomy of remembering versus forgetting, because they both belong to memory, and therefore, to history (Esbenshade, 1995, p. 87). Remembering can go as far as ultimately becoming dangerous for a people or culture, therefore Esbenshade poses the question if there is such a thing as strategic forgetting in order to enable individuals and nations to live on. This is precisely what Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006) focuses on in her theory on how groups deal with traumatic events in a post-conflict environment. With her fieldwork in post-genocide Rwanda, she describes how Hutu's and Tutsi's experience their past as peaceful, whereby the genocide is seen as a sudden break in cohesive society. In order to fully understand life in a post-conflict environment, Buckley-Zistel finds it necessary to look at the way in which group identity is constructed in a memory discourse (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 132). She argues that the memory is still present in the minds of individuals, even though it seems as if they do not have any access to this in the present. Buckley-Zistel's explanation for this is that both groups are dependent on each other in their daily lives and that the presence of any form of cohesion is essential for a 'normal' life with the former enemy. The way to reach this social cohesion is through a chosen amnesia. There is no sign of denial of the past, therefore the term 'chosen' is applicable. The memories are still present, but according to Buckley-Zistel, the members of both groups have consciously chosen to exclude the events from the memory discourse of the group, in order to live peacefully with the other (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 134). Buckley-Zistel (2006) illustrates the reversed process from that of the chosen trauma explained by Volkan (2001), where historical events are included in the group identity in order to form a sense of belonging. Furthermore, the theory of chosen amnesia goes hand in hand with the acknowledgement of a collective innocence. According to Buckley-Zistel, both groups are excluded from fault because the elite which was in power during the conflict is held responsible for creating distinction and violence between the groups. My informants have described this phenomenon in their stories:

> "It is all the manipulation of a few people, the ignorance of people. You only have knowledge of what is being told on the television and on the radio. They (the Serbs) cannot classify as those who have murdered, who have raped. You cannot blame the people, they did not want this to happen, no one wanted for this to happen." (Interview Haris, July 2012)

> "It was a great country around the time of my birth. I believe it was a mixture of Western culture and our own Balkan way of life. Sadly, this had been ripped into pieces because of the wrong ideas of a

few political leaders." (Interview Harun, July 2012)

This collective makes it possible to live together with the other group, as they are not considered guilty and were also manipulated from above (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 140). I think that this aspect of the concept of chosen amnesia is strongly applicable to the Bosnian case. However, in the previous section, *Remembering 1992–95*, the narratives of my informants demonstrate that they do remember the crimes committed by individuals from the other ethnic group. In this sense, it seems inaccurate to claim that they do not have access to the memories of the war, as the conceptualization of chosen amnesia implies. Rather, these memories of the violent ethnic conflict seem to be strategically repressed. The activity of repression is what Freud considers to belong to the 'unconscious' and which is needed in order for social life to be routinely enacted (Billig, 2006, p. 22). Applying this train of thought to the stories of my informants, memories from the war that are disturbing the 'normal life' both ethnic groups share in the post-conflict society need to be regularly and actively repressed. As the necessity for repression originates from social activity (Billig, 2006.), this is another strategy—besides collective innocence—which helps my informants to reconcile and reach not only social cohesion, but also social inclusion. I shall therefore apply the selective chosen amnesia and the repressed nature of forgetting to the further analysis of my findings in Sarajevo.

3.2.1. The Aftermath of War

I have asked my informants the extent to which they agree with statements related to living together with the Serb ethnic group in Bosnia[4]. Examples of some of the statements are: Serbs and non-Serbs have different family values, I want Serbs to adopt Bosniak culture and not to keep their own, I want Serbs to be friends with both Serbs and non-Serbs. This very small sample showed me the perceptions of my informants regarding the integration, assimilation and segregation of the Serb ethnic group in Bosnia. They all seemed to be against the segregation of this group and very adamant for the integration of Serbs, without the Serb group having to sacrifice their cultural values for Bosniak values. My informants placed a high value on living together with the diverse ethnic groups of Bosnia, not just the Serbs. With this it is meant that social contact, social activities and social attitudes are not to be based on the ethnic background of social actors. Still, there are sometimes situations for my informants where the events from the war influence the ethnic relations in a negative way. The below quote from Haris illustrates perfectly how even though he has a tolerant mind-set, he can still feel some kind of ethnic tensions:

> "Yes, there exists some kind of, how can I put it…a restraint, a fear. Every time I find myself alone, which means alone with only Serbs around me, this gives me a very strange feeling. How they, Serbs, are looking at me, as a Muslim." (Interview Haris, July 2012)

Even though the very recent Bosnian war had a strong impact on the lives of my informants, this does not imply that it was this conflict and its ideology that remained the most significant factor to their identity formation. More important are the different ways in which the past is being translated into the present, with the help of memories and storytelling. A clear point in the narratives of Bosniak adolescents was how they valued their upbringing. What their mothers, fathers or grandparents told them about the war was far more significant to them than the factual casualties and cruelties during the conflict. The following quotes from my interviews illustrate exactly what kind of values my informants were taught when growing up:

> "My whole life I have been listening to what was going on during the war. At all of the family meetings and always when I was with my father. It starts off normal, but then after a few minutes the subject shifts to the war. Who betrayed who? Who attacked who? It's always about the war. How was it possible for an ethnic group, not different from the Bosniaks, to attack Sarajevo? Okay, we can count religion as a point of difference, but the culture is almost identical…I have friends who are Catholic, I have friends who are Orthodox, I even knew a few Jewish people. This helped me to accept all of the religions, to see them as one." (Interview Harun, July 2012)

> "I have to respect people, first of all. It should not matter which religion someone has. I am tolerant and I am not a nationalist. During the war, tragic events have occurred and I have lost a lot of people from my family. Yet I do not have an aversion against others. Everyone is first of all human, after this comes the rest." (Interview Naida, August 2012)

The socio-cultural environment of my informants has led them to choose to never follow the footsteps of those parties involved with spreading hatred in the early 1990s. The war is seen as something from the past and a repetition of this should by all means be prevented. The collective trauma of the Bosniaks has not necessarily caused an increased in-group bonding among my informants, as is the case with the chosen trauma theory of Volkan (2001). Rather, the emphasis on bonding with the Serb ethnic group is being stimulated because of this collective trauma. The priority lies

[4] The questions were derived from Ljujic and Dekker (2012

on a peaceful coexistence, where both groups live together as fellow citizens of Bosnia. It even goes a step further, as not merely living together but also including the other in social spaces is found to be of great value. Both groups are dependent on each other in their daily lives and some form of social cohesion is necessary to be able to live a 'normal' post-conflict life. There is no case of denial about what went on during the war, but the war is a subject, which my informants are actively repressing in the present.

4. Dialogical Self Theory

4.1. The Position Repertoire of the Self

The ethnic background of my informants was of such importance during the Bosnian war, that their lives, or their relatives' lives depended on it. Therefore it is interesting to look into the role of ethnicity for adolescents who have lived through an ethnic conflict and who are now living in a peaceful multi-ethnic society. In this section I want to explain how it can be possible for my informants to identify themselves as Bosniak and experience feelings of fear and anxiety towards the Serb ethnic group whilst at the same time advocating the social inclusion of this group and trying to rid ethnic labels. I will do so by introducing Dialogical Self Theory (DST) and connecting it to the narratives of Bosniak adolescents. The core of DST consists of the implication that there is a variety of different I-positions within the self of every human being and moreover, that these positions are in dialogue with one another (Hermans, 2002a, p. 147). One can understand the diversity of I-positions from the fact that humans do not merely identify themselves with cohesive characteristics. This implies the existence of contradicting identifications within the spectrum of I-positions.

According to DST, during certain moments in a person's life, specific I-positions have the dominant voice within the self. This implies the existence of power relations between the positions, whereby every position is expressing one perspective (Hermans, 2002b, p. 25). Due to this, it becomes possible to place someone's actions within some kind of dominant sketch of character. For example, think of a person who has dominant positions such as being independent, introvert and passive, despite the simultaneous presence of a dependent, extravert and active I-position. Note that it is always possible for a dominant position to weaken, which creates the opportunity for another position from the repertoire to become dominant. This phenomenon is what Hermans (2002b, p. 5) describes as dominance reversal. Now that I have briefly set out the core of the dialogical self from a more psychological perspective, I wish to elaborate on the influences of culture(s) on the position repertoire of the self. The dialogical self is not merely interrelated to the individual, but is also a 'culture-inclusive' concept. Every individual is placed within a specific cultural context and it is this culture that is situated within the self, whilst at the same time transcending this individual self (Hermans, 2002b, p. 25). For a great deal, cultures strongly influence the content as well as the organization of the self, by manifesting in it in the form of collective positions, which are the result of historical processes. Cultures are therefore not 'things', but in fact, processes that color the individual self. This does not imply that only the culture to which a person belongs is part of their position repertoire; other potentially conflicting cultures are part of the self as well (Hermans, 2002b, p. 26).

As I have described in my introduction, we are living in an increasingly globalizing world where different cultural processes are crossing and as a result these junctions are becoming more interesting for current and future research within the social sciences (Hermans, 2002b, p. 26). Due to the culture inclusive aspect of the self, globalization has a noteworthy influence on the complexity of the self (Hermans, 2002a, p. 148). This makes it scientifically necessary to look into the development of (changing) dominant collective positions in contexts where diverse cultures cross each other. As my informants are in this exact position, I shall continue with the further elaboration of the multicultural position repertoire of my informants' selves in order to fully understand their shared dilemmas and ambiguities.

4.2. Multiple Multicultural Identifications

One of the important cultural identifications within the position repertoire of my informants which I have come across is that of being a member of the Bosniak community and identifying oneself with an Islamic ethnic group. The other relevant I-position is that of being a citizen of Bosnia, which at first does not necessarily have to be in contradiction with the other position. When one however takes into consideration the complex history of the country and especially of the Bosniak group, the possible friction between the two identifications becomes clearer. On one hand my informants identify with a position which is based on the differences between ethnic groups and on the other, there is an identification which emphasizes a unity with the other ethnic group and which strives to transcend ethnic labels. The following quote from Harun illustrates his Bosniak identification whilst together stressing a 'sameness':

> "Even though I might have an Islamic name, I pretty much have the same habits as a Serb, including all of the things that are forbidden within Islam. For instance, drinking (alcohol) and eating pork meat. Besides, our closest family friend is also a Serb." (Interview Harun, July 2012)

Rather early in my fieldwork, it became clear to me that my informants view their Bosniak identification as part of who they are, whilst rejecting it on certain levels. They believe that people who put too big of an emphasis on differentiation based on ethnicity are somehow linked to the ideology behind the Bosnian war. As my informants reject this nationalist ideology and perceive it to be part of the past, identifying oneself too much with being specifically Bosniak can contradict the values they strongly believe in. The following part from Selma's narrative shows how the desire to de-emphasize ethnic labels is directly linked to the ethnic conflict in the early 1990s:

> "Tolerance towards everyone, that is what I have learnt from my family. I do not categorize people, especially after the war when the divisions were really large. I do not categorize people based on their religion or nation, merely on being good or bad people…I do not wish for a multicultural society, but for an intercultural society. This implies to not only tolerate the other, but also to acknowledge the other and actually interact with them, in a positive way of course." (Interview Selma, July 2012)

I conclude that the Bosniak fight for recognition and its belonging, Bosniak identification has had to make room for a more national, cultural position, which I think is an example of the earlier mentioned notion of dominance reversal. This identification can also be explained by the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) which argues that members' group boundaries perceptions of 'we' and 'them' can be transformed to a more inclusive 'us' (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). The dominance reversal which I have elaborated on, indicates a new perception on intergroup boundaries and according to the CIIM, this enables intergroup conflict to shift towards establishing more harmonious intergroup relations (Gaertner et al., 1993, p. 2). This recategorization, together with the reduction of bias, can ultimately contribute to a common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1993, p. 3). By no means does this imply the dissapearance of the two ethnic groups, but rather, a new group structure is created which includes former 'outgroup' members and leads to positive attitudes (Gaertner et al., 1993, p. 6). The stories of my informants have shown how this can result in a distinct feeling of sameness, even pointing out that there is not that much difference between Bosniaks and Serbs.

5. Conclusions

In the introduction I raised the question: How has the collective trauma of the Bosniak ethnic group influenced the identity formation of adolescents as well as their ethno-religious relations with people from the Serb ethnic group? Both groups are dependent of one another in their daily lives and the presence of any form of cohesion is essential for a 'normal' life with the former enemy. This has caused the development of strategic repression and strategic chosen amnesia (Buckley-Zistel, 2006) in order to enable individuals and nations to live on together. Anthropologist Anders H. Stefansson (2010) describes how peaceful coexistence in post-conflict Bosnia has been made possible. The most important aspect that he raises is the way people deal with the past in everyday life. By silencing sensitive themes related to the war, particularly moral and political issues, a shared everyday life with the ethnic other is made possible. This matches the concept of repression, as well as my ethnographic findings. He concludes that there is a willingness to share a social space with the enemy from the past, which my informants confirm (Stefansson, 2010, p. 62). Marita Eastmond (2010) has also researched everyday life in post-conflict Bosnia. She highlights a different aspect of the coexistence. It is indeed much easier to live together with neighbors and colleagues who are not your enemy. People do have the need for a 'normal life' after such insecure times of conflict. The first and foremost needs are related to material and social security (Eastmond, 2010, p. 11). The reconciliation with the other ethnic group, the former enemy, is not the top priority according to Eastmond. As Bosniaks are busy with rebuilding their lives, she thinks that there is no room for qualitative relations with Serbs. Eastmond concludes that there is a large difference between living together in peace and having actually forgiven what has happened during the war (Eastmond, 2010, p. 12).

This is an interesting point of discussion, as I think it is rather difficult to conclude that the coexistence between Bosniaks and Serbs is merely an everyday necessity. As my informants have illustrated with their narratives, this 'living together' is integrated into their personal and cultural value system. This cannot only be described as a social cohesive society, rather, my informants are socially including this other ethnic group to a shared identification of both being citizens of Bosnia, and also propagating the idea of a collective innocence. I think the narratives of my informants thus indicate a certain degree of forgiveness and therefore, a more 'thick' understanding of reconciliation as well, which is interesting because as in the Bosnian case, specifically, analysts have taken a more pragmatic stance on the debate of reconciliation (Eastmond, 2010, p. 5). Related to the raised point of discussion, I would once again like to stress the importance of a person's age and the socio-cultural environment they grew up in on their attitudes towards the ethnic other. I think my findings are restricted to the life stories of young, educated people growing up in the multi-ethnic capital of Bosnia, and coming into contact with different ethnic groups on a daily basis. This implicates the boundaries of my research and makes these findings less applica-

ble to, for example, elderly Bosniaks living in a smaller village which is inhabited mainly by other Bosniaks.

In addition to repressed memories and chosen amnesia, I think that another explanation for this forgiveness can be found within my research group in the way my informants put the emphasis on themselves as 'human' instead of categorizing on the basis of ethnic boundaries. I am referring to the quotes of my informants which I presented under the section *The Aftermath of War*. Naida for instance stated, "Everyone is first of all human, after this comes the rest." The findings of the empirical study of Wohl and Branscombe (2005) on intergroup forgiveness show how members of the victim group (Jewish participants) were willing to forgive the perpetrator group and assign them less guilt when the victim group was induced to think of themselves as 'human' as opposed to the less inclusive category of 'Jew' (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008, p. 353). Furthermore, this study found that higher levels of forgiveness were also related to reduced social distance, which made it more realistic for my informants because they live in Sarajevo, where you find a mixture of several ethnic groups and religions.

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